Battle of Stalingrad

For the 1949 Russian lm, see The Battle of Stalingrad(lm). For the Russian Civil War battle at the same city,see Battle for Tsaritsyn.The Battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942 2 Febru-

Operation Blau: German advances from 7 May 1942 to 18November 1942to 7 July 1942to 22 July 1942to 1 August 1942to 18 November 1942

ary 1943)[8][9][10][11] was a major battle of World War IIin which Nazi Germany and its allies fought the SovietUnion for control of the city of Stalingrad (now Vol-gograd) in Southern Russia, on the eastern boundary ofEurope.Marked by constant close quarters combat and direct as-saults on civilians by air raids, it is often regarded asthe single largest and bloodiest battle in the history ofwarfare.[12] The heavy losses inicted on the GermanWehrmacht make it arguably the most strategically de-cisive battle of the whole war.[13] It was a turning point inthe European theatre of World War IIthe German forcesnever regained the initiative in the East and withdrew avast military force from the West to replace their losses.[1]

The German oensive to capture Stalingrad began in latesummer 1942 using the 6th Army and elements of the4th Panzer Army. The attack was supported by intensiveLuftwae bombing that reduced much of the city to rub-ble. The ghting degenerated into building-to-buildingghting, and both sides poured reinforcements into thecity. By mid-November 1942, the Germans had pushedthe Soviet defenders back at great cost into narrow zonesgenerally along the west bank of the Volga River.

On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launchedOperation Uranus, a two-pronged attack targeting theweaker Romanian and Hungarian forces protecting theGerman 6th Armys anks.[14] The Axis forces on theanks were overrun and the 6th Army was cut o and sur-rounded in the Stalingrad area. Adolf Hitler ordered thatthe army stay in Stalingrad and make no attempt to breakout; instead, attempts were made to supply the army byair and to break the encirclement from the outside. Heavyghting continued for another two months. By the begin-ning of February 1943, the Axis forces in Stalingrad hadexhausted their ammunition and food. The remaining el-ements of the 6th Army surrendered.[15]:p.932 The battlelasted ve months, one week, and three days.

1 Historical backgroundBy the spring of 1942, despite the failure of OperationBarbarossa to decisively defeat the Soviet Union in a sin-gle campaign, the Germans had captured vast expansesof territory, including Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balticrepublics. Elsewhere, the war had been progressing well: the U-Boat oensive in the Atlantic had been very suc-cessful and Rommel had just captured Tobruk.[16]:p.522In the east, they had stabilized their front in a line run-ning from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south.There were a number of salients in the line where So-viet oensives had pushed the Germans back (notablyto the northwest of Moscow and south of Kharkov) butthese were not particularly threatening. Hitler was con-dent that he could master the Red Army after the win-ter of 1942, because even though Army Group Centre(Heeresgruppe Mitte) had suered heavy losses west ofMoscow the previous winter, 65% of Army Group Cen-tre infantry had not been engaged and had been restedand re-equipped. Neither Army Group North nor ArmyGroup South had been particularly hard pressed over thewinter.[17]:p.144 Stalin was expecting the main thrust of theGerman summer attacks to be directed against Moscowagain.[1]:p.498

With the initial operations being very successful, the Ger-mans decided that their summer campaign in 1942 wouldbe directed at the southern parts of the Soviet Union.The initial objectives in the region around Stalingradwere the destruction of the industrial capacity of the cityand the deployment of forces to block the Volga River.The river was a key route from the Caucasus and theCaspian Sea to central Russia. Its capture would disrupt

1

2 2 PRELUDE

commercial river trac. The Germans cut the pipelinefrom the oilelds when they captured Rostov on 23 July.The capture of Stalingrad would make the delivery ofLend Lease supplies via the Persian Corridor much moredicult.[15]:909[18] Hitler proclaimed that after Stalingradhad been captured, all male civilians were to be killed andall women and children were to be deported because Stal-ingrad was dangerous with its communist inhabitants.[19]

On 23 July 1942, Hitler personally rewrote the opera-tional objectives for the 1942 campaign, greatly expand-ing them to include the occupation of the city of Stal-ingrad. Both sides began to attach propaganda value tothe city based on it bearing the name of the leader ofthe Soviet Union. It was assumed that the fall of the citywould also rmly secure the northern and western anksof the German armies as they advanced on Baku with theaim of securing these strategic petroleum resources forGermany.[16]:p.528 The expansion of objectives was a sig-nicant factor in Germanys failure at Stalingrad, causedby German overcondence and an underestimation of So-viet reserves.[20]

The Soviets realized that they were under tremendousconstraints of time and resources and ordered that any-one strong enough to hold a rie be sent to ght.[21]:p.94

2 Prelude

Main article: Case Blue

If I do not get the oil of Maikop andGrozny then I must nish [liquidieren; killo, liquidate"] this war.Adolf Hitler[16]:p.514

Army Group South was selected for a sprint forwardthrough the southern Russian steppes into the Caucasus tocapture the vital Soviet oil elds there. The planned sum-mer oensive was code-named Fall Blau (Case Blue).It was to include the German 6th, 17th, 4th Panzer and1st Panzer Armies. Army Group South had overrun theUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1941. Poised inEastern Ukraine, it was to spearhead the oensive.Hitler intervened, however, ordering the Army Group tosplit in two. Army Group South (A), under the com-mand of Wilhelm List, was to continue advancing southtowards the Caucasus as planned with the 17th Armyand First Panzer Army. Army Group South (B), includ-ing Friedrich Paulus's 6th Army and Hermann Hoth's4th Panzer Army, was to move east towards the Volgaand Stalingrad. Army Group B was commanded initiallyby Field Marshal Fedor von Bock and later by GeneralMaximilian von Weichs.[15]:p.915

The start of Case Blue had been planned for late May1942. A number of German and Romanian units thatwere to take part in Blau, however, were besieging Sev-astopol on the Crimean Peninsula. Delays in ending thesiege pushed back the start date for Blau several times,and the city did not fall until the end of June. A smalleraction was taken in the meantime, pinching o a Sovietsalient in the Second Battle of Kharkov, which resultedin the envelopment of a large Soviet force on 22 May.

The German advance to the Don River between 7 May and 23July.

Blau nally opened as Army Group South began its at-tack into southern Russia on 28 June 1942. The Ger-man oensive started well. Soviet forces oered littleresistance in the vast empty steppes and started stream-ing eastward. Several attempts to re-establish a defen-sive line failed when German units outanked them. Twomajor pockets were formed and destroyed: the rst,northeast of Kharkov, on 2 July, and a second, aroundMillerovo, Rostov Oblast, a week later. Meanwhile, theHungarian 2nd Army and the German 4th Panzer Armyhad launched an assault on Voronezh, capturing the cityon 5 July.The initial advance of the 6th Army was so successfulthat Hitler intervened and ordered the 4th Panzer Armyto join Army Group South (A) to the south. A mas-sive trac jam resulted when the 4th Panzer and the 1stPanzer both required the few roads in the area. Botharmies were stopped dead while they attempted to clearthe resulting mess of thousands of vehicles. The delaywas long, and it is thought that it cost the advance at leastone week. With the advance now slowed, Hitler changedhis mind and re-assigned the 4th Panzer Army back tothe attack on Stalingrad.By the end of July, the Germans had pushed the Sovi-ets across the Don River. At this point, the Don andVolga Rivers were only 65 km (40 mi) apart, and the Ger-mans left their main supply depots west of the Don, whichhad important implications later in the course of the bat-tle. The Germans began using the armies of their Italian,Hungarian and Romanian allies to guard their left (north-

3Infantry and a supporting StuG III assault gun advance towardsthe city center.

ern) ank. The Italians won several accolades in o-cial German communiques.[22][23][24][25] Sometimes theywere held in little regard by the Germans, and were evenaccused of having low morale: in reality, the Italian di-visions fought comparatively well, with the 3rd Moun-tain Infantry Division Ravenna and 5th Infantry Divi-sion Cosseria proving to have good morale, according toa German liaison ocer[26] and being forced to retreatonly after a massive armoured attack in which Germanreinforcements had failed to arrive in time, according toa German historian.[27] Indeed the Italians distinguishedthemselves in numerous battles, as in the battle of Niko-layevka.The German 6th Army was only a few dozen kilome-ters from Stalingrad, and 4th Panzer Army, now to theirsouth, turned northwards to help take the city. To thesouth, Army Group A was pushing far into the Cauca-sus, but their advance slowed as supply lines grew overex-tended. The two German army groups were not posi-tioned to support one another due to the great distancesinvolved.After German intentions became clear in July 1942,Stalin appointed Marshal Andrey Yeryomenko as com-mander of the Southeastern Front on 1 August 1942.Yeryomenko and Commissar Nikita Khrushchev weretasked with planning the defense of Stalingrad.[28]:p.25, 48The eastern border of Stalingrad was the wide RiverVolga, and over the river, additional Soviet units weredeployed. These units became the newly formed 62ndArmy, which Yeryomenko placed under the command ofLt. Gen. Vasiliy Chuikov on 11 September 1942. Thesituation was extremely dire. When asked how he inter-preted his task, he responded We will defend the cityor die in the attempt.[29]:p.127 The 62nd Armys missionwas to defend Stalingrad at all costs. Chuikovs general-ship during the battle earned him one of his two Hero ofthe Soviet Union awards.

