Battle of Moscow

This article is about the 1941 battle. For other uses, seeBattle of Moscow (disambiguation).

The Battle of Moscow (Russian: )is the name given by Soviet historians to two periods ofstrategically signicant ghting on a 600 km (370 mi)sector of the Eastern Front during World War II. It tookplace between October 1941 and January 1942. The So-viet defensive eort frustrated Hitler's attack on Moscow,capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)and the largest Soviet city. Moscow was one of the pri-mary military and political objectives for Axis forces intheir invasion of the Soviet Union.The German strategic oensive named Operation Ty-phoon was planned to conduct two pincer oensives, oneto the north of Moscow against the Kalinin Front by the3rd and 4th Panzer Armies, simultaneously severing theMoscowLeningrad railway, and another to the south ofMoscow Oblast against the Western Front south of Tula,by the 2nd Panzer Army, while the 4th Army advanceddirectly towards Moscow from the west. A separate oper-ational German plan, codenamed Operation Wotan, wasincluded in the nal phase of the German oensive.Initially, the Soviet forces conducted a strategic defenceof the Moscow Oblast by constructing three defensivebelts, deploying newly raised reserve armies, and bring-ing troops from the Siberian and Far Eastern MilitaryDistricts. Subsequently, as the German oensives werehalted, a Soviet strategic counter-oensive and smaller-scale oensive operations were executed to force the Ger-man armies back to the positions around the cities ofOryol, Vyazma and Vitebsk, nearly surrounding threeGerman armies in the process.

1 Background

For more details on this topic, see Operation Barbarossa.The original German invasion plan, which the Axis

called Operation Barbarossa, called for the capture ofMoscow within four months. On 22 June 1941, Axistroops invaded the Soviet Union and destroyed most ofthe Soviet Air Force on the ground, advancing deep intoSoviet territory using blitzkrieg tactics, destroying entireSoviet armies. While the German Army Group Northmoved towards Leningrad, Army Group South took con-trol of Ukraine, and Army Group Center advanced to-wards Moscow. By July 1941, Army Group Center

The eastern front at the time of the Battle of Moscow:Initial Wehrmacht advance to 9 July 1941Subsequent advances to 1 September 1941Encirclement and battle of Kiev to 9 September 1941Final Wehrmacht advance to 5 December 1941

crossed the Dnieper River, on the path to Moscow.[9]

In August 1941, German forces captured Smolensk, animportant stronghold on the road to Moscow.[10] At thisstage, although Moscow was vulnerable, an oensiveagainst the city would have exposed both of the Germananks. In part to address these risks, in part to attemptto secure Ukraines food and mineral resources,[11] Hitlerordered the attack to turn north and south and eliminateSoviet forces at Leningrad and Kiev.[12] This delayed theGerman advance on Moscow.[12] When the advance onMoscow resumed on 2 October 1941, German forces hadbeen weakened, while the Soviets had raised new forcesfor the defence of the city.[12]

2 Initial German advance (30September 10 October)

2.1 PlansFor more details on this topic, see Battle of Moscoworder of battle.

For Hitler, the Soviet capital was secondary and he be-lieved the only way to bring the Soviet Union to itsknees was to defeat it economically. He felt this couldbe accomplished by seizing the economic resources of

1

2 2 INITIAL GERMAN ADVANCE (30 SEPTEMBER 10 OCTOBER)

Ukraine east of Kiev. [13] When Walther von Brauchitsch,Commander-in-Chief of the Army, supported a directthrust to Moscow, he was told that only ossied brainscould think of such an idea.[13] Franz Halder, head of theArmy General Sta, was also convinced a drive to seizeMoscow would be victorious after the German Army in-icted enough damage on the Soviet forces.[14] This viewwas shared by most within the German high command.[13]But Hitler overruled his generals in favor of pocketingthe Soviet forces around Kiev in the south, followed byseizure of Ukraine. The move was successful, resultingin the destruction of 660,000 Red Army personnel bySeptember 26 and further advances.With the end of summer, Hitler redirected his attentionback to Moscow and assigned Army Group Center tothis task. The forces committed to Operation Typhoonincluded three infantry armies (the 2nd, 4th and 9th)supported by three Panzer (tank) Groups (the 2nd, 3rdand 4th) and by the Luftwae ' s Luftotte 2. Overall,more than one million German troops were committed tothe operation, along with 1,700 tanks and 14,000 guns.German aerial strength, however, had been severely re-duced over the summers campaigning as the Luftwaehad lost 1,603 aircraft destroyed and 1,028 damaged.Luftotte 2 had only 549 serviceable machines, includ-ing 158 medium and dive-bombers and 172 ghters,available for Operation Typhoon.[15] The attack relied onstandard Blitzkrieg tactics, using Panzer groups rushingdeep into Soviet formations and executing double-pincermovements, pocketing Red Army divisions and destroy-ing them.[16]

Facing the Wehrmacht were three Soviet fronts forming adefensive line between the cities of Vyazma and Bryanskwhich barred the way to Moscow. The armies compris-ing these fronts had also been involved in heavy ght-ing. Still, it was a formidable concentration consistingof 1,250,000 men, 1,000 tanks, 7,600 guns. The SovietAir Force/Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS) had sueredappalling losses of some 7,500[17] or 21,200[18] aircraft.Extraordinary industrial achievements had begun to re-place these, and at the outset of Typhoon the VVS couldmuster 936 aircraft, 578 of which were bombers.[19]

