Who is this "We"? Levels of collective identity and self representations

8/11/2019 Who is this "We"? Levels of collective identity and self representations

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Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology

1996,

Vol.71 , N o . 1,83-93

Copyright 1996byIhe American Psychological Association,Inc.

0022-35H /9 6 /S3 .00

W ho Is Th is W e ? Levels of Collective Identity and Self Representations

Marilynn

B.

Brewer and W endi Gardn er

Ohio State University

Cross-cultural perspectives have brought renewed interest

in the

social aspects

of

the selfand

the

extent

to

which individuals define themselves

in

terms of their relationships

to

others and

to

social

groups. This article providesaconceptual reviewofresearchandtheory of the socialself,arguing

thatthepersonal, relational,andcollective levelsofself-definition represen t distinc t formsof self-

representation with different origins, sources of self-worth, and social motivations.

A

setof

3

exper-

iments illustrates haw priming

of

the interpersonal

or

collective we

can

alter spontaneous judg-

ments of similarity and self-descriptions.

Until recently, social psychological theories of the self focused

onthe individuated self-conceptthe person's senseofunique

identity differentiated from others. Cross-cultural perspectives,

however,havebroughtarenewed interest in the social aspectsof

the self and th e extent to which individuals define themselves in

terms of their relationships to others and to social groups

(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal,

Asai, Lucca, 1988). Central tothis newperspectiveis theidea

that conn ectedness and belonging arenotmerely affiliationsor

alliances between theselfand othersbut entail fundamental

differencesinthe way the self is construed (Brewer, 1991;Mar-

kus

&

Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994; Trafimow, Triandis,

&

Goto, 1991; Triandis, 1989; Turner, Oakes, Haslam , &

McGarty, 1994).

Someofthese theoriesofthe social self focusoncross-cul-

tural differences in whether the self is typically construed asin-

dividuatedorinterpersonal. However,allrecognize that these

different self-construals may also coexist within

the

same indi-

vidual, available to be activatedatdifferent times or in different

contexts. Furthermore, in several theories, achievingan ex-

tended sense of self has the status of a fundamental huma n m o-

tivation (Baumeister&Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991 ).In other

words, individuals seektodefine themselvesintermsoftheir

immersioninrelationships with othersandwith larger collec-

tivesandderive muchof their self-evaluation from such social

identities (Breckler Greenwald, 1986; Greenwald Breckler,

1985).Themotivational propertiesofcollective identitiesare

systematically documen tedinBaumeisterandLeary's (19 95)

comprehensive reviewof theevidenceinsupport of a funda-

mental need to belong as an innate feature of human nature.

All

of

the theories mentioned above draw some kind

of

dis-

tinction betweentheindividuated orpersonalself (thos e aspects

of the self-concept that differentiate the self from all others) and

a relationalor

social

self (those aspects of the self-concept that

MarilynnB .Brewer and Wendi Gardner, D epartm ent of Psychology,

Ohio State University.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mari-

lynnB.Brewer, Department of Psychology, Ohio State University,

1885

Neil Avenue, Colum bus, Ohio 43210-1222. Electronic m ailmay besent

via the Internet to mbbrewer@m agnus.acs.ohio-state.edu.

reflect assimilation to others or significantsocialgroups). How-

ever, implicit inacomparison acrossthesedifferent theoriesisa

further distinction between twolevelsofsocial selvesthose

that derive from interpersonal relationships

and

interdepen-

dence with specific others and those that derive from member-

ship in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories.

Both interpersonalandcollective iden titiesaresocial exten-

sions of the self bu t differinwhether the social connectionsare

personalized bonds of attachme nt or impersonal bonds derived

from comm on identification with some symbolic groupor so-

cial category. Prototypic interpersonal identitiesarethosede-

rived from intimate dyadic relationships such as parent-child,

lovers,andfriendships,butthey also include identities derived

from membershipinsmall, face-to-face groups thatareessen-

tially networksof such dyadic relationships. Collective social

identities,on theother hand,do notrequire personal relation-

ships among group m embers.AsTurner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher,

and W etherell (1987) pu t

it,

social identity entailsa

depersonal-

izedsenseof

self,

ashift towardstheperceptionofselfasan

interchangeable exemplar of some social category andaway

from the perception of self as a unique person (p . 50 ). Consis-

tent with this view, Prentice, Miller,andLightdale (1994) dis-

tinguished between group identities thatarebasedoncommon

bonds(attachment toother group members)andthose based

oncommon identity{collectiveidentities).

