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* ABSTRACT
The
ways
in which
cientists ccount
for
nd
ustify
heir wn
scientific
iews
are
analyzed
by
examining
n detail
transcripts
f nterviews
ith
biochemists
working n oxidative
hosphorylation.
t s shown that
cientists
se
two
repertoires,
he
empiricist'nd
the
contingent',
o account for heir
eliefs.
The
empiricist
epertoire
erivesfrom
nd
reinforces he
traditional
onception
f
scientific
ationality
ccording
o
whichdata
obtainedfrom
mpersonal,
standardized
outines
re used
to
establish
he
validity
f
hypotheses
nd
to
decide betweencompeting heories.However,when thecontingentepertoires
adopted,
facts' are seen as
depending
n fallible
nterpretative
ork.Both
repertoiresre used in
informal
nteraction,
cientists
moving
flexibly
etween the
two as
they
onstruct ccounts
of
theory-choice.
n view
of this
variability
f
accounts,
it s
concluded that t s
impossible
o
obtain
definitivevidence of
how
theories re
actually
hosen and
that new form f
sociological
nalysis
s
required.An
attempts made
to illustrateuch
an
analysis.
Warranting cientific
Belief
G. NigelGilbert nd MichaelMulkay
Scientists,
ike
other
social
actors,
construct
henature
of
their
actions
and
beliefs
through
he
(largely
verbal)
discoursewhich
theyuse to
express
nd
to
describe
hese
actionsand
beliefs.
The
character nd meaningof scientists' ctionsand beliefs re con-
tinually
n
flux
not
only n
the
ense
hatnew
actions re
regular-
ly
undertaken
nd
newbeliefs
ormed,
utalso in
the
ense
hat he
meaningof
past
actions and
beliefs
is
constantly
evisedand
reconstituted
y the
actors
themselves
s
they
reformulateheir
interpretative
ccounts n
accordance
with
he
requirementsf
new
Social
Studiesof
Science
(SAGE, London
nd
Beverly ills),
Vol.
12
(1982),383-408
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384
Social
tudies
f
Science
social situations.
As
analysts
of the
social
world
of
science,
t is
therefore
ssential
or
us
to understand
ow
scientists
selanguage,
or moregenerally, ow they rganize heir iscourse, o construct
their
ccounts
of scientific
ction
and
belief.For
in
one
wayor
another
we are
dependent
or
our
knowledge
bout
science
on the
interpretations
f action
and
belief
arried ut
by
participants.
In
this
paper
we
will describe
nd illustrate
ome
of thepro-
cedures
used
by scientists
n
constructing
ccounts
of
theory-
choice.
We showed
n a
previous
paper
that,
t least n our
collec-
tion of interview
ranscripts,
cientists'
ttempts
o account
for
falsebelief realmost lways ignificantlyifferentncontent rom
their
ttempts
o account
for
orrect elief.
Whereas
orrect
elief
is
almost
without
xception
portrayed
s exclusively
cognitive
phenomenon,
s
arising
unproblematically
ut
of rational
ssess-
ments
of
experimental
vidence,
ncorrect
elief
s systematically
presented
s
being
due to the
intrusion
f distorting
ocial
and
psychological
actors
nto he
ognitive
omain.
This
kind
of nter-
pretations, ofcourse,entirelyonsistent ith raditional iewsof
scientific
ationXality,
nd
much
work nthesociology,
history
nd
philosophy
f science
has
incorporated
his
asymmetrical
attern
of accounting
or rror nd
for
orrect
elief
nto ts
analyses.4
y
adopting
this form
f
accounting,
oth
participants
nd
analysts
come
to
present
orrect
cientific elief
s
'objective'
that
s,
as
independent
f
non-cognitive,
social' factors.
However,by
meansof
close
analysis
f a complete
ollection
f
such accounts, akenfrom ur interviewranscripts,e wereable
to
show
clearly
hat
participants'
symmetrical
ccounts
f
correct
and
incorrect
elief
annotbe
accepted
t face
value.
They
cannot
be
taken
as accurate
versions
f how beliefs
were
produced.
This
conclusion
was
basedon the
following
inds
f
considerations:
if-
ferent
cientists
ave
contradictory
ccounts
of the reasonsfor
c-
ceptance
f
a
specific
heory, epending
n
whether
r not
they
c-
cepted t;
individual
cientists
ccounted
for
cceptance
f
a
given
theory uite differently,epending n whether r not theywere
aligning
hemselves
withthat
theory
n
any
particular
tatement;
and
scientists
ften
had a
variety
f different
ccounts
of
error
prepared
n
advance,
to be
brought
nto
play
or
abandoned
depen-
ding
on
their ventual
cientific
udgment
f
whohad been
right
ll
along.
The
general
onclusion
f
our
previous
paper
was
that
cientists
themselves
make use
of
a traditional
conception
of
scientific
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Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
385
rationality hen
they
ry
o
explain
why
ome
scientists dhere
to
incorrect
eliefs
about the
phenomena
they
are
studying.
ach
scientistnterpretshe actions and beliefsof thosewithwhomhe
interacts n the
assumption hat
those
withwhomhe
agrees
cien-
tifically
have
been guided
by
the
experimental
vidence,
whilst
thosewithwhom
he
disagreeshave
unfortunately
een nfluenced
by
scientificallyrrelevant actors. Thus
each scientist
reates
a
worldwhich
ppearsto conform
o
thetraditional ersion f scien-
tific
rationality. et this does not
mean that
the world of
science
literallyslike
that.
ndeed,to the
nalystwho
examines
arefully
number fsuch nterpretations,heonly onsistent
egularity
ies n
the
pattern
f
interpretation
sedby
scientists. hus
asymmetrical
accounting
or
rror nd
correct elief omes
to be seen as
an
inter-
pretative
procedure
whereby
scientists
onstruct
community
which,
nsofar
s
it
staken o
be
revealed
n
participants' iscourse
about
correct nd
incorrect
elief,
ppears
to
embody
he
conven-
tional
viewof
scientific
ationality.5
In the previouspaper, then, we concentrated n scientists'
attempts
o
explain he
existence f
theoretical rror. n
this
paper
weshall
be
mainly
oncerned
with
heother
ide of
thecoin:
that
s,
how
scientists
ccount
for and
justify
heir
own
scientific
iews,
which, f
course,
hey
normallyake to
be
correct r
as
nearly or-
rect
as is
currently
ossible.We
will
show
that
scientists
se
two
well-developed
epertoires
n
order
oaccountfor
heir
eliefs.
One
of these
repertoires
oth
derives
rom
nd
reinforces
he
standard
conception f scientific ationality.We willalso show,however,
that
scientists
hemselves
egularly
nderminehis
conception
nd
replace
t
with
significantly
ifferent
ersion f
scientific
ation-
ality.
n
this
way,
we
will
try o
extend
our
previous
nalysis
by
beginning
o
show
how
accountsof
correct
elief
re
contingently
accomplishedby
participants s
they
select
from
two
different
interpretative
epertoires.
