Zionist versus Jewish Policies: Understanding the Bedouin...

Zionist versus Jewish Policies: Understanding the Bedouin Situation

Robert Cherry

Broeklundian Professor

Department of Economics

Brooklyn College

Brooklyn, NY 112102889

Email: [email protected]

Revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Israel

Studies, Brandeis University (June 15, 2011)

The broadly accepted agreement among Jews that Israel must be a Jewish state ignores the

potential distinction between Jewish state and current Zionistinspired state policies. This

distinction does not arise when looking at government policies to improve the economic situation

of Israeli Arabs but is the source of differences between state policies towards the recognized

and the unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev. This suggests that a Jewish state is

compatible with Israel being a full democracy but not a state governed by the current Zionist

inspired principles.

mailto:[email protected]

1

Zionist versus Jewish Policies: Understanding the Bedouin Situation

Over 1.2 million Arab citizens of Israel are a permanent community that will only marginally

change even if a twostate solution is reached. Israel can claim to be a full democracy only if it

treats its Arab minority fairly. Thus, the strengthening of Israel as a democratic state is

fundamentally related to improving the economic, social, and political situation of its Arab

citizens.

While the economic gap between Israeli Arabs and Jews remains large, this paper will provide

evidence that the current rightofcenter government and even the majority of Jewish Israelis

strongly support policies to reduce substantially these differences. 1 There is also evidence that

in important governmental areas – policing, government employment, national service, and

education – the ruling coalition has undertaken efforts to reduce if not end past discriminatory

practices. This should give pause to critics who believe Israeli government policies sustain wide

economic disparities between its Jewish and Arab communities.

By contrast, Israeli Jews appear to be increasingly hostile to providing full political and civil

rights to its Arab citizens. A 2010 survey conducted by the Dahaf Institute asked 1600 young

Jewish Israelis to rate what was important in terms of running the country. Democracy came in

third place, with only 14.3 percent seeing it as essential to the state; while 26 percent of Jewish

respondents said that Jewish nationality was the most important factor. The majority of Jewish

1 For pessimistic views, see Ilan Pappe, The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel (Yale University Press, 2011); Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman, Israel’s Palestinians: The Conflict Within (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Both discussed in “Palestinians in Israel: There May Be Trouble Ahead,” The Economist (May 26, 2011).

2

youths also emphasized the need for a strong leadership over the rule of law with close to half

supporting revoking some basic political rights of the country’s Arab citizens. 2

This survey was conducted just before Safed’s chief rabbi, a governmentpaid position,

issued a halachic ruling prohibiting Jews from renting homes to Arabs. When he was criticized,

more than one hundred rabbis, many also holding governmentpaid positions, came to his

defense. In Safed, the 500 Arab students attending college there were subject to persistent

harassment and Jewish residents willing to rent to Arabs have been subject to death threats. 3

Rather than taking strong action against these shameful, undemocratic attitudes and behavior,

the ruling coalition has instead promoted similar antiArab legislation. These actions include

proposals to have loyalty oaths, disallow Nakba activities on Israel Independence Day, legalize

housing discrimination against Arabs in small Jewish communities, and diminished rights for

those who do not serve in the army. While these bills have not been passed by the Knesset, and

many would likely be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, together with the youth

survey and rabbis’ actions, they seem to demonstrate a growing antiArab sentiment among

Israeli Jews and the Netanyahu government. 4 This paper will argue that these antiArab policies

point to the difference between Israel being a Jewish state compared to the present state which is

governed by certain Zionistinspired principles. This difference will be most clearly

demonstrated when contrasting government policies towards the recognized Negev Bedouin

towns with the policy towards the unrecognized Bedouin villages.

Economic Development

2 Ruth Eglash, “Jewish Nationalism Is Top Priority of Israeli Youth,” Jerusalem Post (April 3, 2011). 3 Jeff Barak, “That We Need a Reminder to Integrate Arabs Is Shameful,” Jerusalem Post (Nov 114, 2010). 4 For a discussion of these legislative threats to democracy, see Mordechai Kremnitzer and Shiri Krebs, “From Illiberal Legislation to Intolerant Democracy,” Israel Studies Review 26 (Summer 2011) 411; and Naomi Chazan, “Israeli Democracy and Identity under Attack,” Israel Studies Review 26 (Summer 2011) 1720.

