Revue Internationale d'Arts et de SciencesMedjunarodni Casopis za Kulturu, Umetnost i Nauku

International Journal for Arts and SciencesInternationale Zeitschrift für Kunst und Wissenschaft

VOLUME 7 Paris, AUTOMNE/IVER 1998 No 27-28

ISSN: 1164-8147

War in Balkans_______________

An Imperialist War for a New World OrderTania Noctiummes and Jean-Pierre Page

A New War for LootMichel Colon

Indirect Chemical WarefareSlobodan Tosovic and Bogdan Solaja

The Political Economy of GlobalizationEdward S. Herman

“The Srebrenica Massacre”: A Legend?George Pumphrey

Illustrations dans ce numero: Branko Lakic__________Printed in June, 1999

Revue trimestrielle d'arts et desciences

Paris, AUTOMNE/IVER 1998Volume: 7, N°: 27-28

Prix: 60 FPublié par:Association DIALOGUEc/o Titre47 bis, Avenue de Clichy75017 ParisPresident:Vlastimir StojanovicCoéditeur:Editions du TitreImprimé par:Editions du Titre47 bis, Avenue de Clichy75017 ParisDépôt légal: Decembre 1998ISSN: 1164-8147Commission paritaire: N° 74219Copyright © DIALOGUE, 1998

Directeur et rédacteur en chef:Dragan PavlovicRédacteurs associé:Dusan Batakovic * Gérard Caron * EgonCikla i * Louis Dalmas * DianaJohnstone * Raymond Kent * BorisLazic * Djordje Maksimovic * GoranNikolic * Zlatomir Popovic * SpasaRatkovic * Slobodan Soja * MatthiasSteinle * Radivoj Stanivuk * ZeljanSchuster * Roland VasicAdministration:Nikola Sujica, France * Miro Urosevic,AllemagneConseil de Rédaction:Mojsije Abinun, littérature, France *Milovan Danojlic, littérature, FranceDejan Djokic, RU * Zlatko Glamocak,arts, France * Mirko Govedarica,sociologie, France * Dejan Kocovic,France * Jovanka Konj ikovic ,a rch i tec ture , France * Djord jeKonjikovic, France * Vesna Levkovic,droi t , France Djordje Levkovic ,

biologie, France * Bratislav Milanovic,littérature, Yougoslavie * NikolaMilenkovic, l i t térature, France *Vladimir Milicic, EU * Sima Mraovic,biologie, France * Nenad Petrovic,l i t t é ra ture , RU Negovan Raj ic ,littérature, Canada * Nikola Samardzic,histoire, Yougoslavie * Charles Simic,littérature, EU * Vlastimir Stojanovic,dro i t , France* Gordana Suj ica ,a rch i tec ture , France *ThomasTodorovic, sociologie, Japan *Nina Urosevic, AllemagneTraducteurs:Velimir Popovic * Harita Wybrands________________________________

DIALOGUEDirecteur fondateur (1992-1997):

Dr. Bogoljub Kochovich-------------------------------------------

Publiée avec le concours duCentre national du livre.

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Avis aux auteurs“Dialogue” est une revue trimestrielle des idées, plus précisément de toutes

les idées. Comme le contenu d’un numéro se veut très varié et englobera tout ce quise réfère, au sens le plus large aux sciences humaines et naturelles, à la culture etaux arts, les auteurs devraient être conscients que peu de lecteurs sont experts danstous ces domaines. Il faudra éviter les expressions techniques inutiles; là oùl’utilisation de ces expressions sera nécéssaire, il faudra en donner une explicationdétaillée lors de la première utilisation. Les manuscrits devront être proprementdactylographiés, avec un double interligne et uniquement en recto. La rédactionpense que la langue est un outil de communication. Si la forme elle-même est l’objetque l’on veut communiquer, ce texte doit être soumis pour publication dans la partielittéraire de notre revue.

Les “analyses” et les “commentaires longs”, ainsi que les articles originauxseront examinés par plusieurs membres (le plus souvent par 2 à 3 personnes) duComité de rédaction ou de Conseil, parmi lesquels certains habitent en dehors del’Europe. Le délai de transmission d’un pli postal peut ainsi aller de 3 à 7 semaines.Pour cette raison, les auteurs devront avoir en vue que le contenu des articles devrarester d’actualité même 6 mois après leur envoi à la Rédaction de la revue. Les textesen langues étrangères: Les textes soumis pour publication en langue étrangère(français, anglais, allemand) seront publiés sans traduction. Ils occuperont 50% ducontenu de la revue. Ces textes seront accompagnés d’un court résumé.

Les différentes catégories de textes: 1. Editorial (1 à 2 pages). En principeun à trois articles par numéro sur les thèmes politiques (politique au sens large duterme). 2. Commentaires courts (1 page). Ce seront des commentaires écrits par lesmembres de la rédaction ou du Conseil de rédaction ou, exceptionnellement, par leslecteurs. Il s’agira de commentaires sur les articles les plus importants parus dansle même numéro de la revue, ou sur des problèmes divers d’actualité. La structurede ces commentaires courts sera libre, journalistique. Si l’on se réfère à lalittérature, on la citera dans le texte. 3. Analyses et commentaires longs. Cesanalyses et commentaires concerneront les avancées les plus récentes dans undomaine donné. Il est souhaitable qu’ils n’excèdent pas 7 pages de la revue. Lesauteurs devront s’arranger pour que le titre de l’article en décrive correctement lecontenu. L’article doit débuter par un court résumé (100 à 130 mots). Le titre et lerésumé seront traduits en français et en anglais. Un ou deux paragraphes (intro-duction) devront aider le lecteur qui ne serait pas expert du sujet traité, à lecomprendre. Le texte devrait se terminer par une conclusion courte. Dans le cas deconclusion à plusieurs éléments, il faudra la limiter aux plus importants. Lesréférences à la littérature seront mentionnées à la fin de l’article par ordre decitation dans le texte. Les notes ne se référant pas à la littérature sont égalementpermises. Il est recommandé aux auteurs de ne pas essayer de prouver (dans le casidéal) plus d’un fait, et cela en utilisant des arguments déjà acceptés comme desdonnées scientifiques démontrées. 4. Articles originaux. Ce seront des exposésargumentés sur des nouvelles vues des problèmes avec, éventuellement, des solu-tions originales. La structure et la longueur de l’article seront similaires aux“analyses et commentaires longs”. 5. Commentaires des lecteurs. Ce sont descommentaires plus longs (maximum 2 pages) ayant la structure d’un article, maisn’approfondissant pas trop le sujet traité. Un “résumé” n’est pas nécessaire, maisles citations de littérature seront clairement énoncées. 6. Lettres des lecteurs à larédaction. 7. Actualités. Compte - rendus sans analyse profonde, à propos desévénements culturels et scientifiques, ou des nouveaux livres parus aussi bien enYougoslavie que dans le reste du monde, mais qui strictement parlant ne sont pasdu domaine de la littérature (1 page maximum par compte - rendu). 8. Littératureet arts. Prose et poésie. Les créations littéraires originales non encore publiées(maximum 10 pages de la revue). Exceptionnellement il sera possible de faireparaître des contributions littéraires plus longues en plusieurs séquences ou desfragments d’un livre. Peinture et arts plastiques. Des reproductions (3 à 5 pages dela revue).

DIALOG

UEN

° 27-28 1998

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DIALOGUE, N° 27-28AUTOMNE-IVER 1998

Sommaire

La pensée unique 3Louis Dalmas

Yugoslavia: An Imperialist War for a New World Order 20Tania Noctiummes and Jean-Pierre Page

Yugoslavia: a New War for Loot 77by Michel Colon

Aggression on Yugoslavia: Indirect Chemical Warfare 85Slobodan Tosovic and Bogdan Solaja

Report From the War Zone:Yugoslavs Resolute as Bombs Fall Everywhere 90Sara Flounders and Gloria La Riva

The Political Economy of Globalization 96Edward S. Herman

“The Srebrenica Massacre”: A Legend? 108George Pumphrey

Ultimatums or Agreements 143Determined Force (NATO) Ultimatum 143G-8 Plan 144Cologne Agreement from 3. June, 1999 145

Kosovo ou Kosmet ? 149

___________________________________________________________

Arts

Illustrations dans ce numero: Branko Lakic 152

L'Allemagne : le Neandertal du 16mm son synchrone 154Matthias Steinle cont.

Printed in June, 1999

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____________________________________________________Pisma Dijaloga

Lettres de Dialogue / Dialogue Letters(DANS L'EDITION "ABONNEMENT")

“Mitovi, simboli, rituali - Istorijska mo} “znakova” ujugoisto~noj Evropi u 19. i 20. veku” 185Milan Kosanovi}

TRAG ZMAJEVE SAPE (zbirka kratkih prica) 200Antonije Zalica

“PAPIRNI ANDJELI MILETE PRODANOVICA” 206Desanka Sandulovic

IMAMO ISKUSTVO MIRNOG PRIJENOSA VLASTI 212Ivan Supek

Odakle poti~u Slaveni ? 215(intervju: Magdalena Maczynska)

Kriti~ke refleksije o povratku regulisanja pravanacionalnih manjina u Isto~no/Zapadne Evropske poslove 228Adam Burgess

Skup lijevih stranaka u Novom Sadu (Iz hrvatske stampe) 249

Vi{e nego Istorija 252Nenad V. Petrovi}

JEDNA NOVA INICIJATIVA IZDAVACKE DELATNOSTIU SRBIJI 260Jozo Uvodic______________________________________________________________

Et si on persistait à croire en l'homme... 268(KOSSOVO, VERITE POETIQUE; Darinneka Yévritch, Ali Podrimja,Stèvane Tontitch et Visar Zhiti)Boris Lazitch

Le jour où j’ai découvert le mot obsessionnel 162Julien Bobroff

L’Atelier théâtre de serbo-croate del’Université Paris IV- Sorbonne 166Sava Andjelkovic

Le jeu ou le secret de la judéité dans Jardin,cendre de Danilo Kis 174Aleksandar Prstojevic

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D I A L O G U EVolume 7, N° 27-28 Paris Decembre 1998

La pensée unique

Louis Dalmas

La France évoque l’image de poissons alertes frétillantsous une couche de glace. Dans ses profondeurs, denombreuses énergies ne demandent qu’à émerger à la sur-face : elles sont bloquées par une pellicule sclérosée degens en place dont la seule obsession est de veiller à cequ’aucune fissure ne menace leurs privilèges, leurconformisme et leurs complicités.

C’est ainsi que les actions associatives se heurtent auxhiérarchies des partis ou des syndicats, les initiativeséconomiques aux pesanteurs juridiques ou fiscales, lesrevendications populaires à la raison d’Etat, les idéesoriginales à la censure des habitudes et la respirationindépendante à l’étouffement du consensus.

Une marque de la vieillesse est la négation. Les vieuxse recouvrent d’une croûte imperméable au changement. Ilsse renferment dans le refus de la novation, l’auto-défense.A cet égard, la vieille France est la championne du “non”protecteur dans tous les domaines. Les “arrivés” barrent laroute aux nouveaux venus, et en général s’assurent contretoute bousculade, par le culte du statu quo. Sans doute est-ce vrai de toute société à longue Histoire, mais craindre àce point de compromettre les routines, faire tant d’effortspour rendre intangibles les acquis, est plus qu’un symptômed’âge : c’est l’annonce d’une d’agonie.

Pourtant du sang chaud circule dans la carcasse. Maisil n’arrive pas à irriguer un épiderme que l’immobilisme acartonné. Le froid mortel est trop fort : le moindre trou dansla glace est aussitôt bouché. Le poisson qui a pu passer la

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tête est congelé. La nappe se reforme, paralysant tout ce quibouge dans le gel de l’autosatisfaction.

Cette brève description est un peu caricaturale, j’enconviens. Mais elle s’applique assez bien à un domaine oule désordre (c’est-à-dire un maximum de diversité) devraitêtre la règle, car il conditionne la création : celui de lacirculation des idées. La France regorge d’idées : elles ontmême inspiré, à propos du pétrole, une publicité célèbre.Mais elles ne franchissent pas le seuil des mass-media,elles ne parviennent pas jusqu’aux maîtres qui dirigent cesderniers ou qui s’y expriment. Aucune dissidence ne peutentamer à grande échelle la pensée unique, car la penséeunique tient les leviers de commande. Elle enveloppe la têtedu pays d’une masse gélatineuse dont les moyens de propa-gation lui appartiennent. Elle est la garantie des nantis qui,en retour, garantissent son universelle diffusion. Elle est leciment de la minorité qui gère les moyens d’expression, dupouvoir qui influence la télévision, des industriels quipossèdent la presse, des stratèges qui oriententl’information, et de la cour de révérence et de connivenceprofessionnelles qui les entoure.

La pensée unique est un “long fleuve tranquille” quisuit son cours. Tout va dans le même sens. Les clichés serépètent par vagues, les opinions coulent entre des bergesbétonnées. Le pluralisme de l’audio-visuel et de la pressen’est qu’une collection du synonymes charriés dans lemême flot. Un flot qui est l’Evangile de la médiacratie.

Les exemples de cette uniformité abondent. Commeces hordes d’oiseaux qui amorcent de concert le mêmevirage grâce à une mystérieuse télépathie, notre télévision,notre radio et notre presse se laissent à certains momentsdériver tous ensemble dans la même direction, dans unsurprenant processus d’imitation réciproque. Une campagnedéferle en véritable “vague” de bourrage de crânes. Cuba aété à une époque le refuge de la liberté avant de devenir uneprison attardée, Mao fut le phare de Saint-Germain des Présavant d’être rejeté comme un faux prophète, Solidarnoscétait le parangon de la résistance à la barbarie avant de se

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révéler un fer de lance de l’intégrisme catholique, lesmudjahiddins afghans ont été encensés comme les cheva-liers du progrès avant de se métamorphoser en affreuxTaleban. Le pro-américanisme a été porté aux nues au sondes flûtes libérales, l’anti-américanisme l’a été au son destrompettes cocardières, comme a été bruyamment exaltéela défense unilatérale des Palestiniens. L’acceptation dutraité de Maastricht était une condition de survie de l’Europecomme la croisade contre Saddam Hussein était une condi-tion de survie de la civilisation. Toutes ces causesflamboyantes, animées par les girouettes de l’intelligentsia,n’ont souffert aucun démenti avant d’être remplacées pard’autres convictions.

Et ce ne sont que des exemples “politiques”. Neparlons pas de l’information générale, où les raz-de-maréedéferlent pour la promotion d’un film ou le choix d’un sujetdans les périodes de creux.

Serge Halimi, dans un livre remarquable intitulé “Lesnouveaux chiens de garde”, recense les facettes de ce“panurgisme” téléguidé. Les patrons de presse qui ne sontplus des hommes du métier, mais des seigneurs de groupesindustriels, tributaires du nouveau mondialismeéconomique, de leurs servitudes gouvernementales ou deleurs intérêts publicitaires ; les présentateurs d’une infor-mation aplatie, attribuant la même valeur d’antenne au prixNobel, au rocker à succès, au dramaturge inspiré et auchampion cycliste ; les ectoplasmes de journalistes quisuccombent sans scrupules aux impératifs de la rapidité etde la concurrence pour répandre le plus vite possible lesmêmes à-peu-près ; la quinzaine d’”intellectuels”péremptoires, invités aux mêmes dîners, fréquentant lesmêmes salons, coulés dans le même moule, qui sont lachorale officielle du petit écran ; les débats soit-disantcontradictoires qui réunissent les tenants d’opinions aussiéloignées les unes des autres que les pages d’un même livre; les appels aux “experts” qui fournissent l’alibi du spécialisteà la monotonie de leurs considérations ; la concordance dessujets de couverture des hebdos illustrés, traités

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identiquement à d’infimes nuances près presqu’aux mêmesmoments ; la pléthore d’éditorialistes auto-proclamés quicommentent les événements dans le sens du vent ou dans ladirection qui leur a été indiquée ; tels sont les ingrédientsd’une soupe dans laquelle manquent tragiquement lesgrumeaux de l’originalité.

Qu’est-ce qui entraîne cet enlisement ? Sans doute lefait que la France est un pays très compartimenté. Elle estune mosaïque d’ensembles jaloux de leur singularité et deleur cohésion. Des sociétés boulistes de village aux cénaclesd’énarques à la tête de l’Etat, les groupes sont les seulsmilieux d’action possible. L’individu qui n’appartient pas,qui n’est pas un concitoyen, un condisciple ou un confrère,n’a aucune chance. Tout se fait chez nous surrecommandation, sur présentation personnelle. On n’arriveà rien si on n’est pas introduit, et pour être introduit il fautavoir la même origine, sortir de la même école, se livrer àla même activité, pratiquer la même religion ou militer pourla même cause. Et faire partie de la structure qui matérialisel’une ou l’autre de ces identités, depuis les associationsd’anciens élèves jusqu’aux partis politiques, en passant parles innombrables cercles, clubs ou fraternités.

Les deux conséquences de cette compartimentationfigée sont la stagnation et la servitude. Les groupes seperpétuent, fortifiant leurs complicités. A de rares excep-tions près, ils se protègent par d’étroites habitudes decooptation, de consécration interne et d’appui en cas debesoin. Dans cette collection d’appareils étanches, aucunespace ne reste au marginal qui, souvent, par son non-conformisme, est le seul à faire avancer la société (ou, plussimplement, à dire la vérité). Isolé, il est condamné àl’impuissance. S’il veut réussir, le franc-tireur doit sacrifierson indépendance aux usages de son milieu.

Un lent processus de laminage s’engage alors.L’individualiste se voit imposer une loi rigoureuse : se faireau moule. Plus le groupe se situe à un haut niveau de lahiérarchie sociale, plus sa règle est impérative. La hautebanque protestante, l’aristocratie juive, les anciens des

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grandes écoles, la nomenklatura financière, la grande bour-geoisie catholique, les partis politiques de premier plan, lesmediacrates de l’information, ne plaisantent pas avec leurimage de marque. Et plus on grimpe à l’intérieur du groupe,plus on doit s’imprégner de la règle et ne jamais y faillir,sous peine d’être rejeté dans le désert des exclus.

Nous arrivons à la source corruptrice du système. Undes éléments fondamentaux de la règle de tout groupe est le“renvoi d’ascenseur”. C’est la logique même de la solidarité.Le service mutuel, pratiqué entre les membres, ou au mêmeniveau de responsabilité, conditionne l’homogénéité desensembles.

En soi, la solidarité n’est pas un mal, au contraire. Elletémoigne d’un lien actif de compagnonnage. Mais à unecondition expresse : être pratiquée avec désintéressement.Or les cercles supérieurs (qui rassemblent les têtes degroupes dans l’exercice des pouvoirs) sont trop investisd’ambitions, de rivalités et d’intrigues pour que le renvoid’ascenseur ne soit pas forcément intéressé. Celui qui metle pied dans le monde des sommets, ne pouvant rejeter larègle de solidarité de son groupe, ou celle de la complicitédes hauts niveaux, se voit pris au piège du caractère utilitairede cette solidarité. Il a beau ne pas être malhonnête sur leplan personnel, il ne peut refuser le renvoi d’ascenseur, quise présente toujours sous le jour innocent du serviceréciproque, et peu à peu il s’enfonce dans la toile d’araignéede la compromission. Ceux que la morale n’étouffe pas s’ylaissent glisser sans trop de résistance. Mais les plus vertueuxdoivent faire preuve d’un courage héroïque pour y échapper.

Finalement la plupart des purs succombent à leur tour,peut-être moins à leur propre indignité qu’au poids dusystème. Sans toujours être subjectivement pourris, ilssont objectivement emportés par la pourriture. Lespoliticiens se laissent prendre au jeu des fausses facturesou des appels d’offres truqués, les créateurs se laissentgagner par les rémunérations de la célébrité et les avantagesde la société de spectacle, les journalistes cèdent à lafacilité de l’information généralement admise et aux charmes

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monnayés de leur réputation. L’auto-censure lime lesaspérités. On entre dans le rang, lorsque le rang est doré, eton y reste. Il n’y a plus de changements de température, lacouche de glace recouvre tout. Le résultat, dans le domainedes media qui est celui qui nous intéresse, est que lejournalisme, jadis qualifié de Quatrième pouvoir, n’est plusqu’une médiocre chambre d’écho.

Un écho de quoi ? De ce qui s’élabore au sein d’unsubtil réseau d’échanges, toujours au plus haut niveau, entreles trois groupes qui orientent l’opinion : les politiciens,les intellectuels et les journalistes, tous alimentés par lecarburant financier. Echanges non pas d’idées, mais deservices qui influent sur les idées. Le réseau n’est pas unenrichissement réciproque de connaissances, mais unmaillage de connivences croisées. Les politiciens et lesintellectuels ont besoin des journalistes pour leur publicité,les journalistes ont besoin des politiciens pour leurs infor-mations, les politiciens et les journalistes ont besoin desintellectuels pour rationaliser leur analphabétisme, leurservir de “couverture” morale et “rewriter” ou éditer leurstextes, les intellectuels ont besoin des politiciens pour sedonner l’illusion qu’ils agissent sur la réalité en intervenantdans les affaires de l’Etat. Dans la coulisse, le spectacle deces marionnettes est orchestré par les vrais maîtres du jeu: ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir de l’argent. La combinaisonfonctionne dans la fluidité du consensus. Lorsque des faussesnotes résonnent - c’est rare, mais ça arrive - elles sontrapidement effacées par le savon souverain de la langue debois et le baume de quelques tentations monnayées. Aprèsune alerte sans conséquences, tout rentre dans l’ordre :l’ordre glacé de ce qu’on doit “correctement” penser.

Le sirop secrété par cette complicité est la loi mentaledu pays, véhiculée par les grands media, avec les nuancesnégligeables qui séparent la rive droite de la rive gauche dumarais stagnant. La télévision, les radios, les quotidiens,les hebdos illustrés déversent le même brouet au mêmemoment, sous un éclairage qui va du rose pâle au blanc rosé.De temps en temps un enquêteur obstiné déterre la truffe

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d’un scandale : il suscite aussitôt la docte condamnation, aunom de sa déontologie, d’un excès de curiosité. De tempsen temps, un juge consciencieux prend pour cible unepersonnalité : il provoque immédiatement la savante ana-lyse des limites à imposer aux magistrats. De temps entemps un iconoclaste se permet de dénoncer une turpitude: il est de suite traîné devant les tribunaux pour avoir diffamél’autorité.

La pensée unique a la consistance de la gelatine. Letrou formé par un doigt qu’on y enfonce se referme à peinea-t-on retiré sa main. Une propriété qui rend son monopoleplus efficace que la censure d’un gouvernement totalitaire.Dans une dictature, la censure est à ce point stupide qu’onarrive souvent à la prendre en défaut. Mais dans unedémocratie pétrifiée comme la nôtre, l’asphyxie est encoreplus redoutable parce que le gaz qui la provoque est inodore,incolore, insidieux, impossible à repérer. Il s’infiltre partout.Il ne tue pas, il paralyse. Avec le sourire, et la bénédictiondu libéralisme, il entrave la liberté d’expression aussiefficacement que la corsette un régime policier.

Peut-être le lecteur trouvera-t-il que j’exagère.Pourtant il existe une illustration de mon propos qui devraitle faire réflechir : la façon dont on a présenté à l’Occidentles événements qui se sont déroulés depuis 1991 dans l’ex-Yougoslavie. Je ne crains pas d’affirmer que nos enfants yverront (du moins je l’espère) une des plus étonnantesmanipulations de l’opinion publique par les grands mediasqu’ait connu le monde en cette fin de siècle.

Chacun des composants du triangle complice y a jouéson rôle. Les politiciens, au courant des faits réels, les ontétouffés au bénéfice de versions imaginaires justifiant leurscapitulations stratégiques. Les intellectuels se sont lancésdans une de leurs croisades habituelles, aveuglés par leurpassion messianique, mêlant l’inexactitude à l’insulte, aumépris de toute vraisemblance. Les journalistes ont infléchil’information dans le sens des consignes officielles, répétantles plus folles affirmations sans les contrôler, relayant unepropagande au lieu de s’en tenir à des comptes rendus. La

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pensée unique a fonctionné à plein. Elle a répandu lesmensonges, ignoré les démentis, interdit les contradic-tions. Opposant un front d’airain à toute contestation, ellea martelé le dogme auquel il fallait croire : celui de laculpabilité des Serbes.

Un dogme dont l’inanité des prémisses prouve à quelpoint cette pensée unique peut imposer n’importe quoi.Qu’on en juge.

Depuis le début des conflits, tout le monde conçoitsur le même plan trois forces (ou ethnies, ou nationalités)en présence : les Croates, les Serbes et les musulmans.C’est aussi surréaliste que de définir au même niveauFrançais, Espagnols et catholiques. Les deux premiers sontles membres d’une collectivité ethnique, géographique,économique et culturelle, et sont les citoyens d’un Etat ; lestroisièmes sont les membres d’une collectivité spirituelle,et sont les fidèles d’une religion. Les musulmans de larégion sont tous croates ou serbes d’origine, comme lescatholiques de chaque côté des Pyrénées sont espagnols oufrançais.

Assimiler les pratiquants d’un culte aux originairesd’un pays est non seulement créer une inextricable confu-sion, c’est aussi faire le jeu des religions totalitaires (commel’islam) dont le but final est de s’identifier à un peuple(c’est la garantie pour elles de leur domination temporelle).But déjà favorisé par Tito, qui avait créé en Yougoslavie, en1967, pour des raisons de stratégie dans le Tiers monde etd’équilibre intérieur de sa Fédération, la fiction d’unesixième république baptisée “Nation des Musulmans”. Butfavorisé inconsidérément par l’Occident, qui prend lesmusulmans pour une nationalité et s’acharne à faire vivreleur irréelle Bosnie, inconscient du danger de cette prise dupouvoir profane par la religion.

Sur cette base erronée, les intellectuels - relayés parles journalistes et suivis avec plus ou moins de réticence parles politiciens - ont nourri la pensée unique d’une série deslogans inspirés par une propagande adroitement distillée.

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“Les Serbes sont les inventeurs du nettoyage ethnique”.Faux. Ils l’ont pratiqué, mais ils sont loin de l’avoir inventé,ils sont loin d’être les seuls à y avoir eu recours et, de plus,ils en ont été fréquemment victimes, notamment sous lerégime fasciste d’Ante Pavelic durant la Seconde guerremondiale. Les exemples historiques sont trop nombreuxpour qu’on les rapporte ici, mais les déplacements depopulations (par millions) ont accompagné pratiquementtoutes les guerres (et beaucoup de traités de paix) jusqu’auxtemps les plus récents. Quant aux divers “génocides” qu’ona cru déceler dans les affrontements, de nombreuxobservateurs qualifiés ont fait remarquer qu’il était malaiséd’appliquer la définition onusienne du génocide à des com-bats entre originaires de la même ethnie slave.

“Les Serbes sont responsables d’atrocités”. Partial etsouvent inexact. Les Serbes ont commis des crimes deguerre, c’est incontestable, mais leurs adversaires n’ont pasété en reste. Non seulement des massacres ont été perpétrésde tous les côtés, mais les principales accusations portéescontre les Serbes, notamment en ce qui concerne les campsde la mort, les viols organisés ou l’extermination des civils,se sont avérées être soit des mensonges purs et simples soitde grossières exagérations.

“Les Serbes sont des fascistes”. Inapproprié. Milosevicest un ex-communiste devenu nationaliste, songouvernement est un gouvernement autoritaire et personnelqu’on pourrait qualifier de “dictature molle”, mais il n’estpas un fasciste. Les Serbes n’ont jamais fait preuve d’anti-sémitisme (comme le croate Tudjman), ni même de dis-crimination à l’égard de leurs “adversaires ethniques”(beaucoup de Croates et de musulmans vivent à Belgrade entoute tranquillité) ; ils n’ont jamais projeté d’envahir l’Europe; même si le régime contrôle la télévision avec plus oumoins de rigueur, ils ne sont ni réduits au monopole d’unparti unique, ni écrasés par une terreur policière, ni briméspar une censure totale ; ils ne font pas appel à un passéd’extrême-droite (comme Tudjman) ou à une religion

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hégémonique (comme le bosniaque Izetbegovic) ; et s’ilsvivent partiellement en autarcie, c’est par suite des embargosauxquels ils sont soumis.

“Le rêve de Grande Serbie a provoqué une guerreinternationale.” Faux. Le soi-disant rêve de “Grande serbie”a été d’abord la volonté de défendre les Serbes épars dansles différentes républiques, qui se retrouvaient avec desstatuts de minorités infériorisées du fait de la reconnais-sance précipitée par la communauté internationale des Etatssécessionnistes de la Fédération yougoslave. Cette volontéétait la même que celle manifestée par Tudjman de réunirtous les Croates dans son nouvel Etat, la même que celled’Izetbegovic cherchant à “nationaliser” le rassemblementdes musulmans, la même que celle des rebelles albanais duKosovo qui revendiquent la “Grande Albanie et, soit dit enpassant, la même que l’obsession de la France de récupérerl’Alsace-Lorraine perdue après le défaite de 1870. La guerrequi est née du heurt de ces volontés n’était en aucune façonun conflit international (comme le prétend le TribunalPénal de La Haye), mais une guerre civile comparable àcelle qui a opposé les hindous et les musulmans à la suite dela reconnaissance de l’indépendance de l’Inde, et qui aabouti à la création successive du Pakistan et du Bangla-desh.

“Les Serbes empêchent le développement d’un Etatmultiethnique en Bosnie.” Particulièrement incohérent. Lacommunauté internationale accuse les Serbes de s’opposerà une multiethnicité qu’elle a elle-même détruite dans l’ex-Yougoslavie, alors que les Serbes cherchaient à la perpétuer.On peut penser ce qu’on veut de Tito, mais sa Yougoslaviefédérative a assuré aux populations une cohabitationpacifique pendant près d’un demi-siècle. Les Serbesvoulaient conserver cette structure : les grandes puissancesl’ont fait éclater en encourageant les sécessions. C’est unprocédé classique : on accuse celui qu’on veut perdre descrimes qu’on a soi-même commis.

“La domination serbe a obligé les Slovènes, les Croateset les Bosniaques à sortir de la Fédération.” Faux. Le

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régime de Tito avait sensiblement réduit le poids de laSerbie en accordant l’autonomie à la Voivodine et au Kosovoet affaibli la présence serbe aux leviers de commande dupays. Au moment des sécessions, les Serbes étaient loin d’yêtre en majorité ou d’y exercer une domination abusive.

“Les Serbes ont supprimé l’autonomie du Kosovo,refusent de négocier avec les Kosovars albanais et fontrégner la terreur en massacrant la population civile.” Faux.Les amendements de 1989 à la Constitution yougoslave de1974 n’ont fait que clarifier une situation confuse danslaquelle le Kosovo jouissait de droits “souverains” au seinde la fédération sans être une république ; ils ont limité cesdroits souverains sans supprimer les éléments d’autonomie.Ce sont les Kosovars albanais qui ont rejeté tous lesavantages qui leur étaient consentis (langue, enseignement,media, etc), qui ont édifié une sorte de société parallèleclandestine et qui, depuis la naissance de l’Armée delibération (UCK) ont refusé de négocier autre chose queleur indépendance. Quant aux massacres, c’est évidemmentla population civile, tant serbe qu’albanaise, qui est victimedes cruautés perpétrées par les deux côtés.

Le corpus de ces affirmations, réitérées à satiété partous les media pendant des années, a fourni unedémonstration éclatante de la puissance de la pensée unique.Les Serbes sont devenus les parias de l’Occident. Nonseulement leur résistance à l’impérialisme des grandespuissances (résistance souvent admirée ailleurs commeune courageuse manifestation d’indépendance, comme parexemple pour les Afghans ou les Tchétchènes) estcondamnée comme une rébellion de voyous, mais toutevelléité de prendre leur parti est maudite commeréactionnaire et strictement interdite d’expression.Ce dernier point est à souligner. Seriner de concert lesmêmes aneries est déjà grave. Mais empêcher toute véritéde se faire connaître est pire encore. Surtout de cette façonhypocrite. On n’interdit pas les opinions contraires à lapensée unique, on les stérilise. Elles ne paraissent pas dansles grands supports (même sous la forme de courrier de

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lecteurs), les informations qui les fondent ne sont reprisesnulle part. On ne met pas en prison leurs tenants, mais on neles interviewe pas, on ne les invite pas aux débats télévisés,on ne rend pas compte de leurs ouvrages. La dissidencen’est pas opprimée, elle est ensevelie dans le silence. Lacensure ne vous ferme pas la bouche, elle s’arrange pourqu’on ne puisse pas vous entendre.

J’ai détaillé l’intoxication médiatique à propos de laYougoslavie, parce qu’elle a été à la fois énorme etexemplaire.

Mais le processus de conditionnement des esprits parla répétition du mensonge et l’étouffement de la vérité nes’applique pas qu’à un seul sujet. Il est l’instrument dupouvoir dans la société, qui asseoit son autorité surl’accoutumance de l’opinion publique à la confiserieofficielle, au moyen des mass-media, et cela dans tous lesdomaines.

Si vous en doutez, je vous suggère un test. Voici, envrac, quelques idées à contre-courant. Vous n’êtes pasobligé de les partager pour vous demander, non pas si ellesfigurent dans des publications confidentielles ou des livresà faible tirage, mais combien de fois vous les avez entenduesexprimées à la télévision ou à la radio, ou qui les a défenduesdans un quotidien ou un grand hebdomadaire, c’est-à-dire àl’intention de millions de gens.

Croyez-vous que la pensée unique laisserait traiter àgrande échelle (et par des spécialistes qualifiés, autres queles habituels “experts” qui accumulent les banalités “dans laligne”) ce genre de sujets :

La crise économique actuelle, qui fait des ravagesen Asie, risque de gagner l’Amérique du Sud et menacel’Europe et les Etats-Unis, qui détruit l’indépendance desnations en agressant leurs banques centrales et en ruinantleurs économies, qui jette des millions de gens dans lebourbier du chômage et de la misère, est une réelle catas-trophe dont on est loin de mesurer l’ampleur, et est dûe à ladémente politique du Fonds monétaire international, ainsi

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qu’à la conquérante rapacité des grandes banques et agencesde change américaines, engagées dans la conquête financièredu monde par tous les moyens. (Cf les articles du Pr MichelChossudovski).

L’unité continentale de l’Europe se réalise au profitdes multinationales et de la haute finance, à l’ombre del’Allemagne, comme un couvercle technocratiquetransfrontières posé sur une mosaïque croissanted’identifications nationales. Les peuples n’ont guère d’autresdroits que celui d’agiter leurs drapeaux pour pouvoir saluerla naissance de l’euro. L’OTAN est le bras armé de Wash-ington, chargé d’écraser les vélléités de résistance au Nouvelordre mondial, d’établir le règne politique et culturel deWashington, et de procurer aux fabricants d’armesaméricains de colossaux profits par la “mise à jour” desarmées satellites. De plus, son élargissement encercle laRussie de façon menaçante, malgré les assurances de lavirago Allbright. On peut se demander quelle serait laréaction de l’Amérique si la Russie installait ses troupes(pacifiques bien entendu) au Mexique et au Canada...

Les embargos infligés à l’Irak, à la Lybie, à Cuba,à la Serbie ne font souffrir que les peuples en les soudantdavantage à leurs gouvernements. Les gesticulationsmilitaires, destinées à intimider Saddam Hussein, Khadafiou Milosevic, si elles sont suivies d’opérations réelles,risquent de déclencher de dangereuses ondes de choc. Lechantage économique pratiqué sur les Etats réticents, appuyé(comme en Republika Srpska) sur la brutalité d’une occupa-tion digne des invasions nazies, est une vilaine façon depropager la démocratie. L’Occident, au lieu de faire aimerla richesse de sa civilisation, fait haîr les excès de sapolitique, incarnée par l’arrogance de l’hégémonieaméricaine.

