Document of

The World Bank

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 7835

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

ETHIOPIA

SECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

(CREDIT 1088-ET)

JUNE 21, 1989

Eastern Africa RegionCountry Department IIAgriculture Operations

lhs document has a restricted distibution and may be used by redpients only in the performanwc oftheir offidal duties. Its contents may not otherwise be didosed without World Bank authoriation.

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EXCHANGE RATES

Appraisal Year: US$ 1.0 - Birr 2.07Implementation Period: USS 1.0 - Birr 2.07Completion Year: US$ 1.0 = Birr 2.07

GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR

July 8 - July 7

ABBREVTATIONS

ADD - Agricultural Development DepartmentADS - Agricultural Development ServiceAEZ - Agro-ecological ZoneAIDB - Agricultural and Industrial Development BankAISCO - Agricultural Inputs Supply CorporationAMC - Agricultural Marketing CorporationDAP - Diammonium PhosphateDCA - Development Credit AgreementEBCA - Ethiopian Building Construction AuthorityEEC - European Economic CommissionEPID - Extension and Project Implementation DepartmentESC - Ethiopian Seed CorporationETCA - Ethiopian Transport and Construction AuthorityFAO - Food and Agricultural Organization of the United NationsGOSE - Government of Socialist EthiopiaIAR - Institute of Agricultural ResearchIDA - International Development AssociationIFAD - International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentMOA - Ministry of AgricultureMPP I - First Minimum Package ProjectMPP II - Second Minimum Package ProjectPADEP - Peasant Agricultural Development Program/ProjectPCR - Project Completion ReportRMEA - Resident Mission in Eastern AfricaSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportSDR - Special Drawing RightsSIDA - Swedish International Development Associati.,nSWC - Soil and Water ConservationTA - Technical AssistanceT&V - Training and Visit ExtensionTSU - Technical Support UnitUSAID - United States Agency for International DevelopmentWFP - World Food Program

THE WORLD SANKWashngton. O.C. 20433

U.S.A.

oike o4 Oiwaarc-Gu

op.#athu. Ivahtiun

June 21, 1989

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PPESIDENT

SUBJECTs Project Completion Report on Ethiopia SecondAgricultural Minimum Package Proiect (Credit 1088-ET)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled'Project Completion Report on Ethiopia Second Agricultural MinimumPackage Project (Credit 1088-ET)" prepared by the Africa RegionalOffice. No audit of this project has been made by the OperationsEvaluation Department at this time.

Yves Rovani

by Ram K. Chopra

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the peorfanceof their ofAcial duties. Its contents may not otherwis be discosed without World Bank authorition.

FOR OMFIC4L USE ONLY

ETHIOPIAPROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT (CREDIT 1088-ET)

Table of Contents

PanePREFA%;E........................... iBASIC DATA SHEET.... ii - ivEVALUATION SUMMARY........ v - ix

I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION ..

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREFARATION AND APPRAISAL ........ . 2

A. Project Origin . ...... . 2B. Preparation and Appraisal . . . 3C. Targets and Goals . . . 5D. Project Description . . . 5

III. IMPLEMENTATION START-UP ................................... 6

A. Revisions ........................................... . 6B. Implementation of Key Components . . . fC. Reporting . . . ............ 11D. Procurement ... .13

E. Project Costs .... 13F. Disbursements .... 15G. Financial Sources . . . .......... 17H. Performance of Consultant Contractors and Suppliers.. 17

IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE .... 18

A. Overview ..... 18B. Uptake of Extension/Inputs ..... 18

V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT .... . 19

VI. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION .... 20

VII. BANK'S PERFORMAICE.............. ......... 22

VIII. CONCLUSIONS .23

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the pertormanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disCkosed without World Bank authodzation.

TABLES

Table i s Details of Self-Help Roads Constructed under MPP IITable 2 s Regional and Awraja Office ConstructionTable 3 t Summary of Long Term Technical Assistance Provided under MPP IITable 4 s Schedule of Technical Assistance Provided Under MPP IITable 5 : List of MPP II Fellow and Their Status on ReturnTable 6 s Estimated MOA Administration CostsTable 7 s Estimated Project Costs SummaryTable 8 s Impact of InflationlPrice ContingenciesTable 9 s Details of MOA and ZSC Disbursement RequestsTable 10 s Planned and Actually Requested DisbursementsTable 11 t Utilization of IDA Credit and IFAD Loan by MOATable 12 : Summary of ESC Clean Seed Output & DistributionTable 13 : Summary of Fertilizer Use by Peasant FarmersTable 14 s Regional Increase in Fertilizer Use 1977/78 to 1985/86Table 15 : Estimates of Returns to Fertilizer UseTable 16 t Economic Evaluation (MPP II Alone)Table 17 s Economic Evaluation ((MPP I and MPP II Combined)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

ETHIOPIA

Second Agricultural Minimum Package ProAect (Cr. 1088-ET)

PREFACE

This Project Completion Report reviews the Second Agricultural MinimumPackage Project for which an IDA Credit of US$40.0 million was approved Ja DecerNer1980. The original Closing Date of June 30, 1983 was extended to June 30, 1985 dueto Government delays in starting construction and employing consultants. The finaldisbursement under Credit 1088-ET was made on July 2, 1986.

This report was prepared by a Bank mission that visited Ethiopia inFebruary 1987. It is based on field visits to project areas and discussions withGovernment and other appropriate staff in Ethiopia. Additional information wasobtained from the Staff Appraisal Report, November 1980 (Report no. 1774B-ET), theImplementation Volume of the SAR, ID.A and IFAD legal agreements da_ed February andJanuary 1981 reopectively, the mid-term review report of April 1982, supervisionreports, project files and project completion reports prepared by the Ministry ofAgriculture and the Ethiopian Seed Corporation.

This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED). Thedraft PCR was sent to the Borrower and Cofinanciers on March 15, .989, for commentsby May 3, 1989, but none were received.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

ETHIOPIASECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

(CREDIT 1088-ET)

BASIC DATA S3EET

KEY PROJECT DATAActual or Actual as t of

Appraisal Current AppraisalItem Expectation Estimate Estimate

Project Cost (US$ million) 1 77.2 79.2 103Credit Amount (US$ million) 40.0 37.9 95Cofinancing Total (US$ million) 18.9 11.4 60

IFAD 18.0 10.4 58SIDA 0.9 1.0 111

Date Physical Components Completed - 12/82 6/86Proportiorn Completed by that date (Z) 100 95 95

Economic Rate of Return - 2 _Financial P.,rformance FairInstitutional Performance Fair

CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS £

(SDR Million)

FY 81 FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86

Appraisal 10.2 38.8 45.9Actual 0.4 7.5 25.6 3,.6 41.0 45.0Actual asI of Appraisal (Z) 4 19 56 73 89 98

PROJECT DATES

Original Actual orItem Plan Revised Estimated

First Mention in Files orTimetable - --

Government Application - - 12175Negotiations - - 4/80Board Approval 6/80 - 12/80Credit Agreement Date 7/80 - 2/81Effectiveness Date - - 9181Closing Date 6/83 6/84 6/85

1 Equivalent to SDR 32.0 million.

2 SDR 0.9 million cancelled. Includes disbursements from theIFAD loan of SDR 13.9 million as joint financing.

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STAFF INPUTS

(staff -,.ee hs'Eta m an EU F a EXZI= I en E= FY En fm Em Es 2r n1

Preppra;ial .1 _ .2 .9 17.1 21.4 _ -_ .8 - -_ 4.8ApvraI. - - - - 32.6 84.1 24.9 91.5 .3 - - - - - 143.5

NeacCtioa - - 13.7 33.2 8.3 - _- - - - 82.2Sprvilan - - - - - - - - 28.1 . 8 2.4 26.6 8.4 10.8 1.8 21.8

th- - - - - - .6 .9 .S .8 - .7 .4 - - - - - 4.0

TMAL .1 - .2 .9 17.1 84.7 55.0 89.2 71.0 28.8 ".6 65.6 29.5 e . a 5.4 1.5 1.8 450.5

MISSION DATA

Date No. of Specialization Performance Types of(mo. t Persons Represented al Rat-inR bL Trende/ Problem dl

Preparation 09/15 1 a - - -

Preparation 10/75 2 a-b - - -

Preparation 10176 1 a - - -

Preappraisal 02/77 2 a-c - - -

Appraisal 04/77 5 a-d-i-e - - -(Plus 5 fromUSAID & SIDA)

Review 04/78 4 e-a-d-c - - -Apr. Update 10/79 3 a(2)-c - - _Apr. Update 11/79 3 a-d-e - - -

Apr. Update 12/79 2 a-d - - -

Apr. 'Jpdate 01/80 1 a - -

Supervision 01/81 2 a-c - - -

Supervision 02/81 1 a - - -

Supervision 02/81 1 e - -Supervision 03/81 1 e - -Supervision 03/81 2 d-a - - -

Supervision 05/68. 2 a-d - - -

Super,rision 07/81 1 f - -Supervision 08/81 3 a-f-e - - _Superiision 09/81 1 d - -Supervision 10/81 3 a-e-d - - _Supervision 01/82 2 a-g - - -

Supervision 03/82 1 f - -Supervision 05182 1 e - -Supervision 06/82 1 a - -Supervision 09/82 1 e -- -

Supervision 10/82 2 a -- -

Supervision 11182 2 d-g 2 1 M, T, 0

Supervision 02/83 2 a-e 2 1 M, T, 0

Mid-Term Review 04/83 2 e(2) + Othersfrom SIDA,IFAD,GOE

Supervision 09/83 1 dSupervision 12/83 1 eSupervision 03/84 3 e(2)-d 2 2 M, 0Supervision 07/84 3 e(2)-d 2 1 M, T, 0Supervision 10/84 3 d-e-g 2 2 M. T, OSupervision 03/85 2 d-h 2 3 M, T, 0

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OTHER PROJECT DATA

Borrower Government of EthiopiaExecuting Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture

Ethiopian Seed CorporationFiscal Years July 8 - July 7Name of Currencys Ethiopian BirrExchange Rate at Appraisal: 1 US$ - Birr 2.07

at Completion: 1 US$ - Birr 2.07

al a = Agricultural Economist; b - Engineer; c - Economist; d - FinancialAnalyst; e - Agriculturalist; f - Livestock Specialist; g - Architect;h - Extensicn Specialist; i - Rural Development Specialist.

hI 1 - Minor problems; 2 = Moderate problems; 3 = Major problems.cI 1 - Improving; 2 Stationary; 3 - Deteriorating.Al M - Managerial; T Technical; 0 = Other.

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

The Second Minimum Package Project (MPP II) was approved as aninterim two year project, to support the minimum package program until a fulllength production project could be designed and started. Delays in theinitiation of MPP II meant that the Minimum Package Program had changedsubstantially since tne conclusion of HPP I. The first and major change wasthe dismantling and absorption into the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) of theExtension and Project Implementation Department (EPID). This semi-autonomousentity within MOA, had been responsible for the successful implementation ofMPP I, and had prepared and was expected to implement MPP II. Secondly, MOAdecided to substantially broaden the scope of Minimum Package activities andto include virtually all agriculturally productive weredas (districts)throughout the country.

Obiectives

The Second Minimum Package Project (MPP II) was designed to bringbasic agricultural inputs and services to large numbers of small farmers. Itwas an extension and consolid-tion of the MPP I Project (Credit 416-ET) whichclosed on March 31, 1978. W.-t as MPP I had concentrated on the highpotential portions of 280 werecas, MPP II was to concentrate on 440 weredas.It would thereby have more than three times the geographic coverage of itspredecessor. Thirdly, the original MPP II project, designed as a four yearprogram, was redesigned for implementation in two years.

Implementation Experience

MOA was the lead agency for MPP II and was responsible forimplementation of most components. The Ethiopian Seed Corporation (ESC) underthe Ministry of State Farm Development, implemented the remaining activities.Other institutions which played important roles in the implementation of MPPII were the Institute of Agricultural Research (11R); the Ethiopian RoadsAuthority which was, through the Ethiopian Transport and ConstructionAutlority (ETCA), responsible for construction of some 200km of rural roads,and the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB) which wasresponsible for providing credit to farmers for the purchase of inputs. TheAgricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) was originally intended to provideinputs. However, during implementation, AMC's input supply role was shiftedto the newly established Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation (AISCO), asemi-autonomous institution within MOA.

The MPP II project was to have been implemented over the two fiscalyears 1980/81 and 1981/81. However, the project took longer to complete thanexpected. The original estimates were too optimistic given the experienceunder MPP I. Cautionary advice given during the review within the Bank shouldhave been heeded. The SAR implementation schedule provided for the completionof physical works over 19 months. In practice, physical works within MOA took

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over five and a half years to complete. The main cause for slowimplementation of physical facilities was the slow start to construction.Once construction had started it proceeded with reasonable speed. Also, ittook a long time for TA posts to be filled. Government seemed reluctant tocontract with a consulting firm to staff these posts. They relied instead onSIDA and on the Agricultural Development Service, through which the World Bankfilled 6 posts. It was only towards the end of the project (November 1984)that GOSE entered into a contract with a consultinp firm to fill threecritical posts in MOA.

