Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority RadicalizationAuthor(s): Erin K. Jenne, Stephen M. Saideman and Will LoweSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 5 (Sep., 2007), pp. 539-558Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640565 .
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? 2007 Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 5, 2007, pp. 539-558 Sage Publications (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) http://jpr.sagepub.com DOI 10.1177/0022343307080853
Separatism as a Bargaining Posture:
The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization*
ERIN K. JENNE
Department of International Relations and European Studies, Central
European University
STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN
Department of Political Science, McGill University
WILL LOWE
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham
Why do some minorities seek affirmative action while others pursue territorial autonomy or secession,
given similar conditions at the substate level? This article attempts to unpack the puzzle of minority radicalization, focusing on group claim-making as an important dynamic that has been overlooked by
much of the recent quantitative literature on ethnic conflict. To address this gap, the authors introduce a new claims' variable, which codes the demands made by groups in the Minorities at Risk dataset for
three five-year periods from 1985 to 2000. The authors examine the relationship between minority
claim-making and rebellion and conclude that they are similar but distinct forms of group mobilization.
Groups use claims as a means of bargaining with the center; relative power, therefore, has a critical influ ence on the extremity of demands that groups advance against the government. The authors test this
model against alternative arguments using ordinal logit analysis and find that factors related to strate
gic power -
including a history of autonomy, outside military support, and territorial concentration -
are all positively correlated with a group's propensity to advance more extreme demands. This study shows that minorities with greater power vis-?-vis the center are more likely to both rebel and mobilize
around separatist demands. However, minority rebellion ? unlike separatist claims ? may also be
triggered by group deprivation, indicating that violent resistance may be driven by grievances as well as
opportunities.
Introduction
Why do some aggrieved minorities advance radical demands, while others pursue mod
erate goals or none at all? Minority-state
* The dataset is available at http://www.prois-polisci.mcgill. ca/saideman/sepbarjpr.zip and http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. Please direct email correspondence to Stephen Saideman
([email protected]) or Erin Jenne ([email protected]).
conflicts over claims of secession are now
among the most common and intractable
forms of organized violence in todays world
(Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005; Fearon,
2004). Given the apparent association
between minority claims and violent rebel
lion, it may be useful to identify the condi tions that predispose minorities to abandon
peaceful stances in favor of separatism. This
539
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540 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 51 September 2007
article presents several explanations of
minority claim-making and tests these
against the theory that minority demands are a function of bargaining leverage against the center.
There is by now an impressive literature on
the causes of minority rebellion and ethnic
conflict, including a number of studies that utilize the Minorities at Risk dataset to iden
tify factors that predispose minorities to sepa ratism or rebellion (Saideman & Ayres, 2000; Toft, 2003; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The
present article builds on these studies by intro
ducing a bargaining theory of group demands as well as a new
conceptualization of radical
ization that captures the degree of minority challenge
over institutions of the state. Rather
than merely identifying the conditions under which the threshold of secessionism or civil war is breached, the claims' variable permits an exploration of gradations of minority mobilization. This variable is coded as the
extremity of separatist demands advanced
against the center - ranging from no claims to
cultural or language rights to territorial auton
omy to secessionism/ irredentism. The
authors then conduct ordinal logit analysis on
the claims variable to test competing expla nations of minority mobilization. The results
of this investigation generally disconfirm eco
nomic and grievance-based explanations of
claim-making, while lending support to con
structivist and bargaining accounts.
The article proceeds as follows. The next
section introduces the claims variable and
justifies its usefulness in the study of minor
ity?majority relations. We then present five
theories of minority radicalization, each of
which yields testable hypotheses concerning the causes of minority claim-making. The
article proceeds to describe the data and
research design used to test these competing
hypotheses and then presents the results of
these analyses. The final section outlines
general conclusions as well as policy implications
for managing minority?state conflicts.
Minority Claims: Variation over
Time and Space
Ethnic groups can be seen to rally around a
wide range of goals. Some seek relatively modest concessions, such as street signs in
their native language, while others demand
political independence. To complicate matters, most groups vary their stated agen
das from one point to the next. Much of the
scholarly work on group mobilization focuses on
explaining secession and/or organized
insurgency, effectively ignoring these vari
ations. Studies that focus on only one state of
the dependent variable (secession or civil war)
produce indeterminate explanations of
minority radicalization. This is because many
predictors' of extremism are also present
during periods of relative moderation. This
problem is avoided by employing a more
finely graded measure of minority radicaliza tion. This measure permits us to identify the
factors that are systematically correlated
with such variation, allowing for more rigor
ous tests of theories of group mobilization.
For this study, the authors have developed a scaled indicator of minority radicalization
against the center. As a proxy for minority rad
icalization, this claims' variable has advantages over both (1) a secession variable - which
simply captures whether or not a minority seeks independence, and (2) the much-used
minority rebellion index ? which measures the
degree of organized violence by the group. These variables are appropriate for examining the causes of minority secessionism and vio
lence, respectively. When exploring the degree of political mobilization against the state, however, a ranked measure of group goals is to
be preferred.1 As a more comprehensive
measure of
minority radicalization, the claims variable is
1 While the rebellion index does constitute a graded proxy of
minority challenge, it is a measure of group violence only and thus excludes peaceful minority radicalization such as
Quebec separatism. It is also unclear the extent to which such violence constitutes a direct challenge to the state center.
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Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism as Bargaining Posture 541
also (unsurprisingly) correlated with the minority rebellion index. Although the correlation is
weak (.188), it is significant, indicating that extreme claims, such as secession or even
territorial autonomy, are more likely to be
accompanied by violence than are moderate
demands. This is because demands for terri torial autonomy or secession constitute more
direct challenges to the majority's control
over the state. Such declarations may provoke a
reaction on the part of the central government,
which can, in turn, trigger a violent uprising
on
the part of the minority. Given the link between extreme claims and guerilla attacks or even civil
war, it would be useful to identify the conditions under which groups are likely to pursue moder
ate goals rather than separatism.
Ethnic Bargaining vs. Alternative
Explanations
This section seeks to account for different
degrees of minority challenge. The authors first
present the theory of ethnic bargaining and then consider a series of alternative arguments.
