Continuation War

The Continuation War (Finnish: jatkosota; Swedish:fortsttningskriget; 25 June 1941 19 September 1944)refers to the hostilities between Finland and the SovietUnion during the SecondWorldWar, from 1941 to 1944.At the time of the war, the Finns adopted this name toclarify how they viewed it in relation to the precedingWinter War.[11] The Soviet Union saw the war as partof its struggle against Nazi Germany and its allies, on theEastern Front of World War II. The war was known inthe Soviet Union as the Great Patriotic War.[12] Germanyregarded its operations in the region as part of its overallwar eorts on the Eastern Front, and it provided Finlandwith critical material support and military cooperation.Acts of war between the Soviet Union and Finlandstarted on 22 June 1941, the day Germany launched itsinvasion of the Soviet Union, with covert Finnish op-erations. Open warfare began with a Soviet air oen-sive on 25 June. Subsequent Finnish operations undid itspost-Winter War concessions to the Soviet Union on theKarelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia, and captured EastKarelia by September 1941. On the Karelian Isthmus, theFinns halted their oensive 30 km from Leningrad, at thepre-World War II border between the Soviet Union andFinland. Finnish forces did not participate in the siege ofLeningrad directly, holding their pre-World War II ter-ritory on the Karelian Isthmus for two and a half yearsinstead.[13][14][15] In 1944, Soviet air forces conducted airraids on Helsinki and other major Finnish cities. Even-tually, in summer 1944, the Soviet strategic oensivedrove the Finns from most of the territories they hadgained during the war, but the Finnish Army later broughtthe oensive to a standstill in July 1944. A ceasereended hostilities on 5 September and was followed bythe Moscow Armistice on 19 September. The 1947 Parispeace treaty concluded the war formally. Finland cededPetsamo Province to the Soviets, leased Porkkala penin-sula to them, and paid reparations, while ultimately re-taining its independence.

1 Background

1.1 Winter WarMain articles: Background of theWinterWar andWinterWarOn 23 August 1939, the Soviet Union and Germanysigned the MolotovRibbentrop Pact whereby the partiesdivided the independent countries of Finland, Estonia,

Finnish ski troops in Northern Finland on 12 January 1940

Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania into spheresof interest, with Finland falling to the Soviet sphere ofinterest.[16] Shortly afterward, Germany invaded Polandand as a result the United Kingdom and France declaredwar against Germany. The Soviet Union invaded easternPoland on 17 September.[17] Next, Moscow demandedthat the Baltic states allow the establishment of Sovietmilitary bases and the stationing of troops on their soil.The Baltic governments accepted these ultimatums, sign-ing corresponding agreements in September and October1939.[18]

In October 1939, the Soviet Union attempted to negoti-ate with Finland for the transfer of Finnish territories onthe Karelian Isthmus and the islands of the Gulf of Fin-land to the Soviet Union and for the establishment of aSoviet military base near the Finnish capital Helsinki.[19]The Finnish government refused, and the Red Army at-tacked Finland on 30 November 1939.[20] Condemnationof the Soviets by the League of Nations and by coun-tries all over the world had no eect on Soviet policy.[21]International help for Finland was planned, but very lit-tle actual help materialized, except from Sweden.[22] TheMoscow Peace Treaty, which was signed on 12 March1940, ended the Winter War.[23] By the terms of thetreaty, Finland lost one eleventh of its national territoryand about 13% of its economic capacity.[24] However,Finland had avoided having the Soviet Union annex thewhole country.[25]

1.2 Interim peace

Main article: Interim Peace

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

Finnish ags are at half-mast after the publication of the peaceterms

Finlands foreign policy had been based on multilateralguarantees for support from the League of Nations andNordic countries and was considered a failure.[26] Finnishpublic opinion favored the reconquest of Finnish Karelia.Finlands government declared the countrys defense to beits rst priority, and military expenditures rose to nearlyhalf of government spending. Finland purchased and re-ceived donations of war material during and immediatelyafter the Winter War. On Finlands southern frontier theSoviet Union had acquired a military base in Hanko nearthe capital Helsinki, which employed over 30,000 Sovietmilitary personnel.[27]

Finland also had to resettle some 420,000 evacuees fromthe lost territories. To ensure the supply of food, itwas necessary to clear new land for the evacuees tocultivate.[27] This was facilitated by the Rapid Settle-ment Act. The Finnish leadership wanted to preservethe spirit of unanimity that was commonly felt throughoutthe country during the Winter War. The divisive WhiteGuard tradition of the Civil War 16May victory day cele-bration was therefore discontinued.[28] Relations betweenFinland and the Soviet Union remained strained despitethe signing of the one-sided peace treaty, and there weredisputes regarding the implementation of the conditionsof the treaty. Finland sought security against further ter-ritorial depredations by the Soviet Union and proposedmutual defence agreements with Norway and Sweden,but these initiatives were quashed by Moscow.[29][30]

1.3 German and Soviet expansion in Eu-rope

After the Winter War, Germany was not popular inFinland as it was considered an ally of the SovietUnion. However, the Finnish government began to re-store diplomatic relations with Germany. Finland con-tinued its Western-oriented policy and negotiated a wartrade agreement with the United Kingdom,[29] but theagreement was renounced after the German invasion ofDenmark and Norway on 9 April, when Britain cut alltrade and trac communications with Scandinavia. Withthe fall of France, a policy of Western orientation was nolonger considered an option in Finnish foreign policy.[31]On 15 and 16 June, the Soviet Union occupied the Balticstates without resistance. Soviet Puppet regimes wereinstalled; and within two months Estonia, Latvia, andLithuania were incorporated as Soviet Republics withinthe Soviet Union.[32] By mid-1940, the two remainingnorthern democracies, Finland and Sweden, were encir-cled by the totalitarian states of Germany and the SovietUnion.On 23 June, a short time after the Soviet occupationsof the Baltic states began, the Soviet foreign ministerVyacheslav Molotov contacted the Finns and demanded amining licence for the Soviet Union at the nickel mines inPetsamo or alternately the establishing of a joint Soviet-Finnish company to operate there. The licence to minethe deposit had earlier been granted to a British-Canadiancompany, and the proposition was rejected. The nextmonth, the Soviets demanded that Finland destroy thefortications built in the land islands and give the So-viets the right to use Finnish railways to transport Soviettroops to the newly acquired Soviet base at Hanko. TheFinns very reluctantly agreed to these demands.[33] On 24July, Molotov accused the Finnish government of perse-cuting the so-called Society for Peace and Friendship be-tween Finland and USSR, a pro-communist group; andsoon afterwards, he publicly supported this group. Thesociety organized demonstrations, some of which turnedinto riots.[34][35]

1.4 Finnish relations with Germany andthe USSR

On 31 July 1940, the German leader Adolf Hitler gavethe order to start planning an assault on the Soviet Union.This meant that Germany had to reassess its positionsregarding both Finland and Romania. Until then, Ger-many had rejected Finnish appeals to purchase arms, butin August the Germans allowed the secret sale of weaponsto Finland. German and Finnish military authoritiesmade an agreement on 12 September, and an ocial ex-change of diplomatic notes was sent on 22 September.At the same time, German troops were allowed to transitthrough Sweden and Finland.[36] In practice, this meantGermany had redrawn the border of German and Soviet

3German Joachim von Ribbentrop bidding farewell to SovietVyacheslav Molotov in Berlin on 14 November 1940.

spheres of inuence.[37]

Due to the changed situation, Molotov made a visit toBerlin on 1213 November.[38] He wanted Germanyto withdraw its troops from Finland and stop enablingFinnish anti-Soviet sentiments. He also reminded theGermans of the 1939 SovietGerman non-aggressionpact. Hitler asked how the Soviet Union planned to settlethe Finnish question. Molotov answered that it wouldhappen in the samemanner as in Bessarabia and the Balticstates. Hitler rejected this.[39] The following December,the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United Kingdom allvoiced opinions concerning suitable Finnish presidentialcandidates. Risto Ryti was the only candidate none ofthese three powers objected to. He was elected on 19December.[40]

In January 1941, the Soviet Union demanded to take con-trol of the Petsamo mining area. Finland rejected this, asit by then had a rebuilt defense force and was encouragedby Germany to reject the Soviet demand.[40] On 18 De-cember 1940, Hitler had ocially approved OperationBarbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[41]He expected both Finland and Romania to join the Ger-man campaign.[42] Two days earlier, Finnish Major Gen-eral Paavo Talvela had met German Colonel GeneralFranz Halder and, a couple days later, ReichsmarschallHermann Gring, in Berlin. This was the rst time theGermans advised the Finns, in carefully couched diplo-matic terms, that they were preparing for a war with theSoviet Union. Outlines of the actual plan were revealed inJanuary 1941 and regular contacts between Finnish andGerman military leaders started from February.[42]

In late spring 1941, the Soviet Union made a numberof goodwill gestures in order to prevent Finland fromcompletely falling under German inuence. Soviet am-bassador Ivan Zotov was replaced with the more exi-ble Pavel Orlov. Furthermore, the Soviet government an-nounced that it no longer opposed a rapprochement be-tween Finland and Sweden. However, these conciliatorymeasures did not have any eect on Finnish policy.[43]

2 Path to war

2.1 FinnishGerman agreement

On 20 May 1941 the Germans invited some Finnish of-cers to Germany to discuss the coordination of Oper-ation Barbarossa. The participants met on 2528 Mayin Salzburg and Berlin, and continued their meeting inHelsinki from 3 to 6 June. They agreed upon the arrivalof German troops, Finnish mobilization, and general di-vision of operations.[43] They also agreed that the FinnishArmy would start mobilization on 15 June, but the Ger-mans did not reveal the nal date for the assault. TheFinnish decisions were made by a small group of politi-cal and military leaders, and the rest of the governmentwas largely kept in the dark. The government was notinformed until 9 June that the country would start mo-bilization of reservists due to tensions between Germanyand the Soviet Union.[41]

2.2 Deployments and pre-assaults

Finnish, German, and Soviet troops at the start of the Continu-ation War in June/July 1941. The Germans began their assaulton 29 June from Petsamo area, and the Finns attacked on 1 Julyfrom Suomussalmi and Kuusamo area.