In spite of taking twice as long to implement as estimated atappraisal, project costs remained about the same. On the basis of the periodto mid-1986, project costs were about Birr 164 million (USS 79 million)compared with an SAR estimate of Birr 160 millioz. (USS 77 million). Becauseof the longer project period, incremental MOA expenditure in administrationand related overhead costs was 34Z above appraisal estimates. Soil and waterconservation costs were about 132 lower. Expenditures on rural roads were 57Zabove appraisal estimates, and would have been higher still had purchase ofmachinery for the construction of self-help roads been included in thiscategory and not in the MOA incremental ccet category, The unit costs ofboth roads and buildings were several times higher than estimated in the SAR,due p7obably to underestimation at appraisal. Machinery costs on the otherhand were close to SAR estimates. Farm input costs were substantially lowerthan expected, being only 39Z of the appraisal figure. This was partly due tolower quantities being procured, and partly to lower international fertilizerprices. The cost of the ESC component was very close to the appraisal figurebeing just 42 higher than estimated.

The incremental MOA operating costs of Birr 17 million annually wereonly about half of the amounts expected at appraisal. This was one of thereasons for the shortage of operating funds available to MOA staff,particularly in the first half of each fiscal year. This problem was reporteda number of times during supervision and according to the financial staff ofMOA has now largely been rectified.

Project Impact

The project has succeeded in establishing the basic infrastructurenecessar- to deliver productivity improving packages to farmers. An extensionservice based at service cooperatives has been established. The foundationfor setting up an effective agricultural input supply corporation has beenlaid and a system of cleaning and distributing improved seeds has beendeveloped. Most importantly, an effective pilot T&V extension project wasimplemented which has brought about significant improvements in "institutionalunderstanding" of the role and value of extension. This increased acceptancehas prepared the way for the establishment of a professional extension servicein Ethiopia. The MOA capacity to identify, prepare and appraise developmentprojects was improved through support to the MOA Project PreparationDepartment.

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It is not possible to know directly how much of the MPP II extensionadvice was adopted by MPP farmers. However, an estimate can he made based onthe incremental use of inputs within MPP areas during the project period. Onthe assumption that individual farmers use 0.8 - 1.0 quintals of fertilizerper ha holding (probably too high an estimate), the incremental fertilizerusage for 1985186 of 22.2 thousand tons over the 1977/78 figure indicates thatapproximately a quarter of a million incremental farmers are now adopting thefertilizer package, less than half of SAR estimates.

In the early project years, the low uptake of improved inputs wasperceived to have been caused by several factors, including: (i) the lack ofstorage/marketing facilities close to farmers; (ii) the late delivery ofinputs (fertilizer, improved seeds) to the agricultural areas; and (iii) anunsatisfactory system of inp6ts supply credit to PAs, whereby the whole PAcould be deprived of inputs if any one member was in default. After the MidTerm Review in early 1983 and Bank sector work on production incentives inEth'opia, it was determined that the most critical factors which affectedpeasant uptake of new technology were exogenous to the project. Productionincentives deteriorated in the early 1980's. The price of fertilizer roserapidly. This paralleled the imposition of the compulsory g-ain quotaput-hase system at low prices and its progressively rigid enforcement(official grain prices remained largely unchanged since 1979). Simultanehusly,the disttibution of consumer goods to the rural sector declined while pricesrose. The expanding population resulted in new age groups entitled to land,which combined with uncertainties about future collectivization, caused landtenure insecurity to emerge again as a disincentive to agriculturalinvestment. Thus, the deteriorating policy environment worked against majorproduction increases arising from project activtties. Only recently havesupply constraints for fertilizer been eased, and production incentivesimproved. Fertilizer use in 1986187 has risen to recerd levels.

The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) calculated for MPP II as a separateproject, with its own costs and associated benefits, is estimated at 2percent. The cost and benefit streams described in para 6.03 are used.Project costs are incurred starting from 1981182. As can be seen in Table 17,production benefits from this project do not materialize until 1987/88 whenfertilizer adoption picks up dramatically. This poor performance is duemainly to the lack of agricultural production incentives, as noted in para 8above. Two years of severe drought (1983/84 and 1984/85) also affectedproduction returns. If the project is considered as part of continuous Banksupport to the Minimum Package Program, and a necessary followup to MPP 1,then its costs and benefits can be considered as part of the MPP 1 cost andbenefit streams. When this is done, the ERR for MPP 1 and MPP 2 combined isestimated at 8 percent (Table 18). This implies a substantial reduction inthe ERR of 15 percent estimated for MPP 1 in the completion report of May1979. Alternatively, the project can be seen as a necessary precursor to thePeasant Agriculture Development Program (PADEP), and the relatively highbenefits from this new project can be seen as a result, in part, of sunk costsincurred in MPP II.

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Sustainabilitj

Peasant agriculture is the main source of agricultural output inEthiopia. Any project which is to bhve a major impact on agriculturalproduction needs to go through the current centrally planned system and bedirected towards individual farmers. In this respect, the design of theproject was appropriate. It was, however, too ambitious and inadequatelydefined. Revisions tended to exacerbate this problem. It provedimpossible to provide effective support to production in over 440 weredas. Tohave achieved production objectives, the project should have been smaller andtighter, and geared to specific regions with a known response to fertilizerand reasonable accessibility. More effort should have been put intodeveloping and promoting regionally specific development packages rather thanblanket recommendations. The three and a half year delay in obtainingtechnical assistance for ADD was particularly harmful in this respect. Theselessons were identified during supervision, and are being applied in PADEP,replicated in all the productive regions in the country.

Findings and Lessons

The project, although designed as a self-standing operation in 1975,had evolved by 1980 into an interim operation, designed to strengthenagricultural infrastructure and lay the foundations for a countrywideagricultural production project. Preparation of the follow-on project was anintegral part of MPP II objectivee. Due to this metamorphosis, projectconstruction and development activities were collapsed into two years. Programtype aspects, such as financing of a time-slice of MOA operating costs andsalaries were included. Because it had originally been designed as a full-fledged production project, it also included detailed provision for anextension service and credit system, roads, soil and water conservation andlivestock support activities -- which remained in the final design. Thoresultiag project fell halfway between program and project lending, with thedisadvantages of both, and none of the benefits. Had a program approach beenfollowed, conditions on production incentives and efficiency of MOA operationscould have been included and funds would have been disbursed in two yearsagainst broadly defined categories, without the detailed planning and reviewwork necessitated under the existing design. The focus would have been on thefulfillment of the policy objectives, which would have strengthened thedialogue under the Grain Storage and Marketing Project (Cr. 789-ET). Had apure project approach been followed, the project period would have beenextended to 5 years at least, and the extension service, seeds production andfertilizer distribution components would have been better appraised andimplemented.

Th's project cannot be considered successful if evaluated as anisolated effort to improve agricultural production and country economicperformance. However, it can be said to have achieved a fair degree ofsuccess if viewed as part of the continuous process of Bank involvement in the

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agricultural sector in Ethiopia. In this context, it is Justified as aninterim effort to develop institutions that play a key role in agriculturaldevelopment and as a precursor to PADEP, a full fledged production project.Two broad priority lessons emerge from the experience of MPP IIs (i) a projectcannot succeed in achieving primary production objectives unless the incentiveand policy framework are conducive to promoting the adoption of improvedtechnology and practices which would sustain increased output; and (ii)agricultural projects which are too large and complex are difficult toimplement, expensive to supervise, and much less likely to achieve all theirobjectives.

ETHIOPIA

SECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT (CR. 1088-ET)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

1.01 Agriculture dominates the economy of Ethiopia provi4ing 8 out of every10 Ethiopians with a means of livelihood. The Agricultural Sector Review 3provides extensive information about the sector. Cereals account for about80? of a total cropped area of 6.7 million ha, and grain production, which islargely rainfed, varies widely from year to year. The country is a netimporter of grain. The Ethiopian population in 1984 was about 42 million andis growing at 2.9Z per year.

1.02 Most crop production in Ethiopia takes place in the highlands. Thelower pastoral regions are used predominantly for livestock rearing. There aregreat variations in rainfall, altitude, tamperature, soils and topographywhich make Ethiopia an ecologically and agriculturally complex country. Inthe crop growing areas, rainfall varies from about 600mm in the Rift Valley to2000mm in the southwest highlands.

1.03 Great social and political changes have occurred in Ethiopia over thepast ten to fifteen years. The country has moved from a semi-feudal systemdominated by large land holdings with associated landlord tenantrelationships, to an egalitarian society run along centrally planned socialistlines in which reforms providing equal access to services and land have beenput in place.

1.04 Ethiopia over the years has been subject to periodic droughts. Themost recent one in 1984/85 has been one of the country's most severe andpublicized. The occurrence of drought during this period and the associateddemands which it made on government staff in coping both with the droughtaffected population and the enormous external assistance which was generated,has had a substantial impact on the implementation of the Second MinimumPackage Project (MPP II, Cr. 1088-ET).

1.05 The Second Minimum Package Project was designed to bring basicagricultural inputs and services to large numbers of small farmers. It wasintended to be an extension and consolidation of the MPP I Project (Credit416-ET) which was closed on March 31, 1978. By the time the IFAD Loan and theIDA Credit for MPP II were signed (January and February 1981 respectively),the continuing MPP program had changed. The major change since the end of MPPI was the absorption into the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) of the Extensionand Project Implementation Department (EPID). This had been a semi-autonomousentity within MOA, and had been responsible for implementing MPP I. Planswere to make EPID lead implementing agency for MPP II. Furthermore, duringthe gap between the end of the MPP I and the beginning of MPP II, MOA decidedto substantially broadeii the scope of Minimum Package activities and toinclude virtually all agriculturally productive weredas (districts) throughoutthe country. Whereas MPP I had concentrated on the high potential portions of280 weredas, MPP II was to concentrate on 440 weredas. It would thereby havemore than three times the geographic coverage of its predecessor. Theproject was no longer focused only on the areas within select high potential

3 #Agriculture - A Strategy for Growth" Report No. 6512-ET(Green Cover). March 25, 1987.

weredas in which production was likely to respond best to increased inputs offertilizer.

1.06 MPP II was implemented by MOA which was responsible for most of thecomponents. The Ethiopian Seed Corporation (ESC) under the Ministry of StateFarm Development, implemented the remaining activities. Other institutionswhich played important roles in the implementation of MPP II were theInstitute of Agricultural Research (IAR) responsible for research in supportof the project; the Ethiopian Roads Authority which was, through the EthiopianTransport and Construction Authority (ETCA), responsible for construction ofsome 200km of rural roads, and the Agricultural and Industrial DevelopmentBank (AIDB) which was responsible for providing credit to farmers for thepurchase of inputs. The Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) was to haveprovided inputs during the project. However, during implementation, AMC'sinput supply role was shifted to the newly established Agricultural InputsSupply Corporation (AISCO), a semi-autonomous institution within MOA.

1.07 The MPP II project was supported by an SDR 32 million IDA Credit(1088-ET, signed on February 2, 1981) and an SDR 13.9 million IFAD loan (40-ET) signed on January 7, 1981). These funds, together with an estimated SDR0.9 million from SIDA, were to provide financing for two years cf MPPactivities. It was the thirteenth IDA credit made for agriculturaldevelopment in Ethiopia. The creditlloan was eventually closed on June 30,1985 after having disbursed 98Z (2X was cancelled due to misprocurement). MPP1I is being followed by a series of peasant agriculture development projects(PADEPs) which are regionally based. One of these, in Gamo Goffa and Sidamo,is being supported by the African Development Bank. Other donors includingSIDA, IFAD, EEC and IDA intend to support PADEPs in other areas. PADEPprojects covering the regions of Gonder, Gojam, Welega, Ilubabor and Kefa arepresently being processed for IDA funding.

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

A. Proiect Origin

2.01 MPP II was intended as a follow on to MPP I. It had its origin in thecountrywide Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) fertilizer trial programsof the late 19609. MPP I succeeded in supplying fertilizers and basicextension messages to farmers close to the road in some 280 weredas. It wasbased on the Minimum Package area concept, which involved units with oneextension worker to 2,000 farmers, situated within Skm of a road and along15km of its length. Five such units (10,000 farmers covering 75km of road)made up an MPP area. This system operated in portions of 280 weredas. Theaim of the MPP II project was to expand and consolidate MPP I. It recognizedthe need to increase production from the peasant sector in Ethiopia throughwidespread introduction of appropriate simple packages.

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B. Preparation and ADDraisal

2.02 The early preparation of MPP II was undertaken by EPID with supportfrom SIDA technical assistance staff based within the agency. The initialproposal was formulated towards the end of 1975 and is understood to have beenbased on the MPP I concept of service centers developed along all weatherroads. Assistance was also provided by RNEA in finalizing this first MPP IIpreparation document.

2.03 A review of the MPP 1I proposals within GOSE led to the proposedproject being expanded to cover a wider geographical area. This was ofparticular importance to GOSE because of the recent land reform which hadtaken place in Ethiopia (1975) and the need to provide support in terms ofinputs and extension to the newly established Peasant Associations (PAs).During the last quarter of 1976, a revised MPP II proposal was put togetherwith continued technical assistance both from SIDA and RMEA. This revised MPPII project proposal was sent to the Bank in December 1976. At that time, tneintention was that MPP II would be financed in parallel by USATD, SIDA andIDA. Accordingly, a joint USAID/SIDA/IDA mission appraised the project inEthiopia in April 1977. Although the project had initially been prepared as afour year operation, the appraisal mission proposed to reduce it to threeyears.

2.04 Due to country problems including, inter alia, the conflict withSomalia, project processing was delayed until a review mission was sent toEthiopia in April 1978 to update the draft appraisal documents. The firstnegotiations between the Bank and GOSE took place in November 1978. However,due to the existence of standard USAID/IDA cross effectiveness clauses and theunlikelihood of USAID declaring a new Project effective at that time, theproject was not presented to the Bank's Board. SIDA, however, went ahead andprovided interim financial and technical support for the project. In April1979, IFAD indicated that if the project was likely to become operational, itwould be interested in cofinancing. Otherwise it would consider developing aseparate lending operation in Ethiopia.