The distinction between interpersonalandcollective identi-

ties isnot simplyamatter ofthedifference between attachments

thatarebasedonaffect andattachments thatarecognitively

based. Both levels involve affective and cognitive categorization

processes.Thedifference is amatteroflevelofinclusiveness.

Some social identities

can be

construed either

as

interpersonal

relationshipsor ascollective identities. Many social rolesand

professions, for instance, canbeexperiencedinterm s of specific

role relationships (e.g., parent-child, doctor-patient) or in

terms of membershipina general social category (e.g., parents,

medical professionals). Consistent with this reasoning, Mill-

ward (1995) recently demonstrated a distinction between

nurses who construed their career identityinterms of commu-

nal-interpersonal relationships with patientsandthose whose

representation

of

nursewas construedintermsofprofessional

intergroup distinctions.

Some other theorists have also made explicitthed istinction

83


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8

BREWER AND GARDNER

between interpersonal and collective selves. Triandis (1989) and

Greenwald and Breckler

(1985;

Breckler Greenwald, 1986),

for instance, distinguished among private, public, and col-

lective facets of the

self.

ThepublicsW/representsthoseaspects

of the self-concept mostsensitiveto the eva luation of significant

others and consists of cognitions about the self that reflect in-

teractions and relationships with those others. The collective

self,

on the other hand, reflects internahzations of the norms

and characteristics of importan t reference groups and consists

of cognitions about the self that are consistent with tha t group

identification.

Recent evolutionary models of human social behavior also

call attention to functional distinctions between social attach-

ments at different levels of organization. Caporael (19 95;

Brewer & Caporael, 1995), for instance, has developed a hier-

archical model of group structure asacomprehensive theory of

social coo rdination. Accordingtothis model, four fundamental

configurationsdyads (two-person relationships), teams

(small face-to-face social and working groups),bands(small,

interacting comm unities), andtribes (macro-bands character-

ized by shared identity and com munication but without contin-

ual face-to-face interaction) have been repeatedly assem-

bled throughout h uman evolutionary history. Each level rep-

resents different forms of functional interdependence and

different types of coordination, with associated differences in

construals of self and others. These configurations also are rep-

resented ontogenetically. Bugental's (1995) review of the litera-

ture on social development suggests that the development of at-

tachme nt relationships and group-oriented relationships repre-

sent functionally distinct dom ains of social com petence.

Levels of Self Representation

Table 1 presents one attempt to characterize systematically

the differences among the three levels of self-construal that are

represented in the current literature on the social

self.

At the

individual level, thepersonalselfisthe differentiated, individu-

ated self-concept most characteristic of studies of the self in

Western psychology (e.g., Pelham, 1993). At the interpersonal

level, therelationalselfstheself-concept derived from connec-

tions and role relationships with significant others. This corre-

sponds most closely to the interdependent self as defined by

Markus and ICitayama (19 91) in their analysis of the difference

between American and Japanese self-construals. Finally, at the

group level is thecollectiveself,which corresponds to the con-

cept of social identity as represented in social identity theory

and self-categorization theory (Hogg & Abram s, 1988; Turner

etal., 1987).

These different aspects ofthe self refer to different levels of

inclusiveness of the conceptualization of the selfthe shift

from

1

to we as the locus of self-definition. This shift in

inclusiveness of self-representations is postulated to be associ-

ated with corresponding transformations of the bases for

content of the self-concept, the frame of reference for evalua-

tions of self-worth, and the nature of social motivation.

The

Extended

Self-Concept

The idea ofthesocially ex tended selfgoesbeyond perceived

similarity and other relational connections between self and

others. An extended self means th at the boundaries of the self

are redrawn, and the content of the self-concept is focused on

those characteristics that make one a good representative of

the group or of the relationship. As Brewer (1991) put it, when

collective identities are activated, the most salient features of

the self-concept become those that are shared with other m em-

bers of the in-group. The idea that close relationships involve a

blurring of the b oundaries between the self andapartneralsois

represented by Aron and Aron's (1986) self-expansion model

of motivation and cognition in close relationships. O peration-

ally,thisconceptiscaptured in the Inclusion of Other in the Self

Scale (Aron , Aron, Smollan, 1992), which has recently been

extended to collective identities (Tropp Wright, 1995).