The
data we
shall
be
examiningwere
obtained
from
study
f
research n one topic nbiochemistry.hirty-fourcientists ork-
ing on
'Oxidative
Phosphorylation'
r in
closely
elated
reaswere
interviewed
nBritain
nd
the
United
States
n 1979.
Both
authors
participated in
all the
interviews
which
were
recorded
and
transcribed
n
full.6
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386 Social Studies
f Science
A BriefHistory f the
ResearchArea
This section riefly utlines ome of the cientificssueswithwhich
themembers f our nterview
amplewere oncerned.
t is intended
only to provide he ay
readerwith ome background
nformation
about the field o help
n understandinghecomments
made by the
intervieweesbout their esearch.7
The scientists
n
this rea are concernedwith he
formation f a
complex molecule called
ATP (adenosine triphosphate), major
sourceofenergy or nimals,plants nd bacteria.The
mainprocess
whereby his molecule s created n animals and bacteria s called
oxidativephosphorylation.
TP is
formed
y the combination
f
ADP
(adenosinediphosphate)
nd inorganic hosphate.
Since the
early1950s,
t
has
been
accepted hat, n animals, he
process akes
place in smallmembraneous
articles alled mitochondria',
which
are
composed
of
proteins,
nzymes nd lipid and contain
many n-
organic ubstances uch
as calcium,potassium nd sodium, s well
as
phosphate.
Mitochondria ave
two
membranes,
n outer nd an
innermembrane.
n
recent
years t
has
come to be
widely ccepted
thatthe nnermembrane s essential
orthe
formation f
ATP
by
oxidative
phosphorylation.
The synthesis
f ATP
requires nergy,
which
s
stored
n
the
moleculeuntil
t
s needed
for
ther
hysiological rocesses.
During
the
early 1950s,
t
was
recognized
hat a
series
of chemical
oxida-
tion and
reductionreactions
inked
together
ome of the
com-
ponents of mitochondria nto a chain. The operationof this
respiratory
hain
seemedto be
coupled
to
the formation
f ATP.
In
1953 Fennell
proposed
thatthe
respiratory
hain
created
n as
yet
unknown
high
energy
hemical ntermediate' hich
provided
the
energy ecessary
o
bring
ADP and
phosphate
ogether
o form
ATP.
The chemical
ntermediate urned out
to be much
more
elusive
than
anybody
imagined and, although
claims
to have
observed
t have occurred
ven
within
he ast
few
years,
ess
and
lesseffort as beenexpanded n the chemicalhypothesis'ince he
late
1960s.
In
contrast,
he chemiosmotic
ypothesis' roposed
by Spencer
in 1961has
become
widely ccepted
and
in
various
ways Spencer
has become
the
dominant
igure
n the field.
He
was awarded the
Nobel
Prize
in
1978
for
his
contribution
o the
understanding
f
biological energy
ransfer.
he central deas
of the chemiosmotic
hypothesis
re
that the creation
of
ATP
takes
place
in the
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Gilbert
Mulkay:Warranting
cientific
elief
387
mitochondrial
membrane;
hat
the
respiratory
hainis located
in
the membrane nd
operates
o divide
hydrogen
nto electrons
nd
protons; that specifiablenumbers of protons are effectively
transported cross the
membrane,
hereby
reating
gradient
f
protons nd an
electrical
otential
cross the
membrane;
nd that
this
proton
gradient
nd difference
n
electrical
otential,
unnelled
back across the
membrane
hrough particular
tructure,rovides
the
energy
ecessary
o
bind
together
DP
and
phosphate.
Although
pencer's hemiosmotic echanism or he
atalysis
f
ATP
has been
widely dopted
as
basically orrect,
t
has
not
been
acceptedwithout pposition.Moreover, thirdmajorhypothesis
was
proposed by Watson
in
1964. Watson's
idea was that the
energy
necessary
or the formation
f
ATP
was not stored as
a
chemical ntermediate r
as an electro-chemical
radient,
ut
as
changes
n
theconformationr
shape
of the
molecules
n
themem-
brane.
The
division of
ideas
into
these three
mainhypothesess fre-
quently sedbyparticipantsnconstructingistorical ccountsof
the
development
f
the
field.
It
is
in
some
respects
misleading,
however,
because each of
the
hypotheses
has
undergonecon-
siderable
elaboration and
revision.
n
addition, therehave
been
numerous ersions
f each
hypothesis
nd many
ttempts o com-
bine
aspects
of
two
or
more
of
these
heoretical
ositions.
Even to-
day
there
re
manyvariants f the
dominant
hemiosmotic
heory;
many cientists
cceptonly
partofwhat
hey ake
that
heory obe
and others ppearto reject tentirely.
One of
themajor
areas
of
controversy
mongst
hose who do
accept
some version
of the
chemiosmotic
heory
is that of
'stoichiometry'.
his
debate
centres n
precisely ow
many
protons
are
transported
cross the
membrane s one
electron
assesdown
the
respiratoryhain.
In
thenext
ection
f thepaper
we will
examine heaccounts
he
scientists
e
interviewedave us
when
hey xplained
why hey
had
adopted certainknowledge-claimsather han otherswhichhad
been
proposed
n
their
esearch
rea. An
'account' isan
(attempt t
an) explanation f
why
particular elief
s held
by the
speaker r
by another
cientist.
or
instance,
speakermay
provide ccounts
of
why
he
accepts
particularheory nd
why
ther
cientistsre n
error
when
they hink
hatthe
theory s
false.
In thenext
ection,
we will
focus
principallyn
accounts
offered o
showthat
certain
ideas
or
theories re
correct.
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388
Social
tudiesf
Science
When scientists
ccount
fortheir
wn
beliefs,
hey
often
om-
pareand
contrast
heir iews
with ther
ncorrect
iews.As
long
as
they re seeking o explainand justify heir wn (correct) eliefs,
scientists
will
almost always
restrict hemselves
o
an
explicitly
scientific,
echnical
or cognitive
ccount.
In particular,
orrect
belief
s
presented
s
experimentally
upported
nd
incorrect
elief
as lacking
n experimental
upport.
This overtly
echnical
ssess-
ment f pros
and
cons
iscarried
ut
n order
o identify
orrectnd
incorrect
eliefs
s
well as
to justify
he
speaker's
adoption
of the
former.
he technical
haracterization
f incorrect
elief
which
s
partof thisproceduremustnotbe confusedwith accountingfor
error'.Rather,
he haracterization
f ncorrect
elief
nopposition
to correct
elief,
s
thatbelief
which
s
experimentally
njustified,
sets
up
an interpretativeroblem
or he
peaker
namely, ow
to
explain
why
ome
scientists
ometo accept
a belief
which s
scien-
tifically
njustified.
his
problem
s normally
esolved
yreferring
to
the
nfluence
f
non-cognitive
actors.
t
is
this atter
rocedure
of explaining ther
cientists'
cceptance
of
false deas
which
we
call
'accounting
for error'.
The technical haracterization
f
the
scientificnadequacy
of
others'
deas
is
usually
a prelude
o,
but
not dentical
with,
n
account
of
error.
Much
of
the
material
elow
will
consist
f
such
characterizations
f incorrect
s well
as of
cor-
rectbelief.
