Zenon y la unidad de la filosofía

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Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy

Author(s): Jaap MansfeldSource: Phronesis, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2003), pp. 116-131Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182721

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Zeno on the Unity of Philosophy

JAAP MANSFELD

ABSTRACT

The formula 'the elements of logos' in the Zeno quotation by Epictetus at Arrian,

Diss. 4.8.12 need not, pace e.g. von Arnim, pertain to the parts of speech, but

more probably means the elements i.e. primary heoremsof philosophicaltheory,

or doctrine.Theorymoreover should become internalized o the soul and 'lived':philosophy is also the so-called 'art of life'. These theorems are to be distin-

guished but should reciprocally entail each other. Philosophyaccording to Zenois both tripartiteand one, and tripartite specially in that its parts (and subparts)

cannot be transferredsimultaneously: of necessity these have to taught andlearned one after the other.

1. The interpretation of a passage of Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus

quoting Zeno of Citiuml is difficult and disputed. Epictetus points out that

being a professional is not determined by externals, but by the possession

of the techne(art,skill, craft)at issue,and that eachtechne'has a 'set oftheorems, a (subject-)matter, and an aim' (Diss. 4.8.11, Oewpicaxra ... xcal

iSX.v cca rcko;).This also holds for the philosopher ibid., 8.12):

ti; oBv SXD oioi nxOoa6pou; A' TpiowV; 0o, cxx&b Xoyo;. 'ri to

T;; jsi

Opop;V Tp4iova; oi, a~X~L O 6p06V i1EtV 'T6VX6YOV.oia OewpilgaTa; Ttj ti

'la ?epi io ; lLcywv ?iya; yivrat fj 0g a cia;&xX jiXXv a Ziv(v)

cye* "yvOvat ta Tto)X6yo0atotXcia, noiov nt EKaacTOVvcoTveatt sat n

&ptroe'rat p6; &XXia Ka" "Oca O`rot;&IoCoI)Oa av".

This may be renderedas follows (I do not yet attempt o translateogos):

What, then, is the (subject-)matterof the philosopher?It is not a rough mantle,

isn't it? No, it is the logos. What is his aim? It is not to wear a rough mantle,isn't it? No, it is to keep his logos right. What kind of theorems? They do not

have to do with growing a beard, or wearing one's hair long, do they? Nay,rather, t is as Zeno says: "to understand he elements of logos, (viz.) what each

of them is, and how they fit in with each other, and all that follows from them".

As we shall see, iASXis here used both in the sense of 'subject-matter'

and in that of the 'matter' hat has to be informedby the elements of the

Accepted August 2002

l In the chapterentitled 'To those who hastily assume the guise of philosophers'.Epictetusstll read Zeno, see Diss. 1.20.15, 4.9.6.

? KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, 2003 Phronesis XLV1II12

Also available online - www.brill.nl



ZENO ON THE UNITY OF PHILOSOPHY 117

logos. For the craftsas points of departureee also Diss. 1.15.2-3,whereEpictetusdealswith the 'subject-matter'otof the philosopherbutof phi-losophy;in this passagephilosophy s said to be 'the art of living'.2Thecrux of our presentpassage is the meaningof the formulara ToivXoyov

rotoqeia, he 'elementsof the logos'. A partof the text is printedby vonArnimas SVF 1.51, that is to say as the last of the five textswhich formthe firstsection of his Zeno chapter: A. Logica'. Since the other mem-bers of this set deal with dialectic,sophismsetc., von Arnim(followingPearson,TheFragmentsof Zeno and Cleanthes,London1891, whom he

excerpted to a degree in the first volume of the Stoicorum VeterumFragmenta) learlyattributes logical senseto the elementsof logos. Butone does not know exactly what he believes is meant,since he fails toprovidean exegetical note.Oldfather n the LoebEpictetus,andLong andSedley in the chapter Dialectic andRhetoric'of their HellenisticPhilo-sophers (1987) translate logos as 'reason'.3 Long and Sedley add a note:

rejecting he meaning partsof speech', or of 'discourse',4which the for-mulahas in othertexts andwhichmayhave been on von Arnim'smind,they arguethat the elementsof logos/reasonare concepts (Cvvotat)and

preconceptions (npoXP?et;). They adduce two proof-texts: one in Aetius,or ratherps.-Plutarch,5here we read thatthe 'logos/reason, or which weare called rational, s said to be completed rom our preconceptions ur-ing our first seven years'. The other in Galen,6who quotesChrysippus'OnAffections Hepinaa0v), whereChrysippus peaksof the partsof thesoul which constitute ts logos. By way of exegetical(but also polemical)commentGalenadds thatpresumablyChrysippuswishes us to rememberwhat he wrote in anothertreatise,the On the Logos (Hep' 'oi X6you),'where he said that the soul is a collectionof certainconcepts and pre-

conceptions.In favourof this translation ne may e.g. also refer to Pap.

2 For v5XTIs the subject-matter of the philosopher cf. Alcin. Did. 189.12-6Hermann,for that of philosophy Philo Congr. 144-5, Plu. Def. or. 410B. For the 'artof living' see below, n. 63 and text thereto.

3 Long and Sedley (hereafterL&S) vol. 1, Cambridgeetc. 1987 and laterrepr.,31J.4 For this meaningof the expression in Stoic 'fragments'see below, text to nn. 42-

44. A.A. Long, in his recent Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, Oxford2002, 20 translates"elementsof discourse"andibid. n. 20 states that"[th]is is unlikelyto be an exact citation of Zeno",who would be a mere figure-head.I believe that the

gist of the quotationgoes back to Zeno, see n. 1.I Aet. 4.11.4 (ps.Plu. 900C only) - L&S Nr. 39E.4, SVF 2.83.6 Gal. PHP 5.2.49 + 5.3.1 - L&S 53V (not translated n L&S vol. 1), SVF 2.841;

see also below, ? 2 ad init., and n. 59.

7 On this treatise see furtherbelow, n. 24 and text thereto.



118 JAAP MANSFELD

Herc. 1020 (perhapsby Chrysippus), ol. 1.11-24,8 on why thewise nevermakemistakes: In the firstplace,philosophy s eithera strivingafter thecorrectness f logos, or the understandinghereof,or moreparticularlyhesystematicstudydevoted to logos. For once we are thoroughly amiliarwith the partsof the logos andtheircombination,we shalluse it therightway. By logos I mean the one all rationalliving beings possess'. NotethatChrysippus(?) mphasizesthe importanceof doing philosophyas apreliminaryo the achievementof sophia,wisdom.

