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U.S. Welfare Policy Effects on Domestic Abuse: Evidence from

Random Assignment Studies

Lisa Gennetian MDRC

Research in collaboration with: Virginia Knox, Cynthia Miller, Gayle Hamilton, Christina Gibson, Katherine Magnuson, Greg Duncan and

Jared Smith

Presentation at The Development Implications of Gender-Based ViolenceWorld Bank

November 2004

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MDRC is a non partisan research organization dedicated to building knowledge to improve social policy

Over 60 studies informing major issues in U.S. welfare, workforce, and education policy

A mission to provide reliable evidence on what works (and does not work) to improve the well-being of low-income families and children

An interdisciplinary research staff A commitment to sharing findings and lessons with

policymakers at all levels

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MDRC’s specialty is random assignment research studies

Arrive at financial assistance office to apply or re-apply for welfare benefits

Assigned to treatment group (T)

Assigned to control group

(C)

New program

benefits or requirements

Existing welfare

programs

Effects of new policy

Outcome T – Outcome C

4

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

New program Existing welfare system Impact

Illustrative example of evaluating program effects on employment

Note: Quarter 2 represents the first quarter after random assignment.

Quarters of Employment

(%)

Year prior to RA

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MDRC played a key role in evaluating U.S. welfare programs in the 1980s and early 1990s

Tests of policies using random assignment design:

“Make work pay” policies

Mandatory employment services

Time limits

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How might welfare policies affect domestic abuse?

Welfare and employment programs affect economic outcomes

Changes in employment, earnings and income can affect other aspects of family well-being• Increased abuse due to backlash to women’s

increased economic independence • Decreased abuse due to increased

empowerment High rates of reported domestic abuse among

low income women in the U.S.• The Family Violence Option is one response

in the context of welfare policy

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Welfare or workforce evaluation data collection

Baseline information

Unemployment Insurance and public assistance administrative records

Follow-up interviews with survey subsample:• employment histories• family composition• domestic abuse (collected via CASI methods)• children’s outcomes

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The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) Model and Evaluation

The first test of two key policy components: An enhanced income disregard with mandatory employment services

Welfare waiver evaluation implemented in 3 urban and 4 rural counties from 1994 to 1998

Single parent families

Random assignment research design

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Characteristics of single parent long-term recipient families in MFIP

Age in years 28.6

Number of children 2.3

Less than high school education or GED

30%

Black 41%

Ever previously married

30%

Employed prior to study entry

43%

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MFIP’s effects on economic outcomes among single parent long term recipients

Over the first two years of follow-up, MFIP:

Increased the amount of employment

Increased earnings by $986

Increased income from earnings and welfare benefits by $2,430 (and, reduced the proportion of families living below the poverty line)

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MFIP reduced reports of domestic abuse among single parent long term recipients

39.9

30.8

44.2

23.9

31.4

23.7

35.5

19.4

0

10

20

30

40

50

Abuse by partner Abuse by other Any emotional abuse Any physical abuse

AFDC - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties

MFIP - Single parent long term recipients in urban counties (%)

****

Note: Client reports of domestic abuse measured in year prior to interview. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: *p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01

*

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How did MFIP reduce reports of domestic abuse?

Nonexperimental techniques suggest that:• Increased employment reduces domestic

abuse

• Increased income has a possible role

• There is little relationship between domestic abuse and marital status

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There is no consistent evidence to date from welfare programs to support the “backlash” theory

Programs with mandatory employment services that increased employment and earnings (but not income) show decreases in domestic abuse.

Programs with time limits that increased employment and income in the short term show generally neutral effects on domestic abuse.

Some programs show increased domestic abuse only among particular subpopulations.

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Welfare policy responses in the U.S.

Family Violence Option might strike the right balance:• Some women might benefit from being encouraged or

required to increase employment • Other women, especially those who are experiencing

severe or persistent abuse, might not

We need to learn more about the type of abuse, and the context in which it takes place, to better understand potential effects of welfare and employment policies