Accounting or TheoryChoicebyAppeal
to
the
Experimental
acts
All the biochemists
we interviewed
were asked
to describe
the
development
of their
own scientific
deas.
These
biographical
details
usually
ulminated
n
a
description
f their urrent
pinions
about
what
was known
about oxidative
phosphorylation.
ften,
they
lso
provided
one
or a
range
of reasons
for those
opinions.
The mostfrequent indof justificationheyusedwas to pointto
the
experimental
vidence
which
hey
aid
supported
heir
osition.
The
following
xample
comes
from researcher
ho
changed
his
beliefs
radically
n the
course
of his career. n order
to assert
the
correctness
f
his
present
deas
and to
explain
why
his beliefs
had
changed,
he
made
an
exceptionally
trong
tatement
f
justifica-
tion:
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Gilbert
Mulkay:Warranting
cientific
elief
389
1.
I can
tell
you
n
my
own case
why
changed.
changed trictly
ecauseof
ex-
periments.
changedbecause
the
Spencer
hypothesisredicts
ertain
hings hat
myhypothesis idn't. And on the otherhand, my hypothesismade certain
predictions
hat
he
Spencerhypothesis
idn't. And it turned ut that
when
you
tookboth of
them nd
tested
hem,
pencer
urned ut to
be
a
whole
ot
more
right han
was.
(Cookson, 36)
This
biochemistresents
imself
s
being wayed
rom
is
own
hypothesis
o
Spencer's
ecause
of the
force
of
experimental
evidence,
vidence
which
upportedpencer's
ut not his
own
hypothesis.
In
the
econd uotation,
e find
very
imilar ccount. The
speaker
gain uggests
hat he
prime
actor
eading
im o
adopt
the chemiosmotic
heory
as
that
he results f
his
experiments
were
n
accordwith is
predictions
rom
hat
heory:
2. The
situationwas
this ..
.
I
was ust
one of
a number f
people
working
with
these
new
ideas.
It
just seemed
that
everything
e
did could be
explained
satisfactorilyy Spencer'stheory,
nd we were
quitehappy ust
to
adopt this
theory nduse
this
s a
framework
orfurther
ests. So
we
said
right,
f
this dea
is right henwe ought o
be able to
show suchandsuch
thing, nd
we would
go
ahead
and
do
it
and
it
would work.
That
gave
us
a
lot of
confidence hat
the
hypothesis
was right.
Crosskey, )
Not
only ne's own
results,
ut lso
others' xperimental
ork
mayprovide
ustification
or
ne's beliefs:
3. They showed that when actose was transported,.. herewas simultaneous
uptake of
protons, protons
and
lactose, simple protons
and
lactose, and
thereforeherewas a
mechanism or
actose
accumulation.Now as far
s I am
aware that s
totally
ovel
ndvery
upportive
or
he
chemiosmoticypothesis.
(Burridge, 11)
Some
nterviewees
intedhat
he
reasons or he doption
f a
theory
ere
ot lways
uite o
straightforward,
lthough
he ole
ofexperimentalvidenceemainsaramountn ustifyinghe or-
rectness
f
their hoice
n
these
ccounts.or
example,he
peaker
in
quotation
our
uggestsirst
hat he
hemiosmotic
ypothesiss
'wonderful'
ecause t
s a 'terrific
eneralization'.
he
hypothesis,
he
says,
s
good for his eason
lone,
whethert s
in fact ight r
wrong. evertheless,
e s then
uick o
point utthat n
addition
to
being
terrific
eneralization,t s alsocorrect,
s shown
y n
accumulating
ody
f
experimental
vidence.One
byone,things
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390
Social tudies
f
Science
have
beenshown
to operate
across
a
membrane'.
4. So Spencercomesalongwith histerrificeneralization, meanthatthat's
what
was wonderful
bout
it, and
it doesn't
matterwhether
e
was right
r
wrong.
He
was clearly
ight
n
the details
n his
working
ut
but he
came
along
with this
chemiosmotic
ypothesis.
The
result
of
thatwas
everything
must
operate
across
a
membrane,
hat
was the
initial
dogma.
Indeed,
one
by one,
things
ave
beenshown
to
operate
across
a membrane.
Jeffrey,
)
In thefollowing
assage,
the
speaker
describes
ow
a colleague
could be
seen
choosing
between
ompeting
heories
nd
gradually,
as
the
experimental
videnceaccumulated, omingto a decision
about
which
s
correct:
5. If
you
actually
ook
at the cceptance
f
t byPerry
ou
see
himnot bothering
at all about
the hemiosmotic
ypothesis
ndthen
you
will eepapers
n
which
he
will, n
the
discussion,
ry o
interpret
heresults
n the
ight
fone
theory
rthe
other ndthenyou
will
find
him omparing
he
wo,putting
he
wo n a table,
n
Reviews
-
you
say
that
the chemicalhypothesis
ccounts
for
this
and the
chemiosmotic ypothesisccountsfor his, nd I remembernone paperhe ac-
tually ut
scores
n
-
you
know,
he hemical
ypothesis
oes this
better
nd the
chemiosmotic
oes that, nd
actually rithmetically
ottinghem
up.
(Burridge,
1:24)
In all thesepassages,
the experimental
vidence
s used
as
an
in-
dependent
nd
unproblematic
tandard gainst
which heories
an
be assessed.
It
is assumed
that data stand
apart
from
nd
are
in-
dependent fanyparticularheory,ndcan therefore
rbitrate
et-
ween
competing
heories.
Because
experimental
vidence
can
be
used
unequivocally
o
justify
r
reject
theory,
t
s not
surprising
that
scientists
uch
as
the
speaker
n the
following assage
suggest
that
generating
uch
evidence
s an
important
ctivity
n
convincing
oneself
nd
others
f
its
truth:
6. There
was
quite
a
lot
to
do
to
really
onvince urselves
hat
we were
bsolute-
ly
right,
nd
there
was
even
more
o do
to
convince
ur
colleagues.
Harold
came
over...
.
He said 'Yes, verynice,verynice,butI won'tbe convinced ntilyou
show
me
a stoichiometric
nflow
f
protons
with actose.'We
set
to,
to do
the
x-
periments
..
and
we
got
a beautiful
nswer,
which
lthough
t's had many
buf-
fets
n the
ast few
years,
ust
in the ast
month
r two t has
been confirmed
s
being
correct
ver
the entire
H
range.
only
did it
at one
pH,
but t seems
cor-
rect,
with
ne
proton
per
actose.
(Roberts,
12-13)
A
problem
an
arise
for
peakers
n
accounting
or hefact
hat
t
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Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
391
took some
years
before
they
publicly
admittedthat
theyhad
accepted
newly
roposed
heory
which
now
they
elieve
o be
cor-
rect.Othersmaysuggest hat hedelaymight avebeen duetothe
speaker's
inability
o
adapt
to
change,
his
prejudiceagainst
the
theory's
upporters,
r to other
opprobrious
easons. One
way
to
forestall uch
suggestionss
to
explain
that the
delay
n
adopting
the
theory
was to allow
time
for
confirmatory
vidence
o
appear.