As to the 'fitting n with each other',Long and Sedleyrefer to a paper

by Long firstpublished n 1971, in which among otherthingshe provedthatthe importanterma&coXoOico'entailment')has the samefunction neach of the threepartsof philosophy.9

A differentogico/epistemicnterpretationf the Zenofragments advo-catedby F. Ild6fonse n herbook La naissance de la grammaire ans l'an-tiquitegrecque.'0 f I understand ercorrectly,herarguments as follows:the four so-calledStoic categorieswhen takentogetherallow a "determi-nationdiff6rencide",nevermoredifferentiatedndrefined equential eter-minationof what is perceived and apprehended,which culminates n a

propositioncontaininga completeperceptionof somethingreal, such as'if this is a man, it is a living being which partakesof reason'." Shearguesthat this categorialchain is statedexplicitly (!) in Epictetus'Zenofragment,but fails to explain in what way. I suppose she thinksthatthe'elements of logos' are the categories."2This interpretations hard torefute,but not necessarily rresistible.

8 SVF 2.298a, text as at FDS (for this siglum see below, n.14)

Fr.88, Kca[i ap]EVTo; OvTe; Tcov To[iV] Xoyot gopiowv xai T5 muv[Tat?ew ai]frv Xp[(iia6iicOa

E[E4(p(o a[U4]'r X6oyov e [Xf]yo tov I Ka[ra8qnpa]tvn&alt 4[oi;] Xoyt?ot;

iancpXovTa.Also cf. Arius Didymus ap. Stob. 2.7.5w, p. 63.1-5 W., (7n?p te TOKaX-

Xo;oqiJV 'iRaTo;Oat a4UjiE'TpicxaWV gEwX(VKaOEGOTCt)CVL)T(p icpo; 'acXXX11aE Kai

"p;t Xov, oiStwcca'ttOb Y; WuX~i; cxXXo 'oT't -1Itt o X6'youKca' ToVpo5 OOV, TaoX 1) a EtI cxgg?pta ToutDWa @

1gcpcivthus Meineke, geXiiv mss.] au'oi xp6P;TO)OXov rt aurfj; caL ipo; a&ikia

('. . . the beauty of the soul is a due proportionof the logos and its constituent parts,both in relationto the whole of the soul and in relation to each other').

I A.A. Long, 'Language and thoughtin Stoicism', in A.A. Long, ed., Problems inStoicism, London 1971, repr. 1996, 94 ff. Followed e.g. by I. Sluiter,Ancient Grammar

in Context,diss. Amsterdam 1990, 13 ff.10 Paris 1997, 234-5.

Based on Cic. Varro 21, but Cicero does not mention the categories.12 Also see A. Graeser, Zenon von Kition. Positionen und Probleme, Berlin/New

York 1975, 14 ff.




In his book Logic and the ImperialStoal3JonathanBarnesdiscusseslogical terms to be found in Epictetus'Discourses. He refers to Diss.2.9.7-9: a man is saved if he is actuallywhat the term'man' promisesthat he is. In a footnotehe refers to our text, where it is said (in Barnes'rendering) "that you must first learn xa toi Xo6yourotXs-ia". It is clear

thatBarneswould like to take this expression n a logical sense ('parts of

discourse', I presume),but he does not commithimself, statingthat 'thisis a notoriouslypuzzling text'. He refers to Karl-HeinzHulser,who involumeI of his Fragmenteder Dialektikder Stoiker of 1987'4points out

that becauseof the context in Epictetus t is not certain hat the fragmentshouldbe takenin a logical sense. I agreewith Hulser andBarnes,whichis not difficultbecause all I am doing is in fact agreeingwith myself.'5

2. A questionwhich one may pose is, thoughthe answer,naturally,canonlybe a guess: to what workby Zenomay we attribute hefragment?Mysuggestion s: to the On Logos, nfepi 6you.'6ThisZenonianbook-title sattested wice, both times in DiogenesLaertius7.39-40,'7 that is to say inthe sectionof the Stoic book of theLivesdealingwith the partsof philo-

sophy,or ratheron the partsof whatis called 'the logos pertainingo phi-losophy' (6oviax& (ptXoao(piavo6yov).'8nly 'Zeno of Tarsusand someothers' are affirmed o have held that the partsconcernedare 'not partsof the logos [of philosophy, hatis], but of philosophy tself (D.L.7.41).19

3 Leiden etc. 1997, 29 with n. 30.

"4 Stuttgart/BadCannstatt 1987, FDS Fr. 79. He translates (1.83) "Elemente derVemunft (Rede?)".

15 See Huilser,op. cit. l.xxi-ii, and my paper 'Zeno of Citium: criticalobservationson a recent study', Mnemosyne31 (1978) 139.

16 Not listed in the catalogue of Zeno's works at D.L. 7.4 - SVF 1.41. Anothercan-didate, perhaps a less likely one, is the Kazotca' listed ibid. to which no furtherref-

erences are extant. The meaning of this title is not clear: perhaps'universals', as atSext. M. 11.8-11 - SVF 2.224, L&S 30I (still, the proposition 'if some things are exis-tents, they are either good, or bad, or intermediate' is a theorem), perhaps as inEpictetus, for which see below, n. 56 and text thereto.

17 SVF 1.45, 1.46, 2.37; L&S 26B.

18 On the meaning of this formula at D.L. 7.39 ff. see K. Ierodiakonou, The Stoic

division of philosophy', Phronesis 38 (1993) 57 ff., who translates ogos as 'discourse'and provides several parallels. The interesting section 'La philosophieet l'ambiguit6du discours philosophique' in P. Hadot, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?, Paris1995, 265 ff. is not helpful in our present context.

19 SVF 3 Zeno Tars. Fr. 3; L&S 26B. See below, text after n. 59.



120 JAAP MANSFELD

Further nstancesof the formula, of Stoic provenance,are (1) Comut. ND 15.4-5Lang, who states that thereare 'threekinds of issues (or: speculations) by which

the logos concerned with philosophy is made complete' ('rpia'yEvilaKeoIgaTcov

eivat, 8t' Wv o KcaTa ptXoao(piav X6yo; auv tXipoi'rat - for this 'completion'see immediately below, D.L. 3.56 on Plato), and an explanationof the name

Tpv'royivem, bid. 37.14-6, 'others say that therebythe threekinds of issues (or:

speculations)of the theoryconcernedwith philosophyareplacedbefore the mind'

(iXxot E (paoa ata tourou rapiataacr6at 'rpiayEvq 'rv c;xsCg6amvrTj; KcaTa

qnXoao(piav Ieopia;).20This equivalence of logos and theoria is most interest-

ing. For the 'issues' or 'speculations'comparethe book-titleTCov oivqtxoao(poiu

oxeggal(v in Chrysippus'catalogue at D.L. 7.189. The similarformulas ost; ?V

qPnXoao0piaciggaatv and rCovV (ptkouo(pitaiccggsxtwvare found Plu. Virt.mor. 447F and Procl. In Tim. 1.169.27 Diehl, respectively. (2) Philo Agr. 14 -

SVF 2.39 (he goes on with the similes):2' I'Ov yov Ka'a qtXoaotiav Xoyov

`p ov O6vra rot; akiaot; a&ypi qpatv ancticaiaat (simarly at Mut. 74).