3

There are large income and employment gaps between Arabs and Jews. In 2007, employment

rates for Arab and Jewish men were similar, especially for those younger than 40 years old.

Among women, however, there was a dramatic gap: Arab women had an employment rate

dramatically lower than for Jewish women. 5

Not only do Israeli Arabs have lower employment rates but, among those who work, they

have lower earnings than Israeli Jews. Monthly earnings of employed Arab men are only 60

percent as much as for employed Jewish men. Among women, the gap is somewhat less.

Employed Arab women have monthly earnings about 70 percent of employed Jewish women.

Moreover, one half of this gap is the result of the disparity in hours worked. On average,

employed Arab women work less than 120 hours per month while employed Jewish women

work about 150 hours per month. Thus, employed Arab women have hourly wages about 85

percent of employed Jewish women.

The lower employment rates for Arab women translate into substantially fewer two wage

earning households in Arab than Jewish community. This disparity may be an important

5 Jack Habib et al., “Labor Market and SocioEconomic Outcomes of the ArabIsraeli Population,” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper #102 (Mar 18, 2010) Table A.4.

4

explanation for the higher Arab (51 percent) than Jewish poverty rate (15 percent). Thus,

policies to increase the employment of Arab women are considered important for reducing

poverty rates within the Arab community.

Educational Attainment of Jewish and Arab Israelis, 2009

Years of Schooling 010 1112 13 or more Jews 16.9 35.6 47.5 Arabs 42.9 35.9 20.3

Second, there is a large share of Arabs with low levels of formal education. 6 For many of

these less educated workers, industrial employment would be beneficial. Finally, while a

smaller share of Israeli Arabs than Jews has a college education, there are even fewer jobs

available to them so underemployment among more educated Israeli Arabs is widespread. For

example, among those with 12 years of schooling, 48.8 percent of Arabs but only 21.4 percent of

Jews are employed in blue collar positions. 7 Thus, targeted policies to improve the employment

of collegetrained Arabs are necessary, especially in the high paying and expanding hitech

sector.

Recognizing that Arab women have lowlevels of Hebrew and computer literacy, the

government has developed training program that aid in overcoming these employment

handicaps. 8 In addition, in conjunction with the nonprofit organization TEVET, the government

funded a Women Empowerment Program to train Arab women for vocational hitech

employment positions. These programs were set up in Arab villages and training was scheduled

mornings to be more compatible with family responsibilities.

6 Ayman Seif, presentation; Habib et al., Table A.1. 7 Habib et al., Figure 3.5. 8 Sixtyeight percent of Jewish women but only 37 percent of Arab women surveyed used computers in the last three months.

5

The Center for Jewish and Arab Economic Development (CJAED) has been active in

developing entrepreneurial skills among Arab women. CJAED has developed a network of 1800

Arab women business owners and through an organization, Jasmin, helps them interact and

coordinate activities. Since 2008, Jasmin has organized a trade show in Tel Aviv at which

hundreds of these businesswomen present their products and services. In addition, CJAED

launched Project Sama through which participants gain confidence in using the internet to

conduct focused information searches, manage emails, build databases of clients and suppliers,

market their businesses, build a website and manage their finances.

To increase industrial employment, the Israeli government has begun funding joint industrial

parks that link neighboring Jewish and Arab communities. To guarantee equality of opportunity,

the Social Venture Fund coordinated by the Jewish Federations of North America provided seed

money to Arab entrepreneurs to set up businesses there. 9 At the same time, CJAED offers

training to maximize Arab employment. The success of these industrial zones has led the Israeli

government to take unprecedented action: for the first time, it has allocated fund for thirteen

industrial parks in Arab communities.