2.05 The project was reactivated in November 1979 following discussionsbetween the Bank and Ethiopia at the Bank/Fund annual meetings. The appraisaldocuments were then rapidly updated following a series of short, mainlynontechnical missions. In January 1980, IFAD formally agreed to cofinance theproject and strongly proposed reinclusion of the seeds component which hadoriginally been part of USAID's proposed parallel financing. The amendedproject had by now been reduced from a three year time slice to a two yeartime slice of MOA's MPP activities. During the review stage, concern had beenexpressed by the Bank's central projects department that the implementationschedule was too ambitious and that the estimates of yield improvements whichwere to result from MPP II activities were too high. Nevertheless, processingproceeded through the loan committee without comment on project substance.

2.06 Negotiations took place in April/May 1980. At negotiations, theEthiopian delegation attempted to introduce certain changes into the project,

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including the construction of an MOA headquarters building. Secondly, thedelegation requested that the salaries and wages of production cadres shouldbe financed under the project. Thirdly, they wished to raise the estimates ofquantities and costs of fertilizer to be used. The Bank was not prepared toinclude either the construction of the MOA headquarters or the financing ofproduction cadres' wages. However, it did agree to increase the amount of thecredit by US$ 2 million from USS 38 million to VS$ 40 million as a result ofthe more recent estimates of fertilizer prices which had been presented by thedelegation. At the request of the GOSE delegation, the technical assistancecompon.nt of the project was rt ! ed by 8 stast -.ears.

2.07 Other pol.tosals made by the Ethiopian delegation on the project designare described below. Firstly, the Ethiopians resisted the Bank's positionthat the Project Coordinator be placed in the MzOA Permanent Secretary'soffice. Instead the delegation wanted him placed in the Planning andProgramming Department. The final outcome, which was incorporated in theDevelopment Credit Agreement (DCA), was that a Minimum Package ProgramTechnical Support Unit (TSU) would be established in the Ministry ofAgriculture, reporting directly to the Permanent Secretary. The TSU would beheaded by a technical support officer whose functions would be the same asthose originally intended for the project coordinator. Secondly, theEthiopian delegation stressed the difficulties the Government would have insubmitting approved annual workplans by May 1st each year. This condition wasamended allowing Government to submit its proposed annual work to IDA forreview by May 1st. Thirdly, the Ethiopian delegation also objected to therequirement that GOSE had to review its Minimum Package Program in order toimprove cost effectiveness, reduce subsidies, and establish appropriate levelsand methods of cost recovery. This requirement was amended to have Governmentsubmit to IDA and IFAD preliminary findings of such a study so that they couldbe reviewed and acted on prior to the intended project completion date (June1982).

2.08 The project was approved by the IFAD board immediately followingnegotiations, on May 7, 1980. It was originally intended to go to theIDA Board on June 24, 1980. However, this was allowed to slip untilDecember 23, 1980. By then Ethiopia was perceived to have become moreamenable to making some type of arrangement for compensating owners forforeign owned businesses expropriated after the 1974 Revolution. The IFADLoan Agreement was subsequently signed on January 7, 1981 and the IDA creditagreement on February 2nd, 1981.

2.09 Due to issues largely unrelated to the project itself, projectprocessing, from the time of the first draft preparation report to the dateof loan effectiveness, had taken 5 and three quarter years. During thisperiod, great changes had taken place in Ethiopia, and within the proposedproject implementing agencies. For this reason, it is significant to notethat project formulation/design had essentially been out of the GOSE's directcontrol since the review and revisions of mid-1976.

C. Targets and Goals

2.10 The project was the second IDA assisted Minimum Package Project inEthiopia and was designed to: i) increase the productivity and incomes ofsmall farmers by introducing them to fertilizer, improved seeds and otheragricultural inputs; ii) strengthen the institutional and technical frameworkto progressively expand and improve the Minimum Package Program; and iii)help to ensure long term productivity of the land by expanding theGovernment's Soil and Water Conservation efforts.

D. Proiect Description

2.11 The project description as set out in the Staff Appraisal Report(SAR) stated that "... the project is in the nature of an interimassistance to Ethiopia following the gap in IDA's participation in the MPP,and is therefore restricted to a major strengthening of the program over atwo year period pending preparation of a possible third MPP project." (SARpara 3.02).

2.12 The MPP II project was to have been implemented over the twofiscal years 1980/81 and 1981/82, and to have assisted the Government tocomplete the expansion of staff and services to 440 weredas. The primaryobjective was "... to increase small holder production through provision offarm inputs on credit and extension and support services' (SAR para 3.01).Since small holders produced 95X of total crop output, MPP was also seen asthe primary means of increasing overall national production. The project wasto have laid the in&situtional and technical foundation for continuingsuccessful operation of this core program in the Government's ruraldevelopment strategy. Specifically, it was intended to provide:

i) staff and staff training, vehicles, buildings and equipment forthe MOA headquarters and field offices;

ii) farm inputs (on credit) including fertilizers, improved seeds,pesticides and tools and animal husbandry inputs in selectedareas;

iii) buildings, equipment and technical assistance: (a) to assist theEthiopian Seed Corporation to produce basic seed; and (b) toexpand seed multiplication and cleaning at the PA level;

iv) low cost rural roads;

v) applied research, training of IAR staff and field demonstrationsto assist with $.he development of improved seed and technicalpackages for MPP farmers; and

vi) field staff, vehicles and equipment for an expanded soil andwater conservation program in the worst affected areas.

6 -

III. IMPLEMENTATION AND START-UP

3.01 Ethiopia was slow in meeting IDA conditions of effectiveness both withrespect to supplementary loan agreements and appointing technical assistance(TA) staff to key positions. This delay caused disbursements against salariesand operating costs which had been presented to IDA, to be held up for severalmonths. Furthermore, as there had been some uncertainty in the minds of MOAstaff about whether IDAIIFAD funding would indeed be forthcoming, in view ofhaving IDA's Board Presentation delayed by 6 months, little preparatoryproject work on design/procurement took place prior to effectiveness. Thismeant a slow start for construction and for procurement of vehicles andequipment.

A. Revisions

3.02 Following start-up, project coverage was extended further and moreweredas, in addition to those mentiored in para. 1.05, were included for MOAsupport. This ultimately proved undesirable. The ESC component was alteredwith both processing and storage arrangements being changed, partly becausethe ESC component had never been fully prepared or appraised by the Bank. Inthe haste to rapidly process the project once lending to Ethiopia had beenresumed, it had been decided to update the old USAID proposals which focussedon seed cleaning and storage rather than seed production aspects (para 3.23).Funding for livestock components were also substantially increased but theproposed State operated heifer breeding farms were dropped. Other changes inthe project included the introduction in 1983 of a pilot T&V extensioncomponent, the shifting of the responsibility for input supply away from AMC(a unilateral Government decision), the construction of self-help storesrather than MOA stores and funding of 14 overseas fellowships.

3.03 No revisions of the loan/credit agreements were needed to incorporatethese changes. However, delays in project implementation meant that thecredit closing date hae to be extended twice, first to June, 1984 and then toJune, 1985.

B. Implementation of Key ComDonents

3.04 Overview: The project was implemented slowly. The original estimateswere too optimistic given the experience under MPP I, and cautionary advicegiven during the review within the Bank should have been heeded. The SARimplementation schedule provided for the completion of physical works over 19months. In practice, physical works within MOA were over five and a halfyears.

3.05 The main cause for slow implementation of physical facilities was theslow start to construction. Once construction had started it generallyproceeded with reasonable speed. The reasons for delays in start-up weret i)there was no PPF funding for preparatory work; ii) technical assistance

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support was not in place for some time; iii) commvanications with the Bank(RM A) were slow; iv) necessary plant and equipment was slow to arrive; v)there were long delays in receiving vehiclas due largely to the Government'sdesire to coordinate vehicle procurement with other Ministry purchases; andvi) a number of differences of opinion on implementation emerged betweengovernment agencies and Bank supervision missions.

3.06 It took a long time for TA posts to be f 'led. Government seemedreluctant to contract with a consulting firm t .,aff these posts. Theyrelied instead on SIDA (which was relatively unsuecessful in terms of thenumber of posts filled by SIDA staff), and on the Agricultural DevelopmentService, through which the World Bank filled 6 posts. It was only towards theend of the project (November 1984) that GOSE entered into a contract with aconsulting firm to fill three critical posts in HOA.

3.07 The input supply component was implemented at a much lower level thanplanned; total fertilizer purchases over four years were 21,000 tons of DAP inone contract, compared with an SAR estimate of 26,000 tons over two years.This was due largely to reduction in MOA sales and increases in stocks. Thisoccurred because of sharp increases in the fertilizer price to farmers coupledwith stagnant official producer prices for the main grains and thesimultaneous increase (and enforcement) of compulsory quota sales by producersto AMC at these comparatively low prices.

3.08 Construction - MOA: It was planned that MOA would assist in theconstruction of 300 km of self-help rural roads. Under the project, 10 ruralroads were constructed or partly constructed totalling 215 km (Table 1).Construction costs, ranging between Birr 31,4001km and Birr 19,400/km, weresubstantially higher than the appraisal estimate of Birr 3,000/km. Totalexpenditure on the self-help roads over the six years 1980181 to 1985/86, wasan estimated Birr 4.7 million with most of the money being spent in the latterthree years. Disbursements against the rural road category amounted to Birr1.1 million. The IDA/IFAD contribution was less than the 90Z of total costswhich had been intended at appraisal. This was probably due to the fundingallocation being fully utilized, and also to the substantial monetarycontributions by the communities involved.

3.09 In addition to self-hnlp rural roads, about 210 km of other higherstandard rural roads were constructed by ETCA under the project. Thiscompares favorably with the 200km of roads which had been planned under theSAR. The cost of these roads (excluding the purchase of equipment) wasestimated at Birr 7.3 million (Birr 36,500lkm). The project actually providedroad building equipment for ETCA and MOA costing about Birr 10 million).

3.10 All MOA fertilizer stores were supposed to be handed over to AMC. Inorder to keep the 60 fertilizer stores which were to have been built under theproject under MOA's control, the target was changed in June 1981 to theconstruction of 300 self-help 200 ton capacity stores to be owned by servicecooperatives. There were considerable delays in trying to construct the self-help stores and the target numbers dropped from 300 to 125 to 70, and finally

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to 48. One reason for the delays was the protracted dealings with the Bank ondesign. To resolve design questions, 12 pilot stores of three differentmaterials, stone, brick, and concrete blocks were built. After reviewingthese, detailed design changes were finally agreed upon. The remaining 36stores were finalized in 1984/85.

3.11 Concurrently, a large number of self-help stores were also constructed,without project funding. This raises the question of whether the designsproposed by the Bank were too sophisticated given the intended purpose ofgrain and fertilizer storage.

3.12 Difficulty was experienced in raising the peasants' contrib'utiontowards construction of the project supported stores. These 200 tonstructures cost some Birr 45,000 each with ,he project providing Birr 23,000towards materials and supervision, and the peasants a similar sum orequivalent in local materials, labor, etc. No construction isorks were tostart until the peasants had provided 852 of their contribution. Conversely,the locally constructed stores which were made of wood and mud (chika), coston average about Birr 12,000 -rith Government providing technical assistanceonly. For these, the peasants needed only to raise Birr 4,000 beforeconstruction was autlhorized.

3.13 The project target of constructing 13 regional offices and 30 awrajaoffices for MOA was fulfilled. Total construction costs amounted to aboutBirr 12 million compared with an estimated Birr 2.3 million at appraisal.Although it had been intended that disbursements against civil works (CategoryI), would be 802 of cost, procurement problems which resulted in a total of0.9 million SDR (split between the credit and loan) being cancelled, meantthat disbursements were only made against 3 regional offices and 9 awrajaoffices, and amounted to Birr 3.8 million, out of a total cost of Birr 4.6million (Table 2).

3.14 The offices constructed are generally adequate. Lack of detail in theSAR makes it impossible to determine whether the substantial cost overrun wasa result of underestimation of unit costs, or of areas per office. Otherconstruction under the project included 30 houses for the T&V staff costing atotal of at Birr 0.15 million, which had not been included at appraisal.

3.15 Soil and Water Conservation (SWC): The SWC component wasoutstandingly successful, although the program actually implemented provedmarkedly different to that originally planned. At appraisal, it was assumedthat SWC would be on a wereda basis with one conservation agent beingappointed per wereda, with his work being funded by the credit/loan. Betweenthe time of negotiations and project start-up, the SWC department'soperational system shifted to a catchment area based program. This change waslogical from a physical planning standpoint as wereda boundaries are notrelated to topography. Project funds were used for the purchase of handtoolsand for budgetary support. Because of the change of structure, there wereproblems in identifying precisely the staff salaries against whichdisbursements could be made. The problem was resolved by disbursing against

transport of food included under the WFP food-for-work program. These costswere clearly defined expenditures for the support of the component.

3.16 The TA provided under the project for SWC (52 man-months) was timelyand was perceived by the GOSE as being extremely useful. Furthermore, thesupport of SWC under MPP II has been catalytic in expanding the widespread andsuccessful soil and water conservation efforts being made by other donoragencies (WFP, EEC, PAO, etc).