Thus the
peaker
n
the
following
assage
accounts
for he
fact
hat
he
did
not
espousethechemiosmotic
heory
ntil ome
years
fter t
was
formulated y
noting
that
at
first
he
theory
was advanced
withouthesupport fanyexperimentalvidence.Later,
however,
he
was
convinced y
Spencer's beautiful
xperiments'.
7. I
consider
myself
airly
usceptible
o new deas.
I
completelygnored pencer
thefirst ew
years,
whenhe
came out
withhis
concept,
imply
ecause
of
my
pre-
judice
against
nyhypothesis hich s
not
advanced
with
nyexperimental
ata.
But
that admit s
prejudice
n
mypart
nd
I
simplygnored
t. When
Spencer
came to
visitme
.. I
was
verympressed
y
not
only
his
brilliance s a
person
but
also bythefact hathehad settled ownto do experimentsnd didbeautifulx-
periments
which to me
were
convincingmainly.
And
that
was
really
the
key
discovery that
the
respiration
n
mitochondria
s
associated withthe move-
ment
of
protons,
1. And 2: the
hydrolysis
f ATP
is
associated
with the
translocation fprotons
nd
that
o me
was
enough,
not to
accept t,but to
take
itvery
eriously, nd
weimmediately
tarted,
r very
hortly
hereafter.
ublic-
ly,
didn'tcome
out
andbelieve ll
of t, but
experimentallye were
tarting o
consider
t...
And to us his
contribution
as very
mportant
ecause
it
started
changing
our
thinking.
We
started hinkingn
termsof
compartments ith
something
hich s
a
structure hich s
closed
rather han
omething
have
been
used toas a biochemist, orkingwith nzymesndsoluble ystems. hat wasthe
key
departure.We
started
ight here
nd then,
hinkingn
terms
f compart-
ments.
Perry,
-3)
The
normalmode
among our
scientists or
ustifyingr
explain-
ing
theory hoice
was by
reference o a
theory's
onsistency
ith
experimental
vidence.
t
is not
surprisingo
find,
herefore,
hat
they
egularly
ccountedfor heir
ejection fa
theory y
reference
to its failure o rationalize xisting videnceor to generate uc-
cessful
xperiments.
8.
You
suggested arlier hat
here
were
easonswhy ou
were
becoming
oubt-
ful
about the
chemical
ntermediate
ypothesis.
. .
.
was
doubtful
nly
because
nothing as
emerged rom
ll these
ttacks. o
if
say I was
doubtful
would
havesaid, well,
t's a
nice
hypothesis,ut
there's
no
evidencefor t. And
then
hat swhat
later aid
about
Spencer's
hypothesis
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392
Social
Studies fScience
for
several
years because the evidencewas not forthcoming
rom xperiment,
untilhe came
up
with
ome really
olid data. (Perry, )
Similarremarks
weremadeby many cientists:
9.
I
think hatup to the timehe
actuallypublished xperiments,
herewaswide
disbelief nd
it was ust another apertheory. o it was
widely isregarded.
ut
thinkwhenhe started ublishing
ata, thatwas a different
atter. Milner,28)
In thesepassages,the speakers
re making
everal laims about
procedures f theory-choicend the connectionbetween heory-
choice and experimentalvidence.
First, hey
maintain hat hey
o
not give serious onsideration
o a theory nless
t is supported y
such evidence.
econd, they tress hat theory
s particularly
er-
suasive
if
it actually generates
new findingsn the laboratory.
Third, hey onsistently
aintain
hat heir wntheoretical hoices
are based
directly
n evaluation
of
the fitbetween competing
theories nd
experimental ata.
On the whole,
n these passages,
speakers treat the experimental vidence as providingan un-
problematic
riterion gainstwhichthe specific
hypothesis an
be
assessed.
t
is,
of
course,
hardly urprising
o find cientists eclar-
ing that hey nd others upport
theory ecause
of the weight
f
corroborative
xperimental
vidence
lying
behind
it
-
this
is,
despitephilosophers'
ong-standing
ebate
over the
problem
f
in-
duction,
he
conventional
iew
of the
relationship
etween
heory
and
experiment.
ut the material bove becomes
more
nteresting
as soon as we note that he same scientists hopresent xperimen-
tal evidence s unproblematic
n some occasions
also
frequently
treat t as
highly
nreliable nd
even as
positively
misleading,
n
otheroccasions.
It
is
to an examination
f
accounts
which tress
this atter
view of
experimental
vidence hat
we turn n the
next
section.
Underminingxperimentalacts
In
quotation
1,
Cookson
justified
his conversion
o
Spencer's
theory
as
being required by
the
experiments.
He
adopted
this
theorystrictly
ecause'
his
experimentsave
the results
redicted
by Spencer's
theory,
ut
not
by
his own
theory.
Yet later n
the
same
interview,
e defends
ome
of his earlier
xperimental
ind-
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Gilbert Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
393
ings,whichnow
seem to have been
upset
by
another
iochemist's
work,
n the
following
erms:
10.
The
thing
s
that
t
s
very
ard
to
getyour
handson these
hings
hat
you
are
working
n.
Membranes re
extremelyomplicated
nd
it's
hard
to know
that
you've
ever
got
the variables
ll
pinned
down,
so
that
when
you
make
an
obser-
vation, hat hat
bservation
s
really
what
you
think
t
s.
I
am
trying
o think f
a
good example.
All
this
X'
stuffs
perfect. y any
criteria,
p
to a
year
go,
I
don't
think
nybody eading
hat tuffwould have
had
any argument
hat
hose
things ind
to
the
membrane,
ut weren't
ransported.
Because
you had
beenthrough ll
the
controls?
Asmuch s wecould. I frequentlysedto sayto theguys ndespeciallywhen
Gamble
first
hallenged
he
paper,
ook
he can't be
right,
we've
done
everything
we could think f.
He did
something
e didn't think
f,
OK?
(Cookson, 43)
In
this
context, ookson observes
hat,
despite
ll the
efforts
f
an
experimenter
o
produce
valid
data,
other
xperiments
ay
ater
reveal
flaws which
cast
grave
doubts
on
the
interpretation
ne
should
put
on
those
data,
and
may
ndicate hat hedata
should
no
longerbe taken at facevalue. He stresses hatthemeaning f ex-
perimental ata is
remarkably ifficult o establish
onclusively.
However,
he did
not mention
his
earlier,
n
the
passage
from
which
quotation
1
is
taken,
in
which
he
argued
that it
was ex-
perimental
videncewhich
pointed
trictly
o the
superiority
f
one
theory
over
another.
Further n in
the
interview, e
provided
another
adically
ontingent
ccount
of
theory-choice, aintaining
that
truth s
simply
what
most
people are
willing
o
believe
oday.
And that'struth.Tomorrowthepopulationchanges,people are
notwilling
o
believe he
amestuff hat
hey
were
willing obelieve
the
day before
yesterday,hen
ruth
hanges'
Cookson,49). Thus
a
speaker
may
take
'experimental
vidence'as
distinguishingn-
equivocallybetween
wo
theories,
whilst bserving
few
minutes
later
that in
this field t
is
impossible
ever to be
sure
that the
evidence
s
'really
whatyou
think t s'.