Ethnic Bargaining Ethnic bargaining holds that minority radi calization is driven by negotiations between the minority and the center over institutions
of the state (Jenne, 2007, 2004; Cetinyan, 2002). Demands against the center serve as a
bargaining tool for extracting concessions
such as net transfer payments or power
sharing agreements. If the minority believes
it enjoys significant strategic leverage against the center such that ? if challenged
? it can
withstand an organized military attack, it is more likely to advance extreme demands,
such as secession, as a means of obtaining
greater concessions from the state. Strategic rather than economic sources of power are
critical in this respect, for economic advan
tages alone cannot protect a group from vio
lations by the state. Examples include the
economically advantaged, but politically
vulnerable, Europeans in Namibia, Cote
dTvoire, and Zimbabwe, and the Chinese in
Malaysia and Singapore. Because strategically powerful minorities
can credibly threaten secession, they are more
likely to mobilize around extreme demands than are weak minorities. Enhanced minority
leverage is thus linked with more extreme claims against the center, while diminished
leverage is associated with relatively moderate
claims. If a minority already has an institu
tional position that reflects its relative power vis-?-vis the center, it is unlikely to radicalize
its demands.2 However, if the group perceives that it enjoys greater leverage (due to increased
support from external patrons or a weakened
central government), its leaders may make
more extreme demands in an effort to extract
greater concessions from the center. If, on the
other hand, the group has little prospect of external assistance, its leaders are likely to
make mild claims or none at all. Ethnic bar
gaining thus explains variation in group
behavior as a function of strategic leverage
against the center. The sources of strategic
power may be internal or external.
Internal Sources of Power It is reasonable to
assume that the upper bounds of the demands a minority will make are determined by its internal traits (particularly territorial compact
ness), which serve as base indicators of minor
ity strength. Since these traits are observable to
all players, internally weak minorities are
unlikely to use separatist demands to extract
concessions from the center, because such
demands would not be seen as credible.3
Indeed, secessionist challenges are usually
credible only for territorially compact groups,
2 The authors are grateful to an anonymous reader for
raising this point. 3 The authors originally hypothesized that relative group size is associated with extreme claims as it confers strategic benefits upon the group. However, this analysis reveals that size is correlated with neither rebellion nor claims. Even
when interacted with group concentration, group size does not seem to influence minority radicalization.
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542 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 441 number 51 September 2007
since the political, social, and economic self
sufficiency necessary for statehood requires a
certain degree of territorial concentration.
Second, as Toft has pointed out, territorially concentrated groups justify their claims for
independence partly on the basis of ethnic
homogeneity within a particular region.4
Groups that lack a clear regional majority are
unlikely to seek independence, as they would not be able to establish legitimate ownership of their territory.5 Third, geographical con
centration constitutes an important strategic
advantage in mounting and defending a sep
aratist position through force. The territori
ally compact Chechen minority in Russia, for example, succeeded in inflicting serious
casualties on much larger government forces
in the 1990s (Toft, 2003: 78-79). The minor
ity's ability to challenge the center militarily renders its secessionist threats all the more cred
ible. This logic yields the following hypothesis:
HI: All else being equal, territorially compact minorities are more likely to advance
extreme demands against the central
government.
External Sources of Power External sources
of minority power include (1) outside states,6
organizations, or interest groups that provide
military or political support to the minority; and (2) external national homelands that threaten to intervene on behalf of the minor
ity against the center. All else being equal, minorities with outside patronage should be more likely than those without to advance
4 According to Toft, groups concentrated within a 'minor
ity region are more likely to view the territory as their homeland and, therefore, non-negotiable or 'indivisible' in the event of conflict with the center. If the center or major ity also deems this region indivisible from the state, then violent conflict is likely to ensue (Toft, 2003: ch. 2). 5 The secessionist Abkhazis in Georgia are a minority in their own region, making them an exception to this rule.
However, Russian support for the minority (and Georgia's relative weakness) more than compensate for this strategic disadvantage. 6 Saideman (2001) considers several explanations for why external actors might support secessionist movements.
extreme claims against the center.7 Moreover,
their demands should fluctuate in intensity over time in response to shifts in support
from their external patrons.8 For example, Tamil separatism gathered momentum in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s after having received
military aid from Tamil expatriates as well as assistance from their co-ethnics in the Indian
state ofTamil Nadu Qenne, 2003: 228-229). This leads to the following prediction:
H2: All else being equal, minorities with external sources of power are more likely to advance
separatist demands against the center.
Four alternative theories of minority mobilization are given below:
Institutionalist Arguments Institutionalist theories of group claims hold that autonomous structures ?
including local
government, veto power, and tax authority -
lead ethnic groups to make extreme demands
for independence. In this view, national insti
tutions serve to construct' or create nations
around which separatist movements can
gather momentum based on the perceived
right to national self-determination. It
follows that the possession of autonomous
structures, even if only on paper, inclines
minorities to separatism. Such theories were ascendant in the early
1990s, when the multi-ethnic states of the
7 One might reasonably ask why, if extreme demands are used to obtain concessions such as power-sharing or transfer
payments, groups do not simply negotiate for these benefits
directly. This critique overlooks the mobilizing power of nationalism in the modern era. Given the salience of minor
ity rights and national self-determination in today's world, group claims have assumed unprecedented global legitimacy. Collective rights are something that ethnic groups can mobi lize around, outside patrons can support, and central govern
ments are increasingly obliged to take seriously under the watchful eye of the international community. 8
Although perceptions of leverage are the actual drivers of
claim-making, it was not possible to measure group per ceptions directly in the context of this analysis. The authors therefore used objective measures of relative group leverage (e.g. external military support or the collapse of state
power) as a rough proxy of minority perceptions.
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Erin K. fenne et al. SEPARATISM AS Bargaining POSTURE 543
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia fractured along ethno-federal lines. National
symbols - installed by Soviet leaders to
appease the constituent Soviet nations' prior to
assimilating them into a homogenous
Soviet society -
paradoxically reinforced, and
in some cases created, national identities
around which groups rallied for independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Suny, 1994; Slezkine, 1994; Bunce, 1999; Roeder, 1991; Gurr, 1993: 76-82). Suny (1994) argues that national institutions need not have functional
utility to produce this effect. The former Soviet republics provide a striking illustration of this phenomenon. Although
most of these struc
tures had no functional value under centralized
Kremlin rule, Suny demonstrates that the insti
tutions generated salient republican identities around which groups mobilized for indepen dence once the Soviet center
began to implode.9
Brueilly (1994) advances a similar explana tion for the same set of cases. While agreeing that the quasi-state structures of the Soviet
Republics played an important role in the
collapse of the Soviet empire, he argues that this was primarily due to their rent-seeking
potential rather than their symbolic value.