Once Soviet resistance along the Vyazma-Bryansk frontwas eliminated, German forces were to press east, encir-cling Moscow in similar fashion by outanking it from thenorth and south. However, before plans got underway thecontinuous ghting had reduced their armies in ghtingeectiveness. Logistical diculties became more acuteas well. Guderian, for example, wrote that some of hisdestroyed tanks had not been replaced along with fuelshortages at the start of the operation.[20]

2.2 The Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk

The German attack went according to plan, with 3rdPanzer Army pushing through the middle nearly unop-

With all the men at the Front, Moscow women dig anti-tanktrenches around Moscow in 1941

posed and then splitting its mobile forces north to com-plete the encirclement of Vyzama with 4th Panzer Army,and other units south to close the ring around Bryansk inconjunction with 2nd Panzer Army. The Soviet defense,still under construction, was overrun and spearheads ofthe Second and Third Panzer Groups met at Vyazma on10 October 1941.[21] Four Soviet armies (the 19th, 20th,24th and 32nd) were trapped in a huge pocket just westof the city.[22]

The encircled Soviet forces continued their resistanceand the Wehrmacht had to employ 28 divisions to elimi-nate them, using troops which could have supported theoensive towards Moscow. The remnants of the So-viet Western and Reserve Fronts retreated and mannednew defensive lines around Mozhaisk.[22] Although losseswere huge, some of the encircled units escaped insmall groups ranging in size from platoons to full riedivisions.[23] Soviet resistance near Vyazma also providedtime for the Soviet high command to bring reinforce-ments up to the four armies defending Moscow (namely,the 5th, 16th, 43rd and 49th). Three rie and two tankdivisions were transferred from the Far East with more tofollow.[22]

The German oensives during operation Typhoon

In the south near Bryansk, initial Soviet performance was

3barely more eective than Vyazma. The Second PanzerGroup executed an enveloping movement around the city,linking with the advancing 2nd Army and capturing Orelby 3 October and Bryansk by 6 October.But the weather began to change against the Germans. By7 October, The rst snow fell and quickly melted, turn-ing roads and open areas into muddy quagmires, a phe-nomenon known as rasputitsa in Russia. German armoredgroups were greatly slowed allowing Soviet forces to fallback and regroup.[24][25]

Soviet forces were able to counterattack in some cases.For example, the 4th Panzer Division fell into an ambushset by Dmitri Leliushenko's hastily formed 1st GuardsSpecial Rie Corps, including Mikhail Katukov's 4thTank Brigade, near the city of Mtsensk. Newly built T-34 tanks were concealed in the woods as German armorrolled past them; as a scratch team of Soviet infantry con-tained their advance, Soviet armor attacked from bothanks and savaged the German Panzer IV tanks. Forthe Wehrmacht, the shock of this defeat was so great thata special investigation was ordered.[23] Guderian and histroops discovered, to their dismay, that the Soviet T-34swere almost impervious to German tank guns. As thegeneral wrote, Our Panzer IV tanks with their short 75mm guns could only explode a T-34 by hitting the enginefrom behind. Guderian also noted in his memoirs thatthe Russians already learned a few things.[26][27]

Other counterattacks further slowed the German oen-sive. The 2nd Army which was operating to the north ofGuderians forces with the aim of trapping the BryanskFront, had come under strong Red Army pressure assistedby air support.[28]

According to German assessments of the initial Soviet de-feat, 673,000 soldiers had been captured by the Wehrma-cht in both the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets,[29] althoughrecent research suggests a lowerbut still enormousgure of 514,000 prisoners, reducing Soviet strength by41%.[30] The personnel losses (permanent as well as tem-porary) calculated by the Soviet command are smaller butstill massive, namely 499,001.[31] On 9 October Otto Di-etrich of the German Ministry of Propaganda, quotingHitler himself, forecast in a press conference imminentdestruction of the armies defending Moscow. As Hitlerhad never had to lie about a specic and veriable mili-tary fact, Dietrich convinced foreign correspondents thatthe collapse of all Soviet resistance was perhaps hoursaway. German civilian moralelow since the start ofBarbarossasignicantly improved, with rumors of sol-diers home by Christmas and great riches from the futureLebensraum in the east.[32]

However, Red Army resistance had slowed the Wehrma-cht and the brutally cold Russian winter was only weeksaway. When, on 10 October 1941, the Germans arrivedwithin sight of the Mozhaisk line west of Moscow, theyencountered another defensive barrier manned by newSoviet forces. That same day, Georgy Zhukov was re-

called from Leningrad to take charge of Moscows de-fense, with Colonel General Ivan Konev as his deputy.[33]On 12 October, he ordered the concentration of all avail-able forces on a strengthened Mozhaisk line, a move sup-ported by Vasilevsky.[34] The Luftwae still controlledthe sky wherever it appeared and the Stukageschwaderand Kampfgruppen (Stuka and bomber groups) ew 537sorties, destroying some 440 vehicles and 150 artillerypieces.[35][36]