Support for the idea that salient interpersonal relationships

are incorporated into the self-concept was obtained in a series

of studies by Aron, A ron, Tudor, and Nelson (19 91) on the p ar-

allels between cognitive effects of self-referencing and referenc-

ing to close relationship partners. The method and results of

Aron et al.'s Experiment 3 are particularly relevant In this

study, married gradu ate students completed a questionnaire in

which they rated themselves and their spouses on a set of 90

diverse traits. The ratings were used to identify aspects of each

individual's self-concept for which self-ratings matched ratings

of their partn er and those for which self-ratings an d partne r rat-

ings were mismatched. Later, the same individuals m ade yes-

no self-descriptiveness judgments on the same 90 traits on a

computer with reaction times recorded. Mean reaction times

for matching traits were significantly faster than those for mis-

matched traits, suggesting that shared ch aracteristicsweremore

salient or accessible aspects of the self-concept.

Smith and Henry (1996) adapted Aron et al.'s (1991)

method to assess the influence of salient in-group characteris-

tics on judgments of the

self.

College student participants were

asked to describe themselves and then each of

two

groups (an

in-group based on college major or fraternity, and

a

correspond-

ing

out-group)

on

the

90

traits used by Aron et

al.

The research-

Table 1

LevelsofRepresentationo fthe Self

Level of analysis

Individual

Interpersonal

Group

Self-concept

Personal

Relational

Collective

Basis of

self-evaluation

Traits

Roles

Group prototype

Frame of

reference

Interpersonal comparison

Reflection

Intergroup comparison

Basic social

motivation

Self-interest

Other's benefit

Collective welfare


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LEVELS

OF

IDENTITY 85

ers,having made these group identitiessalient,then had respon-

dents make yes-no judgmentsofthese same traitson a com-

puter. Analyses of response time data essentially replicated

Aronet al.'searlier finding sfor spouses. Response times were

facilitated forself-descriptive traits th at matched thoseofthe

relevant in-groupandwere slowerfor mismatching traits.For

both levels of identity, then , there is evidence tha t identification

with others enhances

the

accessibility

of

shared characteristics

in the working self-concept.

Self-Concept

and Social

Comparison

Most theories of personal self-esteem assume that globalself-

worthat theindividual levelisderived from self-evaluationof

personal traits and characteristics basedoninterpersonalcom-

parisonstorelevant others (Pelham, 1995; Pelham&Swann,

1989; Suls & Wills, 19 91). By contrast,theinterdependentor

relational self-conceptisdefinedintermsofrelationships with

othersinspecific contexts,andself-worthisderived fromap-

propriate role behavior (Markus

&

Kitayama, 1991; Stryker,

1991).(InTable 1. we refertothis process asreflection,in the

sense that the selfisderived from the responses and satisfaction

of the other personin the relationship.) Finally,thecollective

self-concept is determined by assimilation to the prototypic

representat ion of the in-grou p, with self-worth derived from the

status of the in-groupinintergroup comp arisons (Turner et al.,

1987).

Evidenceforchangesin thebasesofself-worthat different

levels of self-construal come from efforts to m easure globalself-

esteem separately at the personal and collective levels

(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). In general, self-esteem at the

two levelsare positively correlated, but only moderatelyso

(Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine,&Broadnax, 1994; Luhtanen&

Crocker, 1992).

It should be noted here that in-group membership plays

different rolesin theformation andmaintenanceof the self-

conceptatdifferent levels.On theone hand, in-groups provide

the frameofreferenceforself-evaluationatthe individual level

andforselection of significant othersat theinterpersonal level.

Shared in-group membershipisone important basisfordeter-

mining relevant sources of social comparison. For instance,de-

fining ourselves as social psychologists m eans that we are more

likelytoassessour academic qualificationsandresearch abili-

tiesincomparisonto other social psychologists thantoother

types of behavioralorsocial scientists. Furtherm ore, confirma-

tion of our self-assessment from other in-group members isre-

latedto thecertainty with which we make trait attributionsto

ourselves (Pelham Swann, 1994).