For the expression icara ptXocopiav X&yo; ee also Philo Decal. 150, Quaest.

Gen. bk. 2 Fr. 41; Stob. 2.31.104, 4.44.81, 4.50a.27. Cleanthes ap. Phld. Mus.,PH 1497, col. 28.1 ff. (~ SVF 1.489) speaks of 'rot)[Xyy]o. ri; ptXOOo(pia;.Note that accordingto D.L. 3.56 the i; XptoGopfrx; oyo; eventually became

complete i.e. tripartite hanks to Plato who addeddialectic, and thataccordingto

ibid. 5.28 Aristotledivided the logos concernedwith (Kcaxa')philosophy into twoparts (5vrr6%vJivatOrv KcaraQpiocoiav X&yov):the formula had become what

today is often called 'doxographical', or so it appears.In later authorsthe for-mula X6yot (or X6yo;) rri; wtXoao(pioi;s aboutequivalent to 'philosophy', e.g.

Iambl. VP 87, Eus. Contra Marc. 1.4.24.

We are rather poorly informed about the contents of Zeno's treatise, but

are told at least one important thing, or rather two related things. Zeno

according to Diogenes Laertius was the first22 to say that the logos per-

taining to philosophy falls into three parts: a physical part, an ethical part,

20 Cf. Chrysippus'three kinds of theorems, below n. 22.21 See below, n. 31 and text thereto.22 I do know that this priority is also attributed o the Old Academy, more partic-

ularly to Xenocrates(Sext. M. 7.16 - Xenocr. Fr. 1 Heinze, 82 Isnardi-Parente), ndthat this is accepted by many scholars. Arist.Top. 1.14.105bl9-25 divides 'statements'and 'problems' into 'three parts' (Rep' rpia), viz. ethical, physical and logical. Thisis notyet anexplicitdivision of philosophy,pace e.g. E. Berti,Lafilosofladel <<primo>>

Aristotele, 2nd rev. ed. Milan 1997, 414. ChrysippusOn Lives book IV at Plu. SR1035A - SVF 2.42, L&S 26C (cf. below, n. 30) speaks of the 'three kinds of theo-

rems of the philosopherformulatedby the ancients'; cf. Comutus, quotedabove, ? 2

ad init. But by his time the division had become firmly established, so one cannot besure who these ancientsare. Zeno, the first part of whose life overlaps with the lastpart of Xenocrates',may well be included (cf. the 'ancients' at Philo Agr. 14, above,? 2 ad init.) Let us compromise by saying that Zeno was the first Stoic to advocate

the tripartition.




and a logical part.He was followed by Chrysippusn thefirstbook of thelatter's treatisewith the same title (On Logos), in the first book of his

Physics, and by numerousother Stoics of which the names and some

book-titles regiven:ApollodorusEphillus,Eudromus, iogenesof Seleucia

and Posidonius (D.L. 7.39).23

Two other testimonies are extant which inform us about the contents of

Chrysippus' On Logos: (1) at D.L. 7.54 - SVF 2.105, L&S 40A (where the title

is translatedas On Reason) we read that in book I he also dealt with the crite-

ria of truth,mentioningsense-perceptionand preconception; 2) according to Gal.

PHP 5.3.1-2-

SVF 2.841, L&S 53V24he said - book-numbernot specified -that logos/reasonis a collection of concepts and preconceptions,' and that these

are parts of logos/reason (X6yoi ... 6opia).So this treatise dealt with more top-

ics than the parts of (the logos of) philosophy, viz. epistemology and theory of

mind.One cannot be certain thatthese were also dealt with in Zeno's On Logos,26

though this is not to be rejected out of hand.

The second piece of information oncerningZeno's treatise s about theorderof theseparts: ogic first,physics second,ethics third.Amongthose

whoadvocatedhisorder resaid tobe Zeno n the OnLogos,andChiysippus,Archedemus and Eudromus (D.L. 7.40;27 no titles given). DiogenesLaertiuscontrasts his groupwith others(no namesmentioned)who held

that 'no part is separated rom another,but they are blended, so they

taughtthem as a blend' (D.L. 7.40).28 We happento know that this con-trast is flawed,at the very least insofar as Chrysippuss concerned.To

give only one example, in another treatise,the On How to Use Logos

(Iepi X6you piiesw;)quotedby Plutarch,29e argued hatwhen studyinglogic one shouldalso make use of 'the others'(wv akkXov),hat is to sayof what belongs with the other partsof philosophywheneverthis turnsout to be required.Chrysippus s severelycriticisedby Plutarch or thus

disturbinghis own systematicorder of the partsof philosophy, n which

23 SVF Apoll. Fr. 1, Eudr. Fr. 1, Diog. Fr. 2, and Posid. Fr. 87 E.-K.; L&S 26B.

The title of Eudromus' book, significantly enough, is 'H0uci roItxEIC0at;later also

used by Hierocles; see G. Bastianini and A.A. Long at Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici

Greci e Latini, I 1**, Florence 1992, 373: "trattazione 'elementare' nel senso di'fondativa' e non nel senso di 'rudimentale' o 'semplice"'; references to the literature

ibid., 374).24 Long and Sedley omit PHP 5.3.1; tidtle gain translatedas On Reason.25 Cf. above, text to n. 8 and below, n. 59.26 For Long's and Sedley's translation of Zeno's title see below, n. 57.27 SVF 1.46, 2.34, Arch. Fr. 5, Eudr. Fr. 1, Diog. Fr. 16; L&S 26B.28 SVF 2.41, L&S 26B.29 SR 1035E - SVF 2.50. More examples at Ierodiakonouop. cit., 68 ff.



122 JAAP MANSFELD

theology,the so to speakmysticalculmination eXeri) of physics,comeslast.30Thefamous Stoic similesfor the partsof philosophy:a walledgar-den rich nfruits,an eggwith itswhite,yolkandshell,cappedbyPosidonius'

simile of theliving beingconsistingof bloodandflesh,bones andsinews,and soul,3" lso demonstrate he unity of philosophyand the interdepen-dence of its parts.