On 15 October, Stalin ordered the evacuation of theCommunist Party, the General Sta and various civilgovernment oces from Moscow to Kuibyshev (nowSamara), leaving only a limited number of ocials be-hind. The evacuation caused panic among Muscovites.On 1617 October, much of the civilian population triedto ee, mobbing the available trains and jamming theroads from the city. Despite all this, Stalin publicly re-mained in the Soviet capital, somewhat calming the fearand pandemonium.[23]

3 Mozhaisk defense line (13 30October)

By 13 October 1941, the Wehrmacht had reached theMozhaisk defense line, a hastily constructed double setof fortications protecting Moscows western approachesthat extended from Kalinin towards Volokolamsk andKaluga. Despite recent reinforcements, only around90,000 Soviet soldiers manned this line - far too fewto stem the German advance.[37][38] Given the limitedresources available, Zhukov decided to concentrate hisforces at four critical points: the 16th Army underLieutenant General Rokossovsky guarded Volokolamsk,Mozhaisk was defended by 5th Army under Major Gen-eral Govorov, the 43rd Army of Major General Golubevdefended Maloyaroslavets, and the 49th Army underLieutenant General Zakharkin protected Kaluga.[39] Theentire Soviet Western Frontalmost destroyed after itsencirclement near Vyazmawas being recreated almostfrom scratch.[40]

Moscow itself was also hastily fortied. According toZhukov, 250,000 women and teenagers worked buildingtrenches and anti-tank moats around Moscow, moving al-most three million cubic meters of earth with no mechan-ical help. Moscows factories were hastily converted tomilitary tasks: one automobile factory was turned into asubmachine gun armory, a clock factory manufacturedmine detonators, the chocolate factory shifted to foodproduction for the front, and automobile repair stationsworked xing damaged tanks and military vehicles.[41]Despite these preparations, the capital was within strikingdistance of German panzers, with the Luftwae mount-ing massive air raids on the city. The air raids causedonly limited damage because of extensive anti-aircraftdefenses and eective civilian re brigades.[42]

4 4 WEHRMACHT AT THE GATES (1 NOVEMBER 5 DECEMBER)

On 13 October 1941 (15 October, according to othersources), the Wehrmacht resumed its oensive. Atrst, the Germans attempted to bypass Soviet defensesby pushing northeast towards the weakly protected cityof Kalinin and south towards Kaluga and Tula, cap-turing all except Tula by 14 October. Encouraged bythese initial successes, the Germans launched a frontalassault against the fortied line, taking Mozhaisk andMaloyaroslavets on 18 October, Naro-Fominsk on 21 Oc-tober, and Volokolamsk on 27 October after intense ght-ing. Because of the increasing danger of anking attacks,Zhukov was forced to fall back,[23] withdrawing his forceseast of the Nara River.[43]

In the south, the Second Panzer Army initially advancedtowards Tula with relative ease because the Mozhaisk de-fense line did not extend that far south and no signif-icant concentrations of Soviet troops blocked their ad-vance. However bad weather, fuel problems, and dam-aged roads and bridges eventually slowed the Germans,and Guderian did not reach the outskirts of Tula until26 October.[44] The German plan initially called for therapid capture of Tula, followed by a pincer move aroundMoscow. The rst attack, however, was repelled by the50th Army and civilian volunteers on 29 October, aftera desperate ght within sight of the city.[45] On 31 Octo-ber, the German Army high command ordered a halt toall oensive operations until increasingly severe logisticalproblems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided.

4 Wehrmacht at the gates (1November 5 December)

4.1 Wearing down

The mud of the rasputitsa before Moscow, November 1941

By late October, the German forces were worn out, withonly of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantrydivisions at to strength, and serious logistics issuespreventing the delivery of warm clothing and other win-ter equipment to the front. Even Hitler seemed to sur-render to the idea of a long struggle, since the prospect of

sending tanks into such a large city without heavy infantrysupport seemed risky after the costly capture of Warsawin 1939.[46]

A 7 November 1941 parade by Soviet troops on Red Square de-picted in this 1949 painting by Konstantin Yuon vividly demon-strates the symbolic signicance of the event.

To stien the resolve of the Red Army and boost thecivilian morale, Stalin ordered a traditional military pa-rade on 7 November (Revolution Day) to be staged inRed Square. Soviet troops paraded past the Kremlinand then marched directly to the front. The parade car-ried a great symbolic signicance by demonstrating thecontinued Soviet resolve, and was frequently invoked assuch in the years to come. Despite this brave show,the Red Armys position remained precarious. Although100,000 additional Soviet soldiers had reinforced Klinand Tula, where renewed German oensives were ex-pected, Soviet defenses remained relatively thin. Never-theless, Stalin ordered several preemptive counteroen-sives against German lines. These were launched despiteprotests from Zhukov, who pointed out the complete lackof reserves.[47] The Wehrmacht repelled most of thesecounteroensives, which squandered Soviet forces thatcould have been used for Moscows defense. The oen-sives only notable success occurred west of Moscow nearAleksino, where Soviet tanks inicted heavy losses onthe 4th Army because the Germans still lacked anti-tankweapons capable of damaging the new, well-armored T-34 tanks.[46]

From 31 October 15 November, the Wehrmacht highcommand stood down while preparing to launch a sec-ond oensive towards Moscow. Although Army GroupCentre still possessed considerable nominal strength, itsghting capabilities had thoroughly diminished becauseof combat fatigue. Although the Germans were aware ofthe continuous inux of Soviet reinforcements from theeast, as well as the presence of large reserves, given thetremendous Soviet casualties they did not expect the So-viets to be able to mount a determined defense.[48] Butin comparison to the situation in October, Soviet rie di-visions occupied a much stronger defensive position: atriple defensive ring surrounding the city and some re-

4.2 Final pincer 5

mains of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most of the So-viet eld armies now had a multilayered defense with atleast two rie divisions in second echelon positions. Ar-tillery support and sapper teams were also concentratedalong major roads that German troops were expected touse in their attacks. There were also many Soviet troopsstill available in reserve armies behind the front. Finally,Soviet troopsand especially ocerswere now moreexperienced and better prepared for the oensive.[46]

Soviet poster proclaiming, Lets make a stand for Moscow!"