Self-interested national elites ? anticipating
the collapse of centralized Soviet control ?
engineered popular independence movements
to capture valued republican institutions
such as local tax authorities and legisla tures.10 The two arguments are not mutually
contradictory. In fact, they actually comple ment one another by providing
an institu
tionalist account for elite as well as mass
participation in collective autonomy move
ments. The logic of this approach yields the
following hypothesis:
H3: All else being equal, minorities with a
legacy of political autonomy are more
likely to mobilize around more extreme
demands against the center.
9 See also Anderson (1991: ch. 8). 10 For a more recent formulation, see Cornell (2002).
Political Economy Arguments Economic theories of separatism broadly hold that campaigns for autonomy are the outcome
of economic differentials between the minor
ity region and the state as a whole. There are
two distinct and seemingly contradictory schools of thought
on minority separatism. One is that economically advanced groups or
regions advance demands for autonomy to
avoid subsidizing poorer regions of the state;
examples include Slovenia, in former Yugoslavia, and the Katanga region, in the Congo (Horowitz, 1985: 243-244).n
A contrasting set of arguments holds that
?feadvantaged groups will seek autonomy from the center, owing to their inability to
compete with the dominant group over jobs and other state resources (Horowitz, 1985:
236-237). This may seem counter-intuitive,
since poor regions stand to lose net subsidies
with political independence. To account for
this, Hechter (1975) and Gellner (1983: chs
6, 7) argue that 'backward' region national
ism emerges as a response to exploitation by the center in conjunction with barriers of
access to economic, cultural, or social insti
tutions - Bangladesh
serves as an exemplar.
Independence thus becomes an attractive
alternative to systematic exploitation and mar
ginalization by the dominant ethnic group. Such arguments need not be mutually con
tradictory. Backward and advanced autonomy movements may exist simultaneously. Indeed,
Horowitz (1985, ch. 6) argues for the coexis tence of both types of movements. In order to
test for all possibilities, the authors have con
structed the following hypothesis:
H4: The greater the economic differentials between the minority (or region) and the state, the more likely the minority is
to mobilize around demands for auton
omy or secession.
11 See also Gourevitch (1979: 303-323). For a discussion of advanced region secessionism in post-1991 Russia, see Treisman (1997: 212-249).
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544 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 51September 2007
Ethnie Fears Arguments The ethnie security dilemma holds that ethnic
groups mobilize in response to the internal
security dilemma brought about by state col
lapse (Posen, 1993: 27-47). Posen argues that the breakdown of multi-ethnic states
creates a security dilemma by reproducing international anarchy on the substate level.
When the central government implodes, indi viduals mobilize around the default political category of ethnicity to ensure their survival.
Particularly where ethnic populations are
intermingled, each group has a significant first-strike advantage. This creates incentives
for both groups to strike pre-emptively, increas
ing the likelihood of ethnic war. Groups may also pursue autonomy or secession as a means
of protecting against ethnic attacks. The
problem with this as an explanation of sepa
ratism is that state governments rarely implode or cease to exist; this theory therefore applies to
very few cases.12 More commonly, ethnic fears
are driven by uncertainty over the new govern ment's intentions toward the minority.13
Credible commitment theories of minority mobilization build on this logic. Here, a minor
ity pursues autonomy or secession when the
center cannot credibly promise the minority as
much as it can expect to gain from fighting for
independence (Fearon, 1998; Weingast, 1998; de Figueiredo & Weingast, 1999). These argu ments
largely rest on the assumption ?12& fears
of victimization drive minority mobilization.
Crucially, the majority is least able to commit to minority protection when the state's political institutions are in flux. Thus:
H5: All else being equal, minorities are more likely to mobilize for autonomy or secession in the
wake of state transition or regime change.
12 Saideman (1998) expands the ethnic security dilemma
beyond Posen's focus on military variables, so that intragroup elite competition interacts with intergroup competition to create insecurity in some situations and stability in others. 13 For a critique of the ethnic security dilemma, see
David (1997).
Grievance Explanations Grievance theories of minority radicalization
hold that groups are more likely to mobilize
against the center when they harbor signifi cant resentment toward the dominant group or central government owing to economic
disparities or political exclusion (Gurr, 1970, 2000). The logic follows that people tend to mobilize around salient political cleavages in
response to perceptions of collective discrimi
nation. Grievances due to economic differ
ences are implied in the economic differences
hypothesis. This hypothesis tests for the effect of grievances due to
political exclusion.14
H6: All else being equal, minorities are more
likely to mobilize around extreme demands when they are subjected to
high levels of political discrimination.
Research Design and Claims Variable
The authors use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset to test these competing hypotheses.15 The MAR dataset includes information on 284 minority groups around the world from 1945 to 2003.16 It includes all minorities that are
politically relevant - whether because of
previous mobilization or negative
or positive
14 The authors tested for the impact of ethnic (linguistic, cultural, regional, and religious) differences between the
minority and the majority on group claims and found no
consistently significant relationships. 15 This project, initiated by Gurr and his associates, is
perhaps the most widely used dataset in quantitative studies on ethnic conflict. The full dataset and manual may be downloaded from the website, http://www.cidcm.umd. edu/inscr/mar/data.asp. Published versions of the dataset can be found in Gurr (1993, 2000). The version used in this analysis, together with the new claims variable, is
posted on the JPR website. 16 The MAR dataset includes information on ethno-politi cal groups with a population of at least 100,000 (or 1% of the country's population) and that reside in a country with a population of at least 500,000. The group also had to
satisfy at least one of the two criteria established for being 'politically significant': (1) the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-?-vis other groups in a society, and (2) the group is the basis for
political mobilization and collective action in defense or
promotion of its self-defined interests (Minorities at Risk Phase IV Dataset Users Manual: 5).
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Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism AS Bargaining POSTURE 545
discrimination. The dataset therefore comprises the universe of groups that could plausibly advance collective demands against the center.17
The authors conduct ordinal logit analysis on these data to determine which argument(s) best
predicts the extremity of minority demands.