There have also been a number of programs designed to increase the pipeline of trained Arab

workers who can succeed in the Israeli hightech sector. Interestingly, the major Israeli funders

of these efforts are the industrial giants that have fueled the hightech boom. First among them is

Stef Wertheimer, the Israeli Bill Gates who sold 80 percent of his company to Warren Buffett’s

Berkshire Hathaway for $5 billion. Dov Lautman, founder of Galil Industries chairs the advisory

committee on investments in the Arab sector in the Prime Minister’s Office. He was

instrumental in the government’s Tevel program which provides Arabowned businesses seeking

professional training and advice that will enable them to increase their exports. Initially

9 http://www.jewishfederations.org/page.aspx?id=155456

6

seventeen companies signed up for the program but it will be expanded as 120 ArabIsraeli

companies were identified with export potential. 10 These industrialists are not motivated by

moral imperatives but the realization that the continued success of the hightech boom requires

utilization of the labor potentials of the entire Israeli workforce.

The government has also instituted a policy to pay 25 percent of the salary of all Arab

citizens hired in the hitech sector, the same financial incentive used to spur Ethiopian

employment. The hitech employment of Arab college graduates has almost double in the last

three years, helped by the joint Arab and Jewish organization, Tsofen. Recognizing its success,

the government has provided funding to Tsofen, enabling it to double again the number of Arab

graduates enrolled in its transitional programs. Tsofen is confident that it can maintain its 83

percent placement rate.

Tsofen’s success rate is not simply facilitating hiring by the major Israeli hitech

companies. Instead, it places many of its clients in new divisions set up by international

companies, particular when they are able to locate near Nazareth. Indeed, Nazareth has become

a favored site of new Israeli startup companies, another major source of employment for Arab

college graduates.

Nazareth’s success has also come from the efforts of New Generation Technologies (NGT)

which acts as an incubator for biotech companies. Founded in 2001 with funding from the

government Office of Chief Scientists, NGT is the first and only joint ArabIsraeli incubator in

the country – and the only one established specifically to target the country’s Arab entrepreneurs.

Stef Wertheimer has not only long been a champion of these ideas, but he has invested heavily in

industrial development in the Arab sector. In 2010, he broke ground on an industrial park in

10 Ora Coren, “First Seventeen Companies Sign up for Government Program to Boost Arab firms’ Exports,” Haaretz (July 20, 2010).

7

Nazareth that is expected to house up to 25 exportoriented enterprises and to create 500 to 1,000

new jobs in the short term. 11

Government Employment

National agencies have begun to take seriously their commitment to increase Arab

government employment. In 2006, Arabs comprised only 6 percent of all government

employees and comprised only about 6.6 percent of newlyhired employees. The government set

a goal of 10 percent by 2010. To meet this goal, 30 percent of new hires are now reserved for

Arab citizens of Israel.

When this goal was not met, further affirmative action policies were enacted. One of the

employment barriers is that few Israeli Arabs live near Jerusalem where many of the government

jobs are located, requiring workers to uproot their families. In recognition, the government has

set up “incentives packages” for educational and housing expenses that would make it more

viable for Arabs to relocate to Jerusalem for government employment.

Government policing has also been transformed. In October 2000, at the beginning of the

Second Intifada, Israeli police forces were heavyhanded in their response to demonstrations by

Arab citizens of Israel. After a drawn out inquiry, the Or Commission recommended reforms of

the Israeli police and prosecution of the officers involved in the deaths of thirteen Israeli Arab

demonstrators. The Justice department, however, refused to prosecute any of the officers,

claiming there was insufficient evidence. By contrast, in response to more recent Arab

demonstrations, including during the 2008 Gaza incursion, Israeli police have made conscious

efforts to forestall any violent confrontation.

11 Stacy Perman, “In Israel, Commerce amid Conflict,” Time Magazine (Aug. 15, 2010).

8

Sammy Smooha contends that this change in policing was decisions made by both

communities to avoid violent confrontation. Smooha states,

Both sides are keenly aware of the heavy cost in the event of confrontation. … The

police do not intervene in Arab demonstrations, rallies, processions, general strikes, and

other protest actions as long as there is no largescale breach of law and order. They

refrain from using firearms and coordinate their actions with Arab public figures. … The

fear balance explains why the [2007 and 2008] disturbances in Pequ’in and Acre did not

deteriorate to the degree that the October 2000 uprising did. 12

While he is correct that the fear balance was a catalyst for changing policing policies, it

stimulated important changes within police departments. In response to the October 2000

confrontations, the Abraham Fund engaged Israeli police in successful training programs that

transformed their approach to Arab demonstrations. This transformation also led to providing

community police units to over 100 Arab towns in contrast to only 3 towns a decade earlier.