By 15 November 1941, the ground had nally frozen,solving the mud problem. The armored Wehrmachtspearheads were unleashed, with the goal of encirclingMoscow and linking up near the city of Noginsk, east ofthe capital. To achieve this objective, the German Thirdand Fourth Panzer Groups needed to concentrate theirforces between the Moscow reservoir and Mozhaysk,then proceed to Klin and Solnechnogorsk to encircle thecapital from the north. In the south, the Second PanzerArmy intended to bypass Tula, still in Soviet hands, andadvance to Kashira and Kolomna, linking up with thenorthern pincer at Noginsk.

4.2 Final pincer

On 15 November 1941, German tank armies began theiroensive towards Klin, where no Soviet reserves wereavailable because of Stalins wish to attempt a counterof-fensive at Volokolamsk, which had forced the relocation

of all available reserves forces further south. Initial Ger-man attacks split the front in two, separating the 16thArmy from the 30th.[46] Several days of intense combatfollowed. Zhukov recalled in his memoirs that The en-emy, ignoring the casualties, was making frontal assaults,willing to get to Moscow by any means necessary.[49]Despite the Wehrmacht ' s eorts, the multi-layered de-fense reduced Soviet casualties as the Soviet 16th Armyslowly retreated and constantly harassed the German di-visions trying to make their way through the fortications.The Third Panzer Army nally captured Klin after heavyghting on 24 November, and by 25 November Sol-nechnogorsk as well. Soviet resistance was still strong,and the outcome of the battle was by no means cer-tain. Reportedly, Stalin asked Zhukov whether Moscowcould be successfully defended and ordered him to speakhonestly, like a communist. Zhukov replied that it waspossible, but that reserves were desperately needed.[49]By 28 November, the German 7th Panzer Division hadseized a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canalthe last major obstacle before Moscowand stood lessthan 35 km (22 mi) from the Kremlin;[46] but a pow-erful counterattack by the 1st Shock Army drove themback across the canal.[50] Just northwest of Moscow, theWehrmacht reached Krasnaya Polyana, little more than20 km (12 mi) from Moscow;[51] German ocers wereable to make out some of the major buildings of the So-viet capital through their eld glasses. Both Soviet andGerman forces were severely depleted, sometimes havingonly 150200 riemena company's full strengthleftin a regiment.[46]

In the south, near Tula, combat resumed on 18 Novem-ber 1941, with the Second Panzer Army trying to encirclethe city.[46] The German forces involved were extremelybattered from previous ghting and still had no winterclothing. As a result, initial German progress was only510 km (3.16.2 mi) per day, reducing the chances ofsuccess.[52] Moreover, it exposed the German tank armiesto anking attacks from the Soviet 49th and 50th Armies,located near Tula, further slowing the advance. Guderiannevertheless was able to pursue the oensive, spreadinghis forces in a star-like attack, taking Stalinogorsk on 22November 1941 and surrounding a Soviet rie divisionstationed there. On 26 November, German panzers ap-proached Kashira, a city controlling a major highway toMoscow. In response, a violent Soviet counterattack waslaunched the following day. General Belovs 2nd CavalryCorps, supported by hastily assembled formations whichincluded 173rd Rie Division, 9th Tank Brigade, twoseparate tank battalions, and training and militia units,[53]halted the German advance near Kashira.[54] The Ger-mans were driven back in early December, securing thesouthern approach to the city.[55] Tula itself held, pro-tected by fortications and determined defenders, bothsoldiers and civilians. In the south, the Wehrmacht nevergot close to the capital.Because of the resistance on both the northern and south-

6 5 SOVIET COUNTEROFFENSIVE

German soldiers in heavy snow west of Moscow

ern sides of Moscow, on 1 December the Wehrmachtattempted a direct oensive from the west along theMinsk-Moscow highway near the city of Naro-Fominsk.This oensive had only limited tank support and wasforced to assault extensive Soviet defenses. After meet-ing determined resistance from the Soviet 1st GuardsMotorized Rie Division and ank counterattacks stagedby the 33rd Army, the German oensive stalled andwas driven back four days later in the ensuing Sovietcounteroensive.[46] On 2 December a reconnaissancebattalion managed to reach the town of Khimkisome8 km (5.0 mi) away from Moscowand captured itsbridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as its rail-way station, which marked the farthest advance of Ger-man forces on Moscow.[56][57]

Adapted to the climate: Red Army ski soldiers in Moscow. Stillfrom documentary Moscow Strikes Back, 1942