3.17 Agricultural Development Department WDD): An important TA activitywas to develop a national trials program for applied agricultural research.Following changes in the organizational structure of MOA (para 1.05), thethree TA positions (farming systems specialist, agronomist and soil fertilityspecialist), required to assist MOA in formulating the revised program, werelocated in ADD. Substantial delays in recruitment occurred, due to a lack ofenthusiasm at a high level in MOA for this type of TA, and the posts wereeventually filled only towards the end of 1984.

3.18 In the limited time available between then and the end of the project,the unit, which was centrally based despite the zonal reorganization in MOA,became engaged in a number of major tasks. First, it set out to redefine thecountry in terms of agro-ecological zones (AEZs) according to agronomicpotential, using altitude/thermal characteristics, rainfall and soils to give25 different AEZs. In parallel, the unit initiated 18 adaptive researchtrials in 5 zones based on the newly defined AR,Zs for the 1986 season. Thesetrials are being continued using the same team but under different funding(Drought Recovery Program, Cr. 1576-ET and subsequently, Fourth LivestockDevelopment Project, Cr. 1782-ET). A further 22 sites in 8 more zones werebeing established in 1987. The quality and potential value of the work by theADD team is widely acknowledged. However, as a result of the lack ofappointment of full time Ethiopian counterpart staff, the trials system, whichis vital for the development of future 'extension messages", is in da"ger ofbecoming less effective once the technical assistance contracts are completedin 1988.

3.19 The substantial (three and a half years) delay in initiating thiscomponent has meant that applied research is lagging badly. MPP TT has madeno proven breakthroughs in "extension messages.' It will be another two yearsbefore it will be possible to fully evaluate the likely technical and economicimpact of this component, but current prospe,ts are promising. Moreover, thefundamental design, analytical and survey work conducted by the ADD team hasmade an important contribution towards establishing a sound framework forconducting effective adaptive research for the peasant sector.

3.20 Technical Support to MOA's Financial Department: Both training and TAwere applied to the MOA Finance Department. The training was effective. Thehead of the Department received a fellowship and obtained further relevantqualifications. The TA was also effective, although its training impact waslimited. Firstly, the systems analyst and the programmers provided under SIDAfunding did not remain for long enough to finalize their tasks, and it was not

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possible to obtain extensions to the contracts. Secondly, although theexpatriate chief accountant position was vital to the improvement of Ministryrecords, national staff have not been sufficiently trained to take over thisrole as was originally intended. The situation is similar in the case of theTechnical Support Officer who handled procurement and disbursements for MOA.A major reason for this problem, ts that financial specialists in Ethiopia cancommand much higher salaries in thc private sector than within ministrydepartments and are hence difficult to recruit. TA could also have been usedfor effectively for training (para 3.25).

3.21 In addition, a fixed assets study, aimed at eliminating the auditorsregular qualification of MOA accounts concerning verification of assets, hasbeen initiated and an inception report with preliminary findings andrecommnndations prepared. However, due to difficulties with the conbultants,MOA had not proceeded with the second part of the study in early 1987.

3.22 The Ethiopian Seed Corworation (ESC): The ESC component was fullyimplemented but with some modifications. The main difference was that the TAchanged markedly. Rather than the technically based positions envisaged atappraisal, the project funded two more generalist positions: a planning andevaluation economist, and an agronomist. A total of 98 staff-months was used,compared with the 48 planned at appraisal. In addition, about 21 months of TAwas provided at the beginning of the project by FAO (seeds specialists) andlater, additional assistance on seed cleaning was provided by the supplier ofseed cleaning equipment. Although not provided for directly within theappraisal documentation, the project also funded staff training. Five staffmembers undertook postgraduate university training in seeds technology andfive others underwent short courses in process ensineering. From ESC'sstandpoint, the postgraduate overseas training has been only partiallysuccessful. Three of the trainees have returned and are filling importantposts, but two others failed to return to the country.

3.23 Although ESC has successfully built up its seed cleaning, storage andhandling capacity, little development has occurred in production of basicseed. This appears to have been a major omission in project design. Giventhat increasing supplies of improved seeds were important to MPP IIeffectiveness, investment and institutional development should have includedthe seed industry as a whole, from production onwards. Because virtuallynothing was done in this regard, ESC has simply acted as a cleaner and dresserof field approved seeds and, to a small extent, as an importer. A smallmultiplication program was initiated by ESC with equipment financed under theproject, but has lost momentum due to the lack of access to a high qualityfarm. Basic seeds of new varieties have not been multiplied to any greatextent nor has a program of seed certification which was envisaged atappraisal, yet been developed. Indeed, it was not until 1984185 that ESCreceived from IAR the first breeder seed for multiplication.

3.24 An important constraint to ESU's future effectiveness is that it hasnot been allowed to become financially strong. Firstly, prices for both thepurchase of raw material seed for cleaning and dressing, and the final product

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have been set at levels which give ESC 1-nadequate margins. Secondly, the veryslack financial arrangements which exitt. bJetween ESC, State Farms, AISCO andMOA mean that although ESC has been oper; ing as an independent agency,payments for seeds supplied have been very tardy, with delays of two years ormore occurring frequently. In consequence, ESC is also slow in paying it'ssuppliers and therefore carries a high creditors figure in its balance sheets.ESC is financially weak despite having had more than US$8 million worth offoreign aid applied to it over the last five years. Future funding of ESCshould be contingent on significant improvement in these areas. Indeed, as ithas been agreed that this agency should be an ai%onomous business, it isimportant that its ability to finance future development should bestrengthened, to reduce the continuous need for outside support.

3.25 Technical Assistance and Fellowships: Heavy TA was provided under MPPII. Details of its importance to the different project components has alreadybeen discussed. Overall however, it amounted to some 617 staff-months spreadover five years, compared with an estimated 654 staff-months over two years inthe SAR. In effect, the actual intensity of TA was lower than proposed atappraisal. Tables 3 and 4 show the phasing of TA and also compare the amountand type of TA actually used compared to specified in the SAR. The maindifference is due to the 192 months of accounting trainer's time proposed atappraisal, which was never provided due to tardiness and difficulty in therecruitment efforts. Otherwise tiere were generally fewer individualpositions than anticipated but each one lasted longer. The other majordifference was that a far greater proportion of total TA came under IDA/IFADfunding rather than in the form of grants from FAO, SIDA, etc. While most ofthe TA staff performed satisfactorily, MOA did not (and continues not to) makethe most effective use of these personnel. The failure to appoint (andmaintain) qualified counterpart staff, little attention being giveu topreparing specific training programs for these staff, no effective monitoringand evaluation of TA staff work, and continued use of TA staff to complete adhoc tasks, resulted in contracts being continually extended. In too manycases, the gap in expertise which was to be temporarily filled by TA, stillexists. Although not included in the project description. a series offellowships for MOA and ESC personnel were funded under the project (see Table5). These fellowships proved valuable in providing-MOA and ESC with wellqualified graduates, capable of managing project activities under their owninitiative - of the 13 fellows listed, only three failed to return toEthiopia. The value of this training is re 'ected in the contributions thesestaff are now making to the institutions concerned.

C. Reporting

3.26 Required Reporting: Project reporting was to have involved a numberof elements. First, quarterly reports on project activities were to besubmitted to IDA. Secondly, audit reports of MOA and ESC were to be submittedannually. Third, an annual work plan for IDA's approval was to be submittedprior to May 1st each year. Information to be provided in this report isspecified in the SAR. It covered, inter alia, quantified targets by regionof project activities, including; (i) input supply; (ii) the status of

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veterinary services; (iii) fertilizer availability; (iv) MOA staffing; and (o)staff training. Ir. addition, the work plan was to provide a schedule of loansby region as well as reports on the building program and capital budgets insufficient detail to allow incremental replacement expenditures to beidentified. Proposals ror funding the work plan and the details of themonitoring and evaluation program associated with it were also required.Also, prior to the anticipated project completion date, the Government was tosubmit its preliminary findinas on a financial review of the MPP programsincluding proposals for future cost recovery, etc. Finally, projectcompletion reports were to be prepared by 1OA and ESC.

3.27 Performance on project reporting was generally poor. While auditedreports were submitted and adequate PCRs were prepared, other elements ofreporting showed considerable shortcomings. Annual workplans were submittedlater than planned. and did not contain much of the required information.Quarterly reports were not submitted to IDA although it is understood thattowards the end of the period, quarterly reports have been prepared in.Amharic. These, however, are geared to submission to the National Committeefor Central Planning and, if translated, would not have been adequate forfulfilling the Bank's requirements. Finally, the proposed MPP II financialreview was not prepared. However, following the mid-term review, it had beenrecommended by a Bank supervision mission that this should not be pressed for.The generally poor performance on reporting requirements calls into questionthe desirability of the Bank's routine insistence on (and the Borrower'sroutine acceptance of) frequent reporting in which reports, in too many cases,are given inadequate attention by both the Bank and the Borrower. Reportingshould be more selective, the specific items to be covered carefully defined,and both parties should then allocate appropriate priority to preparation andreview.

3.28 Mid-Term Review: Although not envisaged at appraisal, a joint GOSE,SIDA, IDA, IFAD mid-term review report was prepared in April 1983. Thisevaluated the performance of the project to date and set out proposals for itscontinued operation. The mid-term review was perceived by GOSE and the Bankas a useful means of refocusing and redirecting the project. The mid-termreview appears to have given substantial impetus to a series of initiativesincluding: i) the development of the pilot T&V program which started in 1983;ii) the conducting of a Vehicle Repair and Maintenance Study; iii) therelocation of Development Agents (DA's) out of wereda offices into servicecooperatives, a first step in improving extension service effectiveness; iv)the payment of adequate perdiems, and the transfer of adequate operating costfunding to the regions and awrajas; and v) the creation of AISCO, and thefocus on ways to overcome input supply bottlenecks.

D. Procurement

3.29 MOA procurement was undertaken by the TSU often in collaboration withother agencies. Vehicles and road construction equipment were, for example,procured by TSU and ETCA. Fertilizer was procured by AMC. To assist in

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procurement, the services if specialized consultants were also used. Theresults of this TA were mixed. For goods which were to be procured usinglocal competitive bidding (3 bids), an initial aggregate project ceiling ofUS$1 million was introduced in the DCA. This ceiling appears to have been toolow, and was raised twice, first to US$2 million and then to US$2.5 million.

3.30 Most of the civil works were to be procured through local competitivebidding. This system was not fully understood by the Ethiopian authorities,particularly as the roads element of the project was being implementeddirectly by ETCA. The recent establishment of the Ethiopian BuildingConstruction Authority (EBCA), which perceived itself as fulfilling the samerole as ETCA and undertaking all construction on Government approved projects,resulted in the local bidding procedures agreed at negotiations not beingproperly observed. EBCA started construction on a number of regional officeswithout following the proper tendering process. Accordingly, afternegotiations, IDA and IFAD cancelled SDR 0.9 million of the loan/credit, withthe buildings concerned being considered as misprocured.

3.31 This cancellation of part of the credit/loan was unfortunate andprobably resulted from insufficient detailed communication between Bankproject staff and Ethiopian staff responsible for procurement of construction.The Ethiopian staff concerned with construction in MOA were relativelyinexperienced and not familiar with Bank procedures. By the time matters cameto a head the Bank had no alternative but to declare misprocurement and cancelpart of the loan. However, closer liaison between Bank and Government couldhave avoided the cancellation.

3.32 For a number of items procurement was slow due to poor specificationsand therefore iengthy evaluation, with Bank staff becoming involved in a greatdeal of detail. Veterinary and chemical inputs supply gave particularproblems.

3.33 For technical and consultant services, prudent shopping was generallyused except in the case of the AISCO study, when several international firmswere invited to bid and a formal selection process was followed. Generally,there were no problems with procurement once procedures got under way.Difficulties were associated with obtaining approval to initiate recruitmentprocedures. Government preferred to rely on the services of SIDA or ADSrather than hiring individuals or consulting firms directly.

E. Proiect Costs

3.34 Project costs as defined in the SAR were for expenditurest i) for welldefined project activities, and ii) for the incremental costs of a two yeartime slice of Government costs for the MPP program. While project documentsenable a review to be made of the specific costs, e.g. roads, technicalassistance, vehicles for rLad construction, veterinary supplies, etc., theaccounting and budgeting system of GOSE does not allow a precise and confidentestimate to be made of incremental operating costs. Incremental operatingcosts were considered as those for the period January 1981 to June 1986, the

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date when project finance finished for most of the consultants working on NPPII activities. The nominal closing date was actually June 1985.

3.35 On the basis of the period to mid-1986, project costs were about Birr164 million (US$ 79 million) compared with an SAR estimate of Birr 160 million(US$ 77 million). Project costs are summarized below, from the details inTables 6,7, and 8.

Actual vs. AppraL!al Fstimates of Proiect Costs(Birr '000)

MPP AdministrationSAR Est. Actual Percent SAR

- Gross: 130,715 266,637 204X- Less Base Costs: 63,475 170,203 143X

Net MOA Admin Costs: 67.240 96.434

Seed Multiplicationin PAsS 4,311

Applied Research: 621

Subtotal 72.172 96.434 134X

Soil & Water Cons.: 10,437 9,104 87?Rural roads: 13,924 21,900 1572Farm Inputs: 44,738 17,400 9X

ESC: 18,512 19,215 1041

Total Costs: 159,784 164,053 103%

3.36 During implementation it was not possible to identify expenditures onapplied research, or seed multiplication for PAs. Both are small and areconsidered part of MOA's incremental administration cost, as too isexpenditure on livestock development. Because of the longer project period,incremental MOA expenditure in administration and related overhead costs was34Z higher than estimated at appraisal. Soil and water conservation costswere about 13S lower. Expenditures on rural roads were 57% above appraisalestimates, and would have been higher still had purchase of machinery for theconstriction of self-help roads been included in this category and not in theMOA incremental cost category. The unit costs of both roads and buildingswere several times higher than estimated in the SAR, due probably tounderestimation at appraisal. Machinery costs on the <*her hand were close toSAR estimates. Farm input costs were substantially lower than expected, beingonly 39Z of the appraisal figure (despite the fact that the Ethiopian

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delegation had persuaded IDA to increase the loan by US$2 million based onexpectations of high input usage). This was partly due to lower quantitiesbeing procured, and partly to lower international fertilizer prices. The costof the ESC component was very close to the appraisal figure being just 42higher than estimated.