Each of these units is comprised of both Jewish and Arab personnel, increasing the Arab share of

Israeli police from 1.0 to 4.5 percent. In June, 2011, Deputy InspectorGeneral Jamal Hakroush

became the first Muslim police officer to ascend to his rank in Israel. "It's a position I have been

waiting for, and it offers many challenges," Hakroush said. "I am proud of Israel Police for

choosing me based on my qualifications and nothing else." 13

For more educated Arab women, teaching is a dominant source of employment. Almost

threequarters of Arab women with academic certificates are employed in the education sector. 14

12 Smooha, 13. 13 Omri Efraim, “Muslim Police Officer Ascends to New Heights,” YNetNews.Com (June 15, 2011). http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L4082782,00.html 14 Habib et al., 28.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4082782,00.html

9

Employment of Arab teachers received a boost in 2010 when the government announced that it

was immediately implementing an Arab language requirement for fifth graders in 170 Jewish

schools in northern Israel with an expectation that this requirement would be expanded

nationally. 15 While there have been efforts to expand the hiring of Arab teachers in other areas,

the vast majority of Arab teachers in Jewish schools are language instructors. Thus, besides the

broader political and social implications of the new Arab language requirement, it means there

will be a substantial increase in Arab teachers in Jewish schools.

Finally, in 2007 the government allowed a social service option to substitute for military

service; and opened this option to Arab citizens. Arab women who enter the social service are

assigned to government agencies within their villages. Whereas Arab leadership counsels

women against enter the social service, Netanyahu’s coalition is active in encouraging them to

enlist. The rightwing Knesset leadership that controls funding for this program reasons that if

Arab women engage in social service, they will be more likely to stay in the labor force. Thus,

social service is seen as a vehicle to increase female employment rates.

Israel: A Jewish or a Zionist State?

While the Israeli leadership claims that it wants Israel to be considered a Jewish state, in

reality, it acts as a Zionist state; that is, Israeli organizations undertake policies that are justified

by the currently dominant Zionist precepts. For many critics and supporters, there is no

distinction between the two visions. If looked at closely, however, this distinction is important to

15 “Arab Studies to Become Compulsory in Israeli Schools,” Haaretz (Aug 24, 2010) http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/arabicstudiestobecomecompulsoryinisraelischools1.309941

http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/arabic-studies-to-become-compulsory-in-israeli-schools-1.309941

10

understand what policies are possible and in particular, the ability of Israel to fulfill its

democratic ideals. Let us now enumerate some of these distinctions.

If the Jewish leadership were solely interested in Israel being a Jewish state, its most

important concern would be that Israel has a Jewish majority. With a Jewish majority, Jews

could be certain that its sensibilities and heritage would be respected and that antiSemitism

would not be tolerated. Jewish holidays and remembrances would be part of the national culture

and immigration would remain open to world Jewry.

Current dominant Zionist precepts go much further. Not only do they expect a Jewish

majority, but posit that Jewish political parties alone will control the Knesset. That is, Israeli

governing coalitions will never include Arab parties nor will contested legislation be determined

by how the Arab parties vote. Nor would state policy simply keep Israel open to Jewish

immigration. Instead, it will actively encourage and provide substantial subsidies to Jewish

immigrants. Nor would respect for Jewish sensibilities be enough. Current dominant Zionist

precepts require that not most but all national symbols must be Jewish. 16

In addition, current dominant Zionist precepts consider Israel to be the land of the Jewish

people. Today, 93 percent of Israeli land is in the hands of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and

this land can only be used by Jews. As a result, when Arab villages need to expand because of

natural population growth, they cannot use adjoining vacant land because it is controlled by the

JNF. In the Galilee, this has created an unseemly situation so that JNF has been aggressive in

trying to encourage Jewish settlement on this land despite the demonstrated needs of the Arab

communities there.

16 For a longer discussion of this distinction, see Sammy Smooha, Index of ArabJewish Relations in Israel 2004. (The JewishArab Center, University of Haifa, 2005).