The temperature dropped far below freezing. On 30November, von Bock reported to Berlin that the tempera-ture was 45 C (49 F).[58] General Erhard Raus, com-mander of the 6th Panzer Division, kept track of the dailymean temperature in his war diary. It shows a suddenlymuch colder period during 47 December: from 36 to 38 C (37 to 38 F).[59] Other temperature reports var-ied widely.[60][61] Zhukov said that Novembers freezingweather stayed around 7 to 10 C (+19 to +14 F)[62]

Ocial Soviet Meteorological Service records show thelowest December temperature reached 28.8 C (20F).[62] The absolute numbers did not matter to the Ger-man troops who were freezing with no winter clothing,and whose equipment was not designed for such severeweather. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were re-ported among German soldiers.[37] Frozen grease had tobe removed from every loaded shell[37] and vehicles hadto be heated for hours before use. The same cold weather,typical for the season, hit the Soviet troops, but they werebetter prepared.[61]

The Axis oensive on Moscow stopped. Heinz Gude-rian wrote in his journal that the oensive on Moscowfailed ... We underestimated the enemys strength, aswell as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped mytroops on 5 December, otherwise the catastrophe wouldbe unavoidable.[63]

5 Soviet counteroensive

The Soviet winter counter-oensive, 5 December 1941 7 May1942

Although the Wehrmacht ' s oensive had been stopped,German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had nomore reserves left and thus would be unable to stage acounteroensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalintransferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500aircraft from Siberia and the Far East,[64] relying on intel-ligence from his spy, Richard Sorge, which indicated thatJapandeep in preparation for the Pearl Harbor attackwould not attack the Soviet Union. The Red Army hadaccumulated a 58-division reserve by early December,[37]when the oensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevskywas nally approved by Stalin.[65] Even with these newreserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation num-bered only 1,100,000 men,[60] only slightly outnumberingthe Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deploy-ment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some criti-cal points.[37] On 5 December 1941, the counteroen-sive started on the Kalinin Front. After two days of little

7progress, Soviet armies retook Krasnaya Polyana and sev-eral other cities in the immediate vicinity of Moscow.The same day, Hitler signed his directive No.39, orderingthe Wehrmacht to assume a defensive stance on the wholefront. German troops were unable to organize a solid de-fense at their present locations and were forced to pullback to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that dis-cussions with Hans Schmidt and Wolfram von Richthofentook place the same day, and both commanders agreedthat the current front line could not be held.[66] On 14December, Franz Halder and Gnther von Kluge nallygave permission for a limited withdrawal to the west ofthe Oka river, without Hitlers approval.[67] On 20 De-cember, during a meeting with German senior ocers,Hitler cancelled the withdrawal and ordered his soldiersto defend every patch of ground, digging trenches withhowitzer shells if needed.[68] Guderian protested, point-ing out that losses from cold were actually greater thancombat losses and that winter equipment was held by traf-c ties in Poland.[69] Nevertheless, Hitler insisted on de-fending the existing lines, and Guderian was dismissedby Christmas, along with generals Hoepner and Strauss,commanders of the 4th Panzer and 9th Army, respec-tively. Fedor von Bock was also dismissed, ocially formedical reasons.[70] Walther von Brauchitsch, Hitlerscommander-in-chief, had been removed even earlier, on19 December.[71]

Meanwhile, the Soviet oensive continued in the north.The oensive liberated Kalinin and the Soviets reachedKlin on 7 December, overrunning the headquarters of theLVI Panzer Corps outside the city. As the Kalinin Frontdrove west, a bulge developed around Klin. The Sovietfront commander, General Konev, attempted to envelopany German forces remaining. Zhukov diverted moreforces to the southern end of the bulge, to help Konevtrap the Third Panzer Army. The Germans pulled theirforces out in time. Although the encirclement failed, itunhinged the German defenses. A second attempt wasmade against the Second Panzer Army near Tula, butmet strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt,forming a salient that would last until 1943. In the south,the oensive went equally well, with Southwestern Frontforces relieving Tula on 16 December 1941. A majorachievement was the encirclement and destruction of theGerman XXXIX Corps, protecting Guderians SecondPanzer Armys southern ank.[72]

The Luftwae was paralysed in the second half of De-cember. The weather, recorded as 42 C (44 F),was a meteorological record.[73] Logistical dicultiesand freezing temperatures created technical dicultiesuntil January 1942. In the meantime, the Luftwae hadvirtually vanished from the skies over Moscow, while theRed Air Force, operating from better prepared bases andbeneting from interior lines, grew stronger.[73] On 4 Jan-uary, the skies cleared. The Luftwae was quickly rein-forced, as Hitler hoped it would save the situation. TwoKampfgruppen (Bomber Groups) (II./KG 4 and II./KG

30) arrived from retting in Germany, whilst four Trans-portgruppen (Transport Groups) with a strength of 102Junkers Ju 52 transports were deployed from Luftotte4 (Air Fleet 4) to evacuate surrounded army units andimprove the supply line to the front-line forces. It wasa last minute eort and it worked. The German airarm was to help prevent a total collapse of Army GroupCentre. Despite the Soviets best eorts, the Luftwaehad contributed enormously to the survival of ArmyGroup Center. Between 17 and 22 December the Luft-wae destroyed 299 motor vehicles and 23 tanks aroundTula, hampering the Red Armys pursuit of the GermanArmy.[74][75]

In the center, Soviet progress was much slower. So-viet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on 26 Decem-ber, Kaluga on 28 December, and Maloyaroslavets on 2January, after 10 days of violent action. Soviet reservesran low, and the oensive halted on 7 January 1942, af-ter having pushed the exhausted and freezing Germanarmies back 100250 km (62155 mi) from Moscow.Stalin continued to order more oensives in order to trapand destroy Army Group Center in front of Moscow, butthe Red Army was exhausted and overstretched and theyfailed.[76]

This victory provided an important boost for Sovietmorale, with the Wehrmacht suering its rst major de-feat on land. Having failed to vanquish the Soviet Unionin one quick strike, Germany now had to prepare for aprolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed.