The otherrolethat in-groups play in defining th e individual's

self-concept derives from comparisons between characteristics

shared by in-group membersin comparison to relevantout-

groups. This is the essence of social identity. When we thinkof

ourselvesassocial psychologists in th is sense, we are m ost likely

to attrib ute traits and characteristics to ourselves that we share

with other social psychologistsandthat makeusdistinct from

other socialandbehavioral scientists.Thefocuson intragroup

differences versus intragroup similarities (and intergroup

differences) servesas amain indicatorofpeople's relativeem-

phasis on their personal or collective selves (McFarland&

Buehler,

1995;

Simon, Pantaleo, Mummendey, 1995).

The distinction between interpersonal comparison

and in-

tergroup comparison

as

determinants

of

self-evaluations

was

demonstrated

in a

recent experiment

by

Brewer

and

Weber

(1994).

In

this experiment, participants were randomly

as-

signed

to one

of two artificial social categories. Social identifi-

cation with in-group assignmentwasmanipulated indirectly by

varying

the

salience

and

distinctiveness

of

the in-group cate-

gory. After being assigned

to a

category, participants viewed

a

videotaped interview with another research participant that

provided exposure

to an

upward

or

downward social com pari-

son target.

In the

upward social comparison cond itions, the

in-

dividual

on the

videotape was exceptionally high

in

academic

achievement

and

intellectual ability;

in the

downward social

comparison conditions,

the

same individual played

the

role

of

a poor student with relatively

low

academic accomplishment.

Furthermore,

the

individual

on the

video was identified either

as

a

member of the viewer's own social category (in-gro up)

or

asa member of the contrasting category (out-gro up).

The predicted outcomes of the experimentwerebased on

the

assumption that participantswhohad been assignedtothe non-

distinctive social category would be oriented toward intra-

group, interpersonal social comparison and would evaluate

their own academ ic abilitiesincontrasttothose of another in-

group memberbutwouldbeunaffected bycomparison infor-

mation about an out-group member Members ofthedistinctive

social category, on the other hand,wereexpected to be oriented

toward intergroup social comparisonandwould evaluate their

own academic abilities by assimilating to another in-group

mem ber but exhibiting contrast toanout-group member.

Participants' self-evaluations of academic aptitude following

exposure

to

the videotapes corresponded exactly to predictions.

Participantsin the nondistinctive in-group conditionhad sig-

nificantly lower self-ratings following exposure

to an

upward

comparison target than to

a

downward com parison target when

the personon thevideotape wasanin-group member,but self-

evaluations werenotdifferentially affectedbyexposureto up-

wardordownward out-group comparison targets.Incontrast,

participants in the distinctive in-group condition were more

positiveintheir self-evaluations following exposureto the up-

ward comparison in-group m ember and more negative follow-

ing exposureto thedownward comparison in-group member.

However, exposureto anout-group comparison targethad the

opposite effectlowering self-evaluations whenthetargetwas

highinability and raising them when the target

was low

inaca-

demic ability. Thus, exposureto thesame social comparison

information had very different effects onself-evaluations,de-

pending on the individual's relationship to the in-group and

fo-

cus on personal versus social identity.

Social Motivation

Another important transformation associated with different

levelsofself-construal is achangein thebasic goalsofsocial

interaction. Thereis a fundamental difference between social

motives derived from personal self-interest andthose derived

from concernforthe interests of others (McClintock, 197

2).

As

Brew er( 1991) postula ted, when the definition of self changes,


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86

BREWER

AND

GARDNER

the meaningof self-interest and self-serving motivations also

changes accordingly (p . 47 6).

Both Markus

and

Kitayama (1991)

and

Baumeister

and

Leary (1995) stressed that interdependent relationships

are

characterized by mutu al concern

for

the interests and outcomes

of the other. Batson (199 4) defined this concern as the basis

of

altruistic motivation, which

he

stressed

is not to be

confused

with self-sacrifice (which concerns costs

to

self)

but

as the

mo-

tivation

to

benefit

theother.

At the

collective

level, group welfare

becomes

an end in itself.

Experimental research

on

social

di-

lemmas

has

demonstrated

the

powerful effect

of

group identi-

fication on participants' willingness

to

restrict individual gain

to preserve

a

collective good (Brewer

&

Kramer, 1986; Capo-

rael, Dawes, Orbell, &

van de

Kragt, 1989; Kramer & Brewer,

1984).

Identification with in-groups

can

elicit cooperative

be-

havior even

in the

absence

of

interpersonal communication

among group members. Within

the

in-group category, individ-

uals develop

a

cooperative orientation toward shared problems.