3.37 The incremental MOA operating costs of Birr 17 million annually wereonly about half of the amounts expected at appraisal. This was one of thereasons for the shortage of operating funds available to MOA staff,particularly in the first half of each fiscal year. This problem was reporteda number of times during supervision and according to the financial staff ofMOA has now largely been rectified.

3.38 Even though the project was implemented over a longer period thaninitially envisioned, the effect of inflation has been considerably less thanestimated for foreign expenditures, and about the same for local costs (seebelow and Table 8).

Annual Price Changes over Proiect Period

1980181 1981182 1982/83 1983184 1984185 1985186...... 2 change over previous period .........

ActualLocal 5.7 4.3 2.5 4.0 14.0 3.4Foreign 2.6 -0.5 -2.0 -2.2 -0.5 6.9

AppraisalLocal 15 13.5 -- -- -- --Foreign 9.8 8.5 -- -- -- --

F. Disbursements

3.39 In line with implementation and procurement, disbursement was slow.By the original proposed closing date, June 30, 1983, only 562 of theloan/credit had been disbursed. This is detailed in Tables 9 and 10. Totaldisbursements under the project were about SDR 45.0 million rather than SDR45.9 million envisaged at appraisal. The main difference was due tocancellation of SDR 0.9 million of the loan/credit (SDR 0.621 million fromIDA, 0.279 million from IPAD).

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Appraisal vs Actual Disbursenents 4(SDR million)

FY 81 FY 82 FY 83 FY 84 FY 85 FY 86

Appraisal 10.2 38.8 45.9Actual 0.4 7.5 25.6 33.6 41.0 45.0Actual as2 of Appraisal (X) 4 19 56 73 89 98

3.40 Several problems occurred with disbursements. Firstly, an audit ofstatements of expenditures showed that there had been problems with theaccuracy of the Ministry payroll against which early disbursements were tohave been made. This meant that a special ad hoc exercise had to be undertakento identify individuals salaries against which project funds couldlegitimately be disbursed. In retrospect, it was probably unwise to have usedstaff salaries as a disbursement category, given the difficulty in isolatingMPP II staff from other staff at the regional,.awraja and wereda levels.Similar problems arose with respect to proposed disbursements against the soiland water conservation component. In this case, however, they were overcomeby allowing disbursements to be made against transport costs associated withthe WFP Food-for-Work programs associated with soil and water conservation.An element of double counting of Government's commitment to various projectsmay have existed here.

3.41 A further unusual element of disbursement was that in one identifiedcase, disbursement procedure 3, which is normally used for payment in full tooffshore contractors was used for an 80? payment by MOA to ESC for thepurchase of seeds. According to ESC accounts the matching, 202 of local fundswhich was also due, has not yet been paid. This is an isolated case, but itgives further indication of the financial slackness which exists between theGovernment and parastatal agencies.

'.42 Last, a sum of about SDR 1 million was disbursed towards the end ofthz project period to cover signed contracts for TA consultancies, etc., whichran well beyond the project completion date. All of these commitments did infact run their full course. 5 While extended funding, particularly for TAwhen subsequent projects are in the pipeline, is justified from an operationalstandpoint, there is a danger that funds disbursed may not be used for the

4 SDR 0.9 million cancelled.

5 This was done on an exceptional basis to bridge the gap between the endof MPP II and the start up of the proposed follow-on project (PADEP)which was, at that time, expected to start during late 1985 or early1986. The TA posts were to be included in PADEP, and to preservestaff continuity, these procedures were adopted.

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purpose for which they were intended. All disbursements were against signedcontracts, which minimizes this risk however.

G. Financial Sources

3.43 As planned, the project was funded by IFAD, IDA and GOSE. Inaddition, there was a TA contribution from SIDA which was probably close tothe planned level of SDR 0.9 million, and a small parallel contribution fromFAO and Australian Aid, amounting to a total of about SDR 0.4 million. Interms of Ethiopian Birr, the contribution from IFAD/IDA was lower thanprojected. First, SDR 0.9 million were cancelled, and secondly, the loan sizeand implicit Birr amounts at appraisal were calculated on the basis of thethen current SDR/Birr exchange rates which averaged SDR 1 = Birr 2.62.However, the actual exchange rate over the project period was different,averaging SDR 1 = Birr 2.21. The net effect of these two factors was thatexternal finance for the project was about Birr 100 million compared with anestimated Birr 120 million at appraisal. IDA/IFAD financing of projectactivities in MOA totalled some Birr 83.7 million (see Table 11) with ESCreceiving an additional Birr 16.3 million.

Overall, project funding compared with appraisal was as follows:

Appraisal vs Actual Funding by Source

AppraisalEstimate Actual.......... .million Birr.

IDA/IFAD 120 100SIDA 2 2GOSE 38 62

TOTAL 160 164

3.44 Government funding (including taxes) increased by 63Z. However,because the project costs occurred over five and a half years instead of two,Government's average annual funding for the project fell from an appraisalestimate of Birr 19 million to Birr 11 million.

H. Performance of Consultant Contractors and SupRliers

3.45 The main consultancies funded by the project included specialistinputs in mass media communication, T&V systems (2 persons), a vehicle repairand maintenance study, procurement TA, preparation of a development plan forAISCO, a specialist in extension communication, a technical consultancy ingrain storage pests, a farm implements study, a fixed assets study for MOA,and the TA team for ADD (paras 3.17-3.18). In addition, some of the TA postswere procured on a consultancy basis rather than direct employment.

- 18 -

3.46 The performance of consultants carrying out short and medium termstudies was generally satisfactory. The exceptions to this included: firstlythe procurement TA -- this was only moderately effective and delays inproducing adequate bid evaluation occurred. Secondly, the consultantsrecruited to carry out the fixed assets study of the MOA who, after preparingan adequate inception report, failed to follow through with the implementationactivities. Thirdly, there was also some dissatisfaction with a short termconsultancy on training, in that the consultant was perceived as not havingtaken full account of government's comments when finalizing his report.

3.47 Performance of contractors and suppliers under the project wasgenerally satisfactory.

IV. OPERATING PERFORMANCE

A. Overview

4.01 The project has succeeded in establishing the basic infrastructurenecessary to deliver appropriate productivity improving packages to farmers.An extension service based at service cooperatives has been established overmost of the country. The foundation for setting up an effective agriculturalinput supply corporation has been laid and a system for cleaning anddistributing improved seeds has also been developed. Most importantly, aneffective pilot T&V extension project was implemented which, together withsignificant improvement in "institutional understanding" of the role ofextension, has prepared the way for introducing a professional extensionservice throughout Ethiopia. The MOA institutional capacity to identify,prepare and appraise development projects was substantially improved throughsupport, including overseas staff training and TA, given to the MOA ProjectPreparation Department.

B. Uptake of Extension/InRuts

4.02 It is not possible to know directly how much of the MPP II extensionadvice was adopted by MPP farmers. However, an estimate can he made based onthe incremental use of inputs within MPP areas during the project period.Data for seeds and fertilizers are given in Tables 12, 13 and 14 and aresummarized belows

Input Use By MPP II Farmers('000 MT)

77/78 80181 81182 82/83 83184 84I85 85186 86/87Improved seed 1.3 3.5 0.7 2.5 1.7 16.5 17.0 30.5Fertilizers 27.0 23.4 25.0 36.4 38.0 38.2 49.2 -

- 19 -

4.03 On the assumption that individual farmers use 0.8 - 1.0 quintals offertilizer per ha holding (probably too high an estimate), the incrementalfertilizer usage for 1985186 or 22.2 thousand tons over and above the 1977178figure indicates that approximately a quarter of a million incremental farmersare now adopting the fertilizer package (Tables 13 and 14). In addition, anumber of other farmers are also taking up extension advice and projectsupport but not using fertilizer. On the basis of SAR estimates these wouldamount to about 402 of the number adopting fertilizer packages, i.e., about100,000. The incremental number of participants (about 350,000) is well belowthat predicted for 1985186 in the SAR, which was 900,000. However, it is overdouble the SAR figures for the year after the end of the project which was143,000. Given the policy constraints which emerged during the projectimplementation period, these data greatly understate the potential achievementof MPP II in promoting the adoption of improved technology among the targetgroup. Provided input supply channels are effective, prices are attractiveand the extension service can develop further significant "messages, the longrun level of farmers taking up MPP II and successor project packages couldstill reach SAR estimates of about 2 million (of which 1.7 million areincremental over the 1977/78 level).

V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

5.01 The Minimum Package concept was perceived initially by the World Bankas a means of providing improved agricultural inputs and technology to farmersin areas where the farms were accessible and where there were good prospectsfor yield and production increases para 2.01).

5.02 The widening of scope and coverage under MPP II meant that the projectbecame a broadly based source of finance for MOA, and its productionobjectives were diluted. There are some bright spots, however. Firstly, theeffective operation of a T&V pilot project has been closely monitored by theMinistry and is providing the basis for an effective future extension project.Secondly, a considerable amount of staff training and relocation has takenplace so that the decentralized Ministry is now better equipped to implementpeasant development programs through its regional and district offices than itwas in 1980/81. Thirdly, the consulting help provided to AISCO has formed asound basis for its development, although further capital investment in AISCOtogether with the appropriate TA will be required if it is to adequatelyfulfill its role. Fourthly, the support to the Ethiopian Seed Corporation hasallowed it to build up its capacity; in 1986/87, for example, MOA has orderedeight times more seeds for distribution to the individual sector than in1980/81 at the start of the project. And finally, a well designed andsystematic National Field Trials Program has been started, bringing togetherMOA, IAR, and other research organizations, which should provide some answerson reliable ways to increase yields in peasant agriculture and lay thetechnical basis for future agricultural extension activities.

- 20 -

5.03 In the early project years, the low uptake of improved inputs wasperceived to have been caused by several factors, including: i) the lack ofstorage/marketing institutions closer to the farmers; ii) the late deliveryof inputs (fertilizer, improved seeds) into the agricultural areas; and ii) anunsatisfactory system of inputs supply credit to PAs, whereby the whole PAcould be deprived of inputs if any one member was in default. After the MidTerm Review in early 1983 and Bank sector work on production incentives inEthiopia, it was determined that the most critical factors which affectedpeasant uptake of new technology were exogenous to the project. Productionincentives deteriorated in the early 1980's. The price of fertilizer roserapidly. This paralleled the imposition of the compulsory grain quotapurchase system at low prices and its progressively rigid enforcement(official grain prices remained largely unchanged since 1979). Simultaneously,the distribution of consumer goods to the rural sector declined while pricesrose. The expanding population resulted in new age groups entitled to land,which combined with uncertainties about future collectivization, caused landtenure insecurity to emerge again as a disincentive to agriculturalinvestment. Thus, the deteriorating policy environment worked against majorproduction increases arising from project activities. Only recently havesupply constraints for fertilizer been eased, and production incentivesimproved. Fertilizer use in 1986187 has risen to record levels.

5.04 In the past two years, several constraints have been alleviated. AISCOand ESC have been strengthened, with project support, and are now able todeliver the necessary inputs. Storage facilities have been improved. Pricesof fertilizers have been reduced from their 198112 peaks and, perhaps mostimportant, the inputs supply system is moving towards giving strong incentivesfor cash purchases rather than credit. The rules on provision of inputs toPAs which were previously in default on input credit are also being eased, andcash sales are now permitted. Furthermore, the Commercial Bank of Ethiopl',which has far greater national coverage than AIDB, is to participate in theinput supply chain by making input loans to service cooperatives rather thanto PAs. While it was widely reported that there were shortages of fertilizerin the rural areas for the 1984185 season, the supply position wasconsiderably better in 1985186 and in 1986/87.

VI. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

6.01 The low uptake of fertilizer, at least until 1984/85, and the lack ofany obvious increase in agricultural production from the private sector meansthat no verifiable economic benefits from MPP IfII have yet been shown.However, because: (i) the infrastructure is now set up for delivering minimumpackages; and (ii) there is ongoing research work taking place, economicbenefits which would not have been achieved had the project not occurred canbe expected to take place in the future. An important provision however, isthat Government needs to follow an agricultural input/output pricing policywhich makes the increased use of inputs financially attractive to farmers.

- 21 -

Negotiations on the nature of the incentive framework to be put in place areunderway in the context of the PADEP project.