Claims as the Dependent Variable The claims' variable is coded for three five-year periods from 1985 to 2000, using the existing variables in the MAR dataset, as well as infor mation gathered from the MAR project files for each minority. This variable is designed to
capture gradations of minority challenge against the center. It is coded as follows:
Dependent variable: Claims
4 = group seeks secession or irredentism
3 = group seeks regional/territorial autonomy 2 = group seeks cultural or
linguistic autonomy 1 = group seeks affirmative action or protec
tion from discrimination 0 = no salient claims
In the context of ethnic bargaining, group claims serve primarily as an indicator of state chal
lenge and may be ordered along a continuum from affirmative action to secession or irre
dentism.18 When a group abandons calls for
17 This dataset has been criticized for having selection bias. The problem is most severe when using the data to deter mine why groups become mobilized in the first place, as unmobilized groups have been left out of the dataset. For studies such as the present one that ask why already-mobil izedgroups increase their demands or engage in acts of vio lence, this bias is less relevant. 18 There is strong empirical support for placing group claims on a continuum. In the course of politicking, minority leaders routinely shift their demands up and down this spec trum to indicate relative radicalization or moderation,
respectively. Secession (establishing sovereignty over a piece of state territory) and irredentism (annexation of a piece of state territory by another state) represent the most extreme
demands, as they challenge the integrity of the state itself. Demands for regional autonomy are less extreme, since they call for devolution of state power to minority regions', while
leaving state borders unchallenged. Claims of cultural ot lin
guistic autonomy are more moderate still, since they call for
power-sharing in the spheres of culture and education, while
leaving unchallenged majority control over the state's
politico-territorial institutions. Claims of affirmative action are the least extreme, since they call for greater integration into the majority-controlled state (Jenne, 2007).
regional autonomy in favor of demands for
language rights, it signifies that it has de radicalized its challenge against the state. If,
instead, xhe minority moves from calls for
regional autonomy to secessionism or irreden
tism, it has intensified its challenge. Recognizing that group demands rarely enjoy universal
support within the minority rank and file, group demands are coded as the claims of minority leaders who (1) enjoy a plurality of support among members of the minority as indicated by the most recent election results or
opinion polls, or (2) are recognized by both the minority rank and file and the center as the de facto represen tatives of the minority (i.e. those with whom the central government must negotiate to reach a
genuine settlement with the minority). Although this proxy cannot be taken to represent the claims
or preferences of ?# members of the minority, it does capture the claims that enjoy the greatest
popular support vvdthin the group. To test whether
nonviolent and violent mobilization are driven by similar processes, the authors run the same tests on
a second indicator of radicalization: minority rebellion. This variable ranges in intensity from 0 to 7, with a coding schema as follows:
Dependent variable: Rebellion
7 = protracted civil war 6 =
large-scale guerrilla activity 5 = intermediate guerrilla activity 4 = small-scale guerrilla activity 3 = local rebellion 2 =
campaigns of terrorism
1 = political banditry 0 = none reported
Independent Variables To test the ethnic-bargaining prediction that
strong minorities are more likely than weak
minorities to advance extreme demands against the center, proxies for minority strength have
been included in the analyses. The first
hypothesis relates to internal sources of
strength ?
group size and compactness. To
test this hypothesis, the authors have added an
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546 journal of Peace Research volume 44 / number 51 September 2007
indicator for group compactness, groupconP The causal logic is that concentrated groups enjoy greater leverage against the center,
leading them to bargain more aggressively using extreme demands.20 The second bar
gaining hypothesis relates to external sources
of strength. The expectation is that minori
ties whose ethnic kin control a neighboring state (those that have a national homeland,
GC11), or that receive external military
support (ismil), enjoy greater strategic lever
age against the center and are therefore more
likely to make extreme demands.
The institutionalist hypothesis is that minorities with a legacy of political auton
omy are more likely to advance extreme
claims than those without (Hypothesis 3). To test this, the authors include a dummy vari
able, auton, that codes 1 if the group was his
torically autonomous' and 0 otherwise.
Political economy theories hold that eco nomic disparities between the region and center
drive minority separatism (Hypothesis 4). The authors include a proxy for economic differ
ences to test this claim, ecdifioc. This variable is a
seven-category scale of intergroup economic
differences that indexes relative income levels,
land holdings, access to higher education, pres
ence in commerce, and so on. It ranges from -2
for economically advantaged minorities to 4 for
very disadvantaged minorities.21
19 Variable names in italics correspond to variable labels in the MAR dataset unless otherwise indicated. 20 To test the effects of group size, a dummy variable was created for groups that are both large (more than 10% of the state s population) and territorially concentrated (using the highestgroupcon value). This dummy predicted neither the
extremity of group claims nor rebellion. However, when included with the dummy, the group size variable became
significantly inversely related to the dependent variables. This interaction suggests that large, diffuse groups are actu
ally less likely to make claims or engage in violence, perhaps because they are better able to acquire resources through the existing political system. 21 It is possible that the extremity of economic differences
matters more than the direction of differences. To test for this, the ecdifioc variable was recoded into a new variable that takes the absolute value of the original values, thereby capturing the degree of economic differentials between the
minority and majority. This variable was found to be sta
tistically insignificant.
Credible commitment logic leads us to
expect that regime change triggers minority radicalization because it annuls the status quo
deal between the minority and the majority. When this happens, the central government
can no longer credibly commit to protect the
minority's welfare (Hypothesis 5). A dummy variable for state transition was constructed
using the state 'standardized authority codes'
in the Polity IV dataset, which measure whether the state was
undergoing state tran
sition or regime change in any given year. From
these, a composite variable 'transition was
created for each of the three five-year panels ?
coding 1 if the minority's host government underwent either type of political transition
during that time period and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables Control variables have been included in each model to isolate the effect that each indepen dent variable had on minority claims while
holding potentially confounding state-level factors constant. These include country wealth
(measured as GDP per capita) and regime type (measured as degree of democracy).22 The authors expect that minorities are less likely to
advance extreme demands in wealthy countries
because there are higher opportunity costs for
mobilizing against the state.
