Why I am not an analytic philosopher

David SpurrettSchool of Philosophy and Ethics

University of KwaZulu-NatalHoward College Campus

Durban; 4041

spurrett@ukzn.ac.za

Abstract

From a certain simplistic and inaccurate, although regrettably popular, per-

spective philosophy, at least for the past few decades, is available only in two

main flavours analytic and continental. Some self-identified members of

both camps are apt to endorse uncharitable caricatures of what the others are

up to. Among the many lines of criticism that can be directed against this

false dichotomy, I wish to focus on discussion of a broadly naturalistic orien-

tation that rejects many of the commitments both of paradigmatic analytic

philosophy and paradigmatic continental philosophy. For the committed nat-

uralist, the enterprise of philosophy is continuous with that of systematic em-

pirical enquiry into the workings of the world (science). From a naturalistic

perspective many of the standard moves of analytic philosophy, such as test-

ing a proposal against intuitions, are as preposterous as the claims of

continental and analytic philosophers sometimes appear to one another.

I should begin by trying to say something about my title, and how I came to believe itacceptable to propose to talk to some sub-set of the members of the Philosophical So-ciety of Southern Africa at their annual conference about my philosophical views in apartly auto-biographical and partly polemical register, rather than to offer a more con-ventional presentation in which I simply show up and offer some arguments relating tosome aspect of my current research. What follows is not, as it happens, free of argu-ments, but it is still unusually polemical in intention and unavoidably auto-biographi-cal in genesis. For as long as I can remember, which in my case means for about 14years, Philosophical Society of Southern Africa (hereafter PSSA) conferences, espe-cially during the business of the AGM have seen occasional sweeping remarks aboutanalytic versus continental philosophy.

These remarks have usually been, at least superficially, pacific in intention takingthe forms of appeals to practitioners of the two traditions (Im not endorsing theview that tradition is a useful or accurate term here) to be nice or respectful to oneanother, or to the editors of the South African Journal of Philosophy (hereafter SAJP)to continue to take seriously and to publish contributions coming from both tradi-tions. Sometimes the putative fact that the PSSA includes practitioners of both tradi-tions, or that the SAJP publishes papers written in both of them, is offered as a reasonfor us all to be pleased with ourselves, as though wed collectively managed to executesome difficult trick like enjoying both baseball and cricket, or supporting Arsenal and

154 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2008, 27(2)

Manchester United at the same time.1 Ive also myself at times been identified as ananalytic philosopher, including in cases where the fact that I was apparently one boreon some important political question regarding the PSSA or SAJP.2

Ive found these moments perplexing for a number of reasons. I dont regard myselfas an analytic philosopher, and Ive always found the analytic/continental distinctionsuspect. I have, furthermore, come to find it especially unhelpful in South Africa. Mymain aim here isnt to argue against the distinction, but it will be worth looking atsome problems with it to pave the way to my rejection of analytic philosophy, partly inorder to head of the consequence that anyone endorsing the simplistic false dichotomywould think that if Im not analytic, I must be continental.

First, it is never clear whether the classification into analytic and continental is (sup-posed to be) mutually exclusive, and, whether or not, why it would be. Second, it isalso never clear whether the classification is supposed to be collectively exhaustive,although some sorts of remarks (for example unqualified references to both tradi-tions3 suggest that sometimes some people think that the classification is practicallyexhaustive). These perplexities could perhaps be dispelled were it clearer what thepositive content of the distinction was. Ill say a little about this shortly, but for nowwe should at least note that there are some quite serious problems with affirmativeanswers to the questions just raised.

If the distinction is mutually exclusive, then it must be impossible in some sense tobe an analytic Heideggerean, or Derridean. (So that the main thesis of the book De-construction as Analytic Philosophy (Wheeler 2000) is false by definition). And com-mentators who have discerned continuity of concerns between, say, Derrida andDavidson (including Wheeler 2000, 2005), or Heidegger and Quine (e.g. Matthews2003) just have to be mistaken. The same goes for the considerable fertility of argu-ments and ideas to nominally analytic and continental philosophy from variousthinkers during the acknowledged existence of analytic philosophy, notably includingWittgenstein (e.g. Lyotard and Thbaud 1985, Austin 1962), and the common impor-tance of leading historical figures such as Descartes, Aristotle, and Kant. These lastconsequences are intolerable enough, it seems to me, to count as a reductio adabsurdum of the mutual exclusivity claim.