L’Allemagne, à la fois alliée et rivale del’Amérique, poursuit sa poussée vers la Méditerranée et leProche-Orient. Après avoir fait éclater la Yougoslavie, etmis sous sa tutelle les pays qui s’en sont séparés, ellemultiplie les organismes prêchant une régionalisation de

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l’Europe qui fragmentera en entités sécessionnistes lesnations qui la gênent. (Cf. les articles du général Pierre-Marie Gallois).

L’inégalité sociale ne cesse de croître, allouantaux classes aisées des revenus sans commune mesure avecles maigres subsides de pauvres de plus en plus nombreux.Un minimum de justice économique ne peut être rétabliqu’en prélevant sur la fortune des riches ce qui est nécessaireà la vie de la collectivité, et en brisant les mécanismesd’autoreproduction à vide de l’argent dans les structures dela finance internationale.

L’establishment parisien, par masochismeintellectuel ou complexe de culpabilité colonialiste, versedes larmes indignées sur la moindre victime musulmanedans le Proche-Orient, les Balkans ou le Maghreb. Onpleure moins les victimes israëliennes, croates ou serbes etsurtout on entend peu, du côté islamique, dénoncerl’exécution de femmes cherchant à se libérer de la bigoteriecoranique, le massacre de touristes ou la condamnation àmort d’écrivains.

Les banques et les grandes compagnies d’assurancesdétroussent leurs clients de mille façons insidieuses,entérinées par la loi et discrètement occultées, beaucoupplus efficacement que des gangsters armés ou des voleursà la tire.

L’Eglise catholique, pour avoir caché son sabredans les replis d’une patiente diplomatie, n’en pousse pasmoins son goupillon dans les reins des naïfs qui s’imaginentque la guerre de l’enseignement et la défense de la laïcitérépublicaine sont des anachronismes. Comme elle avaitorganisé jadis la disparition ou la fuite des criminelsfascistes de la Seconde guerre mondiale, elle a contribuépar son soutien à la Croatie fascisante à l’éclatement de laYougoslavie, et elle vient de béatifier le cardinal Stepinac,fidèle soutien de l’horrible régime soutachi, le tout sous lahoulette du pape le plus réactionnaire que se soit octroyé leVatican depuis longtemps (comme le démontrent ses posi-tions prises, entre autres, sur la contraception, l’avortement

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ou le SIDA). La plus forte “nation” musulmane se trouve en

France. On aimerait connaître la réaction de nos maîtres àpenser si les millions de musulmans français revendiquaienttout à coup une nationalité comparable à celle de leurscorréligionnaires dans les Balkans. Hypothèse incongrue ?C’est pourtant ce qui s’est passé en Yougoslavie.

Beaucoup de nos politiciens ont la veulerie,l’ambition et la platitude gravée sur leurs visages et usentd’une langue de bois imbibée de conformisme et deflagornerie. Un grand nombre d’entre eux sont impliquésdans des affaires relevant de la justice. La démocratie n’estpas menacée quand on met une certaine politique au pilori,ou quand on expose les indélicatesses de certains de sesreprésentants, mais plutôt quand on laisse les sacs à ventimpunément se pavaner, les magistrats être accusésd’implanter un “pouvoir des juges”, et les magouilleursprofiter de l’impunité.

Le cinéma est menacé en France par la prétentionde ses messages d’auteurs, et l’édition par son culte d’unformalisme soit-disant d’avant-garde, c’est-à-dire dans lesdeux cas par le mépris du public et la prétention intellectuelled’une coterie de salon, beaucoup plus que par la puissancede l’argent américain.

Il n’est un secret pour personne d’introduit dansles hautes sphères du gouvernement que, dans le privé, nosresponsables ne cessent de condamner ou de raillerl’Amérique pour les erreurs de sa diplomatie, la rustrerie desa politique, la médiocrité de ses Macdo ou la stupidité deson puritanisme. Pourtant, ils dissimulent soigneusementleurs désacccords au public et, lorsqu’il s’agit de prendredes décisions internationales, le maximum qu’ils sepermettent de faire est de traîner faiblement les pieds.

Le “respect de la différence”, agrémenté de lacomplaisance pour les “communautés”, devenus la grandemode chez les donneurs de leçons de la gauche parisienne,est une trahison des valeurs élémentaires de la civilisation.Le véritable respect de l’autre ne consiste pas à le laisser

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emprisonné dans un cocon étanche verrouillé par une reli-gion ou une nationalité, mais à l’aider à accéder à sa qualitéessentielle, et universelle, d’être humain. L’avenir de notreespèce n’est pas dans le maintien des séparations, mais aucontraire dans la recherche des ressemblances.

Le culte des patois locaux, baptisés expressionsde civilisations historiques à sauvegarder, ne fait que mul-tiplier les cloisonnements linguistiques, donc accroîtrel’incompréhension entre les hommes, quand il ne préservepas les plus débiles replatrages de dialectes disparus. Quantà la protection de la langue français par l’interdiction des“anglicismes”, on ne saurait imaginer de plus ineptestérilisation d’une langue. La richesse d’un parler résulte desa capacité à intégrer les apports étrangers, pas de son replifrileux sur une imaginaire pureté.

L’ironie et la dérision, comme les dénonciationsbrutales, lorsqu’elles visent les puissants, sont l’oxygènede la démocratie. Leur force de frappe est dans la crudité.On doit pouvoir traiter un ministre français d’imbécile sansfaire vaciller la République, un chef d’Etat israëlien decrétin sans être antisémite, un mollah iranien de fou sansêtre antimusulman, un pape catholique de retardé sans risquerles flammes de l’enfer. Or aujourd’hui, rien de tout celan’est possible. La moindre verdeur est une inadmissiblegrossièreté, quand elle ne vous vaut pas un passage devantles tribunaux. Les débats s’enlisent dans la morne confiturede la courtoisie (qui est l’uniforme de la pensée unique),alors qu’ils devraient se hérisser des flèches de la polémique.

La pornographie, toujours confondue dans ladécadence de nos moeurs avec la délinquance, la violence etla drogue, est au mieux une stimulation agréable et au pireun passe-temps inoffensif, mais absolument pas un fléausocial à mettre dans le même sac. Il serait plus intelligentd’apprendre aux enfants, qui sont loin d’être des angelotsinnocents à protéger à tout prix (Freud les traitait déjà de“pervers polymorphes”), qu’un coup de reins est de loinpréférable à un coup de feu.

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Etc. Etc. Que ces thèmes vous paraissent crédibles ounon, peu importe. Reconnaissez seulement qu’on n’endiscute pas souvent ...et qu’ils mériteraient peut-être d’êtrediscutés. En les énumérant, je doute qu’ils le soient, car lapensée unique tolère mal les ouvertures suspectes. Cela dit,c’est à l’honneur de Dialogue d’avoir publié cet article, etje l’en remercie. Mais une bouffée d’air frais, heureuseexception à la règle, ne dissipe pas la pollution. La penséeunique est solidement gelée : il faudra plus d’une fissuredans la couche de glace pour la briser...

Février-Septembre 1998.

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YUGOSLAVIA: AN IMPERIALISTWAR FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

Tania Noctiummes* and Jean-Pierre Page**

“The NATO war is a bandit action”Harold Pinter, London, 2 May 1999

Where is the evidence that the NATO aggression is toprotect the interests and democratic aspirations of theordinary peoples of Kosovo, Serbia or Montenegro? Whereis the evidence that NATO aggression promotes the inter-ests of the ordinary peoples in the Balkans? Where is theevidence that NATO aggression is in the interests of theordinary peoples in their own countries?

Working peoples everywhere will pay the price of the war,in terms of jobs lost, declining wages, declining publicexpenditure for social services as an increasing amountof public and private funds is transferred from produc-tion and social expenditure toward war production andwar costs and as the United States raises interest ratesto draw the world’s capital resources to pay for its warexpenditure. Already ordinary people are paying forthe war and the humanitarian catastrophe created bytheir principal class enemy. And, the money is going tofill the pockets of their principal class enemy!

Nothing can justify the destruction of a country and apeoples. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, contemporary his-

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tory has shown the cynicism and hypocrisy of such inten-tions. People are not bombed for their own good!

In a report of 1967, 15 American experts eloquentlyaffirmed that their society needs war. This affirmationlead to the publication in 1969 of a report prefaced byJohn K. Galbraith entitled “Undesirable Peace” whereit is stated: “War fulfils certain essential functions forthe stability of our society”. The report goes on toargue: “Although we do not affirm that, for the economy,it is impossible to imagine a substitute for war, no setof techniques aimed at maintaining control over em-ployment, production and consumption has ever beentried that is even distantly comparable to its efficiency.War was, and is, from far, the essential element ofstability in modern societies...”

A war of aggression

The imperialist war of aggression is being waged, under theNATO umbrella, against a sovereign State and its peoplesunder the leadership of the United States and the activeparticipation of France, Britain, Italy, Germany.... The argu-ment of legitimate defence cannot be invoked. Moreover, itwas launched without authorization of the United NationsSecurity Council, without any approval of the national par-liaments of these countries, and in violation of the terms ofthe Treaty governing the Atlantic Alliance. As such, theperpetrators have violated every rule of international lawand are guilty not only of a breach of the peace but of warcrimes.

The intervention of NATO is unprecedented and creates anew precedent. For the first time, Western Europe hasendorsed and actively participated in a unilateral action ofwar that has upto now been a privileged weapon of theUnited States. What we are seeing today is not simply an

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alignment of Western Europe with US against Yugosla-via. Neither does it reflect any inability of Europe toprovide itself with the necessary means to carry out itsown politics. The war against Yugoslavia reveals ajoint will to implement a common ‘new strategic con-cept’, elaborated and finalized together by WesternEurope and the United States, and ratified at the recentNATO summit in Washington. The war serves to legiti-mize this new concept and, for this reason, NATO can-not afford to lose the war.

It is significant that the war is conducted in the name of the‘international community’ when in reality it is being wagedby a bellicose Euro-American alliance. On what basis doesNATO arrogate itself the right to speak on behalf of theinternational community in a unilateral manner and claim toincarnate ‘the law’? After Pax Americana, Lex Americana!One of its main results is the programmed death of thesystem of international relations built after World War II. Inthe US view. the present system has become anachronic andmust be replaced by a new world order through a new rolefor NATO under US domination.

Within a period of only 8 months, the United States is guiltyof armed aggression, carried out with total impunity, againstfour sovereign States, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugo-slavia, without any authorization by the United Nations andin violation of the United Nations Charter. Theinstrumentalization of the Secretary-General of the UnitedNations, Kofi Annan, is its most significant demonstration:yesterday, forced into silence, today pressed into submis-sion to obtain the agreement of the Security Council tolegitimize ground intervention in Yugoslavia. The NATOAlliance may have agreed to designate the ground forceas a UN force, but it insists that NATO troops must bethe core, wielding heavy NATO firepower and workingwithin an exclusively NATO command structure: “UN-wrapped but NATO-filled”!1 According to sources

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close to the Secretary-General, he was apparentlywarned by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on7 May 1999 that any political or military interventionby the United Nations would be “unacceptable”, thatthe international military presence in Yugoslavia wouldnot be a UN force and that “in no case” would it beunder the control of the UN. He was also told that theUN “should be satisfied with its own business, ie, hu-manitarian affairs”.2

A war planned and prepared in advance...Rambouilletand Akrona

The United States had prepared the aggression against Yu-goslavia well in advance. The ‘negotiations’ undertaken inRambouillet turned out to be a manoeuvre to deceive thepublic into giving a stamp of approval for the war.

The US attack against Yugoslavia began more than a decadeago when the World Bank and the IMF set about destroyingthe multi-ethnic federation with lethal doses of debt, mar-ket reforms and imposed poverty. Millions of jobs weredestroyed. In 1989 alone, 600,000 workers, almost a quar-ter of the workforce, was sacked without severance pay. Butthe most critical reform was the ending of economic sup-port to the six constituent republics and re-colonization byWestern capital.

At the time, ‘Milosevic, the reformer’ was considered afavourite among senior figures in the US State Departmentand the KLA were considered to be “no more than terror-ists”. Richard Holbrooke described President Milosevic as“a man we can do business with, a man who recognizes therealities of life in former Yugoslavia”. In October 1998, theUS drafted a peace plan for Kosovo giving the Kosovans farless autonomy and freedom than they had under the oldYugoslav federation. But this deal included crucially for the

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Americans a NATO military presence. When Milosevicobjected to having NATO troops on his soil, he was swiftlytransformed like Saddam Hussein from client to demon.

Frequently it is claimed that the war has provided each party,Serbs and Albanians alike, with the pretext to fuel the worstkind of nationalism. However, one fails to recognize thatthe situation in the Balkans has a clear origins and respon-sibilities. Germany followed by the rest of Western Europehold direct responsibility for fuelling ethnic divisions andrivalry with the objective to destabilize and dismantle formerYugoslavia. Germany directly inspired the break-away ofCroatia and Slovenia, since then it new economic colonies.Later, German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, was tooffer a glimpse of the underlying strategic context ofthis kind of move when he said, on 19 April 1999, that“the role of Germany in the world has changed...we areadvancing to the centre of Europe for the deepening andenlargement of the process of European integration...thetransfer of the Reichstag to Berlin clearly shows the extentto which German capital can become the link between Eastand West as the hinge of European unity.”3

The ‘intransigence’ of President Molosevic to agree tothe Rambouillet peace accord became the pretext forNATO military intervention in Yugoslavia. In an arti-cle appearing in Le Monde Diplomatique of May 1999,Paul Marie de la Gorce revealed the ‘secret history ofthe Rambouillet negotiations’.4 The ‘invitation’ ex-tended to the Government of Yugoslavia by the ‘Con-tact Group’ (USA, UK, Germany, France, Italy andRussia) took the “form of an ultimatum”; it was “threat-ened with military reprisals should it refuse to presentitself”. All the elements of the Accord presented atRambouillet as ‘non-negotiable’ were already presentin an American text of a ‘peace’ agreement which waspublished in February 1999 in the Albanian journal‘Koha Ditoré’. The text was elaborated by Roger Hill,

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assistant to Richard Holbrooke, former US Secretaryof State and US mediator in former Yugoslavia, follow-ing the latter’s visit to Belgrade in summer 1998 tooblige President Milosevic to begin negotiations withthe Kosovo Albanian community. The negotiations weredelayed as rivalry escalated between the moderateKosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and the ex-tremist Kosovo Liberation Army. Meanwhile, the USbegan work on its own draft.

What was hidden from the public is that the Yugoslavdelegation to Rambouillet had no objection to the po-litical aspects of the Accord but rejected other themilitary section, as a violation of its national sover-eignty and independence. Annex B of the Accord, ineffect, provided for the occupation of the entire terri-tory of Yugoslavia by NATO forces. In fact, there wereno negotiations at Ramboullet. A compromise pro-posal for an ‘international’ presence in Kosovo madeby the representative of the Government of Yugoslaviawas ignored by the Western members of the ContactGroup which, without further ado, acquired the signa-ture of the Kosovo-Albanian representative. The finaldocument was given to the Russian delegation only onthe last day of the conference! Since then, France andUK, co-chairs of Rambouillet, have refused to releaseto the public the section of the document dealing withmilitary aspects.5

A closer examination of the military clauses of theRambouillet Accord will show why the United States and itsEuropean allies would have known in advance that such acondition would be unacceptable to any sovereign State,even a NATO member State! The provisions reduce, notonly Kosovo, but all of Yugoslavia into a colony of theUnited States, the dominant NATO power.

Sections 2,5 and 7 provide for a permanent NATO presence

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in Kosovo. OSCE would control the functioning of thepolice and justice. In case of litigation, the two partieswould have appeal to NATO and only to NATO.

Sections 6 and 7 stipulate that NATO forces will beimmune “under all circumstances and at all times”from the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Federation “inrespect of any civil, administrative, criminal or disci-plinary offenses which may be committed by them inthe FRY” (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). RichardBecker, Western Regional Co-Director of the Interna-tional Action Center, describes this provisions as com-prising “the old, hated, colonial concept of ‘extraterri-toriality,’ under which the colonizers were immunefrom being tried by the courts of the colonized country,even if they committed - as they often did - rape, murderand mayhem.”6 exempt from all provisions of the con-stitution and legislation of the Yugoslav Federation.

Sections 8 and 9 provide NATO forces, their vehiclesand equipment with free, unrestricted and unimpededaccess throughout Yugoslavia, including its airspaceand territorial waters:

Section 8: “NATO personnel shall enjoy, togetherwith their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, freeand unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughoutthe FRY including associated airspace and territorial wa-ters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right ofbivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilization of any areas orfacilities as required for support, training, and operations.”

Section 9: “NATO shall be exempted from duties,taxes, and other charges and inspections and custom regu-lations including providing inventories or other routinecustoms documentation, for personnel, vehicles, vessels,aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering, exit-ing, or transiting the territory of the FRY in support of the

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Operation.”

Sections 11 and 15 give NATO the right to use, in all ofYugoslavia and free of cost, the country’s transport infra-structure and telecommunications services, including broad-cast services;

Section ll: “NATO is granted the use of airports,roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues,tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use.”

Section 15: “The Parties (Yugoslav and Kosovo gov-ernments) shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommu-nications services, including broadcast services, neededfor the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shallinclude the right to utilize such means and services asrequired to assure full ability to communicate and the rightto use all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose,free of cost.”

Section 22 gives NATO the right to modify the country’spublic infrastructure.

Section 22: “NATO may, in the conduct of theOperation, have need to make improvements or modi-fications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such asroads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems.”

The military provisions of the Accord were in effect anultimatum to the Government of Yugoslavia with a condi-tional declaration of war, a violation of the Hague Conven-tion. International law forbids the “use of threat of force”which is “an express or implied promise by a Government toresort to force conditional on non-acceptance of certaindemands of that Government”.

Already in 1996, NATO’s General Secretary, Javier Solana,

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declared: “the experience acquired in Bosnia could serve asa model for future NATO operations.” Ivo Daalder, Direc-tor at the Brookings Institution in Washington, echoedthese sentiments: “If NATO is unable to get rid of a papertiger in the centre of Europe, then what purpose does theAlliance serve? NATO cannot lose its first war in 50 years.Kosovo constitutes a determining moment for NATO.”

The Financial Times of 21 April 1999 reveals how theWestern imperialist scenario for the Balkans was planned ina computer simulated programme run by NATO’s Consulta-tion Command and Control Agency known as C-3 and usedby NATO planners to prepare for a post-war Balkan future.As peace-talks were being held in Rambouillet, 30 seniorofficial from the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro weretaken to the Hague by the US embassy in Belgrade for fivedays of computer games! The game revolved around afictitious Moslem-dominated state, Akrona, in which civilwar had claimed 200,000 lives, displaced 60% of the peo-ple, destroyed 60% of housing, wrecked infrastructure andmade 80% of the people dependent on foreign aid. Thegame’s handbook defined Akrona’s place within the USorbit: “The US is the major player in Akrona’s world. Itbroke a logjam by creating the accords, brought shaky alliesaboard and in the end provided the military and securitystrength.” The actors in the game included the President andPrime Minister of Akrona, the foreign head of the Centralbank, the IMF and World Bank, private US banks, Nato as the“bulwark of Akronian security”, aid agencies and NGOs!

A war based on deceit

The United States and its junior partners have sought tojustify their imperialist war in the name of ‘democracy’,‘human rights’, ‘moral values’. For the first time, ‘univer-sality’ of human rights is being used to give pseudolegitimacy for military intervention in the internal

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affairs of a sovereign State, sabotaging existing mecha-nisms established within the framework of the UnitedNations and creating a precedent for new interventionsto come.

They have accused the Government of Yugoslavia of ‘ethniccleansing’ of its Kosovo Albanian population. In reality,however, prior to the bombardment, the civilian populationof Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs, were fleeing an armedconflict between the Yugoslav armed forces and the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA), which has called for coordinatedaction with NATO forces. It is only after the beginning ofthe NATO bombardment that the exodus took on massiveproportions.

That claims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ is a lie fabricated byNATO member States, the US in particular, to justifytheir bombing campaign, is revealed by foreign observ-ers, including certain OSCE7 human rights monitors of theOSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). An OSCEmonitor, Rollie Keith, is categorical8 : “I did not witness,nor did I have knowledge of any incidents of so-called‘ethnic-cleansing’ and there certainly were no ocurrencesof ‘genocidal policies’ while I was with KVM in Kosovo.”He attributes the violence in the province to “KLA provoca-tions, as personally witnessed in ambushes of securitypatrols which iflicted fatal and othre casualties” which were“clear violations of the previous October’s agreement.9 Thesecurity forces responded and the consequent securityharassment and counter-operations”. He insists that thewithdrawal of the OSCE team on 20 March “in order todeliver the penultimate warning to force Yugoslavian com-pliance with the Rambouillet and subsequent Paris docu-ments” and the start of the NATO bombardment on 24March “obviously resulted in human rights abuses and a verysignificant humanitarian disaster as some 600,000 Alba-nian Kosovars have fled or been expelled from the province... There were no internatioal refugees over the last five

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months of OSCE’s presence within Kosovo and InternalDisplaced Persons only numbered a few thousand in theweeks before the air bombardment commenced ... so Iwould attribute the humanitarian disaster directly or indi-rectly to the NATO air bombardmnt and resulting anti-terrorist campaign.”

OSCE monitors and foreign reporters in Yugoslaviaalso exposed the lie about the ‘Racak massacre’ thatwas ‘discovered’ by OSCE KVM Chief, US AmbassadorWilliam Walker. It was the lie that would lead to NATObombardment of the country and provide justificationfor it on “humanitarian grounds”. On 16 January 1999,Walker accused “Yugoslav security forces” of massa-cring 45 civilians in the village of Racak, an act ofwhich he was “personally convinced” and sent anultimative demand that investigators from the HagueTribunal be permitted to come to Kosovo an Metohijawithin 24 hours. Walker’s version was repeated byAlbanian reporters personally hand-picked by Walkerto accompany him. He had refused to allow representa-tives of the domestic media to be present. According tothe Albanian “eyewitnesses”, in the middle of the day,the police raided the village, separaed women frommen, and subsequently killed the latter. The announce-ment was made before any investigation could be car-ried out. The story of the Racak ‘massacre’ is almostidentical to that of the stories about the Sarajevo mar-ketplace of Markale and from Vase Miskine Street, thetruth of which was learned only after the Serbs hadalready been punished for what they did not do.

Soon after Walker’s announcement, Yugoslav authori-ties refuted this version and in a communique, theForeign Ministry reported that there had been an armedconfrontation in the vicinity of Racak on 15 Januarywhen KLA fighters attacked Serb police undertakingthe arrest of terrorists who had killed a police officer,

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Svetislav Przic, five days earlier. The KVM of the OSCEwas duly informed about the beginning of the arrestsand arrived at the scene of fighting.10

William Walker’s version and that of Albanian ‘eye-witnesses’ was also refuted by films shot both duringand after the fighting in Racak by the American Associ-ated Press and by Renaud Girard, correspondent inYugoslavia for the French daily “Le Figaro” on loca-tion in Racak. The version was also contradicted byOSCE monitors who were present in Racak.

On 20 and 23 January,11 Renaud Girard pointed outthat the Serb police had nothing to hide since theyinvited a television crew from the American Associ-ated Press to film their operation to arrest members ofthe KLA group in Racak, known to be a KLA base, andwho had carried out multiple criminal acts of terror-ism as per Article 125 of the Criminal Code of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. Security forces hadalso informed the OSCE Mission of the campaign, sub-sequently confirmed by a British member of the mis-sion, Neal Strechen.12 Members of the OSCE mission,travelling in two vehicles with American diplomaticplates, were also present.

Le Figaro pointed out that the available facts refute theclaims of OSCE and of the Albanian separatists thatSerbian security forces massacred 45 civilians. Ac-cording to various Western dailies, it appears that thebodies may be those of KLA members killed in thefighting with Serb police which were later gatheredtogether by KLA separatists and brought to the gully tostage a massacre.13 There were very few cartridge shellsand very little blood around the gully where 23 peoplewere found with multiple bullets in their heads. For-eign and domestic experts determined the unnaturalposition of the bodies of the victims. There were tracks

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and traces of brain showing that the bodies had beendragged from the vicinity. Despite the presence ofjournalists and observers in the town durng the KLA-Serb fighting, there were no eyewitnesses and the bod-ies were ‘discovered’ only on the day after the fighting.At the time of the ‘massacre’, the village was under thecontrol of the KLA and the films shot by foreign report-ers showed that Serb police could not move aroundopenly. The residents of the abandoned village of Racakdid not recognize among the victims any of their neigh-bours from the village. Yugoslav forensic experts per-forming autopsies on the bodies declared that “not oneof the bodies showed evidence that the victim wasexecuted”. The Director of the Institute for ForensicMedicine of the Faculty of Medicine in Pristina statedthat eminent patholigists, including two fromBelorussia, had performed autopsies on five bodies andthat none bore signs of injury caused exclusively byfire-arms and that there was no sign of injuries “whichwould support that theyh ad been massacred or other-wise tampered with”. Two members of the OSCE Mis-sion were constantly present at the autopsy.

Inside the OSCE Mission, the conclusion had beenreached, on the basis of evidence available, that the‘massacre’ was, indeed, staged by the KLA. Officials ofthe Mission, who had asked to remain anonymous,informed that they had inspected 15 bodies and deter-mined that some of them were moved.14 According toone monitor, most of the bodies were brought from thesurrounding area. Many were KLA fighters killed in anarmed combat with Serb forces and “were subsequentlydressed in civilian clothes”.15 Willy Wimmer, Vice-president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly toldthe private German television NTV that he rejecs withdisgust manipulation by television pictures intendedto provoke an intervention by NATO in Kosovo andMetohija: “Everything is directed toward provoking a

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certain reaction so that certain pictures create thedesire to immediately issue orders to our soldiers togo into action.”16

The US Chief of the OSCE KVM and NATO Govern-ments went out of their way to prevent the truth of the‘massacre’ being known. Walker prevented the inves-tigating judge from carrying out the on-site investiga-tion on 16 January by demanding that she go withoutpolice protection. Having prevented the country’s ju-dicial and state authorities from carrying out theirduty, Walker himself arrived at the scene on the sameday, accompanied by foreign and Albanian jouralists,and made the dramatic declaration! Outraged by thearrogance of a US Ambassador behaving like an occu-pation force, the Yugoslav Government accused Walkerof intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereignstate: “such an attitude did not come for the first timeto the fore in his statement and in his preventing thatthe investigating judge carry out her duty according tothe laws of her own country. He probably forgot that heis not a Govenor or a Prosecutor or a judge in Serbia orin the FRY but the representative of the organization of54 equal staties and the head of the mission whose taskis not to rule the territory of a sovereign country but toobserve and report accurately.”17

Moreover, before any investigating could be carried, Walkerbrought with him Albanian reporters and allowed them towalk all over the site thus covering up the tracks. We allknow that under normal circumstances, the site of a death iscordoned off to prevent evidence from being removed orcovered up.

In addition, the 21 kilo report of a forensic expert teamsent by the European Union to investigate the circum-stances of death, which was ready at the beginning ofMarch, was not made public. Procedural and other

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arguments were used, especially by the EU President,German Chancellor Schröder, to prevent the contentsbeing divulged during the Rambouillet meeting.18 TheOSCE, itself, admitted indirectly to this.19 The head ofthe team, Finland’s Dr. Helena Ranta, was apparentlyinstructed by Bonn not to reveal the contents and tofollow directions given by German authorities. How-ever, the contents are known within OSCE circles: thatthe massacre was substantially manipulated on theAlbanian side!20

The motivation behind Walker’s announcement is ob-vious today: to prepare public opinion for NATO ag-gression and to create a precedent for what BritishPrime Minister Blair calls ‘the new kind of war’!Immediately after the announcement, German Chan-cellor Schröder warned that, for the first time since 54years, German troops could be sent to the Balkans andthat the event justified “direct intervention on humani-tarian grounds” without a mandate from the UN Secu-rity Council.21 An article in New York Times showsthat the US Administration knew in advance of thewhole scenario of the ‘massacre’. A week before, offic-ers at the highest levels had indicated that the Admin-istration was expecting a “decisive moment”, a “keyevent”, in order to take further steps.22

NATO General Secretary, Javier Solana, himself iden-tified this event as a turning point in the developmentof the crisis. It was after Walker’s announcement of the“Racak massacre” that the governments of the ‘Con-tact Group’ summoned the Government of Yugoslaviato Rambouillet threating military reprisals should itrefuse to present itself!

The sordid career of William Walker shows that he waschosen to head the OSCE Kosovo Verification Missionnot for any commitment to human rights but because of

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his willingness to lie or to keep quiet.23 Almost hisentire career in the foreign service was spent in Cen-tral and South America, including a highly controver-sial posting as Deputy Chief of Mission in Honduras inthe early 1980s, at the time and place where the Contrarebel force was formed. In 1985 he became the DeputyAssistant Secretary of State for Central America and inthe Reagan and Bush White Houses held responsibilityfor the Operation to overthrow the government ofNicaragua. According to information contained in In-dependent Counsel Lawrence Walsh’s lengthy indict-ment of Eliot Abrams, Walker was responsible forsetting up a phony humanitarian operation at an airbasein Ilopanngo, El Salvador, which was used to funnelguns, ammunition and supplies to the Contra rebels inNicaragua. Despite being named in the indictment,Walter was named US Ambassador to El Salvador from1988 to 1992, during the reign of terror by the deathsquadrons, many of whom were trained in US militaryacademies.

In Central America, Walker did not display the moraldisgust that he does in Yugoslavia. In late 1989, whenSalvadorean soldiers execute six Jesuit priests, theirhousekeeper and her 15 year-old daughter, blowingtheir heads off with shotguns, he dismissed the murdersas a “management control problems” which can “existin these kind of situations.” Confronted with eyewit-ness reports that the murders had been committed bymen in Salvadorean army uniforms, Walker told Mas-sachusetts congressman, Joe Moakley: “anyone can getuniforms. The fact that they were dressed in militaryuniforms was not proof that they were military.” Onthe question of the wider problem of state violence andrepression, Walter remarked “I’m not condoning it,but in times like this of great emotion and great anger,things like this happen”. Later, Walker recommendedto the Secretary of State, James Baker, that the US

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should “not jeopardize” its relationship with El Salva-dor by investigating “past deaths, however heinous”.

William Walker’s career shows that he is not an ordi-nary State Department employee. After the ChineseRevolution, the State Department enacted the Wristonreform which required the rotation out of their postsevery few years to prevent the development of “exces-sive” sympathies towards the culture of host countries.As a result, most State employees are moved around toposts in different parts of the world. It is, however,well-known among career foreign service diplomatsthat one of the few exceptions to this rule are CIAagents in the embassies. Until his arrival in Kosovo,Walker spent virtually his entire career in LatinAmerica. In the light of the Racak incident which wasused as an excuse for military action in Yugoslavia, onewonders what indeed was Walter’s role in Kosovo!

A secret report24 by an Italian monitor, using the pseu-donym, ‘Ulysse’, shows how the United States used theOSCE mission to provide partial and fabricated infor-mation for public consumption. The supposedly “neu-tral and civilian” observer mission was in reality pri-marily a military mission headed by US AmbassadorWalter who travelled in a OSCE vehicle brandishingan American Flag and was infiltrated with severalAmerican agents. According to ‘Ulysse’, “the militaryconstituted more than 70% of the so-called ‘civilian’mission, moving around in uniforms, like NATO sol-diers. End November, only 14 Italians remained, ofwhich only two were civilian. To save face.” All infor-mation activities were immediately placed under“Anglo-American” control, who then transmitted tothe observers “carefully ‘cleansed’ reports”. Observ-ers from other countries were excluded: “The Russianswere immediately excluded from the intelligence sec-tor of the head office. And we noticed a clear contradic-

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tion between the Anglo-American and the Franco-Ger-man positions.” Moreover, the reports were drafted by“American officers and local Albanian personnel (sic!).Italians, Russians and Dutch were suspected of beingpro-Serb for having reported cases of human rightsviolations by the Albanians and members of KLA.”

Official German documents and judgements of Ger-man tribunals also reveal the falsity of claims of ‘ethniccleansing’ and ‘massacres’ by the Yugoslav Govern-ment. A situation report of the German Foreign Minis-try of 18 November 1999 pointed out that there was noevidence to prove the existence of ‘massacres’ or ‘massgraves’ claimed by the press: “the repeated press re-ports of ‘massacres’ and reports about ‘mass graves’contributed to alarming the refugees, but could not asyet be confirmed by international observers.”25

Unpublished official documents26 sent to various statetribunals by Germany’s Foreign Ministry also statethat there is no evidence of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and noevidence of a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ facing thepopulation of Kosovo. According to information providedto the High Court of Lower Saxony, “the measures of thesecurity forces are primarily aimed at combating the KLA,which through terrorist means is fighting for the independ-ence of Kosovo and, according to some of its spokesmen,even for the creation of ‘Greater Albania’”.27 Another docu-ment of 12 January 1999 sent to the Administrative Courtof Trier states: “There is no evidence of political persecu-tion explicitly aimed at the Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo.So far the eastern part of Kosovo is not affected by thearmed conflict, civilian life in the cities Pristina, Urosevac,Ginijilan, etc. is relatively normal.” The “actions of thesecurity forces (was) not aimed at the Kosovo-Albanians asan ethnically defined group, but against the armed oppo-nents and their actual or suspected supporters.”28

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Various courts in Germany have concluded that there is nostate planned programme of persecution aimed at the KosovoAlbanians as an ethnic group. On 24 February 1999, theHigh Court of Münster concluded: “There is insufficientevidence to show that there is a secret programme or a silentconsensus on the Serbian side to annihilate, expel or topersecute in any other extreme manner as has been pro-jected, the Albanian people... When the Serbian state powerputs into effect its laws and thereby exerts the necessarypressure on those Albanians who depart from or boycott theState, the objective aim of these measures is precisely nota programmed persecution of this ethnic group... Evenshould the Serbian State benevolently put up with or evenintend that a part of the population, who in such a situationsee no future for themselves or seek to escape coercion,evade abroad, this, by no means represents a programme ofpersecution aimed at the entire Albanian population (inKosovo) in its majority.”29

Already on 29 October 1998, the Administrative Tribunal inBayern, referring to violence in Kosovo since February1998, had concluded that “now as before, there is no Stateprogramme of persecution aimed at the ethnic Albanians asa group. Not even a regional group persecution aimed at allethnic Albanians in a specific area of Kosovo...The violentactions of the Yugoslav military and police since February1998 is aimed at separatist activities and is not proof ofpersecution of the entire ethnic group of Albanians fromKosovo or a part of it. Yugoslav violence and excessessince February 1998 is a matter of selective violent actionagainst the armed underground movement (particularlyKLA) and its surroundings in their territory of opera-tions.”30

That the ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ witnessed today isbeyond doubt one provoked by the NATO bombardmentof Yugoslavia is confirmed in recent reports from for-eign observers visiting Yugoslavia and foreign corre-

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spondents based in the country. On his return from avisit to Kosovo, Paul-Marie de la Gorce, writer andessayist from France, is categorical that the situationin the province and the subsequent exodus of KosovoAlbanians is not the result of what Western leaders call‘ethnic cleansing’: “before the launching of the war thesituation was bad, characterised by the activities ofKLA and by counter-offensives of the province’s mili-tia and later Yugoslav forces ... there were populationmovements provoked by the fighting; there were hu-man losses as always happens in such situations, but itwas nothing compared to what happened afterwards.”He described the reasons for the exodus as “diverse andcomplex”: “First, the fear of reprisals by Yugoslavforces or the Serbian population. Second, obviously,the bombardment..it is useless to deny it. We knowfrom experience of contemporary war that bombingsforce populations to flee whatever their political sen-timents. The third reason is the existence of zones ofcombat. Finally, perhaps wherever there is a concen-tration of the Yugoslav army, it does not wish to see atits side an Albanian population, reputedly hostile.”31

The thesis of ‘genocide’ advanced by NATO leaders isalso rejected by Fatmi Seholi, spokesman for Demo-cratic Initiative of Kosovo, a political party of KosovoAlbanians opposed to KLA’s fight for independence. Inan interview with Paul Watson, correspondent for ‘LosAngeles Times’,32 Seholi declared: “As an Albanian, Iam convinced that the Serbian goverment and its secu-rity forces are not committing any kind of genocide.But in a war, even innocent people die. In every war,there are those who want to profit. Here there is aminority who wanted to rob, but this is not genocide.These are only crimes.” Seholi also pointed out that,after the wave of looting, killings and other types ofaggression, the Government had taken measures torestore order and that Albanians have begun to return,

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often under police protection. If more Kosovo Albani-ans are not publicly questioning the accusations of‘crimes against humanity’ made against Yugoslav lead-ers and security forces, it is also for fear of being killedby KLA, as was Seholi’s father who was murdered byKLA in January 1997 apparently for having being “toocooperative” with Serbian authorities.