11

Current dominant Zionist precepts do not, however, conflict with policies that promote

economic equality. As a result, some of the most committed leftwing and rightwing Zionists

have been firm supporters of government initiatives to improve the economic status of Israeli

Arabs. While Israel’s recent successful effort to gain acceptance into the OECD gave these

efforts an impetus, they had begun much earlier. Most importantly, these efforts reflect a

genuine commitment to reducing Israeli Arab poverty. After all, given the social welfare

payments provided to the poor, the Israeli government has a strong financial interest in reducing

the number of poor families. In addition, increasing the workforce participation of Arab women

can be crucial to reducing the Arab birth rate, an important objective now that Jewish

immigration to Israel has come to a halt.

Though antipoverty efforts are compatible with Zionist precepts, critics fear that Arabs

could continue to be consigned to lower rung employment than comparably skilled Jewish

workers. This discriminatory outcome is neither supported by most Jewish Israelis nor is it part

of Zionist core beliefs. For example, about twothirds of Israeli Jews surveyed in 2009 agreed

with each of the following propositions: (1) the state should launch emergency programs to

bridge Arab Jewish gaps; (2) accept Arabs as full members of Israeli society; and (3) Arabs

should receive a proportional share of state budgets. 17 As a result, efforts made to increase Arab

professional employment and entrepreneurship, particular in the hitech sector, can be successful.

Indeed, it is quite likely given the efforts of leading Israeli industrialists and funding support

from both the government and outside philanthropy.

Evidence from the United States strengthens this contention. When General Electric,

Dupont, Westinghouse and other corporations began opening southern facilities in the 1950s,

they often helped reverse local exclusionary hiring practices. Similarly, Hilton and other hotel

17 Smooha, figures 3 and 5.

12

chains cajoled some southern cities to relax their racial codes. While civil rights organizations

were ultimately responsible for ending Jim Crow, these corporate efforts helped create a

favorable business climate. Thus, given the much more favorable environment, the efforts of

Israeli industrialists to improve the economic situation of Arab citizens should be even more

effective. 18

Government Policies towards the Bedouin Community

The discriminatory effects of Zionistinspired policies are illustrated by the distinction

between government policies towards the unrecognized and recognized Bedouin communities in

the Negev. In 2009, about twothirds of the 188,100 Negev Bedouins reside in eight recognized

communities while the rest reside in unrecognized villages. 19 The Bedouins are the poorest of all

Israeli communities, with poverty rates approaching 80 percent in the unrecognized villages. 20

Poverty Rates Among IsraeliArab Communities, Alternative Measures (2004)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Bedouin, unrecognized

villages

Bedouin, recognized villages

NonBedouin Muslims

Druze Chistian NonUltra Orthodox Jews

Basic Consumption Expenditure Half Median

18 Robert Cherry, Who Gets the Good Jobs: Combating Race and Gender Disparities (Rutgers Univ. Press, 2001). 19 The Negev Bedouin Statistical Data Book # 3, Robert H. Arnow Center for Bedouin Studies and Development (Ben Gurion University, 2010). 20 Sulieman AbuBader and Daniel Gottlieb, “Poverty, Education, and Employment among the ArabBedouin Society: A Comparative Study,” Society for the Study of Economic Inequality (October, 2009) http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2009137.pdf).

http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2009-137.pdf

13

For some, the high rate of poverty among Bedouins is considered primarily a function of

their inability and reluctance to adapt to modern society. They point to the large families and the

severe culture restrictions placed on women to explain the low rates of female employment and

high rates of poverty among Bedouins. Unlike other Arab communities, the majority of Bedouin

families have at least four children. Whereas onequarter of Bedouin families contain at least

nine individuals, such large families are a rarity in other Israeli Arab communities. 21

In addition, note that smaller families comprise a slightly larger share in the unrecognized

than in the recognized Bedouin villages. More detailed data indicate that one or two person

households are about 15 percent of all families in the unrecognized villages but less than three

percent of all families in the recognized villages. 22 This reflects the decision of grandparents to

move back to the unrecognized villages from where they came but leave their families in the

21 AbuBader and Gottlieb, Chart 8. 22 AbuBader and Gottlieb, Chart 8.

14

recognized communities to enable grandchildren to receive better educational and health

services.