6.02 Costs and benefits were developed to consider alternate perceptions ofthe effect (or non effect) of this project on Ethiopian agriculture.Production costs and benefits are derived from those calculated for MPP I inthe Project Completion Report of May 1979. Labor is valued at the market wage.All prices are translated into 1978 constant values. Actual costs andproduction prices were used up to 1987. The initial benefit stream from1971/72 up to 1980181 is practically the same as that for MPP I. From 1980/81through 1986/87, production levels follow the trend of overall grainproduction in the country, as shown in the Agricultural Sector Review of March1987 (Report No. 6512-ET). Although production benefits were supposedly tiedto adoption of fertilizer, this was not used as an indicator of incrementalbenefits until 1987/88. From 1980/81 to 1982/83 fertilizer consumption in thecountry fell dramatically, and only returned to 1979180 levels in 1985/86.Production on the other hand reached the highest recorded level in history in1982/83, and then suffered sharp declines with the droughts of 1983184 and1984185. Minimum package program farmers are assumed to have shared in theseevents. From 1986/87 on a sharp increase in input use is already evident.MPP farmers are assumed to benefit from a 6 percent per annum growth in inputuse (with a concomitant 18 percent a year growth in grain output in that areafertilized) until 1989/90, when the growth due to the influence of MPP 2stops, and production levels off.

6.03 The SAR does not provide an economic rate of return for this project:I ... Because the project is a time-slice of an ongoing nationwide program toassist peasant smallholders, it is difficult to quantify precisely thebenefits related specifically to the project...A precise rate of return wouldthus not be very meaningful. However an indirect analysis was carried out todetermine by how much production would have to increase to give a clearlyacceptable rate of return, and to assess the likelihood of that increase."(SAR para 6.05). The SAR affirms that a rate of return of 20 percent 'isexpected to be exceeded if the project as designed is implemented asprojected." (SAR para 6.06).

6.04 The SAR gives an economic analysis showing the production increaseneeded to generate a 25Z economic rate of return (ERR). The completionmission took a different approach and calculated the ERR based on the costsand associated benefits of MPP II, which is estimated at 2 percent. The costand benefit streams described in para 6.02 are used. Project costs areincurred starting from 1981/82. As can be seen in Table 17, productionbenefits from this project do not materialize until 1987/88 when fertilizeradoption picks up dramatically. This poor performance is due main'y to thelack of agricultural production incentives, as noted in para 5.03 above. Twoyears of severe drought (1983184 and 1984/85) also affected productionreturns. If the project is considered as part of continuous Bank support tothe Minimum Package Program, and a necessary followup to MPP 1, then its costsand benefits can be considered as part of the MPP 1 cost and benefit streams.When this is done, the ERR for MPP 1 and MPP 2 combined is estimated at 8

- 22 -

percent (Table 18). Th8s implies a substantial reduction in the ERR of 15percent estimated for MPP 1 in the completion report of May

1979. Alternatively, the project can be seen as a necessary precursor to thePeasant Agriculture Development Program (PADEP), and the relatively highbenefits from this new project can be seen as a result, in part, of sunk costsincurred in MPP II.

VII. BANK'S PERFORM&NCE

7.01 Project Processina: This project was difficult to process in theBank because timing and approval were heavily influenced by nonproject issues.This resulted in a long processing period. Furthermore, it meant that theunderstanding between Bank projects staff and the relevant Ethiopian staff onthe nature and content of the project may have been unclear. In retrospect,project re-preparation with significant Ethiopian involvement should havetaken place.

7.02 Project Supervision: Because of the hurried final processing ofthe project, considerable supervision including what was essentiallyreformulation of certain components (e.g., seeds and livestock), took place inthe first two years. Indeed during 1981 and 1982, 17 Bank supervisionmissions visited Ethiopia with 184 man-days spent in the field. It wasonly after this large input had been completed that the first supervisionreport (Form 590) was prepared. Between February 1983 and February 1985, theproject was supervised a further seven times and normal sup-rvision reportingprocedures were followed. During this period the supervision missionsgenerally comprised at least two staff, an agricultural economist or finricialanalyst plus a technical specialist. Continuity of Bank supervision staff wasgood with three senior staff (who all overlapped) being the task managers overfive years. Overall, the project placed a heavy demand on Bank supervisionstaff. A total of 429 man-days were spent in the field during January 1981 toMarch 1985. Furthermore, the substantial quantity of file materialaccumulated, confirms that the project was demanding of Bank office time.Substantial time was spent in dealing with procurement, disbursement andtechnical assistance recruitment problems. Despite this heavy staff input,some key staff involved felt that relative to requirements, inadequateresources were made available for supervision.

7.03 This project has suffered from being neither a classical well definedproject, which could have been tightly supervised, nor a sub-sector loan,where the emphasis would have been on sectoral development policies. Had itbeen the latter, supervision would not have concentrated so heavily on detailsof procurement and institutional development, but rather would have insuredthat important pricing or other potential conditionalities had been fulfilled.

- 23 -

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

8.01 Peasant agriculture is the main source of agricultural output inEthiopia. Any project which is to have a major impact on agriculturalproduction needs to go through the current centrally planned system and bedirectpd towards individual farmers. In this respect, the design of theproject was appropriate. It was, however, too ambitious and inadequatelydefined. Revisions tended to exacerbate this problem. It proveuimpossible to provide effective support to production in over 440 weredas. Tohave achieved production objectives, the project should have been smaller andtighter, and geared to specific regions with a known response to fertilizerand reasonable accessibility. More effort should have been put intodeveloping and promoting regionally specific development packages rather thanblanket recommendatiorLs. The three and a half year delay in obtainingtechnical assistance for ADD was particularly harmful in this respect. Theselessons were identified during s1tpervision, and are being applied in thepreparation of a PADEP project, replicated in all the productive regions inthe country.

8.02 More effort should have been made by the Bank at appraisal andnegotiations to ensure that the proposed technology packages would remainsufficiently attractive to farmers in financial terms. Fertilizer prices inEthiopia, particularly early in the project period, were extremely high (US$550/ton at farmgate). In this context, improved linkage with the GrainStorage and Marketing Project (Cr. 789-ET), initiated in 1978 and charged withproviding adequate production incentives to peasant farmers, would haveincreased the pressure on Government to take action on these issues.

8.03 The project, although designed as a self-standing operation in 1975,had evolved by 1980 into an interim operation, designed to strengthenagricultural infrastructure and lay the foundations for a countrywideagricultural production project. Preparation of the follow-on project was anintegral part of MPP II objectives. Due to this metamorphosis, projectconstruction and development activities were collapsed into two years. Programtype aspects, such as financing of a time-slice of MOA operating costs andsalaries were included. Because it had originally been designed as a full-fledged production project, it also included detailed provision for anextension service and credit system, roads, soil and water conservation andlivestock support activities -- which remained in the final design. Theresulting project fell halfway between program and project lending, with thedisadvantages of both, and none of the benefits. Had a program approach beenfollowed, conditions on production incentives and efficiency of MOA operationscould have been included and funds would have been disbursed in two yearsagainst broadly defined categories, without the detailed planning and reviewwork necessitated under the existing design. The focus would have been on thefulfillment of the policy objectives, which would have strengthened thedialogue under the Grain Storage and Marketing Project (Cr. 789-ET). Had a

- 24 -

pure project approach been followed, the project periol would have beenextended to 5 years at least, and the extension service, seeds production andfertilizer distribution components would have been better appraised andimplemented.

8.04 Project content was too broad and its scheduling too ambitious. Thetime period proposed in the SAR for the project was unrealistic given that, asfar as procurement and construction was concerned, it was a "new start"situation. Warnings to this effect from reviewers within the Bank wentunheeded. One effect of trying to implement the project within a shortperiod, was that all activities were to be implemented more or lesssimultaneously. Rational sequencing of project activities was not attemptedand would not have been possible. In retrospect, the initial four yearproject proposed by EPID in 1975 would have been more appropriate.

8.05 With respect to project contents, the inclusion in MPP II of the ruralroads component constructed by ETCA appears inappropriate. It had no bearingon the mainstream activities of MPP II and simply complicated the project. Itcould have been executed under the Bank's Second Road Sector Credit (1404-ET).Funds could have been better used for more self-help roads implemented by MOA.

8.06 Although T&V extension systems are frequently supported by the Bank,this concept wa. not introduced into the project until 1983. It became one ofthe successful aspects of the project, and would have had a greater impact hadit come right at the beginning, and received broader dissemination.

8.07 The ESC component should have concentrated more on seed production.In the end, it only really undertook cleaning and packing of field seed. Itmay have been useful to have included more funding ior the improving inputdistribution under the project, particularly fertilizer. This could haveincluded investments in the AISCO storage and distribution network in additionto the AISCO study.

8.08 The financial structure of ESC does not permit it to fund its futuredevelopment. Government levies a 5Z capital charge annually on allinvestments which it has made in ESC and, furthermore, ESC profits are taxedat 90Z. Unfortunately these issues were not clear at the time of negotiationsand therefore not tackled. If future projects are to support parastatals,these problems should be faced during preparation. Careful analysis ofparastatal financial structures and tax obligations should be made, and thefinal project negotiated so as to ensure that these do not inhibit theenterprise's autonomous objectives.

8.09 Despite the substantial technical assistance provided in this area,the Ministry of Agriculture's budgeting and accounting procedures did notallow the MPP II project costs to be clearly identified. This was proiablybecause too little input was put into designing the project to fit within thegovernment budgetary system at the time of appraisal. Future projects alongMPP/PADEP lines should be designed so that the financial accounting of theproject corresponds with specific financial budgetary headings used by

- 25 -

government. This would ensure that project budgeting and accounting can beintegrated into the Government budget without the need for special ad hocexercises as was the case in MPP II.

8.10 This project cannot be considered successful if evaluated as anisolated effort to improve agricultural production and country economicperformance. However, it can be said to have achieved a fair degree ofsuccess if viewed as part of the continuous process of Bank involvement in thea,ricultural sector in Ethiopia. In this context, it is justified as aninterim effort to develop institutions that play a key role in agriculturaldevelopment and as a precursor to PADEP, a full fledged production project.Among the various accomplishments it can be noted that; (i) a separatefertilizer and inputs supply agency was established and began operations;(ii) MOA offices and other physical infrastructure were expanded and improved;(iii) a study was undertaken on vehicle maintenance and administration which,if implemented in future projects would greatly assist implementation; (iv) asoundly based, well designed National Field Trials program was initiated; (v)an improved agricultural extension methodology was successfully tested (T&VPilot Project); (vi) MOA was reorganized and decentralized; (vii) anorganization capable of cleaning and distributing the country's improved seedrequirements was established (admittedly lacking seed production facilities);(viii) a national Peasant Agriculture Development Program was prepared (stillunder negotiation); and (ix) large numbers of staff were trained at home andabroad. All of these achievements, although disjointed, can be put to gooduse in a subsequent agricultural development effort, where the productivefocus is sharpened, and emphasis is placed on field performance, and on farmresults.

8.11 Two broad priority lessons emerge from the experience of MPP II: (i) aproject cannot succeed in achieving primary production objectives unless theincentive and policy framework are conducive to promoting the adoption ofimproved technology and practices which would sustain increased output; and(ii) agricultural projects which are too large and complex are difficult toimplement, expensive to supervise, and much less likely to achieve all theirobjectives.

- 26 -Table 1

woJW cA*I83 OUPW

Nagd Ppwo,q Leagth 19068/ W181/2 1862/6 1066/0 1816/U IoU/U ToaW low SIp.r $110%0

- . ..... .... t Cost" 00 bier.

Welles-Letm a1 18.8 140.0 M66. 60 4611.9 011.4 Nwely f"lalbeds To be 6.,ft..d

boled- vs-lb. See 1 14.0 188.i 8.8 M.? i .1 Plah"

I*-44i soe 2a £8.8 33.4 S1.8 1.8 t/b,tgb * I#

bI4r4lk So t 4 121.0 0.0 1.6t 1.4 7.4 iNet Gest oely: sI ft.blw

bes.51.ds-Yesofed aiZ9Je 83 1. 2-.1 0".0 MO 7U.6 *4.4 886 PlauIJ:W

I sl.0..Sla jjo. 17 21.0- 1"44. 8U.9 M1.7 1.7 lhte,ly Pilahitd Tro be feifaged

giae-7eiedua CJia- U 1.6 t.7 1A5.0 21.8 4.4 PlaIte

*40_tYsiqw O$ 1? 8 8.7 144. 1O.6 84.4 U.5 88.8 .4 Pl_ab"

ftis-10J.. 0.443 Goa. 10 17.3 2t.4 100.6 1.1 PaIted:t Oly Iam of Iwo retd

S..ep.-bt. Goad.. 21 83.6 #10.6 216.6 114.0 321101-.8 46t.2 PaIted

Totl Dilp" Ceslt vs 11.6 USA 8456.4 411.2 iM.* #4.I St4.0 SO.1

0Vf4155isM t15 11.6 14 1 118.8 JA8.0 8100.4 10.6 745.8 4.4

lm&le s oh1a 70.6 857.6 7"O.8 800.2 16t.4 ?M. 4ens.6 u.s

yetge.r.rsseby SoetsepoPIetedlt i i t 1.1 815.8 4616.4 854.0 7Mt. M.$ IR16. 81.4

11il Plaited ns" o 77 81.0 1. 740.1 41.6 1480.4 21.8

ote 1. 4 12.0 17.? 87.0 186.7 I.