What NATO powers are also seeking to hide is that theKLA is a ruthless clandestine armed group which,since 1996, was equipped and trained by the Germansecret service as it did the Croatian militia. Shocktroops of the military secret service in Berlin(Kommandos Spezialkräfte) provided operationaltraining, arms, transmission material and black uni-forms taken from the stocks of former East Germany’sStasi. At the end of 1998, the US entered into contactwith KLA and decided to back, i.e., instrumentalize, theorganisation. Bases were established in northern Al-bania and western Macedonia. The KLA made itselfknown on 11 February 1996, when it claimed responsi-bility for bomb attacks against five Serbian refugeecamps in Krajina. Alone in 1997, the KLA carried out14 attacks in Kosovo and one in Macedonia. All ‘trai-tors’ were systematically eliminated. On 7 January1998, the KLA announced that it will carry the war toMacedonia. In other words, it was fighting not only forthe independence of Kosovo but for the creation of a‘Greater Albania, which would include Albania,Kosovo, one-third of Montenegro and the western halfof Macedonia. In mid-February 1998 it launched itsfirst major offensive and within 5 months ‘liberated’some 30% of the territory. In the ‘liberated’ areas,KLA prohibited all political parties, physically at-tacked other minorities, Serbs, gypsies and the goran(Macedonian muslims), and denounced Ibrahim Rugova,his political party and the Kosovan parliament.33

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Political leaders, NATO and the media have remained sig-nificantly silent about the thousands of Kosovo Albanianswho have sought refuge in Belgrade with Serbian families.They have also remained silent about the fact that before thebombardment, more Serbs were fleeing Kosovo than Alba-nians. In the past 20 years, the Albanian population inKosovo increased from 70 to 90 percent. Since the war,along with Albanians, Serbs are fleeing Kosovo in theirthousands.

War, the expansion of capitalism by other means

The global expansion of corporate interests, manifestsitself through the phenomenon of ‘globalization’ or ‘impe-rialism’, the global expression of capitalism pursued do-mestically. War in its various forms is the militarymeans by which capitalism acquires vast markets, apermanent supply of cheap labour and raw materials,essential to counteract the inexorable decline in itsrate of profit.

In a 1967 report that was subsequently published in1969 with the title “Undesirable Peace” with a prefaceby J. K. Galbraith, 15 American experts affirmed thatwar is the sole technique available today for the stabil-ity of capitalism: “War fulfils certain essential func-tions for the stability of our society ... although we donot affirm that, for the economy, it is impossible toimagine a substitute for war, no set of techniques aimedat maintaining control over employment, productionand consumption has ever been tried that is even dis-tantly comparable to its efficiency. War was, and is,from far, the essential element of stability in modernsocieties...”

The global crisis of capitalism, now threatening the UnitedStates at the very heart of the system, characterized by a

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wave of frantic corporate mergers, acquisitions andalliances, could be off-set only through an accelerationof its control over the global economy. The multiplica-tion of US sanctions is also a reflection of a deflationaryglobal economy which, in other words, means thatcapitalism is undergoing a crisis of overproduction - a‘global glut’. Only two months ago, Time Magazine pub-lished on its front page a picture of Rubin, Greenspan andSummers, describing them as “the Committee to Save theWorld”. At the same time, meetings of G-7, the WorldEconomic Forum in Davos and the Bretton Woods institu-tions acknowledged that a great economic crisis was threat-ening global capitalism. George Soros shocked Congressrecently when he said bluntly, “The global capitalistsystem ... is coming apart at the seams”.34 The USeconomy is reaching the end of an economic cycle. It isfeared that growth will transform itself into a ‘hardlanding’. Patrick Artus, chief economist at the ‘Caissedes Dépots’ notes: “The next crisis will probably emergefrom the financial bubble and indebtedness of the Ameri-can economy.”35 This end of the cycle manifests itselfparadoxically through extravagant figures in WallStreet. The capitalization of American stocks rosesharply from 60% of GDP in 1993 to 120% in 1998, andDow Jones continues to increase without any relationto profits to be gained. The US must, therefore, main-tain the domination of the dollar. The war managementof the end of the American cycle is strongly supportedby European Union countries. In 1998, FF 930 billionleft Europe mainly to the United States. In exchange,the European Union removed all trade and other barri-ers to facilitate mergers by global corporations.

Only ten years after Western capitalist powers de-clared the ‘victory of capitalism’ following the fall ofthe Berlin Wall, the totality of capitalist postulates -markets, mobility, transparence, trade - is being in-creasingly challenged the world over. The challenge to

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all these ‘values’ imposed under the guise of ‘moder-nity’ was sufficiently important that even the influen-tial financial magazine, Business Week, could not ig-nore it when the global crisis, after Asia and Russia, hitBrazil, in the Amercia’s ‘backyard’: “The Americanmodel is attacked everywhere. The market is increas-ingly perceived as the enemy of growth. Nations arewithdrawing from it in order to respond to one of thelargest ever destruction of wealth.”36

That this crisis was seen as a serious threat to Ameri-can ‘national interests’ by the political and financialcouple, fathers of the so-called “American miracle”, isreflected in a statement made by one of them, RobertRubin, former US Treasury Secretary on 3 June 1998:“I am profoundly concerned - and I can tell you that thePresident shares these concerns - about the weakeningof public support for globalization at a moment wheneconomic interests, national security and geopoliticsof the country require the opposite ... Never have somany countries faced so many difficulties at the sametime.”37

In the US, the “high-tech” industry is seen as the engineof the ‘crisis-free’ ‘new economy. With the threat of acrisis looming ahead, NATO could be the aircraft car-rier for US economic interests with the more or lessreluctant approval of the European Union. WesternEurope and Japan are the chief competitors of the US inglobal markets. The European Union’s vision of globalhegemony is seen as a threat by Washington and themilitary industry, reflected in the warning by Chair-man of Lockheed-Martin, Vance Coffman, about thecreation of a “Fortress Europe” as Western Europeandefense industry consolidates.38 In the context, Wash-ington must find bogeymen to frighten these countriesinto spending billion on, and investing in, America’smilitary industry and its products. This would simulta-

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neously serve the purpose of rendering Western Europesmore dependent on US imperialism as well as ensurethe transfer of national income through Wall Street tothe military-industrial complex.

President Milosevic’s refusal to allow a NATO militarypresence on Yugoslav territory represented a challenge toUS strategy to pursue the process of integrating into NATO,after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, also Albania,Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. For thoseimpoverished countries, £ 22 billion weapons buildup willbe required. The beneficiaries will be the world’s dominantarms industries of the US and Britain - the contract forfighter aircraft alone is worth £10 billion. Private sectorfinancing of NATO’s 50th anniversary gala amounted to $ 8million. Corporate chief executives paid $250,000 to sit ona host committee that included Ameritech, Daimler-Chrysler, Boeing, Ford Motor, General Motors, Honeywell,Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nextel, SBC Communica-tions, TRW and United Technologies.

To Eastern European countries that recently joined NATO,they intend to sell weapons, form networks, elevators,airconditioners, heaters and many other commodities. Tothe leading NATO war-makers they want to sell cell-phones,two-way radios, military supplies, communicationequipments.

War provides the justification for the transfer of publicwealth to the financial and economic elites through theState military establishment, while reducing social spend-ing. Expanding the military system is the preferred deviceto force the public to subsidize high-technology industryand provide a state-guaranteed market for its production.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US lost the mainjustification it gave its people for its huge military budgetthat served to sustain a substantial portion of the US economy

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and to maintain the profit levels of the big capitalist corpo-rations. The defence budget had to be reduced and theAmerican people had to be provided with fresh pretexts formaintaining its military arsenals to cope with alleged threatsto the security of the United States and the protection of itsinterests in other parts of the world. Its military and politi-cal experts worked out regional strategies and they foundregional bogeys in North Korea for East Asia, in Iraq for theMiddle East, and of late, in Yugoslavia for Europe. The lastmentioned provided the pretext for the resuscitation andstrengthening of NATO. Earlier the Gulf War provided thepretext for the production and maintenance of aircraftcarriers and sophisticated military aircraft. When Indiaproduced a nuclear device even India began to be held out asa potential threat to US security in South Asia. The mediaand the various groups of academics, journalists and otherswho serve the economic, political and military interests ofthe ruling class in the United States, serve to keep the USpublic continuously mis-informed and so misguided as tothe true purposes of the current ruling strata in the US. Theydo likewise for the rest of the world.

It is in this economic context that the US State power,headed by Bill Clinton, has launched its military interven-tion in Yugoslavia. At the end of 1998, Pentagon an-nounced that the financial crisis in Asia was a “coresecurity concern” for the US. On 20 April 1999, hardly amonth into the bombing, the IMF declared that only Europecould offset the inevitable slowdown in the US economycaused by “the adverse external environment”.39 There canbe no doubt that the President not only consultated hismilitary strategic advisors, but also his economic strategicbefore launching the war. There can also be no doubt thatBlair, Chirac, Schröder and the rest of the European alliesand collaborators of the US State in Europe would them-selves have been aware of the economic crisis in which theywere called upon to collaborate with the US decision onmilitary intervention. The economic crisis has not been

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resolved and it will continue to underlie the development ofthe US war in Europe. Hence, the war against Yugoslaviais a manifestation of a major crisis of capitalism.

Today, the war-mongers are in full cry and the war produc-tion industries are being geared for full production whichmay help to sustain the US military-industrial complex inthe first place to stave off the crisis of capitalism that hasbeen threatening. While the war itself creates more busi-ness in the short term for the industry, winning the war willensure the continuous flow of ever greater profits as morecountries are brought into the system.

The foreign policy of the United States is intricately linkedto the construction of a global system of domination subor-dinated to the needs of its own economy: “Our interestsand our ideals compel us not only to undertake but todirect... We must promote democracy and marketeconomy in the world because it protects our interestsand our security, and because it reflects values whichare at once American and universal.”40 Hence, Ameri-can values of markets and democracy are the sole andinseparable values of a universal character. They musttherefore be imposed on the rest of the world for theirown sake. “What is good for General Motors is goodfor America”, and what is good for America is .....

Once, referring to the world order, Winston Churchilldeclared that the “defense of democracy and human rights”and “democracy” is successfully achieved once govern-ment is in the hands of “the rich men dwelling at peacewithin their habitations”. The political histories of theUnited States and its allies shows that the concept ofdemocracy promoted by the elites in power - whether fromthe right or from the left of the political mainstream -differs from, and is incompatible with, that aspired to byordinary working people within these same countries. Incapitalist democracies, politics is effectively reduced to

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interactions among groups of investors who compete forcontrol of the State. Hence, when governments and politi-cians speak of defending “national security interests”, theymean those special interests of one sector only: corpora-tions, financial institutions and other business elites.

The governments that are at war outside are simultaneouslyfighting another war against their own people inside theircountries: dismantling social programmes, public enter-prises and services, transferring, through the military sys-tem, public funds to advanced industry and to the wealthysectors generally: aircraft industry and its by-productsalong with steel and metal generally, electronics, chemi-cals, machine tools, automation and robotics and othercentral components of the industrial economy. Unemploy-ment, under-employment, homelessness, disease, illiteracyis growing rapidly in all these countries.

The US concept of democracy is “closely identified withprivate, capitalistic enterprise” and ‘free markets’. Accord-ing to Samuel Huntington, “the United States must maintainits international primacy for the benefit of the world be-cause, alone among nations, its national identity is definedby a set of universal political and economic values, namelyliberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets,accordingly the promotion of democracy, human rights andmarkets are (sic) far more central to American policy thanto the policy of any other country.”41

In line with these ‘values’, the United States has not hesi-tated to use force wherever the interests of its corporateelite have been threatened. The historical record of the USand its Western European allies shows that a solicitousconcern for democracy and human rights may go hand inhand with tolerance for large-scale slaughter, or directparticipation in it, as in Latin America, Marcos in thePhilippines, enthusiastic backing for General Suharto’smass murder in East Timor and Indonesia, Mobutu in Zaire.

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Yesterday, elected governments were subverted and over-thrown in Guatemala, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Chile,Laos, and large-scale terror organized against democracyand independence in Nicaragua, Cuba and elsewhere!42 Theenemies are invariably ‘rogue states’, ‘Communists’, ‘na-tionalists’, ‘fascists’, ‘fundamentalists’, ‘psychopaths’, etc.,but never ‘democrats’!

The double-standard of Western capitalist democraciesdoes not allow them to act in favour of 800,000 Kurds whohave fled a war with almost 30,000 dead, or in favour of855,124 children who, according to UNICEF, have died inIraq between 1991 and 1997 because of the embargo.Today, two-thirds of the world’s population is under oneform or other of US sanctions.43 What credibility canthen be accorded when ‘moral values’ and ‘humani-tarianism’ is invoked by the US and its European col-laborators to justify the aggression against the peoplesof the Balkans: “this campaign is being fought for a setof human values - to assert that there are some crimesso heinous that the community of nations will act topunish them even when they occur within nationalborders.”44

Under the guise of safeguarding Europe against so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Yugoslavia, NATO is en-gaged in ‘political cleansing’ of an intractable rulingregime in Yugoslavia. So far Milosevic remains whilethe country’s economic infrastructure, industrial baseand civilian infrastructure is being demolished and itspeoples - irrespective of ethnic origins - terrorized.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Ger-many, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, andwith former socialist countries of Eastern Europe eager tojoin the Western club, the US strategy for domination hadto adapted. The Clinton Doctrine announced in September1993 by National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, re-

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flected this shift from ‘containment’ to ‘enlargement’ (‘roll-back’ in the case of Russia), ‘consolidation’ and ‘perfec-tion’: “Throughout the Cold War, we contained a globalthreat to market democracies: now we should seek to en-large their reach’. A year later, he expanded this concept:the “new world” opening before us “presents immenseopportunities” to move forward to “consolidate the victoryof democracy and open markets”. Salina Khan, writing inUSA Today, pointed out that many US corporations, par-ticularly defense contractors such as Lockheed MartinCorp have played “an active role ... in the move to enlargeNATO beyond its traditional US-Western European axis”.

In the view of the Americans, the Eurasian continentwhich extends upto China and including India, consti-tutes the pivot of the world. The importance of control-ling this region is justified by the fact that “it containsapproximately 75% of the world’s population ... thegreater part of the physical wealth in the form ofcorporations or raw material deposits. The global GNPof the continent amounts for some 60% of the globaltotal. Three-quarters of the world’s known energy re-sources is concentrated there... After the US, six of themost prosperous economies and six largest defencebudgets are to be found there, including all holders ofnuclear weapons... All the political and/or economicrivals of the United States as well. Their cumulativepower far surpasses that of the United States. Happilyfor the latter, the continent is too vast to realize itspolitical unity.”45

In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Security Adviserto former US President Carter and member of theCenter for Strategic and International Studies, “Eura-sia remains the chess-board upon which the strugglefor global primacy takes place .. As Eurasia is situatedin the centre of the world, whoever controls this conti-nent will control the planet... The appearance of a rival

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in Eurasia capable of dominating this continent anddefying America will put into question its objectives.”46

This concern is part of US strategic objectives to ‘roll-back’ the influence of Russia, which it intends to continueto isolate. Brzezinski see three reasons for this. First, itis the region that links the Eurasia from East to West.Secondly, Russia and the former Soviet republics stillunder its influence contain vast deposits of naturalresources. Thirdly, political instability in Russia issuch that there could be a threat of nationalists orCommunists taking power. Weakening Russia, even acapitalist one, is the condition for the unrivalled pillage ofEurasia. Brzezinski proposes that Russia be disman-tled in three parts, European, Asian and Central.47

Controlling Yugoslavia would also deprive Russia ofits principal support in the Balkans as well asimportanat access to the Mediterranean Sea. In 1992,Caspar Weinberger, former US Defence Secretary, wrote“if Moscow succeeds in dominating the Caspian Sea (and itspetrol), this victory could be more important than theenlargement of the West was for the Occident”. Rollingback Russia is part of strategy of global domination toimpose control over a vast ‘Eurasian’ region representing75% of the world’s population and 60% of global produc-tion. Controlling this vast region to guarantee US leader-ship is, according to Brzezinski, to ensure domination ofthe whole world.

Despite promises made by the Western capitalist countriesto bring prosperity to Eastern Europe and countries of theformer Soviet Union, the objective of the imperialist pow-ers - United States and Germany, in particular - is to turn thisvast region of the world into suppliers of cheap labour forceand to exploit its vital raw material for the benefit oftransnational capital. Russia’s potential resources in rawmaterial alone is estimated at US$ 140,000 billion!.48

NATO’s warning in 1991 to the rising challenge to its

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economic model was clear: “We will continue to support,with all means available to us, the reforms undertaken in theEast and efforts aimed at creating market economies”!49

The hostility of China and Russia toward NATO inter-vention in Yugoslavia under US leadership must beseen in this context. The region coveted by the Americais of strategic importance for both these countries. Inan unprecedented recent ackowledgement in an offi-cial newspaper, China indicated that it will need toimport 40% of its oil by 2010, up from less than 20now.50 Hence, securing a stable supply of oil and gaswill become a central factor in China’s foreign policy.The basis of China’s energy security strategy is todiversify sources of supply increasingly toward Rus-sia, Central Asia, Iran and the Middle East. The strate-gic importance for China of the republics of CentralAsia, especially Kazakhstan, goes beyond the fact thatthey are rich in oil. They also border China’s Moslemdominated north-west region. Hence, the view amongmany Chinese officials that NATO aggression againstYugoslavia is aimed at expanding its sphere of afflu-ence: “Where will NATO stop? Will they next inter-vene in Azerbaijan or maybe in Tajikistan on China’sborder?”, as one Chinese official.51 The People’sLberation Army has also recently called for a review ofits military strategy in the light of the war againstYugoslavia. Over time, control over the South ChinaSea through which oil tankers supplying its ports mustpass, would also become crucial for China.

Control over the evolution of a new international orderconstitutes one of the challenges of the war. Yugoslaviaholds a strategic position in the Balkans, a region that is vitalfor the further expansion of capital. US control over theregion will be guaranteed through the imposition of itsmilitary bases in the Balkans. The region not only repre-sents a market to be conquered and source of raw mate-

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rial to be pillaged. It also controls key points of access tothe Near and Middle-East through its main navigation routesand infrastructure to major oil resources in the region ofgrowing tension for the United States. Kazakhstan,Turkemenistan and Azerbaidjan are reported to contain oiland gas reserves equivalent to that of the Gulf region today.Already in 1992, the US Senator, Robert Dole, declared thatthe frontiers of American concern to control oil and gasresources had advanced from the Gulf region “towards theNorth and including the Caucasius, Siberia and Kazakhstan!”Access to the Caucasius through the Black Sea is possiblethrough the Danube, where Yugoslavia occupies a strategicposition, and/or Kosovo through which a new US sponsoredpipe-line project is planned.

In the logic of imperialist expansion, Yugoslavia rep-resents an obstacle in the region for the United Statesand its main allies. Although the Government of Yugo-slavia has been open to privatisation of public enter-prise, it has remained opposed to a radical change insocial property.52 Quentin Peel points out that “withthe one glaring exception”, practically all countries ofthe former Soviet bloc in Central Europe have eitherjoined or are seeking to join the European Union. Peelcontinues, “NATO leaders will undoubtedly be obsessedwith this exception”.53 presented. The aim of EuropeanUnion leader Germany’s “stability pact” for the Bal-kans is precisely to bring Yugoslavia within its orbit ofcontrol: to create “lasting conditions for democracy, amarket economy and regional cooperation” that would tiesouth-eastern European countries “firmly in the Euro-At-lantic structures”.54 In a similar vein, at its recent sum-mit, NATO announced that it planned to upgrade itssecurity relations with Balkan countries through itspartnership for peace programmes.

This must be taken into account in taking a broaderapproach to geo-strategic concerns for global domina-

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tion. The eruption of China in the diplomatic processsince the attack against its Embassay in Belgrad re-flects not only the international character of the warand the stakes involved, but also the place held by Chinanot only as permanent member of the UN SecurityCouncil. As cynically stated by Brzeznski, “the fact isthat the stakes are infinitely more than simply thefuture of Kosovo”.55

Beyond the credibility of NATO’s action in Yugoslaviaand NATO itself, there is fear about the emergence of apotential danger in the near future: the birth of a largecoalition between China and Russia and perhaps Iran,in an anti-hegemonic coalition. “In order to avoid thiseventuality, unlikely today, the US must deploy all itsgeo-strategic abilities along the perimeters of Eurasiaor, at least, in the West, East and South”. “But a Sino-Japanese axis, even a localized one, would have greaterconsequences. It could only emerge from a collapse ofthe US defence system in the Far-East and out of aradical re-orientation of Japanese foreign policy.”56 Itis easy to understand why, right in the middle of the waragainst Yugoslavia, the Diet approved new legislationon military cooperation between US and Japan re-orientating the objectives of the alliance to enlarge thepossibility of intervention and logistical support forJapan’s military self-defence system and in case ofcrisis that could affect American ‘security’ in the re-gion!

When President Milosevic refused to permit NATO troopsto occupy Yugoslavia, it was clear that the total subordina-tion of the country could be achieved only through themassive destruction of its economic base. Where politicsfail to bring a country to its knees, war becomes the neces-sary means. Seen in its global context, Yugoslavia is not justa part of the Balkans but a part of Western Europe, i.e.,capitalist Europe, which next to the United States, is a

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principal supporter of global capitalism. In effect, Yugosla-via has been chosen as the pretext for the US militaryintervention in Europe.

The destruction of the economic base of Yugoslavia wouldpermit the entry of American and Western European capitalto ‘re-build’ the country. But that is not all. The war alsoshows that US capital must, in order to counteractdecline in profit rates, gain or re-gain control over theproduction, distribution and consumption of goodsand services. Not surprisingly public enterprises or re-cently nationalized private enterprises have become tar-gets for NATO bombs, justified by Pentagon spokesman,Kenneth Bacon, because of the “control” by PresidentMilosevic of “the entire economic sector”! Hence, amongthe targets of NATO are Galenika (the recently nationalizedpharmaceutical company owned by US corporation ICN ofPasadena, California), the automobile company Zastava, acigarette factory and tobacco warehouses in Nis, the C-chain of food stores, the Beopetrol chain of petrol outlets,Technogas and Progres which imports Russian gas,Jugopetrol which refines and distributes petroleum prod-ucts, Sartid steel plant of Smederevo, etc. etc.

The steel industry is a significant example of how thewar will enable the US steel industry to counteractdeclining profit rates by wielding control over globalproduction. The steel industry is facing profound chal-lenges in the global economy. Declining profits withgrowing global overcapacity and prices plunging in adeflatinary spiral have sparked the erection of tariffwalls and ‘anti-dumping measures’. Much of the grow-ing global overcapacity is concentrated in EasternEurope, then Asia, then Western Europe. In 1998, theUS urged the European Union to impose duties onSerbian steel, imports of which increased by 77% in thefirst six months. Paul Wilhelm, president of US SteelGroup, speaking for his industry at a high-level meet-

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ing at the White House in November proclaimed, “Weare in a crisis”, a warning that is being echoed inEurope.

A war on American terms

The American strategy of global expansion and dominationrequires that it be “inside” not against Europe. ZbignewBrezenski writes: “the central problem for America is tobuild an Europe founded on viable relations linked to theUnited States in order to extend the international system ofdemocratic cooperation upon which will depend the exer-cise of global hegemony of America.”The ‘Washington Consensus’ on the subject reflected in areport of the new US Council on Foreign Relations is that:“the United States should draw Europe, over time, muchfurther into a global strategic partnership to help shape theinternational system in the new era”. William Wallace,professor of international relations at the London Schoolof Economics points out that “this is to be a partnership onAmerican terms”.57 Hence, in relation to the NATO’swar against Yugoslavia, the date and hour, the strategicobjectives, the use of airpower and missiles, were alldecided by the US President and his chiefs of staff!58 The‘new strategic concept’ adopted the recent NATO Sum-mit allows the US to preserve peace and reinforcesecurity and stability “throughout the Euro-Atlanticregion”, which includes the 19 alliance members and28 other countries with him it has partnership ar-rangements.

That the ‘partnership’ whether with Western Europe orJapan will be on American terms, with the latter playing therole of ‘junior partner’ is evident in measures that theUnited States continues to take against its economic rivalsthat seek to cash in on the crisis. Sanctions against Europeanpartners aimed at forcing open their markets for genetically

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modified organisms and dollar- bananas. Threats to theJapanese steel industry to impose tariffs of upto 17,86 to61,14 percent of the value of certain products. Even beforethe decision is taken by the US International Trade Commis-sion, exporters are being obliged to pay the tariff. On themilitary front the United States has sought to preventthe emergence of an independent Western Europeanmilitary force. A crucial consideration for the US is toensure that any potential threat is brought first toNAGO, giving it a right of “first refusal”. The creationin June 1996 of an European group of a multinationalmilitary force within NATO in June 1996 ensured thatall military decisions taken by Europe is authorized byWashington. Although the Group is under the author-ity of the Western European Union (WEU), it can onlybe used with the approval of NATO, i.e, only with theapproval of Washington. At the recent NATO summit,agreement was reached that the European buildup theirmilitary unity primarily within NATO and not sepa-rately under the EU.

The recognition by Western Europe of US leadership withinNATO applies also in the domain of logistics, infrastruc-ture and in research and development. The share of thedefense budget spent by the United States on research anddevelopment is almost four times superior to that spent bythe EU countries, with the latter spending US$ 10 billionand the former US$ 36 billion.

The shared economic and political interests between theUnited States and its Western European allies manifestsitself in the ‘New Transatlantic Marketplace’ and the related‘Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation’, inwhich agreement extends to even the use of force andunilateral coercive measures wherever their economic in-terests are threatened. The military machinery to ‘defend’these shared interests is NATO. In other words, the Trans-atlantic Economic Partnership is to the economy what

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NATO is to the military.

NATO today has transformed itself from a defensive arm ofthe alliance to an offensive arm. The message is clear. Anychallenge to American interests, even neutrality reflectedin a refusal to be incorporated within its area of power, as inthe case of Yugoslavia, will be met with bombs!

The ‘new strategic concept’ adopted at the NATO Summitin April 1999 in Washington for the first time enlarges itsscope of intervention to include ‘crisis management’, pro-viding a new justification for its existence andperenniality. In other words, intervention in the internalaffairs of a State when a crisis in that country threatens theinterests of the United States and its ‘junior partners’. As aglobal power with economic interests to defend allover the world, the US considers that it is directlyresponsible for maintaining global “stability” whichit alone is capable of guaranteeing.59 That the conceptis not new but is part of US imperialist strategy isreflected in the joint declaration of 1996 of Clinton andthe Prime Minister of Japan, Hashimoto, re-orientat-ing the objectives of the US-Japanese military allianceto enlarge the possibility of intervention in case ofcrisis that could affect American ‘security’ in the re-gion! The recent NATO summit only provides ‘postfacto’ legitimization for the concept put into effect inUS aggression in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan and Yugosla-via.

Winners and losers

In USA Today of 15 April 1999, Salina Khan wrote, “theUS’s defence equipment such as the satellite-guided smartbombs has stolen the international spotlight as NATOairforces pound Serbian forces. That could mean increasedforeign interest in US military equipment.” Stock prices of

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the large military manufacturers shot up in the first fewweeks of the war. Raytheon was up 17%, Boeing 12%,Lockheed Martin 8%. On 16 April 1999, Boeing, onlyrecently in trouble, announced a surprising ninefold rise infirst-quarter profits and a further sharp rise in its stockprices! Dassault saw its capitalization on the stock marketjump by Francs 700 million! Raytheon spokesperson, DavidShea, said “We are expecting the Kosovo conflict to resultin new orders downstream”. Out of the extra emergencyfunds for the war effort, Raytheon will be siphoning offapproximately $ 420 million. This is why the US Adminis-tration continues to insist that military security and interna-tional competitivity of the economy are linked.

Mostly unreported, the bombing of Serbia and Kosovoprovides a valuable laboratory for the Anglo-Americanarms business. More arms contracts have already beenapproved by the Blair Government than by the Tories, withtwo-thirds of the arms exports going to regimes with apaling human rights record such as the dictatorship inJakarta.

The new strategic concept of NATO will allow Washingtonto impose upon its allies, i.e., to sell its vision of the warbaptised “Joint Vision 201”. At present, the total defensebudget of the EU member states only half that of the US. Inelectronic information and comman system which are in-creasingly becoming ,the dominanet weapon, most Euro-pean countries are considerably behind. This must hence beremedied through the encouragement of mergers, moderni-zation of equipment and diversification of the weaponssystem, which will be led by large US corporate groups.They will also be imposed upon new members and futurecandidates that the NATO summit decided to rapidly incor-porate, i.e., all countries of Central Europe, former Sovietrepublics and the Balkans with the exception, of course, ofYugoslavia.

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“Money must go to those who cooperate, those whocombat the nationalist logic and share a basic philoso-phy compatible with Europe” affirms Jacques Rupnik.60

The intangible principle will be ‘conditionality’. “It isnecessary to be concrete and create joint-ventures eve-rywhere.”61 On the basis of these considerations andthese principles, the door is largely open for enter-prises, many of which have already been mobilized.This is case of German corporations already on the spotto evaluate the market. The Americans have at theirown disposal an efficient arm, the Civilian MilitaryCooperation. (CIMIC) This structure brings togetherreserve officers and senior executives who have beensent to the field to build action programmes for recon-struction. In fact, they are there to prepare for thearrival of US corporations.

The damage caused by the war to the economies of thecountries of the Balkans gives an indication of theprofits to be made by these corporations in that region.

NATO targets have not been limited to military machineryof the Yugoslav Government. Targets have included indus-trial plants, warehouses, airports, electricity and telecom-munication facilities, television stations, drinking waterfacilities, railways, bridges, fertilizer and other chemicalfactories, oil refineries, fuel depots, schools, hospitals,day care centres, a refugee camp housing several hundredSerb refugees from Croatia, public transport, residentialareas in all major cities, villages, thousands of dwellingss,government buildings, museums, monasteries and churches.

According to Michel Chossudovsky thirteen of the coun-try’s major hospitals were among hospitals and health-careinstitutions bombed. More than 150 schools, including pre-primary day care centres, had been damaged or destroyedand more than 800,000 pupils and students were not able toattend schools. Historical and cultural landmarks on the

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UNESCO Heritage list which have been targeted by NATOincluded the 14th century Gracanica monastery, the 13thcentury Pec Patriarchate, the Rakovica monastery and thePetrovarardin Fortress.62

According to the Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug, 500,000people have lost their jobs. In a total population of tenmillion, two million are without any source of income toensure even minimum living conditions. Guy Dinmorereports that most state workers are receiving only half theirsalaries and payments of pensions are delayed.63

Alarming reports point to imminent threats of starvation inYugoslavia. FAO and the World Food Programme haveraised the alarm that soon the people, again only referring toKosovo (!) will be starving. The war has devastated agricul-ture production, destroyed farming equipment and ferti-lizer factories, rendered useless agricultural machinerywithout fuel, devastated transport infrastructure leading tothe collapse of internal food distribution. The planting of2,5 million hectares of land has been halted as water, soiland air have become poisoned as more than a hundred highlytoxic chemical compounds have been released by the NATObombings of refineries, fertilizer facilities and other chemi-cal plants. Yugoslavia’s New Green Party scientist, LukaRadoja, pointed out that “the NATO bombings is happeningjust as many crops vital for survival are supposed to beplanted: corn, sunflower, soy, sugar beets and vegetables.”64

The collapse of agricultural production within the countryraises the spectre of absolute dependence of the people ofYugoslavia, for a long time to come, on the very criminalsblasting them with bombs! Food would soon become a newweapon in the hands of the imperialist powers, prohibitedby international law.

On 17 May 1999, the Government of Yugoslavia an-

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nounced that it had been able to identify the bodies ofover 1,300 civilians killed by NATO bombs.65 The realfigures will however be higher. All ethnic groups havesuffered civilian casualties. Kosovo Albanians have notbeen spared. According to the Decany Monastery in Kosovo,a NATO cruise missile hit the old town of Djakovic, mostlyinhabited by Albanians, and several Albanian houses weredestroyed. Even vehicles carrying Albanian refugees havenot been spared.

Since NATO attacks began against Kosovo, Serbia andMontenegro, some 785,000 refugees are estimated tohave fled the country, according to UNHCR. Thousandsof others have been displaced within the country itself.Western media have ignored the number of Serbs whohave fled Kosovo or other parts of the country beingbombed or who have become refugees inside the coun-try.

The extent of damage caused to the health of the populationand the environment by poisonous gas emissions or byradioactive weapons used by NATO cannot even begin to beestimated. People in places like Belgrade have been askedto wear gas masks to protect themselves from poisonousgas emitted by chemical and pharmaceutical industries,refineries and warehouses storing liquid raw material andchemicals, which have been destroyed by NATO. Further-more, the bombing of drinking water facilities have totallycut off drinking water supplies in Novi Sad and vastlyreduced the supply in Belgrade. Many parts of the countryare without electricity or heating. Hospitals are reported tobe using emergency generators.

In addition, internationally banned weapons such as cruisemissiles with depleted uranium (DU) are being used. Ac-cording to radiobiologist, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, President ofthe International Institute of Concern for Public Health,“When used in war, the DU bursts into flame...releasing a

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deadly radioactive aerosol of uranium, unlike anything seenbefore. It can kill everyone in a tank... This radioactiveceramic can stay deep in the lungs for years, irradiating thetissue with powerful alpha particles within about a 30 mi-cron sphere, causing emphysema and/or fibrosis. The ce-ramic can also be swallowed and do damage to the gastro-intestinal tract. In time, it penetrates the lung tissue andenters into the blood stream... It can also initiate cancer orpromote cancers which have been initiated by other car-cinogens”. In southern Iraq where Americans used the de-pleted uranium missile, leukaemia in children and birthdeformities have risen to match the levels after Hiroshima.According to Paul Sullivan, Executive Director of the Na-tional Gulf War Resource Center, “In Yugoslavia, it’s ex-pected that depleted uranium will be fired in agriculturalareas, places where livestock graze and where crops aregrown, thereby introducing the spectre of possible con-tamination of the food chain.”66

Despite the Blair Government’s ban on landmines, theRoyal Air Force is using the BL 755 ‘multi-purpose’ clusterbomb which is an air dropped land-mine. Dropped from theair, the Bl 755 explodes into dozens of little mines shapedlike spiders. Those are scattered over a wide area and killand maim people who step on them, children especially.

