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U.S. Welfare Policy Effects on Domestic Abuse: Evidence from
Random Assignment Studies
Lisa Gennetian MDRC
Research in collaboration with: Virginia Knox, Cynthia Miller, Gayle Hamilton, Christina Gibson, Katherine Magnuson, Greg Duncan and
Jared Smith
Presentation at The Development Implications of Gender-Based ViolenceWorld Bank
November 2004
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MDRC is a non partisan research organization dedicated to building knowledge to improve social policy
Over 60 studies informing major issues in U.S. welfare, workforce, and education policy
A mission to provide reliable evidence on what works (and does not work) to improve the well-being of low-income families and children
An interdisciplinary research staff A commitment to sharing findings and lessons with
policymakers at all levels
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MDRC’s specialty is random assignment research studies
Arrive at financial assistance office to apply or re-apply for welfare benefits
Assigned to treatment group (T)
Assigned to control group
(C)
New program
benefits or requirements
Existing welfare
programs
Effects of new policy
Outcome T – Outcome C
4
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
New program Existing welfare system Impact
Illustrative example of evaluating program effects on employment
Note: Quarter 2 represents the first quarter after random assignment.
Quarters of Employment
(%)
Year prior to RA
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MDRC played a key role in evaluating U.S. welfare programs in the 1980s and early 1990s
Tests of policies using random assignment design:
“Make work pay” policies
Mandatory employment services
Time limits
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How might welfare policies affect domestic abuse?
Welfare and employment programs affect economic outcomes
Changes in employment, earnings and income can affect other aspects of family well-being• Increased abuse due to backlash to women’s
increased economic independence • Decreased abuse due to increased
empowerment High rates of reported domestic abuse among
low income women in the U.S.• The Family Violence Option is one response
in the context of welfare policy
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Welfare or workforce evaluation data collection
Baseline information
Unemployment Insurance and public assistance administrative records
Follow-up interviews with survey subsample:• employment histories• family composition• domestic abuse (collected via CASI methods)• children’s outcomes
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The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) Model and Evaluation
The first test of two key policy components: An enhanced income disregard with mandatory employment services
Welfare waiver evaluation implemented in 3 urban and 4 rural counties from 1994 to 1998
Single parent families
Random assignment research design
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Characteristics of single parent long-term recipient families in MFIP
Age in years 28.6
Number of children 2.3
Less than high school education or GED
30%
Black 41%
Ever previously married
30%
Employed prior to study entry
43%
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MFIP’s effects on economic outcomes among single parent long term recipients
Over the first two years of follow-up, MFIP:
Increased the amount of employment
Increased earnings by $986
Increased income from earnings and welfare benefits by $2,430 (and, reduced the proportion of families living below the poverty line)
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MFIP reduced reports of domestic abuse among single parent long term recipients
39.9
30.8
44.2
23.9
31.4
23.7
35.5
19.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
Abuse by partner Abuse by other Any emotional abuse Any physical abuse
AFDC - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties
MFIP - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties (%)
****
Note: Client reports of domestic abuse measured in year prior to interview. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01
*
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How did MFIP reduce reports of domestic abuse?
Nonexperimental techniques suggest that:• Increased employment reduces domestic
abuse
• Increased income has a possible role
• There is little relationship between domestic abuse and marital status
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There is no consistent evidence to date from welfare programs to support the “backlash” theory
Programs with mandatory employment services that increased employment and earnings (but not income) show decreases in domestic abuse.
Programs with time limits that increased employment and income in the short term show generally neutral effects on domestic abuse.
Some programs show increased domestic abuse only among particular subpopulations.
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Welfare policy responses in the U.S.
Family Violence Option might strike the right balance:• Some women might benefit from being encouraged or
required to increase employment • Other women, especially those who are experiencing
severe or persistent abuse, might not
We need to learn more about the type of abuse, and the context in which it takes place, to better understand potential effects of welfare and employment policies
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