ConsequencesofShiftsinLevels of Identity

Shift From Personal

to

Collective Self

The consequences of shifting from personal identity

to

social

identity

in

levels

of

self-categorization have been

a

continuing

focus

of

research derived from social identity theory (Turner,

1982). Although Deaux (1992,

1993) has

argued that social

identities

are

integrated into personal identities, there

is evi-

dence of discon tinuities between self-descriptions and social

be-

havior associated with

the

two levels

of

construal (Hogg Ab-

rams, 1988).

Asthe results of SmithandH enry's (1996) experiment dem-

onstrate, whenaparticular social identity is made salient, indi-

vidualsarelikelytothinkofthemselvesashaving characteris-

tics thatarerepresentativeofthat social category. Social iden-

tity,

in

other words, leads

to

self-stereotyping (Simon

&

Hamilton, 1994). This effect wasdemonstratedin anexperi-

ment by Hogg and Turner (1987 ) that involved gender identity.

In this study, male and female college students participatedin a

discussion under one of two conditions.Inthe personal identity

condition,thediscussionwasbetweentwopeopleofthe same

sex, andthe twodiscussants held different positions on the issue

under consideration. In the social identity condition,thediscus-

sion group consisted of four peopletwo men and two

womenand thesexesdiffered on the issue. The latter arrange-

mentwasintendedtomake categorizationby sexpa rticularly

salientinthe setting and to increase the probability t hat partic-

ipants would think of themselvesinterms of their gender iden-

tity. Followingthesocial interaction, participantsin thesocial

identity condition characterized themselves

as

more typical

of

theirsex and attributed more masculineorfeminine traitsto

themselves than thoseinthe personal identity condition.

Consistent with this perspective, other experimental research

has demonstrated that retrieval cues designedtoactivatethe

priv ate self-representation increase generationofself-cogni-

tions thatare quite different fromtheself-cognitions retrieved

whenthe collective self-aspectisactivated (Trafimowet al.,

1991). These resultsledTrafimowandcolleaguestospeculate

that privateand collective self-conceptsarestoredinseparate

locationsinmemory.

Shift

From Personal to

Relational Self

Manyofthe cognitive, emotional,andmotivational conse-

quences associated withthecross-cultural differences in self-

construal reviewedbyMarkusandKitayama (1991) wouldbe

expectedtoholdforshifts inlevelsof self-representation within

the sameindividual. Indeed, Cheek (198 9) argued that personal

and social (relationa l) identities

are

enduring properties of the

self-concept, representing separate sources of individual differ-

ences in self-definition. Also, Cousins (1989) demonstrated

that both American and Japanese participants produced

different typesof self-descriptors in response to theTwenty

Statements Test (Hartley, 1970) when the instructions wereal-

tered from thegeneric( Iam ) prompttopromp ts situated

in specific interpe rsonal con texts.

Shift From Relational toCollective Self

Less research

has

been devoted

to

direct comparisons

be-

tween interpersonal

and

collective levels

of

self-categorization

and associated behaviors. One exception isHogg's(1992,1993)

work

on

the distinction between interpersonal liking

and

social

identity as sources of attraction to others.

Inthe research literatureoninterpersonal attraction, liking

between two individuals is strongly related to the similaritybe-

tween them (Byrne, 1971), People are likelytobecome friends

or loverstothe extent that they perceive that they a re similarto

each other in preferences, attitudes, and values.At thisinterper-

sonal level, attraction seems to beafunction of the two individ-

uals' personal traits and the degree of m atch between their indi-

vidual identities.On theother hand, researchonsocial catego-

rization and in-group preference suggests that positive

evaluations and likingforother individuals can be induced sim-

ply by the knowledge th at they shareacommon group identity.

In-group mem bers tend

to

be liked more than out-group

mem-

bers even whenweknow nothing about their personal charac-

teristics. In general,wetendto assume that fellow in-group

membersaresimilartoeach other,but inthis case likingand

similarity seemto be aconsequence of group formation rather

thanitscause (Hogg&Turner, 1985).As aconsequence,in-

group favoritismcanoccurin theabsenceofinterpersonalat-

traction or its antecedents.