This
variability f views
about thenature
of
experimental ata
within singlenterviewranscriptionsnotunusual,buttypical. t
provides a
major reason
for
not
takingscientists'
ccounts of
theory-choice
iterally. or
we
can
hardly onclude
that
scientist
accepted that
such
evidence s
essentially
nconclusive r
that the
cognitive
onsensus o
whichhe
claims
tobelong s
simply
result
of
what
peoplehappento
be
willing o
believe t the
moment. on-
sequently,
nsteadof
trying o
distil
from hese
divergent
ersions
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394
Social
tudies
fScience
of theory-choice
ome
composite
nalyst's
ccountof
how
theory-
choices
were
actually
made,
itseems
more
appropriate
o
begin
by
tryingo identifyhedifferentircumstancesr interpretativeon-
texts
n
which cientists
resent
xperimental
vidence
s either
n
unproblematic
eterminant
f
theory-choice
r
as an inconclusive
factor
which
may or
maynot
have
discernible
heoretical
mplica-
tions.
In
general,
cientists
reat
herelationship
etween
xperimental
data and
theory
s determinate
r
as open-ended,
epending
n
the
interpretative
ork hey
re carrying
ut
at any
particular
uncture.
This canbe seenclearlynthetwoquotations romCookson 1 and
10).
In
thefirst
uotation,
Cookson
is
justifying
is
support
for
chemiosmosis
s
if
the
experimental
vidence
was
entirely
n-
problematic.
By
treating
herelationship
etween
heory
nd ex-
periment
s unproblematic,
e is able
in thispassage
to present
is
previous
act
of theory-choice
nd
his current
cientific
iewsas
both
inevitable
nd scientifically
roper.
Any
suggestion
hatthe
evidencewas
not wholly
onclusive
nmight
e
heardas
weakening
hisattempto explainhis conversion' ochemiosmosisndrequire
him to do
further
xplanatory
work. n the
second
quote,
his
con-
tention
hat
xperimental
esults
n
this rea
are
nconclusive
s used
to
justify
is
previous
bservational
laim,
whichhe
now views
s
having
been successfully
hallenged
by
Gamble.
Gamble's
results
are
taken
to
provide
the
unequivocal
standardagainst
which
Cookson's previous
bservations
re
tobemeasured.
Nevertheless,
Cooksonretains genuinelycientifictatusforhisprevious laims
by
inking
hem
o a
generalized
tatementmphasizing
xperimen-
tal
uncertainty.
hus
in this second
passage
Cookson
makes
his
previous
experimental
mistake understandable,
xpectable,
and
scientificallycceptable
by inking
t to
a
different
haracterization
of
the
relationship
etween
heory
nd
experiment
rom
heone
he
relied
on earlier.
Let
us give
another
llustration
f
the
variability
f scientists'
accountsof therelationshipetween xperimentndtheory.n the
interview
rom
which
he
following
s
taken,
he researcher
rgued
strongly
hat
experimental
ata alone
should
be usedto
determine
the
truth
of theories.
He then maintained
that
this field
was
characterized
y
whatseemed
o himto be an excessive
oncentra-
tion
on the
development
f
theory
s
opposed
to a focuson
careful
experimentation.
t this
point,
he was
asked:
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Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
395
1
1.
If the
ield
s
like
that,
an
you
assume that
he
right'
heory
s
going
o
win
out
in theend?
In the ongrun,yes. tmaynot beveryoon. You see,theres onething bout
science, here's
no
way
to avoid the
facts
forever.
ventually
whatever
heories
exist,
hey
will
volve
o
whatever
s
something
hatwill
fit. o
you
see
a
situation
in
which
hey
may
swing
ompletely.
ou
may
have one
year,
nd
you
can
say
90o
of
the
people
are
in
chemical
oupling.
That was not too
long
back.
Now
you
can
saythey
re 9OVo
hemiosmotic.
Well,
that
doesn't mean
that
ne or
the
other
was
right,
r
anything
f the
sort. But timewill
tell. Because
eventually
data will
be generated..
What
you're
suggesting,
hen,
s
that n this
ield
this
ong
term ebate at the
theoreticalevel s
in
your
view till
nconclusive?
As far s I
can see
it
s
inconclusive. he data
are
certainly
ot such
s
to draw
conclusions.And no
matter
how
closed
some
people
say
it
is,
it is still
open.
Maybe t's
chemiosmotic,
maybe
t's
not. We
won't know
for
while
yet.
don't
know
what t will
take
to be
sure. But
right ow thedata aren't
clear.
Hawkins,
13)
Hawkins
responds
to
the
suggestion
hat
he
and
his
colleagues
might
nd
up
with
the
wrong
theoryby
asserting
hat
a crucial
feature fscience s that heresno wayto avoid thefacts nd that
theorieswill
evolveto fit
hosefacts.What
s
required
n
this
field,
he
continues,
s
more
data,
from
which
ne
will
eventually
e able
to
draw firm
onclusions
bout
the
correct
heory.
The
theoretical
situation
s
still
unsettled,
e
suggests,
ecause
thedata
are
not
yet
clear.
However,
compare
this point of
view with
the
passage
below,
spoken
only
minutes
efore
n
the
same
conversation:
12. Don tthevarious heories avesomethingo sayabouthowtherespiratory
chain works?
Well
the
theories
on't.
The
experiments
ight.
hetheories
on't.
There'sa
difference
etween
n
experiment
nd a
theory.
You can
generate
undreds
f
different
heories
o
fit
particular
etof
data
and
none of
those, n
anyway,
ay
anything
bout the
original vent.
Hawkins, 9)
In
the
first
passage,
Hawkins
manages to
portray
cience
as
achieving
the
truth,
by
asserting
hat
clear,
theoretically
n-
ambiguousdata willeventuallymerge. n quotation12,
however,
in
seeking
o deny
the
currently
vailable
theories
ny
explanatory
power,
he
so
weakens
he
connection
etween
heory
nd
data
that
it
becomes
difficulto
seehow
any
theoretical
onclusions
an
ever
be
established
y
meansof
data
alone.
In
each
isolated
fragment
f
conversation, he
speaker
produces
plausible
ccounts n
which,n
one
instance,
he
epistemological
tatus
of
scientific
nowledges
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396
Social
tudies
f
Science
preserved
nd,
in the
other
ase, the speaker's
current
ntellectual
views
are
sustained.
But
these
specific
nteractional
ccomplish-
ments re achievedbytreatingherelationship etweenfactand
theory
n
a
highly
lexible
way.
Like Cookson,
Hawkins
ppears
to
choose
between
woradically
ifferent
ersions
f
thisrelationship
in accordance
with
ubtle
changes
occurring
nthe
conversational
context.
In ourtranscripts,
t
is
noticeable
hat
cientists
requently
reat
the relationship
etween
data
and
theory
s
unproblematic
hen
they
re
directly
ngaged
n justifying
heir
wn
choice
of
theory
and treat hisrelationships equivocalwhen ngaged nundermin-
ing another
erson's
choice.