The Germans took responsibility for the 500 km (310mi) stretch of the front in northern Finland consistingof Finnish Lapland. The Finnish army was now muchstronger than it had been during the Winter War, now

4 4 1941: FINNISH OFFENSIVE

boasting 475,000 men. The artillery, too, was relativelystrong. However, there was only one tank battalion and alack of motorized transportation.[44]

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union had eigh-teen divisions in the region, against fteen Finnish andfour German divisions. The Finns enjoyed air supremacy.Furthermore, the Soviet Union needed its best units andmost up-to-date materiel on its western front.[45]

The German troops assaulted the Soviet Union on 22June elsewhere but not from Finland. However, Germanminelayers hiding in the Archipelago Sea laid two largemineelds across the Gulf of Finland in the late hours of21 June.[46][47] Later the same night, German bombersew along the Gulf of Finland to Leningrad and minedthe harbour and the river Neva. On the return trip, thesebombers landed for refueling on an aireld in Utti. In theearly hours of 22 June, Finnish forces launchedOperationKilpapurjehdus, which aimed to man the demilitarizedland Islands. An international treaty on the status ofthe islands called for Finland to defend them in case ofthe threat of an attack.[48] However, the operation wascoordinated with the Nazi invasion, and the Soviet con-sulate there was arrested. According to Finnish historianMauno Jokipii, Finland knew that it had violated interna-tional norms.[49]

On 21 June, Finnish units began to concentrate at theFinnish-Soviet border, where they were arranged into de-fensive formations. Finland mobilised 16 infantry divi-sions, one cavalry brigade, and two jger brigades, whichwere all standard infantry brigades, except for an ar-moured battalion in the 1st Jger Brigade. Separate bat-talions were mostly formed from border guard units andwere used mainly for reconnaissance. Soviet militaryplans estimated that Finland would be able to mobiliseonly ten infantry divisions, as it had done in the WinterWar, but they failed to take into account the materiel Fin-land had purchased between the wars and its training ofall available men. Two German mountain divisions werestationed at Petsamo and two infantry divisions at Salla.On the morning of 22 June, the German Mountain CorpsNorway began its advance from northern Norway to Pet-samo. Finland did not allow direct German attacks fromits soil into the Soviet Union. On the same day, anotherGerman infantry division was moved from Oslo to faceLadoga Karelia.On the Soviet side, the Karelian Isthmus was covered bythe 23rd Army. Ladoga Karelia was defended by the 7thArmy. In the MurmanskSalla region, there was the 14thArmy with the 42nd Corps. The Red Army also hadaround 40 battalions of separate regiments and fortica-tion units present. Leningrad was garrisoned by three in-fantry divisions and one mechanized corps. As the initialdevastating German strike against the Soviet Air Forcehad not aected air units located near Finland, the Sovi-ets deployed 700 planes as well as some aircraft from theNavy against 300 Finnish planes.[50]

3 Soviet air attackOn the morning of 25 June, the Soviet Union launchedan air oensive of 460 ghters and bombers targeting 19airelds in Finland; however, inaccurate intelligence andpoor bombing accuracy caused several raids to hit Finnishcities or municipalities.[51] There was considerable de-struction in the cities. Twenty-three Soviet bombers werelost,[51] while the Finns lost no aircraft.[52]

The Soviet Union stated that the air attack was directedagainst German targets, especially airelds, in Finland.[53]At the same time, Soviet artillery stationed at the Hankobase began to shell Finnish targets, and a minor Sovietinfantry attack was launched over the Finnish side of theborder in Parikkala.The bombings oered the Finnish government a groundfor claiming that the country had become the target of anew assault, and the Finnish parliament approved the de-fensive war as a fait accompli.[54] According to historianDavid Kirby, the message was intended more for publicopinion in Finland than abroad, where it was seen that thecountry was in the German camp.[55]

4 1941: Finnish oensive

The front in December 1941

In July the Finnish military began its planned oensive.According to Finnish historian Olli Vehvilinen, in 1941most Finns thought that the scope of the new oensive

4.3 Conquest of East Karelia 5

was only to regain what had been wrongly taken in theWinter War.[56]

The Soviet Union struggled to contain the German inva-sion, and soon the Soviet High Command had to call allavailable units stationed along the Finnish border to therapidly deteriorating front line.[57] According to Finnishhistorian Ohto Manninen, because of this, the initial airoensive against Finland could not be followed by a sup-porting land oensive as allegedly planned.[58] More-over, 237th Infantry Division and, excluding the 198thMotorized Division, the Soviet 10th Mechanized Corpswere withdrawn fromLadogaKarelia, thus strippingmostof the reserves from the remaining defending Sovietunits.[59]

4.1 Reconquest of Ladoga KareliaMain article: Finnish reconquest of Ladoga Karelia(1941)

The Finnish plans for the oensive in Ladoga Kare-lia were completed on 28 June.[60] The oensive waslaunched on 10 July,[15][60][61] and already by 16 July theFinns reached the shore of Lake Ladoga and cut the de-fending Soviet army in two, hindering the Soviets de-fense of the area.[60] Finnish headquarters halted the of-fensive in Ladoga Karelia on 25 July after reconqueringthe area of Ladoga Karelia lost to the Soviet Union in1940 and after advancing as far as Vitele. The Finnishoensive then moved on to other sections of the front.

4.2 Reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus

Finnish military parade in Viborg on 31 August 1941, after itsrecapture

Main article: Finnish reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus(1941)

The Finnish II Corps (II AK) started its oensive in theregion of the Karelian Isthmus on 31 July.[62][63] Finnishtroops reached the shores of Lake Ladoga on 9 August,surrounding most of three defending Soviet divisions on

the northwestern coast of the lake, from where the So-viet divisions were evacuated across the lake. On 22August the Finnish IV AK Corps started its oensivefrom the 1940 border between the Gulf of Finland andthe II AK, and advanced towards Viborg.[62] By 23 Au-gust, the Finnish II Corps had reached the Vuoksi water-way from the east and continued to surround the Sovietforces defending Viborg.[62] The Soviet withdrawal or-der came too late, and the Soviet divisions lost much oftheir equipment, although a sizable portion of their man-power was later evacuated via the Koivisto islands. Thebadly mauled defending Soviet army was unable to haltthe Finnish oensive, and by 2 September the Finns hadreached the 1939 border along its whole length. On 31August, Finnish headquarters ordered the 2nd and 4thArmy Corps, which had advanced the furthest, to halttheir oensive after reaching a line just past the formerborder that ran from themouth of the River Sestra via Re-tukyl, Aleksandrovka, and the eastern edge of the villageof S. Beloostrov (Russian: ) to Ohtaand form for defense.[64][65]

According to Soviet sources, the Finns advanced and tookthe settlement of Novyi Beloostrov with its train stationon 4 September, but a Soviet counter-attack threw themout the next day.[66][67][68] The war diary of the Finnish12th Division facing this settlement[64][69] notes that itwas quiet at the time[69] while the neighboring 18th Di-vision had orders on the morning of 4 September 1941to form a line of defense north of N. Beloostrov,[70] andthe Finnish 6th Regiment responsible for the Finnish18th Divisions front line facing N. Beloostrov[64] formedfor defense along the small stream (Serebryanyy ruchey)north of N. Belootrov on 4 September 1941.[71][72] Ac-cording to Finnish sources, Soviet forces advanced northfrom N. Beloostrov and attacked the Finnish positionsalong the small stream on the morning of 5 Septem-ber 1941, but the Finns managed to repel them.[71][72]Staryi Beloostrov (Valkeasaari) was taken by the Finnson September 4 and the Soviet counterattacks failed toretake the settlement.[64] Finnish forces captured N. Be-loostrov again on 10 or 11 September 1941.[64][67][68][73]According to the war diary of the Finnish 12th Divi-sion, this was done to strengthen their lines.[73] The So-viet war correspondent Luknitsky noted that this created adangerous bulge in the Soviet defensive line.[67] Accord-ing to Russian historian Nazarenko, the Finns were notable to advance further due to stronger Soviet defensivepositions.[68] Fighting for the settlement continued until20 September, when the Soviets managed to force theFinns out.[74] After that the front stabilized.[75][76]

4.3 Conquest of East KareliaMain article: Finnish conquest of East Karelia (1941)

The Finnish oensive in East Karelia started in early Julyin the northern section of the front. In early Septem-

6 4 1941: FINNISH OFFENSIVE

ber, the attack in the northern section reached Rukajrvi(, Rugozero) village and Finnish headquartershalted the oensive there. On August 27, Finnish head-quarters ordered the oensive in the south to reach theSvir River. Finnish troops cut the Kirov railroad on7 September, crossed the Svir on 15 September, andthen halted the oensive. Advance troops reached theshores of Lake Onega on 24 September. The town ofPetrozavodsk was captured on 1 October after the So-viets withdrew to avoid encirclement. On 6 November,the Finnish headquarters ordered their forces to captureKarhumki and then move to defense. The Finnish forcescaptured the area of Karhumki and Povenets, and haltedthe oensive in early December.Related to the Finnish advance to the Svir, the GermanArmy Group North advanced from the south towards theSvir River and managed to capture Tikhvin before So-viet counterattacks forced theGermans to withdraw to theVolkhov River. Soviet forces also made several attemptsto force the Finns out from their bridgehead south of theSvir during October and December 1941; however, theSoviet eorts to reduce the bridgehead were blocked bythe Finns. Soviet forces also attacked the German 163rdDivision, which was operating under Finnish command,across the Svir in October 1941; but the Soviet forces thathad crossed the river were pushed back soon after.[77]

4.4 Operation Silver Fox in the North

Main article: Operation Silver Fox

The German objective in northern Finland was to takeMurmansk and seize control of the Murman Railway.Murmansk was the only year-round ice-free port in thenorth, and it was a threat to the nickel mine at Petsamo.Operation Silver Fox was run by the German AOK Nor-wegen and had two Finnish divisions under its command.The German soldiers were from central Europe and theyhad diculties moving over a roadless terrain of swampand forest. Troops managed to advance some distancewith heavy casualties, but the terrain oered good defen-sive positions for the Soviet resistance.[78]

The order for GermanFinnish troops to move to de-fensive operations was given on 17 November, when at-tempts to reach the Murmansk Railway had failed.

4.5 Naval campaign

Further information: Baltic Sea Campaigns (19391945)Although the Soviet Red Banner Baltic eet started thewar in a strong position, German naval mine warfare andaerial supremacy, and the rapid advance by the Germanland forces forced the Soviet Navy to evacuate its bases toKronstadt and Leningrad. The Soviets evacuations fromTallinn and Hanko proved to be very costly operations

Soviet troop transporter nearly sunk by German mines on 3 De-cember 1941 in the Finnish Gulf during the Hanko evacuation

for them. As the Soviet Navy withdrew to the easternend of the Gulf of Finland, it left nearly the whole BalticSea as well as many of the islands to the Germans andFinns. Although Soviet submarines caused some threatto German trac on the Baltic, the withdrawal of the So-viet Navy made the Baltic Sea a German lake until thesecond half of 1944. Although the Soviet Navy left in ahurry, the naval mines it had managed to lay before andduring the evacuations caused casualties both to the Ger-mans and the Finns, including the loss of one of the twoFinnish coastal defence ships, the Ilmarinen.