The case of Montenegro, member of the Yugoslav Federa-tion, reveals to some extent the human tragedy triggered bythe imperialist powers. Out of a total labour force of120,000, 75,000 are unemployed, 30,000 receive wagesonly episodically, a large majority of the 80,000 retiredhave neither social security coverage nor pensions. Theaverage monthly wage is between DM 120 and 150, whenthe vital minimum is estimated at DM 450. The pressure of117,000 refugees for a population of 650,000, would equal14 million refugees for a country like France. Hepatite-Cand tuberculosis is rapidly propagating, especially inPodgorica. And the social budget in Montenegro has been

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exhausted. Today, the market of its principal partner Serbiais closed for upto 90% of its products. Economic produc-tion is functioning only at 15-20% of its full capacity.Railway transport has come to a halt. Road transport is at astandstill. Telephones function only rarely. NATO has pro-hibited activities of shipping companies and fishermencannot leave the ports of Montenegro. The threat of faminelooms ahead for the winter of 1999. Civil war is imminent.

Western sources estimate the destruction of property atmore than US$ 100 billion. On 25 April 1999, NATOofficials evaluated the cost of reconstruction of bridges,routes and buildings bombed in Serbia at DM 13 billion(6,64 billion Euros). In mid-May, the Yugoslav govern-ment estimated damages in Belgrade alone at US$ 10billion.67 According to the Vienna Institute for the Interna-tional Economy, should the war end today, the recessionwill rise to 20% in 1999.68

After one and a half months of bombing, the repercus-sions on economic activity in the Balkans are alreadyconsiderable. If the loss in GNP is 27% for Serbia andMontenegro, it will be 20% for Bosnia-Herzegovina,9% for Albania, 8% for Macedonia, 4% for Bulgariaand 3,3% for Rumania.69

Nighbouring countries and peoples have not been spared the‘punishment’. Imperialist aggression has also created a‘humanitarian catastrophe’ in countries neighbouring Yu-goslavia. Economic dislocation, political destabilizationand social disruption is part of a strategy for which a heavycost must be paid by the peoples of the Balkans. Theconsequences are not simply an indirect by-product of thewar against Yugoslavia. Destruction and dislocation is anintended objective of imperialist strategy to enable a per-manent occupation of the region as a guarantee for theexpansion of Western capital into ‘Euro-Asia’, a region thatextends up to China and Japan and which first of all implies

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control over the Mediterranean Sea, the Near and the Mid-dle East and their vast wealth of natural resources, rawmaterial and cheap labour for a capitalist system facingnear-collapse.

The neighbouring countries are confronted with the disrup-tion of trade flows and flight of investment capital. Thealready fragile economies of the Balkans are at risk ofbreakdown, one after another, under the shock of the war inYugoslavia. Yet another manifestation of the domino ef-fect!

Albania, the poorest country of Europe with an economyoften described as mafia-dominated and a gross nationalproduct of only US$ 790 per inhabitant (half of that forAlgeria) is, according to the Wall Street Journal, facing abrutal withdrawal and freeze in international investments.With most of its population living out of agriculture, itsproduction is being devastated as food surpluses of West-ern capitalist countries flood the market in the form ofhumanitarian aid. The collapse of the financial pyramid atthe beginning of 1997, under former President Berisha, anactive supporter of the Kosovo Liberation Army, had pre-cipitated the country into a civil war and a severe recessionwith a 7% drop in 1997 after an expansion in 1996 of 9%.Today, the livelihood of its people is being threatened again.

Macedonia has, from one day to another, lost its principaltrade partner, Yugoslavia. Ninety percent of its trade withthe European Union transited through Yugoslavia. The haltin economic activity in Yugoslavia has meant that its enter-prises cannot receive or export raw materials and spareparts, the basis of its partnership with Yugoslavia. It isexpected that for the month of April alone, industrial activ-ity will drop 60%. Before the war, unemployment rateswere already at 40%, with a peak of 70% affecting youthbetween 15 to 24 years. Today, Macedonia’s economy isfurther threatened as Western food surpluses flood the

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country in the form of humanitarian aid, devastating agricul-ture production in the country and robbing farmers of theirrevenues.Bulgaria, with a very heavy public debt burden of US $10 billion and inflation running at 1000%, estimatesits monthly loss caused by the war at some US$ 260million. Half of its trade flows transit in normal timesthrough Yugoslavia. Romania, already in full recession(GDP dropped 7.3% in 1998) is losing some US$ 50million per week because of the war. With regard toBosnia, the World Bank estimates that, since the begin-ning of the war, there has been a 20% general decline inactivity and revenue. In Croatia and Hungary, despitethe volume of external support received, the psycho-logical impact on investors and tourism is alreadyconsiderable. In the case of Croatia which earns 12% ofincome out of tourism, 6 million were expected in1999. But already 40% of those expected to arriveduring Easter cancelled their reservations duringEaster alone.

With their economies in a state of near-collapse, mostcountries are turning to the IMF and the World Bank for newloans; the accompanying conditionalities will bring thepeoples of these countries to their knees. The human andenvironmental catastrophe awaiting the peoples of the Bal-kans cannot as yet been estimated. Yugoslavia’s New GreenParty scientist, Luka Radoja, warned that “the entire Balkanecosystem” is in danger as a result of the bombings byNATO of refineries, fertilizer facilities and other chemicalplants in Yugoslavia.

With regard to the costs of the war and the aftermatch,the only recent reference available to experts is theGulf War. That war cost US$ 61 billion for the Ameri-cans, but they were reimbursed US$ 54 billion by coun-tries of the Gulf, Japan and Germany. According toGavin Davis, economist at Goldman Sachs, on this

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basis, a ground operation of 6 months would cost aroundUS$ 80 billion.70 Three-quarters of the bill, aroundFrancs 360 billion, will be paid by the EU. Obviouslythat cost will increase budget deficits and consumermorale will be affected as it happened with the GulfWar.

The war will have a major impact on the economies ofNATO member countries. The average cost of the war isestimated on 20 April 1999 by Merrill Lynch at US$ 200million a day. But these figures under-estimate the real costof the war, that is the cost of establishing a protectorate inKosovo. According to Mr. Schmieding, economist at MerrillLynch, “the real risk is in fact a degradation of consumerconfidence in Europe anxious about the duration of the war,the reaction of Russia and eventually Western losses on theground.” Should consumer confidence and internal demanddecline in Europe before a revival of exports, then growth inthe Euro Zone could, instead of rising upto 2.5%, declineupto 1% by the end of 1999: “the risk is worth considering.”

According to the IMF and the World Bank, the prejudice toYugoslavia’s neighbours would be approximately US$ 1,6billion should the war continue until the end of the year, andUS$ 800 million if its stops in a few weeks. This has ledMichel Camdessus, Director General of IMF, to launch theidea of a ‘Marshall Plan’ to finance Yugoslavia’s neigh-bours. The European Union has already released Francs 1,6billion (250 million Euros). Although no figures exist atpresent for the costs of the plan, the Times of Londonestimates it at 22 billion Euros.

The US Congress has just approved a substantial US$112billion increase in its defence budget, the largest sincethe beginning of the 1980s. President Clinton has re-ceived an additional US$6 billion to cover military opera-tions for the rest of this fiscal year. As at 19 April 1999,France was spending an extra Francs 250 to 300 million per

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month for its war effort, covering only expenditure forsome 6,000 personnel placed at NATO’s disposal, severalwarships and over 50 aircraft. The figures do not includecosts related to maintenance of material, replacement ofused munition, humanitarian operations and France’s con-tribution to NATO’s expenditure.

Varying estimates from military and other sources to coverthe war costs against Yugoslavia between now and 30 Sep-tember range between US$ 4 and 8 billion. The cost of theF-117 lost over Yugoslavia was estimated at US$ 70 mil-lion! Its European NATO allies spent US$ 10 billion of theirdefence budget on research and development comparedwith US$ 36 billion in the US. All this at the expense ofpublic services, social programmes and employment.

Peace will cost more than the war. As of now, onequestion is posed. Who will finance the ‘Marshall Plan’for the Balkans? What Western experts call “the build-ing project of the century” is expected to last ten yearsand cost approximately US$ 30 billion. Thirty-threecountries are concerned and seven institutions, fromthe World Bank to the EBRD, all meeting in the so-called Balkan Committee since April 1999. The newPresident of the European Commission, Romano Prodi,has proposed a first annual plan of aid amounting toFrancs 34 billion to be financed from the EU budget.However, parameters such as the duration of the warand the extent of damage cannot be controlled. As statedsimply by the Bulgarian President, Peter Stojanov: “Itis necessary to get the Balkans out of the Balkans inorder to integrate it into the dynamic of Europe”.71

The European Central Bank and the Brussels Commissionhave imposed budgetary disciplines on European Unionmembers. On 16 April 1999, the European Central Bankissued a sharp warning that governments in the Euro-zoneare close to breaching the budget deficit limit and priority

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should now been given to making structural reforms, par-ticularly to remove “structural rigidities” in the labourmarket! For instance, Germany’s budget deficit for 1999 isDM 4,7 billion, that is, just below the ceiling.

At the same time, the value of the Euro has declined. Thereasons include withdrawal of American and Asian inves-tors from a Europe at war to safer markets, fear that eco-nomic consequences of the war will result in a crisis inconsumer confidence, and fear for the budgetary conse-quences of European member States. The behaviour offinancial markets will further reduce the margin of manoeu-vre to raise the necessary finances for the Plan.

All the remaining options available to the European Unionwill imply that the costs of the war will have to be borne bythe working people and marginalized social groups: in-creasing interest rates for loans or decreasing the discountrate, increasing the tax burden on the general public, divert-ing public funds from social expenditure or reducing labourcosts; or doing all three simultaneously. Already on 8 April1999, the European Central Bank reduced its discount rateby half a point. France meanwhile raised the 10 year inter-ests rates for State loans by from 3.90% to 3,99%. Thecosts of these measures will be borne by working people asthe money available for economic activity declines.

In any event, in the capitalist West, whether Europe or NorthAmerica, the working people will be called upon to bear thecosts of a war waged on behalf of corporate power! The callfor ‘sacred national unity’ in the countries participating inthe aggression is aimed at suppressing any opposition to thewar and frightening the domestic enemy (the general popu-lation) sufficiently so that they would agree to bear thecosts of programmes to which they are opposed. The warwill serve to obtain consensus on the dismantling of socialprogrammes, public enterprises and services.

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The war has created an unprecedented ‘humanitarian mar-ket’ for transnational corporations as working people buythousands of tonnes of food and consumer products fromsupermarkets to send to the refugees from Kosovo. Aid inwhatever form - individual, Government or NGO - is even-tually paid out of the pockets of ordinary working people.With rising unemployment, declining real incomes andgrowing impoverisation in the Western capitalist countries,transnational capital, the war is the ideal device to extractprofits from the working people - of course, all in the nameof ‘democratic’ values!

The IMF and the World Bank, using public funds, have beenmobilized to win over Yugoslavia’s neighbours in supportof the war effort. A US$450 million deal has been struck byIMF with Romania, paving the way for a US$250 millionWorld Bank loan and US$150-200 million loans fromWestern banks. The World Bank has opened a line ofcredit of up to Francs 600 million for Albania andMacedonia. The Paris Club has already decided on amoratorium on the debt owed by Albania and Macedo-nia.72 However, Albania has estimated the loans it willneed to maintain its economy at US$ 820 million. Bul-garia will ask for US$300 million in extra balance ofpayments support. But, Serbia and Montenegro are ex-cluded from international aid because... they don’t be-long to the Bretton Woods institutions. Along withtheir larger involvement in the Balkans with the EU,the role of these institutions in seeking to neutralizeRussia has been significant. Suspended in August 1998after the Russian debt moratorium, the IMF and the WorldBank have decided to resume their loans to Moscow. TheAgreement of Principle will enable the release of US$7,5billion fresh liquidity from private creditors, the IMF andthe World Bank and open the way for re-scheduling ofRussia’s foreign debt by the Paris Club. This will increasethe total amount of financial aid to Russia to US$23 to 24billion.

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STOP THE WAR!

On 23 April 1999, NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary inWashington with the objective of receiving endorsementfor its new strategic concept. On this occasion, the Organi-zation was determined to claim victory. According toZbignew Brezenski, “it is not unreasonable to affirm that thefailure of NATO will simultaneously mean an end to thecredibility of the Alliance and weaken global Americanleadership. The consequences will be devastating for thestability of the planet.”

Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser forGeorge Bush, pointed out that NATO’s very survival is atstake. Warning that failure in Kosovo could result in “ten-sions that could lead even to a rupture” among allies,Scowcroft argued in favour of sending ground forces toYugoslavia. Ivo Daalder, Director of Brookings Institute inWashington, added that the failure of NATO to bend Presi-dent Milosevic would question its capacity to fight against“global threats such as nuclear proliferation, internationalterrorism or the interruption of energy supplies”. What isstake in Yugoslavia is also whether “the United Statesand its allies have the will to shape the world in con-formance with out intrests and our principles?”73 Allobjectives that the Clinton Administration intends toassume!

The war must go on and ground forces must be utilizedto provide justification for the transfer of public wealthto the financial and economic elites through the Statemilitary establishment, while reducing social spend-ing. As pointed out by a writer to the InternationalHerald Writer, “The argument about sending in groundforces is curiously misleading. Ground forces willcertainly be sent to Kosovo and they will probably have

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to stay there a long time. The issue is whether they waituntil the door is opened to them, or whether they bashtheir way in.”74 The ‘intransigence’ of PresidentMilosevic on this count makes it unlikely that “thedoor is be opened” to NATO occupation. To “bash theirway in”, NATO governments need justification. Hence,the continued demonization of President Milosevic tocover up for their own ‘intransigence’.

Why? For a long time, the US Administration has beenseriously envisaging the constitution of ‘pure ethnic enti-ties’ to solve the problem of the Balkans. The project is nottotally foreign to the idea of a new federation of the Balkanswhich could extend to a re-designing of the frontier. TheDayton Accord for Bosnia has been described as contain-ing the premises of such a a project: “A Muslim Bosniaunder US tutelage, a Serbian enclave under NATO militarycontrol, the creation of a ‘Great Albania’ under US tutelage,which would leave the North of Kosovo with its mineralresources to the Serbs and the South to an Albanian en-tity.”75 But what will be the consequences, when in Macedo-nia a quarter of the population is Albanian? What will happenin Greece where the nationalists consider Macedonia astheir own? What will happen in Bulgaria where the authori-ties claim that a third of the Macedonian population isethnically Bulgarian? Hence, the realisation of the USproject for the Balkans will inevitably require a massive andpermanent presence of NATO forces in the region. It alsorequires that the present Government of President Milosevicand Milosevic himself must go. This was confirmed byMadeleine Albright on NBC: “I consider that this is moreand more the real question and is something we are concen-trating on.” But to get to that point, the next logical step isto move swiftly towards a ground military operation.

In other words, victory is essential, at whatever cost, notonly to provide legitimacy for NATO action in Yugoslavia.But, more so, to arm itself with a full mandate as a ‘legal’

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instrument for international coercion.

This poses a challenge to all working people in the world torise up and mobilize against the war.

The imperialist war against Yugoslavia is the military mani-festation of the logic of capitalism, the expansion of whichhas become more than ever urgent today with an imminentthreat at home of the financial crises that hit South-EastAsia, Latin America and Russia. With the development ofthe crisis, the dominant system is increasingly forced tointervene in order to control and to orient national policiesin strategic areas: economic, financial, monetary, trade.This is the mission now imparted on the World Bank, theInternational Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organiza-tion, which in its forthcoming Millennium Round will focuson this new mission.

The war against Yugoslavia is the first war waged by the ‘newglobal Robocop’ for so-called ‘universal values’ on behalfof the ‘international community’. As such, it poses a chal-lenge not only to the peoples of Europe, on whose soil it isbeing fought; it also poses a challenge to all peoples of theworld, in whose name it is being waged. The challenge posedis whether humanity should live under conditions dictatedby imperialist powers or whether it should mobilize andjoin forces in order to resist the logic of a global orderdesigned to meet the needs of corporate interests and tobuild a society that can harness the world’s productiveforces to meet social needs.

The reactions of the peoples of the US and Europe andspecifically of the workers and its organized sections in thetrade union movement will be a factor both in relation to thewar and the economic crisis that the war has served for thetime being to cover up through media concentration on thewar and the refugee pretext for its intensification. The taskof all those who are genuine opponents of the capitalist

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global economic system and who stand for a new socialorder in the world is to explain and expose the true contextin which the war in Yugoslavia has been begun and is beingcontinued by US imperialism and its capitalist allies inEurope. We have first to identify the enemy and the objec-tives of the enemy in order to determine our own objectivesand course of action in that regard without allowing our-selves to be diverted, let alone brain-washed, by the mediaand or by secondary or even lesser considerations directlyconcerning this or that section of the working class or thepeople in this or that country.

“Stop the War” is the sole agenda for peoples around theworld today, if the system of global corporate capital, led byUS imperialism and its allies, is to be rejected. To supportthe war or to remain silent would amount to collaborationwith global expansion of capital.

Saying ‘NO!’ to the war today is saying ‘NO!’to war tomor-row against those who pose a threat to corporate rule.

*******

* Tania Noctiummes is an Economist attached to the UnitedNations.** Jean Pierre Page is a trade unionist and member until 1999 of theExecutive Committee of CGT. He is also member of the Executive Council ofEspace Marx, Chief Editor of ‘Syndicalisme et société’ and member of theEditorial Committee of ‘Recherches Internationales’________________________________________________

1 Rupert Cornwell, “Diplomacy staggers out of the rubble”, The Independent onSunday, 9/5/99 2 “Washington veut confiner l’ONU dans un rôle strictement humanitaire,” Le

Monde, 10/5/99 3 Arnaud Leparmentier, “Gerhard Schröder assure que ‘le rôle de l’Allemagne

dans la monde a changé”, Le Monde, 21/4/99 4 de la Gorce, Paul-Marie, “Histoire secrète des négociations de Rambouillet”, in

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Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1999. 5 The existence of the military section of the Rambouillet Accord was first

revealed by the German daily, Tageszeitung, on 6 April 1999, two weeks afterNATO aggression. The full text, which was extracted from NATO’s electronicserver, appeared in the daily’s website. Since then, the document is said to have‘mysteriously’ disappeared from NATO’s server! In France, which co-presidedRambouillet with the British, the Foreign Ministry under pressure fromparliamentarians to release the text responded first that the text was not available inFrench, and later that “in virtue of a position of principle adopted with the British,we have decided not to publish the text. Since it was not signed by one of the twoparties, we cannot in effect consider it to be final” (L’Humanité, 30 April-2 May,1999). 6 Becker, Richard, “A Declaration of War disguised as a peace agreement”,

International Action Center, http://www.iacenter.org 7 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 8 Rollie Keith, “Failure of democracy”, The Democrat, May 1999 9 The cease-fire agreement of 16 October 1998 ending the previous eight months

of internal conflict, mediated by US mediator Holbrooke, was the basis of the OSCEMission. The Agreement was one-sided: it was signed by President Milosevic butnot by KLA, which meant that the KLA was not bound by it. 10 Yugoslav Daily Survey, No. 2004, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Belgrade, 16 January 1999 11 Le Figaro, 20 and 23 January 1999, 12 “Bodies of those killed at Racak were moved”, Guardian, 22 January 1999 13 “Kosovo: obscure areas of a massacre, Figaro, 20/1/99; “Les morts de Racak

ont-ils vraiment été massacrés froidement?”, Le Monde, 21/1/99; “Neuf questionssur les mort de Racak”, Liberation, 21/1/99; “Die Krieg um die 40 Toten von Racakim Kosovo Massaker oder ‘nur’ die öpfer eines Tages?”, Die Welt, 21- 22/1/99;Guardian, 22/1/1999; Los Angeles Times, 14 Guardian, 22/1/1999 15 Roland Heine and Thomas Gütz, ‘OSZE-Vertreter widerlegen Walker’,

Berliner Zeitung, 13 March 1999 16 NTV contact programme “Schlagzeilen” 17 Yugoslav Daily Survey, No. 2005, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Belgrade, 17 January 1999 18 Roland Heine, “Fragwürdiger Umgang mit einer Tragödie”, Berliner Zeitung,

12 March 1999;; Claudius Technau, ‘Der brisante Bericht der Pathologin’, BerlinerZeitung, 16 March 1999; “Genaues will man nicht wissen”, Junge Welt, 18 March1999, Nr.65 19 “Ob es ein Massaker war, will keiner mahr wissen”, Welt, 8 March 1999 20 Claudius Technau, ‘Der brisante Bericht der Pathologin’, Berliner Zeitung, 16

March 1999. 21 Otto Köhler, ‘Mass Murder Inc.”, Konkret, 3/99 22 New York Times, 19 January 1999

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23 William Walker’s background described by Gary Wilson the New Yorker‘Workers World newspaper of 28 January 1999 and various other newspaperreports. 24 Cited in Michel Collon, ‘A secret Italian report reeals: OSCE observers

prepared NATO bombardment’, 3 May 1999. 25 z.: 514-516.80/3 YUG, p.18 26 All quotations cited below from these documents are taken from a Press

Release of 22 April 1999 issued by the German Section of the InternationalAssociation of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms. 27 Az: 514-616.80/3 Yug 28 Az: 514-516.80/32 426 29 Az: 14 A 3840/94.A, S.44 f 30 Az: 22 BA 94.34252, p.9 31 “Les deux camps OTAN et Yougoslavie, dans l’impasse”, L’Humanité, 18

May 1999 32 Los Angeles Times, 17 May 1999 33 The information on KLA is taken from Christophe Chiclet, ‘Aux origines de

l’Armée de libération du Kosovo’, Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1999 34 George Soros, USA Today, 16/9/98 35 “Les Apaches de Wall Street”, L’Humanité, 6/4/99 36 “Time to Act”, Business Week, 14/9/98 37 International Herald Tribune, 7/9/98 38 Gerald Horne, “US imperialism besieged on all fronts”, in Political Affairs,

Vol.77, No.12, December 1998 39 Financial Times, 21/4/99 40 Anthony Lake in Remarks, 21 September 1993, Washington, D.C. 41 Friedman, New York Times Week in Review, 2/6/92. Huntington,

International Security, Vol. 17, April 1993 42 Noam Chomsky, Powers and Prospects, Pluto Press, London, 1996 43 William Wallace, “Meeting of minds”, Financial Times, 15/4/99 44 Philip Stephens, “Staying power”, Financial Times, 14/5/99 45 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chess Board, Harper Collin Publishers, 1997 46 Ibid 47 Ibid 48 Michel Collon, Solidaire, 13/4/99 49 NATO Review, June 1991, cited in Michel Collon, ibid 50 James Kynge, “Beijing anxious to ensure oil supplies are more secure”,

Financial Times, 6/5/99 51 James Kynge, “Walking a tightrope”, Financial Times, 10/5/99 52 Catherine Samary, “Sursis précaire pour M. Milosevic”, Géopolitique du

chaos, Manière de voir 33, Le monde diplomatique, February 1997

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53 Quentin Peel, Financial Times, 22/4/99 54 Peter Norman, “EU aims to take heat off ethnic cauldron,” Financial Times,

16/4/99 55 Z. Brzezinski, “Guerre totale contre Milosevic”, Le Monde, 17/4/99 56 Ibid 57 William Wallace, “Meeting of minds”, Financial Times, 15/4/99 58 Michael Klare, “Washington veut pouvoir vaincre sur tous les fronts,” Le

Monde Diplomatique, May 1999 59 Michael Klare, op.cit. 60 L’Expansion, op.cit. 61 Ibid 62 Information provided during a press conference held in Ottawa, Canada, on 11

April 1999 63 Guy Dinmore, ‘Serbs draw on all their experience of hard times’, Financial

Times, 20 April 1999 64 Mitchel Cohen, “Ecological Catastrophe Hits Yugoslavia”, Green Party of

New York 65 France 2, 17 May 1999 66 Cited by Prof. Chossudovsky during a press conference held in Ottawa,

Canada, on 11 April 1999 67 Borba, 17 May 1999 68 L’Expansion, No.597, 12-26 May 1999 69 L’Expansion, op.cit 70 Ibid 71 Le monde, 3/5/99 72 L’Expansion, op.cit. 73 Robert Kagan and William Kriston, cited in “Grand Strategy: Round and

Round on American Interests”, The New York Times, 24/4/99 74 Flora Lewis, “Kosovo: No New Answers, and No Changing the Subject,”

International Herald Tribune, 30/4-2/5/99 75 Michel Muller, “Derrière l’opération militaire, que projette l’OTAN,”

L’Humanité, 8/4/99

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Yugoslavia: a New War for Loot

by Michel Colon

Humanitarian war? No. The NATO bombardments haveworsened the situation of all the inhabitants of Kosovo–asforeseen, and desired. For NATO needs victims to justifyits aggression against a sovereign state, and in completeviolation of international law.

What are the real objectives of Washington, Berlin,and their consorts? (1). Control oil transport routes. (2).Recolonize and exploit East Europe. (3). Weaken Russia,thus give the West the means to pillage the whole ofAsia.(4) In order to realize the foregoing, impose NATO asthe gendarme of the world, starting with assurances ofmilitary bases in this strategic region. All of these objec-tives are tied together. The most important, at this point, isthe preparation for an attack on Russia.

Most important: on each of these objectives, Wash-ington and Berlin are at the same time in unity and in rivalry.Each tries to use the other so it can grab the cake.

In short, a new war for loot. A war for the profits of themultinationals, a war to break the resistance of the peoples.

Objective No. 1: Always, the Battle for Oil“The oilfields of Kazakhstan, the gas fields of

Turkmenistan, and the enormous offshore reserves of blackgold of Azerbaijan, make up a zone that can gain, over thenext fifty years, an importance equal to that of the PersianGulf today,” writes a big German daily.(1)

Likewise in 1992 the US Senator Dole said, “The GulfWar was a symbol of the American preoccupation for thesecurity of oil and gas reserves. The frontiers of that preoc-

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cupation are advancing to the north and include the Cauca-sus, Siberia, and Kazakhstan.”2. The threat is clear.

Add to this the most important gold mine in the world(in Uzbekistan), the largest deposit of silver (in Tajikistan),note the rumors of uranium, and you understand why LeMonde Diplomatique wrote in 1995: “To capture the con-tracts, no holds are barred.”(3)

No holds, including war–particularly around the pipe-lines that transport oil (and soon, gas, of which the impor-tance will grow). Ferocious wars explode around the routes,real or projected, of pipelines: Chechnia, Nagorny-Karabakh, Georgia, Kurdistan.

Yes, all means are good to block the people of theregion (including Russia) from control of their own riches.Why does Washington support the Taliban criminals inAfghanistan? To control the southern access to the oil ofCentral Asia.(4)

But the battle to control this wealth rages alreadybetween the Western “allies” themselves: “Baku is an oilcenter of great importance in the eyes of Germany. On thelevel of raw materials, we must be on the attack.” Signed:F.W. Christians, Chairman of the Deutsche Bank.(5) Forthis was always the Achilles heel of German imperialism:its lack of raw materials. Hence its constant and very strongtendency to expansionism.

But the United States doesn’t want to hear that. It wantsto keep worldwide control of oil. Not for fear of need—ithas enough on its own soil–but because, in the event of a newworld conflict between great powers, it is essential to beable to deny energy to the adversary. Who wants to rule theworld, must control the oil.

What is the role of the Balkans in all of this? The oiltransport routes must pass by there. From the Caucasus itgoes to the Black Sea. Then there are two possibilities.First, the Danube. This very long river (2800 km, about1700 mi.), of great flow, allows the connection of the BlackSea to Northwest Europe. Oil reaches Hamburg and Am-sterdam by passage through the Rhine and the Main. Bel-

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grade alone occupies a strategic position on the Danube.This shows why Germany wants to absolutely break Yugo-slavia.(6)

A second path is possible: a new pipeline projectwould cross Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albany, and . . . Kosovo.This enormous project of several billion dollars is sup-ported by the United States. One condition is necessary torealize it: to subdue the local populations. This shows whyWashington wants absolutely to impose its military bases inthe Balkans.

Certainly, to justify the installation of military bases,there is a “need” for a local conflict. We see why severalWestern powers armed the Croatian nationalists of Tudjmanin ‘91, Muslims in Bosnia in 1993, and Kosovars of the KLAin ‘98. Those who call themselves firemen need incendiar-ies.

Objective No. 2: Recolonize East EuropeIn 1989 the West promised East Europe prosperity.

Six years later Unicef found: “75 million newly poor in theEast. The hardest hit: Bulgaria (half the population is poor),Roumania, Moldova, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Lettony, Esto-nia. In these countries are found between 27% and 35% ofpoor people in 1994, as against 1.55 in 1989.”(7)

Chance? Bad luck? Transition a little too late? Not atall. The West had no intention at all of keeping its promises,as Noam Chomsky explains: “I think the prospects arepretty dim for Eastern Europe. The West has a plan for it —they want to turn large parts of it into a new, easily exploit-able part of the Third World. There used to be a sort ofcolonial relationship between Western and Eastern Europe;in fact, the Russians’ blocking of that relationship was oneof the reasons for the Cold War. Now it’s being reestablishedand there’s a serious conflict over who’s going to win therace for robbery and exploitation. Is it going to be German-led Western Europe (currently in the lead) or Japan (waitingin the wings to see how good the profits look) or the UnitedStates (trying to get into the act)? There are a lot of re-sources to be taken, and lots of cheap labor for assembly

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plants. But first we have to impose the capitalist model onthem.”(8)

What isn’t evident is that the West particularly fearsthe resistance of the workers of the East, who have knownthe advantages of socialism, who have gained traditions oforganization and resistance with the Communists. This iswhy, since 1991, NATO has threatened that, “We willcontinue to give our support by all means at our disposal tothe reform enterprises of the East and to the efforts aimingat creation of market economies.”(9) This “with all themeans at our disposal”! A clear threat on the part of amilitary organization.

Here again the Western powers agree on the imposi-tion of capitalist law and the extreme pillage of the ex-socialist countries. But each intends to draw the chestnutsout of the fire to its own advantage.

Objective No. 3: Weaken Russia to Plunder Asia

Why does the West want to dominate and subdue Russia?First, because it is a tempting prize: its potential in rawmaterials adds up to $140 trillion.

Next, and above all, to prevent Moscow from compet-ing in the region. Paul-Marie de la Gorce, the expert of LeMonde Diplomatique, explains: “The American policy to-ward Russia is conceived and applied to prevent it fromreconstructing around itself a power able to again play adecisive role on the international scene.”(10)

The West is fully on guard against any return to social-ism. Derycke, the Belgian Foreign Minister declared in1996, “The West supports Yeltsin because it is the policy ofthe last resort. A return to communism would be a prob-lem.”(11)

But the West also guards against even a bourgeoisRussia that would presume to a policy of national independ-ence. In reality, the war unleashed against Yugoslavia in1991 is also a war against Russia to deprive it of an ally andaccess to the Mediterranean.

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The problem is that if the West humiliates Yeltsin tooopenly, it will play into the hands of the Communists andnationalists. The result is un delicat exercice d’equilibrisme.

In the short term, they support their friend Yeltsin. Inthe middle run, they prepare a war against Russia. Theformer US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger wrotea book to show that the United States must prepare itself towage several wars. His basic argument is, “If Moscowmanages to dominate the Caspian Sea (and its oil), thatvictory would be, for the West, more important than theexpansion of the West.”(12)

The capitalist catastrophe in Russia is obvious. Logi-cally. Why would the West create a powerful economicrival for itself? On the contrary, wages must be low in orderfor the profits of the multinationals to be high. Hence therisk of revolt. Hence the threat of NATO.

Thus Russia is actually the principal “enemy”. Wash-ington, Berlin, London, Paris, and Brussels are agreed onthat. But even in this situation, the snags between “allies” donot disappear. Au contraire.

In 1996, the American Wall Street Journal complained,“Mr. Kohl is no longer satisfied to allow the United Statesto set the tone of German relations with Russia. It hasbecome completely clear that Germany’s allies no longercontrol its relations with Russia.”(13) The celebrated USstrategist Kissinger raises the alarm: “If we fail to expandNATO to the east, it could lead. . . to the danger of secretagreements between Germany and Russia.”(14)

Actually, the United States and Germany try to ma-nipulate each other. Washington wants an obedient Europethat will help it control Russia. If Europe becomes toostrong, Washington fears that it will control Russia or allywith it. Berlin and certain of its allies want to profit fromAmerican military power to boss Russia. But Germanyhopes to more and more play the sole horseman in theregion.

Behind this game of liar’s poker is revealed the mainstakes of a great competition between capitalist powers:

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who will control what the US strategist Brzezinski calls“Eurasia”? 75% of the world’s population, 60% of its eco-nomic production. Whomever controls it dominates theworld. We will return to this in a following article.

Objective No. 4: NATO, Gendarme of the WorldTo realize the above objectives, the West needs an

army. And military bases (and a docile public opinion,hence manipulated). There has been a problem here since1990. Theoretically, NATO should go on unemploymentsince it was supposedly founded to face the Soviet menace,gone at the present.

Ah well, not at all! Since 1991, NATO has defined astrategy still more aggressive: it will be the gendarme of thetotality of the capitalist world. Its charge is to make thedictates of the multinationals respected everywhere. Itsown documents announce the preparation of militaryaggressions along three axes:

1. Against East Europe and Russia.2. Against the Arab-Mediterranean world (three zones

are explicitly cited: Algeria, Egypt, and the Middle East).3. Against the whole of the Third World, in fact, under

the most diverse pretexts (“terrorism”, “arms of mass de-struction”, etc.) (15)

The most important is to encircle Russia. Thus NATOannexed three reputedly “sure” countries (Hungary, Poland,the Czech Republic), and it launched a “partnership” withother countries looking to take control of their armies.They gave the Russians a little carrot but carefully left itout. This is normal: they are the target. Ukraine got Ameri-can credits in order to isolate Russia. Nuclear arms havebeen placed at the doors of Moscow–for a “safer world”,they tell us.

The strategic forces of NATO have been totally re-structured: “We must be in a position to move our forcesfrom one region to another,” declared Gen. Galvin, head ofNATO in 1991.(16) Thus, at the same moment that itclaimed triumph, capitalism prepared aggressions againstmore and more “enemies”.

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Behind the reform of NATO also hide the rivalriesbetween the United States, Germany, and France. In 1995,Ruhe, the German War Minister, warned: “The NATO treatymust be replaced by a new treaty between the EuropeanUnion and the United States. Europe must be able to inter-vene strategically as a world power at the side of the UnitedStates.”(17)

The British review Searchlight analyses this subtlechess game: “The French government hopes to containGermany in the short term via the Eurocorps and the army ofthe West European Union. The United States and GreatBritain have another idea: maintain Germany in a subordi-nate position through a persistent NATO presence in Eu-rope and a larger engagement of Bonn in the affairs ofNATO. At this time, Bonn plays intelligently on the twoopposites and pretends to be in favor of both.”(18)

Effectively, Germany plays on two levels: one foot inNATO, one foot outside. It systematically reinforces itsarmy (see chapter 5 of my book, Poker menteur. [Liar’sPoker–tr.] The aim: to systematically get a foot in theinternational military scene. Its Army Minister declares:“War has become again a political means. In the future wemust be capable of resolving conflicts likewise by militarymeans.”(19)

Controversy raged in 1995. Germany and Francewanted to share the military command of NATO but theUnited States intended to keep its monopoly. Kinkel, theGerman Foreign Minister, proclaimed: “In the long term itis neither in the European interest, nor in the Americaninterest to call on the aid of our American friends each timethat something goes wrong somewhere.”(20) Translationof this polite but hypocritical language: “Our Americanrivals must not meddle in Europe.”

The American “friends” got the message. A US diplo-mat replied, “I cannot imagine a situation in which theAmericans would not feel involved. If a real threat arisesanywhere in the world, we will be there.”(21) Translation ofthis, as well, so-polite and so-hypocritical language: “Our

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German rivals must not complain about U.S. world leader-ship. That includes Europe.”