The minority's decision to pursue sepa ratism may also be affected by its political freedom to do so. To control for this effect, the
authors have included a variable that captures the degree of democracy in each host state.23
Here, the results could go either way. One
possibility is that democratic governance is
positively correlated with minority secession
ism, since democracy provides the political
space for groups to mobilize on a collective
basis. Conversely, low levels of democracy may be correlated with group secessionism, since
22 This variable has been logged in order to normalize its distribution, which is significantly skewed to the right. 23 This variable is derived from Polity III data, available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
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Erin K. fenne et al. SEPARATISM AS BARGAINING POSTURE 547
Table I. Ordinal Logit Analyses, 1985-2000
Dependent variable
Claims Rebellion
Late
1980s Early 1990s
Late
1990s Late
1980s Early 1990s
Late
1990s
Bargaining Concentration
Neighbor kin-state
Intl military
support
Autonomy Institutions
Political Economic
economy differences
Ethnic fears Transition
Grievance
Controls
Political
discrimination
Regime type
Log GDP/cap
Cutl
Cut 2
Cut 3 Cut 4 Cut 5 Cut 6 Cut 7
N
Wald chi2 Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
0.24*
(0.13) -0.25
(0.16)
0.09
(0.48) 0.05
(0.09) -0.23
(0.67) -0.06
(0.11) 0.10***
(0.04) -0.41**
(0.20) -3.36
-2.39
-1.94
-1.28
158 18.51
0.0177
0.0494
0.37***
(0.12) 0.15
(0.16) 0.26**
(0.13) 0.88**
(0.41) 0.20**
(0.08) 0.41
(0.56) 0.09
(0.12) 0.03
(0.03) -0.17
(0.19) -0.69
0.35
1.51
3.08
156 36.86
0.0000
0.0684
0.38***
(0.11) -0.03
(0.14) 0.37***
(0.11) 0.98***
(0.33) 0.14*
(0.07) -1.93**
(0.80) 0.02
(0.10) 0.02
(0.02) 0.02
(0.15) 0.06
0.91
2.16
3.73
192 43.01
0.0000
0.0861
0.59**
(0.20) -0.33
(0.23)
0.69
(0.48) -0.05
(0.10) 2.73***
(0.65) 0.30**
(0.15) 0.04
(0.04) -0.53*
(0.27) -1.92
-1.51
-1.27
-1.17
-0.83
0.04
1.21
156 51.26
0.0000
0.1485
0.32**
(0.16) -0.34
(0.22) 0.47***
(0.11) 0.44
(0.45) -0.01
(0.10) 0.13
(0.48) 0.17
(0.14) -0.01
(0.03) -0.61**
(0.28) -4.07
-3.36
-3.02
-2.56
-1.92
-1.26
-0.57
155 75.12
0.0000
0.1460
0.33**
(0.17) -0.14
(0.21) 0.54***
(0.11) 0.54
(0.37) 0.06
(0.10) 1.41
(0.85) 0.20
(0.13) 0.03
(0.03) -0.59***
(0.22) -2.44
-2.00
-1.79
-1.33
-0.88
-0.28
0.35
191 43.78
0.0000
0.1445
? p <0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p< 0.01, one-tailed.
minorities in repressive states have greater
incentives to seek institutional exit.
Discussion of Results
The authors use ordinal logit to analyze three
separate panels of data ? the most extreme
claims advanced by each of the minorities
from 1986 to 1990, from 1991 to 1995, and
from 1996 to 2000. The independent vari
ables are measured at or near the beginning
of each five-year period in order to minimize
the problem of reverse causality. The findings are reported in Table I. The analyses
were
then re-run using only the significant vari
ables, the results of which are reported in
Table II. To ascertain the substantive impact
of the findings that remain robust across
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548 journal of'Peace Research volume 44 / number 51 September 2007
Table II. Ordinal Logit Analyses 1985-2000, Restricted Models
Dependent variable
Claims Rebellion
Late
1980s Early 1990s
Late
1990s Late
1980s Early 1990s
Late
1990s
Bargaining Concentration
Institutions
Political
Intl military
support
Autonomy
Economic
economy differences
Ethnic fears Transition
Grievance
Controls
0.33***
(0.11)
Political
discrimination
Regime type
Log GDP/cap
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4 Cut 5 Cut 6 Cut 7
N
Wald chi2 Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
0.11***
(0.03) -0.32**
(0.16) -1.95
-0.99
-0.59
-0.11
220 23.83
0.0000
0.0474
0.31***
(0.10) 0.18**
(0.09) 0.89***
(0.30) 0.12**
(0.05)
-0.54
0.49
1.43
2.84
261 32.21
0.0000
0.0401
0.29***
(0.10) 0.31***
(0.10) 1.04***
(0.29) 0.14**
(0.05) -0.82
(0.64)
-0.63
0.34
1.41
2.99
261 39.33
0.0000
0.0590
0.68**
(0.16)
2.77***
(0.61) 0.32***
(0.11)
-0.20
(0.16) 1.64
2.01
2.35
2.42
2.72
3.50
4.36
220 53.03
0.0000
0.1090
0.37**
(0.12) 0.56**
(0.10)
-0.47***
(0.17) -2.30
-1.76
-1.44
-1.04
-0.36
0.22
0.91
224 84.84
0.0000
0.1085
0.38**
(0.14) 0.60***
(0.09)
-0.59***
(0.15) -2.92
-2.52
-2.27
-1.81
-1.43
-0.86
-0.43
275 62.85
0.0000
0.1199
*p < 0. 1; **/>
< 0.05; ***/> < 0.01, one-tailed.
analyses, Tables III and IV present the pre dicted probabilities of radicalization using software created by Long & Freese (2001).24
Table V gives the summary results of these
24 In the tables and graphs, all of the independent variables are set at their minimums (except for transition, which is set at its maximum) to create a baseline representing groups that are least likely to make claims or engage in violence.
The baseline probabilities are 24.4% for no claims, 21.6% for modest claims, 11.2% for limited autonomy, 14.9% for autonomy, and 27.9% for secession or irredentism in the late 1990s panel. A second reason to set the values at their
minimums or maximums (rather than their means) is that nearly all of the variables are either dichotomous or ordinal. Setting a baseline at the variables' mean values would mean
relying on values that do not exist in the dataset.
tests, which are discussed in further detail below. Overall, the authors find support for the theory of bargaining.
Bargaining This analysis indicates that group concentra
tion is a significant predictor of both claims and rebellion in all three time periods.