4.6 Political development

Administrative map of Finland from 1942 to 1944

Germanys main forces advanced rapidly deep into So-viet territory during the rst weeks of the OperationBarbarossa campaign. The Finns believed the Germanswould defeat the Soviet Union quickly. President Ryti

7envisioned Greater Finland, where the country and otherFinnic people would live inside a natural defence border-line by incorporating the Kola Peninsula, East Karelia,and perhaps even northern Ingria. In public the proposedfrontier was introduced by the slogan A short border a long peace.[79] Some members of the Finnish par-liament, such as the Social Democrats and the SwedishPeoples Party, opposed the idea, arguing that maintain-ing the 1939 frontier would be enough.[79] On July 10,Finnish Commander-in-Chief C. G. E. Mannerheim gavean order of the day, the Sword Scabbard Declaration, inwhich he pledged to liberate Karelia. The Finnish gov-ernment assured the Americans that it was unaware ofthe order.[80]

Finland had prepared for a short war, but in late autumn itwas clear that there would be no decisive outcome in theshort term. Finnish troops suered losses during their ad-vance; and, overall, German victory became uncertain asGerman troops were halted near Moscow. The Finnisheconomy suered from a lack of labour, food shortages,and increased prices. The Finnish government had to de-mobilize part of the army so that industrial and agricul-tural production would not collapse.[81] In October, Fin-land informed Germany that it would need 175,000 shorttons (159,000 t) of grains to manage until next years har-vest. The German authorities would have rejected the re-quest, but Hitler himself agreed. Annual grain deliveries200,000 short tons (180,000 t) amounted to almost one-half of the Finnish domestic crop. In November, Finlanddecided to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.[82] The advancein East Karelia was halted on 6 December. The Finns hadsuered 75,000 casualties, of whom 25,000 were Finnishdeaths during the advance.[81]

4.7 Finland and Western alliesFinland worked to maintain good relations with theWest-ern powers. The Finnish government stressed that Fin-landwas ghting as a co-belligerent with Germany againstthe Soviet Union only to protect itself.[81] Furthermore,Finland stressed that it was still the same democraticcountry as it had been in the Winter War. However, on12 July 1941, the United Kingdom had signed an agree-ment of joint action with the Soviet Union. Furthermore,under German pressure, Finland had to close the Britishlegation in Helsinki. As a result, diplomatic relations be-tween Finland and the United Kingdom were broken on 1August.[83] On 28 November, Britain presented Finlandan ultimatum, in which it demanded that Finland ceasemilitary operations by 3 December.[84] Unocially, Fin-land informed the Western powers that troops would halttheir advance in the next few days. The reply did notsatisfy the United Kingdom, which declared war on Fin-land on 6 December 1941. The Commonwealth mem-ber states of Canada, Australia, India, and New Zealandfollowed.[85][Note 7]

Relations between Finland and the United States were

more complex; the American public was sympatheticto the brave little democracy, and there were anti-communist feelings. At rst, the United States em-pathised with the Finnish cause; however, the situa-tion became problematic after Finnish troops crossed the1939 border. Finnish and German troops were a threatto the Murmansk Railway and northern communicationsupply line between the Western Allies and the SovietUnion.[86] On 25 October 1941, the United States de-manded that Finland cease all hostilities against the SovietUnion and withdraw behind the 1939 border. In public,President Ryti rejected the demands, but in private hewrote to Mannerheim on 5 November 1941 asking himto halt the oensive. Mannerheim agreed and secretlyinstructed General Hjalmar Siilasvuo to break o the as-sault against the Murmansk Railway.[84]

5 194243: Trench warfare

Trench warfare of the Continuation War in 1942; the Sovietsmade four major assaults, which all were repelled.

5.1 Military operationsSee also: Baltic Sea Campaigns (19391945) and Siegeof Leningrad

Although military operations during 1942 and 1943were limited, the front did see some action. In early

8 5 194243: TRENCH WARFARE

1942, Soviet Karelian Front forces attempted to retakeMedvezhyegorsk, which had been lost to the Finns in late1941. As spring came, the Soviet forces also went onthe oensive on the Svir front as well as in Kiestinki re-gion. All Soviet oensives started promisingly, but dueeither to the Soviets overextending their lines or stubborndefensive resistance, the Soviet oensives were stoppedand repulsed. After Finnish and German counterattacksin Kiestinki, the eventual front lines had moved very lit-tle. In September 1942, the Soviets tried again at Krivnear Medvezhyegorsk, but despite ve days of ghting,the Soviets managed to push the Finnish lines back only500 m (550 yd) on a roughly 1 km (0.62 mi)-long stretchof the front.[87]

Unconventional warfare was fought in both the Finnishand Soviet wilderness. Finnish LRRPs organized both byFinnishHQ4th Separate Battalion (Er.P 4)and by lo-cal units patrolled beyond Soviet lines. In summer 1942,the Soviet Union had formed the 1st Partisan Brigade.The unit was only 'partisan' in name, as it was essentiallymore than 600 men and women on long range patrol. The1st Partisan Brigade was able to inltrate beyond Finnishpatrol lines but was found out and largely destroyed.[88]

On the naval front, the Soviet Baltic Fleet still operatedfrom the besieged city of Leningrad. In early 1942, So-viet forces recaptured the island of Gogland but lost bothGogland and Bolshoy Tyuters to the Finns later in spring1942. During the winter of 1941/1942, the Soviet BalticFleet made the decision to use the large Soviet subma-rine eet to carry the ght to the enemy. Though ini-tial submarine operations in the summer of 1942 weresuccessful, the German Kriegsmarine and Finnish Navysoon stepped up their anti-submarine eorts, making theSoviet submarine operations later in 1942 very costly.The underwater oensive carried out by the Soviets con-vinced the Germans to lay anti-submarine nets as wellas supporting mineelds between Porkkala and Naissaarwhich proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for theSoviet submarines.[89]

5.2 Diplomatic manoeuversOperation Barbarossa was planned as a blitzkrieg intendedto last a few weeks. British and U.S. observers believedthat the invasion would be concluded before August. Inthe autumn of 1941, this turned out to bewrong, and lead-ing Finnish military ocers started to doubt Germanyscapability to nish the war quickly. German troops innorthern Finland faced circumstances they were not prop-erly prepared for, and failed to reach their targets, mostimportantly Murmansk. As the lines stabilized, Fin-land sent out peace feelers to the Soviet Union severaltimes.[90] Germany was alarmed by this, and reacted bydrawing down shipments of desperately needed materi-als each time. The idea that Finland had to continue thewar while putting its own forces in the least possible dan-ger gained increasing support, perhaps in the hope that

Hitler, Marshal Mannerheim (Finnish Army chief) and FinnishPresident Ryti meet, Imatra June 1942

theWehrmacht and the Red Army would wear each otherdown enough for negotiations to begin, or to at least getthem out of the way of Finlands independent decisions.Nationalist elements, including the IKL, may also havecontinued to hope for an eventual victory by Germany.Finlands participation in the war brought major benetsto Germany. The Soviet eet was blockaded in the Gulfof Finland, so that the Baltic was freed for the trainingof German submarine crews as well as for German ship-ping, especially for the transport of vital iron ore fromnorthern Sweden and nickel and rare metals (needed insteel processing) from the Petsamo area. The Finnishfront secured the northern ank of the German ArmyGroup North in the Baltic states. The sixteen Finnish di-visions tied down numerous Soviet troops, put pressure onLeningrad (although Mannerheim refused to attack it di-rectly), and threatened the Murmansk railway. Addition-ally, Sweden was further isolated and was increasinglypressured to comply with German and Finnish wishes,though with limited success.

Finnish Waen-SS volunteers in Gross Born Truppenlager in1941

Despite Finlands contributions to the German cause, theWestern Allies had ambivalent feelings, torn betweenresidual goodwill for Finland and the need to accommo-date their vital ally, the Soviet Union. As a result, Britaindeclared war against Finland, but the United States didnot. With few exceptions, there was no combat between

5.4 Finnish occupation policy 9

these countries and Finland, but Finnish sailors were in-terned overseas. In the United States, Finland was de-nounced for naval attacks made on American Lend-Leaseshipments, but received approval for continuing to makepayments on its World War I debt throughout the inter-war period.Because Finland joined the Anti-Comintern Pact andsigned other agreements with Germany, Italy, and Japan,the Allies characterized Finland as one of the Axis Pow-ers, although the term used in Finland is "co-belligerencewith Germany, emphasizing the lack of a formalmilitaryalliance.

5.3 International volunteers and support

Estonian volunteers in Finland during the Continuation War

Foreigners to Finland from Sweden and Estonia wereamong international personnel who fought during theContinuation war.[91]

As in theWinterWar, Swedish volunteers were recruited.Until December 1941, these formed the Swedish Volun-teer Battalion, which was tasked with guarding the So-viet naval base at Hanko. When it was evacuated by seain December 1941, the Swedish unit was ocially dis-banded. During the Continuation War, the volunteerssigned up for three to six months of service. In all, over1,600 Swedish volunteers fought for Finland, althoughonly about 60 remained by the summer of 1944. About athird of the volunteers had previously participated in theWinter War. Another signicant groupabout a quarterof the menwere Swedish ocers on leave.From 1942 to 1944 there was also a Schutzstael (SS)battalion of volunteers on the northern Finnish front re-cruited from Norway, then under German occupation,and similarly, some Danes. About 3,400 Estonian vol-unteers took part. On other occasions, the Finns re-ceived a total of about 2,100 Soviet prisoners of warin return for those Soviet POWs they turned over tothe Germans. These POWs were mainly Estonians andKarelians who were willing to join the Finnish army.These, as well as some volunteers from occupied EasternKarelia, formed the Kinship Battalion (Finnish language:Heimopataljoona). At the end of the war, the USSR re-

quested members of the Kinship Battalion to be handedover. Some managed to escape before or during trans-port, but most of themwere either sent to the labor campsor executed.