- 27 -

Table 2

ETHIOPIASECOND AGRICULTU!AL MSNIMUM PACKAGi PROJECT

Regional and Awraja Office Construction-------------- _------------_---------

(iirr)

Cost toSITE Budget Date Status

Adigrat 99897 95589 FiaishedAlem Ketama 151649 122668 FinJshedDilla 136127 139544 FinishedGimbi 178952 41373 Not CompletedShambu 174848 94075 Not CompletedNafas Mewicha 165234 156404 Not CompletedGore 173343 208776 Not KnownSawla 161139 107351 Not KnownM±zanl Tefferi 199206 316757 Not Known

Subtotal 1440395 1282537

Asmara 977475 1473505 FinishedNekempt 777158 843646 FinishedMettu 805779 981384 Finished

Subtotal 2560412 3298535

Totals IDA/IFAD Funded 4000807 45b1072

- 28 -

Table 3ElHICPIA-

SEMIS AIICIWAL MINIM PA(UAE PROJECTREC ILETION RWRT

9AWy of LUr TOM TlofIaaI AslIStU Provided lr IF PII

...... Total NM s ..... ...... . IWlfAD jidPOSITION Adin Iuit Acul SiR Varulm Acul Sm VarUIs

Tdiloal Saort Off lowr 7 47 24 23 47 24 23

Evalumtlog Em9mst FPO 51 24 27 49 49Dgrlsltwal Planr PFD 59 24 35 59 59Il&ESystuhs FF0 0 12 -12 0

SW Total PlainlngdProjects 110 60 so 108 0 108

Chlef ACUtatat FIN f5 24 41 85 24 41SYatm MaIyst FIN 28 24 4 24 -24S tmPlavli FIN 0 6 -8 6 -6Prorr FIN 42 0 42 0AccAtIng Tralners FIN 0 192 -192 0

h TotAl FIuw-n 135 248 -111 65 54 11

CooperatIve abowmtnt CCO 34 24 10 0Ibitiig & Credit Abmtrt CCO 0 24 -24 0

9b Total CoweatIvas & Marketing 34 48 -14 0 0 0

Agroist AM0 20 24 -4 20 24 -4Sol IFrtiI ty SInallst AM 20 24 -4 20 24 -4Farm Systems a1 20 0 20 20 20rain Storarp ADD 0 24 -24 0Seed ilt &Prelnng AM 0 24 -24 24 -24Farm lopl I& Tools AMD 0 24 -24 0

9a Total Ariultwr 60 120 40 so 72 -12

SolI & kterw wlvat-n Sic 0 24 -24 0Sll ScaIerriptIan Sl: 52 0 52 52 52

9. Total SC 52 24 28 52 0 52

Llwstodk Prods krkstirg LO 0 24 -24 0Llvestock Prod SPclalIsts LD 60 0 60 0

b TotalLlvctock 30 24 38 0 0 0

Caurs Plair TO 0 24 -24 0Training Systm D 0 12 -12 0

S Total Training 0 36 -8 0 0 a

Sees SacaI lst ESC 18 24 -6 aSeeds Proming Engineer E$ 0 24 -24 24 -24Seedi ProdtIon ESC 3 24 -21 aAgrunist ES 40 0 40 40 40Plaming & Ev. Ecomlst ESC 58 0 58 58 58

SW Tota IESC 119 72 47 98 24 74

TOTAL TECtNICAL ASSISTANCE 617 654 -37 430 174 256

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

-- W- --- --- -- -|-|- t- -- T - ------ |- '

I------ I--- I 1- l--I -r --E I --- |--- t

I II~~~~~~~

---- -- -1 ---- ----- III ---------

--- ---- --- - ---- - --- -------IIIT|

1 s " I '9X^ D I f 888^

_ _

- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -

------ ~ ~~ - --- - -- - - -- - -- - - -- - -

- 30 -

Table 5

AGUCUUALMInfU= PACKAG PUJICTPROaCT CQNHPLUOU EXPRT

LIST Or )WPZI ulWI S In t ATUS On UZIUR

Uni.Atten-

sae Agency ded Degree Year Job on Return

Waged, Volde ESC dmn. tlSc. Seed Technology 83164 Production Manager ZSCMariam.

Zewde 3ishaw SSC Edin. M.Sc. Seed Technology 83184 Quality & Processing Manager

gliraliga Zewdie rsc VYe M.Sc. Agronomy 82/83 Agronomist - Productio Dept.

Mu-legeta Goro tSC 3dml. K.Sc. Seed Techbology 85186 Did Not Return

Meagnsie Legesse USC Zdm. M.Sc. Seed Technology 85/86. Did Not Return

Tesfay. leguesie ADD Vye M.Sc. Plant Science 82183 ADD Senlor Agronomist

Aklu Salhu ADD Wye M.Sc. Plant Science 82/83 Did not return

Tesfayc Morses. lT Vyc K.Sc. Ag. Econ. 82/83 Senior Egtensioan Officer

Dagnew Esbete ADD Wye K.Sc. Ag. Icon. 82/83. Senior Economist ADD

Hailemari s Ntile kOA Wye K.Sc. Plant Science 82/83 Read NV legion Officeleskel

Kabede Tefesse MOA Vye N.Sc. Ag. Icon. 82/83 Economist PAD!P Secretariat

Zaleke Teufayc KOA Wye M.Sc. Plant Science 82/83 Read Crop & Ag Dev South Zone

Deres Abdulkadir MUA Vyc M.Sc. Plant Science 82/83 Read Ag. Dept Harar RegionalOffice

- 31 -

Table 6

ITOPIASECOND AGUCULTURAL MINIMU PACEAGE PROJECT

POJECT COMPLETION RPORT

ESTIMATED MOA ADMINISTRATION COSTS (ncl. IAR. PA seeds & Livestock)

1980181 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 TOTAL(1/2 Yr)

Allocation to IPPII 20.0 49.5 46.5 54.7 58.5 68.0 297.2

less specific items 0.0Inputs 0.0 0.0 1.9 4.0 1.8 0.7 8.4Rural Roads 2.9 0.7 3.7 1.1 0.0 8.4Self Help Roads 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.8 0.8 4.7Svc 0.0 0.6 6.0 2.2 0.3 0.0 9.1

Total Specific Allocation 2.9 1.7 12.3 8.2 4.0 1.4 30.6

MPPII Admin etc. 17.1 47.8 34.2 46.5 54.5 66.6 266.6

less Inflated Base Cost 13.5 28.2 28.9 30.0 34.2 35.4 170.2

MPP Incremental Admin Cost 3.6 19.7 5.3 16.4 20.3 31.2 96.4

MPPI1 uninflated base cost 12.8 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 140.5Inflation factor 1.057 1.103 1.130 1.176 1.340 1.385 1.211

- 32 -

Table 7

ETHIOPIASECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Estimated Project Costs Summary

lEt. SAR EstimatedWith Conts Actual Percent

SAR Added Back Costs of SAR

.. '000 Birr.....

MPP Admin - Gross 105,216 130,715 266,637 204%-less base costs 51.093 63.476 170,204 143%

Net Admin Costs 54,123 67,240 96,434 143.4S

Seed Multiplication PAs 3,470 4,311Applied Research 500 621

MOA Sub Total 58,093 72,172 96,434 133.6Z

Soil & Water Cons 8,401 10,437 9,104 87.2ZRural Roads 11,208 13,924 21.900 157.3SFarm Inputs 36,011 44,738 17.400 38.9S

ESC 14,901 18,512 19,215 103.8Z

Total Base Costs 128,614 159,784 164,053 102.72

Contingencies - Phys 6,431- Price 24,739

TOTAL PROJECT COST 159,784

- 33- Table 8

ETHIOPIA

SECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

Impact of inflation/Price Contingencles

A) LOCAL INiLATION Addis Ababa Genral CPI 2/

Local Price Index Local Inf aUlon ConvrtSAR Actual Incr from prev Yr year Index to mar 1980Est. SAR Actual Basis

Est. 1979 338.4 96.8

Bas March 1980 100.0 100.0 Mar 80 349.7 100.0

1980/81 I/ 115.0 105.7 13.5X 5.7X 1980 353.5 101.11981/82 130.5 110.3 15.0X 4.31 1981 375.2 107.31982/83 113.0 n.a. 2.5X 1982 398.1 113.31983/B4 117.6 n.a. 4.0X 1983 394.5 112.81984/85 134.0 n.a. 14.01 1984 427.8 122.31985/88 138.5 n.a. 3.41 1985 509.4 145.7

1988 459.4 131.4

B) FREIGN INFLATION

World Bank MaY Index 3/For elo Price Index For top InflatIon ConvertSAR AstuaI lncr from prev Yr year Index to Mar 1980Est. SAR Actual Basis

Est.1979 95.5 93.3

Base March 1980 100.0 100.(' Mar 80 102.4 100.0

1980f81 1/ 109.8 102.6 9.81 2.61 1980 104.7 102.21981/82 119.1 102.1 8.51 -0.51 1981 105.2 102.7198213 100.0 n.a. -2.01 1982 103.8 101.41983/84 97.8 n.a. -2.2X 1983 101.0 98.61984/85 97.3 n.a. -0.5X 1984 99.3 97.01985/88 104.0 n.a. 6.90 1985 100.0 97.7

1988 113.0 110.4

1/ Part year only. Project only covered second half.

V Source: Central Statistics OffIce, Ethiopia

3/ Source: World Bank Comodities Division

- 34 -

Table 9

EWPIASEC(M) AGI0LDMAL MIKIIUri PACKAGE PRJECt

PROC CLETlON REPORT

Detai Is of IOA and ESC OIlsemmt PAmsts

., . ............. m ....... ............. E9C .......Fiscal at Icwl Rus Acts l etu i Actual Rsqasts AtI Rust TOTAL cum ESC

(Ed Date) In Cui- In Ioml- In ODI- In Cul- Lid Peets RbordedPeriod .tlve Period ative Period ativ Period ative REOSTS S A Olsb.

(set 1/)...'O Blrr .. .... .... irr... .. '000 SOF.

MW 31, 1981Jos30. 191 424 424 173 173 510 510 209 209 382 3.7S 572

So 30, 1981 3,593 4.017 1,531 1,704 510 209 1.913 7.81Do 31. 1981 2,582 8,599 1,074 4*778 538 1,048 224 432 3,211 10.71 804Mar 31, 1982 1,833 8,432 779 3,558 2,473 3,521 1,051 1,484 5,041 14.3X 2m775AN 30. 1982 5,538 13,970 2,395 5,952 251 3,M 109 1.592 7,544 19.4Y 282

Sw3D, 1982 133 14,103 59 8,01i 535 4,307 238 1,830 7,841 18.51 800m 31 1982 23,590 37,893 10,577 18.589 379 4,688 170 2.000 18,588 41.5S 425

mar 3, 1983 1,978 39u,6 874 17,483 1,514 8,200 870 2,870 20,133 43.91 1,899Mi 30. 1983 11,570 51,239 5,185 22,848 730 8,930 327 2.997 25.845 55.93 819

Sep 3D, 1983 2,345 53.584 1.074 23,723 442 7,371 202 3,199 28,922 58.71 498Om 31, 1983 4,933 58,517 2,285 25,987 84 7,455 38 3.238 29.225 83.71 94IMr 31, 1984 2,488 81,003 1,145 27,133 2,259 9,714 1,040 4,278 31,411 88.41 2,535Jm 30, 1984 4,692 85,695 2,167 29,300 34 9,747 18 4,234 33,593 73.2Z 38

Sep 30, 1984 3,125 88,820 1,492 30,791 2,284 12,011 1,081 5,374 38,188 78.81 2,540Oec 31, 1984 2,244 71,0C4 1,090 31,882 936 12,947 455 5,829 37,711 82.2S 1,050Mar 31, 1985 2,248 73,310 1,122 33,004 93 13.040 47 5,815 38,879 84.71 105Jun 30, 1985 1,341 74,851 653 33,857 2,988 18,008 1,444 7,319 40,978 89.31 3,328

Sep 3D, 1985 2,414 77,085 1,135 34,792 4 16,010 2 7,321 42,113 91.71 5Ow 31, 1985 6,524 83,589 2,923 37,715 918 18,928 411 7,732 45,447 99.03 1,030

Note: 1/ EMC f lzres estImateI m a pro rata basis from exueniltures.