In
all of
the
material
n the
preceding
section,
where scientists
were ustifying
heir
theories,
he
con-
sistency
f
data and
theory
was
treated
s
obvious:
for
nstance,
'thetheory
wouldpredict
omething
nd
we would
go ahead
and
do
it
and
it would
work';
'itwas
a
mechanism
or actose
accumula-
tion and
therefore
..
very
supportive
for
the
chemiosmotic
hypothesis';we set to, to do the experiments...andwe got a
beautiful
nswer';
and so
on. Occasionally,
passing
reference
s
made
in
thesepassages
to
the possibility
f alternative
eadings
f
the
data.
Thus
it
was
noted
that
the
beautiful
nswer'
had
'had
many
buffets
n
recent
years'.
But
thesepossibilities
re
treated
s
tangential
nd
are usually
quickly
explained
away
(see
quote
6);
eventhough
he
diversity
f
judgments
bout
these
results
mong
other
scientists
ften
eems very onsiderable.
n
contrast,
when
scientistsre underminingnother's cientificlaim,they endto
emphasize
that
data
always
require
nterpretation
nd they
how
that,
in
particular
ases,
alternativenterpretations
re
actually
available.
When
scientists
re
directly
ustifying
claim
by
reference
o
experimental
esults,
heir
tatements
re
constructed
so
that the
data
appear
to
speak
for
themselves
nd
to speak
in
favour
f their laim;
whilst
when
cientists
re
ustifying
heir
wn
position
byrejecting
n
alternative
laim,
their tatements
re
con-
structedo as to revealthe nterpretationhich ll (ormost)data
require
nd
to
challenge
he
nterpretation
hich
has been
carried
out by
their
pponents.
This
latter
oint
s
illustrated
n the
following
uotation,
where
the
speaker
re-interprets
ata
(with
which
he has
no
quarrel)
n
a
way
which
uggests
hat
hey
have
no relevance
o thetheory
which
they
re supposed
to
support.
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Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
397
13. He considered
hathe was
looking
t a
primary jector f
protons
which
was
not
accompaniedby
anything
lse,
and
he was
talking
f backlash
that s
pro-
tons were ejected by the respiratoryhain, chargingup a condenser the
mitochondrial
membrane s a
condenser).
Now
that n fact was not
the
case:
what
he
was
looking
t was
the
uptake
of calcium
by
themitochondria
nd
what
he thought
was
the
capacity
of
the condenser
that s,
you
couldn't
add
more
than a certain
mount
of
oxygen)
was
not
the
capacity
of the
mitochondrial
membrane,
he
electrical
apacity,
but the
amount
of
calcium that was
there.
(Burridge, :11,
12)
On
occasion,
scientists
hemselves
ommenton the
flexibility
withwhich givendatummaybe interpretedo support uitedif-
ferent heoretical
ommitments.his
s true
f
the
following uota-
tion,
in
which
a
proponent
f
one
position
on
the
stoichiometry
issue
comments
n
thereasons
for
the
continuing
ontroversy:
14. The
basic
observation s
agreed
on
-
that f you
add
NEM you
see more
protons.
The
experimentshat are
done to
demonstrate hat this is
real
-
because it's
energetic
hosphate
ransport
r
because
it's
doing
something
if-
ferent are notactuallydonebybothsides, don't think.One sidedoesthem
and
makes some
nterpretation.he other
ide
criticizes hat
nterpretation
nd
does different
xperiments
hich
re then
criticized
y
the
first
ide.
Whydoesn't
one side
repeatthe
experiments
f the
other
ide?
I
think
hat's
basically
because
we expect
we'd get
the same
result.
o there's
not
muchpoint
n
doing t
ust to confirm
ou
can
demonstrate his
particular
effect.
Norton,
25)
This
scientists
describing
situation n
which
he
basic
observa-
tionaldatum, hatyou seemoreprotons fyouaddNEM', istaken
as
common
to
and
agreed by
both
sides.
Nevertheless,
hecon-
troversy
an
continue
because
the
interpretationso
be placed
on
this
fact
differ. he
speaker
alkshere s if
further
xperimentation
and
more
data
are
notalone
enough
o
resolve he
dispute,
ecause
those
data
are
also
opento
alternative
nterpretations.
lsewhere,
however,when
seeking o
justifyhis
theoretical osition
vis-a-vis
that
of
Spencer,
he
moves
owards
more
onventional
iewof
ex-
perimentalvidence nd theory-choice.
15. I'm
fairly
ure shan't
change
his
mind. ...
I
find t
quite
difficulto
argue
about
this,
because
I
cannot
see
how he
cannotaccept
that
our arguments
nd
experimentsre
right.
suspect hat
he has
thesame
problem.
So I
don'tthink
it's a
problem
f
straightcience.
Norton,
23-24.)
Even here,
Norton
continues
o
recognize hat
both
sides to the
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398
Social
Studies
fScience
dispute
are treating
heir
own
data and interpretations
s
un-
problematic.
utthis
balanced
view
generates
problem
for
him,
as he seeksto justify is ownactionsand scientificudgments. f
both
parties
re
being
qually
scientific',
hat s,
if
hisexperiments
do
not eliminate
pencer's
onclusions,
hen
t
s impossible
o
pro-
vide
a clear-cut
cientific
ustification
or
his
own
position.
The
solution
he
adopts
s to
suggest
hat
something
nscientific
s
hap-
pening'.
More
specifically,
e goes
on
tosuggest
hat pencer
s
too
committed
o
this heory
nd
hence
unable
to
respond
bjectively
o
the
available
evidence.
Having
noted
that
data require
nterpreta-
tion,Norton s able to focuson Spencer'sattemptst interpreta-
tion
and
to portray
hem s
unsatisfactory.
It is
a recurrent
eature
f
our
material
hat
cientists
ndermine
each
other's
choices
of theory
by drawing
ttention
o
the
'im-
proper
nterpretation'
f
data.
The
procedures
sedto
gather
ata
are
typically
aid
to
have
been
influenced
by the
researcher's
theoretical
viewpoint,
with
the consequence
that
disconfirming
evidencehas not been collectedor has been disregarded.
n
the
passage
below,
the speaker
firstmakes
a
point
bout
thedesirabili-
ty
of
a
strict
eparation
etween heory
nd
experiment
much
he
same
separation
s
that used in ustifyingheory-choices.
e
then
observes
hat
ome researchers,
hose
who
areover-committed
o
a
theory,
may
not
consider
lternative
nterpretations
f
their esults,
and so
may
fail
to
produce
evidence
which
does
not
fit
with
that
theory.
16.
You
have
to be
very
areful
bouthow you
ook
at
things.
he
theory
hould
never nfluence
hedata.
Ifyoudo
that,
nd
it's
very
ommon
n this
field,
hen
you
are bound
to disaster.
Because
there's
no
way
that
you
can keepfact
nd
fancy
part
any
more.
How
do
you
mean,
that
he
theory
mightnfluence
he
data?
Can
you
give
me
an example?