Why do the Americans want to tighten the grip ofNATO on Europe? To obstruct the creation of a Europeanarmy that would be their rival. In 1991 Wolfowitz, a Penta-gon expert, wrote: “Our status as the only superpower mustbe perpetuated by a military force sufficient to dissuade anynation or group of nations from defying the supremacy ofthe United States.”(22)

And to be perfectly clear, Wolfowitz stipulates whathe means: “discourage [the advance industrial nations] fromchallenging our leadership . . . and thwart the emergence ofan exclusively European security force.”(23) This is veryclear: “allies” are at the same time “enemies”.

Behind the war against Yugoslavia hides an undeclaredwar against Russia. And also the possibility on day of aworld conflict between the capitalist great powers them-selves._______________________________________________

• 1 Die Zeit, March 96.• 2 Frankfurter Allgemeine, 15 June 92.• 3 Le Monde Diplomatique, November 95, p. 22.• 4 Michel Collon, Poker menteur, 1998, EPO, p. 133.• 5 idem p. 132.• 6 idem, p. 137.• 7 Unicef, “Poverty, Children and Policy, Central and Eastern Europe in transition,”report n°3 - 1995.• 8 Noam Chomsky, “What Uncle Sam Wants”• 9 Revue de l’Otan, June 91, p. 28-29.• 10 Le Monde Diplomatique, March 94.• 11 Le Soir, 14 December 91.• 12 AK (Allemagne), 23 September 92.• 13 Wall Street Journal, 23 February 96.• 14 Welt am Sonntag, 12 January 97.• 15 Poker menteur, chapter 8.• 16 Revue de l’Otan, August 92, p. 23.• 17 Solidaire, 13 December 95. (

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• 18 Searchlight, “Reunited Germany”, 1994, p. 31.• 19 Der Spiegel, n° 5 - 1995.• 20 International Herald Tribune, 4 June 96.• 21 Idem.• 22 Poker menteur, p. 116.• 23 Idem________________________________________________________________

Aggression on Yugoslavia:Indirect Chemical Warfare

Dr Slobodan TosovicSenior Specialist

Head of the Department for EcotoxicologyInstitute of Public Health of Belgrade

Professor Dr Bogdan SolajaCo-Chairman of the Serbian Chemical Society

The fear that the conflict in Yugoslavia could take on thecharacteristics of chemical warfare due to indirect use ofextremely toxic chemicals has proven justified after sev-eral weeks of NATO strikes.

Few were those who believed that NATO would dare strikeor cover with bombs chemical plants producing exclusivelyfor civilian production (such as chlorine and ammoniareservoirs, and the like).

When it became evident that anything and everything in thecountry was good enough target, Yugoslavia has tried toprevent chemical accidents by closing the plants, removingchemicals, neutralizing or leaking of the chemicals intosurface flows and the ground. Such preventive actions were

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based in concerns about possible side-effects of acutenature and immediate, but they could not have dealt withlong-term consequences.

Fear and anxiety in the Yugoslav population due to therelease of poisonous chemicals, explosions, or fires, haveresulted in emptying of cooling systems within great cool-ing plants, which some institutions have decided to do forsafety reasons. Others have moved or leaked huge quantitiesof ammonia in the waterflows out of fear of chemicalhazards.

Bombing of the town of Pancevo (pop. 150,000) is perhapsthe best example: it is located 15 km NE of Belgrade. At onepoint (the night between April 14 and 15, 1999) the NATOaggressor bombed three industrial complexes simultane-ously: the Oil Refinery, Petrochemical Plant, and the Ni-trogen Processing Plant. All three plants are within theindustrial zone of the town (ca. 8 km2), bordering on theresidential area. The nearest residential buildings are lessthan 150 m away the Nitrogen Processing Plant. After thestrike on the Refinery Complex, several reservoirs were seton fire. These had not been hit by previous NATO attack ofApril 12, 1999. The reservoirs contained raw oil and deriva-tives. A huge cloud of thick smoke was formed above thereservoirs, about 1.5 km wide and 3 km high, leaving sedi-ment of soot, ashes and dust. The last part of this cloud wascarried by the wind westwards, where it came down to theground at about 15 km from the explosion spot. This cloudwas changing direction in the 10-day period to follow(during the brush fire that lasted for 10 days with variousintensity), so that at one moment had to be evacuated a partof the town. In the first five of these 10 days, concentrationsof sulfur-dioxide, soot and total chlorocarbons increasedby the 4-8 times in relation to the referent border values.This was especially the case with unburned contents of theoil: benzene, toluene, xylenes etc., carbon-monoxide,mercaptanes, formaldehide and the like.

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At the same time Petrochemical Complex was attacked: itsreservoirs were hit by bombs; they contained vinyl-chlo-ride-monomer (VCM - 1,200 tons), chlorine in residues,ethylene-dichloride (EDC-1,500 tons), NaOH (40%; 6,000tons), HCl (33%; 800 tons). About 1,400 tons of EDC,3,000 tons of NaOH and 600 tons of HCl leaked into theDanube.

A large quantity of oil also leaked into the Danube (about 50tons of the emulsion) and derivatives, through a commonequipment for the treatment of waste-waters (which was notworking during the NATO aggression). The VCM reservoirburned for hours, creating a whitish smoke and a cloud thatwas moving westwards, toward the outskirts of Belgrade(Borca, Ovca, Padinska Skela). The cloud was carried by lowair currents, and merged with another cloud that had beenformed when the storehouse full of fertilizer NPK was hitof the Nitrogen Processing Plant. The VCM concentrationsmeasured in those clouds were 3,000-4,000 times higherthan the allowed values. Increased concentrations of NOx(10 mg/m3) and phosgene (2 ppm) were also registered.About 250 tons of liquid ammonia leaked from the NitrogenProcessing Plant.

After the situation had been proclaimed stable (twodays later) teams from the Institute of Public Health ofBelgrade and of Pancevo started examinations and meas-urements of concentrations of certain matters in the soil,surface waters and nutritive plants that were in the territorywhich surrounds the targeted zone. The soil at the Petro-chemical Complex was soaked with EDC. All the chemicalsthat had been released in water, was present in the surfacewaters, as well as the compounds resulting from theirreactions.

What is most important, concentrations of several gramsper litter of EDC were found in the deep of the river. As the

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result, fishing was forbidden downstream from the town ofPancevo. According to the examinations performed by theInstitute of Biology “Dr Sinisa Stankovic” from Belgrade,there is a decrease in the activity of the river flora and faunaat the penetration point of the chemicals into the Danube. Alarge quantity of dead fish was observed in the area 30- 40km downstream from Pancevo.

Pancevo is only one among the locations where aunique experiment with the human population has beenperformed in vivo.

Just a few days after the Pancevo accident, NATO planesbombed a great transformer station in Belgrade. On thatoccasion, the quantity of 150 tons of the special trans-former-plant oil leaked from. Through a canal system, theoil reached the Rakovica Stream and the Topcider Rivulet,the right tributary to the river Sava. Being aware of thechemical dangers of this type of oil, professionals foughtfor seven days to collect the oil from the surface of the riverand to prevent the contamination of the Sava River. Theirsuccess was, unfortunately, only partial.

The bombings of the Baric industrial zone caused theSava river to accumulate great quantities of hydrogenfluoride(HF; 99.9%), HNO3 (concentrated) and about 200 tons ofliquid ammonia. All this necessitated regimen perforationof the Belgrade Waterworks.

The consequences of NATO attacks on the Pancevo Refin-ery and other industrial complexes are still being examineddetail in the days to come. An curious aspect of the NATOaggression was the striking of the LPG spheres in Novi Sad,where it was obvious that the aggressor had wanted toprovoke the explosion of gaseous substance, thus causing assevere ecological damage as possible.

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Finally, the majority of the chemical plants not related inany way to the military production of any kind has beendamaged or completely destroyed. The Yugoslav popula-tion is wandering how to chlorinate drinking water if theyare forbidden to start the production of chlorine? Theywould like to know how the cooling plants are supposed tooperate without ammonia.

The examination of the consequences of the heavy strikesby NATO on the Novi Sad Refinery and other chemicalplants will be the subject of our further communications.

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Report From the War Zone:Yugoslavs Resolute as Bombs Fall

Everywhere

By Sara Flounders and Gloria La Riva

May 18—Tonight at 11:30 p.m. two huge detonations de-stroyed Yugopetroll’s last remaining fuel-storage facilityin Belgrade, a little over a mile from our hotel.

We raced to the scene through darkened streets towitness with our own eyes the latest crime of U.S. andNATO forces. The truth is inescapable: this war of aggres-sion on Yugoslavia is a war against the people.

Today at the Clinical Centre of Serbia, we witnessedpatients with truly horrifying injuries. Dr. Vladimir Yucicwas about to leave for the heavily bombed city of Nis toperform emergency surgery on injured patients there. Hetold us, “I am a specialist in liver surgery. This hospital wasabout to introduce liver transplants. Instead I’m doing am-putations on people wounded by bombs.”

Dr. Sonja Pavlovic works in intensive care. She tookus to meet Nada, a 15-year-old girl whose legs had beenmangled by a cluster bomb. The child’s family is Serbianand lives in Kosovo. Because of the relentless bombingthere, they sent her by bus to relatives in Montenegro. Thebus was hit by a NATO cluster bomb. She is now paralyzedfrom the waist down, with shrapnel throughout her body.

NATO bombers have a diabolical practice: they drop asecond missile minutes after the first, just as rescue teamsarrive.

We spoke with two men from civil defense who hadgone to rescue workers in the army headquarters in down-town Belgrade. As their vehicle approached the damaged

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building, a second bomb hit. One of the men whispered ingreat pain that a co-worker had died when they were blowninto the air. He said he knew “in a millisecond” that his ownlegs had been blown off.

The other patient, Nebojsa Starcevic, has hadreconstructive surgery that doctors hope will save his leg.

These two people were courageous not only in theirstruggle to survive, but in telling us their story and relivingthe horror. Belgrade’s top official for civil defense wasalso a patient in the ICU unit.

Dr. Pavlovic said, “These men are truly our heroesbecause they know of the second bombs and still rush to thescene to recover the wounded and dead.”

During the day, people fill the streets of Belgrade andother cities, shopping, going to work. Life seems normal.But when the air-raid sirens go off, their lives can be turnedupside down in an instant.

This afternoon at 3 p.m. we stood on a balcony indowntown Belgrade, about to head out to a refugee camp atRakovica, a suburb 15 minutes away that had recently beenbombed. Suddenly the sirens sounded. Within minutes camean announcement that bombs were dropping once again onRakovica.

Yugoslavia has no high-tech weapons that could pos-sibly take on the Pentagon. So what are NATO’s targets?

In 50 days of bombing, NATO’s goal has been to breakthe Yugoslav people’s resistance to an army of foreignoccupation—the main demand presented by the U.S. atRambouillet before the bombing began.

The list of NATO military targets includes schools,hospitals, heating plants, communication grids, fertilizerplants to undermine this rich agricultural country, televi-sion and radio stations, cultural and religious sites, bus andtrain stations, and housing units on busy downtown streets.

All government and municipal services, fuel suppliesand bridges have been targeted.

To drive from Budapest, Hungary, to Belgrade we had

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to take back roads. All the main highways, including bridgesand overpasses, had been bombed and were impassable.

The countryside is intensely green. Fields have justbeen planted and new plants peek up in neat rows.

Between Novi Sad and Belgrade, we came on a smallgas station still smoldering, flames licking pools of oil.Four laser-guided bombs had hit it just hours before. Gasfumes hung heavily in the air. Two gas pumps plus a smallkiosk that sold coffee, crackers and plastic quarts of oilwere now melted rubble. Several fuel storage tanks hadbeen twisted into grotesque shapes.

A small house across the way had only two walls leftand no roof. A haggard man—the gas station attendant—described how he heard the first bomb hit and fled into thefields. He said, “In one minute, I lost my home, everythingI had, and my livelihood.”

Local people stood around, looking at the smokingruins.

Novi Sad was our first stop inside Yugoslavia. Threefine bridges once spanned the Danube River there. Theoldest was used by local people in the downtown area. Therewas a railroad bridge and, further upstream, a new six-lanespan for a major highway.

All three bridges have been bombed and now block theDanube, the major waterway of Europe. Some 150 vesselsfrom Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Romania are strandedat the Yugoslav border. Altogether, 35 major bridges inYugoslavia have been destroyed or damaged.

The largest and most advanced cardiovascular insti-tute in the Balkans must now be reached by a gerry-riggedferry boat. A large floating platform or raft with threeengines at the stern, it is able to carry several hundredpeople at a time. Several other smaller ferries and boatsshuttle back and forth, trying to make up for the loss of thebridges.

Our hotel in Novi Sad had only cold water. The thermalplant that had provided heat and hot water for the whole cityhad been bombed. This is an inconvenience in May. It will

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be life-threatening next January.

THE PEOPLE ARE CALM

Before nightfall, we visited a bombed school. A huge craterdevoured what was once the schoolyard. All the windowswere gone and the walls were charred.

Yet, after two months of bombing, we found peoplesurprisingly calm even when night falls and the air-raidsirens wail. Conversation continues. People move quietlyto the shelters.b

The first day in Belgrade we spent touring bombedrubble, from small houses on side streets to the hugethermal plant that provided heat and hot water to all NewBelgrade, a modern development of 80,000 new apart-ments. Now its 350,000 people are without heat or hotwater.

The neonatal hospital in downtown Belgrade was astep into a seemingly secure world. Premature and criti-cally ill newborns from all over Yugoslavia are sent here.Some 180 tiny, fragile infants cling to life in incubators andon mechanical ventilators. If the electricity is cut even fora few minutes, many lives will be lost. But backup genera-tors stand by.

Bombings just two blocks away, however, have alreadyrattled and disrupted these sensitively calibrated mecha-nisms several times.

We met with six doctors. All, including the director ofthe hospital, were women. All health care in Yugoslavia isfree, as is medical school. Since the bombing started,hospital emergency rooms have quadrupled their beds andmaterial.

DEFENSE IS WELL ORGANIZED

The initial bombings targeted government buildings, but allgovernment ministries had already been moved and evacu-

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ated weeks before. Many valuable or life-sustaining sup-plies have been dispersed widely around the country. Air-raid shelters are well-stocked and marked. Even little chil-dren can recite air-raid warning procedures.

Hundreds of thousands of people have been on themove for several years, as Yugoslavia was being dismem-bered under the pressures of Western imperialism. Withmany refugees from the Krajina in Croatia, from Bosnia,and now from Kosovo, housing is packed.

Before the bombing, big apartment blocks were goingup everywhere. The cranes can still be seen on the skyline.But all work has now been halted.

Even before the latest bombings—the heaviest of thewar— half a million jobs had been lost as plants and infra-structure were destroyed. However, the government con-tinues to issue paychecks so no one starves.

We visited Nis, one of the most heavily bombed citiesin southern Serbia, just north of the province of Kosovo.The bridge we took coming into the city was blown up justa half hour after we passed over it. We had to take a differentroute on our return to Belgrade.

Nis is a city of 250,000. We saw destruction to a flourmill, a bus station, and to many little houses all along theroad. Huge gasoline holding tanks that provided heating andcooking fuel for 800,000 people in the entire region weredestroyed.

In one of the worst crimes, the central market of Niswas hit at noon on May 7. Eleven people were killed andscores injured. A hospital with a red cross clearly markedon the roof was hit with cluster bombs. In one area of a fewblocks, 1,300 bomblets were dropped.

Cluster and fragmentation bombs are anti-personnelweapons banned by all international conventions. Onebomb full of razor-sharp ribbons of steel can shred an areathe size of a football field.

On grassy lawns and pathways, unexploded clusterbombs are marked with bright ribbons and signs so peoplewill avoid stepping on them.

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Also bombed was the Greek consulate. As with China,there is tremendous popular sentiment for Yugoslavia inGreece.

At the Nis tobacco factory, a worker named Miloyetold us, “Planes are constantly flying overhead but we cometo work every day.” Asked if he was afraid, he said, “Ofcourse, but we must work because without work there is nolife.” The factory employs 3,000 workers and has beenbombed on three separate occasions.

Miloye spoke about his eight-month-old daughter. “Iwonder what her future will be. I hope this will be over sowhen she grows up to be a woman she can’t even rememberit.”

[La Riva and Flounders went to Yugoslavia May 14with an International Action Center delegation headed byformer U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark. They wereaccompanied by Pacifica radio news reporter JeremyScahill. La Riva, who also visited Belgrade with Clark in thefirst week of the bombing, is making a video, “NATOTargets.” Flounders is an editor and co-author of the book“NATO in the Balkans.” Scahill will be filing twice-dailyreports from Yugoslavia to over 200 U.S. radio stations.]

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFGLOBALIZATION

Edward S. Herman*

Capitalism has long had a global reach, and much of thewealth of the great European powers supporting their indus-trial revolutions was obtained from the exploitation ofcolonies, the slave trade, and piracy. International trade andinvestment were also important throughout the 19th and20th centuries in providing raw materials and market out-lets for an industrializing capitalism.

But in our time, from the late 1960s and early 1970s,to the present, there has been a new surge of cross-bordertrade, investment, and financial activity that represents aqualitative change in the character and importance of glo-balization, and a new phase in the history of capitalism. Thisnew form of globalization has an important political as wellas economic component, to which I want to devote primaryattention, although this is closely connected to the eco-nomics of globalization.

Economics of Globalization

The contemporary globalization process has severaleconomic features deserving special mention:

First, global trade has been growing at twice the rate ofglobal output since 1970, so that trade is in fact becomingmore important for many countries. For the United States,for example, the ratio of exports and imports to GDP rosefrom 11 to 24% between 1972 and 1995.

The composition of this trade has also changed mark-edly. While manufacturing led this process, services began

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to exceed manufacturing in late 1980s, although much of itwas facilitating the manufacture and distribution of goods—as with telecom, financial and technical services—but theglobalization of the hotel, food, entertainment, and airlinebusinesses have also been important.

The intra-firm proportion of trade has also grownsteadily and is now over a third of the transnational corpo-rate (TNC) total, meaning that trade is increasingly part ofa system of integrated international production, with morematerials, parts, and partially and fully assembled goodspassing between parents and affiliates.

This integrated production reflects the massive growthin direct investment, which entails the control and use ofassets abroad in global production systems (in contrast withportfolio investment, which is often passive). The 40,000or so TNCs hold about 30% of their assets abroad, totallingabout $1.5 trillion, and the sales of their foreign affiliates,now some $5.5 trillion, are larger than the world’s exportsof goods and services. They not only supply themselveswithin their global networks, reflected in the huge intra-firm trade, they outsource in each country in which theyoperate. This global production system, which allows TNCsto tap cheap labor globally, enormously increases theirbargaining power at home. They can’t move plant and heavyequipment abroad immediately, but they can redirect newinvestment and alter rates of production among their vari-ous global sites, and their threats to make such moves givesthem great bargaining leverage.

A final important element in modern globalization is,of course, the globalization of finance, including insurance,commercial and investment banking, and the brokerage andsecurity trading businesses. The rapid development of in-ternational finance dates back to the emergence of theEurodollar market in the 1960s; but it was greatly stimu-lated by the ending of fixed exchange rates and coming offloating rates after 1971, and the removal of capital con-trols starting in the US and Canada in the early 1980s.Finance has been the most rapid service growth area since

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1975, and has absorbed an increasing share of income andacquired steadily growing influence.

Under the new order, with volatile exchange rates andmoney free to move across borders, the buying and sellingcurrencies has become increasingly dominated by effortsto hedge against exchange rate risk, and by speculation. In1970 some 90 percent of foreign exchange (Forex) trans-actions funded commodity flows, about 10 percent specu-lation; now, the relationships are more than reversed, withonly some 5 percent of Forex turnover financing commod-ity transactions. Between 1977 and 1995 Forex turnoverrose from $18 billion to $1.2 trillion a day, or by 70-fold;the ratio of Forex turnover to export value rose from 3.5 toover 64; and the ratio of global official foreign exchangereserves to Forex turnover fell from 15 to 1 day. What thismeans is that the power of central banks to counteractmarket movements and pressures has greatly diminished—this was illustrated in 1992 by the inability of the majorcentral banks to protect the pound. It also means that thedisciplinary power of markets has increased; and it alsomeans that the potential for destabilization in the globalizedmarkets is steadily growing.

I should mention that, contrary to conventional wis-dom, these developments were exactly the sort the organiz-ers of the Bretton Woods agreement and IMF were con-cerned to avoid—they wanted to encourage trade and capitalflows, but they feared unrestrained money movements thatencouraged speculation and tax evasion, and that couldallow financial operators to put limits on social reform. Wehave come a long way since that kind of thinking prevailed!

The economic developments just described have tiedthe economies of the world together more closely, greatlyenlarging the scope, options and power of business, butweakening labor, which is organized, if at all, within coun-tries, and weakening governmental power to oppose the willof business. I will return to these important matters.

Driving Forces in Globalization

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The driving force in this new global surge was pressureon business profits, which caused businesses to look out-ward, as well as to try to reduce costs at home. By the early1970s the long period of Cold War prosperity had ended,global competition was intensifying, there were sharp oilprice increases in the 70s, new risks from floating exchangerates, and there was a slowup in productivity growth—allpressing on business profitability.

Businesses in the G-7 countries also faced high laborcosts— high, that is, compared with labor costs in Mexico,Indonesia, and China—and high taxes funding welfare states,and environmental and other forms of regulation, whichwere built into collective bargaining contracts in the case ofhigh labor costs, and protected by organized labor anddemocratic political systems. Globalizing companiessought to escape regulation and high wages by locating incountries with more favorable climates of investment, whereregulation was weak and labor unorganized and cheap. Thiswas facilitated by the technological changes that were goingon, making transportation of goods cheaper and communi-cation and coordination of spatially dispersed corporateunits easier as well as less expensive. It should be recog-nized, however, that technology did not dictate this globalspread—that was very much a corporate choice, and it wascorporate control over technology that caused that technol-ogy to serve corporate ends both at home and abroad. Forexample, software evolution that has permitted the elimina-tion of countless white-collar jobs, as well as the ability toprocess transactions and accounts by computer at a greatdistance, represent an investment in technology to serve anarrow business end.

The Economic Failure of Globalization

Because the globalization process has been engineeredby the corporate elite and serves their interests they havesuccessfully conveyed the impression that globalization in

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not only “inevitable’ but has been a great success. This isfallacious. Even ignoring for the moment its distributionaleffects, globalization has been marked by substantial de-clines in rates of output, productivity, and investment growth.Under the new regime of enhanced financial power, and withthe new volatility of financial markets increasing risk, realinterest rates have been high, discouraging long term in-vestment and stimulating investments in mergers, re-equiping old facilities, buybacks of stock, financialmaneuvers, and speculative activities. Total factor produc-tivity growth in the OECD countries fell from 3.3%, 1960-73 to 0.8%, 1973-95, or by some 75 percent. Gross fixedinvestment fell from 6.1%, 1959-1970, to roughly 3.1%thereafter, or by half.

But the elite did well despite the slackened productiv-ity growth, because globalization helped keep wages down,allowing the upper 5 percent to skim off a large fraction ofthe reduced productivity gains, thereby permitting eliteincomes and stock market values to rise rapidly. It was adifferent story for the global majority. Income inequalityrose markedly both within and between countries. In theUnited States, with a 35 percent increase in productivitybetween 1973 and 1995, the median real wage rate waslower in the latter year. Most of the productivity gains in theUnited States were captured by the upper 5% of incomerecipients, as inequality rose to levels of 70 years earlier.During the past 25 years underemployment, job insecurityand benefit loss, and worker speedup under “lean” produc-tion systems increased, not only in the United States butthroughout the global system.

The gap in per capita incomes between the rich andpoor countries increased from 12 to 1 in 1972 to 16 to 1 in1992, and Third World conditions have in many respectsworsened absolutely, with unemployment rampant, massivepoverty side-by-side with growing elite affluence, 75 mil-lion people a year or more seeking asylum or employmentin the North, as Third World governments allow virtuallyunrestricted capital flight and seek no options but to attract

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foreign investment.The new global order has also been characterized by

increased financial volatility, and from the early 1980scollapse to the Mexican breakdown of 1994-95 to thecurrent Asian debacle, financial crises have become moreand more threatening. With increasing privatization andderegulation, the discrepancy between the power of unregu-lated financial forces and that of governments and regula-tory bodies increases and the potential for a global break-down steadily enlarges.

Only an elite perspective permits this record to beregarded as an economic success and welfare enhancing.

Globalization as an Attack on Democracy

The globalization of recent years was never a demo-cratic choice of the peoples of the world—there were neverany debates in public forums and legislatures where it wasdecided that massive globalization was a good idea. Theprocess has been business driven, by business strategies andtactics, for business ends. Governments have helped, byincremental policy actions, and by larger actions that wereoften taken in secret—but I repeat, without national debateand discussion of where the entire process was taking thecommunity. In the cases where major actions advancing theglobalization process were taken, like passing NAFTA orjoining EMU, publics have been subjected to massive propa-ganda campaigns by the interested business-media elites. Inthe US, public opinion polls showed the general publicagainst NAFTA even after incessant propaganda, but themass media supported it, and it was passed. In Europe aswell, polls have consistently shown solid majorities op-posed to the introduction of the Euro, but a powerful elitesupports it, so that it moves forward.

In every country, the business community and elite hasargued that globalization is inevitable, that we must acceptthe costs in order to be “competitive.” But this is hugelyself-serving, as the costs are borne by ordinary citizens

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while the business community and elite have skimmed offall the benefits of globalization.

In an important sense, therefore, globalization hasbeen a tool for serving elite interests and a means ofcarrying out a virtual class war against labor and the rest ofthe community. It has also constituted a war against democ-racy, because the containment of labor costs and scalingdown of the welfare state has required the business minorityto gain control of the state and immobilize it— removing itscapacity to respond to the demands of the majority.

This may sound like an over-severe indictment of thebusiness community, questioning its commitment to de-mocracy. But the US business community, for example, hasa long record of support for authoritarian governmentsabroad that will provide a “favorable climate of investment,”as in the case of Marcos in the Philippines, and numerousmilitary governments throughout Latin America in the 1950sand later. President Suharto of Indonesia has received steadyUS and other western governmental—and IMF and WorldBank—support from his takeover, accompanied by a massslaughter, in 1965, to today. Many other examples could becited from recent U.S. and European history. Where thebottom line and democracy conflict, I am afraid businessoften has no hesitation in sacrificing democracy.

The attack on democracy that is flowing from theglobalization process today, however, is more subtle thansimply supporting rule by a Marcos or Suharto. It is amultileveled process that saps democracy in a number ofways. Some of this anti-democratic thrust is an unplannedresult of the economic process, but some is a deliberateattack on democracy.

First, is the assault on labor. Globalization hasweakened labor, by corporate downsizing, enlarged use ofcontingent workers, outsourcing abroad, and by using theexternal option to drive hard bargains at home. But labor hasalso been weakened by deliberate government policy—tight money and restrictive budget policies to contain infla-tion, have been at the expense of high unemployment. These

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policies, and the incessant focus on labor market “flexibil-ity” as the solution to the unemployment problem, reflect acorporate-antilabor policy agenda, fully institutionalized.There have even been more open and direct attacks onorganized labor—both Reagan and Thatcher engaged inunion busting, and the latter was quite explicit in her aim toweaken labor as a political force. In the pluralistic theoriesof democracy, democracy is said to rest on the existence ofintermediate groups, like labor organizations, that can bar-gain and work on behalf of an otherwise atomized popula-tion. The deliberate weakening of such groups is an attackon democracy.

Second is the ideological campaign. In the US, Brit-ain and other countries the business community has alsomounted a sustained ideological campaign to make theirpreferred policies part of common understanding. Thefavored neoliberal ideology pushes the idea that the marketcan do it all, that government is a burden and threat, and thatderegulation and privatization are inherently good and in-evitable. It presses an extreme individualism and the valueof “personal responsibility,” which is highly advantageousto corporate power, leaving bargaining between large firmsand isolated individuals. Collective and community values,the threat of externalities and ecological and environmentaldamage from unconstrained business growth, free marketinstability, are all shunted aside in this ideological system.This ideological campaign has been highly successful, be-cause vast sums of business money fed to intellectuals andthinktanks, and business domination of the mass media, hasallowed their views to prevail. Heritage Foundation leaderEdwin Feulner has described the strategy of his corporate-funded thinktank as analogous to Procter & Gamble’s inselling soap—saturate the market with messages that over-whelm any that are less well funded. But this is a corruptionof democracy; it is a bought market of ideas, not a freemarket of ideas.

Third is the capturing or immobilizing of govern-ments. The business community has also mounted a power-

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ful effort to control governments—either by capture or bylimiting their ability to serve ordinary citizens. Globaliza-tion has contributed to this effort. By enlarging businessprofits and weakening labor it has shifted the balance ofpower further toward business, so that political parties havebeen even more decisively influenced by business money inelections. In the US, it is notorious that Mr. Clinton hassought and received enormous sums from business andserves their interests almost exclusively, with only tokenefforts on behalf of the major nonbusiness constituenciesof the Democratic Party. The globalizing corporate mediahas added its growing strength to the advance of neoliberalideology and opposition to any vestiges of social democ-racy, making social democratic policies difficult to imple-ment. The Murdoch effect on British elections, and thecurrent Murdoch-Blair connection illustrates the point.

Another well-known and important antidemocraticforce is the power of global financial markets to limitpolitical options. Social democratic policies make for anunfavorable climate of investment, and businesses willrespond to politicians and acts serving ordinary citizenswith threatened or actual exit, and in the case of financialmarkets, capital flight with quick effects on exchange andinterest rates. Spokespersons for the new global economyactually brag about the ability of capital to penalize badpolicies, and the fact that money capital now rules. That ruleis now facilitated by the new IMF, which helps to enforcethat which the founders of the IMF feared—massive specu-lation and speculator/finance domination of national eco-nomic policy.

These business and IMF efforts, validated by mediaagreement and support, now regularly cause social demo-crats to retreat to policies acceptable to the rulers. Thus, incountry after country social democratic parties have ac-cepted neoliberalism, despite the preferences of great ma-jorities of their voting constituencies. But this means thatnominal democracy is no longer able to serve ordinarycitizens, making elections meaningless and democracy

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empty of substance. This helps explain why in a country likethe U.S. half or more of eligible voters no longer participatein national elections.

Fourth are the supra-national attacks on democ-racy. Not satisfied with this level of political control, thebusiness community has pushed for international agree-ments, and policy actions by the IMF and World Bank, thatfurther encroach on the ability of democratic polities to acton behalf of their constituencies.

These agreements and international financial institu-tions actions invariably call for precisely the policies de-sired by the TNC community. The EMU conditions giveprimacy to budget constraints and inflation control, inaccord with the neoliberal and corporate agenda. GATT, theWTO, and the NAFTA agreement also give top priority tocorporate investor and intellectual property rights, to whichall other considerations must give way. In the early 1980s,the IMF and World Bank took advantage of the Third Worlddebt crisis and used their leverage with numerous dis-tressed Third World borrowers to force their acceptance ofStructural Adjustment Programs. These forced the borrow-ing countries to agree to give first priority to external debtrepayment, private as well as government; it compelledthem to adapt austerity programs of tight money and budgetcutbacks focusing heavily on social expenditures affectingthe poor and ordinary citizens; it forced a stress on cultivat-ing exports, that help generate foreign exchange to allowdebt repayment and that more closely integrate the borrow-er’s economy into the global system; and it stressed priva-tization, allegedly in the interest of efficiency, but servingboth to help balance the budget and to provide openings forTNC investment in the troubled economy. The IMF is doingthe same in Asia today.

A second characteristic of the new agreements and IFIactions is their denial of democratic rights to non-corpo-rate citizens and elected governments. These are subordi-nated to the rights of corporate investors, who are thesuperior class of global citizens with priority over all

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others. In the NAFTA agreement, governments are denied inadvance the right to take on new functions; any not assertednow are left to the private sector and to the superior class ofcitizens. In these agreements, also, and even more aggres-sively in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment nowunder consideration, the global TNCs have absolutely noresponsibilities and none can be imposed on them (beyondobeying the law). They can fire people, abandon communi-ties, fatally damage the environment, push out of businesslocal companies, and purvey cultural trash at their fulldiscretion. They can or will be able to sue governments, anddisagreements are to be settled by unelected panels outsidethe control of democratic governments.

A third characteristic of the new agreements and IMF-World Bank actions is that they rest not only on neoliberaltheory but on a false reading of recent experience andeconomic history. As I pointed out earlier, globalization sofar has been a productivity failure, a social disaster, and athreat to stability. The claim of its proponents that freetrade is the route to economic growth is confuted by his-tory: no country, past or present, has taken off into sus-tained economic growth and moved from economic back-wardness to modernity without large-scale governmentprotection and subsidization of infant industries and othermodes of insulation from domination by powerfuloutsiders.(This includes Great Britain, the United States,Japan, Germany, South Korea and Taiwan, all highly protec-tionist in the earlier takeoff phases of their growth proc-ess.) The governments and institutions bargaining on behalfof the TNCs today, through the IMF, World Bank, WTO andNAFTA, have been able to remove these modes of protec-tion from less developed countries. This threatens themwith extensive takeovers from abroad, thoroughgoing inte-gration into foreign economic systems as “branch planteconomies,” preservation in a state of dependence andunderdevelopment, and most particularly, an inability toprotect their majorities from the ravages of neoliberal top-down development priorities.

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In sum, we are in the midst of an antidemocraticcounterrevolution in which globalization and its impera-tives are being used to weaken popular and elected authorityin favor of a system of domination by super-citizens, theTNCs. This process sows the seeds of its own destruction,because it is serving a small global minority and literallydamaging the majority. But that destruction will be explo-sive if the process is not contained and democracy is notrehabilitated. This will be difficult, as the forces supportingthis antidemocratic crusade are powerful and have plausiblearguments. But as I have tried to show, these arguments areself-serving and wrong, and we should be prepared to con-test them and struggle for an agenda that serves ordinarycitizens rather than the TNCs and financial institutions. Thisagenda will include, negatively, strenous opposition to allsupranational arrangements that take powers out of thehands of democratic governements to serve some allegedeconomic need. Positively, support for the imposition ofserious responsibilities as well as rights on TNCs, capitalcontrols, and other deterrents to financial speculation.Pursuit of this agenda is going to require a combination ofunderstanding and effective organization of the large ma-jority who are the victims of globalization.—————————————————*Edward S. Herman, Professor Emeritus of Finance,Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, is the authorof a number of books, including Manufacturing Consent(1988, with Noam Chomsky), Triumph of the Market(1996), and The Global Media (1997, with RobertMcChesney).This paper was read at the ABF (Workers EducationalSociety) in Stockholdm, Sweden on May 7, 1998.

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“The Srebrenica Massacre”:A Legend?

By George PumphreyBonn, Germany

(November 1998)

The “massacre of Srebrenica”, where 8,000 Muslimmales of military age are reported to have been summarilyexecuted by Bosnian Serbian troops in the aftermath of thetakeover of the town, has been termed the worst war crimein Europe since World War II.

The case of Srebrenica, and the subsequent “geno-cide” indictment, can be seen to have brought about a majorchange in the political and social rules of conduct in inter-national relations, and not only for this region of Europe. Anew set of factors have been introduced into world politics.Some of the most important changes are:

* the discrediting of the United Nations for supposedlyhaving stood idly by, allowing a “genocide” to take place onterritory under its authority, which was a prerequisite for:

* promoting NATO as the new world “peace keeping”force, allowing the US-led military alliance to strike andeventually occupy sovereign states or to take sides in civilwars outside the constraints of the democratic and peace-oriented principles of the United Nations Charter;

* the relativisation and resulting trivializing of Nazibarbarism, a prerequisite for releasing Germany from itsobligations to seek reconciliation with its World War IIvictims and allowing it once again to exercise military forceanywhere in the world;

* creating public acceptance of inquisitorial methods

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of journalism and judicial inquiry, denying the accused notonly the presumption of innocence and the benefit of thedoubt, but of long-established democratic rights to properlegal defense;

* undermining journalistic standards of fairness in favorof propaganda in a media industry organically linked todominant economic and military powers;

* the imposition of a discriminatory “moral” doublestandard of “human rights”, selectively applied in favor ofparticular national, social, cultural or “ethnic” groups, leav-ing others without “rights” worthy of respect by Euro-American powers, and therefore:

* growing acceptance of treating a whole nation orpeople as inherentlly criminal and therefore unworthy ofbasic rights of equity before the law.