As a matterof fact, the systematicunity of Stoic philosophy s empha-sized by both ancient authors and modem scholars. In the illuminatingpages dealingwith this issue in his bookLe systemestoicien et l'idee de

temps32VictorGoldschmidtppeals o the Stoic doctrine f the XvtaKxo1)Oiariov a&pr7w-v,he 'reciprocal implication of the virtues': one cannot have

one virtue alone and not have the others as well. In book I of his OnVirtuesChrysippus aidthat this is so because thevirtuessharetheirtheo-rems.33 This inter-entailmentdoctrine (though not the term a&vrancoXou90a)

is attested orZeno by Plutarch:mhe cardinalvirtues are inseparablebutyet distinctand different rom one another';Zeno next defined each indi-vidualvirtue.Goldschmidtarguesthat this inter-entailmentlso holds forthe partsof Stoic philosophy.35f for the momentwe forgetabout Stoics

such as Ariston,who limitedphilosophyto ethics, we cannot but admitthat he is right.

I For this orderand terminology see the verbatimquotation from Chrysippus'OnLives book IV at Plu. SR 1035A - SVF 2.42, L&S 26C (cf. above, n. 22). See e.g.

my paper 'Providence and the destruction of the universe in early Stoic thought', in

J. Vermaseren, ed., Studies in Hellenistic Religions, Leiden etc. 1979, 134 ff. (repr.with samepaginationas Study I in my Studies inLater GreekPhilosophyandGnosticism,

London 1989).

31 Sext. M. 7.17-9 (- SVF 2.38 1st text, Posid. Fr. 88 E.-K., L&S 26D); D.L. 7.40(- SVF 2.38, 2nd text, L&S 26B; Diogenes Laertius does not cite names but beginswith Posidonius' simile, and adds that of a walled city governed according to logos).For Philo on this theme see above, text to n. 21. See furtherK.-H. RohLke,BildhafteVergleichebei den Stoikern,Hildesheim/New York 1975, 410 f.

32 First publ. Paris 1953; I quote from the 4th rev. ed. of 1979, 64-7. Also cf.Ierodakonou,op. cit. 63, and J. Brunschwig, 'Les Stoiciens' in M. Canto-Sperbered.),Philosophie grecque, Paris 1997, 516-21.

33 SVF 3.295 (D.L. 7.125-6); cf. 2.299 (Plu. SR 1046E - L&S 61F).34 SR 1034C - SVF 1.200, L&S 61C.

3S Aet procem.2 (ps.Plutarchonly, 874D - SVF 2.35, L&S 26A) reports hataccord-

ing to the Stoics the most general virtues (of the wise man, I presume) are three innumber,which is the reason why philosophy is tripartite,physics being concernedwiththe enquiry concerning the cosmos, etc. Paralleledat ps.Andron.De pass. 3.2, 241.35-

6 (not in SVF) and 50-4 Glibert-Thiny (- SVF 3.267) on the virtues subordinateto

(ppoviat;, where in the summaryat the end logic is replaced by its subdisciplines




3. It would be nice if we had an explicit statementby Zeno to the effectthat the partsof philosophy,or ratherof the logos of philosophy,form asystematicand consistentwhole.

WhatI would like to suggest is that in fact we do have such a state-ment:I submit hatwe mayinterprethe fragment ransmitted y Epictetusas dealingwith the systematiccoherence of the logos of philosophy,as

eventuallyincarnated, o to speak, in the philosopher. have suggestedabovethat the treatise n which this fragmentwouldbe at home is Zeno's

OnLogos. In this OnLogos the logos of philosophy s divided into three

parts.It is quite apt to neutralize his division to some extentby insistingthat these partsbelongtogether, hatis to say forma unified,or unifiable,whole. The elements(crotXFita)f the logos, a termanticipatedby Epic-tetus with the term'theorems',would then be the principlesof (eachpartof) the logos of philosophy,and it would be these principleswhich 'fit inwith each other' in the sense thateach principlepresupposes he others,and leads to the others.For the formula with each other' here entailsthatthis relation s reciprocal, s an inter-relation.36t is, then, the task of the

dialectic and rhetoric. Glibert-Thirrybrackets ethics (also omitted by von Arnim)which is lacking in some mss. and in William of Moerbeke's translation,but one need

not concur;moreover, ethics is representedby several of its subordinatevirtues, justas logic is at the beginning of the chapter. Further parallels at A. Glibert-Thirry,Pseudo-Andronicusde Rhodes <<? EPI IAef2N>>, Corp. lat comm. in Arist. graec.suppl. 2, Leiden 1977, 306 f. The earliest evidence is Cic. Fin. 3.72-3 - SVF 3.281-82, on dialectic, physics and (by implication) ethics as virtues. Add Strabo 2.5.2 (notin SVF), i1&Jvdi" p&pe ntt;- tc 8' xpETaravv1no0EtoEI atFIv CEaivv ilpn?va;,Kcaliv aiorat; c%oI(saq;ate apxa&;ati t&a; epit to{v itaCtt;, and D.L. 7.46,Triv 6taK-ttdv [..v &pET' v ?V e6t neptexo'xav petz, D.L. 7.83 &pe (both

at SVF 2.130); D.L. 7.92 - SVF 3.261, others say the virtues are three: koytd1v icaA

(epX)t flv KcaXttrlmv.

36 See e.g. Alcin. Did. 169.7 Hermann, on the Platonic elements: apiooacOvtovnav-rv avakoyi'a npo; a&XXikia. ompare, in Epictetus' report about the Kurieu6n(Diss. 2.19.1 - SVF 2.283), the phrase about the mutual incompatibility of its com-ponentstatements:KotvT .. . oikn1; paXr; Toi; tpta'tro&rot; ip'O; aXXTIka;Cleom.

Cael. 1, 1.1 1-3 Todd (- SVF 2.534), on the interrelationof the parts of the cosmos:

5;o-enaOFrtGai v Ev ai4 gptpv tpo; a&XXriXasee R. Goulet, Cleomede, Theorie

ilkmentaire, Paris 1980, 179-80). Furthere.g. Marc. Aur. 3.13.1, 6.38.1. - The descrip-tive formula oi X6yovcrrotcia which apg6o,retat ipob; iXkXka is to some extentparalleled by one of the two definitions of a philosophical hairesis cited and appliedSext. P. 1.16 (irpo6oaktaiv

86'ygaal toXXoi;a&icoXojOIiav

Xouatnpo;a k1hi k.