Observers also suggest that welfare dependency has become a way of life for many within

the Bedouin community. Under political pressure from the Haredi community, the Israeli

government provides generous benefits to large families. As a result, large Bedouin families can

survive without any paid employment. Consistent with this thesis, the share of Bedouin families

with no employment is 37 percent compared to 23 percent for other Arab families. 23

Welfare dependency and cultural barriers that impede the employment of women are

certainly present among Negev Bedouins. Personal narratives attesting to these factors are

widely told by even those who sympathize with the plight of the Bedouins. Indeed, these

impediments are sometimes highlighted in writings that seek to explain persistent Muslim

poverty in European countries. 24 These factors, however, cannot be the only important

explanation for Bedouin poverty. While Bedouin employment rates are much lower than for

other Israeli Arabs, this seems to be at least partially the result of much higher unemployment

rates rather than solely culturallybased decision not to seek jobs.

The position that access to jobs is an important impediment is strengthened by evidence

concerning harmful government policies. Much is made of the government’s decision not to

provide electricity to the unrecognized villages. Given the universal use of electric generators,

however, this is not the most serious deficiency its residents experience. Even the persistent

demolition of Bedouin housing in the unrecognized villages – more than one hundred annually

is more a political struggle than an economic impediment. 25 Far more important is the lack of

23 Habib et al., Table 3.5. 24 For the same explanations for Muslim poverty in Holland, see Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel (Free Press, 2007). 25 Mijah Grinberg, “More than 800 Protest Bedouin House Demolitions,” Haaretz (July 16, 2007) http://www.haaretz.com/news/morethan800protestbedouinhousedemolitionsinfrontofknesset1.225630. For

http://www.haaretz.com/news/more-than-800-protest-bedouin-house-demolitions-in-front-of-knesset-1.225630

15

basic infrastructure provided to Bedouin communities. Compared to other Muslim communities,

Bedouins have much more limited access to public transportation, medical facilities, primary

schools, and shopping centers. These impediments may be the source of much of the

employment gap between Bedouins and other Arab communities. 26

Consistent with the government’s approach to reducing poverty, there have been significant

improvements in the government’s behavior towards the recognized Bedouin towns. Rahat was

selected to be the site of the first governmentfunded industrial zone in the Bedouin community.

Public transportation has been expanded there and in four of the other seven recognized towns,

linking them with Beersheva. Complementing this aid, the government is replicating the

employment centers that had been set up for Russian immigrants, hoping to strengthen the

estimates on total house demolitions of Arab homes throughout Israel made by the Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions in a telephone interview conducted by the Palestinian rights organization Adalah, see As’ad Ghanem, “The Expanding Ethnocracy: Judaization of the Public Sphere,” Israel Studies Review 26 (Summer 2011) 2127. Ghanem also claims that 133 Bedouin villages “were fully or partially demolished in recent years,” citing an Adalah report in which this does not appear: Inequality Report: The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel (March 2011): http://www.adalah.org/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf 26 Habib et al.

http://www.adalah.org/upfiles/2011/Adalah_The_Inequality_Report_March_2011.pdf

16

transition of Bedouin women from home to paid employment. In addition, in the last few years

the Soroka Medical Center in Beersheva has begun to offer more comprehensive services and is

linked to newlyestablished community health clinics in numerous Bedouin communities. Ben

Gurion University trains Bedouin women to be employed as nurses in these facilities.

These improvements in the recognized villages are only beginning to overcome the

employment obstacles experienced there. Employment centers will not be sufficient to

substantially change employment rates without creating jobs inside the Bedouin towns,

establishing more day care centers, and offering reliable and more frequent public transportation

inside the towns. Due to the inadequacy of these employment supports, the employment rate of

Bedouin women remains low and unemployment rates remain high.