It is possible, sometimes, that people who think that the analytic/continental distinc-tion is deeply significant might intend, or be inclined to defend, some kind ofincommensurability thesis about the relationship between the two, to the effect thatthere was an unbridgeable and interpretation-defeating, comparison thwarting gulf be-tween the two of them. Although once popular in the philosophy of science, such the-ses in their strong forms have fallen on hard times even in cases where they oncelooked strongest. So it seems prima facie unlikely that there could be a compellinggeneral argument for a mutual exclusivity thesis here.

1 In his opening remarks at the 2008 conference of the PSSA at which this paper was delivered PSSAPresident Pieter Duvenage referred to the two traditions as being two fundamentally different styles ofthinking.

2 I have in mind here especially the difficult debate that took place at the 2007 AGM of the PSSA, wherespecific allegations of bias against continental and in favour of analytic philosophy were madeagainst the then editors of the South African Journal of Philosophy.

3 A comment including unqualified reference to both traditions (where context made clear that the twowere analytic and continental) was made by the President of the PSSA, Pieter Duvenage, at the 2007AGM of the PSSA in Stellenbosch, and again in opening the 2008 conference in Pretoria.

It is even more easy to see that the distinction cant be exhaustive. For a start, mostof the recorded history of philosophy (around 95% if you just count the centuries) pre-dates it. Its nonsensical to ask whether Kant, or Descartes, or Aristotle were analyticor continental philosophers.

There are also, and this is a really uncontroversial point, many active kinds of phi-losophy right now. Current professional academic practice in philosophy correspond-ingly embraces a large variety of specialisations. There are many kinds of appliedphilosophical practice, especially in ethics, and only a small fraction of the work inthis collection of areas is straightforwardly analytic or continental in orientation. Thereare also many examples of cross-over work, such as where analytic methods and ap-proaches are brought to bear on problems not initially conceived of in those terms. Ex-amples of this include analytical Marxism (e.g. Cohen 1978) and analytic existential-ism (the subject of a 2001 conference held in Cape Town). Much philosophy of reli-gion is neither analytic nor continental, often drawing as it does on philosophy (Thom-ism, phenomenology) from prior to the setting up of that distinction. It is surely espe-cially worth noting in here and now that most African Philosophy, along with allworld philosophy not fitting into a specific and rather short historical period in West-ern Europe and North America (plus Australia) resists classification into being eitheranalytic or continental, and hence that blithe assertions that there are two kinds of phi-losophy, analytic and continental, are especially exclusionary if made in Africa, orelsewhere outside the developed world mainstream. (That is, unless they are breathtak-ingly condescending, assuming that African philosophy is part of continental philoso-phy. The various rich connections, for example between some existentialism,psychoanalysis and phenomenology and some African and post-colonial philosophy(e.g. Fanon 1967), surely dont warrant the colonialism of an assimilation thesis.)

Some schools of thought, such as pragmatism, interestingly straddle the purportedanalytic-continental distinction. So Rorty, a lively opponent of most analytic philoso-phy champions pragmatism as an alternative, but in doing so explicitly draws inspira-tion from figures like Quine and Davidson (e.g. in his 1979), both often taken to beparadigmatic late analytic philosophers. More importantly still, a growing naturalisttendency in philosophy sees philosophical practice as in important respects continuouswith empirical science, and rejects in various ways paradigmatic features of analyticphilosophy, such as appeals to intuitions. Ill return to this shortly.