- cf. Clem. Strom. VIII 5.16.2, printed SVF 2.121), at D.L. 1.20 (np6oacktaiv

8oypocccLv&okoX0iavexovastv: 'adhesion a des doctrines presentant un enchaine-ment', tr. Goulet) - Diogenes' version being obviously abridged, and at ps.Galen Hist.

phil. 7 (itpoacXktotvBoyga'uovnokXXv pbo;&aXllXao-qxpvcov KC..).



124 JAAP MANSFELD

philosopher o understandwhat preciselyeach of these principles s, i.e.to distinguishthem from each other(just as one has to distinguish heindividualvirtues from each otheralthough they are 'inseparable'),butalso to understandn whatway theyhangtogether, hat s to say to under-stand in what way the logos of philosophy s one andunifiable.And asa next step one shouldunderstandwhatfollows from this set of interre-lated principles:not only the rest of the logos of philosophy, presume,but also the correctuse of this logos by the humanagent.

This may be illustrated n a simplemanner.Zeno's telos-formulahas

been transmitted n two versions:(1) 'to live in agreementwith nature,that is to live according o virtue; ornature eadsus towardsvirtue'(D.L.7.87, Zeno in the On the Natureof Man), and (2) 'to live in agreement;this is to live according to one logos which is in harmony' (AriusDidymus37p. Stob.2.7.6a.1;no book-title).38Whichof thesetwoversionsis the originalone, or whether the addedexplanationsare original, t ishard to say, but these issues need not detain us now.39Let us firsttakethe second and simplerversion,which does not referto nature.Even so,it shows thatknowledge belongingwith the domainof 'logic' in the Stoic

sense of the word) and ethics go together.That the logos according owhich one has to live has to be 'in harmony'(as the addedexplanationhas it) entails thatit has partswhichhave to forma consistentwhole.Theauthenticityof Diogenes Laertius'version is shoredup by the fact thatthe tide of the treatiseby Zeno where it was to be foundis mentioned,and because Zeno also wrotea treatiseentitledOn theLifeAccording oNature (nepiToi acTat (piD6otviou).40 This first version is even clearer. To

live in agreement s: to live in agreementwith nature.Ethicsdependsonphysics, but also, of course,on logic i.e. knowledge,becauseone has to

understand ature n order o be able to live in agreementwith it. And weare able to understandnaturebecause we are partof nature,or of the

37 ogoboyoue'vco; 4inv- roiso 8' er'd ica0' i?va X6yov at' uPoWVo v. AriusDidymus can no longer be identified with Augustus' courtphilosopherArius (a Stoic),so not only his affiliation but also his precise date are uncertain.See T. Goransson,Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Goteborg 1995, 208 ff.

38 Both texts at SVF 1.179 (cf. L&S 63C and 63B). Diogenes' version is supportedby Cic. Fin. 4.14, likewise printed SVF 1.179.

39 See my paper 'Diogenes Laertius on Stoic philosophy', Elenchos 7 (1986) 331

ff. (repr. with same pagination in myStudies in the Historiography of GreekPhilosophy, Assen/Maastricht1990), where I arguethat both definitionsmay be attrib-

uted to Zeno. See furtheresp. G. Striker,Essays in HellenisticEpistemologyand Ethics

(Cambridge 1996) 2234, and Brunschwig, op. cit. 551-2.40 D.L. 7.4 - SVF 1.41.




world,4'ourselves: so natureenables us to acquire the knowledge bymeansof which, in its turn, t can be known by theknower,andfollowedby the agent. And understandinghe principleson which a morally cor-rect action is based entailsknowing why one is doing what one is doing,

and so entails knowing oneself, viz. knowing one's position vis-a-vis

natureand as partof nature,and so presupposes nowledgeof nature.

4. But we shouldreturn o the Zeno fragment n Epictetus,and morepar-

ticularlyto the expression a toi X6oyoi totxeia, the 'elements of the

logos'. Galen PHP 8.3.14 (- SVF 2.148) says that Chrysippus called 'thenoun,verb,preposition, rticle andconjunction' ou X6oyouToIxeia, ele-mentsof discourse'.There are also two titles in the second series of the

thirdsection of the logical part of Chrysippus'bibliographywhich pointin thisdirection.42n his accountof the view of Diogenes of Seleucia con-cerned with the noun, name, verb, conjunctionand article DiogenesLaertiususes the formulasgipo; Xoyoi andcTotXciov oyounterchange-ably, though it would seem that Diogenes of Seleucia used gipo; andunnamedothers ToltXEoV.43This, as far as I know, is al the indubitable

andclearevidence relating o the Stoicswe haveabout oi X6oyoitColxEtaas 'elements of discourse' or, if you wish, 'of language', or 'speech',translatedby Cicero Luc. 92 as elementa oquendi.4

41 D.L. 7.142-3 - SVF 2.633 (cf. L&S 53X), laudatio of Chrysippus'OnProvidencebook I, Apollodorus'Physics (- SVF Apoll. Fr. 10), and Posidonius (- Fr. 99a E.-K.).I. Kidd,Posidonius vol. II, TheCommentary i), Cambridge1988, 404 plausibly arguesthat the substance of this argument derives from Zeno. Compare the argumentcon-cerning spermatic reason attributed o Zeno at Sext. M. 9.101-3 (not in SVF; on thispassage see the forthcoming paper of T.L. Tieleman, 'Zeno and PsychologicalMonism: The Evidence Reconsidered'), as well as Chrysippus' view at D.L. 7.87 -

SVF 3.4, L&S 63C ('our naturesare part of the nature of the whole').42 Ap. D.L. 7.192-3, two out of five:Hepit W-vFTo0tXEiWVilX6you Icacidv YOAE,vcov

a' j y' 5' ?', and Hep't v aowiXiwv 'ro X6yo) ip6; Ntidcava'.43 D.L. 7.58 (- SVF Diog. Fr. 22, L&S 33M).I Cf. also Cic. Luc. 143, quod in elementis dialectici docent.... Simpl. in Cat.

10.21 ff. Kalbfleisch cites Pophyry (Porph. Fr. 46F Smith - Thphr. Fr. 683 FHS&G),who says that Theophrastus n his treatise Hcp'trCov oil X6youa'rotXriVw discussedthe question 'whether only noun and verb are elements of logos, or also articles andconjunctions etc., which are parts of diction' (or 'expression', X?_4Eo ...

gkpi).

But this treatise is elsewhere cited with the more appropriate itle nepp'tXeco;, seeW.W. Fortenbaugh & al., Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings,

Thought & Influence vol. 2, Leiden etc. 1982, p. 510 at 17a-b. Simplicius may havemade a mistake.