5.4 Finnish occupation policy

Main articles: Finnish military administration in EasternKarelia and East Karelian concentration camps

On 19 July 1941, the Finns set up the military adminis-tration in occupied East Karelia. The goal of the admin-istration was to prepare the region for eventual incorpo-ration into Finland. In the early stage, the Finns aimed atethnic cleansing where the Russian population would beexpelled from the area once the war was over.[92] Theywould be replaced with Finnic peoples such as Karelians,Finns, Estonians, Ingrians, and Vepsians. The Russianpopulation was deemed non-national.[93] Most of theEast Karelian population had been evacuated before theFinnish forces arrived. About 85,000 peoplemostly theelderly, women, and childrenwere left behind, and lessthan half of them were Karelians. A signicant numberof civiliansalmost 30% of the remaining Russianswere interned in concentration camps.[93]

The winter of 194142 was an ordeal for the Finnish ur-ban population, due to poor harvests and a shortage ofagricultural laborers.[93] However, for the interned it wasdisastrous; more than 3,500 people died, mostly fromstarvation. This gure amounted to 13.8% of the inmates,while the corresponding gure for the free population ofthe occupied territories was 2.6% and for Finland proper1.4%.[94] Conditions gradually improved, ethnic discrim-ination in wage levels and food rations were terminatedthe following year, and new schools were established forthe Russian-speaking population.[95] By the end of the oc-cupation, mortality rates dropped to the same levels as inFinland proper.[94]

5.5 Soviet partisans

Main article: Soviet partisans Finland and KareliaSoviet partisans conducted a number of operations inFinland and in Eastern Karelia from 1941 to 1944.The major one failed when the 1st Partisan Brigadewas destroyed in the beginning of August 1942 at LakeSeesjrvi. Partisans distributed propaganda newspapers,Pravda in Finnish and Lenins Banner in Russian. Oneof the leaders of the partisan movement in Finland andKarelia was Yuri Andropov.[96]

Finnish sources state that partisan activity in East Kare-lia focused mainly on Finnish military supply and com-munication targets, but almost two thirds of the attackson the Finnish side of the border targeted civilians,[97]killing 200 and injuring 50, including children and the

10 6 1944: SOVIET OFFENSIVE

Two Finnish boys executed by Soviet partisans at Seitajrvi, July1942

elderly.[98][99][100]

5.6 Jews in FinlandMain article: Jews in Finland

Finland had a small (approx. 2,300) Jewish population.They had full civil rights and fought with other Finns inthe ranks of the Finnish Army. The Germans had men-tioned the Finnish Jews at the Wannsee Conference inJanuary 1942, wishing to transport them to Majdanek inGeneral Government. SS leader Heinrich Himmler men-tioned the Finnish Jews during his visit in Finland in thesummer of 1942. Finnish Prime Minister Jukka Rangellreplied that Finland had no "Jewish question".[101] How-ever, there were dierences for Jewish refugees in Fin-land. In November 1942, the Finns handed eight Jew-ish refugees over to the Gestapo. This raised protestsamong the Finnish Social Democrat ministers, and afterthis event no more refugees were handed over.[102] Over500 Jewish refugees were granted asylum.[103]

The eld synagogue in Eastern Karelia was one of thevery few functioning synagogues on the Axis side duringthe war. There were even several cases of Jewish ocersof Finlands army being awarded the German Iron Cross,which they declined. German soldiers were treated byJewishmedical ocers who sometimes saved the soldierslives.[104][105][106][107]

5.7 Finland and the Western alliesThe Continuation War represents the only case of a gen-uinely democratic state participating in World War II onthe side of the Axis powers, albeit without being a sig-natory of the Tripartite Pact. The United Kingdom de-clared war on Finland on 6 December 1941 (Finnish In-dependence Day), with Canada and New Zealand declar-ing war on Finland on 7 December and Australia andSouth Africa declaring war the next day. U.S. Secre-tary of State Cordell Hull congratulated the Finnish en-

voy on 3 October 1941 for the liberation of Karelia butwarned Finland not to enter Soviet territory; furthermore,the United States did not declare war on Finland when itwent to war with the Axis countries and, together withthe UK, approached Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin at theTehran Conference about acknowledging Finnish inde-pendence. However, the U.S. government seized Finnishmerchant ships in American ports, and in the summer of1944 shut down Finnish diplomatic and commercial of-ces in the United States as a result of President Rytistreaty with Germany. The U.S. government later warnedFinland about the consequences of continued adherenceto the Axis.[108]

The best-known British action on Finnish soil was an air-craft carrier strike on German and Finnish ships in theFinnish harbour of Petsamo on 31 July 1941.[10] This at-tack achieved little except the loss of three British air-craft, but it was intended as a demonstration of Britishsupport for its Soviet ally. Later in 1941, Hurricanes ofNo. 151 Wing RAF, based at Murmansk, provided localair cover for Soviet troops and ghter escorts for Sovietbombers.[109] The British contribution to the war was oc-casional but signicant.Finnish radio intelligence is said to have participated ef-fectively in German actions against British convoys toMurmansk.[110] Throughout the war, German aircraft op-erating from airelds in northern Finland attacked Britishair and naval units based in Murmansk and Archangelsk.

6 1944: Soviet oensiveMain article: VyborgPetrozavodsk Oensive

6.1 Overtures for peaceMain articles: Bombing of Helsinki in World War II andBattle of Narva (1944)

Finland began to actively seek a way out of the war afterthe disastrous German defeat at the Battle of Stalingradin February 1943. Edwin Linkomies formed a new cabi-net with peace as the top priority. Negotiations were con-ducted intermittently in 194344 between Finland and itsrepresentative, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, on one side, and theWestern Allies and the Soviet Union on the other, but noagreement was reached. Stalin decided to force Finlandto surrender; a bombing campaign on Helsinki followed.The air campaign in February 1944 included three majorair attacks involving a total of over 6,000 sorties. Finnishanti-aircraft defences managed to repel the raids as onlyve percent of the dropped bombs hit their planned tar-gets. Helsinkis air defense included the strategic plac-ing of searchlights and res as decoys outside the city tolure the Soviet bombers to drop their payloads in what

6.2 Soviet strategic oensive 11

The front line on 4 September 1944, during the last days of thewar

were actually unpopulated areas. Major air attacks alsohit Oulu and Kotka, but because of radio intelligence andeective anti-aircraft defences, the number of casualtieswas small.[111]

Meanwhile, the lengthy and ferocious German defence inNarva aided by the Estonians eliminated Soviet-occupiedEstonia as a favorable base for Soviet amphibious inva-sions and air attacks against Helsinki and other Finnishcities. The tactical success of the army detachmentNarwa from mid-February to April diminished thehopes of the Stavka to assault Finland and force itinto capitulation from Estonia.[112][113][114] Finland ter-minated the negotiations in mid-April 1944,[115] becausethey considered the Soviet terms to be impossible tofulll.[116]

6.2 Soviet strategic oensive

On 9 June 1944, the Soviet Union opened a major of-fensive against Finnish positions on the Karelian Isthmusand in the area of Lake Ladoga (it was timed to accom-pany D-Day[117]). On the 21.7 km (13.5 mi)-wide break-through segment the Red Army had concentrated 3,000guns and mortars. In some places, the concentration ofartillery pieces exceeded 200 guns for every kilometer ofthe front (one every 5 m (5.5 yd)). On that day, Sovietartillery red over 80,000 rounds along the front on theKarelian Isthmus. On the second day of the oensive, the

Finnish troops passing by the remains of a destroyed Soviet T-34at the battle of Tali-Ihantala

Soviet forces broke through the Finnish front lines. TheSoviets penetrated the second line of defence by the sixthday. The Soviet pressure on the Karelian Isthmus forcedthe Finns to reinforce the area. This allowed the secondSoviet oensive in Eastern Karelia to meet less resistanceand to capture Petrozavodsk by 28 June 1944. Accordingto Erickson (1991), James Gebhardt (1989), and Glantz(1998), the main objective of the Soviet oensives wasto force Finland from the war.[118][119][120]

6.2.1 German help for Finland

Finland especially lacked modern antitank weaponrywhich could stop Soviet heavy tanks, and German For-eign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop oered these inexchange for a guarantee that Finland would not seeka separate peace again. On 26 June, President RistoRyti gave this guarantee as a personal undertaking, whichhe intended to last only for the remainder of his presi-dency. In addition to delivering thousands of hand-heldPanzerfaust and Panzerschreck antitank weapons, Hitlersent the 122nd Infantry Division, the half-strength 303rdAssault Gun Brigade, and Luftwae Detachment Kuhlmeyto provide temporary support in the most threatened de-fense sectors.With new supplies from Germany, the Finnish armyhalted the Soviet advance in early July 1944. At thispoint, the Finnish forces had retreated about one hun-dred kilometres, which brought them to approximatelythe same line of defence they had held at the end ofthe Winter War. This line was known as the VKT-line(short for "ViipuriKuparsaariTaipale"; it ran from Vi-borg to the River Vuoksi to Lake Ladoga at Taipale),where the Finnish Army stopped the Soviet oensive inthe Battle of Tali-Ihantala in spite of Soviet numericaland materiel superiority.[121][122][123] The front stabilizedonce again.[121][122][123]

12 8 ARMISTICE AND AFTERMATH

6.2.2 Finlands exit from the war

A few battles were fought in the latter stages of the war.The last of them was the Battle of Ilomantsi, a Finnishvictory, from 26 July to 13 August 1944.[116][124][125][126]The struggle to contain the Soviet oensive was exhaust-ing Finnish resources. The German support under theRyti-Ribbentrop Agreement had prevented a disaster, butit was believed the country would not be able to hold an-other major attack.[127] The Soviet advances against Ger-man Army Groups Center and North further complicatedmatters for Finland.[127]

With the front being stable so far, it was a good time forFinland to seek a way out of the war.[127][128][129] At thebeginning of August President Ryti resigned to allow Fin-land to sue for peace again, which the new government didin late August.[119][128][130] The Soviet peace terms wereharsh, but the $600,000,000 reparations demanded in thespring were reduced to $300,000,000,[116]most likely dueto pressure from the United States and Britain.[131] How-ever, after the ceasere the Soviets insisted that the pay-ments should be based on 1938 prices, which doubled theamount.[131] This sum constituted half of Finlands an-nual gross domestic product in 1939.