6 Aftermath

See also: Battles of RzhevThe Red Armys winter counter-oensive drove the

Wehrmacht from Moscow, but the city was still consid-ered to be threatened, with the front line relatively close.Because of this, the Moscow theater remained a prior-ity for Stalin, who at rst appeared to be in shock dueto the initial German success.[77] In particular, the initialSoviet advance was unable to level the Rzhev salient, heldby several divisions of Army Group Center. Immediatelyafter the Moscow counter-oensive, a series of Soviet at-tacks (the Battles of Rzhev) were attempted against thesalient, each time with heavy losses on both sides. Byearly 1943, the Wehrmacht had to disengage from thesalient as the whole front was moving west. Neverthe-less, the Moscow front was not nally secured until Oc-tober 1943, when Army Group Center was decisively re-pulsed from the Smolensk landbridge and from the leftshore of the upper Dnieper at the end of the Second Bat-tle of Smolensk.Furious that his army had been unable to take Moscow,Hitler dismissed his commander-in-chief, Walther vonBrauchitsch, on 19 December 1941, and took personalcharge of the Wehrmacht,[71] eectively taking control of

8 7 CASUALTIES

Medal For the Defence of Moscow: 1,028,600 were awardedfrom 1 May 1944.

German soldiers surrender: still from the documentary MoscowStrikes Back, 1942

all military decisions and setting most experienced Ger-man ocers against him. Additionally, Hitler surroundedhimself with sta ocers with little or no recent combat

experience. As Guderian wrote in his memoirs, Thiscreated a chill in our relations, a chill that could neverbe eliminated afterwards.[78] This increased Hitlers dis-trust of his senior ocers and severely reduced the Ger-man advantages due to their superior military leadership.Germany now faced the prospect of a war of attrition,something it was not prepared for and bound to lose in thelong run. Overall, the battle was a stinging defeat for theAxis, though not necessarily a crushing one, and it endedGerman hopes for a quick and decisive victory over theSoviet Union.For the rst time since June 1941, Soviet forces hadstopped the Germans and driven them back. This re-sulted in Stalin becoming overcondent and deciding tofurther expand the oensive. On 5 January 1942, duringa meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin announced that he wasplanning a general spring counteroensive, which wouldbe staged simultaneously near Moscow, Leningrad and insouthern Russia. This plan was accepted over Zhukovsobjections.[79] Low Red Army reserves and Wehrmachttactical skill led to a bloody stalemate near Rzhev, knownas the "Rzhev meat grinder", and to a string of Red Armydefeats, such as the Second Battle of Kharkov, the failedattempt at elimination of the Demyansk pocket, and theencirclement of General Vlasov's army near Leningrad ina failed attempt to lift the siege of the city. Ultimately,these failures would lead to a successful German oen-sive in the south and to the Battle of Stalingrad.A documentary lm, Moscow Strikes Back, (Russian: , Rout of theGerman Troops near Moscow), was made during thebattle and rapidly released in Russia. It was taken toAmerica and shown at the Globe in New York in Au-gust 1942. The New York Times reviewer commentedthat The savagery of that retreat is a spectacle to stunthe mind.[80] As well as the Moscow parade and battlescenes, the lm included frank images of German atroc-ities committed during the battle, the naked and slaugh-tered children stretched out in ghastly rows, the youthsdangling limply in the cold from gallows that were rick-ety, but strong enough.[80]

The defense of Moscow became a symbol of Soviet resis-tance against the invading Axis forces. To commemoratethe battle, Moscow was awarded the title of "Hero City"in 1965, on the 20th anniversary of Victory Day. A Mu-seum of the Defence of Moscow was created in 1995.[81]

7 Casualties

Both German and Soviet casualties during the battle ofMoscow have been a subject of debate, as various sourcesprovide somewhat dierent estimates. Not all histori-ans agree on what should be considered the Battle ofMoscow in the timeline of World War II. While the startof the battle is usually regarded as the beginning of Op-

92001 Russian stamp for the 60th anniversary of the Battle ofMoscow

eration Typhoon on 30 September 1941 (or sometimeson 2 October 1941), there are two dierent dates for theend of the oensive. In particular, some sources (such asErickson[82] and Glantz[83]) exclude the Rzhev oensivefrom the scope of the battle, considering it as a distinctoperation and making the Moscow oensive stop on 7January 1942thus lowering the number of casualties.There are also signicant dierences in gures from var-ious sources. John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The Axisand the Allies, gives a gure of 653,924 Soviet casualtiesbetween October 1941 and January 1942.[82] Glantz, inhis book When Titans Clashed, gives a gure of 658,279for the defense phase alone, plus 370,955 for the wintercounteroensive until 7 January 1942.[83] The estimateof 400,000 German casualties by January 1942 reportedin the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was published in 197378.[70] On the other hand, Wehrmacht daily casualty re-ports show 35,757 killed in action, 128,716 wounded,and 9,721 missing in action for the entire Army GroupCenter between 1 October 1941 and 10 January 1942.[84]

Regardless of these disagreements, the Battle of Moscowis considered among the most lethal battles in world his-tory.