126 JAAP MANSFELD

I have said above that one cannot deny with absolute confidencethatthis sense is valid for the Zeno fragment,but also suggestedthat another

meaningmay be putto the test. The meaningI have in mind is elements

not in the sense of 'what something s composedof (though this is not

ruledout, as we shall see) but in the sense of 'whatsomething s based

on': principles, irsts,points of departure,primitives.Furthermore, am

less concernedwith their form (as propositionsor arguments, houghthis

is relevantas well) thanwith their systematicfunction.

This meaningcan be amply documented.Lucretius 1.81 speaks of

rationis ... elementa,where ratio pertains o "a system of philosophy".45Rationistranslates 6you,or so I presume, ust as does Cicero's loquendi

(see above); Latin speakers when translatingthe Greek word had to

choose. Bailey in his comments on this line of Lucretiusaptly refers to

Epic. Ep. Hdt.47, 'it is useful to grasp this principleas well' (Xp#noluov

&h cad oito ICcvCaoeIvto TolXsov).46Horacewrites to Maecenas n his

first Epistle that he has renounced frivolous poetry and now studies

(mostly Stoic)ethics,47which is difficult o put into practice.But one can

try; Horaceholds himself in check and consoles himself with its 'ele-

ments' (Ep. 1.27, elementis).He provides a strikingexample of such an'element', ibid. 41-2, 'virtue is to flee fromvice, and the most important

wisdom to be free fromstupidity'.The Stoic doctrine nvolved is too well

4 See C. Bailey, T. LucretiiCari De RerumNaturavol. II, Commentary,Books I-111

(Oxford 1947 and laterrepr.) ad loc., and p. 605-6 on the various meanings of ratio.

46 Transferredby Bailey to before ? 63 (not by Arrighetti, who translates in the

same way as Bailey: "e utile tenere a mente anche questo principio").Cf. also Epic.

Ep. Men. 123, 'principles of the good life'. I retract a remark made in my paper

EpicurusPeripateticus, n A. Alberti. ed., Realtd e ragione. Studisulla filosofi antica,

Acc. <<La Colombaria>>Studi 140, Florence 1994, p. 47, where I argue that at Epic.

Ep. Pyth. 86 the use of otxoqcia n the sense of physical elements is due to Peripatetic

influence. Other authorstoo, e.g. Aristotle, Lucretius, and Cicero use GtotXEta/ele-menta both in the sense of physical elements (and even letters of the alphabet) and in

that of principles.47 In the next Epistle he recommendsthe study of Homer, who is even better than

ChiysippusandCrantoron what is good, evil, useful, and useless (Ep. 2.3-4). Horace's

tongue was in his cheek in the first Epistle, but that does not detract from the value

of the informationprovided;what is more, Homer is better than the philosophersonly

because of the exempla provided. Compare Porphyrio's comment, p. 270.20-71.4

Meyer: scribens Lollio ait lecto a se poemate Homeri manifestumsibi factum esse,

melius exprimi ab eo philosophiaepraecepta quam ab optimis eius professionis auc-

toribus Chrysippoet Crantore. In Iliade enium ostendit vitia hominum, n Odyssia per

Ulixis personam virtutes demonstrat.The rest of the 2nd Epistle to a large degree is

again concernedwith moral philosophy.




knownto stand in need of Belege; note that Horace says 'to flee fromvice', not 'to be freefromvice'."8One may compare he concludingpara-

graph of Philo's De agricultura, n which he says that 'Noah, the right-eous man, having made himself master of the primaryelements of thecraft of agriculture, lacked the strength to reach its final stages'.49

Galen in the De dignoscendispulsibus speaks of 'the first issues andso to speakelementsof the account(or theory,logos)' - viz., of pulses-and of 'thefirstsandelements,so to speak,of the whole account(or the-

ory, logos) concerningpulses'.S Earlier n the same work he uses a dif-

ferentformula,speakingnot of the elementsof the doctrine at issue, butof those of the art,techne:'yet these are the firsts and so to speak ele-ments of the artdealingwith pulses; if these are not known it is impos-sible to have certainknowledgeof the others',viz. of the othertheorems.5'Elsewherehe speaksof 'the elementsof the art of Hippocrates'.52tobaeusAnth.3.14.7haspreserved long fragment f a comedybya certainNicolaus(datenot known),in which a parasite nstructsthe public about his art;this figure gives quite a few examples,and says (line 31): 'these are theelements of my whole art' (atotXeiapiv taiY' at'airi; O'kXi;vXvr).153

This use ofoYotXFia

n thesense of'principles'can also be documentedfromAristotle'sTopics.5At is, for instance,a atotX6yovhatthe extension

48 See Porphyno'scomment on line 28, p. 269.3-5 Meyer: 'this is his reply to thosewho discourage the study of wisdom [i.e. philo-sophy] by denying that anyone has

ever acquired perfect wisdom' (his respondet, qui a studio sapientiae deterrentes

negantperfectamsapientiamquemquamadsecutum).

4 Philo Agric. 181, N&e ov 8icatov, '6; r'ci pGa caz OTotXeu.'6&ir; yeopytC,;

cta?ci.RsVOo; T?viI; axpt td@vnepa6Tov a&Srf; EEXOIv i'1a9iviacT.

50 8.818.14-5 Kuhn, t-a o5vOVrpata 7Tcxga xat oiove't crotXcia TroO 6yo,

and ibid. 934.13-4, TcaiT' Eatia rp&ta icat oiov atotxeta TroOavro; ncpt rv om)yv

x6yoii.51 8.771.9-12Kuhn, cait'rot )CZETa'c xanpiTa Kcai OtOvarot%Ea T; ?v oto;axygot;

C~s;~tv v&vo~cvo~ 'r&v&Xova kvoiU'Bv OTOv' ijv yvwvatIeki;E%'-VII 'FT,iV, COVaVOO'UgEVCOV 0D6 TVa UEOO V vvt OcPai's;;

cf. ibid. 776.6-9, ci go6vovxcpi' n&pGxa KcaitoiovEdatotxeia "-; T?nvi ticcavov; ir

-rTetp4q.vo;.

52 Adv.Lycum, 18A.197.6-7 Kuhn, 8jX6; iatt g8ra ta ootia -; 'Inoicpa6tol);

53 This is Com. graec. Nicolaus fr. 1 Kassel and Austin, who tentatively date the

author to the 2nd cent. CE (i.e. roughly make him a contemporary of Epictetus) andfor arotxcicxappositelyrefer to Epic. Ep. 3.123.