Territorially concentrated groups are both
more likely to advance extreme claims and
more likely to launch violent uprisings. Table III shows that highly concentrated groups are
nearly 27% more likely to be secessionist or
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Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism as Bargaining Posture 549
Table III. Predicted Probabilities for Claims, Late 1990s
No
claims
Affirmative action,
protection
Linguistic/ cultural
autonomy
Territorial
autonomy
Group concentration
Military
support
Autonomy
Dispersed
Primarily urban or
minority in
one region
Majority in
one region, others dispersed
Concentrated
None
Low
Moderate
Strong
Very strong
No
Yes
0.244
0.181
0.131
0.094
0.244
0.182
0.133
0.096
0.069
0.244
0.108
0.216
0.187
0.154
0.121
0.216
0.188
0.155
0.123
0.094
0.216
0.134
0.112
0.109
0.100
0.085
0.112
0.109
0.100
0.087
0.071
0.112
0.092
0.149
0.161
0.163
0.153
0.149
0.161
0.163
0.154
0.137
0.149
0.158
Secessionism/
irredentism
0.279
0.361
0.452
0.547
0.279
0.359
0.448
0.540
0.629
0.279
0.508
Table III is a based on the logit analysis presented in Table I. All independent variables are set at their minimums, except for transition, which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to least likely to make claims).
Figure 1. The Impact of Group Concentration on the Probability of Claims, Late 1990s
0.60
0.50
? 0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00 1 2
Group Concentration
None Auton Sec/I rr
Figure 1 is based on the logit analysis presented in Table 1. All independent variables are set at their mini
mums, except for transition which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to least likely to make claims).
irredentist than are dispersed groups. Figure 1
shows that the likelihood of making no claims
drops with increased territorial concentration.
As can be seen in Table IV, group concen
tration is also a strong predictor of violent rebel
lion. Highly concentrated groups are more than
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Ut o <2> > O m w W > n N
Table IV. Predicted Probability of Rebellion, Late 1990s
None
Political banditry
Campaigns of terrorism
Local rebellion
Small-scale guerilla
activity
Intermediate guerilla
activity
Large-scale
guerilla Protracted
activity civil war
Concentration
External military support GDP/cap
Dispersed Primarily urban or minority in one region Majority in one region,
others dispersed
Concentrated
None Modest
Moderate Strong
Very Strong
Min.
Mean
Max.
0.408 0.330
0.261 0.202
0.408
0.286
0.189
0.119
0.073 0.345 0.693 0.867
0.108
0.103 0.092
0.079
0.108 0.097
0.076
0.054
0.035 0.125 0.099
0.049
0.051 0.051 0.048 0.043 0.051 0.050 0.042 0.031
0.021
0.080 0.048
0.021
0.109
0.115
0.115
0.109
0.109 0.116 0.107
0.086 0.062
0.091 0.045 0.019
0.089
0.100 0.108
0.110 0.089
0.106
0.110 0.099
0.078
0.088
0.036 0.014
0.091
0.110 0.128 0.142 0.091 0.122 0.144
0.149
0.133
0.156 0.050
0.019
0.062
0.079 0.099 0.119 0.062 0.091
0.124
0.149 0.157 0.060 0.016
0.006
0.082 0.111 0.148 0.196 0.082 0.133
0.209 0.313 0.440
0.055
0.013
0.005
Table IV is based on the logit analysis presented in Table II. All independent variables are set at their minimums, except for transition, which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to
least likely to engage in violence).
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Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism as Bargaining Posture 551
Figure 2. The Impact of External Military Support on Claims, Late 1990s
0.70 -
1 3
External Military Support
None Auton Sec/I rr
Figure 2 is based on the logit analysis presented in Table 1. All independent variables are set at their
minimums, except for transition, which is set at its maximum (the baseline is set to least likely to make claims).
Table V. Summary Findings
Theory Prediction Evidence
Ethnic bargaining
Institutionalist arguments
Political-economy arguments
Ethnic-fears theories
Group grievances
Concentration -> extreme claims
External leverage -^ extreme
claims
Autonomy -> claims
Economic differentials -^ claims
Regime change, transition -> claims
Discrimination -^ claims
Significant and sizable impact in
the predicted direction on both
claims and rebellion
Supported by analyses
Positive association with claims
but not rebellion
Relatively poor regions are more
likely to advance separatist demands, but only in the 1990s;
regional disparities have no effect
on violent rebellion
No relationship with claims;
transition does predict violent
rebellion, but only for the
late 1980s
No relationship with claims; does
positively influence violent
rebellion, but only in the
late 1980s
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552 journal of Peace RESEARCH volume 44 / number 51 September 2007
23% more likely to engage in the most severe
forms of violence (small-scale guerilla activity or
more) than are dispersed groups. This is con
sistent with Toft (2003) and others. Minorities that enjoy external support are
also more likely to radicalize their demands than those that do not. Indeed, groups with
the strongest levels of assistance are more than
twice as likely to pursue secession or irreden
tism as those that have no external support.
Figure 2 shows this relationship quite clearly. The strong association between external
military support and radicalization should not be surprising,
as minorities are unlikely to challenge their governments without sig nificant external backing. Having ethnic kin in control of a
neighboring state, however, is
not a significant predictor of group claims for
any of the three periods, indicating that the mere presence of an external national home
land does not confer bargaining advantages
upon the minority in question.25 At the same
time, the presence of a kin state also does not
appear to dampen minority rebellion in any of the three periods. These results would seem to contradict Van Houtens (1998) claim that the presence of a kin state serves
as a credible guarantee of minority protec
tion, effectively deterring majority aggression and thereby diminishing the minority's incentives to rebel. Van Houten qualifies this
argument, however, by noting that the kin
state promotes ethnic accommodation only when it sends ambiguous signals of support to the minority, generating the requisite
uncer
tainty on both sides to induce a compromise solu
tion. In contrast, an interventionist homeland
state can be expected to exacerbate a minor
ity?state conflict. These expectations are
consistent with those of ethnic bargaining in that what matters is not so much the poten
25 Collier & Hoeffler (2004: 575-576) investigate the causes of civil conflict around the world using the Polity III data and find that, although the presence of a large kin
group over the border does not appreciably increase the risk of an initial civil conflict, it does increase the probability of a repeated conflict in the said state.
Hal, but rather the actual partisan support for the minority.
Altogether, the bargaining variables perform far better than the other variables in accounting for both claim-making and violent rebellion
against the state. This suggests that the logic of
minority claim-making is not dissimilar to that of minority rebellion - both are processes of
minority radicalization, which has a powerful strategic component.