8 See also Ivan Panlov Panlovs Twenty-Eight Guardsmen German war crimes during the Battle of Moscow

9 Footnotes[1] Mercatante (2012). Why Germany Nearly Won: A New

History of the Second World War in Europe. p. 105.

[2] Stahel (2013). Operation Typhoon: Hitlers March onMoscow, October 1941. p. 45.

[3] Stahel (2011). Kiev 1941, by David Stahel Kiev 1941. p.339.

[4] Glantz (1995), p. 78.

[5] Bergstrm 2007 p.90.

[6] Williamson 1983, p.132.

[7] Both Sources use Luftwae records. The often quotedgures of 9001,300 do not correspond with recordedLuftwae strength returns. Sources: Prien, J./Stremmer,G./Rodeike, P./ Bock, W. Die Jagdiegerverbande derDeutschen Luftwae 1934 bis 1945, Teil 6/I and II; U.SNational Archives, German Orders of Battle, Statistics ofQuarter Years.

[8] Bergstrm 2007, p. 111.

[9] Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Memoirs ofa soldier), Smolensk, Rusich, 1999, p. 229.

[10] Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 19731978, entryBattle of Smolensk

[11] Guderian, pp. 267272.

[12] Alan F. Wilt. Hitlers Late Summer Pause in 1941. Mili-tary Aairs, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp. 187191

[13] Flitton 1994.

[14] Niepold, Gerd (1993). Plan Barbarossa. In David M.Glantz. The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22June August 1941: Proceedings of the Fourth Art of WarSymposium, Garmisch, FRG, October 1987. Cass series onSoviet military theory and practice 2. Psychology Press.p. 67. ISBN 9780714633756.

[15] Bergstm 2007, p. 90.

[16] Guderian, pp. 3079.

[17] Hardesty, 1991, p.61.

[18] Bergstrm 2007, p.118.

[19] Bergstrm 2007, p. 9091.

[20] Guderian, p. 307

[21] Clark Chapter 8,"The Start of the Moscow Oensive,p.156 (diagram)"name="GlantzVAB">Glantz, chapter 6,sub-ch. Viaz'ma and Briansk, pp. 74 .

[22] Vasilevsky, p. 139.

[23] Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. Viaz'ma and Briansk, pp. 74.

[24] Guderian, p. 316.

[25] Clark, pp. 165-166.

[26] Guderian, p. 318.

[27] David M. Glantz. When Titans Clashed. pp. 80, 81.

[28] Bergstrm 2007, p.91.

10 9 FOOTNOTES

[29] Georey Jukes, The Second World War The EasternFront 19411945, Osprey, 2002, ISBN 1-84176-391-8,p. 29.

[30] Jukes, p. 31.

[31] Glantz, When Titans Clashed p. 336 n15.

[32] Smith, Howard K. (1942). Last Train from Berlin. Knopf.pp. 8391.

[33] The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (19701979).2010 The Gale Group, Inc

[34] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 10.

[35] Plocher 1968, p. 231.

[36] Bergstrm 2007, p.93

[37] Jukes, p. 32.

[38] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 17.

[39] Marshal Zhukovs Greatest Battles p.50.

[40] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 18.

[41] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 22.

[42] Braithwaite, pp. 184210.

[43] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 24.

[44] Guderian, pp. 32930.

[45] Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 235.

[46] Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. To the Gates, pp. 80.

[47] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 27.

[48] Klink, pp. 574; 590592

[49] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 28.

[50] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 30.

[51] Guderian, p. 345.

[52] Guderian, p. 340.

[53] Erickson, 'The Road to Stalingrad,' p.260

[54] A.P. Belov, Moscow is behind us, Moscow, Voenizdat,1963, p. 97.

[55] Belov, p. 106.

[56] Henry Steele Commager, The Story of the Second WorldWar, p. 144

[57] Christopher Argyle, Chronology of World War II Day byDay, p. 78

[58] Chew (1981), p. 34.

[59] Raus (2009), p. 89.

[60] Glantz, ch.6, subchapter December counteroensive,pp. 86.

[61] Moss (2005), p. 298.

[62] Chew (1981), p. 33.

[63] Guderian, pp. 3545.

[64] Goldman p. 177

[65] Zhukov, tome 2, p. 37.

[66] Guderian, pp. 3535.

[67] Guderian, p. 354.

[68] Guderian, pp. 3601.

[69] Guderian, pp. 3634.

[70] Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 197378, entryBattle of Moscow 194142

[71] Guderian, p. 359.

[72] Glantz and House 1995, pp. 8890.

[73] Bergstrom 2003, p. 297.

[74] Bergstrm 2007, p. 112113.

[75] Bergstrm 2003, p. 299.

[76] Glantz and House 1995, p. 9197.