3 Attack on Stalingrad

The German advance to Stalingrad between 24 July and 18November

On 23 August the 6th Army reached the outskirts of Stal-ingrad in pursuit of the 62nd and 64th Armies, which hadfallen back into the city. Kleist later said after the war:[30]

The capture of Stalingrad was subsidiaryto the main aim. It was only of importance asa convenient place, in the bottleneck betweenDon and the Volga, where we could block anattack on our ank by Russian forces comingfrom the east. At the start, Stalingrad was nomore than a name on the map to us.[30]

The Soviets had enough warning of the Germans advanceto ship grain, cattle, and railway cars across the Volgaand out of harms way but most civilian residents werenot evacuated. This harvest victory left the city shortof food even before the German attack began. Before theHeer reached the city itself, the Luftwae had renderedthe River Volga, vital for bringing supplies into the city,unusable to Soviet shipping. Between 25 and 31 July, 32Soviet ships were sunk, with another nine crippled.[2]:p.69

The battle began with the heavy bombing of the cityby Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen's Luftotte 4,which in the summer and autumn of 1942 was the mostpowerful single air formation in the world. Some 1,000tons of bombs were dropped in 48 hours, more than inLondon at the height of the Blitz.[2]:p.122 Much of thecity was quickly turned to rubble, although some facto-ries continued production while workers joined in theghting. The 369th (Croatian) Reinforced Infantry Reg-iment was the only non-German unit[31] selected by theWehrmacht to enter Stalingrad city during assault opera-tions. It fought as part of the 100th Jger Division.Stalin rushed all available troops to the east bank ofthe Volga, some from as far away as Siberia. All theregular ferries were quickly destroyed by the Luftwae,which then targeted troop barges being towed slowly

4 3 ATTACK ON STALINGRAD

across the river by tugs. Many civilians were evacu-ated across the Volga.[28] It has been said that Stalin pre-vented civilians from leaving the city in the belief thattheir presence would encourage greater resistance fromthe citys defenders.[29]:p.106 Civilians, including womenand children, were put to work building trenchworks andprotective fortications. A massive German strategicbombing on 23 August caused a restorm, killing thou-sands and turning Stalingrad into a vast landscape ofrubble and burnt ruins. Ninety percent of the livingspace in the Voroshilovskiy area was destroyed. Be-tween 23 and 26 August, Soviet reports indicate 955 peo-ple were killed and another 1,181 wounded as a resultof the bombing.[2]:p.73 Casualties of 40,000 were greatlyexaggerated,[5]:p.188189 and after 25 August, the Sovietsdid not record any civilian and military casualties as a re-sult of air raids.[Note 4]

Approaching this place, [Stalingrad], soldiers used to say:"Weare entering hell." And after spending one or two dayshere, they say: "No, this isn't hell, this is ten times worsethan hell."[32]

Vasily ChuikovThe Soviet Air Force, the Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily

October 1942: German ocer with a Russian PPSh-41submachine gun in Barrikady factory rubble. Many German sol-diers took up Russian weapons when found, as they were moreeective than their own in close quarter combat.

(VVS), was swept aside by the Luftwae. The VVS basesin the immediate area lost 201 aircraft between 23 and 31August, and despite meager reinforcements of some 100aircraft in August, it was left with just 192 serviceable air-craft, 57 of which were ghters.[2]:p.74 The Soviets con-tinued to pour aerial reinforcements into the Stalingradarea in late September, but continued to suer appallinglosses; the Luftwae had complete control of the skies.The burden of the initial defense of the city fell on the1077th Anti-Aircraft Regiment,[29]:p.106 a unit made upmainly of young female volunteers who had no train-ing for engaging ground targets. Despite this, and withno support available from other units, the AA gunnersstayed at their posts and took on the advancing panz-ers. The German 16th Panzer Division reportedly hadto ght the 1077ths gunners shot for shot until all 37

German soldiers on their way in Stalingrad

anti-aircraft guns were destroyed or overrun. The Ger-man 16th Panzer Division was shocked to nd that, dueto Soviet manpower shortages, it had been ghting femalesoldiers.[29]:p.108[33] In the early stages of the battle, theNKVD organized poorly armed Workers militias" com-posed of civilians not directly involved in war productionfor immediate use in the battle. The civilians were of-ten sent into battle without ries.[29]:p.109 Sta and stu-dents from the local technical university formed a tankdestroyer unit. They assembled tanks from leftover partsat the tractor factory. These tanks, unpainted and lackinggunsights, were driven directly from the factory oor tothe front line. They could only be aimed at point blankrange through the gun barrel.[29]:p.110

Soviets preparing to ward o a German assault in Stalingradssuburbs

By the end of August, Army Group South (B) had nallyreached the Volga, north of Stalingrad. Another advanceto the river south of the city followed. By 1 September,the Soviets could only reinforce and supply their forces inStalingrad by perilous crossings of the Volga under con-stant bombardment by artillery and aircraft.On 5 September, the Soviet 24th and 66th Armies orga-nized a massive attack against XIV Panzer Corps. TheLuftwae helped repulse the oensive by heavily attack-ing Soviet artillery positions and defensive lines. The So-

3.1 Fighting in the city 5

viets were forced to withdraw at midday after only a fewhours. Of the 120 tanks the Soviets had committed, 30were lost to air attack.[2]:p.75

A street ght in Stalingrad

Soviet operations were constantly hampered by the Luft-wae. On 18 September, the Soviet 1st Guards and 24thArmy launched an oensive against VIII Army Corps atKotluban. VIII. Fliegerkorps dispatched wave after waveof Stuka dive-bombers to prevent a breakthrough. Theoensive was repulsed. The Stukas claimed 41 of the106 Soviet tanks knocked out that morning, while es-corting Bf 109s destroyed 77 Soviet aircraft.[2]:p.80 Amidthe debris of the wrecked city, the Soviet 62nd and 64thArmies, which included the Soviet 13th Guards Rie Di-vision, anchored their defense lines with strongpoints inhouses and factories.Fighting within the ruined city was erce and desperate.Lieutenant General Alexander Rodimtsev was in chargeof the 13th Guards Rie Division, and received one oftwo Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded during the bat-tle for his actions. Stalins Order No. 227 of 27 July 1942decreed that all commanders who ordered unauthorizedretreat would be subject to a military tribunal.[34] How-ever, it was the NKVD that ordered the regular army andlectured them, on the need to show some guts. Throughbrutal coercion for self-sacrice, thousands of desertersand presumed malingerers were executed to discipline thetroops. At Stalingrad alone, 14,000 soldiers of the RedArmy were executed in order to keep the formation.[35]"Not a step back!" and There is no land behind the

Volga!" were the slogans. The Germans pushing forwardinto Stalingrad suered heavy casualties.

3.1 Fighting in the cityBy 12 September, at the time of their retreat into thecity, the Soviet 62nd Army had been reduced to 90 tanks,700 mortars and just 20,000 personnel.[29] The remainingtanks were used as immobile strongpoints within the city.The initial German attack attempted to take the city in arush. One infantry division went after the Mamayev Kur-gan, one attacked the central rail station and one attackedtoward the central landing stage on the Volga.

A German sniper in Stalingrad

Though initially successful, the German attacks stalled inthe face of Soviet reinforcements brought in from acrossthe Volga. The 13th Guards Rie Division, assigned tocounterattack at the Mamayev Kurgan and at RailwayStation No. 1 suered particularly heavy losses. Over 30percent of its soldiers were killed in the rst 24 hours, andjust 320 out of the original 10,000 survived the entire bat-tle. Both objectives were retaken, but only temporarily.The railway station changed hands 14 times in six hours.By the following evening, the 13th Guards Rie Divisionhad ceased to exist. So great were Soviet losses that attimes, the life expectancy of a newly arrived soldier wasless than a day, and the life expectancy of a Soviet ocerwas three days.Combat raged for three days at the giant grain elevatorin the south of the city. About fty Red Army defend-ers, cut o from resupply, held the position for ve daysand fought o ten dierent assaults before running outof ammunition and water. Only forty dead Soviet ght-ers were found, though the Germans had thought therewere many more due to the intensity of resistance. TheSoviets burned large amounts of grain during their retreatin order to deny the enemy food. Paulus chose the grainelevator and silos as the symbol of Stalingrad for a patchhe was having designed to commemorate the battle aftera German victory.German military doctrine was based on the principleof combined-arms teams and close cooperation betweentanks, infantry, engineers, artillery and ground-attack air-

6 3 ATTACK ON STALINGRAD

craft. Some Soviet commanders adopted the tactic ofalways keeping their front-line positions as close to theGermans as physically possible; Chuikov called this hug-ging the Germans. This slowed the German advanceand reduced the eectiveness of the German advantagein supporting re.[36]

The Red Army gradually adopted a strategy to hold for aslong as possible all the ground in the city. Thus, they con-verted multi-oored apartment blocks, factories, ware-houses, street corner residences and oce buildings into aseries of well defended strongpoints with small 510 manunits.[36] Manpower in the city was constantly refreshedby bringing additional troops over the Volga. When a po-sition was lost, an immediate attempt was usually madeto re-take it with fresh forces.