- 35 -

Table 10

ETHIOPIASECW AGRICOLTIMI. MINIM PPAGE PROEC

PRWECT COWLETNIO Raw

PIatm ard AcIal ly ReOund Dhis Suit

Esthatsm In SIR SA Est SM Edt ctal Rumts SIrr:SM Acml RPest tm RhQstFlnoal 0arter Within Period OA. In Ms In Sms In mil- EDchp In P.ul- Rests I SR

(Ehd Date) IDA IFAD Totl CUR CIA PFrlod ative Rat Period atiw ISAR Total

..... (US$ .000) ...... 1000 OR s ... 8000 Birr ... .... 000 SO R.... S 1

Mar 31, 1981 4,200 2,350 8,550 5,175 11.31 0 0 2.5724 0 0 O.0S 0.0OJi 30, 1981 4,700 1,700 12,950 10,247 22.3S 934 934 2.4458 382 382 3.71 0.81

Sep 30, 1981 12,500 5,600 31,050 24,572 53.58 3,593 4,527 2.3469 1,531 1,913 7.81 4.28Dee 31. 1981 4,800 2,200 38,050 30,111 85.68 3,120 7,647 2.4038 1,298 3,211 10.71 7.01Mar 31. 1982 4,4C0 2.000 44,450 35,175 78.68 4,308 11,953 2.3525 1,830 5,041 14.38 11.0GJn 30. 1982 3,200 1,400 49,050 38,816 84.6S 5,789 17,742 2.3128 2,503 7,544 19.43 16.41

Sep 30, 1982 3,200 1,400 53,650 42,457 92.51 688 18,410 2.2479 297 7,841 18.5S 17.11Dec 31, 1982 2.007 900 50,550 44,752 97.51 23,969 42.379 2.2303 10,747 18,588 41.5S 40.51Mar 31, 1983 1,000 450 58,000 45,900 00.0% 3,490 45,8Q9 2.2801 1,544 20,133 43.9S 43.9SJmu 30, 1983 58,000 45,900 100.0S 12,300 58,169 2.2312 5,513 25,845 55.91 55.9S

Sep 30, 1983 58,000 45,900 100.0% 2,787 60,955 2.1829 1,277 26,922 58.71 58.71Doe 31, 1983 58,000 45,900 100.01 5,017 65,972 2.1781 2,303 29,225 63.71 63.7%Mar 31, 1984 58,000 45,900 100.01 4,745 70,717 2.1710 2,186 31,411 88.41 68.4SkAi 30, 1984 58,000 45,900 100.01 4.728 75,442 2.1650 2.183 33,593 73.2S 73.2S

Sep 30, 1984 58,000 45,900 100.01 5,389 80,831 2.0951 2,572 38,168 78.8% 78.81oec 31, 1984 58,000 45,900 100.01 3,180 84,011 2.0G81 1,545 37,711 82.2X 82.28Mar 31. 1985 58,000 45,00 100.0S 2,339 88.350 2.008 1t,189 38,879 84.71 84.71Jui 30, 1985 58,000 45,900 100.01 4,307 90,657 2.0541 2,097 40,976 89.38 89.38

Sep 30, 1985 58,000 45,900 100.01 2,418 93,075 2.1283 1,137 42,113 91.71 91.71DOe 31, 1985 58,000 45,900 100.01 7,442 100,517 2.2320 3,334 45,447 99.01 99.01

USS:0R Ecug Rates: SAR Assud 1.284ACtLal Rate 1.088

BIrr:USS Exchanp Rates: SMR Assued 2.070ACtaI Rate 2.070

- 36 -

Table l1

ETHIOPIASECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACRAGE PROJECT

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

Utilization of IDA Credit and IFAD Loan by MOA

Year 1981182 1982183 1983184 1984/85 1985186 TOTAL

Offices 287 S74 1,733 741 444 3,779Self Help Stores 203 467 669T & V Houses 7 109 7 122

Total Buildings 287 574 1,740 1,053 918 4,570

Rural Roads 2,254 581 2,882 825 6,543Self Help Roads 100 952 1,052

Total Roads 2,354 S81 2,882 1,777 0 7,594

CIVIL WORKS 2,641 1;155 4,622 2,829 918 12,165

Vehicles 12,544 41 139 12,724Equipment 881 6,912 3,077 1,637 2,467 14,973Spareparts 127 381 2,399 2,907T & V Equipment 10 10S & W Tools 646 646Polyethane Tube 552 379 348 1,278

VEHICLES & EQUIP. 1,433 20,111 3,583 2,407 5,005 32,538

Fertilizer 9,042 9.042Veterinary Drugs 1,733 1,778 602 4,114Pesticides 77 2,153 778 524 3,532Chemicals 3 8 111 122Seed 30 3 383 32 448

FARM INPUTS 3 10,882 3,934 1,770 666 17,256

Salaries - Local 8,654 4 8,658S & W Op. Cost 4,815 1,647 6,462T & V Op. Costs 47 102 279 154 581

OPERATING COSTS 8,654 4,862 1,749 283 154 15,701

Expat. Salaries 1,213 121 663 734 110 2,842Consultants 18 22 136 825 1,888 2,888T & V Consultants 22 19 41

TOTAL TECH ASSIST 1,231 165 818 1,559 1,998 5,771

TRAINING 224 6 2 42 274G---ND-TOTAL-13,962--37,400-14,712-8,849 --8,781 -83,704

GRAND TOTAL 13,962 37,400 14,712 8,849 8,781 83,704- - - - - - - - - - -- - - -

- 37 -

Table 12

EN4OPIA

o AZOL1WAA. NPwU PAOM PR4=

MJv CaWLr er

$S~ of.w9 CleJn Seed itput a DiletrIhtian

-54*.~i.PerIod- -..-- WP po rIad-

tam, 1975/79 1979/60 19il0/8 1961/2 1mi 10/8 1964/815 lWi/8ti 1986/8

... ............................... -s i a ................................ ^_re

Cra

e19.07 1S."4 10.44 1I.57 2.8 2.7m 24.,8 6,26

Serley 286 744 267 86s 1.62 1.71t 2.107 2.600

Nt3* 1,1e2 2.,8 1.419 2.495 1.324 13,4" 9.914 11,280

= rgha 2m 1 270 221 0SO 774 1,094 1.10

Tot 194 117 1i9 S 1 267 87 GM 1.840

stricZ S8 14 2go 2 04 286 324 430

other 176 97 28 26 34 p0 72 910

ToTL 20.,92 26.384 15.81 210.284 16.84 36.262 89,047 U4,216

Coaoributeen by Soct~rSltate Fern y e

- C;:trt ClieanIn 8.0S2 9,397 9.674 2.818

- Sol" 19.00t 16.79 16S., 18.27 4.52 S.380 4.764 14.100

Sub-Te"l State Scr 19.05 30.79S 10.0l 2 18,278 12.,W 14.77? 14.416 1,6.18

- INA/h O I/ 1.27? 3.456 684 2.4n 1.743 18.486 17.000 3.8O40

- 64u 1.8 e 1 1,376 7 an89 1.000 1.000

- OHte. V 25 1.88 14 78 6,171 6.09 6,060

Sub-TOtl Pseeant Secter 18922 8.86 2.760 3.981 8.2a 28.485 24.6W9 S7,600

ToTAL 20.92B 22,364 18.812 20,284 LS.884 38.282 I9,047 S4.218

FeetnVtee: 1/ Inelvi. AISo prndeceseor.

2/ No* aN direat saeei to D_aCt former..

Saurn: SC Preduaitian Dertne

- 38 -

Table 13.

10 LUIUL N243M PAO(M TJ0

. FR0W Tauf ITm

siny of P..t) I is.' U.. by fPinaa Pi eel

Pvojs.t I~Pw - shterls Ped- -IP 7 N.'Itod -

Yea 1977/70 191370 1979f0 195/6 19/92 195 193/4 196/6 196/6

...................................... tric t..

WPt Areas

°OP 25.363 40.,5 33.S41 21,91. 23.5916 35.421 35.60S 31.665 41.26

Urm. 1.,47 5.010 2,5 1.444 1,419 3.00 4.464 1.27 I."6

Total SeP1 17.060 43.905 5,616 916.40? 25.012 36.429 87.116 36.112 66 AS

GAP 6.116 7,.S= 7.401 7,705 6,62 6.62 6.61 &.VI 18.2S4

Unea 70 us 62

Totl iU 6.04 7.2 7.401 7.705 5.662 . SA62W 8.e1 8.371 1.1921

'hoI. Cowtcv

Dv 32.217 418.27 40.742 20.666 30.255 42.047 42.147 43.96 W.50

UP" .7 6010 2.S4 t.44 1.419 6.006 4.77 2.67 0.01

c*m Total 5.904 51.207 43.927 81.112 51.474 4S.0,6 46.5,4 46.363 "4.5

DNCRWAL USE SP '

GW 18.572 1 7.95 (3.410) (1.790) 85.06 80,112 10.132 15.61

U... 1.3,5 0 (0 (225) 1.361 21.7 9iO 6.10

Total Iewrompntal 16.Ul, 86,056 (3.62 (2.01) 9.39 10.919 11162 22.206

far. a.4. Fort; li.sar Price. (Sirr/ot)

AP JS0 50 650 ao 1,16s ago 614 814 614

UP" SW 550 6o 0 a 7 SU 6 an

Sour".: AZSCD& Anlyalo I solo

- 39 -

Table 14

PmiOpIA

=0 AMICULT11AM. I4ND4I PA0(JI M0Ml26

QMUNL 1NEd VI PUSGLW WS 7/7 to 166/16

Pewil luau U. 16JE17/0 Set I hto Us. 16/u6 over. 19767/7

CAP U'.. Toutl 0 uJes ?r40 CA U... Toutl

E;r 861 26 617 on 19 *2 t 7 ) as

Tig.. 206 1 06 Su a0 206 (1) 297

Vol le 2 2 1.212 1.22 1.210 0 1.210

Gander 178 3 1 1.12 277 1.402 947 514 1.171

0.3.. 2,?13 2M0 2.631 10,42? 1,2617 11.4 7.664 1.062 8.716;

10,26414 1.114 11.7 18,60 S.119 6,919 6S.16 4.008 12.,41

:3ol lag.2,241 21 2.A2 2, 2.86 277 2.641 120 266 S7

t lubibe 14? 0 14? 11 Su 16 (0) 14

afIf 2,?f0 1 2.M6 2.071 2.071 (69) (1) (600)

:ads we 71 1 74 100 100 7 (1) 2?

Side.. 4,661 26 4.1? 31.1 6 .170 (1.397) (20) (1.417)

Sol. 91 91 6o so (e61) 0 (S66)

"burh 667 S200 W17 200 1,02 1.211 (446) 6n 14

PI Are 2S. 1.,U47 V.060 41.210 7,967 49,216 15.16 6.3120 2,.206

Arai 6.114 70 6.06 16.284 62 16.2W 8.400 (6) 6.392

TOTAL PE_ANS S2.217 1.1 16,64 8,560 0.029 646624.2"6 6.312 30.69I

- 40 -

Table 15

EThIOPIASECOND AGRICULTURAL MINIMUM PACKAGE PROJECT

PR0JE;.T COMPLETION REPORT

Estimates of Returns to Fertilizer Use…-----------------------------------_-----

Ferts No Fort Forts No FertTrad Package Package Package Package

.... Yields gaiHa ......... ..Percent Tnct....Teff 780 1180 920 512 182SorghumlMillet 930 2070 1350 1232 452Maize 970 3920 2630 3042 1711Barley 740 1570 900 1122 22SWheat 830 1560 970 S8S 172Pulses 730 860 860 18S 182Oilseeds 310 370 370 19S 1923nseteCoffee 400 400 400 0S 02

ETHIOPIA

55C00 4538L.IIAL NDLU PCKA08 3905r

390.J57 CSWLVW NOW

5....ri@ 1, 19P1 WAe W?3 C.0d"fo

71 /7 7MM /74 74/7 78/76 T76OM 77M8 7MI7" 79/60 60/18 61/6 U MM84 64/6 65/65 86/67 Mf / Som/ o/wn

Poj.NCt Coee 6.56 O.7 6.O4 18.081 DD., l2 ,8t 14. 76n 14.9M 14.M l.5 , t.317 8.81 47.1n, 54.4t1 67.143 W.,U 89u 58.6 6,9 aSWS

OA F . Coe

ftrkilixr Sl.,lZ 4.989 9.5t1 12.709 S6,3t4 3D0Ui i0.95 36.93t It.i92t1 1,57 1,.9il 16."*0 I5,06 3,587 2ti.92t u9, t.1 b.9S 80.95 a,on aas

lmre.vd sea 239 64 U4 4SI 1.20 1.95 31 M6 o 46 M llt 58U 463 in M86 - 5 M5 671 a7s

Fe. I W1~ts 1,7I0 1.790D 43 1.1 1.0 1,'M 1.412 1190 1." 1.Ui7 3.011 3.12 .11t

P"McIde. 23.81 23,818 *1.6 1.480 3.86 a,l79 1.4, 23.81 3.0 2.46 *.6 3,*M '.M1

0 Ite 2,746 3.744 2 ,174 1.739 3,744 2,i79 .195 23,744 3.744 23.1 8.Mi 8.M 8.20

Fail I or La., l, 1.95 8.87 5,97 19.812q 5.95l 5.653 6i7.86 91.655 8.86 43.440 67,65 68,606 1886 67.865 67,86 11.4i7 15.58 60,365 68.95

5. tem 8.9 6,6e,91 18.103 19,129 66.i766 55,743 ii4,115 101.0t0,75t 81Ot, 66,M04,7t 9t,742 6561 ,0t .163 101.7at 101,niti 0.,i6 1u.m 131.1 631.160

_m .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.TOTAL. CaSTS 10.367 16.781 31.516 53.160 77.60F 04.095 68.85 16.550 116.56 96361 16.390 18.M5 143.749 Ia,M 150.646 141.M8 W.1470 1184.156 141.401 161.M1

408 OM 1.5t1 8.099 8.8 6.95 6.427 10.9" 1.616 6.679 5,9l 9.0 6.44 5.295 9."7 *.117 7?.W7 7.1 7."7 7.447

Taft 906 1,913 8.11 7,?0. 7.406 13.22 14U,411 24,61i9 0.37 0.747 18.U90 .466 GR.AN 17,0 30.90 31.65 17U,86 16.M 17.040 17.,46

ibs* X1,415 8,951 8,501 30.430 13.N* 34,66 W7.AN 30.613 a6.136 84.61 84.10 01.25 05.211 88M,70 51,170 "1,3 76.8t "6.01 90,66 60.6

er- MPt7 1,729 8.144 5,917 7,Ui 14.101 15.96 86,790 J4.0t 38.6ff 18.608 40.83t 8.950 36,6ll4 371.01 i0.i4 $$.M 00,35 96.307 WS.F7

TOTAL m7S lO 31 7.511 18,476 3.818 60.43 690 84.,05 13.6o 5 .71 111,1 7;t.U8 U8,9i64 15,749 10.G6 111.408 117.65 U16,81 WS.65 310.75 tk10*.

SET (CON) liIT (6,757) (9,50 (7.6) (5.661) (47,109 (3,194) MU7 ) 1.M 19. 14.U9190 (U,471) gl.406t (1700) (84.114) (47.438) (6.) (7?.6 14.7ff 4.M0 4,.7IS

6c0W.e 36 of..u.6

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