7 Prisoners of war

7.1 Soviet prisoners of war in Finland

Main article: Soviet prisoners of war in Finland

The number of Soviet prisoners of war was estimated tobe around 64,000 persons. Of these, 56,000 were cap-tured in 1941.[132] About 2,600 to 2,800 Soviet prison-ers of war were handed over to the Germans in exchangefor roughly 2,200 Finnic prisoners of war.[133] Food wasespecially scarce in 1942 in Finland due to a bad har-vest, and this was the primary reason for the numberof deaths. Out of 64,188 Soviet POWs, 18,318 died inFinnish prisoner of war camps.[134]

7.2 Finnish prisoners of war in the SovietUnion

Main article: Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union

There are two views of the number of Finnish prisonersof war. The Soviet and Russian view is that of 2,377Finnish prisoners of war who reached the prison camps1,954 were returned after the Moscow Armistice. TheFinnish view is that of the original approximately 3,500Finnish prisoners of war, only about 2,000 were returned(more than 40% perished). The dierence can be at leastpartially explained by the Soviet practice of counting only

the prisoners who survived to reach a prison camp.

8 Armistice and aftermath

Areas ceded by Finland to the Soviet Union following theMoscowArmistice

Memorial at Lappeenranta to the dead of the Winter and Con-tinuation Wars. The wall in the background carries the namesof Finnish dead buried inside Karelia. The gures are cleanerscarrying out a daily cleaning and tidying of the memorial in May2000.

Main articles: Moscow Armistice and Lapland War

Mannerheim had repeatedly reminded the Germans thatin case their troops in Estonia retreated, Finland wouldbe forced to make peace even on extremely unfavourableterms.[135] The territory of Estonia would have providedthe Soviet army a favourable base for amphibious inva-

13

sions and air attacks against Finlands capital, Helsinki,and other strategic targets in Finland, and would have sev-ered Finnish access to the sea. The initial German reac-tion to Finlands announcement of ambitions for a sepa-rate peace was limited to only verbal opposition. How-ever, the Germans then arrested hundreds of sailors onFinnish merchant ships in Germany, Denmark, and Nor-way.Previously, in return for critically needed food and de-fense materiel from the Germans, President Ryti had per-sonally committed, in writing, that no separate peace withthe Soviets would be attempted. Accordingly, it becameclear that he must resign, paving the way for a separatepeace. Finlands military leader Mannerheim was ap-pointed president in an extraordinary procedure by theFinnish parliament. In agreeing to take oce, he ac-cepted responsibility for ending the war.On 4 September 1944, the cease-re ended military ac-tions on the Finnish side. The Soviet Union ended hos-tilities exactly 24 hours after the Finns. An armisticebetween the Soviet Union and Finland was signed inMoscow on 19 September. Finland had to make manyconcessions: the Soviet Union regained the bordersof 1940, with the addition of the Petsamo area (nowPechengsky District, Russia); the Porkkala peninsula (ad-jacent to Helsinki) was leased to the USSR as a naval basefor fty years; and transit rights were granted. Finlandsarmy was to be demobilized with haste, but Finland wasrst required to expel all German troops from its terri-tory within 14 days. As the Germans did not leave Fin-land by the given deadline, the Finns fought their formerco-belligerents in the Lapland War. Finland was also re-quired to clear the mineelds in Karelia (including EastKarelia) and in the Gulf of Finland. Retreating Ger-man forces had also mined northern Finland heavily. Thedemining was a long operation, especially in the sea areas,lasting until 1952. One-hundred Finnish army personnelwere killed and over 200 wounded during this process,most of them in Lapland.As sizable numbers of civilians who had been relocatedinto Finland from Karelia in 1939-40 had moved backinto Karelia during the war, they had to be evacuatedagain; of the 260,000 civilians who had moved back intothe Karelia, only 19 chose to remain and become Sovietcitizens.[136]

Nevertheless, in contrast to the rest of the Eastern frontcountries, where the war was fought to the end, a Sovietoccupation of Finland did not occur and the country re-tained sovereignty. Neither did the Communists rise topower as they had in the Eastern Bloc countries. A pol-icy called the PaasikiviKekkonen line formed the basisof Finnish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union untilthe Soviet Unions dissolution in 1991.

9 Analysis

9.1 Finnish reasons for entering the warand nature of FinnishGerman rela-tions

Finland re-entered World War II mainly because of theSoviet invasion of Finland during the Winter War, whichhad taken place after Finnish intentions of relying on theLeague of Nations and Nordic neutrality to avoid con-icts had failed from lack of outside support.[137] Dur-ing the Continuation War, Finland primarily aimed to re-verse its territorial losses under the March 1940 MoscowPeace Treaty and, depending on the success of the Ger-man invasion of the Soviet Union, to possibly expand,especially into East Karelia (Karelo-Finnish Soviet So-cialist Republic).[138] Some right-wing groups also sup-ported a Greater Finland ideology. Henrik Lunde notesthat, unlike many of Germanys allies, Finland survivedWorld War II without losing its independence,[139] al-though the price for war was high in war casualties, repa-ration payments, territorial loss, a bruised internationalreputation according to Olli Vehvilinen, and accordingto some, subsequent Soviet inuence on Finlands for-eign policy during the Cold War. According to TuulikkiVuonokari, the FinnishGerman alliance was dierentfrom most of the other Axis relationships, an exampleof which was the participation of Finnish Jews in theght against the Soviet Union.[140] The Finnish govern-ment did not take any anti-Jewish measures, despite re-peated requests fromNazi Germany.[141] One remarkableaspect of the FinnishGerman relationship was that Fin-land never signed the Tripartite Pact, which was signed byall de jureAxis countries. The Finns, and Mannerheim inparticular, clearly stated they would ght against the So-viets only to the extent necessary to redress the balance ofthe 1940 treaty (which would ultimately have dire conse-quences for Germany, when Finland refused to advancebeyond its 1939 borders to complete the German encir-clement of Leningrad.) However, for Hitler the matterwas irrelevant; and he saw Finland as an ally.[101]

Finland adopted the concept of a parallel war wherebyit sought to pursue its own objectives in concert with, butseparate from, Nazi Germany, as co-belligerents.

9.2 Tides of warMajor events across Europe and the tides of war in generalhad a signicant impact on the course of World War II inFinland:

Germanys invasion of the Soviet Union (OperationBarbarossa) is closely connected to the ContinuationWars beginning.

The Allied invasion of France (Battle of Normandy)was coordinated with the Soviet major oensive

14 11 NOTES

against Finland (9 June15 July 1944).[90]

The subsequent Soviet and Allied advances towardsGermany drew away the interest in military opera-tions from Northern Europe, hastening the end ofthe Continuation War.

9.3 Soviet buer zones across Europe

Soviet sources maintain that Soviet policies up to theContinuation War were best explained as defensive mea-sures by oensive means: The Soviet division of occu-pied Poland with Germany, the Soviet occupations ofLithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and the Soviet invasion ofFinland in the Winter War are described as elements inthe Soviets construction of a security zone or buer re-gion between the perceived threat from the capitalist pow-ers of Western Europe and the Communist Soviet Union.These Soviet sources see the post-war establishment ofSoviet satellite states in the Warsaw Pact countries andthe Finnish-Soviet Agreement of Friendship, Coopera-tion, and Mutual Assistance as the conclusion of this So-viet defense plan.[142][143][144] Western historians such asNorman Davies and John Lukacs dispute this view anddescribe the pre-war Soviet policy as an attempt to stayout of the war and regaining land lost after the fall of theRussian Empire.[145]

9.4 Assessment of Soviet designs for Fin-land and their outcome

Several Western historians, while noting the Soviets as-sertion of their alleged need for a Soviet security buer,contend the Soviet designs on Finland were no dier-ent from their designs on other Baltic countries. Ameri-can Dan Reiter (1990) notes, [Finland recognized] thatthe Soviet Union was unlikely to be satised with ter-ritorial concessions as a means to increase its security.[T]he Soviets viewed the control of small buer statesas critical to their security...This was the motivation,he asserts, behind the de facto 1940 Soviet annexa-tion of the Baltic States, and Moscow saw the control ofFinland also as ultimately being necessary. Reiter andBritish historian Victor Rothwell quote Soviet ForeignMinister Molotov as telling his Lithuanian counterpartat the time Lithuania was eectively absorbed into theUSSR, [S]mall states will disappear...Baltic states, in-cluding Finland, will be included within the honourablefamily of Soviet peoples.[146][147] However, contends Re-iter, "[T]he fear of rising costs of ghting pushed Stalinto accept a limited war outcome with Finland, rather thanpursue absolute victory,[148] although a contemporarySoviet document... called for the brutal military occupa-tion of Finland at wars end.[149] The Finnish victory [atIlomantsi] ended the Soviet oensive in Finland and per-suaded the Soviets to give up their demand for Finlands

unconditional surrender.[150] Peter Provis (1999) con-cludes his essay on point, By following [self-censorshipand limited appeasement] policies and fullling the So-viet Unions demands [for great reparations]...Finlandavoided the same fate as other nations that were 'liberated'by the Red Army...Finland had once again defended herindependence in a global conict that engulfed and de-stroyed many other nations...The Finns had once againdemonstrated their determination to avoid defeat by theSoviet Union and maintained their independence.[151]

Russian historian Nikolai Baryshnikov disputes the viewthat the Soviet Union wanted to deprive Finland of itsindependence, and that Finnish defensive victories pre-vented this. He argues that there is no documentary evi-dence for such claims and that the Soviet government wasalways open for negotiations. Baryshnikov cites the for-mer head of the Oce of Information of the Finnish Gen-eral Sta, Kalle Lehmus, and other Finnish sources toshow that the Finnish leaders already knew of the limitedSoviet plans for Finland in the rst half of July 1944, af-ter intelligence indicated that some Soviet divisions wereto be transferred to reserve in Leningrad.[152][153]

10 See also List of Finnish corps in the Continuation War List of Finnish divisions in the Continuation War Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union Co-belligerence Einsatzkommando Finnland Finlandization FinnishWaen-SS volunteers PaasikiviKekkonen line Salpalinja No. 151 Wing RAF Karelian question in Finnish politics Russo-Finnish wars Siege of Leningrad Army of Karelia

11 Notes[1] Most of the Finns served during the Finnish oensive

in 1941 (approx. 500,000 men) and the Soviet oen-sive in August 1944 (528,000 men). Army strength var-ied from 260,000 to 360,000, Air Force 8,00022,000,

12.1 Citations 15

Navy 14,00040,000 and directly under the HQ com-mand 15,00036,000. In addition some people wereobliged by law to provide supporting tasks, like 19,000in labour groups and 25,000 men in air-raid defence (rebrigades, air-raid shelter maintenance, etc.), and 43,000women volunteers in various non-military tasks (clercks,radio-operators, air-observers, supply).