In short, with Srebrenica important mainstays in theinternational political order of the post-war period wereushered out the door. This has all been made possiblethrough a massive propaganda campaign spreading the storyof a yet-to-be-proven massacre, which has become the keypiece of evidence for an also yet-to-be-proven “genocide”.Momentous political decisions have been based upon andjustified by the supposition that a huge massacre took placein Srebrenica, decisions determining the welfare of thepeoples of this region and beyond.

Three years later, in 1998, the effort to find evidencewas still underway, as yet more areas in the vicinity ofSrebrenica were being dug up in search of the “mass graves”presumed to contain the remains of the victims of the“Srebrenica massacre.” As with previous years’ excava-tions, representatives of the UN Security Council’s ad hocInternational Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia held its pressconference at the beginning of the dig.

Information from this press conference, as reported inthe New York Times, provokes questions about the basis ofthe juridical work of this ad hoc tribunal. Mike O’Connor,reporting on the beginning of a dig in the village of Kamenica,

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in the spring of 1998, writes that “Exhumations in 1996[the first year of digging] recovered 460 bodies, (...) 7,500others were still missing from the town of Srebrenica.Finding the others has been the goal of war-crimes inves-tigators for more than two years.” Anonymous investiga-tors (investigators for the Tribunal spoke to the reporter“on condition of anonymity”) say that what they hope tofind “will bolster the cases against [the] 2 Bosnian Serbleaders” Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Radko Mladic, in-dicted for genocide by the tribunal. 1)

But if finding the other 7,500 has been the goal of warcrimes investigators for more than two years, the questionshould be raised: on what did the Tribunal base its chargesof “genocide” if they did not even have the proof that themassacre for which the two Serb leaders are charged everoccurred? If they now - three years later - are still trying toscrape together enough bodies to make their indictmentplausible, on what was their indictment based? O’Connorwrites that they now have to try to “prov[e] that the soilaround the bodies came from the original mass graves,” 2)

one can assume that what they had considered to be “theoriginal mass graves” were either empty or sheltered toofew bodies to justify their charges.

Under such circumstances, it appears that the Tribunalcharged Karadzic and Mladic according to the principle:“Indict now. Look for evidence of a crime later”. And evenwhen the evidence is not found, there is no suggestion thatperhaps the proper course would be to revise the indictmentor drop the charges.

Diana Johnstone, who has been closely following thedevelopments in the Balkans noted in The Nation:

“When, in the early months of the war which ragedacross Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, the Muslim-led gov-ernment in Sarajevo, seconded by Croatian agencies inZagreb, presented Western media with reports indicatingthat the Serbs were pursuing a deliberate policy of geno-cide, a basic principle of caution, essential to justice wasrapidly abandoned. That is the principle that the more

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serious the accusation, the greater the need for proof,since otherwise accusations will become an instrument ofthe lynch mob.” 3)

In the media, each succeeding generation of speculation- even falsification - is built upon preceding generations ofunproven reports, many of which were set in motion asdeliberate disinformation by secret services and publicrelations agencies. Once they have been repeated over andover as certainty, anyone who would dare to venture up-stream to the source and demand substantiating evidenceruns the risk of being verbally lynched for having deniedsomething as obvious as the earth’s surface being flat.

Given the fact that the number of persons alleged to havebeen summarily executed could make the difference be-tween a charge of “genocide” and a charge of “war crime”,and faced with the difference between the 8,000 alleged tohave been killed and the 460 dead bodies actually found, thefirst step in beginning to sort out fact from fiction would beto clear up this discrepancy in numbers.

1) Playing the Numbers:The International Committee of the Red Cross pub-

lished a press statement on September 13, 1995, in which itwas stated:

“The ICRC’s head of operations for Western Europe,Angelo Gnaedinger, visited Pale and Belgrade from 2 to7 September to obtain information from the Bosnian Serbauthorities about the 3,000 persons from Srebrenicawhom witnesses say were arrested by Bosnian Serb for-ces. The ICRC has asked for access as soon as possible toall those arrested (so far it has been able to visit onlyabout 200 detainees), and for details of any deaths. TheICRC has also approached the Bosnia-Herzegovina au-thorities seeking information on some 5,000 individualswho fled Srebrenica, some of whom reached centralBosnia.” 4)

The September 15, 1995, New York Times gives anotheraccounting:

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About 8,000 Muslims are missing from Srebrenica, thefirst of two United Nations-designated ‚safe areas‘ over-run by Bosnian Serb troops in July, the Red Cross saidtoday. (...) Among the missing were 3,000, mostly men,who were seen being arrested by Serbs. After thecollapse of Srebrenica, the Red Cross collected 10,000names of missing people, said Jessica Barry, a spokes-woman. In addition to those arrested, about 5,000 ‚havesimply disappeared,‘ she said. 5)

Aside from simply adding the 3,000 Muslim men inSrebrenica upon arrival of the Bosnian-Serb military (whichthe Serbs then took as prisoners of war) and the 5,000Muslim men, reported to have left Srebrenica before thearrival of Bosnian Serb forces, to inflate the figures - andtherefore the gravity of the accusation - this report makesno mention of the fact that by mid-September 1995 a sizableportion of the group of 5,000 had already reached Muslimterritory and safety. And the fact that the Red Cross wasasking the Bosnia-Herzegovina [Muslim] authorities forinformation about the 5,000 (the original figure) - “some ofwhom [had already] reached central Bosnia” - has com-pletely disappeared from the news. The entire 5,000 of theone group and the 3,000 of the other are still today - 3 yearslater - being counted as “missing” and therefore presumeddead.

The Red Cross report was, itself, lacking the objectivitythat one would have hoped for from a non-partisan organi-zation. Its very off-hand “some of whom reached centralBosnia” gives the impression that only a handful could beaccounted for by mid-September. But again the press gaveanother picture. Within a week of the takeover of Sre-brenica (July 18, 1995) one learns that:

“Some 3,000 to 4,000 Bosnian Muslims who wereconsidered by UN officials to be missing after the fall ofSrebrenica have made their way through enemy lines toBosnian government territory. The group, which inclu-ded wounded refugees, sneaked past Serb lines underfire and crossed some 30 miles through forests to safety.”

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6)

Similar reports appeared in other journals at the time.On August 2, 1995, The Times of London published thefollowing:

“Thousands of the “missing” Bosnian Muslim soldiersfrom Srebrenica who have been at the centre of reports ofpossible mass executions by the Serbs, are believed to besafe to the northeast of Tuzla.

Monitoring the safe escape of Muslim soldiers andcivilians from the captured enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepahas proved a nightmare for the United Nations and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross. For the firsttime yesterday, however, the Red Cross in Geneva said ithad heard from sources in Bosnia that up to 2,000 BosnianGovernment troops were in an area north of Tuzla.

They had made their way there from Srebrenica “with-out their families being informed”, a spokesman said,adding that it had not been possible to verify the reportsbecause the Bosnian Government refused to allow theRed Cross into the area. 7)«

The Washington Post explains: “The men set off atdawn on Tuesday, July 11, in two columns that stretchedback seven or eight miles” 8).

Two weeks before the Red Cross representatives AngeloGnaedinger and Jessica Barry gave their numbers to thepress, another spokesperson for the International Red Crossin Geneva, Pierre Gaultier, provided an important detail. Inan interview given to the German journal Junge Welt, heexplained:

“All together we arrived at the number of approxi-mately 10,000 [missing from Srebrenica]. But there maybe some double counting... Before we have finished [weed-ing out the double countings] we cannot give any exactinformation. Our work is made even more complicated bythe fact that the Bosnian government has informed us thatseveral thousand refugees have broken through enemylines and have been reintegrated into the Bosnian Mus-

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lim army. These persons are therefore not missing, butthey cannot be removed from the lists of the missing (...)because we have not received their names.” 9)

Given the fact that the number of “missing” (and there-fore assumed dead) has remained at a constant 8,000throughout the past 3 years, it can be reasonably assumedthat the Muslim government has never furnished the RedCross with the names of those who reached Muslim lines.Also to be noted is that when Prof. Milivoje Ivanisevic at theUniversity of Belgrade took a close look at the Red Crosslist, he discovered it contained the names of 500 peoplewho were already deceased before Bosnian-Serb troopsentered Srebrenica. Even more interesting, when compar-ing the Red Cross’ list with the electoral list for the 1996fall elections, he also found that 3,016 people listed by theRed Cross as “missing” were on the electoral lists thefollowing year. 10) This leads to one of two possibilities:either the Muslims were having their dead vote, meaningthat the voters were bogus, and the election a fraud; or thevoters were in fact alive, in which case, here is an additionalpiece of evidence that the massacre is a fraud.

Early in the war, journalists of Time magazine sawthrough the game being played on journalists and interna-tional organizations. They wrote: “Bosnian Muslims, fight-ing at the raw level of their rivals, are likewise guilty ofbarbarism—and of inflating horror stories about theSerbs to win sympathy and support.” 11) It appears that theywere not without success.

With deliberately inflated figures clearly being used tofuel a major propaganda campaign to make “Srebrenica” asymbol of Serbian “genocide”, some Red Cross spokesper-sons in effect became a party to the conflict by failing tobring important information to public attention. It is alsohard to understand how correspondents such as MikeO’Connor and their editors could be unaware of the ex-tremely misleading and inaccurate content of the reportsthey published.

Both Red Cross and UN officials knew that thousands

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were safe. Yet neither corrected the communique given inSeptember. And both failed to report that Ms. Barry’s 5,000who “simply disappeared,” had simply disappeared backinto the ranks of the Bosnian army. The propaganda put intocirculation by representatives of the Bosnian governmentwas allowed to stand uncontested even by organizationsotherwise seen as non-partisan.

Within days of the take-over of Srebrenica, Zepa, asecond Moslem enclave (and UN Safe Area), was alsocaptured by Bosnian Serb forces. Among the defenders ofZepa were hundreds of the “missing” soldiers fromSrebrenica. The New York Times recounts:

“The wounded troops were left behind, and when theBosnian Serbs overran the town on Tuesday, the woundedwere taken to Sarajevo for treatment at Kosevo Hospital.Many of them had begun their journey in Srebrenica, andfled into the hills when that ‚safe area‘ fell to the BosnianSerbs on July 11. These men did not make it to Tuzla,where most of the refugees ended up, but became thedefenders of Zepa instead. ‚Some 350 of us managed tofight our way out of Srebrenica and make it into Zepa,‘said Sadik Ahmetovic, one of 151 people evacuated toSarajevo for treatment today. (...) They said they had notbeen mistreated by their Serb captors. 12)”

It might seem strange that the Muslim soldiers of Zepawould abandon their wounded comrades and that 5,000Srebrenica soldiers would abandon their women and chil-dren to an enemy with a reputation - at least in the media -of being sadists, rapists and seeking to commit “genocide”.Could it be that these Muslim soldiers knew that they neednot be particularly worried about their women, children andwounded comrades falling into the hands of their Serbiancountrymen? The Serbian forces had the wounded Muslimsoldiers evacuated behind Muslim lines to their Muslimhospital in Sarajevo. Is this how one goes about committinggenocide? Is this the military force compared to Nazis?What a trivialization of Nazi barbarism!

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The London Times article quoted above mentions that2,000 Srebrenica soldiers made their way to the north ofTuzla “without their families being informed”. Were theirfamilies ever informed? Other than the very few articlesthat took notice of their resurrection from the presumeddead, the public at large was never informed that they werein fact alive. On the contrary. And the women of Srebrenicacontinue to demonstrate demanding information about theirloved ones, whom they believe are still alive.

To maintain the legend, it is not only necessary to createthe illusion that the proof of a massacre exists, but it is alsonecessary to suppress any evidence that it did not happen.Not only must the 5,000 never be accounted for, but not toomany of the 3,000 listed by the Red Cross as prisoners ofwar must be allowed to return “from the dead.”

On January 17, 1996, the British daily “Guardian”published an article concerning one group of the formerMuslim POWs from Srebrenica and Zepa, who, once liber-ated from a POW camp, were flown directly to Dublin:

“Hundreds of Bosnian Muslim prisoners are still be-ing held at 2 secret camps within neighboring Serbia,according to a group of men evacuated by the Red Crossto a Dublin hospital from one camp - at Sljivovica. (...) Agroup of 24 men was flown to Ireland just before Christ-mas [1995] (...). But some 800 others remain incarceratedin Sljivovica and at another camp near Mitrovo Polje,just three days before the agreed date for the release ofall detainees under the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia(...). The Red Cross in Belgrade has been negotiating forseveral weeks to have the men released and given sanc-tuary in third countries. A spokeswoman said most werebound for the United States or Australia, with others dueto be sent to Italy, Belgium, Sweden, France and Ireland.(...) Since late August, the Red Cross has made fortnightlyvisits from its Belgrade field office. (...) Teams from theWar Crimes Tribunal at The Hague have been in Dublinto question and take evidence from the men.” 13)

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Why would prisoners of war, whose normal first wishupon being freed would be to be reunited with their familiesand to restart their interrupted lives in peacetime, be rushedoff to Dublin, with “papers to remain in Ireland”? Whywould the Red Cross - usually known for reuniting families- be seeking to secretly spirit them out of their homeland,away from their family and friends? Were their familiesever informed?

The ex-prisoners were widely dispersed. To a secondcountry...:

[The] US decided to accept 214 Bosniaks who, after thefall of Srebrenica and Zepa, had been detained in Ser-bian camps and give them refugee status. “It is horriblethat those people besides being captured during thebloodshed in Srebrenica had to spend at least anothertwo months in Serbian detention camps under dreadfulconditions”, said State Department spokesman NicolasBurns. Burns emphasized that at least 800 men out of 80000 people who have been expelled from their homesafter the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa had been taken toSerbia. 14)

Why have neither the Red Cross (which has been visitingthe prisoners since August), nor the Tribunal (in its searchfor evidence of a “genocide” in Bosnia, for which Srebrenicais slated to be the key incriminating evidence), nor theAmerican government made mention since August 1995 ofthese men being held as war prisoners?

And a third country... The pro-government [Muslim]news agency TWRA reports:

“[One] Hundred-three Bosnian soldiers who wererecently released from prisons in Serbia, were sent toAustralia against their will”, claims their commander,Osmo Zimic. Zimic also criticizes the UNHCR, whosespokesman claimed these soldiers demanded departureto Australia and by no means return to Bosnia for theywould allegedly face criminal charges as deserters there.“This is not true”, says Zimic. Australian immigration &ethnic affairs office spokesman says he was informed [of]

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Zimic’s allegation from the Bosnian embassy in Can-berra and that the investigation was initiated.” 15)

“The Bosnian Embassy in Australia requested theHague International Tribunal (ICTY) to start an investi-gation on the deportation of Bosniaks (800 persons) fromSerbia to Australia and Europe in which, supposedly,UNHCR assisted, instead [of] involving Bosniaks in theexchange of prisoners, esp. for they had been in thecamps in Serbia which claimed not to be involved in thewar in Bosnia. The principal witness for the prosecutionis Osmo Zimic, a Bosnian Army Officer, one who had beendeported to Australia against his will.” 16)

From the case of the Bosnians sent to Australia, one getsan impression of just how important their absence fromBosnia must have been - to somebody. It seems as thoughthe Red Cross, the UNHCR, and a host of “western” govern-ments around the world were engaged in hiding the fact thatthese men were not massacred. Who stood to gain?

The first of the two indictments on charges of genocideeliminated Karadzic and Mladic as partners in the Daytonnegotiations. That this was the political intent behind theindictment can be inferred from a statement made duringthe July 1995 genocide indictment hearings by AntonioCassese, then president of the International Criminal Tribu-nal. Cassese said: “The decision [to indict on charges ofgenocide] represents a decisive step. Let us see who willsit down at the negotiating table now, with a man accusedof genocide.” He concluded: “That gentleman will not beable to take part in peace negotiations.” 17) That this wasno mere idle threat can be seen from the fact that the Serbsof Bosnia had to content themselves with Slobodan Milosevicto represent their interests. But then other questions arise:What was Milosevic’ role? Why did he keep silent duringthe campaign around Srebrenica?

Before discovery of conclusive evidence that the al-leged crime has even been committed, the indictment aloneis made to serve as punishment. This reverses the principle

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of “innocent until proven guilty” and inquisitorial “justice”.For three years the Tribunal has been searching for evidenceof an alleged “genocide” which has already largely servedits political purpose. Now the search is on for a retrospec-tive judicial fig leaf.

As a result of the Srebrenica legend, a new order of theworld is beginning taken to take shape, where the UNHCRassists in creating refugees, where the Red Cross helpsseparate families and where tribunals indict first and lookfor crimes later.

2) A Sat-eye’s view of SrebrenicaThe fact that the Tribunal’s investigators have found so

little proof of a large-scale massacre ought to suggest thatthe story of a giant massacre is a fabrication. But MikeO’Connor prefers a different explanation. The NewYorkTimes journalist writes in the article quoted above, that:

“7,500 Muslim men were hidden to try to thwart theprosecution of Bosnian Serb leaders for genocide. (...)When the original sites were inspected in 1996, in-vestigators suspected most of the bodies had beenmoved. 18)

In spite the absence of proof, O’Connor never doubtsthat many thousands of men and boys were executed byBosnian Serbs. It is apparently out of the question that anunexpectedly small number of bodies might mean thatfewer people were killed. If fewer people were killed, theneven if summary executions did take place, but not on themass scale that the media and the government in Sarajevoallege, then that would indeed constitute a war crime, butnot “genocide”, and not “the worst atrocity since World WarII”. Not to mention the fact that discovery of hastily buriedbodies in an area where civil war raged on and off for overthree years is to be expected.

Explanations for the shortage of corpses were soughtand found. As if to anticipate a logical follow-up question,O’Connor explains that the US had provided surveillancesatellites that can locate bodies decomposing undergroundto aid the search:

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“Doubts were cast on American military’s satellitesurveillance, with some investigators charging at thetime that slipshod monitoring had allowed Bosnian Serbauthorities to move the bodies undetected. Now, how-ever, tribunal officials say the bodies were moved inOctober 1995, before the pinpoint satellite surveillancewas requested by the tribunal. Once the original siteswere discovered to have been tampered with, Americansatellite photographs of the region were reviewed andwere found to show trucks and earth-moving equipmentat the original burial sites, according to tribunal offi-cials.” 19)

But if the surveillance photos show what they claim toshow, why have they not been made public? Why have theynot been turned over to either the Tribunal or the press?

The charges against the Bosnian Serb leadership stemfrom the August 10, 1995 closed session of the SecurityCouncil where Madeleine Albright for the first time showedaerial spy photos purporting to show that the Bosnian Serbsin the aftermath of the takeover of Srebrenica “committedwide-scale atrocities against Muslim civilians”. (Ms.Albright’s disdain for precision is evident in her allegationthat the supposed atrocities were committed against “civil-ians”, when she must have been aware that she was referringto Muslim soldiers.)

The Clinton Administration made public three of theeight photos shown in the Security Council. As a New YorkTimes journalist complained, the US government refused“to let reporters see the satellite photographs (...) whichwere said to include pictures of people crowded into asoccer field. American officials said the satellite photo-graphs were classified, although Ms. Albright showedthem to the other 14 members of the Security Council.” 20)

This striptease sort of procedure, in itself, should provokequestions concerning the credibility not only of these pho-tos but also of the journalists who base their reports onsatellite photos they themselves have never seen.

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“According to one American official who has seen thephotographs, one shows hundreds and perhaps thou-sands of Muslim men and boys in a field near a soccerstadium about 5 miles north of Srebrenica. Anotherphoto taken several days later shows a large area offreshly dug earth, consistent with the appearance ofknown mass graves, near the stadium, which is empty. 21)”

Given the fact that the photos are “classified”, the anony-mous American “official” must have been from the intelli-gence community - a reason for his anonymity. What hedeclares, should be taken as being what the intelligencecommunity wants us to believe. Still his version of what ison those pictures is of interest. Some of the questions thatarise are:

* Why are photos, purported to be the most important -those showing “Muslim men and boys” - hidden from thepublic? Do they actually show what the US administrationclaim that they show?

* How does the US secret service discern the differ-ence between “hundreds and perhaps thousands of Mus-lim men and boys” from the same number of Serb orCroatian males - and that from a high altitude? If they couldnot count the figures precisely (to tell “hundreds” from“thousands”), how could they identify them as “Muslimsmen and boys”? The Security Council members apparentlysaw something different on these photos: Following thepresentation to the Security Council a NewYork Timesjournalist reports: “The photographs showed a stretch offields at Novo Kasaba, near Srebrenica, where BosnianMuslim families were apparently herded together.” 22) Amere detail? Which is the true story? The version “Muslimmen and boys” given by the anonymous [intelligence] “of-ficial” the day before, or the one of “Bosnian Muslimfamilies” the day after members of the Security Councilviewed the pictures with their own eyes? Had they realizedthat they were viewing mainly women and children (perhapsbeing “herded together” to prepare to be taken by bus toTuzla)? Is this not an indication that perhaps the surveillance

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photos will not stand up under independent appraisal? Couldthis embarrassing discrepancy be the main reason why thesurveillance photos were made inaccessible to the public?

* How closely were diplomats of the Security Councilable to examine (for authenticity, manipulation, falsifica-tion) the photos? Did they have their intelligence experts onhand or did they have to view the photos with the eyes ofnon-experts? Were they forced to appraise the photosquickly? Were they allowed to keep copies of the photos?

* The assumption that several days after having seen afull soccer field, an empty one would signify that thoseformerly seen there had been executed, is so farfetched,that it could be dismissed out of hand. How many soccerstadiums remain filled overnight, or days at a time? Or werethey thinking of Santiago de Chile, autumn 1973? If thoseseen had in fact been captured Muslims, why not assume thatthey had been taken to a prisoner of war camp?

* Satellite surveillance is carried out on a permanentbasis, observing the targeted area without interruption forany meaningful interval. Where then were the other moreconclusive photos showing people in the process of beingshot, dead bodies being removed, open pits being dug oralready filled with bodies or being covered?

One of the three photos that were made available to thepublic and reproduced in several newspapers may give a clueas to the level of credibility of the other photos that remainhidden. It could also shed light on journalists’ level ofcritical treatment of this small tidbit of image. Showing twobuildings, a main and subordinate road, two light coloredpatches (indicated with arrows) in the middle of what couldbe a field with a parallel double-lined path (tire tracks?)leading from the main road to each of the light areas is to beseen on the photo labeled: “Possible Mass Graves; Kasaba/Konjevic Polje Area, Bosnia; unclassified Jul. 95". In thelower left corner is the explanation of the arrows: “Recentlydisturbed earth.”

* Where is the original photo taken by the reconnais-

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sance aircraft? Obviously it was not the original photo thatwas shown to the Security Council. Why? Photos fromreconnaissance cameras show built-in time and the geo-graphical settings. The labeling that accompanied the pub-lished photo: “Possible Mass Graves” was added after thephoto was taken and time and geographical settings of theoriginal were edited out of the picture. Arrows and otherwritten interpretations of what one is supposed to see wereedited onto the photo. Without such indications, the samephoto could be interpreted to show something having noth-ing to do with either warfare or the Balkans. How does oneeven know that the photo was taken near Srebrenica, or at thetime that it is claimed to have been taken - and not at someother time in some other part of the world?

* Could it be that the US government knows that theorigin of this “disturbed soil” has nothing to do with “MassGraves”? Could this be the reason why the photo is entitled:“Possible Mass Graves”? Would this not also explain whythe State Department and CIA found it necessary to launchrumors that Serbs had allegedly removed the thousands ofbodies that were supposed to have been buried under this“disturbed soil” - albeit without any satellite photos to backup their new rumor?

Making use of its superior technological developmentparticularly in the area of global hi-tech espionage, the USgovernment blackmails any and all into bowing to its wishesbecause it “knows”. “Knowledge, more than ever before,is power,” is how Joseph S. Nye, Jr., the Clinton Adminis-tration’s former Chairman of the National IntelligenceCouncil and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-tional Affairs, and Admiral William A. Owens, former ViceChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Clinton Admin-istration, introduced their important essay on the role ofinfo-techology in US foreign policy strategy. They write:

“These technologies provide the ability to gather, sort,process transfer, and display information about highly com-plex events that occur in wide geographic areas. However,this is important for more than fighting wars. In a rapidly

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changing world, information about what is occurring be-comes a central commodity of international relations,just as the threat and use of military force was seen as thecentral power resource in an international system over-shadowed by the potential clash of superpowers.

(...) In this setting, the emerging US capabilities sug-gest leverage with friends similar to what extended nu-clear deterrence once offered. The nuclear umbrella pro-vided a cooperative structure, linking the United States in amutually beneficial way to a wide range of friends, allies,and neutral nations. It was a logical response to the centralissue of international relations (...).

Now the central issue is ambiguity about the type anddegree of threats, and the basis for cooperation is thecapacity to clarify and cut through that ambiguity.

(...) These capabilities point to what might be called aninformation umbrella. Like extended nuclear deterrence,they could form the foundation for a mutually beneficialrelationship. The United States would provide situationalawareness, particularly regarding military matters of inter-est to other nations. Other nations, because they could sharethis information about an event or crisis, would be moreinclined to work with the US. 23)

Having a quasi monopoly on this “knowledge” meansthat no one can prove the contrary of what the US alleges.

By imposing surveillance photos upon the Security Coun-cil, and therefore upon the rest of the world, photos that theClinton Administration had apparently no intention of vol-untarily making available to independent, impartial scru-tiny, and in the knowledge that no authority exists to forcethem to publicize the other photos, the US Administrationhas created a lawless and law-free realm for itself. The USgovernment can fabricate, manipulate, present or suppressevidence at will and with impunity and call it legal proof.Any country or other institution allying itself with the UScan also enjoy a bit of this “freedom” from the restraints ofinternational codes of conduct and national standards of

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rule of law, provided the interests they pursue do notconflict with those pursued by the US.

As in the case of Srebrenica, the US government hasnever come forward with evidence to support its claimsabout situations elsewhere in the world, for example thatIraq poses a “threat to the peace” in the Middle East, that BinLaden was in any way connected to - let alone responsiblefor - the bombings near US embassies in Eastern Africa, orthat the factory in Khartoum was producing anything otherthan pharmaceutical products for healing people and ani-mals. These unproved claims have been used to justify theUS government “getting away with murder” of distant peo-ples.

A second question is: what objective was the US pursu-ing in making these allegations against the Bosnian Serbleadership?

The day Ms. Albright made her exhibit at the SecurityCouncil, the New York Times shed light on the intentionsbehind the scenes.

The timing of the Administration’s disclosure of thephotos, which Mr. Clinton discussed with his nationalsecurity advisers on Monday, coincided with a new Ameri-can plan to broker peace in the Balkans. Anthony Lake,the President’s national security adviser, arrived in Lon-don today to begin talks with European allies. 24)

Alongside Lake’s trip to London, a second reason forMs. Albright’s spectacular stage management became ap-parent: “Ms. Albright’s presentation today came as thou-sands of Serbian refugees fled their homes after a Croatianmilitary offensive, carried out with tacit American ap-proval, overran an area of Croatia previously held byrebel Serbs.” 25)

To distract attention from the largest ethnic cleansing ofthe entire Yugoslav civil war, with not only “tacit Americanapproval” but with active American assistance, the ClintonAdministration put on a spy photo “peep show” for the UNSecurity Council. A supplementary objective must have

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been to dissuade Security Council members from seekingto impose sanctions against an ally of the United States fora criminal offensive in the Krajina on a far greater scale thanthe Serb capture of Srebrenica. The US government hopedto spare itself the politically embarrassing situation ofhaving to veto any such initiative. A US veto would havemeant giving up its official position of impartiality, whichit needed to be a credible chaperon for the negotiations.

To monopolize attention, the crimes attributed to Serbshad to be more horrendous than those known to be commit-ted by Croats or Muslims. From then on the well-tested BigLie method of “waving the bloody shirt” serves to preparethe lynch mob.

Nye and Owens provide confirmation in the article quotedabove. They write: “The negotiation of the Bosnian peaceagreement at Dayton, Ohio, last fall illustrated a diplo-matic dimension of information power. The United Statessucceeded in getting an agreement where for years othernegotiating parties had failed in part because of itssuperior information assets.” 26)

The advantage of a US “knowledge” (intelligence) mo-nopoly is supposed to be based on its “real-time” instanta-neous availability. The US government claims to be able toobserve events thousands of miles away at the time they aretaking place. But what happened with Srebrenica? Why doesthe US only come forward with “incriminating” evidenceone month after the events are supposed to have takenplace?

The Tribunal receives a large portion of its “evidence”from the media. The fact that neither the media nor theTribunal were ever given access to all of the photos, meansthat the Tribunal’s charges against Karadzic and Mladiclinked with Srebrenica are primarily based on faith. TheBible defines faith as “the substance of things hoped for,the evidence of things not seen”. The indictments werebased on faith in the journalists’ faith in the Security Coun-cil’s faith in the CIA and its spy photos.

But once the indictment was handed down, once the

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Bosnian Serb leaders were shut out of negotiations and oncethe Serbian President Milosevic was under effective black-mail (that he too could suffer indictment like his BosnianSerb brethren if he doesn’t play by US rules), the ClintonAdministration showed little interest in helping “further thecause of justice”.

Apparently realizing that with the Dayton negotiationsabout to get underway, the Tribunal would no longer beneeded as a fig leaf, its chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone,desperate to maintain the Tribunal as an international insti-tution, pressured the US government for assurances that theindicted leaders of the Bosnian Serbs would be extradited toThe Hague for trial. Also desperately searching for evi-dence to justify the second “genocide” indictment arisingfrom the Srebrenica legend, Goldstone wrote a letter to theUS Embassy in The Hague, asking the US government tocome forward with the “evidence” it had evidently prom-ised, but not delivered. His letter was quoted in the Wash-ington Post. Among other complaints:

“Judge [Goldstone] called the ‚quality and timeli-ness‘ of intelligence provided by the United States ‚dis-appointing.‘ He complained about the failure to handover spy photos that he said could help the United Na-tions-sponsored tribunal identify mass graves that ap-peared after the fall of Srebrenica in July. The judge alsocomplained that much of the information provided by theUnited States so far was based on ‚open-source material‘not relevant to the original requests. He submitted anadditional 25 questions to Washington, including a re-quest for information about a transcript of a conversa-tion between General Mladic and Yugoslav Army com-manders who report directly to President SlobodanMilosevic of Serbia.” 27)

(The reference to “open-source material”, simply meansthat the US government provided the Tribunal with mediareports as “evidence”, some of which were obviously CIApropaganda plants.)

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The White House spokesman, Michael D. McCurry, andother US officials responded to Goldstone’s complaints bysaying:

“There are certain types of intelligence informationthat our Government cannot share with the internationalcommunity. Mr. McCurry cited ‚national security rea-sons‘ as the reason the United States would withholdsome evidence, and criticized the complaints by the pros-ecutor, Judge Richard Goldstone, as ‚unfortunate.‘ (...)In defending their level of cooperation with the tribunal,Administration officials insisted that Judge Goldstone isgetting most of his data from the United States and therewould be no war crimes tribunal if not for the UnitedStates.” 28)

With this statement, US “administration officials” ac-tually confirmed what critical observers have been sayingfrom the beginning: that the Tribunal is an instrument of USforeign policy, manipulated by the US to serve its interests.This Tribunal is supposed to proceed on the basis of “evi-dence” that is never produced and unverifiable “data” selec-tively provided by a single Superpower which (by its supportto Croatian and Muslim operations against Serbs) has be-come a party to the conflict it is judging.

It has been reported that in the New York central head-quarters of the UN, all files relevant to Srebrenica have beenclassified “secret” for the next 30 to 50 years and are not tobe made available even to the Tribunal. This decision wastaken at the demand of three permanent members of theSecurity Council, the USA, France and Great Britain, toprotect the secrecy of government documents. 29)

By what right does the US classify, as a “nationalsecurity secret,” evidence that it claims to possess, con-cerning what is often referred to as “the worst war crimecommitted in Europe since World War II”? Does this notmake the US government party to the obstruction of justice,if not to its outright perversion? How does the US justifyclassifying evidence of “crimes against humanity” com-mitted by those it designated as “enemy forces”? Is the US

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administration hiding proof of a crime or proof that it has noproof of a crime? Is the helplessness of the Tribunal in theHague in this situation not simply another indication thatthis body is merely a poodle on the US government’s leash?Most disturbing of all is that amid all the clamor for “HumanRights”, no one appears interested in raising these and otherimportant questions.

3) The vanishing corpses:

Franklin Zimring, director of the Earl Warren LegalInstitute at the University of California at Berkeley de-scribed statistics on murder as “important because homi-cide is by far the best measured crime, given the difficultyof hiding bodies”, he added “also because homicide is thecrime that most alarms the public. 30)” With this statement,Mr. Zimring touched the heart of the Srebrenica question.Wanting to secede from Yugoslavia like Slovenia and Croatiabefore it, the Muslim leadership in Bosnia was confrontedwith a very special set of circumstances. Having neither amajority of the population nor control of the greater part ofthe territory, and without having the military power to offsetthose disadvantages, President Alija Izetbegovic’s Islamicparty (the Party of Democratic Action, or SDA) in power inSarajevo, set out to alarm international public opinion inorder to pressure the US government and NATO to come toits aid. To do this the Sarajevo government had to cry“bloody murder” in every possible variation.... only to runup against the fact that for “bloody murder” there has to bea proof in the form of dead bodies. The Tribunal and themedia, having generally - and uncritically - propagated the“bloody murder” line, found themselves obliged either toproduce the bodies or come up with an excuse for beingunable to do so.

In November 1995, the icy winter ruled out the possibil-ity of digging in search of evidence.As the spring thawapproached, the Tribunal and its chief prosecutor at thetime, Richard Goldstone, began to get nervous. The USgovernment was still not forthcoming with more conclusive

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evidence of a massacre. At one point, Goldstone warned that“the exhumation of the graves may become necessary inorder to determine the identity of the corpses and the timeand cause of death and to obtain the necessary evi-dence.” 31) What Goldstone formulated here should havebeen - if the tribunal were functioning as a normal court oflaw - the most logical first step in order to determine thatthe alleged crime had in fact been committed, in otherwords a prerequisite for an indictment, not a result.

Another assumption deserves attention. There is a wide-spread but mistaken impression that finding a “mass grave”means having found victims of a mass execution. Both inwartime and in peace time, the death in battle or due todisease or catastrophe of a large number of victims who areunidentifiable, or who due to circumstances camnot beburied in the normal manner, may be dealt with by theinterim solution of burying the corpses in mass graves, atleast until orderly burial is possible. When in October1998, an oil pipeline in exploded in Nigeria, killing morethan 600 people, the Nigerian government, to protect theremaining population from the danger of epidemics, had thevictims buried in mass graves until the fire could be extin-guished and a proper burial be arranged. The same is com-mon practice in warfare where battlefield victims of theopposing side may be disposed of in this way, until a transferof the remains can be negotiated with the other side, to avoidthe health problems that their decomposition on the surfacemight cause, particularly in summer.

Even before exhumation got underway, the media beganto prepare public opinion for the disappointment that wouldcome when the “mass graves” failed to produce the prom-ised incriminating evidence. .