Rorty (2003) suggests that the distinctions between different kinds of philosophy arelargely institutional, maintained by the needs of graduate students to prepare for em-ployment in the competitive first world market, and he is surely partly correct in this.In the highly professionalised and competitive universities of the developed world, forbetter or worse, job advertisments are typically highly specific (philosopher of biol-ogy rather than philosopher of science), especially at leading universities with largedepartments. Graduate students tailor their profiles to the market, and the specificniches they aspire to occupy. It doesnt dilute the effect that only a tiny minority makeit into the best departments all kinds of places end up hiring people whose CVs aretailored for the elite departments.

Institutional distinctions can survive independently of settling, and alongside activeambiguity about, fine questions of content such as those regarding whether the ana-lytic/continental distinction (or what counts as a historian of philosophy, or a specialistin ancient philosophy, etc.) is exclusive or exhaustive. They identify in groups andout-groups, like the old distinction between hips and squares and can (and do) rely

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156 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2008, 27(2)

heavily on proxies like where a person did her PhD, or who was her supervisor. Suchproxies need not, and do not, track fine details such as exactly what was in someonesthesis (did her work on Quine include a Chapter on Derrida) or what everyone in a de-partment, or a thesis supervisor, works on, who visits, etc.

Despite the difficulties canvassed above, and allowing that for many purposes thedistinction is more usefully regarded as institutional than philosophical, Ill need tomake a more precise target of analytic philosophy in order to make an argumentagainst it. This wont be easy. A list of the philosophers likely to be counted as ana-lytic, such as Moore, Russell, Kripke, Kaplan, Chisholm, Davidson, Brandom, Carnap,Lewis, Armstrong, Austin, Hempel, and Wittgenstein, makes clear almost immediatelythat no list of necessary and sufficient conditions is going to pick out these philoso-phers and fail to include doubtful and incorrect cases.

It is also necessary to note that the history of philosophy includes various discus-sions of analysis, and the relation between analysis and philosophy, or the ways inwhich analysis variously conceived relates to the proper method of philosophy, inde-pendently of the specific movement initially called analytic philosophy and itsdescendents and elaborations.

Among the models of analysis taken seriously as a resource in philosophy is ancientgeometry. The Socratic method is sometimes regarded as a form of analysis, and theMeno is usefully seen as Platos discussion of the paradox of analysis (a discussionthat itself draws on geometric arguments and procedures). Aristotle explicitly com-pares philosophical argument to geometrical procedures as well, for example saying inthe Nicomachean Ethics (1908) that the person who deliberates seems to investigateand analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construc-tion (not all investigation appears to be deliberation- for instance mathematical investi-gations- but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysisseems to be first in the order of becoming (Book III, section 3). There are subtle anddetailed discussions of analysis in medieval philosophy, including in Aquinas (see,e.g., Sweeney 1994) and Buridan (2001). Rediscovery and retranslation of variousGreek texts inspired further debate over analysis in the Renaissance.

A vital figure in the modern story is Descartes, who himself made major contribu-tions to what is now known as analytic geometry, and insisted on the importance ofanalysis in philosophy. (See especially the Rules for the Direction of the Mind in Des-cartes 1985, Volume 1). In reply to a query from Mersenne Descartes wrote that it isanalysis which is the best and truest method of instruction, and it was this methodalone which I employed in my Meditations (Descartes 1985, Volume 2: p110-11.)

Leading early modern Western philosophers whether empiricist or rationalist sharedsome ideas about analysis. Thus Locke, in a sentence that might well, but for the style,be found in Descartes or Hume, wrote that all our complex Ideas are ultimately re-solvable into simple Ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up,though perhaps their immediate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex Ideas(Locke 1975, Book II, xxii, 9).

Allowing, then, that analysis is by no means philosophically univocal, and thatmillennia of philosophical discussion of it predates analytic philosophy, what can wesay about the movement called analytic philosophy?

The first six decades or so of branded analytic philosophy can usefully be seen asproceeding through about four relatively clear stages, after which the proliferation of

separate developments and sub-traditions makes it much less clear that there is such athing as analytic philosophy to be found.