[2] Germans were located in Finnish Lapland executing theOperation Silver Fox.

[3] Finnish detailed death casualties: Dead, buried 33,565;Wounded, died of wounds 12,820; Dead, not buried laterdeclared as dead 4,251; Missing, declared as dead 3,552;Died as prisoners of war 473; Other reasons (diseases, ac-cidents, suicides) 7,932; Unknown 611

[4] The ocial Soviet number was 2,377 POWs. Finnish re-searchers have estimated 3,500 POWs.

[5] Italian participation was limited to four motor torpedoboats and their crews which were used alongside alreadyobsolete Finnish motor torpedo boat Sisu and four Ger-man minelaying KM-boats to form international NavalDetachment K which operated on Lake Ladoga during thesummer and autumn of 1942.

[6] Although the United Kingdom formally declared war onFinland on 6 December 1941, there was only one Britishattack on Finnish soil a carrier strike on Petsamo[10]carried out on 31 July 1941 four months before the decla-ration of war. Additional British participation in the Con-tinuation War was limited to supply aid, aerial support forits Arctic operations and a British airwing (No. 151 WingRAF) under Soviet command, which supported Soviet airraids in the Murmansk area and trained Soviet crews forroughly a month in the autumn of 1941 a couple ofmonths before the declaration of war against Finland bythe United Kingdom.

[7] See also the Statute of Westminster 1931.

12 References

12.1 Citations[1] Mouritzen, Hans (1997). External Danger and Democ-

racy: Old Nordic Lessons and New European Challenges.Dartmouth. p. 35. ISBN 1-85521-885-2.

[2] Nordstrom, Byron (2000). Scandinavia Since 1500. Min-neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p. 316. ISBN978-0-8166-2098-2.

[3] Morgan, Kevin; Cohen, Gidon; Flinn, Andrew (2005).Agents of the Revolution: New Biographical Approachesto the History of International Communism in the Age ofLenin and Stalin. Bern: Peter Lang. p. 246. ISBN 978-3-03910-075-0.

[4] Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun historian laitos, Jatkosodanhistoria 16 (The History of the Continuation War, 16), 1994

[5] , ed. (2001). (in Russian). -. pp. 269271. ISBN5-224-01515-4.

[6] Manninen (1994) pp. 277282

[7] Kurenmaa, Pekka; Lentil, Riitta (2005). Sodan tap-piot. In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti. Jatkosodanpikkujttilinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner SderstrmOsakeyhti. pp. 11501162. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.

[8] Malmi, Timo (2005). Jatkosodan suomalaiset sotavan-git. In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti. Jatkosodanpikkujttilinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner SderstrmOsakeyhti. pp. 10221032. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.

[9] Manninen (1994) pp. 306313

[10] FAA archive: Raid on Petsamo

[11] Lavery, Jason Edward. The history of Finland. Green-wood Press. p. 126.

[12] Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Finland, Moscow, 1974.ISBN 0-02-880010-9

[13] Wykes, Alan (1972). The Siege of Leningrad, BallantinesIllustrated History of WWII.

[14] Brinkley, Douglas (2004). Haskey, M., ed. The WorldWar II Desk Reference. Grand Central Press. p. 210.

[15] Baryshnikov (2002)

[16] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 30

[17] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 31

[18] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 33

[19] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 39

[20] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 44

[21] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 49

[22] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 65

[23] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 69

[24] Kirby 2006, p. 215

[25] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 70

[26] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 74

[27] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 75

[28] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 76

[29] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 77

[30] Kirby 2006, p. 216

[31] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 78

[32] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 79

[33] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 80

[34] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 81

16 12 REFERENCES

[35] Kirby 2006, p. 218

[36] Kirby 2006, p. 220

[37] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 83

[38] Kirby 2006, p. 219

[39] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 84

[40] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 85

[41] Kirby 2006, p. 221

[42] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 86

[43] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 87

[44] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 90

[45] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 91

[46] (Finnish) Nordberg, Erkki, Arvio ja ennuste Venjn soti-laspolitiikasta Suomen suunnalla, 2003, ISBN 951-884-362-7

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[66] Werth 1999, p. 294

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[71] Hkkinen, Edvin, Ilmari (1986). Kannaksen kahlaajat -JR 6 Jatkosodassa [Waders of the Isthmus - 6th InfantryRegiment in the Continuation War] (in Finnish). Turku:Koteva Oy. pp. 176179, 182183. ISBN 951-99787-9-8.

[72] E/JR6 Taistelukertomus v. 1941 [War Diary of theheadquarters of the 6th Infantry Regiment for 1941]. Wardiary collection (in Finnish). National Archives Servicesof Finland. pp. 206, 209, 324. Retrieved 25 February2013.

[73] Os.2/12.DE, sotapivkirja, 4.9.41 18.1.42 [War di-ary of 12th Divisions headquarters, section 2]. War diarycollection (in Finnish). National Archives Services of Fin-land. p. 8. Retrieved 25 February 2013.

[74] Luknitsky 1988, p. 72

[75] Salisbury 2003, p. 246

12.1 Citations 17

[76] Werth 1999, pp. 360-1

[77] Raunio, Ari; Kilin, Juri (2008). Jatkosodan torjuntatais-teluja 194244 [Defensive battles of Continuation War194244] (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy.pp. 1011. ISBN 978-951-593-070-5.

[78] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 95

[79] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 92

[80] Kirby 2006, p. 224

[81] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 96

[82] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 101

[83] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 97

[84] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 99

[85] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 100

[86] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 98

[87] Raunio, Ari; Kilin, Juri (2008). Jatkosodan torjuntatais-teluja 194244 [Defensive battles of Continuation War194244] (in Finnish). Keuruu: Otavan Kirjapaino Oy.pp. 7681. ISBN 978-951-593-070-5.

[88] Tikkanen, Pentti, H. (1973). Sissiprikaatin tuho [Destruc-tion of Partisan Brigade] (in Finnish). Arvi A. KaristoOsakeyhti. ISBN 951-23-0754-5.

[89] Kijanen, Kalervo (1968). Suomen Laivasto 19181968, II[Finnish Navy 19181967, Part II] (in Finnish). Helsinki:Meriupseeriyhdistys/Otava. p. 123.

[90] Jutikkala 1988, p. 248

[91] Jowett, Philip; Snodgrass, Brent; Ruggeri, Raaele(2006). Finland at War 1939-45. Oxford: Osprey Pub-lishing Ltd. pp. 2931. ISBN 978 1 84176 969 1.

[92] Vehvilinen (2002), p. 105

[93] Kirby 2006, p. 225

[94] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 107

[95] Kirby 2006, p. 226

[96] (Russian)Andropov Yuri Vladimirovich. Biography.

[97] (Finnish) Eino Viherivaara, Partisaanien jljet 19411944. Oulun Kirjateollisuus Oy, 1982. ISBN 951-99396-6-0

[98] Erkkil, Veikko, Vaiettu sota (The Silenced War). Ara-tor Oy. ISBN 952-9619-18-9

[99] Lauri Hannikainen, (1992). Implementing HumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conicts: The Case of Finland,Martinuss Nijo Publishers, Dordrecht. ISBN 0-7923-1611-8.

[100] (Finnish) Tyyne Martikainen, (2002). Partisaanisodansiviiliuhrit, PS-Paino Vrisuora Oy. ISBN 952-91-4327-3.

[101] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 102

[102] Vehvilinen 2002, p. 103

[103] Finland (PDF). Yad Vashem. Retrieved 2010-10-29.

[104] (Finnish) Rautkallio, Hannu, Suomen juutalaisten asevel-jeys (Finnish Jews as German Brothers in Arms), Tammi,1989

[105] Tuulikki Vuonokari (2003), Jews in Finland During theSecond World War, Finnish Institutions Student Paper:FAST Area Studies Program Department of TranslationStudies, University of Tampere, Autumn 2003 . Retrieved2009-02-06.

[106] Poljako in Torvinen, Kadimah: Suomen juutalaisten his-toria 35 Smolar 15557

[107] Torvinen, Taimi, Kadimah: Suomen juutalaisten historiaHelsinki: Otava, 1989 pages 117167. Retrieved 2009-02-06.

[108] World War II: Finland

[109] The Royal Air Force in Russia :Hurricanes at Murmansk

[110] Ahtokari, Reijo and Pale, Erkki: Suomen Radiotiedustelu19271944 (Finnish radio intelligence 19271944),Helsinki, Hakapaino Oy, pp. 191198, ISBN 952-90-9437-X

[111] Mkel, Jukka (1967). Helsinki liekeiss. Helsinki:Werner Sderstrm osakeyhti. p. 20.

[112] Paulman, F. I. (1980). Nachalo osvobozhdeniya Sovet-skoy Estoniy. Ot Narvy do Syrve [From Narva to Srve](in Russian). Tallinn: Eesti Raamat. pp. 7119.

[113] Laar, Mart (2005). Estonia in World War II. Tallinn:Grenader. pp. 3259.

[114] Jackson, Robert (2007). Battle of the Baltic: The Wars19181945. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime.

[115] Gebhardt 1989, p. 1

[116] Moisala 1988

[117] Declaration of the Three Powers, December 1, 1943,Tehran Conference

[118] Erickson 1993, p. 197

[119] Gebhardt 1989, p. 2

[120] Glantz 1998, p. 202

[121] 500 Days: TheWar in Eastern Europe ... Google Books

[122] Finland at War 193945 Google Books

[123] Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: F-O Google Books

[124] Lunde 2011, p. 299

[125] Ilomantsin mottitaistelut 26.7.13.8.1944 (The motti-battle in Ilomantsi). Ilomantsi sodassa (Ilomantsi at war).In Finnish: Nykyisen Ilomantsin itosissa kytiin kesll1944 yli viikon mittainen kiivas torjuntataistelu, jossa kaksiviivyttmll kulutettua neuvostodivisioonaa pysytettiin,paloiteltiin motteihin ja lytiin lhes tydellisesti. Tm

18 12 REFERENCES

suurtaistelu varmisti armeijamme puolustuksen pitvyydenjatkosodan raskaina viimeisin pivin. A week-long ve-hement defensive battle was fought in the eastern parts ofwhat is now Ilomantsi, where two Soviet divisions werestopped, cut up into mottis, and almost completely de-stroyed. This operation secured our armys defence in thetough nal days of the Continuation war.