[77] Roberts, Cynthia A. (December 1995). Planning forwar: the Red Army and the catastrophe of 1941. Europe-Asia Studies (Taylor & Francis, Ltd.) 47 (8): 12931326.doi:10.2307/153299. JSTOR 153299. Marshal GeorgiiK. Zhukov, who had pressed Stalin on several occasionsto alert and reinforce the army, nonetheless recalled theshock of the German attack when he noted that 'neitherthe defence commissariat, myself, my predecessors B.M.Shaposhnikov and K.A. Meretskov, nor the General Stathought that the enemy could concentrate such a mass of... forces and commit them on the rst day ...

[78] Guderian, p. 365.

[79] Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 434.

[80] T.S. (17 August 1942). Movie Review: MoscowStrikes Back (1942) 'Moscow Strikes Back,' Front-LineCamera Mens Story of Russian Attack, Is Seen at theGlobe. The New York Times. Retrieved 18 March 2015.

[81] Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941: A City and Its Peopleat War, p. 345.

[82] John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, table12.4

[83] Glantz, Table B

[84] Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Army/ArmyGroup, 1941. Retrieved 28 March 2012.

11

10 References Braithwaite, Rodric. Moscow 1941: A City and Its

People at War. London: Prole Books Ltd, 2006(hardcover, ISBN 1-86197-759-X).

Collection of legislative acts related to State Awardsof the USSR (1984), Moscow, ed. Izvestia.

Belov, Pavel Alekseevich (1963). Za nami Moskva.Moscow: Voenizdat.

Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Barbarossa TheAir Battle: JulyDecember 1941. London:Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.

Boog, Horst; Frster, Jrgen; Homann, Joachim;Klink, Ernst; Mller, Rolf-Dieter; Ueberschr,Gerd R. (1998). Attack on the Soviet Union.Germany and the Second World War IV. Trans-lated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers, LouiseWillmot. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-822886-4.

Chew, Allen F. (December 1981). Fighting theRussians in Winter: Three Case Studies. Leaven-worth Papers (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US ArmyCommand and General Sta College) (5). ISSN0195-3451.

Erickson, John; Dilks, David (1994). Barbarossa:The Axis and the Allies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-versity Press. ISBN 0-7486-0504-5.

Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1995).When Titans clashed: how the Red Army stoppedHitler. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.ISBN 0-7006-0717-X.

Goldman, Stuart D. (2012). Nomonhan, 1939; TheRed Armys Victory That Shaped World War II.Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-61251-098-9.

Guderian, Heinz (1951). Erinnerungen eines Sol-daten. Heidelberg: Vowinckel.

Hardesty, Von. Red Phoenix. Washington, D.C.:Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991. ISBN 1-56098-071-0

Jukes, Georey (2002). The Second World War:The Eastern Front 19411945. Oxford: Osprey.ISBN 1-84176-391-8.

Lopukhovsky, Lev (2013). The Viaz'ma Catastro-phe, 1941 The Red Armys Disastrous Stand AgainstOperation Typhoon. Translated & Edited by Brit-ton Stuart. West Midlands: Helion & Company Ltd.ISBN 978-1-908916-50-1.

Moss, Walter (2005). A History of Russia: Since1855, Volume 2. Anthem Russian and Slavonicstudies (2 ed.). Anthem Press. ISBN 1-84331-034-1.

Nagorski, Andrew (2007). The Greatest Battle:Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for MoscowThat Changed the Course of World War II. NewYork: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-8110-1.

Flitton, Dave (director, producer, writer) (1994).The Battle of Russia (television documentary).USA: PBS.

Plocher, Hermann (1968). Luftwae versus Russia,1941. New York: USAF: Historical Division, ArnoPress.

Prokhorov, A. M. (ed.) (19731978). Great SovietEncyclopedia. New York: Macmillan.

Raus, Erhard; Newton, Steven H. (2009). PanzerOperations: The Eastern Front Memoir of GeneralRaus, 19411945. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-7867-3970-3.

Reinhardt, Klaus. Moscow: The Turning Point? TheFailure of Hitlers Strategy in the Winter of 194142.Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992 (hardback, ISBN 0-85496-695-1).

Sokolovskii, Vasilii Danilovich (1964). RazgromNemetsko-Fashistskikh Voisk pod Moskvoi (with mapalbum). Moscow: VoenIzdat. LCCN: 65-54443.

Tooze, Adam (2006). The Wages of Destruction:The making and breaking of the Nazi economy. Lon-don: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-100348-1.

Vasilevsky, A. M. (1981). Lifelong cause. Moscow:Progress. ISBN 0-7147-1830-0.

Williamson, Murray (1983). Strategy for Defeat:The Luftwae 19331945. Maxwell AFB: Air Uni-versity Press. ISBN 978-1-58566-010-0.

Zhukov, G. K. (1971). The memoirs of MarshalZhukov. London: Cape. ISBN 0-224-61924-1.

11 External links Map: Deployment of troops before the battle of

Moscow

Map (detailed): Battle of Moscow 1941. Germanoensive

WW2DB: Battle of Moscow

Coordinates: 5545N 3738E / 55.750N 37.633E

12 12 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

12 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses12.1 Text

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BackgroundInitial German advance (30 September 10 October)PlansThe Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk

Mozhaisk defense line (13 30 October)Wehrmacht at the gates (1 November 5 December)Wearing downFinal pincer

Soviet counteroffensiveAftermathCasualtiesSee alsoFootnotesReferencesExternal linksText and image sources, contributors, and licensesTextImagesContent license