In the first stage Moore (e.g. 1903) and Russell rejected Kantian and Hegelian ideal-ism in favour of a quasi-Platonist realism4 about propositions with considerable em-phasis on meanings. Their work also involved a turn away from the habit of offeringvery broad philosophical theories in favour of focussed treatments of specific issues(see Russells account in his 1959).

In the second stage Russell abandoned propositional realism in favour of logical at-omism (e.g. Russell 1918), in this to some extent inspired by the work of the earlyWittgenstein (1922). This is also when Russell developed the theory of descriptions,as a response to problems with the Meinongian object theory of meaning. Moore, forhis part, turned towards common sense realism, for example in his (1925).

Logical positivism is a third stage. In it some of the general philosophical commit-ments of the analytic movement, including logical atomism (Wittgensteins 1922Tractatus was a major source for logical positivists as well as for earlier logical atom-ists), are combined with the positivism as found in such thinkers as Mach. Unlike ei-ther of the first two stages, logical positivists tend to maintain that the only knowledgeis scientific or empirical knowledge, and dismiss non-tautological claims that cannotbe empirically verified as being meaningless. A key text here is Ayers Language,Truth and Logic (1936).

The fourth relatively clear stage is provided by ordinary language philosophy, orordinary language analysis. Key figures here include the later Wittgenstein (1953) andsome who associated with him at Cambridge, but also a number of Oxford philoso-phers including Gilbert Ryle (e.g. 1959) and Paul Grice (e.g. 1989) and J. L. Austin(e.g. 1962). The ways in which this programme was a reaction against the ideal lan-guage philosophy of the second stage is clearly seen in Wittgenstein whereas beforeWittgenstein had held that philosophical problems were to be resolved by translatingclaims into symbolic form, now he maintained they could be dispelled by diligent in-vestigation of how language was actually used. Malcolm credits Moore with a keyinsight here:

Moores great historical role consists in the fact that he has been perhaps thefirst philosopher to sense that any philosophical statement that violates ordinarylanguage is false, and consistently to defend ordinary language against itsphilosophical violators (Malcolm 1942: p368).

Beyond the heyday of the ordinary language movement the picture is considerablymore complicated. Important criticisms of the analytic project, such as those of Quine(1951) against logical positivism and other attacks on ordinary language philosophy(including Gellner 1959) partly explain this. An additional reason for fragmentation isprovided by innovations such as those of Kripke (1972) and other theories of refer-ence, and the a revival of overtly speculative metaphysics, partly through Lewiss(1973) elaboration of Davidsons attempt to develop a formal theory of meaning basedon Tarskis semantics (e.g. Davidson 1967) into possible world semantics. The robosthostility of various parts of analytic philosphy (including both stages of Wittgensteinand logical positivism) to history has given way to far greater interest in the history of

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4 This is not specifically analytic, indeed Moores views had features in common with Bolzano and oth-ers, including Husserl. Bell (1999) argues that Moore may have got to these views partly by readingwithin this Austro-German tradition (See Bell 1999).

158 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2008, 27(2)

philosophy, and many notable contemporary analytic philosophers (Peter Hacker (e.g.1996) is one example) are also serious scholars of the history of philosophy.

Given this variety, its difficult to say that analytic philosophy presents a single tar-get. Dummett himself notes that what he calls the fundamental axiom of analytic phi-losophy, the thesis analysis of language is prior to the analysis of thought (Dummett1993: p128) excludes canonical works such as Evans (1982). When Dummett goes onto say that Evans remains inside the fold, despite not endorsing the supposedly funda-mental axiom (itself apt to give false positives) because Evans adopts a certainphilosophical style and appeals to certain writers rather than others (Dummett1993, 5) it seems to me that he concedes Rortys point about noted above to the effectthat the distinction is more institutional than philosophical. Another popular sugges-tion to the effect that analytic philosophy is distinguished by preference for rigoroustreatments of relatively specific problems gives false negatives, because some clearlyworks are broad in scope, and false negatives, because of paradigmatic continentaldiscussions of highly specific questions, such as Derridas Signature, Event, Context(in his 1985).