S4As is recognized by P. Slomkowski,Aristotle's Topics, Leiden etc. 1997, 49, whomoreoverpoints out that thereare topoi which closely resemble the Aristotelian prin-ciples of the principiumcontradictionisand the excluded middle. For furtherexam-ples (and parallels in other Aristotelian treatises) see ibid., loc. cit. and 45 ff. Alsocompareanother early treatise,Cat. 12.14a36-bl, on mathematics: 'the elements are



128 JAAP MANSFELD

of the genus is wider than thatof the species and the specificdifference(Top. 4.1.121b1 1-3). At Top. 4.5.128a21-9 three such aroiXEia are listed:

(1), the extensionof the genus is wider than thatof the difference;2), as

to the definition of the 'what it is' the genus is more fitting than the

difference;and (3), the differencealways means a quality of the genus,

but not conversely. Clearly, principles uch as these are of fundamental

importance o the whole of Aristotle'sdialecticin the Topics.55One can-

not practise the technique of dialecticaldisputationwithout havingthem

continuouslyat the back of one's mind.

5. My hypothesis, then, is that the elements of logos in the Zeno fragment

transmitted y Epictetusare theelementary nd fundamental rinciples f

tie logos te'sfilosofias, f the Stoicphilosophical octrine, ystem,orgeneral

theory.56 These principlescan be taughtand learned,and the theory can

grow (as it did duringthe historyof the school).Hicks' translation,n the

Loeb Diogenes Laertius, of Zeno's title Hepi '6you, viz. Expositionof

Doctrine, is in my view on the right track.57 heory,or doctrine,when

assimilatedby a human being, becomes part of his soul and so informs

his logos, or reason.58 The logos, or doctrine, of philosophy becomespart of and so determines the logos, or reason,of the philosopher.This

explainswhy Epictetus s in a position o lead upto his quotationby twice

using the term logos in the sense of 'reason':logos/reason s the '(sub-

prior to the proofs' - which holds in analogous ways for other disciplines. The title

nfep'tTotsiowv ax j' y' in the Aristoteliancatalogue at D.L. 5.23 may also be rele-

vant, see P. Moraux, Les listes anciennesdes ouvrages d'Aristote, Louvain 1951, 82-

83 (note that M. Narcy in M.-O. Goulet-Caze,ed., Diog6ne Laerce, Vies et doctrines

des philosophes illustres, Paris 1999, 578 n. 1, who argues in this direction is a bitimprecise), though it may well be a misplaced title of a physical work.

ss Cf. Cic. Top. 25, 'the topoi presented as the elements (elementis) for discover-

ing any argumenthave now been describedand defined'.

"6 Epictetus' own term for these principlesseems to be ta (ca6o0k1cacf., perhaps,

the Zenonian book-title quoted above, n. 16). See Diss. 4.4.29-30, where examples of

generalrules are given, and 4.12.7, where it is said that they must always be at one's

disposal (s pxetpa"

ewv cat Xwp't;EiCriVWVsi a0E11etv).See R. Dobbin,Epictetus.Discourses Book 1, Transl. with Introd.& Comm., Oxford1998, 155 ff. Fornp6Xetpovsee e.g. Epict. Diss. 3.29.95, 4.4.34, on Cleanthes' four lines of prayer to Zeus-and-

Destiny; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-romischeTradition der Seelenleitung,

Berlin 1969, 58 n. 107.57 LongandSedley vol. 1 159 translateOn Discourse,while theytranslateChrysippus'

identical title as On Reason (above, n. 24).

58 Compare heexplanationof thedifferencebetweentheincorporeal ogos tesfilosofias

and corporealphilosophy by Ierodiakonou,op. cit. 60 f.




ject-)matter'of the philosopher, nd his 'aim' is to keep his logos/reasonright. Accordingto Zeno, in orderto do this he mustknow, thatis to say

have imitated,the elements of logos/doctrine.He must be able to distin-

guish each of them individuallyas well as be aware of theirinterdepen-

dence. And he must searchfor andbe aware of whatfollows from these

principles.

As principlesper se the elements of logos are principlesof doctrine.

As principles hat have beenreproduced ndcopied,and thus been incor-

poratedor corporealized, heyarepartsof humanreason:cognitions, atio-

nal ingredientsof our soul. Philosophyhas become a partof the humanmind.59This explains why Zeno of Tarsus and others could hold that the

partsconcerned are partsof philosophy,not of the logos of philosophy;

but this is by the way.Epictetus began his diatribeagainstthe pseudo-philosophers ith the

arts andcrafts,the technai: hese have a (subject-)matter,n aim,andtheo-

rems. According to him this also holds for philosophy.Evidenceexists

that otherStoics too saw philosophyas a techne'.A definitionof philos-

ophy as the 'practisingof the techne of what is appropriate'a`a"at;

enct'riou tCXv%) s transmitted by ps.Plutarch/Aetius.0 This rather latesnippetof information omes quiteclose to one of the definitionsof phi-

losophy at Pap. Herc. 1010 col. 1.14-5 as the 'pursuitof rightnessof

logos/reason'([]mnTJu[c;t];ko6yoi p[0]6t0o;),6' which is attributed o

Chrysippusby Isidorusof Pelusion.62 n exampleof the well-known butpresumablyalso a bit late) definitionof philosophyas ars vitae is pro-vided at Epict. Diss. 1.15.3 (ri; iep't iov tXV ).63 In his overview of

59Chrysippusis taken to task by Gal. PHP 5.2.49-5.4 (cf. above, text to nn. 6-8)because in the flep' iuxaiv he said that 'there are parts of soul (tri; 4mxyIs; 'ppT)

throughwhich its logos/reason and its disposition are constituted',while in the On

Logos he said that 'concepts and preconceptionsare partof logos/reason'. To Galen,who defends the tripartitepsychology of Plato (and, as he believes, of Hippocrates),soul and logos/reason are not identical, but for a Stoic this view is standard, ince the

affections are perversions of logos, or reason in a perverteddisposition. Note more-

over the precision of Chrysippus'expression;he does not say 'all the parts of soul'.

6 Procem.2 (ps.Plu. 874E) - SVF 2.35, L&S 26A. Cf. ps.Gal. Hist. phil. ? 5 (notin

SVF), oi &? 9acfnOIv avop6not; eintnbcia; dxvii;0piaavro [sc. tiv PtXoqPIdavl,a(icrlcriav &vlrriv pnXoao(pixvEiivtet;, ?n&icaV &? xvilv tVi aoqiav 6vogatcav-

ec;"X. For aalcytn; of the virtues/technai

consistingof theorems see Ar. Did.

ap.Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b4, 61.15-9 Wachsmuth - SVF 3.278.61 Translatedabove, text after n. 8.62 Migne PG 77, 1637.