Soviet soldiers in the Red October Factory

Bitter ghting raged for every ruin, street, factory, house,basement, and staircase. Even the sewers were the sitesof reghts. The Germans, calling this unseen urban war-fare Rattenkrieg (Rat War),[37] bitterly joked about cap-turing the kitchen but still ghting for the living room andthe bedroom. Buildings had to be cleared room by roomthrough the bombed-out debris of residential neighbor-hoods, oce blocks, basements and apartment high-rises.Some of the taller buildings, blasted into rooess shells byearlier German aerial bombardment, saw oor-by-oor,close quarters combat, with the Germans and Soviets onalternate levels, ring at each other through holes in theoors.[36]

Fighting on and around Mamayev Kurgan, a prominenthill above the city, was particularly merciless; indeed, theposition changed hands many times.[28]:p?[38]

In another part of the city, a Soviet platoon under thecommand of Sergeant Yakov Pavlov fortied a four-story building that oversaw a square 300 meters from theriver bank, later called Pavlovs House. The soldiers sur-rounded it with mineelds, set up machine-gun positionsat the windows and breached the walls in the basement forbetter communications.[29] The soldiers found about tenSoviet civilians hiding in the basement. They were not re-lieved, and not signicantly reinforced, for two months.The building was labeled Festung (Fortress) on German

Pavlovs House (1943)

maps. Sgt. Pavlov was awarded the Hero of the SovietUnion for his actions.

Soviet marines landing on the west bank of the Volga River.

The Germans made slow but steady progress throughthe city. Positions were taken individually, but the Ger-mans were never able to capture the key crossing pointsalong the river bank. The Germans used airpower, tanksand heavy artillery to clear the city with varying degreesof success. Toward the end of the battle, the giganticrailroad gun nicknamed Dora was brought into the area.The Soviets built up a large number of artillery batter-ies on the east bank of the Volga. This artillery was ableto bombard the German positions or at least to providecounter-battery re.Snipers on both sides used the ruins to inict casualties.The most famous Soviet sniper in Stalingrad was VasilyZaytsev,[39] with 225 conrmed kills during the battle.Targets were often soldiers bringing up food or water toforward positions. Artillery spotters were an especiallyprized target for snipers.A signicant historical debate concerns the degree ofterror in the Red Army. The British historian AntonyBeevor noted the sinister message from the StalingradFronts Political Department on 8 October 1942 that:The defeatist mood is almost eliminated and the num-ber of treasonous incidents is getting lower as an ex-ample of the sort of coercion Red Army soldiers expe-

3.2 Air attacks 7

rienced under the Special Detachments (later to be re-named SMERSH).[40]:p.154168 On the other hand, Beevornoted the often extraordinary bravery of the Soviet sol-diers in a battle that was only comparable to Verdun,and argued that terror alone cannot explain such self-sacrice.[29]:p.154168 Richard Overy addresses the ques-tion of just how important the Red Armys coercive meth-ods were to the Soviet war eort compared with othermotivational factors such as hatred for the enemy. Heargues that, though it is easy to argue that from the sum-mer of 1942 the Soviet army fought because it was forcedto ght, to concentrate solely on coercion is nonethe-less to distort our view of the Soviet war eort.[41] Af-ter conducting hundreds of interviews with Soviet veter-ans on the subject of terror on the Eastern Front andspecically about Order No. 227 (Not a step back!")at Stalingrad Catherine Merridale notes that, seeminglyparadoxically, their response was frequently relief.[42]Infantryman Lev Lvovichs explanation, for example, istypical for these interviews; as he recalls, "[i]t was a nec-essary and important step. We all knew where we stoodafter we had heard it. And we all its true felt better.Yes, we felt better.[43]

Soil after the battle of Stalingrad in the Vladimir Military Mu-seum

Many women fought on the Soviet side, or were underre. As General Chuikov acknowledged, Rememberingthe defence of Stalingrad, I can't overlook the very impor-tant question ... about the role of women in war, in therear, but also at the front. Equally with men they bore allthe burdens of combat life and together with us men, theywent all the way to Berlin.[44] At the beginning of thebattle there were 75,000 women and girls from the Stal-ingrad area who had nished military or medical training,and all of whom were to serve in the battle.[45] Womenstaed a great many of the anti-aircraft batteries thatfought not only the Luftwae but German tanks.[46] So-viet nurses not only treated wounded personnel under rebut were involved in the highly dangerous work of bring-ing wounded soldiers back to the hospitals under enemyre.[47] Many of the Soviet wireless and telephone oper-ators were women who often suered heavy casualtieswhen their command posts came under re.[48] Thoughwomen were not usually trained as infantry, many So-viet women fought as machine gunners, mortar operators,and scouts.[49] Women were also snipers at Stalingrad.[50]Three air regiments at Stalingrad were entirely female.[49]At least three women won the title Hero of the Soviet

Union while driving tanks at Stalingrad.[51]

For both Stalin and Hitler, Stalingrad became a matter ofprestige far beyond its strategic signicance.[52] The So-viet command moved units from the Red Army strategicreserve in the Moscow area to the lower Volga, and trans-ferred aircraft from the entire country to the Stalingradregion.The strain on both military commanders was immense:Paulus developed an uncontrollable tic in his eye, whicheventually aicted the left side of his face, while Chuikovexperienced an outbreak of eczema that required him tohave his hands completely bandaged. Troops on bothsides faced the constant strain of close-range combat.[53]

3.2 Air attacks

Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber over the neighborhood west ofthe Red October factory; some of the administration buildings areat lower right; Bayonet Gully is at top right.

Determined to crush Soviet resistance, Luftotte 4sStukawae ew 900 individual sorties against Soviet po-sitions at the Dzerzhinskiy Tractor Factory on 5 October.Several Soviet regiments were wiped out; the entire staof the Soviet 339th Infantry Regiment was killed the fol-lowing morning during an air raid.[2]:p.83

In mid-October, the Luftwae intensied its eortsagainst remaining Red Army positions holding the westbank. Luftotte 4 ew 2,000 sorties on 14 October and550 t (610 short tons) of bombs were dropped whileGerman infantry surrounded the three factories. Stuk-ageschwader 1, 2, and 77 had largely silenced Soviet ar-tillery on the eastern bank of the Volga before turningtheir attention to the shipping that was once again tryingto reinforce the narrowing Soviet pockets of resistance.The 62nd Army had been cut in two, and, due to inten-sive air attack on its supply ferries, was receiving muchless material support. With the Soviets forced into a 1-kilometre (1,000-yard) strip of land on the western bankof the Volga, over 1,208 Stuka missions were own in aneort to eliminate them.[2]:p.84

8 4 SOVIET COUNTER-OFFENSIVES

The Luftwae retained air superiority into November andSoviet daytime aerial resistance was nonexistent. How-ever, the combination of constant air support operationson the German side and the Soviet surrender of the day-time skies began to aect the strategic balance in the air.After ying 20,000 individual sorties, the Luftwae ' soriginal strength of 1,600 serviceable aircraft had fallento 950. The Kampfwae (bomber force) had been hard-est hit, having only 232 out of a force of 480 left.[5]:p.95The VVS remained qualitatively inferior, but by the timeof the Soviet counter-oensive, the VVS had reached nu-merical superiority.

Romanian IAR 80 ghter planes.

The Soviet bomber force, the Aviatsiya Dal'negoDeystviya (Long Range Aviation; ADD), having takencrippling losses over the past 18 months, was restrictedto ying at night. The Soviets ew 11,317 night sortiesover Stalingrad and the Don-bend sector between 17 Julyand 19 November. These raids caused little damage andwere of nuisance value only.[2]:p.82[54]:265

On 8 November, substantial units from Luftotte 4 werewithdrawn to combat the Allied landings in North Africa.The German air arm found itself spread thinly across Eu-rope, struggling to maintain its strength in the other south-ern sectors of the Soviet-German front.[Note 5] The Sovi-ets began receiving material assistance from the Ameri-can government under the Lend-Lease program. Duringthe last quarter of 1942, the U.S. sent the Soviet Union45,000 t (50,000 short tons) of explosives and 230,000 t(250,000 short tons) of aviation gas.[55]:p.404

As historian Chris Bellamy notes, the Germans paid ahigh strategic price for the aircraft sent into Stalingrad:the Luftwae was forced to divert much of its air strengthaway from the oil-rich Caucasus, which had been Hitlersoriginal grand-strategic objective.[56]

3.3 Germany reaches the Volga

After three months of slow advance, the Germans nallyreached the river banks, capturing 90% of the ruined cityand splitting the remaining Soviet forces into two narrowpockets. Ice oes on the Volga now prevented boats and

tugs from supplying the Soviet defenders. Nevertheless,the ghting, especially on the slopes of Mamayev Kurganand inside the factory area in the northern part of the city,continued.