Institutionalist Findings Table I shows that a history of minority autonomy has a significant impact on sepa
ratism in the 1990s.26 Groups with the
experience of autonomy are almost 24%
more likely to pursue secession or reunion
with a kin state. This lends some confirma tion to the institutionalist argument that
autonomous structures construct' a state
like identity that can form the basis for an
independence movement when opportunities for claim-making emerge. It should be noted that this finding is also consistent with the
bargaining explanation of group demands, in that institutions confer significant mobiliza
tional (and therefore strategic) advantages upon groups, making them more likely to use extreme demands to extract concessions
from the center. However, this factor appears to have had no impact on claim-making in the 1980s - with or without controlling for the former communist bloc. A possible explanation for this is that the breakup of ethno-federations at the end of the Cold War lent greater legitimacy to collective rights, encouraging minorities with autonomous
status to use their status to bargain with the
center in the post-Cold War period. The fact that the mean extremity of group claims in
the 1990s is fully twice that of the 1980s pro vides support for this contention.
26 This result holds even when a dummy variable is included to control for residing in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union.
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Erin K. Jenne et al. Separatism AS Bargaining POSTURE 553
Interestingly, autonomy is not a significant
predictor of minority rebellion. This may be because the use of violence is governed,
at least
in part, by a logic other than bargaining. In this respect, it is important to remember that
engaging in violence is very costly from an
individual standpoint. Given its considerable
costs, it may require something greater than
expected rewards to motivate people to par
ticipate in collective rebellion. To summarize,
a history of autonomy seems to encourage more assertive claims in the direction of sepa
ration from the center. However, it has at most
an indeterminate effect on the likelihood of violent rebellion.
Political Economy Findings These tests show that economic differences
between the minority and the majority are
significant predictors of separatist claims
throughout the 1990s, but insignificant pre dictors of violence in all three periods. This indicates that regional disparities
are associ
ated with separatism but not violence.
Groups that are relatively worse off than the
majority appear, at least in the 1990s, to have used separatist claims to negotiate with the
center over a greater share of state resources.
The fact that this effect does not hold for the late 1980s may mean that the greater legiti
macy of collective demands after the Cold War encouraged disadvantaged groups to use
separatist claims to negotiate a better deal
with the center. However, economic dispari ties do not appear to have predisposed groups to engage in violence, possibly because rela
tively impoverished groups are in a poor
position to challenge their more advanced
state centers through force.
Ethnic Fears
Contrary to ethnic-fears expectations, Table
I shows that state/regime transition actually had an inhibiting effect on minority sepa ratism, but only in the late 1990s. Changing institutions ought to have increased fears
about government performance. Instead,
political change in the late 1990s was associ ated with weaker claims. Possible expla nations are that institutional change during this time either satisfied groups or under
mined their leverage against the center. The
available data cannot help us distinguish between these two
plausible accounts; case
studies are needed to sort out the causal
mechanism at work.
There is also no consistent relationship between regime change and violence.
Political transition is significantly and posi tively correlated with violent minority rebel
lion, but only in the late 1980s. This pattern holds even when controlling for the post-com munist cases. When substituting
a democra
tization variable for regime change, this too
is found to be insignificant, indicating that the direction of regime change is not driving this effect. Because the transition indicator is
somewhat blunt, it is difficult to determine
exactly what is going on here. What is clear is that these findings call into question the notion that institutional change is associated
with ethnic separatism and violence (Snyder, 1999). Interestingly, political transition
appears to influence claims and violence dif
ferently; this indicates that, while related,
claim-making and rebellion are not identical
processes of minority radicalizaron. More
work - case studies and/or better data - are
necessary to determine why political change has such an inconsistent impact on group mobilization.
Grievances
Political discrimination was found to have a
significant effect only on rebellion in the late 1980s and not on claims in any period. This
suggests that grievances do not predispose minorities toward separatism, although
they may increase the likelihood of violent rebellion. This pattern has an intuitive inter
pretation. Repressed minorities are unlikely to attempt to bargain with the center using
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554 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 441 number 51September 2007
Separatist demands, as they generally lack the
strategic resources with which to advance
extreme agendas. They may, however, engage
in sporadic violence in response to barriers to
institutional access (examples include the
repressed groups in Pakistan and the Hutus and Tutsis in the Democratic Republic of
Congo). By extension, the most aggrieved
groups are the least likely to challenge the center using extreme demands. Indeed, the
most repressed groups in contemporary
Europe are the Roma in nearly every country.
Despite ample motives for doing so, they have engaged in neither separatism nor vio
lence. What they lack is leverage -
they are neither territorially concentrated, nor do
they have a history of autonomy nor even
access to political institutions. Moreover,
they enjoy almost no foreign support, despite recent efforts by the EU, the OSCE, and the
Council of Europe to improve their con
dition (Jenne, 2000; Barany, 2002).27 The control variables had inconsistent
effects on minority radicalization. Table I indicates that country wealth had an inhibit
ing influence on both separatist claims (in the late 1980s) and violent rebellion. In other
words, residing in a wealthy country makes a
group less likely both to advance extreme claims and to engage in violence. This, too,
has an intuitive interpretation, for minorities
that reside in relatively wealthy countries pre
sumably have more to lose economically from radicalizing against the state. That
country wealth did not have a similarly dampening effect on claims in the 1990s may be because many groups
? such as Quebec
separatists ? were able to
challenge the center
through normal political channels, thereby avoiding the costs of violent rebellion.
Regime type is an insignificant predictor of claims and rebellion across all panels, with the exception of claims in the late 1980s,
27 In another study, Saideman (2001) finds that Roma receive far less political and military support than other groups.
which were positively associated with the
degree of democracy. This effect may be driven by the prevalence of extremely unde
mocratic governments in Eastern Europe, Central and South America, sub-Saharan
Africa, and Southeast Asia in the late 1980s - under such regimes, minorities had limited
political space in which to bargain. By the
1990s, many of these governments had begun to democratize, providing greater opportuni ties for group activism. Consequently, the
variation in the level of democracy across
countries could no longer account for the
variation in minority claims.
It should be noted that these analyses, par
ticularly with respect to group claims,
explain only a small part of the variation in
minority rebellion and demands, as indicated
by the low pseudo-i?2. Bargaining and claim
making are more
complex than what can be
captured in this or any other structural analy
sis, as state governments anticipate what
groups are likely to demand and act to contain emerging crises. Indeed, there is
simply no way that such analyses can ade
quately measure the effects of all the elements
of bargaining, which include signaling resolve,
establishing credibility, inferring intentions, and selecting tactics. Still, both the individ ual results and the models are
statistically sig
nificant, indicating meaningful associations between key strategic factors, on the one
hand, and group claim-making and rebellion, on the other.