The government has not funded the necessary childcare facilities. Whereas 16.3 percent of

Jewish children are in governmentfunded childcare facilities, only 3.7 percent of Arab children

are. Even though Arab children comprise 25 percent of all children, when the government

funded 150 new childcare facilities, only 17 were in Arab communities. 27 The Ministry of

Education also shortchanges Arab schools. For example, its Shahar program provides funds to

help weak students in socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds but virtually none of these

funds are allocated to Arab schools; and there has been no implementation of a court ruling to

rectify this discriminatory situation. Similarly, Adalah found that Jewish Negev towns had a 2.5

times higher funding rate for school psychologists than Bedouin towns. 28

Whatever its shortcomings, there has been significant progress in the recognized towns but

not in the unrecognized villages. Despite survey evidence that 65 percent of Israeli Jews support

27 Adalah, Inequality Report. 28 Adalah, Table 7: Jewish towns (Ofakim and Dimona) had 16.6 positions funded out of 20.9 positions needed according to MOE criteria – a 79.4 percent funding rate – whereas Bedouin towns (Rahat and Hura) had only 7.3 positions funded out of 23.2 positions needed – a 31.4 percent funding rate.

17

recognizing these villages, government and JNF policies preclude this possibility – houses

continue to be demolished and the government continues to deny basic services. 29

While in 2011, the government highlighted its support for the new science high school in

Hura, it continues to be insensitive to the needs of Bedouin students living in the unrecognized

villages. The region of Abu Tulul – ElShihabi contains seven unrecognized villages. Only 170

of the 750 highschool age Bedouins are in school. This dropout rate is so high because the

nearest high school is 1215 kilometers away and no public transportation is provided. As of

early 2011, the government has yet to implement a Supreme Court settlement in which the

Ministry of Education agreed to provide a school by 2009. 30

The harsh policies to restrict the Bedouin Negev communities seem to be related to the

government regional plans. In 2005, the government embarked on a program to increase Jewish

development in the Negev by initiating a series of tax and housing incentives. Along with the

JNF, it has encouraged Jewish settlement and has planned new military installations there. Thus,

harsh policies towards the unrecognized villages reflect a Zionistdriven commitment to Israeli

land use for only Jewish needs.

Unfortunately, much of the American Jewish community is unaware of the Bedouin

situation. Typical was a 2011 article in The Jewish Week rejoicing that a group of American

Jews had made aliyah to the Negev. 31 It discussed their settlements and the expected growth of

Jewish families there through the movement of defense installations to the area. The article

ignored completely that this Jewish expansion is being done at the same time that neighboring

Bedouin villages remain unrecognized and Bedouin homes are persistently demolished.

29 Smooha, Figure 5. 30 Adalah. 31 Sharon Udasin and Adam Dickter, “For Liberal Olim, Southern Comfort: A Nondenominational Seed Takes Root in the Negev,” The Jewish Week (April 18, 2011).

18

Concluding Remarks

This paper has demonstrated that to understand what is currently possible for Arab citizens

of Israel, we must determine what is consistent and what is not consistent with current dominant

Zionist precepts. Since economic equity is consistent with these precepts, we should be hopeful

that employment and earnings gaps between Jews and Arabs will decline, government Arab

employment will increase, and Arab poverty rates will decline. We should also begin to see

many firsts as Israeli Arabs attain a larger number of prominent positions in industry, education,

and government.

Economic improvement will also be extended to the Negev Bedouin community.

Educational and industrial initiatives will continue, and employment opportunities will grow.

Hopefully, the cultural impediments Bedouin women face will lessen and their communities will

more fully adapt to modern life. Of course, this transition would be aided by the abandonment of

Zionistdriven policies towards the unrecognized villages.

While these economic advances will make Israeli Arab lives better – and counter harsh

criticisms of Israeli policies towards its Arab citizens – they will not bring about full democracy.

As long as current dominant Zionist precepts dictate government behavior, JDF policies will

restrict Arab access to land, government efforts will still privilege Jewish immigrants, national

symbols will remain exclusively Jewish, and the Knesset will not extend full participation to

Arab legislators. Thus, Israel can be both a Jewish and a fully democratic state only if current

dominant Zionist precepts are radically changed.

Zionist versus Jewish Policies: Understanding the Bedouin...

Documents

Transcript of Zionist versus Jewish Policies: Understanding the Bedouin...