4 Soviet counter-oensives

Soviet soldiers attack a house, February 1943

Recognizing that German troops were ill prepared for of-fensive operations during the winter of 1942, and thatmost of them were redeployed elsewhere on the southernsector of the Eastern Front, the Stavka decided to conducta number of oensive operations between 19 November1942 and 2 February 1943. These operations opened theWinter Campaign of 19421943 (19 November 1942 3March 1943), which involved some 15 Armies operatingon several fronts.

4.1 Weakness on the German anks

During the siege, the German and allied Italian, Hungar-ian, and Romanian armies protecting Army Group Bsanks had pressed their headquarters for support. TheHungarian 2nd Army was given the task of defending a200 km (120 mi) section of the front north of Stalin-grad between the Italian Army and Voronezh. This re-sulted in a very thin line, with some sectors where 12km (0.621.24 mi) stretches were being defended by asingle platoon. These forces were also lacking in eec-tive anti-tank weapons.Because of the total focus on the city, the Axis forces hadneglected for months to consolidate their positions alongthe natural defensive line of the Don River. The Sovietforces were allowed to retain bridgeheads on the rightbank from which oensive operations could be quicklylaunched. These bridgeheads in retrospect presented aserious threat to Army Group B.[15]:p.915

Similarly, on the southern ank of the Stalingrad sectorthe front southwest of Kotelnikovo was held only by theRomanian 7th Army Corps, and beyond it, a single Ger-man division, the 16th Motorized Infantry.

94.2 Operation Uranus: the Soviet oensiveMain article: Operation UranusIn autumn, the Soviet generals Georgy Zhukov and

The Soviet counter-attack at StalingradGerman front, 19 NovemberGerman front, 12 DecemberGerman front, 24 DecemberSoviet advance, 1928 November

Aleksandr Vasilevsky, responsible for strategic planningin the Stalingrad area, concentrated forces in the steppesto the north and south of the city. The northern ankwas defended by Hungarian and Romanian units, oftenin open positions on the steppes. The natural line of de-fense, the Don River, had never been properly establishedby the German side. The armies in the area were alsopoorly equipped in terms of anti-tank weapons. The planwas to punch through the overstretched and weakly de-fended German anks and surround the German forcesin the Stalingrad region.During the preparations for the attack, Marshal Zhukovpersonally visited the front and noticing the poor organi-zation, insisted on a one-week delay in the start date of theplanned attack.[29]:p.117 The operation was code-namedUranus and launched in conjunction with OperationMars, which was directed at Army Group Center. Theplan was similar to the one Zhukov had used to achievevictory at Khalkhin Gol three years before, where he hadsprung a double envelopment and destroyed the 23rd Di-vision of the Japanese army.[57]

On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Opera-tion Uranus. The attacking Soviet units under the com-mand of Gen. Nikolay Vatutin consisted of three com-plete armies, the 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, and21st Army, including a total of 18 infantry divisions, eighttank brigades, two motorized brigades, six cavalry divi-

sions and one anti-tank brigade. The preparations forthe attack could be heard by the Romanians, who contin-ued to push for reinforcements, only to be refused again.Thinly spread, deployed in exposed positions, outnum-bered and poorly equipped, the Romanian 3rd Army,which held the northern ank of the German 6th Army,was overrun.Behind the front lines, no preparations had been made todefend key points in the rear such as Kalach. The localresponse by the Wehrmacht was both chaotic and indeci-sive. Poor weather prevented eective air action againstthe Soviet oensive.On 20 November, a second Soviet oensive (two armies)was launched to the south of Stalingrad against pointsheld by the Romanian 4th Army Corps. The Romanianforces, made up primarily of infantry, were overrun bylarge numbers of tanks. The Soviet forces raced west andmet on 23 November at the town of Kalach, sealing thering around Stalingrad.[15]:p.926 The link-up of the Sovietforces, not lmed at the time, was later re-enacted for apropaganda lm which was shown worldwide.

5 Sixth Army surrounded

Romanian soldiers near Stalingrad

German soldiers as prisoners of war. In the background is theheavily fought-over Stalingrad grain elevator

About 265,000 German, Romanian, and Italiansoldiers,[58] the 369th (Croatian) Reinforced Infantry

10 5 SIXTH ARMY SURROUNDED

German dead in the city

Regiment, and other volunteer subsidiary troops in-cluding some 40,000 Soviet volunteers ghting forthe Germans (Beevor states that one quarter of thesixth armys frontline strength were HIWIs, as collab-orationists recruited from the ranks of Soviet POWswere called)[59] were surrounded. These Soviet HIWIsremained loyal, knowing the Soviet penalty for helpingthe Germans was summary execution. German strengthin the pocket was about 210,000 according to strengthbreakdowns of the 20 eld divisions (average size 9,000)and 100 battalion sized units of the Sixth Army on 19November 1942. Inside the pocket (German: Kessel,literally cauldron), there were also around 10,000Soviet civilians and several thousand Soviet soldiers theGermans had taken captive during the battle. Not all ofthe 6th Army was trapped; 50,000 soldiers were brushedaside outside the pocket. These belonged mostly to theother 2 divisions of the 6th Army between the Italianand Romanian Armies: the 62nd and 298th InfantryDivisions. Of the 210,000 Germans, 10,000 remainedto ght on, 105,000 surrendered, 35,000 left by air andthe remaining 60,000 died.The Red Army units immediately formed two defen-sive fronts: a circumvallation facing inward and acontravallation facing outward. Field Marshal Erich vonManstein advised Hitler not to order the 6th Army tobreak out, stating that he could break through the Sovietlines and relieve the besieged 6th Army.[60] The Ameri-can historians Williamson Murray and Alan Millet wrotethat it was Mansteins message to Hitler on 24 Novem-ber advising him that the 6th Army should not break out,along with Grings statements that the Luftwae couldsupply Stalingrad that "... sealed the fate of the SixthArmy.[61] After 1945, Manstein claimed that he toldHitler that the 6th Army must break out.[62] The Ameri-can historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Manstein dis-torted his record on the matter.[63] Manstein was taskedto conduct a relief operation, named Operation WinterStorm (Unternehmen Wintergewitter) against Stalingrad,which he thought was feasible if the 6th Army was tem-porarily supplied through the air.[64][65]

Adolf Hitler had declared in a public speech (in theBerlin Sportpalast) on 30 September 1942 that the Ger-man army would never leave the city. At a meet-ing shortly after the Soviet encirclement, German armychiefs pushed for an immediate breakout to a new line onthe west of the Don, but Hitler was at his Bavarian re-treat of Obersalzberg in Berchtesgaden with the head ofthe Luftwae, Hermann Gring. When asked by Hitler,Gring replied, after being convinced by Hans Jeschon-nek,[5]:p.234 that the Luftwae could supply the 6th Armywith an "air bridge. This would allow the Germans inthe city to ght on temporarily while a relief force wasassembled.[15]:926 A similar plan had been used a yearearlier at the Demyansk Pocket, albeit on a much smallerscale: a corps at Demyansk rather than an entire army.

A Ju 52 approaching Stalingrad

The director of Luftotte 4, Wolfram von Richthofen,tried to get this decision overturned. The forces under6th Army were almost twice as large as a regular Germanarmy unit, plus there was also a corps of the 4th PanzerArmy trapped in the pocket. The maximum 107 t (118short tons) they could deliver a daybased on the num-ber of available aircraft and with only the aireld at Pit-omnik to land atwas far less than the minimum 750 t(830 short tons) needed.[5][Note 6] To supplement the lim-ited number of Junkers Ju 52 transports, the Germanspressed other aircraft into the role, such as the HeinkelHe 177 bomber (some bombers performed adequatelythe Heinkel He 111 proved to be quite capable and wasmuch faster than the Ju 52). General Richthofen in-formed Manstein on 27 November of the small transportcapacity of the Luftwae and the impossibility of supply-ing 300 tons a day by air. Manstein now saw the enormoustechnical diculties of a supply by air of these dimen-sions. The next day he made a six-page situation reportto the general sta. Based on the information of the ex-pert Richthofen, he declared that contrary to the exampleof the pocket of Demjansk the permanent supply by airwould be impossible. If only a narrow link could be estab-lished to Sixth Army, he proposed that this should be usedto pull it out from the encirclement. He acknowledged theheavy moral sacrice the giving up of Stalingrad meansbut this is made easier to bear by the conservation of thecombat power of Sixth Army and the regaining of the ini-

11

tiative ...[66] He ignored the limited mobility of the armyand the diculties of disengaging the Soviets. Hitler re-iterated that Sixth Army would stay at Stalingrad and thatthe air bridge would supply it until the encirclement wasbroken by a new German oensive.The Luftwae was able to deliver an average of 85 t (94short tons) of supplies per day out of an air transportcapacity of 106 t (117 short tons) per day. The mostsuccessful day, 19 December, delivered 262 t (289 shorttons) of supplies in 154 ights.In the early parts of the operation, fuel was shippedat a higher priority than food and ammunition becauseof a belief that there would be a breakout from thecity.[20]:p.153 Transport aircraft also evacuated technicalspecialists and sick or wounded personnel from the be-sieged enclave. Sources dier on the number own out:at least 25,000 to at most 35,000. Carell: 42,000, ofwhich 5000 did not survive.