The
theory
nfluencing
hedata. It
ust
means
that
f
you
getvery,
ery
ound
up
in
your
heory,
t feedsback
into he
experiment
n the
ense hatyou
then
do
the
experiment
oo
closely
designed
to the theory
nd you
don't
do
the
ap-
propriate
ontrols.That's one ofthe most obviouserrors.People whoare, for
example,
chemiosmotic
n the extremewill
not bother
o run controls
bout
chemical things
or their
nterpretation
ill
automatically
e as a
membrane
potential
r whatever.
Without
sking
he
question,
Well,
is it
really?'
Because
the
theory
equires
hat here
e
a
membrane
otential
which
has certain
roper-
ties
and,
therefore,
hen
you
see
something
hatbehaves
that
way
t's
assumed
to be
that.
Hawkins,
9-10)
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Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warrantingcientific
elief 399
Hawkins,
n
the course of
justifying
is
own
non-chemiosmotic
beliefs,
ccountsforsomeof the evidencewhich
pparently
up-
ports he hemiosmoticiewbyquestioning hetherlltherelevant
data have been collected.
Doubt is cast
on the
use
of
experimental
data as an infallible
uide
to theselection
f thecorrect
heory
nd
emphasis s
placed
on the
need
for
nterpretation
nd
correct
x-
perimental esign.
The
importance
f
these
atter lements
s
then
used
to undermine he
credibility
f
chemiosmotic
work
and,
by
implication,
o endorse
he
speaker's
own
rejection
f that
heory.
In
these ccounts,
he
divergence
etween
he
peaker's
cientific
viewsand thoseofanother cientists routinelyesolvednfavour
of
the speaker. t is
his
statements
bout the
physical
worldwhich
are
taken o
represent
hereal
physical
world.
Consequently
t
s the
other's failure o
recognize
he
speaker's
version
of the
physical
worldwhich
needs
to be
explained y
referenceo theother's nter-
pretative
nadequacy nd,
in
many
ases, by
reference
o
supposed
non-cognitivenfluences.
his
tendency
o
treatphysical eality s
equivalent
o the
speaker'scurrent
iews,
ombined
with
flexible
repertoire or
depicting he
relationship etweenfact
and
theory,
makes t
possible
for
cientists
o
explain
way
even
very recise
x-
perimental
confirmations' f
theory.
For
example,
n
the next
passage
the
peakeruses the
very recision
withwhich
xperimental
findingsppear to
support theory s
a conclusive ndication
f
the
nadequacy
of
those
findingsnd ofthe
distortingffect f
the
experimenter'sheoretical
ommitment.
17.
The
greatpro-Spencerian esbitt.
Nesbitt'snumbers
lways greewith
what
Spencerwould want. mean,
t's bizarre. o
you get ll thesedifferent
umbers
coming out
and
I
am sure I
could do an experimentnd
produce almost
any
number
wanted .. I think
ne needsto
forget hat kindof
research) nd start
afresh nd
just study he
ndividual pans of
the chainchemically nd see
what
they
re
doing and how they
do it. (Harding,
26-27)
Having
undermined
esbitt'swork
by presentingts
agreement
with heoretical redictions s 'bizarre', n view ofthe diversityf
results
roducedby other
xperiments,nd by
implying
esbitt's
over-commitmento a
theory, he
speakerreturns
o the conven-
tional viewof
experimental acts n
outlining is
own alternative
research
trategy. hus,once again, we
can observe
speakermov-
ing selectively etween
wo views of
experimentalvidence s
he
makes
senseof
divergentindingsn
such a way that
his own scien-
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400
Social
Studies f
Science
tific udgments
come
to appear natural, commonsensical
udg-
ments.Nesbitt's esults
re
presenteds
unconvincing,
espite heir
unusual coincidencewiththeoretical xpectation, yhighlighting
theelement
f spurious
nterpretation'
hich
must,given
hecor-
rectness f
the speaker's
own scientific
osition,
have
attended
their
production.
According o
the speaker's
formulationf
his
alternative
pproach,however,
he
spans
of theredox
chain could
be allowed to speak
for
hemselves.
xperiments
ould
be designed
simply
o reveal
whattheywere
doingand
how
theyweredoing
t'
without ecourse
t all, it
appears,to fallible
nterpretations.
Discussion
We
have tried o
illustrate
bove
someof the
discursive
methods
used
by
scientists
n
furnishingccounts
of theory-choice.
e
have
shown
how scientists
raw
flexibly
n the
course
of semi-formal
conversations
n
two differentersions
f,
or perspectives
n, the
relationship
etween
fact and theory.
On
the one hand, scientists
employ
conventional
mpiricist
onception
f
science,
ccording
to which
data,
obtained
from
mpersonal, tandardized
outines,
are
used
to
establish
he
validity
f
hypotheses
nd to discriminate
unequivocally
etween
ompeting
heories.
rom this
perspective,
researchers
re
expected
o be detached
nd
self-critical;
nd
any
observed
failure'
n
this
respect
an
be
used
as a basis
forunder-
mining knowledge-claim.his is, of course,theconceptionof
science
which s
displayed
most
clearly
n
the
formal
iterature.
n
our more
nformal
material,
his
view
s
typicallydopted
when
he
speaker
is
fashioning direct,
xperimental
ustification
or
his
own scientific
pinions
or
for the
cognitive
fficacy
f science
n
general.
The
great
advantage
of
this
formof account
is
that
it
makes
the
speaker's
scientific
onclusions
appear
entirely
n-
problematic
nd
in
need
of no further
upport.
The
experimental
data are presented s revealingwhat thephysicalworld s really
like;
and the
match
between
data
and
theory
s
skillfully
c-
complished
by
means
of selective
nd
simplified
ormulations
f
both
theseelements.
On the other
hand,
scientists
re also
able
to
depict
he
relation-
ship
between
act
nd
theory
na muchmore
contingent
manner.8
When
this
perspective
s
adopted,
facts
re
no
longer
presented
s
speaking
for
themselves,
ut
are seen
as
depending
ecessarily
n
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Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
401
interpretationhich
an
always
be
wrong
nd which s all
too
easily
influenced
y
non-cognitive
actors. This
repertoire
or
talking
about fact and theorys similar o the informal epertoire hich
scientists se
to
describe
aboratory ractice
nd in which
reat
m-
portance s attached o
intuition, ersonal
nterest
nd craft
kills.9
From
this alternative
erspective,
he connectionbetween
heory
and the observations
roduced
by
individual raftsmen ith
vary-
ing
degrees f
skill an
easily
be
made
to
appear
much ess
certain,
and
muchmore
dependent
n
highly
ariable
nterpretations.his
perspective
ends
notto
appear
n
theformal iterature.
owever,
t
playsan important art n informalnteraction,ecauseit allows
scientists he
nterpretative
cope
necessary
orthem o
strengthen
their wn
claimsby
rejecting
hose
of
their
pponents.
These
two
perspectives ustnot
be
seen as
furnishingncompati-
ble
abstract
versions
f
the
relationship
etween
fact
and
theory.
As we have
stressed
bove,scientistsmove
flexibly
etween hetwo
as
they
make
sense
of their
ocial world
n
the
act
of
constructing
accounts
of
theory-choice.
hus,
for the
actors,these
two
reper-
toires re
resources o be
drawn
on
as and whentheir
versions
f
events
require.