[126] Juutilainen 1994

[127] Grier 2007, p. 31

[128] Erickson 1993, pp. 329-30

[129] Glantz 1998, p. 229

[130] Glantz 1998, pp. 201-3

[131] Ziemke (2002), p. 390

[132] Juutilainen & Leskinen (ed.); Kujansuu, Juha (2005), p.1036

[133] Helsingin Sanomat: Wartime refugees made pawns incruel diplomatic game. 8 November 2003

[134] (Finnish) Ylikangas, Heikki, Heikki Ylikankaan selvitysValtioneuvoston kanslialle, Government of Finland

[135] Howard D. Grier. Hitler, Dnitz, and the Baltic Sea, NavalInstitute Press, 2007, ISBN 1-59114-345-4. p. 121

[136] Hietanen, Silvo (1992). Evakkovuosi 1944 - jlleenmatkassa [Evacuation of year 1944 - again on the road].Kansakunta sodassa. 3. osa. Kuilun yli (in Finnish).Helsinki: Valtion Painatuskeskus. pp. 130139.

[137] Lunde 2011, p. 9

[138] Jokipii 1999, pp. 145-6

[139] Lunde 2011, p. 379

[140] Vuonokari, Tuulikki (2003-11-21). Jews in FinlandDuring the Second World War. University of Tampere.Archived from the original on 2008-01-10. Retrieved2010-10-29.

[141] Letter to the New York Times by Mark Cohen, ExecutiveDirector of Holocaust Publications in NewYork, 28April,1987

[142] (Russian)The problem of ensuring the security ofLeningrad from the north in light of Soviet war planningof 19321941 by V. N. Baryshnikov: The actual warwith Finland began rst of all due to unresolved issues inLeningrads security from the north andMoscows concernsfor the perspective of Finlands politics. At the same time,a desire to claim better strategic positions in case of a warwith Germany had surfaced within the Soviet leadership.

[143] (Russian) . " "(The Finnish war. A look from the 'other side'") by A. I.Kozlov: After the rise of National Socialism to powerin Germany, the geopolitical importance of the former'buer states had drastically changed. Both the SovietUnion and Germany vied for the inclusion of these statesinto their spheres of inuence. Soviet politicians and mil-itary considered it likely, that in case of an aggression

against the USSR, German armed forces will use the ter-ritory of the Baltic states and Finland as staging areas forinvasionby either conquering or coercing these coun-tries. None of the states of the Baltic region, excludingPoland, had sucient military power to resist a Germaninvasion.

[144] (Russian) Stalins Missed Chance, byMikhail Meltyukhov:The EnglishFrench inuence in the Baltics, characteris-tic for the '20searly '30s was increasingly limited by thegrowth of German inuence. Due to the strategic impor-tance of the region, the Soviet leadership also aimed toincrease its inuence there, using both diplomatic meansas well as active social propaganda. By the end of the '30s,the main contenders for inuence in the Baltics were Ger-many and the Soviet Union. Being a buer zone betweenGermany and the USSR, the Baltic states were bound tothem by a system of economic and non-aggression treatiesof 1926, 1932 and 1939.

[145] Norman Davies, Europe at War 19391945: No SimpleVictory, 2007, ISBN 978-0-670-01832-1

[146] Dan Reiter, How Wars End, Princeton University Press,Princeton, New Jersey USA (2009), p. 131.

[147] Rothwell, Victor. War Aims in the Second World War:The War Aims of the Key Belligerents 1939-1945= 2006.Edinburgh University Press. pp. 143, 145. ISBN 978-0-7486-1503-2.

[148] Dan Reiter, How Wars End, Princeton University Press,Princeton, NJ (2009), pp. 138, 135.

[149] Dan Reiter, How Wars End, Princeton University Press,Princeton, NJ (2009), p. 135.

[150] Dan Reiter, How Wars End, Princeton University Press,Princeton, NJ (2009), p. 136.

[151] Provis, Peter (1999). Nordic Notes: Finnish achieve-ment in the Continuation War and after JSSN 1442-5165. Celsius Centre for Scandinavian Studies.

[152] Baryshnikov (2002), pp. 222-223 (Section heading" , paragraph #48 et seq., aftercit. 409)

[153] Baryshnikov (2006)

12.2 Bibliography Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2002). - 19411944[Finland and theSiege of Leningrad, 19411944] (in Russian). St.Petersburg: Johan Beckman Institute. ISBN 952-5412-10-5.

Baryshnikov, Nikolai I. (2006). :' '[The Phenomenon ofLies: 'The Victory in the Confrontation']. St. Peters-burg and the Countries of Northern Europe (in Rus-sian). St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Humani-tarian Academy. Retrieved November 1, 2013.

19

Erickson, John (1993). The Road to Berlin: StalinsWar with Germany. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress. ISBN 0-300-07813-7.

Gebhardt, James (1990). The Petsamo-KirkenesOperation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in theArctic, October 1944 (PDF). Leavenworth Papers(Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute) (17).ISSN 0195-3451. Retrieved 10 May 2010.

Glantz, David; House, Jonathan (1998). When Ti-tans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-0899-7.

Grier, Howard (2007). Hitler, Dnitz, and the BalticSea: the Third Reichs last hope, 19441945. An-napolis: US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-345-1.

Jokipii, Mauno (1999). [The Launching of the Continuation War] (inRussian). Petrozavodsk: Karelia. ISBN 5-7545-0735-6.

Jutikkala, Eino; Pirinen, Kauko (1988). A Historyof Finland. Dorset Press. ISBN 0-88029-260-1.

Juutilainen, Antti (1994). Ilomantsi lopultakinvoitto (in Finnish). Rauma: Kirjapaino Oy WestPoint. ISBN 951-95218-5-2.

Kirby, David (2006). A concise history of Finland.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 343.ISBN 978-0-521-53989-0.

Krosby, H. Peter (1968). Finland, Germany, andthe Soviet Union, 1940-1941: The Petsamo Dispute.University of Wisconsin Press.

Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (ed.) (2005).Jatkosodan pikkujttilinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.).WSOY. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.

Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (1999).Talvisodan pikkujttilinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.).Werner SderstrmOsakeyhti. p. 976. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.

Luknitsky, Pavel (1988). [Through the Siege] (in Russian). Leningrad: Leniz-dat.

Lunde, Henrik O. (2011). Finlands War of Choice:The Troubled German-Finnish Alliance in WorldWar II. Newbury: Casemate Publishers. ISBN 978-1-61200-037-4.

Manninen, Ohto (1994). Molotovin cocktail- Hit-lerin sateenvarjo [Molotovs cocktail - Hitlers um-brella] (in Finnish). Helsinki: Painatuskeskus.ISBN 951-37-1495-0.

Moisala, U.E.; Alanen, Pertti (1988). Kunhykkjn tie pysytettiin (in Finnish). Keuruu:Otava. ISBN 951-1-10386-5.

Raunio, Ari (ed.); MaanpuolustuskorkeakoulunHistorian laitos (1994). Jatkosodan historia 16 (inFinnish) (1st ed.). WSOY.

Salisbury, Harrison E. (2003). The 900 Days: TheSiege of Leningrad (2 ed.). Cambridge: Da CapoPress. ISBN 978-0-306-81298-9.

Vehvilinen, Olli (2002). Finland in the SecondWorld War: Between Germany and Russia. NewYork: Palgrave. ISBN 0-333-80149-0.

Werth, Alexander (1999). Russia at War, 19411945 (2 ed.). New York: Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-7867-0722-5.

Ziemke, Earl (2002). Stalingrad to Berlin. The Ger-man Defeat in the East. Washington DC: Govern-ment Printing Oce. ISBN 978-0-16-001962-3.

13 Further reading Wuorinen, John H., ed. (1948). Finland and WorldWar II 19391944. The Ronald Press Company.ISBN 0-313-24133-3.

Schwartz, Andrew J. (1960). America and theRusso-Finnish War. Washington, D.C.: Public Af-fairs Press. ISBN 0-8371-7964-5.

13.1 Finnish Finnish National Archive Luovutukset: Researchon prisoner-of-war deaths, extraditions and depor-tations from Finland between 193955, Researchproject, See

Krosby, H. Peter (1966). Nikkelidiplomatiaa Pet-samossa 1940-1941. Kirjayhtyma.

Krosby, H. Peter (1967). Suomen valinta 1941. Kir-jayhtyma.

Polvinen, Tuomo I. (1979). Suomi kansainvlisesspolitiikassa 19411947, osa 1: 19411943: Bar-barossasta Teheraniin. WSOY.

Polvinen, Tuomo I. (1980). Suomi kansainvlisesspolitiikassa 19411947, osa 2: 1944: TeheranistaJaltaan. WSOY.

Polvinen, Tuomo I. (1981). Suomi kansainvlisesspolitiikassa 19411947, osa 3: 19451947: JaltastaPariisin rauhaan. WSOY.

20 14 EXTERNAL LINKS

Sana, Elina (1994). Luovutetut/ The Extradited: Fin-lands Extraditions to the Gestapo. WSOY. ISBN951-0-27975-7.

Seppinen, Ilkka (1983). Suomen Ulkomaankaupanehdot 19391944. ISBN 951-9254-48-X.

13.2 Russian Platonov, S.P., ed. (1964). .Voenizdat Ministerstva oborony SSSR. ISBN 0-12-558180-7.

. 19411944 "" ISSN 0131-6222, 1995.

14 External links (Russian) Stavka directive of 24 June 1941 onmea-sures to foil a possible enemy strike from the terri-tory of Finland against Leningrad, authorising theSoviet air oensive of 25 June 1941 (page 1, page2)

The Mannerheim Cross is the most distinguished Finnish militarydecoration and awarded to soldiers for extraordinary bravery;the achievement of extraordinarily important objectives by com-bat, or for especially well conducted operations.