Already while showing her pictures to the SecurityCouncil, Ms Albright had an excuse prepared for the lack ofevidence to support her charges. She warned:

“We will keep watching to see if the Bosnian Serbs tryto erase the evidence of what they have done.” 32)

Since then, several rumors have been put into circula-

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tion. One of the first rumors for the vanishing corpses wasthat “the Serbs” used a corrosive agent. Once again theCIA’s anonymous “American officials” were behind therumor:

“American officials said today that they suspect Bos-nian Serb soldiers may have tried to destroy evidencethat they killed thousands of Muslim men (...). The Serbsare suspected of pouring corrosive chemicals on thebodies and scattering corpses that had been buried inmass graves, the officials said. The suspicions first arosein early August, after Central Intelligence Agency ex-perts analyzed pictures of the area taken in July byreconnaissance satellites and U-2 planes.” 33)

So instead of omnipresent sky spy “knowledge”/intelli-gence, Serbs are - merely - “suspected” of having destroyedevidence. As with the “possible” mass graves photo, rumoris enough to convict in a lynch-mob climate. This rumorcirculated in October 1995, months before the first “massgrave” exhumations. It was forgotten in the climate ofoptimistic anticipation as the graves began to be opened in1996, only to be revived when the graves’ yield was disap-pointing. At the end of the first year’s hunt for mass gravebodies and the exhumations, the Tribunal’s investigatorsbegan asking: “Where have all the bodies gone?”

“Of the thousands of men and boys from the UN safearea who were executed by Bosnian Serbs in July 1995,only a few hundred - less than 10% of the 7,000 Muslimsmissing - have been dug up.” 34)

Still, this journalist is convinced that the crime had takenplace.

“The empty graves speak volumes about the con-spiracy by Bosnian Serbs to cover up the massacre atSrebrenica. Their leadership claims that few bodies havebeen found because the stories of atrocities there wereexaggerated. The more plausible theory is that bodieshave been made to “disappear”. As long as a year ago,American spy satellites first revealed evidence of tam-

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pering at several grave sites which, when later exhumed,yielded fewer corpses than expected. [...] One explana-tion for the empty graves is that the bodies may have beendug up and taken to an aluminium factory at Zvornik to bechemically dissolved. American satellite images frombetween September 27 and October 2 last year showunusual activity both at the aluminium plant, which offi-cially was shut down, and at the grave site itself. Thealuminium factory had the capability to dissolve humanflesh because it was using sodium hydroxide to convertbauxite ore into aluminium. Sodium hydroxide is highlytoxic and, according to Abdulah Sacerbegovic, a Muslimand the plant’s former manager, it easily dissolves hu-man flesh, leaving virtually no trace except a sludge.” 35)

Before the crime can be proven to have taken place, theculprit has been identified. Throughout the summer’s dig-ging, there had been no mention of sludge. Even in theabsence of sludge (how would “the Serbs” then dispose ofthat much sludge?), the journalist still finds CIA legends“more plausible.”

Another explanation was simultaneously being circu-lated: “the Serbs” had simply dug up and reburied bodiessomewhere else.

This excuse has its advantages: no sludge to find, andBosnia is large. With a “needle in the haystack” search for“mass graves”, the public could be kept in anticipation - andat bay - year after year for quite a while. But also itsdisadvantages. How does one “plausibly” remove thousandsof buried, decomposing bodies without being seen byMadeleine Albright’s “sky-eyes” of aerial surveillance?Undismayed by such problems of factual detail, the Tribunal(and media) continued their course.

In November 1995, the Dutch Minister of Defense,Joris Voorhove, accused Serbs of “trying hastily to de-stroy the evidence of the massacre they committed againstthousands of Bosniaks around Srebrenica.” Citing “intel-ligence services” as his source, he claimed in a TV inter-

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view, that “these days Serbs have been exhuming thecorpses from the mass graves in order to remove theevidence of their crimes”. 36)

It should be remembered that “these days” the UnitedStates - according to Mike O’Connor - already had itssatellite surveillance in place, a satellite surveillance ableto find decomposing bodies under the earth’s surface. Wherewas the proof furnished by “intelligence services” thatincited Joris Voorhove to make such an allegation? Why inthree years have they been unable to locate the corpses thatthey claim were in the area since July 1995? Also missingis any explanation as to how “the Serbs” were able - “plau-sibly” - to dispose of 7,500 decomposing corpses, in thetime and space that this presumably would entail, withouthaving been photographed by the super-hi-tech US aerialsurveillance.

Washington Post journalist John Pomfret visited sitesthat “according to a Western investigator, could be two ofseveral mass graves in the region believed to hold corpsesof some of the estimated 12,000 Muslim fighters”. Pomfretobserves that: “while dirt obviously had been moved re-cently around the sites in Glogova, if Serbian gunmenhad attempted to tamper with it or destroy evidence, theydid not do a thorough job. Bones were readily visible onthe clay dirt, as were bandages, shoes and other thingsthat obviously once belonged to the men buried be-low.” 37) Besides his inflationary figure of “12,000 Muslimfighters”, pulled out of thin air, Mr. Pomfret readily at-tributes recently “moved dirt” to “Serbian gunmen”. HadSerbs come back with guns rather than shovels to “tamper”?No wonder they didn’t do a thorough job. Another explana-tion could be that dirt was moved to make it appear as thoughsomeone had “attempted” to tamper. Since the region wasbeing watched by American IFOR forces, if they didn’tcatch the “would be tamperers” in the act, there is no way toknow whether they were Serbs... or Americans. This is allvery vague, but fortunately Mr. Pomfret has his “Westerninvestigator” to put the right “spin” on it.

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It is noteworthy how many correspondents have a privi-leged source: their anonymous “investigators” and “gov-ernment officials”- more often than not another name forintelligence agents. Intelligence agencies have now beenpromoted to “reliable” - even unquestionable - sources of“news”.

The civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has produced manycruel encounters among Serbs, Muslims and Croats. TheSrebrenica area was a site of such encounters throughoutthe war. Muslims had driven out Serb inhabitants early on.Contrary to the assumption that a “UN protected area” wasa demilitarized zone for civilian refugees, Srebrenica wasused for years by Muslim fighters as a protected militarybase from which to launch attacks on nearby Serbian vil-lages. Serb forces that took the town in July 1995 were nodoubt looking for Muslim soldiers who had taken part inthose murderous raids. Knowing this would happen, mostMuslim soldiers tried to flee. Some escaped and others didnot, although exactly what happened remains unclear -deliberately unclear, so long as all facts must be distortedto lend credence to the notion of a massive “genocide”.Even the fact that the Serbs provided safe passage to womenand children is interpreted as sinister, when it is proof that“genocide” was not happening.

* * *

The International CriminalTribunal in The Hague has notsought to render justice in a non-partisan manner, whichmight have contributed to reconciliation among the peoplesof the region. Instead, a biased approach only exacerbatesthe feeling among each ethnic group of being the victims:the Muslims, of being victims of Serbian “genocide”, astheir leaders claim; the Serbs, of being victims of unjustaccusations. The Tribunal was set up on the assumption thatone side in the Bosnian conflict, and one side only - theBosnian Serbs - were guilty of “genocide”. The Tribunal wasa political instrument used by the United States to demon-strate support for the Muslim side and put pressure on the

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Serbs. The bias was built-in, and those media that were acontributing source of that bias have spared the Tribunal anyserious critical scrutiny of its methods or results. Instead,it has been widely praised as an example of what is neededon a more global basis as an answer to the problems of “warcrimes” and “genocide”. Viewed as a tentative first steptoward a brave new system of world justice, the Tribunal isnot held to any normal judicial standards. Yet the fact is thatneither the Tribunal (nor the press) have yet produced solidevidence that genocide was ever either planned, attemptedor carried out in Bosnia or that a crime against humanity onthe level of “genocide” every took place in Srebrenica. Andstill the indictments stand.

Should the standards promoted by this Tribunal everbecome international legal norms, humanity will be setback to a period predating the French and American Revo-lutions. Even the best national system of jurisprudencewould be corrupted and undermined by the pressure of anoverriding international jurisprudence that has abandonedsuch safeguards as the assumption of innocence until provenguilty, and the need to produce material proof that analleged crime has actually been committed.

Standing at the threshold of absolute domination, fol-lowing the end of the world socialist system, decidingliterally over the life and death of entire populations, theUnited States and its “western world” allies cloak them-selves in a moralist fig leaf and call their dictate to the rest(the majority) of the world “law.” The tribunal is designedmerely to lend an aura of “justice” and permanence to theunabashed return to the realm of the mighty, “governed” bythe arbitrary law of the jungle.

G.P.

++++++++++++++++++++++++Sidebar:The Eyewitness, ErdemovicApparently not anxious to exhume suspected graves, but

needing other proof of mass executions in order to make aplausible indictment of the Bosnian Serb leadership, the

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tribunal turned to “eyewitness’” testimony as its fundamen-tal form of “evidence”. As most jurists would agree, this isone of the most unreliable forms of evidence. Based onmemory and the interpretation of meanings behind termsused to describe a situation, this form of evidence proves tobe one of the most easily manipulated and tailored to fit theneeds of the prosecution. Eyewitness testimony is alsodifficult to disprove. Because the accused is at a disadvan-tage, this form of evidence tends toward reversing the basicrule-of-law maxim: “proof of guilt lies with the prosecu-tion”.

The “eyewitness” to the mass execution in Srebrenica,Drazen Erdemovic, came forward in March 1996, asking togo toThe Hague as a witness. In a confession to the Frenchdaily Le Figaro, Erdemovic described himself as havingbeen a “soldier in the Bosnian Serb Army” and as suchhaving participated in mass executions of Muslim civiliansfrom Srebrenica. In vague details, spiced with bits of con-crete information, he told how he participated in the execu-tion of 1,200 people from Srebrenica on a farm in Pilice.According to him the executioners “used 7,62mm bul-lets” 1) and that the bodies were disposed of in mass graveson the same farm.

With this concrete information, one would think that theTribunal would finally have absolute proof, providedErdemovic was telling the truth. They would simply have totake Erdemovic to the scene, let him show what happened,where the bodies were buried and exhume the bodies. Aforensic examination could verify if they had, in fact, beenkilled with 7,62mm bullets from what angle and distance.That is, of course, if the Tribunal really wanted to learn ifErdemovic was a reliable witness or simply giving falsetestimony.

(Reuters news agency reported in the spring of 1998 thatduring “the opening of a mass grave in Bosnia,” nearSrebrenica, according to the United Nations, “experts foundthe remains of skulls, clothes and hundreds of spent

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rounds of ammunition.” Further in the article, one learnsthat “more than 1,500 spent rounds have been discoveredin this area over the past two years”. 2) One sees that theTribunal is lacking both bodies and bullets. Not only havethey found no more than 460 bodies of the alleged 8,000 butover the two years of searching they have not found morethan 1,500 rounds of spent ammunition meaning that to havekilled 8,000 people each shot had to have killed more than5 people.)

Erdemovic’s story raises many questions. Born of Serbo-Croatian parents, he identifies himself as a Croat. In 1992,Erdemovic first served in the military police of the HVO(the ultra-nationalist, Croatian military “Council of De-fence”) in his native Tuzla, before he crossed over to theBosnian-Serbian side following punishment for allegedlyhaving helped Serbs escape to Republika Srpska. 3) Accord-ing to his testimony he was then mustered into the Serbianmilitary and was present at the takeover of Srebrenica.Erdemovic, who had been an ordinary soldier, said that aftera falling out with his commander in Bosnia, he decided tomove to Serbia and tell his story “apparently in revenge”writes the International Herald Tribune. 4) In Serbia hefirst came in contact with correspondents of (US) ABC-TVstation and the (French daily) Le Figaro, to whom heoffered his story, asking them to help him “escape to TheHague. 5)”

Is Erdemovic a reliable witness? Is it plausible that aCroatian nationalist, an ex-HVO military policeman wouldhave joined - or even been accepted - in the Bosnian Serbarmy? Already as a military policeman of the HVO he helps“the enemy”, runs into difficulty with his superiors and runsto the other side. He then serves under arms with the Serbianforces, gets into difficulty again with his superiors, andagain changes sides. Did he go straight to the correspond-ents, or did he first go to yet another side to offer hisservices? Being someone who seemingly touches all bases,this could be a plausible explanation for his asking to“escape to The Hague” - how many common soldiers seek

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out The Hague? The only ones to gain from his testimonywould be those in the government in Sarajevo, and appar-ently this is the only one of the three civil war contendersagainst whom he does not (yet) have a grudge. Would thisnot also help explain the “anonymous” witness (an allegedsurvivor of the execution) who testified before the Tribunalthat Erdemovic stopped other soldiers of the Serbian troopsfrom killing him?

This might also help explain why it was Le Figaro thatgot to break this story, even though it was a “scoop” wortha Pulitzer Prize. Why didn’t ABC-TV take this “scoop” of alifetime? This smacks of known intelligence service “blackpropaganda” method, one of which is to plant a hoax in areputable foreign paper to avoid suspicion of its origin. TheAmerican press then carries it as a reprint. In comparison tothe German and American media at the time, the Frenchpress was far less fanatically anti-Serb. This is mere specu-lation, but raises the sort of questions that should have atleast made experienced judges begin to doubt the credibil-ity of a Drazan Erdemovic.

It has also been reported - and denied - that among theoffers made Erdemovic by former chief prosecutor Rich-ard Goldstone were benefit of the “state’s witness” privi-lege, freedom from prosecution for himself and a guaranteeof a new life abroad in exchange for his valuable testimony 6)

against the Serbian leadership.

Erdemovic arrived in the Hague as a witness and becamea defendant charged with crimes against humanity for hisrole in the executions that he had described.

In an article in The Nation, Diana Johnstone describedthe conviction as being:

“heralded as a great “first” in establishment of globaljustice. [The Erdemovic] case is considered of great im-portance to the Tribunal since his confession of takingpart in executing over a thousand Muslims after the Serbcapture of Srebrenica is considered prime evidence in theTribunal’s “main event”, the future trial of Bosnian Serb

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leader Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. 7)

Mirko Klarin, journalist for Nasa Borba described thetrial as follows:

To the prosecution, Erdemovic is above all a “valuedcollaborator”. (...) The defendant further helped the in-vestigators to identify about 10 persons who had perpe-trated or ordered these crimes, whose identity, the pros-ecution admitted, would have remained a mystery with-out Erdemovic’s cooperation. Also in his favour was the“voluntary, courageous and public testimony” in theRule 61 hearings on the indictments of Bosnian Serbleaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, whereErdemovic appeared as the leading witness for the pros-ecution.” 8)

But as Johnstone further points out, there was a catch:“(...) inasmuch as he confessed to his crimes, there was

no formal trial and no presentation of material evidenceto corroborate his story. In any case, since he had turned“state’s evidence”, there would have been no rigorouscross-examination from either a contented prosecutionor a complaisant defense regarding the discrepancy be-tween the number of Muslims he testified having helpedexecute at a farm near Pilica — 1,200 — and the numberof bodies actually found there by the Tribunal’s forensicteam: about 150 to 200. 9)

Originally sentenced to ten years in prison, upon appealthe judges accepted his change of plea from “guilty to acrime against humanity,” to one of “guilt of a war crime.”Citing his “honest disposition; [...] supported by his con-fession and consistent admission of guilt” 10) among otherthings, his sentence was reduced from 10 to 5 years.

The question remains: does the “honest disposition”cited by the Tribunal signify that those defendants whoinsist upon and defend their innocence will be exemplarilypunished, especially since the Tribunal makes no effort atverifying the evidence in their defense?

GP

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1) O’Connor, Mike; Mass Graves in Bosnia Bolster War-Crimes Cases; IHT(NYT-Services), 14.5.982) ibid3) Johnstone, Diana, Selective Justice in The Hague: The War Crimes Tribunalon Former Yugoslavia is a Mockery of Evidentiary Rule; The Nation, 22.9.974) Former Yugoslavia: Srebrenica: help for families still awaiting news; ICRCNews 375) AP; Conflict in the Balkans; 8,000 Muslims Missing; New York Times; Sep15, 1995; p. 8.6) Chris Hedges; Conflict in the Balkans: In Bosnia; Muslim Refugees SlipAcross Serb Lines; New York Times; July 18, 1995, p. 7.7) Evans, Michael and Kallenbach, Michael; Missing’ enclave troops found;The Times; 02 August 1995 p. 9.8) Dobbs, Michael/ Spolar, Christine; 12,000 Muslims Massacred In JulySrebrenica Exodus; Washington Post, October 27, 1995.9) Pierre Gaultier (interview), Wo sind die Vermißten aus Srebrenica? JungeWelt, 30.8.9510) Faux électeurs... ou faux cadavres; Balkans Infos, Paris; Oct. 1996 (No. 6)pg. 1; See also Ivanisevic, Milivoje; “Un Dossier qui pose bien des Questions”;Balkans Infos, Paris; Dec. 1996 (No. 8) pgs. 6 - 7.11) McAllister, J.F.O. et al; Specters of barbarism in Bosnia compel the US andEurope to ponder: Is it time to intervene?; Time Magazine Aug. 17, 1992.12) Hedges, Chris; Bosnia Troops Cite Gassings At Zepa; New York Times, Jul27, 199513) Vulliamy, Ed; Bosnia: The secret War - Serbs ‚run secret camps‘: Men freedfrom clandestine detention tell Ed Vulliamy of random beatings and ‚mobile torturemachines‘; Guardian, 17.1.9614) S.K., Another Two Mass Graves - Discovered, Press TWRA, Jan 19,199615) A.S.; Bosnian Soldiers in Australia Against Their Will; Press TWRA, Feb 6,199616) A.S.; Investigation on Deportation of Bosniaks Requested; Press TWRA,March 9, 199617) Nasa Borba, July 27, 1995, Quoted in Cavoski, Prof. Dr. Kosta; “The Hagueagainst Justice Revisited: The Case of Dr. Radovan Karadzic; Serbian Sarajevo 1997,pg. 1918) O’Connor, Mike; op cit19) O’Connor, Mike; op cit20) Op cit: Crossette, Barbara; U.S. Seeks to Prove (...) The New York Times;11.8.9521) Schmitt, Eric; Spy Photos Indicate Mass Grave at Serb-Held Town, USSays; NY Times, Aug. 10, 199522) Op cit: Crossette, Barbara; U.S. Seeks to Prove (...) The New York Times;

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11.8.9523) Nye, Joseph L. Jr./Owens, William A.; America’s Information Edge, ThePower Resource of the Future, Foreign Affairs Vol. 75 No. 2 March/April 1996 pg.20, 24, 26, 2724) Schmitt, Eric; Spy Photos Indicate ob cit25) Crossette, Barbara; U.S. Seeks to Prove Mass Killings; NY Times, Aug 11,199526) Nye, Joseph L. Jr./Owens, William A.; America’s Information Edge, ob cit27) Sciolino, Elaine; US Says It Is Withholding Data From War Crimes Panel;NY Times, 8.11.95 (pg. 10)28) op. cit. Sciolino, Elaine;29) Zumach, Andreas; UN-Tribunal kritisiert französische “Totalblockade”:Paris verbietet Zeugenvernehmung Janviers und anderer französischer Offiziere inDen Haag; Tageszeitung (Berlin), 17.12.9730) Butterfield, Fox; Serious Crime Recedes Further in US, But 4-YearDowntrend Masks a Surge of Violence by Teenagers; IHT (NYT), May 6, 199631) god/cha, UN-Tribunal will Massengräber in Bosnien öffnen lassen;Goldstone: Exhumierung notwendig zur Beweissicherung, Agence France Presse(Deutschland - AFD) 19.01.1996 - 17:5432) Weiner, Tim; U.S. Says Serbs May Have Tried To Destroy MassacreEvidence; NY Times, Oct. 30, 199533) ibid34) Swain, Jon; Empty Bosnian graves baffle UN; The Sunday Times, Nov. 3,199635) ibid36) Serbs Try To Remove Evidence Of Massacre In Srebrenica, TWRA - DailyBulletin, Nov 18, 199537) John Pomfret, Bosnia Killing Fields Reveal A Grisly Demise, Mass Gravesnear Srebrenica, IHT / WPS, 20.1.961) Vanessa Vasic-Janekovic, A Man Who Knows Too Much (Covjek koji znaprevise), quoted in the ARZIN index-60, 15.3.962) lae/gwa; Schädelreste und Kugeln in Massengrab in Bosnien; Reuters(Germany) Apr. 20, 1998 - 19:393) Klarin, Mirko; Defendant for the Prosecution: To the Prosecutors,Erdemovic is above all a valued witness; The Institute of War and Peace Reporting19964) Jane Perlez, Milosevic is expected to Aid in a War crimes Case; 2 BosnianSerbs may face court, IHT, 14.3.96 (emphasis added)5) Klarin, Mirko; op cit6) cd sg Bosnien/UN/Jugoslawien; Tribunal verlangt in Belgrad Auslieferungvon Srebrenica-Zeugen, dpa 12.03.1996 - 12:577) Johnstone, Diana; Selective Justice in The Hague: The War Crimes Tribunalon Former Yugoslavia is a Mockery of Evidentiary Rule; The Nation, 22.9.97

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Ultimatums or Agreements

1.

Determined Force (NATO) Ultimatum(Madelaine Albright declaration)

(...)3. Our military actions are directed not at the Serb peoplebut at the policies of the regime in Belgrade, which hasrepeatedly rejected all efforts to solve the crisis peace-fully. President Milosevic must:

— Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and theimmediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; — Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and para-military forces; — Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an internationalmilitary presence; — Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refu-gees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to themby humanitarian aid organizations; and — Provide credible assurance of his willingness to workfor the establishment of a political framework agreementbased on the Rambouillet accords.

___________________________________________________________

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2.

G-8 Plan

TEXT OF G-8 STATEMENT ONKOSOVO

May 6, 1999 BONN, Germany (AP) - Text of the statementagreed by the foreign ministers of the G-8 group — theUnited States, Germany, France, Britain, Russia, Canada,Italy and Japan — at their meeting today:

1.The G-8 foreign ministers adopted the following generalprinciples on the politic alsolution to the Kosovo crisis: - Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repressionin Kosovo; - Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and para-military forces; - Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civiland security presences, endorsed and adopted by the UnitedNations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of thecommon objectives; - Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo tobe decided by the Security Council of the United Nations toensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for allinhabitants in Kosovo; - The safe and free return of all refugees and displacedpersons and an unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitar-ian aid organizations; - A political process towards the establishment of aninterim political framework agreement providing for a sub-stantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account ofthe Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty

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and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-via and the other countries of the region, and the demilita-rization of the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army); - Comprehensive approach to the economic developmentand stabilization of the crisis region. 2.In order to implement these principles the G-8 foreignministers instructed their political directors to prepareelements of a United Nations Security Council resolution. 3.The political directors will draw up a road map on futureconcrete steps towards a political solution to the Kosovocrisis. 4.The G-8 presidency will inform the Chinese governmenton the results of today’s meeting. 5.Foreign Ministers will reconvene in due time to reviewthe progress which has been achieved up to that point.________________________________________________

3.

Cologne Agreement from 3. June, 1999

This is the text of the agreement obtained from EuropeanUnion sources in Cologne and was the document taken toBelgrade by the EU’s envoy, Finnish President MarttiAhtisaari, and Russia’s Viktor Chernomyrdin.

Agreement should be reached on the following principlesto move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repressionin Kosovo.

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2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, po-lice and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under UNauspices of effectiveinternational civil and security presences, acting as may bedecided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guar-anteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence, with substantialNato participation, must be deployed under unified com-mand and control, and authorised to establish a safe envi-ronment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safereturn to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo,as part of the international civil presence, under which thepeople of Kosovo can enjoy a substantial autonomy withinthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by theSecurity Council of the United Nations. Interim administra-tion to provide transitional administration while establish-ing and overseeing the development of provisional demo-cratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for apeaceful and normal life of all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav andSerbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform thefollowing functions:

Liaison with international civil mission and internationalsecurity presence Marking/clearing minefields Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced personsunder the supervision of the UNHCR and unimpeded accessto Kosovo by humanitarian aid organisations.

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8. A political process towards the establishment of aninterim political framework agreement providing for a sub-stantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account ofthe Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereigntyand territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-via and the other countries of the region, and the demilita-risation of the KLA. Negotiations between the parties fora settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishmentof democratic self-governing institutions.

9. Comprehensive approach to the economic developmentand stabilisation of the crisis region. This will include theimplementation of a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Eu-rope with broad international participation in order to fur-ther promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stabil-ity and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptanceof the principles set forth above in addition to agreement toother, previously identified, required elements, which arespecified in the footnote below. A military-technical agree-ment will then be rapidly concluded that would, among otherthings, specify additional modalities, including the rolesand functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo.

Withdrawal

Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailedschedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyondwhich forces will be withdrawn.

Returning Personnel Equipment associated the returningpersonnel. Terms of reference for their functional respon-sibilities. Timetable for their return. Delineation of theirgeographical areas of operation. Rules governing their re-lationship to international security presence and interna-

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tional civil mission.

Other required elements Rapid and precise timetable forwithdrawals meaning, for example 7 days to complete with-drawal; air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25kmmutual safety zone within 48 hours. Return of personnel forthe functions specified above will be under the supervisionof the international security presence and will be limited toa small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands). Suspen-sion of military activity will occur after the beginning ofverifiable withdrawals. The discussion and achieving of amilitary-technical agreement shall not extend the previ-ously determined time for completion of withdrawals.

A second footnote refers to the composition of the inter-national force, as follows:

It is understood that Nato considers an international secu-rity force with “substantial Nato participation” to meanunified command and control and having Nato at the core.

This in turn means a unified Nato chain of command underthe political direction of the North Atlantic Council inconsultation with non-Nato force contributors.

All Nato countries, partners and other countries will beeligible to contribute to the international security force.Nato units would be under Nato command.

It is understood that Russia’s position is that the Russiancontingent will not be under Nato command and its rela-tionship to the international presence will be governed byrelevant additional agreements.

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KOSOVO ou KOSMET ?

La province du sud de Serbie, Région autonome de Kosovo etMetohie - KOSMET (AKMO), puis Région socialiste autonome (SAPKosovo) fait partie de la «Vieille Serbie», berceau de l’État et de la cultureSerbe.

A l’instar des séparatistes shqipetars (Albanais du Kosmet) luttantpour la création d’une «Grande Albanie» au détriment des pays voisins(Yougoslavie, Grèce, Macédoine), les médias et hommes politiquesoccidentaux ont délibérément supprimé le nom de METOHIE de leurdiscours: KOSMET devenant ainsi «KOSOVO».

Cette volonté de gommer une réalité géographique, historique etsurtout une mémoire n’est pas innocente, elle est pleine d’arrières penséeset de préjugés.

METOHIA vient de «Metoh», signifiant domaine de l’église. Cenom témoigne de la longue et intense histoire depuis 7 siècles, centréeautour des principaux monastères de cette région, datant du XIIIe et XIVe

siècle, tels: Visoki Decani, Pecka Patrijarsija (Patriarcat de l’église serbe dePec), l’église des Saints Archanges près de Prizren, etc.

La Metohie jouxtant l’Albanie (crée en 1913), est traversée par larivière Beli Drim, représente environ 40% de l’ensemble du Kosmet. Lesprincipales villes de Metohie sont: Pec, Prizren, Djakovica.

Les séparatistes et nationalistes shquipetars ont toujours cherché àéliminer le nom de Métohie ou à le confondre avec la région de DUKADJINsituée de l’autre côté de la frontière, en Albanie et à chasser les Serbes. Ilsont été soutenus par différents envahisseurs: Ottoman, Autrichien, Italiendurant la Seconde guerre mondiale Détenant tous les pouvoirs dansla province entre 1968 et 1988, les séparatistes ont imposé lenom de Kosovo à la place de Kosmet. KOSOVO POLJE(champs du merle en serbe), renvoie à la célèbre bataille des Serbes,(installés là depuis le VIe siècle), contre les envahisseurs turcs en 1389. LeKosovo représente un territoire relativement restreint entre les villes deKosovska Mitrovica-Pristina et les rivières Lab et Sitnica. Seshabitants se nomment Kosovac. Le reste du territoire (en dehors duKosovo) est constitué par :Drenica, Stari Kolasin, Bajgora, Salja,Nerodimlje....

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Mais, la confusion et simplification volontairement entretenues nes’arrêtent pas là. L’emploi du terme «KOSOVAR» (mot albanais ?) nedésigne, pour ceux qui l’utilisent, que les habitants shquipetars de laprovince en excluant les autres communautés: Serbes, Monténégrins,Musulmans, Turcs, Romes, Gorans, Égyptiens..., soit près de lamoitié de la population du KOSMET.. De même le mot «Bosniaques»excluait les Croates et les Serbes de Bosnie-Herzégovine, en confondantces derniers avec les Serbes de Yougoslavie, l’armée serbe deBosnie avec celle de Yougoslavie.

L’on oppose aussi systématiquement, dans les médias et discoursoccidentaux, les «Kosovars» aux Serbes en spoliant ces derniers deleurs racines et de leurs droits, et pratiquant ainsi une sorte de «purificationethnique».

Quasi inexistants lors du premier recensement fait par les occupantsOttomans (arrivés là au XIVe siècle), ramenés d’Albanie par ces derniers àpartir de la fin du XVIIe siècle, les Shquipetars, étaient minoritaires auKosmet jusqu’à la Seconde guerre mondiale.

Grâce à une natalité la plus élevée d’Europe, la terreur menée contreles autres habitants, surtout les Serbes, et une politique erronée de laprécédente Yougoslavie ( d’avant 1991), ils sont devenus majoritaires .

Oeuvrant depuis 30 ans pour un «Kosovo ethniquementpur», soutenus à présent par l’agression de l’OTAN les Shquipetarssuggèrent leurs dénominations: changement du nom de la province,mais aussi celui de la plupart des villes, rivières etc. (exemple : ville d’Urosevac devient Ferizaj et celle de Pec est nommée Peja). Toutefois, il nefaut pas préjuger de l’avenir, le KOSMET est toujours en Serbie (etYougoslavie) et n’est pas encore devenu un protectorat, comme le souhaitentcertaines approches néo-colonialistes.

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KosovoMetohia

AP Kosovo and Metohia

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Branko LakicBelgrade

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L'Allemagne : le Neandertal du 16mmson synchrone

Matthias Steinle

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Cet article projette une lumière sur un chapitre peu connu de l'histoire du filmdocumentaire mais aussi de l'histoire de la télévision : l'emploi du 16mm son

synchrone par des équipes de télévision allemande au milieu des années 50 bien avantla naissance du “direct cinéma” ou du “cinéma vérité”.

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“A la fin des années cinquante, l'Allemagne ex-nazie tentede se faire oublier”, alors que le Canada, plus précisémentle ONF (Office National du Film), invente l'équipementnécessaire à la naissance du “cinéma direct à vocationdocumentaire - enregistrement simultané de l'image et duson en situation (…)”. Cette récente présentation d'unenouvelle ère dans l'histoire du documentaire par GuyGauthier ne diffère guère de ce que l'on rencontregénéralement dans la littérature concernant “la révolutiondu direct” au début des années 60. Celle-ci résulteprincipalement de deux innovations du matériel technique :de caméras légères d'une part et de la possibilité d'enregistrerle son synchrone à l'image d'autre part. Montréal, New-York, Paris sont communément désignées comme les cen-tres où la Révolution, pellicule 16 mm à la main, guidant lescinéastes, aurait pris d'assaut les barricades du réel ; MichelBrault, Richard Leacock, Jean Rouch, quant à eux, seraientles “révolutionnaires”. Wilhelm Roth lui-même, auteur enAllemagne du livre de référence sur le documentaire, attribueà Richard Leacock et D.A. Pennebaker l'invention d'unecaméra légère à son synchrone et considère l'année 1960,avec le tournage de Primary, comme l'année charnière de cenouvel équipement.