Im not going to try to extract a determinate target that is analytic philosophy itsno part of my brief here to defend the view that there is a fundamental style of think-ing that is analytic philosophy. Rather I want to sketch some of the reasons for takingseriously a substantially separate (even if sometimes overlapping with putatively ana-lytic and continental philosophy) approach, and one that is harmfully ignored by any-one endorsing the view that the simplistic analytic/continental dichotomy exhaustscontemporary philosophy.

This approach is naturalism. In keeping with some streams of logical positivism,naturalist philosophy admires science, but views philosophy as continuous with sci-ence rather than performing logical housekeeping for it. Quines famous attack on theanalytic/synthetic distinction (an old distinction, but its Carnaps version Quine wasstalking) was a crucial contribution to the most recent version of the tendency to viewphilosophy as continuous with the empirical science, and the rejection of the view thatconceptual analysis was an epistemically defensible enterprise.5

One cautionary note is called for. There are various ways of being epistemically im-pressed by science, partly because of the variety of philosophies of science. When justany positive attitude to science is lumped together, one ends up with unhelpful carica-tures, leading to positions like Adornos classification of Popper as a positivist(Adorno et al, 1976), or Allens attempt to distinguish analytic from continental phi-losophy (in Prado 2003).6 Although beyond the scope of the present paper, a forcefulstatement of the main outlines of the naturalism I endorse can be found in Ross et al(2007).

I organise the present sketch of reasons for naturalism under two main headings,with some overlap between them scepticism about folk theories in various domainsand complementary claims made by the recent experimental philosophy movement,the growing importance of cognitive prostheses in gaining knowledge.

To begin with, a body of work in various fields has shown or argued that folk theo-ries in many areas, including psychology (e.g. Churchland & Churchland 1998), phys-

5 One recent defence of conceptual analysis, with a qualified rejection of Quines critique of analyticity,has been offered by Frank Jackson in his book, From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998).

6 Lumping analytic philosophy and naturalism is especially awkward given the brisk rejection of the rele-vance of science to philosophy in influential figures like Wittgenstein.

ics (e.g. Hayes 1979, 1985a, b) and biology (Medin & Atran 1999). This is relevant tophilosophy insofar as much analytic metaphysics is at least implicitly inimical to sci-ence, in the ways it prioritises armchair intuitions about the nature of the universe overscientific discoveries. This is anti-naturalist twice over.7 First, appeal to intuitions herepretends that science, especially physics, has not shown us that the actual universe isdeeply alien to our default conception of the world. Second, and the two are con-nected, privileging intuitions ignores key findings the cognitive and behavioural sci-ences (including evolutionary theory), concerning the nature of our minds, whichpartly explain why our default conception is tailored to a different task thanfundamental knowledge of reality.

What people find intuitive is neither highly determinate nor stable. For people ingeneral, what counts as intuitive depends partly on our evolved cognitive makeup andpartly on culturally specific learning and training. Intuitions are the basis for, and arereinforced and modified by, everyday practical heuristics for getting around in theworld under various constraints, and coping with the social world; they are not de-signed to produce reliable guidance in philosophy, mathematics or the scientific studyof the world. In light of the dependence of intuitions on species, cultural, and individ-ual learning histories, we should expect variation in what is taken to be intuitive, andthis is just what we find. In the case of judgements about causes, for example, Morrisand colleagues (1995) report that Chinese and American subjects differ with respect tohow they spontaneously allocated causal responsibility to agents and environmentalfactors.