Torepresent the idea tha t likingissometimes based on group

membership alone, Hogg (1992, 1993;Hogg & Hardie,1991)

has drawna distinction between idiosyncratic

personal

attrac-

tion

anddepersonalized

social

attraction. Personal attractionis

basedonpersonal identitiesof the individuals involved,and

similarityofpersonal interests, attitudes,andvalues is thepri-

marybasisforthis form of liking. Social attraction, on the other

hand,isbased on preferential liking for in-groupoverout-group

members.To the extent thata particular group memberex-

emplifies the characteristics tha t are distinctive or imp ortantto

that grou p, that individual will be socially attractive to otherin-

group m embers, regardless of interpersonal similarity.

Because these two forms

of

attraction have different origins,

it

is

possible

to

display preference

for an

in-grouper

we

don*t

like very m uch and to discriminate against

a

member of an

out-

group even if we like tha t ind ividual personally. Because of this

distinction

in

sources

of

attraction,

it is

possible

for

groups

to


5/11

LEVELS

OF

IDENTITY

87

work togetherascohesive units even when me mbers do n ot like

each other interpersonally,aphenomenon thathasbeendem-

onstratedinlaboratory groups (Hogg

&

Turner, 1985)and in

real-life groups such as sports teams (e.g., Lenk, 1969).

ResearchbyPrenticeetal. (1994) alsohasverifiedthe dis-

tinction between group identification that is based on directat-

tachm ents to the social category and identification based on in-

terpersonal attachments among group members.

In

studies

of

various campus groups, they found that membersofgroups

basedon acommon identity were more attachedto thegroup

than to fellow group members, whereas membersof groups

basedoninterpersonal bonds were mo re attachedtomembers

of

the

group overall and showed a stronger relationship between

identification with

the

group and evaluation of individual group

members.

Collective Self-Representations: Some

Preliminary Studies

The idea of the socialself asrepresentedby theinterper-

sonal and collective self-conceptsisthat ofam ore inclusiveself-

representationinwhich relations and similaritiestoothers be-

come central. Thisissymbolically represen ted by the shift from

/ t o weasatermof self-reference (Taylor Dube, 1986).Ex-

perimentsby Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990)

have demonstrated thatthepronounsweand uscarry positive

emotional significance thatisactivated automaticallyand un-

consciously. We suggest further thattheconceptweprimes so-

cial representations of the self that are m ore inclusive than th at

ofthepersonal self-concept. In apreliminary investigationof

the im plication s of different levels of the social self-concept, we

conducteda set ofthree experimentstoexploretheeffectsof

priming variousweschemas on individual judgments andself-

descriptions.

Experiment1

The initial experimen ts were premised on the idea that social

identities should lower the threshold for perceived similarity be-

tween the self and others and direct attention toward judgm ents

of agreement rather than disagreement (Turneret al.,1994).

We reasoned that this change of threshold should affect thein-

terpretation and acceptance of ambiguous attitude state-

ments statements tha t could be viewed as either supportive of

or opposedto a particular attitude position. Whereas neutral

and ambiguous statementsareoften contrasted away fromthe

perceiver's own attitude (Eiser &van derPligt, 1984), whena

social self-concept has been activated such sta tements should be

more likely

to be

assimilated

and

perceived

as

similar

to the

perceiver's own position.

To test this idea, we usedastandard priming tasktoactivate

the conceptsweortheyand then tested respondents* judgm ents

of similarity/dissimilarityfor ambiguous attitude statements.

The experimental design consistedoffivedifferent priming con-

ditions.In onecondition we-uspronouns were activated,and

in the contrasting condition ihey-them pronouns were acti-

vated, and thesewereboth compared with a conditioninwhich

the neutral pronoun

it

was activated.Forfurther comparison

purposes, two additional priming conditions were includedin

which either positiveor negative adjectives were usedin the

priming materials. These adjective conditions servedas a con-

trol for theeffects ofpositiveand negative affective priming,

respectively.

Method

Participants. One hundred m ale and female introducto ry psychol-

ogy students participated

in the

experiment

for

partial course credit.

Twenty partici pants were randomly assigned

to

each of thefiveexperi-

mental conditions.

Procedure.