63 See also above, text to n. 2; the formula is often found in Sextus. On the relation



130 JAAP MANSFELD

Stoic ethicsAriusDidymussays that'all the virtueswhich areknowledge(in the plural)and crafts sharetheirtheoremsand aim'."'The subscrip-tion of the second section of the part listing the ethical works in

Chrysippus'catalogueat D.L. 7.201 suggests that the 'crafts and virtuesproducedby thelogoswhich is common'mayamount o the samething.65We should recall on the one handthat Epictetus n the Zeno quotationspeaksof the aimandtheoremsof the craftsand of the philosopher,andon the otherthatChrysippustated hatthevirtuesareinseparable ecausethey sharetheirtheorems.66inally, as we have seen theparts of philos-

ophyarevirtues aboven. 35), andthe(more mportant)irtuesaretechnai.

6. Even so, I do not know any textwhere philosophy s called a sciencetoutcourt.To be sure,DiogenesLaertius ells us thataccording o 'somethelogical part s divided ntotwoepistemai,dialecticandrhetoric' 7.41);and in the definitionsof these sub-partsof logic which follow (7.42) weagain find the wordepisteme.67osidonius'differentdefinitionof dialec-tic as the 'knowledge perhaps:discipline) of the true, the false and theneitherof these' (D.L. 7.62), modelledafterthe definitionsof the virtues,

also calls it an epistme.68Perhaps he 'episttmaithe graspingof whichis thwartedby conceit'according o an apophthegm ttributedo Zenoare

logic, ethics andphysics.!9

between this art of living and the others,esp. the stochastic arts (e.g. medicine) seeG. Striker, 'Antipater,or the art of living', in M. Schofield and G. Striker,eds., TheNorms of Nature, Cambridge1986, 194 ff., repr. in G. Striker,Essays on HellenisticEpistemology and Ethics, Cambridge1996, 306 ff.

4 Ap. Stob. Ecl. 2.7.5b5, 63.6-7 Wachsmuth - SVF 3.280, L&S 61D: nadsa; 6i

ta; apeta; oaat eintaTfiati Eiot I(X TL val Kotva Te,0eFp-Ra) a "xctv icSa'tTX'o;.

The inseparabilityof the virtues is mentionednext. See also, among the definitions ofepisteme which are found in the section on the good (not printed in SVF vol. 1) ibid.2.7.5', 73.23-74.1 Wachsmuth - SVF 3.112, L&S 41H.3 (in the section 'Knowledgeand opinion'): 'another definition of knowledge [Long and Sedley translate science'])is a system of technicalpieces of knowledgewhich contains certaintyin itself, as arethe virtues' (&XXo; [Wachsmuth,&aXiv ms., followed by L&S] - scil., ?itar'STV

Etval - e au, rlxa e', cntaTr1jePvtCXvuC0VEt arroiv Exov sob P3fcalov, b; Coi.otv

at apera); this text too implies that the virtues are inseparable.I 'The ethical topos dealing with the logos that is common and the crafts and

virtues that arise therefrom'.I See above, text to n. 33. I suppose that Chrysippus (and Arius Didymus) are

thinkingof the primary heorems, for the virtues/technaican hardly have all their the-orems in common.

67 SVF 2, L&S 31A (who translatec'ntag as 'sciences').6 SVF 2.122, Posid. Fr. 188 E.-K.69 D.L. 7.23 - SVF 1.71 (and 321), "ckeyc 86' grnv civatv oiaco; &XX)o-




But otherStoics call dialectic a techne',as in Diogenes of Seleucia's

and Crinis' book-titlesat D.L. 7.71 (AtaXe1icti'T%Xvi),n the catalogueof Sphaerus at D.L. 178 (TEXvi; 8taXElcxtcii; Hvo), and, particularly

important,as the fifth title of Chrysippus'catalogueat D.L. 190 (T?xvll5taXFeictuirpb;'AptcT?ay6pav').'0 According to PlutarchChrysippus

also called rhetorica techne.&7erhaps the best course to follow is to

assume that in Stoic (and Stoicizing) texts inta"Sgn either means 'knowl-

edge' or 'understanding',r is more or less equivalent o techne'. n ourZeno fragmentand severalrelatedtexts we are,afterall, dealingwith the

philosopherandphilosophy,not with the wise man and wisdom.

Admittedlypartof this evidenceis late, and not all of it is concernedwith individualStoics, but it helps to explain the contextin Epictetus.I

do not wish to arguethatEpictetus'theoremsand Zeno's elements havethe same extension.Yet I submitthat all elementsof this type are theo-

rems, or can be converted nto theorems,while the converse is presum-ably false. Zeno's 'elements'are the primary heoremswhich should beknown individuallyas well as collectively, that is to say insofaras theyare inter-entailed.But the philosopher hould also try hard to understandwhat follows from theseprimaryheorems, hat s to say anyfurther heo-

rems that can be known,and all of thisknowledgeshould be appliedandpractised.The philosopher s to be recognizedfrom what he knows anddoes. Long hair, a beard or a roughmantle are irrelevantandeven mis-leadingexternals."2*

UtrechtUniversity,Department f Philosophy

TpuoKepov 7tpo6; catk6lxiv tiv intrTqgrv. One cannothelp thinking of Arist. Top.1.2, 101a27-8, &aS;xara4pXoaopixv at'taTqga;, with Alexander's comment,in Top.

28.26-7, car"a ptXoao(pfrav&E?'ntarIjc; else t1 V (puautcv, tiiV I0otuV, TiV XoyuftV,

riv jeTa t&aqptcx6 (substractingmetaphysics, of course).70 SVF 3 Diog. Fr.26, Crin. Fr.4; SVF 1.620 (Sphaerus).For Chrysippusalso com-

pare D.L. 7.193, TEXvik6oywvaKt po'ov ip6; Atoawoupi8iivc', and the subscrip-tion in the ethics section at D.L. 7.201 quoted above, n. 65.

71 Plu. SR 1047A - SVF 3.297; L&S 31H (who translate cvTi here as 'expertise').72 The objection that the Stoics failed to practisewhat they preached(e.g. Plu. SR

1033BC on Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus - SVF 1.27 and 1.262 (2nd text); not in

the Cleanthes section of SVF vol. 1, and not in vol. 3 either)is beside the point in the

present context.* This paper was read at the Zeno Conference (Larnaca,Cyprus),9-13 September

1998, and to universityaudiences at the Westfalische Wilhelms-Universitait,Munster,on 28 April 1999, and at the Humboldt-Universitait, erlin, on 5 May 1999. Thanksare due to my critics on those occasions and to the anonymous referee of Phronesis.

Zenon y la unidad de la filosofía

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