The center of Stalingrad after liberation

Initially, supply ights came in from the eld atTatsinskaya, called 'Tazi' by the German pilots. On 23December, the Soviet 24th Tank Corps, commanded byMajor-General Vasily Mikhaylovich Badanov, reachednearby Skassirskaya and in the early morning of 24 De-cember, the tanks reached Tatsinskaya. Without any sol-diers to defend the aireld, it was abandoned under heavyre; in a little under an hour, 108 Ju 52s and 16 Ju 86stook o for Novocherkasskleaving 72 Ju 52s and manyother aircraft burning on the ground. A new base was es-tablished some 300 km (190 mi) from Stalingrad at Salsk,the additional distance another obstacle to the resupplyeorts. Salsk was abandoned in turn by mid-January fora rough facility at Zverevo, near Shakhty. The eld atZverevo was attacked repeatedly on 18 January and afurther 50 Ju 52s were destroyed. Winter weather con-ditions, technical failures, heavy Soviet anti-aircraft reand ghter interceptions eventually led to the loss of 488German aircraft.In spite of the failure of the German oensive to reach6th Army, the air supply operation continued under evermore dicult circumstances. The 6th Army slowlystarved. Pilots were shocked to nd the troops too ex-hausted and hungry to unload. Germans fought over the

slightest scraps of bread. General Zeitzler, moved by theirplight, began to limit himself to their slim rations at mealtimes. After a few weeks on such a diet, he had lost12 kg (26 lb) and had become so emaciated that Hitler,annoyed, personally ordered him to start eating regularmeals again.The toll on the Transportgruppen was heavy. 160 air-craft were destroyed and 328 were heavily damaged (be-yond repair). Some 266 Junkers Ju 52s were destroyed;one-third of the eets strength on the Eastern Front.The He 111 gruppen lost 165 aircraft in transport oper-ations. Other losses included 42 Ju 86s, 9 Fw 200 Con-dors, 5 He 177 bombers and 1 Ju 290. The Luftwaealso lost close to 1,000 highly experienced bomber crewpersonnel.[5]:p.310 So heavy were the Luftwae ' s lossesthat four of Luftotte 4s transport units (KGrzbV 700,KGrzbV 900, I./KGrzbV 1 and II./KGzbV 1) were for-mally dissolved.[2]:p.122

6 The end of the battle

6.1 Operation Winter Storm

Main article: Operation Winter Storm

Soviet forces consolidated their positions around Stalin-grad, and erce ghting to shrink the pocket began. Oper-ation Winter Storm (Operation Wintergewitter), the Ger-man attempt led by Erich von Manstein to relieve thetrapped army from the south, was initially successful. Thecross country ability of German tanks in the snow mayhave slowed the relief attempts. By 19 December, theGerman Army had pushed to within 48 km (30 mi) ofSixth Armys positions. The encircled forces at Stalin-grad made no attempt to break out or link up with theMansteins advance. Some German ocers requestedthat Paulus defy Hitlers orders to stand fast and insteadattempt to break out of the Stalingrad pocket. Paulus re-fused. On 23 December, the attempt to relieve Stalingradwas abandoned and Mansteins forces switched over to thedefensive to deal with new Soviet oensives.

6.2 Operation Little SaturnMain article: Operation Little SaturnOn 16 December, the Soviets launched Operation Little

Saturn, which attempted to punch through the Axis army(mainly Italians) on the Don and take Rostov. The Ger-mans set up a mobile defense of small units that wereto hold towns until supporting armor arrived. From theSoviet bridgehead at Mamon, 15 divisionssupportedby at least 100 tanksattacked the Italian Cosseria andRavenna Divisions, and although outnumbered 9 to 1, theItalians initially fought well, with the Germans praisingthe quality of the Italian defenders,[67] but on 19 Decem-

12 6 THE END OF THE BATTLE

Soviet gains (shown in blue) during Operation Little Saturn

ber, with the Italian lines disintegrating, ARMIR head-quarters ordered the battered divisions to withdraw tonew lines.[68]

The ghting forced a total revaluation of the German sit-uation. The attempt to break through to Stalingrad wasabandoned and Army Group A was ordered to pull backfrom the Caucasus.The 6th Army now was beyond all hope of German relief.While a motorised breakout might have been possible inthe rst few weeks, the 6th Army now had insucient fueland the German soldiers would have faced great dicultybreaking through the Soviet lines on foot in harsh winterconditions. But in its defensive position on the Volga, 6thArmy continued to tie down a disproportionate numberof Soviet Armies.

6.3 Soviet victoryMain article: Operation Koltso

The Germans inside the pocket retreated from thesuburbs of Stalingrad to the city itself. The loss of the twoairelds, at Pitomnik on 16 January 1943 and Gumrak onthe night of 21/22 January,[69] meant an end to air sup-plies and to the evacuation of the wounded.[70]:p.98 Thethird and last serviceable runway was at the Stalingrad-skaja ight school, which reportedly had the last landingsand takeos on the night of 2223 January.[31] After day-break on 23 January, there were no more reported land-ings except for intermittent air drops of ammunition andfood until the end.The Germans were now not only starving, but running outof ammunition. Nevertheless, they continued to resist,in part because they believed the Soviets would executeany who surrendered. In particular, the so-called HiWis,Soviet citizens ghting for the Germans, had no illusionsabout their fate if captured. The Soviets were initiallysurprised by the number of Germans they had trapped,and had to reinforce their encircling troops. Bloody urban

759,560 Soviet personnel were awarded this medal for the de-fence of Stalingrad from 22 December 1942.

warfare began again in Stalingrad, but this time it wasthe Germans who were pushed back to the banks of theVolga. The Germans adopted a simple defense of x-ing wire nets over all windows to protect themselves fromgrenades. The Soviets responded by xing sh hooks tothe grenades so they stuck to the nets when thrown.The Germans had no usable tanks in the city, and thosethat still functioned could, at best, be used as makeshiftpillboxes. The Soviets did not bother employing tanksin areas where the urban destruction restricted their mo-bility. A low-level Soviet envoy party (comprising Ma-jor Aleksandr Smyslov, Captain Nikolay Dyatlenko anda trumpeter) carried an oer to Paulus: if he surrenderedwithin 24 hours, he would receive a guarantee of safetyfor all prisoners, medical care for the sick and wounded,prisoners allowed to keep their personal belongings, nor-mal food rations, and repatriation to any country theywished after the war; but Paulusordered not to surren-der by Hitlerdid not respond.[71]:p.283

13

Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus (left), with his chief ofsta, Generalleutnant Arthur Schmidt (centre) and his aide,Wilhelm Adam (right), after their surrender.

Soviets defend a position

On 22 January Paulus requested that he be granted per-mission to surrender. Hitler rejected it on a point of hon-our. He telegraphed the 6th Army later that day, claim-ing that it had made a historic contribution to the greateststruggle in German history and that it should stand fast tothe last soldier and the last bullet. Hitler told Goebbelsthat the plight of the 6th Army was a heroic drama ofGerman history.[72]

On 26 January 1943, the German forces inside Stalin-grad were split into two pockets. A northern pocket cen-tered on the tractor factory and a smaller southern pocketin the city center. The northern pocket was tactically

commanded by General Walter Heitz while the southernpocket was commanded by Paulus.On 30 January 1943, the 10th anniversary of Hitlerscoming to power, Goebbels read out a proclamation thatincluded the sentence: The heroic struggle of our sol-diers on the Volga should be a warning for everybody todo the utmost for the struggle for Germanys freedom andthe future of our people, and thus in a wider sense for themaintenance of our entire continent.[73] Hitler promotedPaulus to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall. No Germaneld marshal had ever surrendered, and the implicationwas clear: if Paulus surrendered, he would shame him-self and would become the highest ranking German o-cer ever to be captured. Hitler believed that Paulus wouldeither ght to the last man or commit suicide.[74] Paulus,however, commented, I have no intention of shootingmyself for this Bohemian corporal.[75][Note 7]

The next day, the southern pocket in Stalingrad collapsed.Soviet forces reached the entrance to the German head-quarters in the ruined GUM department store. GeneralSchmidt negotiated a surrender of the headquarters whilePaulus waited in another room. When interrogated by theSoviets, Paulus claimed that he had not surrendered. Hesaid that he had been taken by surprise. He denied thathe was the commander of the remaining northern pocketin Stalingrad and refused to issue an order in his name forthem to surrender.[76][77]