In

the priming task, participants read a descriptive par-

agraph

(a

story about

a

trip

to the

city) with instructions

to

circle

all

the pronouns that appearedin thetext,aspartofa proofreadingand

word search task.In the three pronoun priming conditionsthepara-

graph contained 19 pronouns,

but

the text was varied so that the same

materials were presented with almost

all of

the pronouns referring

to

weorus ,or to

they

orthem,or toit.Partic ipants in the adjective prim ing

conditions proofread

a

different paragraph (describing residents

of a

city) withtheinstructionstocircle all of the adjectivesinthe text.The

lextwasvaried so that the19adjectiveswereeither predominantly pos-

itive concepts (e.g.,lucky, humorous)

or

predominantly negative (e.g.,

dissatisfied,

gossipy).

After completing this word search task, particip ants were escorted

to

another room to take part in

an

ostensibly different experiment involv-

ing judgments

of

attitude statements. They were presented

on a

com-

puter monitor with

a

series

of

16attitude statements

on

various issues

and were askedtojudge, as quickly as possible, whether the statements

were similarordissimilartotheir own views by pressing a numb er key

onthekeyboard, ranging from

1 (

very

dissimilar)

to 4

(

very

similar).

Eight

of

the items were selected

to be

unambiguously

pro or con in

regard

to

the at titude issue, and the other eight were ambiguous in their

implications (e.g., Abortion should be available

to

victims

of

rape ) .

The unambiguousandambiguous items were intermixedin random

order.

Attheconclusionofboth tasks, participants were probedforsuspi-

cion (none reported

seeing any

connection between the

two

experimen-

tal tasks ), debriefed, and dismissed with thank s.

Results

Preliminary analysesofresponsesto theunambiguous atti-

tude statem ents revealednoeffects of experimental conditions

on responsesto these items. Judgmentsofsimilaritytothese

items were approximately normally distributed witha mean

rating of 2.75 on the4-pointscale. Mean response tim e was 7.49

s for sim ilarity judgm ents and 8.19sfor dissimilarity judgments,

with no significant differencesacrossprim ing conditions.

Similarity ratings and response latencies for am biguous items

servedas theprimary measureofthreshold forjudgmentsof

agreementorsimilarity to theself.Of the items includedin the

judgment task, only those thatmet specific empirical criteria

for ambiguity were used

to

test

the

primary hypothesis. Items

selectedforanalysis were those that(a)evoked ap proximately

half similar and half dissimilar ud gme ntsacrossall respondents

in the experimentand (b)were responded to consistently (i.e.,

anyonerespondent judged eachofthe itemsto besimilaror

dissimilar).InExperiment 1, two of the ambiguous items

1

met

1

The two statements were The existenceoffamineanddiseasein

the world causes doubt in some religious doctrines and Abortion

could

be

made unnecessary with appropriate

sex

education. Most

of

the unselected itemswere soneutral in content that v irtuallyallrespon-

dents judged them as similar.


6/11

88

BREWER AND GARDNER

these criteria. For each participan t, ratings and response times

were averaged across these two items as the primary dependent

measures.

Similarity judgments. Results of a one-way analysis of vari-

ance (ANOVA) i ndicated that the re were marginally significant

differences in the mean similarity ratings for the ambiguous

items across the five priming conditions,_F(4,95) = 2.04,p (4,56) =2.63,

p


8/11

9 BREWER AND GARDNER

group,

H'f-Iarge

group, iheysmaW group, itey-large group,

(/-small

grou p). After finishing the word search, participa nts went on to a sepa-

rate task in which they were given the TST, completing 20 sentence

stems beginning with I am After completing both tasks, partici-

pants responded to a brief questionnaire that included a manipulation

check item on how many people they believed were being referred to in

the paragraph they read.

At the completion of the experimental session, the experimenter

probed for suspiciousness concerning the primin g task and its possible

influence on the self-description task. No p articipan t guessedtheexper-

imental hypothesis or connected the p riming with the TST in any way.

Participantswerethen debriefed, than ked, and released.

Table 4

Proportiono fSocial Self-Descriptionsas aFunctiono f

TypeofPrime: Experiment 3

Descriptive code

Type of prime

Interpersonal

We

They

It

7

5

2

Collective

.18

.09

.09

Results

Manipulationcheck. Results of an ANOVA of the size esti-

mates revealedonlythe expected ma in effect of the small-versus

large-group versions of the priming paragraphs. Perceptions of

the size of the group described in the stadium scenario para-

graphs(M =7,332.37)were significantly larger than were esti-

mates of thesizeof the group described in the city visit scenario

(M =10.64), F( 1, 94) =5.21,/>

Who is this "We"? Levels of collective identity and self representations

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