Conclusions
This article develops and tests the argument that variation in minority claims is largely a function of variation in strategic leverage
against the center. Groups with greater power vis-?-vis their governments are more likely to
make extreme claims, while relatively weak
groups are unlikely to ask for much. The
authors demonstrate that, although claim
making and violence are related forms of
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Erin K. fenne et al. Separatism as Bargaining Posture 555
radicalization, they differ in important ways. These findings indicate that variables that
capture minority strength (e.g. territorial
concentration and external support) are pos
itive predictors of both forms of minority radicalization. This may be attributed to the
strategic advantage that such factors confer
upon groups. Other things being equal, minorities with greater leverage vis-?-vis the
center are more likely to advance separatist
claims and engage in violent rebellion.
However, the likelihood of violent rebellion
may also be influenced by things such as
ethnic fears and political discrimination.
When there is considerable uncertainty
about majority intentions, or when the
group suffers repression, the minority may
decide to challenge the government through violence. Chechen separatism has been
violent in part because it has not been possi ble to bargain with Moscow through peace ful channels. In contrast, Quebec separatism
has been largely peaceful as they have been
able to advance their demands through the
existing political system. These results have important policy
implications for resolving internal conflicts.
In the last decade, scholars and policymakers have increasingly favored de jure or de facto
ethnic partition through protectorates or
territorial autonomy as a means of resolving
the most intractable secessionist conflicts.28
Examples include the partitions, quasi-parti
tions, and proposed partitions of Israel,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, East Timor, and
Northern Ireland, to name but a few. This
'last resort' solution is largely a consequence
of taking extreme minority demands at face
value. It is widely believed, for example, that
minorities such as the Chechens and the Sri
Lankan Tamils will accept nothing less than
quasi- or fully independent statehood in
return for disarmament. Such conflicts are
28 For some of the key academic works in this debate, see
Downes (2001) and Kaufmann (1996). For criticisms of
partition, see Sambanis (2000) and Kumar (1997: 2-8).
also attributed to ethnic fears borne of
minority persecution or state collapse. The
findings in this study suggest, however, that
minority claims are a function neither of
grievances nor of commitment problems, but
rather of relative bargaining power between the minority and center. Ethnic partition cannot by itself resolve such power imbal ances. The creation of de jure ethnic enclaves
may instead exacerbate such conflicts by cre
ating disincentives for interethnic coopera
tion within the existing state framework.
This analysis points to three possible methods of managing counterproductive
power differentials. First, an international task
force could be created to restrict the access of
secessionist minorities to outside military
assistance such as troops, training camps, 'safe
havens', and other military aid. Doing so may
dilute popular support for secessionist demands,
inducing minority representatives to negotiate
with the government over policies of ethnic
accommodation. This strategy may be fruit
fully applied to the ongoing conflict between
the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan govern ment. Longitudinal analysis of the Tamil movement demonstrates that separatist vio
lence gained momentum only after the Tigers
gained significant strategic advantages against
the center (Rotberg, 1999: 7-8) ,29 Limiting their access to outside sources of military aid
may assist in negotiating a real and lasting
peace with the Tamil rebels. Indeed, the global war on terrorism -
including restrictions on
the flow of money to the leaders of organized
insurgencies ?
may have already had such an
impact. However, given the manifest difficul
ties that the international community has had
in persuading states and interest groups to
restrict support to minorities in conflict, there
are serious limitations to this approach.
29 Smith (1999: 26) writes that the intensified LTTE sep aratist campaign in the second Eelam War 'was facilitated
by the ability of the Tamil Tigers to procure more sophis ticated weaponry'.
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556 journal of Peace Research volume 441 number 51 September 2007
Second, regional security regimes can be
used to manage shifting power differentials in deeply divided societies. Regional organiz ations are ideally suited for this task, as they operate close to the ground. Moreover, the
members of such regimes typically have a
vested security interest in resolving internal
conflicts that threaten to destabilize the
region. Transparent decisionmaking and
multistate interventions may also limit the
partisan involvement of any single state,
which usually does more harm than good. Finally, regional security regimes are well
positioned to undertake the long-term con
flict management necessary for resolving entrenched territorial wars. ECOMOG is one such regime that has recently begun
to
manage conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.
ASEAN could develop a similar peacekeep ing capacity for South and Southeast Asia.
One of the key predictors of minority rad icalization -
territorial concentration - is also
one of the most difficult to manipulate in the interest of achieving ethnic peace. There is little the international community can do,
particularly in the short run, about a states
ethnic configuration. Efforts to create more
integrated polities (particularly through popu lation transfers) smack of the discredited social
engineering projects undertaken by Soviet
style governments, which have since been
denounced as cultural genocide. Relocating
people on the basis of ethnicity is simply not a viable policy option in todays political climate. Moreover, resettlement policies are
likely to generate far more problems than they solve, increasing the humanitarian toll and
giving rise to entirely new security problems.
Governments may, however, be persuaded to
adopt an incremental approach to ethnic
integration -
using economic incentives, edu
cational regulation, and the like to encourage
people to co-habitate rather than live in eth
nically segregated communities. Gradually decreasing the concentration of ethnic groups, while controversial, is likely to yield long-term
dividends in terms of discouraging separatism and violence.
This analysis suggests (1) that what
groups seek is not necessarily what they will
settle for, and (2) that this calculation is
largely based on the minority's strategic assets. Given the fluidity of such assets, it should not be surprising that deals over
ethnic accommodation are continually being made and remade. These findings also indi cate that separatism and rebellion are gov
erned by related, yet distinct, logics. Not all
separatist groups are violent, and not all
violent groups are separatist. Given this, we
would do well to pursue solutions that facili tate peaceful minority-majority bargaining, rather than those that inhibit separatism but do little to discourage violence.
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ERIN K. JENNE, b. 1970, PhD in Political Science (Stanford University, 2000); Post
doctoral Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University
(2000-02); Associate Professor, Central Euro
pean University (2002- ). Most recent book:
Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority
Empowerment (Cornell University Press, 2007).
STEPHEN M. SAIDEMAN, b. 1966, PhD in Political Science (UC, San Diego, 1993); Canada Research Chair in International
Security and Ethnic Conflict and Associate
Professor, McGill University (2002- ). Most
recent book: The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict (Columbia University Press, 2001).
WILL LOWE, b. 1973, PhD in Cognitive Science (University of Edinburgh, 2000); Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Basic Research
in the Social Sciences, Harvard University (2000-03); Research Fellow, Trinity College
Dublin (2004-05). Currently Research Fellow at the Social Science Methods and Data
Institute, University of Nottingham.
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