Four Soviet armies were deployed against the remainingnorthern pocket. At four in the morning on 2 Febru-ary, General Strecker was informed that one of his ownocers had gone to the Soviets to negotiate surrenderterms. Seeing no point in continuing, he sent a radiomessage saying that his command had done its duty andfought to the last man. He then surrendered. Around91,000 exhausted, ill, wounded, and starving prisonerswere taken, including 3,000 Romanians (the survivors ofthe 20th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and Col.Voicu Detachment).[78] The prisoners included 22 gen-erals. Hitler was furious and conded that Paulus couldhave freed himself from all sorrow and ascended intoeternity and national immortality, but he prefers to go toMoscow.[79]

7 AftermathBased on Soviet records, over 10,000 soldiers continuedto resist in isolated groups within the city for the nextmonth.The German public was not ocially told of the impend-ing disaster until the end of January 1943, though pos-itive media reports had stopped in the weeks before theannouncement.[80] Stalingrad marked the rst time thatthe Nazi government publicly acknowledged a failure inits war eort; it was not only the rst major setback forthe German military, but a crushing defeat where German

14 7 AFTERMATH

The aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad

losses were almost equal to those of the Soviets was un-precedented. Prior losses of the Soviet Union were gen-erally three times as high as the German ones.[80] On 31January, regular programming on German state radio wasreplaced by a broadcast of the somber Adagio movementfrom Anton Bruckner's Seventh Symphony, followed bythe announcement of the defeat at Stalingrad.[80]

On 18 February, Minister of Propaganda JosephGoebbels gave the famous Sportpalast speech in Berlin,encouraging the Germans to accept a total war that wouldclaim all resources and eorts from the entire population.

A Red Army soldier marches a German soldier into captivity.

According to the German documentary lm Stalingrad(1993), over 11,000 soldiers refused to lay down theirarms at the ocial surrender. Some have presumed thatthey were motivated by a belief that ghting on was betterthan a slow death in Soviet captivity. The Israeli historianOmer Bartov claims they were motivated by National So-cialism. He studied 11,237 letters sent by soldiers insideof Stalingrad between 20 December 1942 and 16 Jan-uary 1943 to their families in Germany. Almost everyletter expressed belief in Germanys ultimate victory andtheir willingness to ght and die at Stalingrad to achievethat victory.[81] Bartov reported that a great many of thesoldiers were well aware that they would not be able toescape from Stalingrad, but in their letters to their fami-lies boasted that they were proud to sacrice themselvesfor the Fhrer.[81]

The remaining forces continued to resist, hiding in cel-lars and sewers, but by early March 1943, the remainingsmall and isolated pockets of resistance had surrendered.According to Soviet intelligence documents shown in thedocumentary, a remarkable NKVD report from March1943 is available showing the tenacity of some of theseGerman groups:

The mopping-up of counter-revolutionaryelements in the city of Stalingrad proceeded.The German soldiers - who had hidden them-selves in huts and trenches - oered armedresistance after combat actions had alreadyended. This armed resistance continued until15 February and in a few areas until 20 Febru-ary. Most of the armed groups were liqui-dated by March ... During this period of armedconict with the Germans, the brigades unitskilled 2,418 soldiers and ocers and captured8,646 soldiers and ocers, escorting them toPOW camps and handing them over.

The operative report of the Don Fronts sta issued on 5February 1943, 22.00 said:

The 64th Army was putting itself in order,being in previously occupied regions. Locationof armys units is as it was previously. In theregion of location of the 38 Motorized RieBrigade in a basement 18 armed SS-men (sic)were found, who refused to surrender, the Ger-mans found were destroyed.[82]

Out of the nearly 110,000 German prisoners captured inStalingrad, only about 5,000 ever returned.[83] Alreadyweakened by disease, starvation and lack of medical careduring the encirclement, they were sent on death marches(75,000 survivors died within 3 months of capture) toprisoner camps and later to labour camps all over the So-viet Union. Some 35,000 were eventually sent on trans-ports, of which 17,000 did not survive. Most died ofwounds, disease (particularly typhus), cold, overwork,mistreatment, and malnutrition. Some were kept in thecity to help rebuild.A handful of senior ocers were taken to Moscow andused for propaganda purposes, and some of them joinedthe National Committee for a Free Germany. Some, in-cluding Paulus, signed anti-Hitler statements that werebroadcast to German troops. Paulus testied for the pros-ecution during the Nuremberg Trials and assured familiesin Germany that those soldiers taken prisoner at Stalin-grad were safe.[28]:p.401 He remained in the Soviet Unionuntil 1952, then moved to Dresden in East Germany,where he spent the remainder of his days defending hisactions at Stalingrad, and was quoted as saying that Com-munism was the best hope for postwar Europe.[28]:p.280General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach oered to raise

15

an anti-Hitler army from the Stalingrad survivors, but theSoviets did not accept. It was not until 1955 that the lastof the 5-6,000 survivors were repatriated (to West Ger-many) after a plea to the Politburo by Konrad Adenauer.

8 SignicanceStalingrad has been described as the biggest defeat in thehistory of the German Army.[84] It is often identied asthe turning point on the Eastern Front, and in the waragainst Germany overall, and even the greatest turningpoint in the Second World War. Before Stalingrad, Ger-many had gone from victory to victory, with a limitedsetback in the winter of 1941-42. After Stalingrad, theywon no signicant battles, even in summer.[85] The RedArmy had the initiative, and the Wehrmacht was in re-treat. A year of German gains during Case Blue had beenwiped out. Germanys Sixth Army had ceased to exist,and the forces of Germanys European allies, except Fin-land, had been shattered.[86] In a speech on 9 November1944, Hitler himself blamed Stalingrad for Germanysimpending doom.[87]

Stalingrads signicance has been downplayed by somehistorians, who point either to the Battle of Moscow orthe Battle of Kursk as more strategically decisive. Oth-ers maintain that the destruction of an entire army (thelargest killed, captured, wounded gures for Axis sol-diers, nearly 1 million, during the war) and the frustra-tion of Germanys grand strategy made the battle a wa-tershed moment.[88] At the time, however, the battle wasperceived as having global strategic consequences. On1 January 1943, British General Alan Brooke, Chief ofthe Imperial General Sta, reected in his diary on thechange in the position from a year before:

I felt Russia could never hold, Caucasus wasbound to be penetrated, and Abadan (ourAchilles heel) would be captured with the con-sequent collapse of Middle East, India, etc.After Russias defeat how were we to handlethe German land and air forces liberated? Eng-land would be again bombarded, threat of inva-sion revived... And now! We start 1943 underconditions I would never have dared to hope.Russia has held, Egypt for the present is safe.There is a hope of clearing North Africa ofGermans in the near future... Russia is scoringwonderful successes in Southern Russia.[88]

At that point, the British had won the Battle of El Alameinin November 1942. However, there were only about50,000 German soldiers at El Alamein in Egypt, whileat Stalingrad 200,000 Germans had been lost.[88]

Regardless of the strategic implications, there is littledoubt that Stalingrad was a morale watershed. Germanysdefeat shattered its reputation for invincibility. It dealt

a devastating blow to German morale. On 30 January1943, the tenth anniversary of his coming to power, Hitlerchose not to speak. Josef Goebbels read the text of hisspeech for him on the radio. The speech contained anoblique reference to the battle, which suggested that Ger-many was now in a defensive war. The public mood wassullen, depressed, fearful, and war-weary. Germany waslooking in the face of defeat.[89]

The reverse was the case on the Soviet side. There wasan overwhelming surge in condence and belief in vic-tory. A common saying was: You cannot stop an armywhich has done Stalingrad. Stalin was feted as the heroof the hour and made a Marshal of the Soviet Union.[90]In recognition of the determination of its defenders, Stal-ingrad was awarded the title Hero City in 1945. A colos-sal monument called The Motherland Calls was erectedin 1967 on the Mamayev Kurgan, the hill overlookingthe city where bones and rusty metal splinters can stillbe found.[91] The statue forms part of a war memorialcomplex which includes the ruins of the Grain Silo andPavlovs House.The news of the battle echoed round the world, withmany people now believing that Hitlers defeat wasinevitable.[92] The Turkish Consul in Moscow predictedthat the lands which the Germans have destined for theirliving space will become their dying space.[93] Britainsconservative Daily Telegraph proclaimed that the victoryhad saved European civilisation.[93] The country cele-brated Red Army Day on 23 February 1943. A cer-emonial Sword of Stalingrad was forged by King GeorgeVI. After being put on public display in Britain, this waspresented to Stalin by Winston Churchill at the Tehranconference later in 1943.[90] Soviet propaganda spared noeort and wasted no time in capitalising on the triumph,impressing a global audience. The prestige of Stalin,the Soviet Union, and the worldwide Communist move-ment was immense, and their political position greatlyenhanced.[94]

9 Other information

9.1 Orders of battle

Red Army

Main article: Red Army order of battle at the Battle ofStalingrad

During the defence of Stalingrad, the Red Army deployedve armies (28th, 51st, 57th, 62nd and 64th Armies)in and around the city and an additional nine armies inthe encirclement counter oensive.[29]:435438 The ninearmies amassed for the counteroensive were the 24thArmy, 65th Army, 66th Army and 16th Air Army fromthe north as part of the Don Front oensive and 1st

16 9 OTHER INFORMATION

Collage.The Eternal Flame inMamayev Kurgan.Volgograd, Rus-sia

Guards Army, 5th Tank, 21st Army, 2nd Air Army and17th Air Army from the south as part of the SouthwesternFront.