Even if there was some determinate and universal fact about what was intuitive tohumans, wed need an argument for making the intuitions in question part of theexplanandum for metaphysics, or for allowing them to exercise any argumentative in-fluence at all. (Descartes, for example, claimed to have reason for thinking that hismind was, if used correctly, a perfect truth detector.) Any such argument will have toconfront the fact that data that might plausibly be taken to indicate what our intuitionsare sometimes shows that they are systematically misleading by the lights of our scien-tific and mathematical theories of the relevant domains. There are interpretive contro-versies about some of these data, but it seems clear that people are spontaneously un-reliable at judgements in various domains including conditional dependence, as mea-sured in the Wason selection task (see Cosmides 1989); probability, where many peo-ple will, for example, assert that the conjunction of two possibilities is more likelythan one of the conjuncts alone (Tversky and Kahneman 1983); strategic anticipation,where they dont look forward to others goals and then reason back over their proba-ble means (Camerer 2003); and in other areas. Commentators on science have pointedout in various ways how science is at odds with common sense or the intuitive. ThusWolpert says that both the ideas that science generates and the way in which scienceis carried out are entirely counter-intuitive and against common sense by which Imean that scientific ideas cannot be acquired by simple inspection of phenomena andthat they are very often outside everyday experience (Wolpert 1992: p1). He latermakes a stronger claim: I would almost contend that if something fits with commonsense it almost certainly isnt science (1992:p 11).

More recently rather than inferring from experimental psychology to scepticismabout the methods of analytic philosophy, members of the experimental philosophymovement have directly conducted experiments concerned with intuitions and folk

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7 This paragraph and the next two retrace steps occurring in Ross, Ladyman & Spurrett (2007).

160 S. Afr. J. Philos. 2008, 27(2)

opinions in a range of areas. Weinberg et al (2001) argue that intuitions are not humanuniversals, but vary with factors including cultural and educational background. Swainet al (in press) argue that the specific pattern of cases recently considered by a subjectmakes a difference to their judgements in cases where it was previously supposed thatintuitions were uniform and stable. Weinberg et al call the philosophical tradition thattakes intuitions as data Epistemic Romanticism and call it a very bad idea (2001:434). Alexander and Weinberg elsewhere argue that the world of experimental philos-ophers challenges the suitability of intuitions to function in any evidentiary role(2007: 63). In another bracing statement Bishop and Trout argue that the methods ofStandard Analytic Epistemology ...are suited to the task of providing an account ofthe considered epistemic judgments of (mostly) well-off Westerners with Ph.D.s inPhilosophy (2005: 107).

These claims are of course controversial. For defence of aspects of analytic philoso-phy, and arguments against some of the specific claims of experimental philosophers,see, among others, Sosa (2006, in press) who suggests that an error theory may be ableto explain the observed disagreements, and that verbal disagreement doesnt entailconceptual disagreement, and Kauppinen (in press), who argues that the claim of ana-lytic philosophy applies to what the folk would say only under specific and demandingconditions, conditions more demanding than typical experimental philosophy condi-tions. Further defence of intuitions can be found in Liao (in press).

An additional set of reasons for thinking that the solitary intellect of any human,whether trained philosopher or not, come from work on the ways in which appliedepistemology, in the work of science, increasingly depends on cognitive augmenta-tions of various kinds. Paul Humphreys (e.g. 2004) has argued that empirical discov-ery in various domains is increasingly dependent on the use of tools, especially includ-ing computer models, that are what he calls epistemically opaque, that is not amena-ble in principle to having their detailed operation verified by human processes, butwhich can be taken to work on the basis of a set of indirect inferences about aspects oftheir performance. Recent cognitive science, including Hutchins (1995) and Clark(1997), among others, have also made a great deal of the social and material distribu-tion of cognition, even though neither has drawn conclusions relevant to generalepistemic practice in philosophy.

The philosophy suggested by these brief reflections is broadly empiricist suspi-cious at best of claims to a priori knowledge, concerned that claims have empiricalcontent, and that attention be paid to the evidence bearing on them. Its broadly natu-ralist in a roughly Quinean sense philosophy and science are distinguished to the ex-tent that they are, again roughly, by the degree of generality of the conclusions theyaspire to consider and defend, and not because philosophy can claim any legitimatemethodological or other autonomy. Contemporary naturalism also tends to be less an-thropocentric. Also, clearly, it isnt analytic philosophy.

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