The
formal
ncompatibility
f the two
versions f
'fact
and
theory' oes not
mply hat
cientists'
pecific
nterpreta-
tions are
inconsistent. s we have
shown
elsewhere, eneralized
formulations,
uch
as these two
versions
f
scientific
ationality,
are
applied to
particular
ases bymeans of
specific, d hoc
inter-
pretations.
0
Thus we
would expect
hat,
were an
apparent ncon-
sistencybouttherole of facts n choosingbetween heories o be
noticed
n
thecourseof
conversation, he
speakerwould
be able
to
explain
t
away,perhaps
by
reference o some
supposedly
pecial
feature f
the
theories r
experiments e
was
talking bout.
Cer-
tainly,
one
is not
struck
by
interpretative
nconsistencywhen
discussing
with
cientistshe
relationship
etween
act
nd theory.
Scientists'
se of
twoformally
ivergent
epertoiresnly
becomes
observable
when
the
sociologist
records
and
systematically
x-
aminesscientists' alk.Duringordinaryonversation,hesereper-
toires re
employed
uite
effectivelyo
sustain
hespeaker's
own
scientific
iews
s
well as
the
traditional
onception f
the
connec-
tion
between
fact
and
theory.They are
used to
convey n
overall
impression
hatcorrect
cientific
elief,
which lmost
lways
coin-
cides
with
he
peaker's
views, s
unproblematicallyrounded n
ex-
perimental
ata.
It
has been
noticed
before hat
when
scientistsalk
about
their
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402
Social
Studies f Science
professional
ctions,they
tend
to devise
their ccountsof
those
actions
in accordance
with
their
current scientific
views.
Respondents' actions and those of theircolleagues are made
understandable
n the
light
of what
the speaker
takes to be
ex-
perimentally
nd theoretically
orrect.
n
other
words,scientists'
accounts
of action
and belief
re
systematically
rganized
nways
which both explain
and
provide scientific
ustification
or
the
speaker's
actions,whilst
xplaining
nd condemninghose
of
his
opponents.
Condemnatory
ccounts
chieve
heir ffect
y inking
actions
and beliefs
o contingent
ersonal
and social
factors.
n
such accounts,speakers show' that specific ctionsand beliefs
would have been
otherwise
f it had
not
been forthe
impact
of
scientifically
rrelevantnfluences.
lthough
he
potential ange
of
such contingent
actors s
verywide, the
basic
procedure
f under-
mining
he
scientific
egitimacy
f actions
and beliefs
by showing
them o
be contingent
s highly
epetitive.
2
The kind
of ustificatory
ccount
withwhich
we
have
beenmain-
ly
concerned
n
this
paper
s organized
o 'show'
that he
speakers'
(or
some
other
cientists')
ctions
and beliefs
ould
notproperly
have
been
otherwise.
his
can
be achieved
on some
occasions
by
presenting
articular
ctions
or
udgments
s following
ecessarily
from
procedural
ule
whichcan be
taken
for
granted.
We
have
described
lsewhere
how
Popper's
rules
of
scientific
method
are
regularly
sed
in
this
way
by
the
scientists
e
have
studied.
3
More
frequently,
owever,
ur
scientists
ormulate
heir
ustificatory
c-
countsoftheory-choicenstraightforwardmpiricisterms that
is,
theypresent
heir
ctions
and beliefs
s
following
ecessarily
from
what has
been
revealed
experimentally
o
be
the case
in the
natural
world.
Rule-based
ustifications
nd
empiricist
ustifica-
tions are similar
n
that
they
both
minimize
he element
f
choice
available
to actors
n
reaching
heir cientific
iews. The
actor
is
presented
s
being
forced,
ither
y
some
nvariant
uleof
conduct
or
by
the
natural
world
tself,
o come
to
certain cientific
onclu-
sions. Indeed, it is precisely his interpretativeemovalof the
capacity
for
personal
volition
n
rule-based
nd
empiricist
ccounts
which
makes
them
particularly
ffective
s
justifications
f
scien-
tific ction
and belief.
There s
a
rough,
but
clear,
correspondence
etween
hetwo
par-
ticipants'
repertoires
escribed
n this
paper
and the
two
broad
perspectives
on science
which are available
in the
scholarly
literature
n the
ocial
nature
f
science.
4
Scientists'
mpiricist
nd
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7/24/2019 Warranting Sci Belief
22/27
Gilbert
Mulkay:
Warranting
cientific
elief
403
rule-based
ersions f action
and
belief
orrespond
o the
standard
view
of
science
and
scientists'
ontingent
ersions
o
the radical
view of science. We wish to suggestthat these two opposing
analyses
of
science
may
derive heir
evidence' from
he
two
main
repertoires
cientists
se.
Finally,
t
will
helpto
establish he
ignificance
f
this
paper
f
we
compare its
conclusions
o
those
contained
n
the
one
published
study
n
which,
t
least
n
some
of
its
chapters,
similar
nalytical
approach
s
adopted
n
the
nalysis
f
theory-choice.
n
Laboratory
Life,15
Latour
and
Woolgar
suggest
that in
the
early
stages
of
research n a given opic therewillbe various
competing
roposi-
tions
or
hypotheses
which
participants
egard
as
attempts
o
characterize
segment f
the
world
s
yet
not
fully
nderstood.
At
this
tage,
cientific
tatements
re
treated
s
distinct
rom
he real
world.
However,
as
scientific
greements
achieved, o
scientists
come
to
explain the
success of
the
statement
which
has been
ac-
cepted
s
being
due to
its
correspondence ith
he real
world.
From
their
nitial
nception
members f
the
aboratory
re
unable to
determine
whether
tatements
re
true
or
false,
objectiveor
subjective,
highly
ikelyor
quite
probable.
While
the
agonistic
rocess s
raging,
modalities
re
constantly
added,
dropped,
nverted,
r
modified.
Once the
statement
egins o
stabilize,
however, n
important
hange
akes
place.
The
tatement
ecomes
split
ntity.
On
the one
hand it
is
a set of
words
which
represents
statement
boutan
ob-
ject. On
the
other
hand t
corresponds o
an
object
n
tself
which
akeson
a
life
of
tsown.
It
isas if
the
original
tatementad
projected
virtual
mage
of
tself
which
xists
utsidethe
tatement.16
Latour
and
Woolgar
imply
hat
scientists'
wn
philosophizing
tends o
vary
n
accordance
with
he
stage
of
scientific
ebate
and
with
participants'
ositions
n
that
debate.
Depending n
the
argument,
he
aboratory,he
time
ofyear,
nd
the
currency
of
the
ontroversy,
nvestigators
ill
variously
akethe
tand
f
realist,
elativist,
idealist,
ranscendental
elativist,
keptic
nd
so on. 7
If
one
combines
his
tatement
ith
he
previous
uotation,
he
m-
plication
seems
to be
that
scientists
ormulate
heir
ccounts
of
theory-choicen
'realist'
terms
nly
after
ny
controversy
as
set-
tled
nd
after
high
degree
f
consensus
has
allowed
the
real
world
to
cometo
be
seen
as
the
determinant