Axis

Main article: Axis order of battle at the Battle ofStalingrad

9.2 CasualtiesThe calculation of casualties depends on what scope isgiven to the battle of Stalingrad. The scope can vary fromjust the ghting within the city and suburbs itself to theinclusion of almost all ghting on the southern wing of theSoviet-German front from the spring of 1942 to the endof the ghting in the city in the winter of 1943. Dierentscholars have produced dierent estimates depending ontheir denition of the scope of the battle. The dierenceis comparing the city against the region.The Axis suered 850,000 total casualties (wounded,killed, captured) among all branches of the Germanarmed forces and its allies; 400,000 Germans, 200,000Romanians, 130,000 Italians, and 120,000 Hungarianswere killed, wounded or captured.[95]

On the material side, the Germans losses were 900aircraft (including 274 transports and 165 bombersused as transports), 500 tanks, and 6,000 artillerypieces.[2]:122123 According to a contemporary Soviet re-port, 5,762 artillery pieces; 1,312 mortars; 12,701 heavymachine guns; 156,987 ries; 80,438 sub-machine guns;10,722 trucks; 744 aircraft; 1,666 tanks; 261 other ar-mored vehicles; 571 half-tracks; and 10,679 motorcycleswere captured by the Soviets.[96] An unknown amount ofHungarian, Italian, and Romanian material was lost.The USSR, according to archival gures, suered1,129,619 total casualties;[97] 478,741 personnel killed ormissing, and 650,878 wounded or sick. On the materialside, the USSR lost 4,341 tanks destroyed or damaged,15,728 artillery pieces, and 2,769 combat aircraft.[98]

Anywhere from 25,000 to 40,000 Soviet civilians died inStalingrad and its suburbs during a single week of aerial

bombing by Luftotte 4 as the German 4th Panzer and6th Armies approached the city;[99] The total number ofcivilians killed in Stalingrad is unknown.In all, the battle resulted in an estimated total of 1.72million Axis and Soviet casualties.

9.2.1 Luftwae losses

Aircraft losses of the Luftwae for the supply of the 6thArmy at Stalingrad, and the recovery of wounded from24 November 1942 to 31 January 1943:The losses of transport planes were especially serious, asthey destroyed the capacity for resupply of the trapped 6thArmy. The destruction of 72 aircraft when the aireld atTatsinskaya was overrun meant the loss of about 10% ofthe entire Luftwae transport eet.[100]

These losses amounted to about 50% of total aircraftcommitted. In addition, the Luftwae training programwas stopped and sorties in other theaters of war were sig-nicantly reduced to save fuel for use at Stalingrad.

9.3 In popular culture

Main article: Battle of Stalingrad in popular culture

The events of the Battle for Stalingrad have been cov-ered in several lms of German, Russian,[101] British, andAmerican origin.The struggle is also remembered and reected upon innumerous books, for its signicance as a turning point inthe Second World War and for the loss of life associatedwith the battle.In the 2011 video game Red Orchestra 2: Heroes of Stal-ingrad, the single player campaign focuses on the Battleof Stalingrad, and several maps in the game portray fa-mous locations of the battle, such as Pavlovs House, theRed October Factory and Mamayev Kurgan, among oth-ers. The Multiplayer also consisted of several famous lo-cations from the single player so people could experiencefor themselves what it was like, to an extent.The 2013 game, Company of Heroes 2, portrayed the bat-tle in certain missions, but was heavily criticized by someRussian players for being historically inaccurate,[102]and on 7 August DVD sales of the Russian version ofthe game were halted in Russia, while the game is stillavailable for downloading from Steam.[103]

The Battle of Stalingrad was also portrayed by theSwedish power metal band Sabaton in their song Stal-ingrad.Stalingrad (2013 lm) focused on 5 individuals holding abuilding along with various units to defend Stalingrad andVolga River from German attacks.

17

10 See also Barmaley Fountain Hitler Stalingrad Speech Italian participation in the Eastern Front List of ocers and commanders in the Battle of

Stalingrad

11 ReferencesFootnotes

[1] The Soviet fronts composition and names changed severaltimes in the battle. The battle started with the South West-ern Front. It was later renamed Stalingrad Front, then hadthe Don Front split o from it.

[2] The Front was reformed from reserve armies on 22 Octo-ber 1942.

[3] This force grew to 1,600 in early September by withdraw-ing forces from the Kuban region and South Caucasus:Hayward (1998), p. 195.

[4] Bergstrm quotes: Soviet Reports on the eects of airraids between 2326 August 1942. This indicates 955people were killed and another 1,181 wounded

[5] 8,314 German aircraft were produced from JulyDecember 1942, but this could not keep pace with a three-front aerial war of attrition

[6] Shirer p. 926 says that Paulus radioed that they wouldneed a minimum of 750 tons of supplies day own in,while Craig pp. 206207 quotes Zeitzler as pressing Go-ering about his boast that the Luftwae could airlift theneeded supplies: Are you aware ... how many daily sor-ties the army in Stalingrad will need? ... Seven hundredtons! Every day!"

[7] Fr so einen Schweinehund wie den bhmischen Gefreitenerschiee ich mich nicht! (I am not going to shoot myselffor such a swine as this Bohemian corporal!), quoted in:Ich bitte erschossen zu werden, Der Spiegel, 1949-01-29.

Citations

[1] Bellamy, (2007)

[2] Bergstrm (2007)

[3] Glantz (1995), p. 346

[4] Anthony Tihamer Komjathy (1982). A Thousand Yearsof the Hungarian Art of War. Toronto: Rakoczi Founda-tion. pp. 14445. ASIN B001PHB3N0. ISBN 978-0-8191-6524-4. ASIN is for the version cited. ISBN is fora dierent printing from a dierent publisher.

[5] Hayward, (1998)

[6] Bergstrom (2005)

[7] Glantz (1995), p. 134

[8] McDougal Littell, (2006)

[9] Roberts (2006: 143)

[10] Biesinger (2006: 699): On August 23, 1942, the Ger-mans began their attack.

[11] Battle of Stalingrad. Encyclopdia Britannica. By theend of August, ... Gen. Friedrich Paulus, with 330,000of the German Army's nest troops ... approached Stal-ingrad. On 23 August a German spearhead penetratedthe citys northern suburbs, and the Luftwae rained in-cendiary bombs that destroyed most of the citys woodenhousing.

[12] Luhn (8 June 2014). Stalingrad name may return to cityin wave of second world war patriotism. theguardian.com(The Guardian). The Guardian. Retrieved 16 February2015.

[13] Taylor (1998) Vol IV, p. 142

[14] Beevor (1998: 239)

[15] Shirer (1990)

[16] Kershaw, (2000)

[17] Taylor and Clark, (1974)

[18] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar, Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 96

[19] Michael Burleigh (2001). The Third Reich: A New His-tory. Pan. p. 503. ISBN 978-0-330-48757-3.

[20] Walsh, Stephen. (2000). Stalingrad 19421943 The In-fernal Cauldron. London, New York: Simon & Schuster.ISBN 0-7432-0916-8.

[21] McDonald (1986)

[22] German High Command (communique) (27 October1941). Text of the Days War Communiques. New YorkTimes (28 October 1941). Retrieved 27 April 2009.

[23] German High Command (communique) (10 November1942). Text of the Days War Communiques on Fightingin Various Zones. New York Times (10 November 1942).Retrieved 27 April 2009.

[24] German High Command (communique) (26 August1942). Text of the Days War Communiques on Fightingin Various Zones. New York Times (26 August 1942).Retrieved 27 April 2009.

[25] German High Command (communique) (12 December1942). Text of the Days War Communiques. New YorkTimes (12 December 1942). Retrieved 27 April 2009.

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[26] In spite of the unfavourable balance of forces - the 'Cosse-ria' and the 'Ravenna' faced eight to nine Russian divisionsand an unknown number of tanks - the atmosphere amongItalian stas and troops was certainly not pessimistic.... TheItalians, especially the ocers of the 'Cosseria', had con-dence in what they thought were well built defensive posi-tions. All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust 1941-43, Jonathan Steinberg, p. ?, Routledge, 2003

[27] The attack at dawn failed to penetrate fully at rst anddeveloped into a grim struggle with Italian strongpoints,lasting for hours. The Ravenna Division was the rst tobe overrun. A gap emerged that was hard to close, andthere was no holding back the Red Army when it deployedthe mass of its tank forces the following day. Germanreinforcements came too late in the breakthrough battle.The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and HitlersForeign Soldiers, Rolf-Dieter Mller, p. 84, I.B.Tauris,28 Feb 2014

[28] Craig, (1973)

[29] Beevor (1998), 198.