21

Finlands supreme commander FieldMarshal Mannerheim at hisheadquarters

22 15 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

15 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses15.1 Text

ContinuationWar Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuation_War?oldid=671672018Contributors: Derek Ross, BryanDerksen,Jeronimo, Eean, Guppie, Alex.tan, Ktsquare, Leandrod, Edward, JohnOwens, Michael Hardy, Paul Barlow, Llywrch, Fred Bauder, Aezram,Bobby D. Bryant, Wapcaplet, Mic, 172, Paul A, Kosebamse, WilliamM. Connolley, Jpatokal, Caid Raspa, Jniemenmaa, Angela, Ajk, PoorYorick, Andres, Tristanb, Kaihsu, Cema, Ruhrjung, Tobias Conradi, Johan Magnus, Vroman, Vanished user 5zariu3jisj0j4irj, Graculus,Wik, Polaris999, Tpbradbury, Echoray, Morwen, Itai, VeryVerily, Tuomas, MiLo28, Raul654, Proteus, Jason Potter, Phil Boswell, Robbot,Pigsonthewing, ChrisG, Kizor, PBS, Altenmann, Romanm, Modulatum, Dukeofomnium, Der Eberswalder, Mervyn, GreatWhiteNorth-erner, Lysy, Whiskey, DocWatson42, Oberiko, Sj, Fudoreaper, Orangemike, Wwoods, Joconnor, Home Row Keysplurge, Varlaam, Revth,Ezhiki, Kowh, Bobblewik, RivGuySC, OldakQuill, Chowbok, Ruy Lopez, Marqoz, Latsgo, Quadell, Mikko Paananen, Balcer, Kahkonen,Keresaspa, Neutrality, Irpen, Ukexpat, Mzabaluev, Lacrimosus, Bornintheguz, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, Martinl~enwiki, Thrawn,Kostja, D-Notice, Pavel Vozenilek, MBisanz, El C, Vecrumba, Shanes, MonkeyCookie, Wwwillly, I9Q79oL78KiL0QTFHgyc, AzureHaights, Darwinek, RussBlau, Pearle, Wempain, Orangemarlin, Lokakyy, Andershalden, Chino, Sherurcij, Joshbaumgartner, SlimVirgin,Galdalf, Hohum, Mixer, Vuo, SteinbDJ, LordAmeth, Axeman89, YixilTesiphon, Killing Vector, Qaphsiel, Ekedolphin, Kmartin, Siafu,Thryduulf, Joriki, Vashti, Mikko H., Woohookitty, Oliphaunt, Ardfern, -Ril-, Tabletop, Skybum, Teemu Leisti, Xrobertcmx, BD2412,DannyF, Rjwilmsi, Ligulem, The wub, Valip, HJV, Kmorozov, Rune.welsh, Fisenko, Russavia, Joonasl, MoRsE, Chobot, Kresspahl,Michael Denmark, DVdm, Gdrbot, Bgwhite, Scoo, Sus scrofa, YurikBot, Wavelength, Ecemaml, Hairy Dude, Dannycas, NMS, Russ-Bot, Damacguy, Kurt Leyman, Gardar Rurak, Elrith, ML, Mark O'Sullivan, Manxruler, Benja, Leutha, Aeusoes1, Voyevoda, Tne80,Mmccalpin, Yoninah, Irishguy, THB, Grakm fr, Gadget850, Bota47, 3 Lwi, CLW, Sandstein, Capt Jim, StuRat, Chase me ladies, I'mthe Cavalry, Abune, BorgQueen, Petri Krohn, CWenger, Kevin, Curpsbot-unicodify, Guinness man, Argan, Nick-D, Paul Pieniezny, ThatGuy, From That Show!, Otheus, SmackBot, Psytron, Haymaker, Reedy, Stie, Prexcaz, Srnec, Xaosux, Gilliam, Hmains, Choalba-ton, YMB29, Chris the speller, Kurykh, Thom2002, Hiphop2, GBE, Mensch, BScar23625, Ben-Velvel, LV, DHN-bot~enwiki, ColoniesChris, Pekkaroponen, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, SuperDeng, Ajdz, Jaro.p~enwiki, Master Scott Hall, Valenciano, Andreas1968,Vanigo, Writer23, Acdx, Stor stark7, Ged UK, Lambiam, Adagio Cantabile, Micropot, Jperrylsu, Dybeck, Rakovsky, Illythr, Volker89,Beetstra, DjumboDjett~enwiki, Drieakko, Neddyseagoon, AdultSwim, Citicat, Hu12, Hetar, Clarityend, JoeBot, Ribbit~enwiki, Jatrius,RookZERO, Pudeo, Filelakeshoe, Boeseschwarzefee, Slash 013, HDCase, JForget, CmdrObot, BeenAroundAWhile, Sirkeg, Ruslik0,Harej bot, inn, ShelfSkewed, Cydebot, Eugene V. Packham, Future Perfect at Sunrise, Crossmr, Travelbird, R-41, Sdoradus, DumbBOT,TheCheeseManCan, Karlovian, Biblbroks, Iss246, JohnInDC, Kennet.mattfolk, Biruitorul, Mercury~enwiki, HappyInGeneral, Staberinde,MPorciusCato, Nezzadar, Nirvana77, EdJohnston, Team alfa~enwiki, Smith2006, Jj137, Vanjagenije, Mutt Lunker, J'onn J'onzz, Lklundin,Skarkkai, DagosNavy, HanzoHattori, JAnDbot, Husond, Harryzilber, Ekabhishek, Turgidson, Wanderer602, Plm209, Jarmothenn, Du-vin, Dodo19~enwiki, VoABot II, Askari Mark, Jaakko Sivonen, Josefmatula, Buckshot06, Craw-daddy, Objectivesea, ChoumX, Bleh999,Cardamon, Eiskis~enwiki, Gomm, Markus451, Spespatriae, Semper-Fi 2006, EyeSerene, Cfrydj, Bkavanaugh, Sakuragi, AlexiusHor-atius, Trusilver, PalestineRemembered, Lkatona, Hodja Nasreddin, Qghert, Lucano~enwiki, Bot-Schafter, , Masa62,M-le-mot-dit, Colchicum, DadaNeem, Ko Soi IX, Henryborowitz, Gaussgauss, Boothferry, MisterBee1966, HenryLarsen, DH85868993,Mooocow, Xyl 54, Suursaari, Eat your carrots, ... but a war broke out, Swedish Speaker, Ahven is a sh, Eat apple a day, Riksfrestn-dare, Known Wikipedians, Good heart, Matti84, Andropov Andrej, Hugo999, Anno Domino, Nietjrvi, VolkovBot, Pasixxxx, Thomas.W,TheQuandry, Nug, Toddy1, EuTuga, Ormewood, Dojarca, Alex1709, Andrein, Bob103051, Eldaran~enwiki, Mkpumphrey, Robert1947,JimBurd, One half 3544, Lucyhill, Falcon8765, Northern Sapniards, The Devils Advocate, Posse72, 613 The Evil, AlleborgoBot, SalJy-DieBoereKomLei, Yaksar, HansHermans, TheXenocide, SieBot, ToePeu.bot, The Parsnip!, Smsarmad, Dimitri Harlamov, Wikinist, Dig-wuren, Henrik ., Trip Seventeen, Tripoli nights, JSpung, Henrik rhus., Lieutenant Dan Taylor, Ana ywn, KathrynLybarger, Mur-mansk 22, Finns practiced exactly the right survival moves, Jmj713, RJ CG, Recesende, Jaan, Mr. Stradivarius, Sinnedit, Peltimikko,De728631, ClueBot, Bob1960evens, Jazzman831, Riisipuuro, Nnemo, Czarko, Maxthatkillz, Farolif, ELV7, P. S. Burton, Kelaine,Alice, Nymf, Tomeasy, Joensuu 77, PixelBot, John Nevard, Muhandes, Ziko, Ozfacts, Coinmanj, Davydo, Mlas, Thewellman, DJSturm, DumZiBoT, Stoljaro1987, Nikitn, Stickee, Mahmudss, Irtehprwn, Good Olfactory, Addbot, Ape89, Magus732, Jsg24, Repde-tect117, Sarvagyana guru, Ginosbot, LemmeyBOT, LinkFA-Bot, Fireaxe888, Fred927, Numbo3-bot, F Notebook, WorldWars, Lightbot,Yobot, Danvolodar, OtroQus~enwiki, TaBOT-zerem, Dimitri Karpov, Neptun88, Azylber, Paul Siebert, KamikazeBot, BeBoldInEdits,AnomieBOT, FeelSunny, ThaddeusB, JackieBot, Dave94703, Materialscientist, 90 Auto, Citation bot, Xqbot, Janjko, K731, Srich32977,Porttimies, GrouchoBot, A. Tihonov, Anotherclown, RibotBOT, SassoBot, Mvaldemar, , Samwb123, StoneProphet, FrescoBot, To-bby72, Haeinous, Polyxeros, Trust Is All You Need, Citation bot 1, Diwas, Jiujitsuguy, Germash19, White Shadows, DocYako, Tim1357,Mjs1991, NortyNort, Comnenus, Anti-Nationalist, War began with Soviet oensive, VJKonecni, Naiwatson, Jurryaany, Enabling oth-ers, Mikroblgeovn, FelixtheMagnicent, Boris Novikov, Kingroodney, RjwilmsiBot, Hoodatdat, Skamecrazy123, Makemeame, Work-setsufree, EmausBot, Paavo273, John of Reading, D2306, Koskenkorva, El gato verde, Esgorde, GoingBatty, Koivuhalko, Virginian123,Ovidcaput, Sakuni, Josve05a, Xabier Armendaritz, Jonttu899~enwiki, H3llBot, Demiurge1000, La choue, Comrade Sniper93, Erikupoeg,Donner60, Youseagangsta, Edmund from Cardi, Soviet agreession, Aikenware, EricClarion, BJ Crowning, MangYang, Whoop whooppull up, WorldWarTwoEditor, WMC, Josefhoracek, MelbourneStar, Vacation9, Lord Roem, Frietjes, Alphasinus, Widr, , HelpfulPixie Bot, Postpiano, Andrew Gwilliam, Gob Lofa, Ymblanter, Emayv, Jaimyxxx, Portuguese Man o' War, Zedshort, Hamish59, Cool-DrummerBoy, BattyBot, Qbli2mHd, Tuntematonsotilas, Maple leaf eh, Alexander Pastukh, Qbek16, Norsecanuck, Dexbot, Nor1980,Ekaterina2012, Pyotr Isaev, Ibnrustah, 93, Tvoi Ded, Christinaxx, EyeTruth, Byuntaeng, Von Roon, RaBOTnik, XTrueGentlemanX,Tiger 23, College studies, Monkbot, Gentlemanxxx, KasparBot, Sygaos and Anonymous: 437

15.2 Images File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101II-MN-2787-30,_Baltikum,_gesunkenes_russisches_Schiff.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/

wikipedia/commons/1/13/Bundesarchiv_Bild_101II-MN-2787-30%2C_Baltikum%2C_gesunkenes_russisches_Schiff.jpg License: CCBY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches Bundesarchiv)as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negativeand/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Peter

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15.2 Images 23

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