[30] Clark, Lloyd, Kursk: The Greatest Battle: Eastern Front1943, 2011, page 157

[31] Poji, Milan. Hrvatska pukovnija 369. na Istonom bojitu1941. 1943.. Croatian State Archives. Zagreb, 2007.

[32] Clark, Lloyd, Kursk: The greatest battle: Eastern Front1943, 2011, page 164165

[33] Stalingrad 1942. Retrieved 31 January 2010.

[34] Beevor (1998), 84-5, 97, 144.

[35] Krivosheev, G. I. (1997). Soviet Casualties and CombatLosses in the Twentieth Century. Greenhill Books. pp.5197. ISBN 978-1-85367-280-4.

[36] TV Novosti. Crucial WW2 battle remembered.Archived from the original on 9 March 2009. Retrieved19 February 2009.

[37] Bellamy (2007), 514-517.

[38] Beevor (1998), 135-137.

[39] Beevor (1998), 203-206.

[40] Beevor (2004)

[41] Overy, Richard. Russias War (New York: 1997), 201.

[42] Merridale, Catherine. Ivans War (New York: 2006), 156.

[43] quoted in Merridale, Catherine. Ivans War (New York:2006), 156.

[44] Bellamy (2007), 520-521.

[45] Pennington, pp. 180182.

[46] Pennington, p. 178.

[47] Pennington, pp. 189192.

[48] Pennington, pp. 192194.

[49] Pennington, p. 197.

[50] Pennington, pp. 201204.

[51] Pennington, pp. 204207.

[52] Alexander Werth, The Year of Stalingrad (London:1946), 193-194.

[53] Beevor (1998), 141-142.

[54] Golovanov, (2004)

[55] Goodwin (1994)

[56] Bellamy (2007), 516.

[57] Maps of the conict. Leavenworth Papers No. 2 Nomon-han: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939; MAPS. Re-trieved 5 December 2009.

[58] Manstein (2004)

[59] Beevor, Antony (1999). Stalingrad. London: Penguin. p.184. ISBN 0-14-024985-0. Beevor states that one quarterof the sixth armys frontline strength were HIWIs. Note:this reference still does not directly support the claim thatthere were 40,000 HIWIs

[60] Weinberg, Gerhard A World In Arms, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2005 page 451

[61] Murray, Williamson & Millet, Alan War To Be Won,Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000 page 288.

[62] Weinberg A World In Arms, 2005 451.

[63] Weinberg, 2005 A World In Arms, page 1045.

[64] Weinberg, Gerhard A World At Arms, Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2005, pp. 408; 449; 451.

[65] Manstein 2004, pp. 315; 334.

[66] Kehrig, Manfred Stalingrad, Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1974 pages 279,311-312,575.

[67] During this phase, the Germans praised the steadfastnessof Italian infantry, who held out tenaciously even in iso-lated strongpoints, but eventually reached their breaking-point under this constant pressure. " The Unknown East-ern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitlers Foreign Soldiers,Rolf-Dieter Mller, p. 83-84, I.B.Tauris, 28 Feb 2014

[68] Paoletti, Ciro (2008). A Military History of Italy. West-port, CT: Praeger Security International. p. 177. ISBN0-275-98505-9. Retrieved 4 December 2009.

[69] Deiml, Michael (1999). Meine Stalingradeinstze (MyStalingrad Sorties). Einstze des Bordmechanikers Gefr.Michael Deiml (Sorties of Aviation Mechanic PrivateMichael Deiml). Retrieved 4 December 2009.

[70] MacDonald, (1986)

[71] Clark (1995)

[72] Kershaw (2000), p. 549.

[73] Kershaw (2000), p. 550.

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[74] Bellamy (2007), 549.

[75] Beevor, p. 381

[76] Beevor, p. 390

[77] Bellamy (2007), 550.

[78] Pusca, Dragos; Nitu, Victor. The Battle of Stalingrad 1942 Romanian Armed Forces in the Second World War(worldwar2.ro). Retrieved 4 December 2009.

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[81] Bartov, Omer Hitlers Army Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1991 pages 166167

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[85] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar, Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, pp 95, 108.

[86] Georey Roberts, Stalins Wars: From World War to ColdWar, 19391953, Yale University Press, New Haven andLondon, 2006, pp 154155.

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[90] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar, Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 106

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[92] Georey Roberts, Stalins Wars: From World War to ColdWar, 19391953, Yale University Press, New Haven andLondon, 2006, pp 154155.

[93] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar, Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 95

[94] P.M.H. Bell, Twelve Turning Points of the Second WorldWar, Yale University Press, New Haven and London,2011, p 108.

[95] Craig, William (1973). Enemy at the Gates: the Battlefor Stalingrad. New York: Penguin Books (ISBN 0-14-200000-0 & ISBN 1-56852-368-8).

[96] ". """.

[97] (Russian). Retrieved 4 December2009.

[98] : , : . . / . . , . ., . . . .: , 1993.. 178182, 369370. ISBN 5-203-01400-0

[99] Georey Roberts (2002). Victory at Stalingrad: the battlethat changed history. Pearson Education. p.77. ISBN 0-582-77185-4

[100] Beevor, 1999. p. 301

[101] The Great Battle on the Volga (1962)".Video.google.com. Retrieved 12 November 2010.

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Glantz, David (2011), 'After Stalingrad: The RedArmys Winter Oensive 19421943', Helion andCompany, ISBN 978-1-907677-05-2

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12 Further reading Antill, Peter (2007). Stalingrad 1942, Osprey Pub-

lishing, London. ISBN 1-84603-028-5

Biesinger, Joseph A. (2006). Germany: a referenceguide from the Renaissance to the present. InfobasePublishing, New York City. ISBN 978-0-8160-4521-1

Corum, James S. (2008). Wolfram von Richthofen:Master of the German Air War. Lawrence, KS, Uni-versity Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1598-8.

Dibold, Hans (2001) Doctor at Stalingrad. Littleton,CO: Aberdeen, (hardcover, ISBN 0-9713852-1-1).

Grossman, Vasili Semenovich; Beevor, Antony;Vinogradova, Luba (2007). A Writer at War:A So-viet Journalist with the Red Army, 19411945. NewYork: Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-307-27533-2.

Hellbeck, Jochen. (2015) Stalingrad: The City ThatDefeated The Third Reich. New York, NY: Publi-cAairs. ISBN 978-1-61039-496-3.

Holl, Adelbert. (2005) An Infantryman In Stal-ingrad: From 24 September 1942 to 2 February1943. Pymble, NSW, Australia: Leaping HorsemanBooks (hardcover, ISBN 0-9751076-1-5).

Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. (1999) 199 Days: The Battlefor Stalingrad. New York: A Forge Book, (paper-back, ISBN 0-312-86853-7).

Jones, Michael K. (2007) Stalingrad: How the RedArmy Survived the German Onslaught. Drexel Hill,PA: Casemate, (hardcover, ISBN 978-1-932033-72-4)

Mayer, SL & Taylor, AJP (1974). History of WorldWar II. London: Octopus Books. ISBN 0-7064-0399-1 & ISBN 978-0-7064-0399-2

Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations: The Eastern FrontMemoir of General Raus, 19411945, compiledand translated by Steven H. Newton. Cambridge,MA: Da Capo Press, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-306-81247-9); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-306-81409-9).

Roberts, Georey. (2002) Victory at Stalingrad:The Battle that Changed History. New York: Long-man, (paperback, ISBN 0-582-77185-4).

(2006) Stalins wars: from World War to ColdWar, 19391953. Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-11204-1

Samsonov A.M., (1989) Stalingrad Battle, 4th ed.re-edited and added-to, Moscow, Science publish-ing. Russian: .. , 4- ., . . .: , 1989.(in Russian)

Snyder, David R. (2005). Review in The Journal ofMilitary History Volume 69 (1).

Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich & Harrison E.,Salisbury (1969). Marshal Zhukovs Greatest Bat-tles. New York: Harper & Row. OCLC563797912.

Joly, Anton (2013) Stalingrad: Battle Atlas, StalDataPublications (paperback, ISBN 979-10-93222-03-5).

13 External links Detailed summary of campaign Story of the Stalingrad battle with pictures, maps,

video and other primary and secondary sources Volgograd State Panoramic Museum ocial home-

page The Battle of Stalingrad in Film and History Written

with strong Socialist/Communist political under andovertones.

Roberts, Georey. Victory on the Volga, TheGuardian, 28 February 2003

Stalingrad-info.com, Russian archival docs trans-lated into English,original battle maps,aerial pho-tos,pictures taken at the battleelds,relics collection

H-Museum: Stalingrad/Volgograd 19432003.Memory

Battle of Stalingrad Pictures View footage from the Battle of Stalingrad in Jan-

uary 1943 The photo album of Wehrmacht NCO named

Nemela of 9. Machine-Gewehr Bataillon (mot)There are several unique photos of parade and awardceremony for Wehrmacht personnel who survivedthe Battle of Stalingrad.

22 14 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

14 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses14.1 Text Battle of Stalingrad Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad?oldid=671416561 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Kpjas, David

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