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Et si l'invention avait été découverte quelque part enAllemagne dans la première moitié des années 50 ? Et sielle était devenue opérationnelle et utilisée de manièreprofessionnelle dès 1954 ? Supposons que ce soit le cas, ceque ces lignes se proposent dans un premier temps dedémontrer, se pose alors la question de savoir pourquoi cechapitre de l'histoire du documentaire est tombé dans l'oubli.Les réponses à ces questions ne sont pas réellement liéesà l'ambiance socio-politique en “Allemagne ex-nazie”, maisplutôt à des raisons structurelles et institutionnelles del'organisme au sein duquel est née et par la suite mise enpratique, l'invention : la télévision, ou plus précisémentl'émetteur de télévision publique au nord de l'Allemagne, leNWDR (Nord-West-Deutscher-Rundfunk) à Hambourg.En 1948, les autorités britanniques décident d'implanterune télévision dans leur zone d'occupation. L'émetteur trouverefuge dans un vieux bunker au Heiligengeistfeld à Hambourget diffuse le 27 novembre 1950 ses premières imagesessais. Mais, alors même que cette télévision vient de faireses premiers pas, les pionniers du nouveau médium ne sontpas pris au sérieux par leurs collègues de la radio et de lapresse. En outre s'ajoutent divers problèmes techniques dusaux dévastations causées par la guerre. Ils peuvent néanmoinscompter sur les expériences et les membres d'une équipe dela Poste qui, durant la dictature national-socialiste, étaitchargée d'un programme télévisé. - Notons que déjà lorsdes Jeux Olympiques de 1936 les Berlinois pouvaient suivreles épreuves sportives sur petit écran dans 28 salles detélévision (Fernsehstuben). - Cette continuité au sein dupersonnel constitue, certes, un grand avantage au niveautechnique, mais d'un point de vue politique il s'agit plutôt,selon Rüdiger Proske journaliste au NWDR à l'époque,d'une “catastrophe”. De plus, la nomination d'un ancienmembre du NSDAP, le Dr. Pleister, en qualité de“Chefintendant”, PDG de la chaîne, ne contribue nullementà améliorer la réputation de l'émetteur hambourgeois.En ce qui concèrne ses programmes la jeune télévision fait,dans le domaine de la fiction, fréquemment appel aux œuvres

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de distraction produites par l 'UFA, entreprise decinématographie autrefois au service de la propagande nazie.C'est sur une période beaucoup plus courte qu'elle diffuseraégalement beaucoup de “Kulturfilme”, “films culturels”,réalisés durant l'époque du III Reich. La fonction principaledes “films culturels” dans le programme du NWDR étant deremplir l'espace entre deux émissions en direct. Sur un planesthétique, le “Kulturfilm” et la “Wochenschau” (lesactualités) aux tendances harmonisantes des contradictionssociales et un style aussi idéalisant qu'emphatique continuentà exercer une grande influence. Mais tout en s'inspirant dela BBC et des émissions américaines, les journalistes duNWDR créent également des formes nouvelles et sedétachent de l'héritage du documentarisme ancien. Lesjournalistes sont d'une certaine manière contraintsd'expérimenter des formes nouvelles, le support “pellicule”étant très mal perçu par les responsables de la télévision.Cela se comprend si l'on considère qu'au sein du personnelbeaucoup sont issus de la radio ou de l'équipe de télévisionde la première heure et que leurs aspirations sont toutesautres que faire du cinéma. Considérant le direct comme laforme spécifique du petit écran, le directeur Pleisterdéclarera même : “Le film (cinématographique, M.S.) n'arien à faire dans la télé.” Ainsi le programme des premièresannées consiste pour une marge supérieure à 60% en desémissions diffusées en direct. Le film cinématographique,quant à lui, n'est tout d'abord admis que pour les sujets pourlesquels il s'avère impossible de déplacer les caméras detélévision du studio. Ainsi, si l'on recourt à la pellicule, ontourne en 35 mm avec un matériel évidemment toujours trèslourd comparé au 16 mm.Comment est-il possible, dans cette ambiance hostile aucinéma, de développer un nouveau matériel d'enregistrementsur pellicule ; et ce à l'insu des dirigeants ? Face à larésistance interne au NWDR, les premières expériences aumoyen de caméras 16 mm sont entreprises en 1953 sansque la direction en soit informée. Des essais en 16mm sonttout d'abord tournés en muet, puis avec une caméra Auricon

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provenant des Etats-Unis permettant l'enregistrement del'image et du son sur la même pellicule par une bande sonoreoptique. Pour cause de qualité sonore insuffisante, unequalité ne dépassant pas celle d'une transmissiontéléphonique, ce système se voit néanmoins très viteabandonné. Aussi l'invention d'un ingénieur de la télévisionbavaroise, la “Synchronisierung mittels Pilotton” (synchro-nisation au moyen d'un son pilote) arrive à un momentpropice. Contrairement au NWDR, le jeune émetteur sud-allemand ne peut cependatn pas encore se servir de cetteinnovation technique qui permet l'enregistrement synchronedu son avec un magnétophone normal, remplaçant la perfo-ration mécanique de la bande sonore par une synchronisa-tion électromagnétique.Profitant de l'absence du chef pour mettre à l'épreuve unecaméra légère avec un son synchrone, le reporter HansJoachim Reiche, le cameraman Carsten Diercks et un ex-pert en culture africaine le Dr. Peter Coulmas partent enjanvier 1954 pour Léopoldville. Equipés d'une petite caméraARRIFLEX 16 ST et d'un magnétophone portable MAIHAKMMK 3, pesant à peine 11 kg, ils réalisent leur premierenregistrement en 16 mm son synchrone le 24 janvier 1954: la chanteuse Pauline de la “Radio Congo Belge”. Sans pourautant avoir avant leur départ testé l'outillage technique etmalgré des températures avoisinant les 40o, le tournage serévèle être un succès. Cette réalisation, un reportage endeux parties, est diffusée sous le titre Musuri. EineFernsehexpedition nach Belgisch Kongo (Musuri. Uneexpédition télévisuelle au Congo belge) le 31 mars et le 7avril 1954. L'émission connaît en Allemagne un vif échoavec une acceptation auprès du public jusqu'alors jamaisconnue.Mais d'une nouvelle technique ne résulte pas ipso facto unnouveau style. En ce qui concerne la représentation duCongo Belge et de ses habitants, le reportage Musuri suit,selon Peter Zimmermann, des schémas établis par des filmsculturels ou des films de voyage et des documentairesanimaliers. Les journalistes célèbrent, sur un ton

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colonisateur, les acquis de la civilisation occidentale et lapaix profonde dans cette partie de l'Afrique, (ce qui s’avéreraquelques années plus tard être - et aujourd'hui encore - unegrave erreur.) Notons cependant que, par son ton “léger” etla mise en scène de l'équipe, le reportage souligne lasubjectivité et la perception des auteurs, relativisant ainsil'autorité des images.Cette expédition marque le début d'un travail au moyen d'unmatériel qui, six ans plus tard, donnera naissance au “directcinéma” et au “cinéma vérité”. La “entfesselte Kamera”, la“caméra déchaînée” comme la dénomment ses premiersutilisateurs, est née. En 1956, un tiers de la production seratourné en 16 mm par les équipes du NWDR.Subsiste la question de savoir pourquoi l'invention et sesinventeurs sont tombés dans l'oubli et que ce n'est qu'audébut des années '90 que des chercheurs allemands sepenchent sur ce chapitre de l'histoire de la télévision. Demultiples raisons peuvent être avancées et l'on ne peutindiquer que quelques pistes de réflexion, visant :a) la particularité du médium et le contexte de diffusion,b) un public restreint,c) un discours cinéphilique, négligeant la télévision.

a) Particularité d'un médiumUne première réponse à cette question serait, si l'on seréfère au contexte dans le cadre duquel l'invention s'inscrit,la télévision. Ce médium complexe peut être défini par leflux de ses programmes plutôt que par le contenu de certainesde ses émissions. Il s'avère possible que, dans le cadre decette grande “machine narrative”, la diversité du programmeait gommé ou tout du moins marginalisé la particularité del'enregistrement en 16mm son synchrone. Celui-ci - alorsmême qu'il révolutionnera par la suite le documentaire surgrand écran - n'est qu'une innovation parmi tant d'autres pourla jeune télévision en quête de nouveaux moyensd'expressions. De plus, la synchronicité du son avec l'imageest à la base même de la télévision sous la forme du “direct”,il est alors compréhensible qu'une découverte derrière les

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coulisses n'ait pas fait de vagues. Dans le dispositifcinématographique en revanche, les possibilités techniquesdu nouveau matériel sont étroitement liées à une nouvelledémarche filmique. Cette rencontre “cinéma - 16mm sonsynchrone” est perçue comme une “révolution”, provoquantainsi un changement de paradigme dans l'histoire dudocumentaire à l'échelle internationale. L'équipe du NWDRa l'honneur d'avoir été la première à extraire la technique dela caverne, mais être le premier n'a jamais mis l'Homme duNeandertal à l'abri de la disparition.

b) Le publicOutre ces raisons structurelles, beaucoup a été perdu pourde simples raisons techniques : l'enregistrement des im-ages cathodiques n'étant pas possible à l'époque et l'archivagedes films plutôt le fruit d'un heureux hasard que d'unedémarche méthodologique. La mémoire de la télévision estcourte. S'inscrivant dans le quotidien, la télévision se pencherarement sur son histoire et ne vit que dans la mémoirecollective des spectateurs. Ceux-là mêmes qui en 1954 nesont pas encore nombreux lorsque Musuri passe à l'antenne: on ne compte en effet que 18.000 téléviseurs dans toute laR.F.A. En 1955 le nombre s'accroît certes jusqu'à 100.000et atteint le million vers la fin des années 50, mais l'impactsur l'ensemble de la population est de moindre importance.

c) Le discoursNe s'agissant “que de la télé”, celle-ci fait souvent objet depolémiques et se voit attribué le rôle de bouc émissaire. Ense concentrant sur le documentaire cinématographique, lacritique et la recherche scientifique ont contribué à réduirele vaste champ d'images documentaires au film d'auteur oude création ; surtout si l'on considère l'Allemagne de l'Ouest,où documentarisme signifie presque automatiquementtélévision, cette dernière étant le plus grand producteur etpresque le seul diffuseur. De la réduction à l'œuvrecinématographique résultent des jugements hâtifs et un peusimplistes comme la citation introduisant cet article. Certes,

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les premiers documentaires réalisés à Hambourg ne sontpas des exemples d'un documentarisme critique. Selon lecameraman Carsten Diercks, ses collègues et lui voulaientdécouvrir le monde (cette fois de manière pacifique) ce quirépondait au désir des téléspectateurs. Cependant, avec lacréation du magazine Panorama au début des années 60,s'affirme à Hambourg un documentarisme télévisuel sousforme de journalisme d'investigation fort dérangeant pourle pouvoir. Cette nouvelle forme de journalisme se retrouveégalement au SDR (Süddeutscher Rundfunk) en Allemagnedu Sud, où sous l'influence de plusieurs journalistes dumagazine “Spiegel”, a pu se développer “l'école de Stutt-gart” qui réalise des films documentaires dont l'intérêtréside aussi bien dans la forme que dans le choix des sujets(et cela en utilisant bien avant 1960 de caméras 16mm avecson synchrone).De nombreuses questions restent néanmoins ouvertes etl'exemple du 16mm son synchrone démontre la nécessitéd'un regard au delà des frontières nationales mais aussi au-delà d'un médium. Il est probable que le Neandertal del'invention se retrouve ailleurs qu'en Allemagne. Unecontroverse autour de la question de savoir qui est à l'originede la “révolution du réel” est aussi vaine que celle relativeà l’invention du cinéma : les frères Lumières en France oules frères Skaladnowsky à Berlin. Le commentaire de find'un documentaire sur ces derniers illustre également demanière très juste ce chapitre concernant les images animées(à caractère documentaire) : “Le film (le cinéma direct/vérité/du réel/de la caméra déchaînée) avait plusieurs pères,mais une seule mère qui est l'époque, prête à l’accueillir.”

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Le jour où j’ai découvert le motobsessionnel

Julien Bobroff, Paris

Ma tante Nicole était venue dîner chez moi. Ellem’avait offert, comme à son habitude, une page dedictionnaire. Nicole offrait ainsi à ses amis, à sa famille,des pages de dictionnaire. Les unes après les autres, elle lesarrachait avec soin, là pour un déjeuner chez son frère, làpour Roland et ses enfants, là pour un week-end chez sondocteur et ami, André. Elle collait la page choisie sur unbristol ocre. Elle choisissait d’illustrer certains mots, deuxou trois. Il pouvait s’agir d’un petit dessin, souvent auxcrayons de couleurs. Il pouvait s’agir d’une réflexion, écriteà l’encre bleue, d’une plume épaisse et appliquée. Parfois,elle collait des photos découpées ailleurs, dans deshebdomadaires de cinéma ou d’actualité.

Depuis bientôt dix ans, elle effeuillait les lettres del’alphabet. On pouvait jauger la fréquence de ses sorties àl’avancement dans l’alphabet. Nicole était venue me voir sixfois dans le A, trois fois dans le B, ... Aujourd’hui, c’était leO. Je me souviens, pour ses cinquante ans, Nicole avaitvoulu fêter la lettre en cours, le L. Et nous tous de nousdéguiser, en légionnaire, en lion, en Lénine...

Nicole n’a jamais voulu me dire si elle avait parfoisarraché des pages sans les offrir. Elle n’a jamais voulu medire ce qu’elle fera, une fois son dictionnaire achevé.

Le jour où j’ai découvert l’usage du répondeurtéléphonique

C’était Noël, c’était la famille, et les enfants, quis’étaient cotisés pour m’offrir un répondeur. Je rougissaisassez inévitablement devant le petit mot griffonné: “ chertonton, comme ça, on pourra te laisser des tas de messages

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pour quand tu seras parti en vacances ”. Ces vacancesauxquelles faisaient allusion mes neveux, c’étaient mesaller-retours incessants avec Lyon auxquels m’obligeaitmon travail. Enfin, j’avais un répondeur, après quatre Noëlsde sous-entendus, de fines allusions et d’innombrablesappels du pied. Ils avaient finalement compris que je voulaisun répondeur. J’espérais avoir Dostoïevsky dans la Pléiadepour dans cinq ou six ans, ce qui m’obligeait à commencersans plus tarder ma campagne d’intoxication. Je décidaisans plus tarder d’installer le boîtier mi-gris, mi-bordeaux.Quelques beep rageurs plus tard, je pensais avoir à peu prèsdompté la machine. Je veux dire, je n’en comprenaiscertainement pas toute la potentialité, les astuces, les codes.Mais je nous sentais elle et moi sur un terrain d’entente,presque de la complicité. Je parlai, elle enregistrait. Nospremiers échanges.Je m’essayai à plusieurs messages. fonctionnel (oui, vous êtes bien au 01 44...) (on m’avaitmis en garde de ne surtout pas laisser mon nom, on ne saitjamais) rebelle (oui, vous êtes bien chez ...) (où je laissaisexplicitement mon prénom et mon nom pour taquiner ceuxqui m’avaient mis en garde) sympa (un peu larmoyant quand même) drôle (pas tant que ça à la seconde écoute, plus du tout à latroisième) mystérieux complice décontracté ...

La soirée à enregistrer, effacer, enregistrer.J’abandonnais ce premier jour mon répondeur sans mes-sage dans le ventre, un peu honteux mais franchementfatigué. Le lendemain, je décidais d’utiliser le dit-répondeurpour remédier à mes problèmes de coeur du moment (Valériem’avait quitté le 8 décembre). Je prenais l’annuaire, je

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cochais une vingtaine de noms et prénoms féminins. Jechoisissais avec soin les adresses, des petites rues, prèsd’un cinéma si possible. Puis je vérifiais les piles de monenregistreur de poche, celui qu’on m’avait offert deuxNoëls plus tôt (encore un “ Noël chez Darty pour tonton quiaime tant les gadgets “) (plus j’y pense, plus Dostoïevskydans la Pléiade me semble inaccessible). J’essayaisl’enregistreur. Puis j’appelais une Marie T., rue Vigaud.J’enclenchais mon enregistreur, collé à l’écouteur :“ bonjour, vous êtes bien chez Marie au 01 48 32 37 32, jerentre bientôt, laissez moi un message - beep - ”. Je vérifiaisla qualité de mon enregistrement, la voix de Marie un peugrésillante, forcément. Je rappelais Marie, et laissais aprèsle beep mon propre message : “ beep- bonjour (ma voix laplus blanche possible), rappelez le 01 44 82 54 54, merci ”.Ensuite, deuxième phase de mon plan diabolique,j’enregistrais ma propre annonce de répondeur, en y mettantla voix de Marie enregistrée. Je faisais vite car mon trainpour Lyon partait vers dix heures.De retour de Lyon, trois jours plus tard, je jubilais. Qu’est-ce que Marie allait pouvoir dire à Marie, quand elleentendrait son propre message en m’appelant ? Dans mesrêves les plus optimistes, j’allais jusqu’à envisager unepossible invitation au cinéma. Je rembobinais les troismessages qu’indiquait mon répondeur. “ - beep - Salut Marie,c’est Jean, rappelle moi quand tu rentres, faut me dire ce quetu veux que j’apporte. Bon, salut - beep - Bonjour Marie,c’est Sophie, je ne me souviens plus à quelle heure c’est cesoir. On dit que si tu ne rappelles pas, je viens vers huitheures. Je dois récupérer José à Port Royal d’abord, doncje serai peut-être un peu en retard. On s’appelle. - beep -c’est Jean, j’ai croisé Lulu au boulot qui m’a dit que du vin,c’était bien. Donc ne me rappelle pas, j’amène du vin. A cesoir - beep - ”. Ni la voix de Jean, ni celle de Sophie, ne medisaient grand chose. J’étais dans l’embarras. Je préféraisappeler à nouveau Marie pour lui transmettre les messagesqui lui étaient destinés. “ beep - vous êtes bien au 01 44 8254 54, je suis à Lyon jusqu’à mercredi, mais n’hésitez pas

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à laisser un message à mon nouveau répondeur, quej’essayerai de faire marcher dés mon retour - beep ”. Là,d’entendre ma propre voix, j’étais vraiment dans l’embarras.Je rappellais, et, pendant la lecture de ce message, jecomposai à tout hasard mon propre code secretd’interrogation à distance, ##1234. “ beep beep beep beepbeep beep (ça rembobinait) beep beep beeeeeep - Salut,c’est nous (voix hystériques de mes deux neveux), on espèrequ’on est les premiers à te laisser un message ! Joyeux Noël! - beep “ . Quand Marie allait entendre ça, ça allait sûrementchauffer pour moi. J’étais gêné. Comment faire ? Changerde téléphone, de répondeur, de numéro d’abonnementTélécom ? Le soleil était tombé, la nuit ne semblait pasporter conseil, et l’heure du diner approchait. Je vérifiais:déjà huit heures vingt. Soudain, la sonnerie retentit. Al’interphone, je demandais “ oui ? ”. Une voix que jeconnaissais depuis peu répondit “ oui, c’est Sophie et José,tu es à quel étage déjà ? ”

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L’Atelier théâtre de serbo-croate del’Université Paris IV- Sorbonne

Historique de la troupe

ParSava Andjelkovic

L’Atelier théâtre de serbo-croate de l’UFR d’EtudesSlaves de l’Université PARIS IV-SORBONNE existe depuis1994, à l’instigation du professeur Paul-Louis Thomas, quien confie la charge à Sava Andjelkovic, lecteur à l’Universitéayant une expérience professionnelle du théâtre. Alors quela guerre fait rage dans l’ex-Yougoslavie, l’un des buts del’atelier n’est pas de reconstituer une "Yougoslavie duthéâtre" à Paris, mais de permettre à des étudiants d’originesdiverses (Français "de souche" ou d’origine serbe, croate,bosniaque... ainsi que réfugiés venant de l’ex-Yougoslavie)de communiquer et d’apprendre à se connaître par letruchement d’une réalisation théâtrale commune, où ilsutilisent une même langue, le serbo-croate ou bosniaque,croate, monténégrin, serbe (système linguistique àdifférences régionales moindres que celles entre le françaisde France, de Belgique, du Canada ou d’Afrique, l’anglais etl’anglo-américain ou l’espagnol d’Europe et d’Amérique duSud). Pour que tous puissent se reconnaître dans les piècesmises en scène, on a choisit un auteur classique qui peutfaire penser à Molière, Jovan Sterija Popovic1, dont latroupe monte successivement La courge qui se donne degrands airs (1995), Mariage et vie maritale (1996), Amenteur, menteur et demi (1997) et Une femme méchante(1998). La troupe, constituée d’étudiants de 2ème annéeauxquels peuvent se joindre des étudiants de 1ère, 3ème et

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4ème années qui le souhaitent, se renouvelle chaque annéeuniversitaire, avec quelques éléments qui en font partplusieurs années de suite; elle prépare chaque année, en seréunissant un après-midi par semaine pendant deux, trois,quatre heures, parfois plus, une pièce dont elle donne deuxreprésentations en mai, avant le début des examens. Sonsuccès et le nombre croissant d’étudiants désirant yparticiper ont amené le metteur en scène à monter uneseconde pièce en 1997 (Conversations de femmes, d’aprèsDusan Radovic2), expérience renouvelée cette année avec lapréparation d’un second spectacle, qui est pour la premièrefois un drame: Adam et Eve de Miroslav Krleza3.

Jovan Sterija Popovic, Une femme méchante(première 14 mai 1998):

Intention de mise en scène et options dramaturgiques

L’"idée" de cette pièce du 19ème siècle, fondée surl’expression serbe "C’est du paradis même que viennent lescoups de bâton" - mais dont le but était en fait plus d’amuserque d’instruire - n’est bien sûr plus soutenable aprèsl’expérience du féminisme militant, puis mesuré. Aussicette comédie classique du théâtre serbe est-elle beaucoupmoins représentée que les autres comédies de Sterija, endépit de toutes les qualités qu’elle possède, y compris biensûr les procédés comiques. Dès sa parution (août 1838,Novi Sad), "La femme méchante", d’abord destinée à unpublic de lecteurs, apparut comme une comédieproblématique, et cela non seulement parce que les lecteursétaient en fait en grande majorité des lectrices, ce dontSterija était pleinement conscient: dans la préface de "Lafemme méchante", il écrit qu’"il respecte les femmes commeles respecte le meilleur disciple d’Epicure" même si " avecses œuvres précédentes aussi il n’a obtenu qu’un faiblecrédit auprès du sexe féminin". Si nous laissons de côtétoutes les autres interprétations, il est incontestable queSterija traite, dans cette comédie comme dans les autres,

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des déformations humaines qu’il a observées dans sonmillieu. Mais il y eut des attaques plus sévères de la critiquelittéraire, auxquelles Sterija, s’efforçant de défendre sonœuvre, répondit simplement qu’il fallait laisser le soin auxlecteurs de décider qui avait raison, de lui ou des critiques.Lorsque la pièce fut jouée pour la première fois à Zagreb,le 15 mai 1840, elle fut beaucoup mieux accueillie par lepublic que par la critique. Dans les nouvelles lectures desœuvres de Sterija, l’auteur se voit également reprocher sa"pédagogie des coups de ceinturon" et la transformationinsuffisamment motivée de son héroïne.

De même qu’il faut une nouvelle lecture scéniquepour une représentation contemporaine de "La mégèreapprivoisée" de Shakespeare, de même une autre vision estnécessaire à "La femme méchante" (dont Sterija a lui-mêmedéclaré avoir emprunté le sujet à un opéra-comique del’Allemand Weisse, et qui est par ailleurs la seule de sescomédies fondée sur un quiproquo) pour que cette piècepuisse être présentée au spectateur contemporain, en de-hors des raisons littéraires et historiques. Dans notreinterprétation ce ne sont pas les coups de bâton qui con-stituent le remède magique qui rééduque la mauvaise etméchante comtesse. Bien qu’à un niveau hiérarchiquementinférieur, le cordonnier de Jovan Sterija Popovic est cebarbare balkanique qui, des années vingt de notre siècle (àl’époque du mouvement littéraire yougoslaveexpressionniste d’avant-garde appelé "zénithisme") auxannées quatre-vingt-dix (guerre dans l’ex-Yougoslavie etcourant artistique belgradois "Polit-art"), est plus enclin àla balkanisation de l’Europe qu’à l’européisation des Bal-kans. Comme le"Serbe idéal" évoqué par Ljubomir Micicdans son "Manifeste du zénithisme", c’est "un Serbeautochtone, à l’état brut, sans une miette d’apport étranger",qui soumet les autres à lui d’une façon qui lui est propre etcaractéristique.Dans le théâtre de guignol la bastonnade est comique par larevanche de la vie sur ce qui est mécanique et dépourvu devie, alors que dans les farces la bastonnade est au service

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d’un comique débridé et parfois vulgaire; dans notre miseen scène le comique de situation ne vient pas des coups debâton mais du jeu des acteurs sur un autre plan. La comédiea ses exigences auxquelles nous devons bien sûr nous tenir,mais notre idée essentielle était que Sultana, la femmeméchante, succombe au charme macho d’un vrai "homobalkanicus", et que les choses s’arrangent comme l’avaitprévu l’auteur, mais pour des raisons autres que les coups debâton: le goût de Sultana évolue de la noblesse éclairée desLumières, du rationalisme aristocratique du raffiné ettolérant comte Trific, vers le charme exotique et barbare durobuste cordonnier Sreta. Notre thèse est la suivante: unetelle Sultana, aussi gâtée qu’agressive, dans une certainemesure peu sûre d’elle car insuffisamment mûre pour secomporter correctement envers son entourage, fait toutdans le but de soumettre les autres à elle, car personne n’aessayé, avant Sreta, de la soumettre elle-même. C’estpourquoi nous avous introduit plusieurs chants de Voïvodine,dont nous avons gardé la musique mais réécrit les paroles,dans lesquelles Persa et Sida commentent l’action à lagloire de Sreta. La "méchanceté" de Sultana n’est pas le traitdominant de son caractère et son comportement ne setransforme pas radicalement: d’une mégère gâtée elle nedevient pas en une nuit une femme douce et obéissante, ellereste la Sultana qu’elle était, mais à présent, après unesituation où elle a appris quelque chose sur elle-même etles autres, elle regarde son entourage d’un œil différent. Ilest d’ailleurs à remarquer qu’une caractéristique descomédies de Sterija est de ne pas offrir de "guérisons"durables ni de fins heureuses assurées pour toujours.

Miroslav Krleza, Adam et Eve(première 5 mai 1998):

Intention de mise en scène et options dramaturgiques

Elle a son mari, une passion pour un autre homme et unatout dont elle est persuadée qu’il réussira à le retenir

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auprès d’elle. Il a son épouse, une passion pour une autrefemme et le besoin de quitter celle-ci. Leur drame amoureuxse déroule à l’hôtel Eden. Elle s’appelle Eve, et lui, Adam.Leur Créateur est absent. En revanche se trouve presquetoujours à proximité Quelqu’un qui change d’aspect et saittout à leur sujet. Quelqu’un qui tire les invisibles ficelles denos mauvaises décisions. Son atout, à elle, c’est la mort.Mais cela va-t-il changer quelque chose? Adam va-t-il suivrele chemin de celle qui fut jadis sa côte? Le code génétiqueest-il plus fort que notre désir d’être différents ici etailleurs, dans cette vie et dans une autre?

Il y a des milliers d’années que la pomme, cetaccessoire biblique, a été croquée, mais le pommier necesse de donner de nouveaux fruits, qui sont toujours lespréférés des nouveaux Adam et Eve. A l’intérieur de soncycle expressionniste de drames intitulé "Légendes",Miroslav Krleza tente, dans la pièce en un acte "Adam etEve", de nous montrer le conflit insoluble des sexes, lecombat qui s’appelle l’amour, amour qui détruit plus qu’ilne féconde.

A la lecture des "Légendes" de Krleza, Josip Bach,dramaturge du Théâtre national croate, avait estimé qu’ilétait impossible de les mettre en scène, opinion qui allaitheureusement être réfutée dès 1925, lorsque le réalisateurBranko Gavela monta deux des "Légendes", dont "Adam etEve". Le problème essentiel dans la mise en scène des"Légendes" est l’organisation de l’espace scénique; celuique suggère l’écrivain ici consiste en une divisionhorizontale de la scène, comme dans les mystères du MoyenAge, ce qui élargit la signification du drame vers "le thèmedu tourment et de la souffrance de l"homme pris dans lesfilets d’un amour inauthentique"4. Les scènes se déroulentdans des espaces réels (une chambre d’hôtel, un train), maisaussi dans la tombe, dans un espace intermédiaire entre lemonde d’ici-bas et un autre monde irréel, ainsi que dans cetunivers intangible de l’autre côté du réel. Dans notre miseen scène aux moyens techniques modestes, l’espace s’ouvreinsensiblement vers la salle, s’élargit en direction du pub-

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lic; ainsi espérons-nous donner à la pièce au moins le refletdu cercle dramatique qu’évoque Mira Miocinovic à proposd’"Adam et Eve", cet "édifice dramatique baroque dontl’action et la problématique tournent dans un cercledramatique vicieux, qui signifie un retour éternel, sansapaisement, sans résolution définitive du conflit"5.

Toutes les "Légendes" de Krleza sont "antihistoriqueset antimythiques, comme tout le reste de son œuvre, et ellesle deviennent précisément par son rapport créateur auxmotifs"6; aussi nous sommes-nous le moins possible écartédu texte et des indications de Krleza, bien que lespersonnages d’Adam et d’Eve puissent supporter tous lesanachronismes et se concevoir en tout temps et tout lieu (leThéâtre national de Mostar a récemment représenté "Adamet Eve" sur le site du Vieux pont détruit, devant plusieurspierres du pont repêchées dans la Neretva). "Adam et Eve"représente une nouveauté dans le théâtre croate en s’écartantaudacieusement de l’expression dramatique consacrée eten brisant les exigences des jeux de scène du théâtretraditionnel; c’est pour Krleza "une avancée vers une or-ganisation harmonieuse du sujet dramatique"7. L’un despremiers comptes rendus publiés souligne bien que dans cedrame "se développent d’une manière rapide,cinématographique, des motifs à la Strindberg et à laWedekind, condensés dans un cadre grotesque"8. C’est dansce cadre que nous avons introduit un élément qui n’estnullement étranger à Krleza: des marionnettes (vêtues decostumes baroques). Dans son roman "Banquet en Blithuanie"Krleza insère en effet tout un texte dramatique pour un jeude marionnettes, extrêmement important pour lacompréhension de l’ensemble du roman car il représente lecommentaire de l’auteur. Cette sorte de jeu médiéval estconsidéré par certains théoriciens comme "un pendant auxLégendes de Krleza"9. Par sa structure littéraire, ce textedramatique inséré "rappelle la facture des œuvresdramatiques symbolistes mais aussi expressionnistes, brefle monde poétique des Légendes de Krleza"10. Aussiconsidérons-nous que dans l’existence parallèle des mondes

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du réel et de l’irréel, de la mort et du rêve, il y a place dans"Adam et Eve" pour la présence parallèle d’acteurs vivants etde marionnettes tout aussi vivantes. Comme les marionnettesdu début et de la fin de la pièce, les acteurs du drame sontmenés par une main invisible.

Outre faire découvrir une œuvre du plus grand écrivaincroate du 20ème siècle, notre intention est de montrer quel’impossibilité de l’amour heureux ne vient pas du Créateur,mais de celui qui prétend diriger les sombres états d’espritet intentions des humains, et qui apparaît ici sous les traitsde quatre personnages différents de la pièce.

_____________________________________________1Jovan Sterija POPOVIC (18O6-1856), né à Vrsac (Voïvodine), est le premier grandauteur dramatique serbe. Rompant avec le néo-classicisme et se détournantrésolument du romantisme, il va écrire une série de comédies où il tourne en dérisionles défauts et les vices de son milieu: l’avarice (L’avare, pièce qui fera de lui le"Molière serbe"), le faux patriotisme (Les patriotes), la prétention et la sottise desparvenus (La courge qui se donne de grands airs), l’hypocrisie et la vénalité desmariages arrangés (Mariage et vie maritale), la crédulité des "nouvelles précieuses", àla tête farcie de romans d’amour allemands (A menteur, menteur et demi) ...2 Dusan RADOVIC (1922 - 1984), ne à Nis (Serbie), a fait ses étides à la faculté delettres de l’uneversité de Belgrade, avant de publier dans des revus pour enfants et decréer de nombreuses émissions enfantines à la radio et à la télévision. Refisant ladidactique mensongère, il s’adresse aux enfants en tant que public sérieux et averti,aussi bien dans la série poétique Une lettre, des mots que dans des pièce de théâtrecomme La capitaine John Peoplefox. Son œuvre, qui revitalise et revivifie la poésie àl’aide des moyens techniques modernes, concerne aussi un public d’adultes, commeen témoignent la série d’émissions matinales Bonjour, Belgrade, qui présentependant des années des aphorismes pleins d’inventivité et de fraîcheur à la radioindépendante Studio B, ou le recueil Conversation de femmes, d’où sont extraits lestextes adaptés pour le spectacle.3 Miroslav KRLEZA (1893-1981) est incontestablement, par la richesse etl’abondance de son œuvre, l’écrivain croate le plus important du 20ème siècle. Sonexpérience de l’armée austro-hongroise pendant la 1ère guerre mondiale marquerathématiquement une grande partie de sa création. Engagé aux côtés de la gauchelittéraire dans l’entre-deux-guerres, il participe à plusieurs revues tant à Belgrade qu’àZagreb. Dès le début des années 50 il condamne fermement les tentatives de"jdanovisation" des littératures yougoslaves, concourant à libérer celles-ci des carcansdu réalisme socialiste. Il s’est essayé avec succès dans tous les genres: romans (Leretour de Philippe Latinovicz, Je ne joue plus, Banquet en Blithuanie...), nouvelles(Mars dieu croate...), essais, poésie, théâtre...4 Branimir DONAT, O pesnickom teatru Miroslava Krleze, Mladost, Zagreb, 1970,

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p. 94.5 Mirjana MIOCINOVIC, Esejii o drami, Vuk Karadzic, Beograd, 1975, p. 28.6 Mate LONCAR, Antiteze i analogije u Krlezinim legendama, in "Ekspresionizam ihrvatska knjizevnost", Kritika, 3, Zagreb, 1969, p.111.7 Stanko LASIC, Mladi Krleza i njegovi kriticari (1914 - 1924), cité in MirjanaSTANCIC "Adam i Eva", Krlezijana, Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleza,Zagreb, 1993, p. 1.8 Milan BEGOVIC, Premijere "Michelangelo Bounarroti" i "Adam i Eva" odMiroslava Krleze, Vecer, Zagreb, VI, n° 1361, 4. VI 1925, p. 4.9 Zdravko MALIC, Lutke in Krlezin zbornik, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1964, p. 241.10 Viktor ZMEGAC, Krlezini evropski obzori, Znanje, Zagreb, 1986, p. 199.

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Le jeu ou le secret de la judéité dansJardin, cendre de Danilo Kis

Aleksandar Prstojevic

Le cirque de famille (1) de Danilo Kis repose sur lesecret qui, telles les nervures d’une feuille, diffuse dans lafiction la rancune pensive. Le secret, qui n’est pas la sourcede l’oeuvre, car il ne déclenche ni la narration ni la recher-che principale du narrateur, apparaît tardivement dans lecorps du récit pour donner forme au parcours cognitifd’Andréas Sam. Son importance cardinale provient de lanature même de l’oeuvre. En effet Le cirque de famille estle produit directe d’une réflexion intradiégétique et de cefait inachevé. Le narrateur qui se souvient de son enfance aà sa disposition un matériau romanesque cohérent qui, auprime abord, ne demande qu’une mise en forme artistiqueappropriée. Néanmoins, son implication intime dansl’histoire de la famille et l’absence de conclusion que celle-ci devrait, par sa structure même, imposer, ne lui permet pasle recours à la forme narrative traditionnelle. Le cirque defamille est presque intégralement contenu dans unbannissement parfaitement dépourvu d’incertituderomanesque : au fur et à mesure que le lecteur progressedans le corps du récit, le destin du père - qui serait la seulequestion susceptible de communiquer au roman une énergiefabulative - se métamorphose en disparition certaine. Endépit de la formulation explicite du narrateur (2), la trilogiede Kis n’est pas une histoire dans le sens fort du terme. Saconstruction s’apparente plutôt à la méthode que Monetintroduit dans la peinture moderne : par la mise en rapportdes segments d’une réalité disparue le narrateur suscite,

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auprès de son lecteur, l’impression “d’être là”. C’estexactement ce processus de surgissement de la réalité quiest, du point de vue artistique, la moelle du cycle. Plusclairement : à défaut d’une histoire qui aurait son début, sonmilieu et sa fin et qui, par l’imbrication de ces trois périodes,produirait une morale immédiate, le narrateur doit, par lareconstruction de son passé, par le changement des rapportsentre les menus éléments de son “contenu mémoriel”, fairejaillir une lumière nouvelle qui lui permettrait de comprendrece qui s’est réellement passé dans son enfance. Pour qu’il yait une histoire il faut qu’il y ait préalablement au récit uneconclusion claire dont le narrateur, jusqu’au dévoilementultime situé à la fin du roman, est le seul possesseur. Or,Andréas Sam n’écrit pas pour transmettre sa compréhension: Andréas Sam écrit pour comprendre. La différence avec leroman traditionnel de même que l’impossibilité de formu-lation typique du secret dès l’ouverture du roman, car celaproduirait une histoire forte et une recherche rectiligneparfaitement inadaptée à l’état d’esprit du narrateur, résidentdans cette si compréhensible et si humaine position ducréateur du Cirque de famille.

Le secret dans le roman kisien a un double caractère.Il est, d’un côté, la réponse à la question de la disparition dupère et du foyer et de l’autre côté, le ressentiment envers lepère. La recherche d’un esprit maître qui aurait régi le passéest conditionnée par un autre qui est l’inavouable rancuneenvers le père. Les deux secrets son difficiles à formuler.Le premier parce qu’il doit être l’aboutissement del’entreprise du narrateur, le second parce que sa formula-tion verbale disloquerait le roman. La recherche d’AndréasSam ne mène pas à la découverte d’un élément matériel oud’un événement concret qui pourrait réifier le secret. Lacause du malheur familial se trouve dans l’enchevêtrementdes conditions socio-historiques trop impersonnelles pourêtre coulées dans le moule d’une seule manifestationfictionnelle. Aucune chose, aucun personnage, aucunévénement ne peut contenir toutes les causes dubannissement de la famille et de la mort du père. Autant dire

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qu’Andréas Sam manque fatalement d’objet de rancune.Accablé par un passé traumatique il est obligé de lereconstruire, pièce par pièce, et de déboucher sur le terrainvague de la culpabilité commune. C’est à cet instant que seprésente à son esprit, exténué d’être trop plein d’inimitié,le coupable idéal sous les traits convulsifs du pèrealcoolique. La pensée est si terrible qu’elle doit être tue.Néanmoins, l’inconscient d’Andréas Sam ne renonce pas ànourrir ce sentiment, car sans cette échappatoirepsychologique son être serait privé de sa plénitude parceque son passé, entendu comme souffrance, n’aurait plus desource. Bien entendu, le roman de Danilo Kis n’est pasdémuni d’interprétations mythologiques, surtout de cellesinspirées par l’Ancien Testament ou par le mythe du Juiferrant, mais la matrice ainsi proposée est toujours amenéeen une sorte de collision avec la réalité brute qui faitinvariablement état de la folie paternelle, de son incapacitécoupable à protéger le foyer et par ce biais à une fauteidentifiée, personnalisée et qui ne saurait trouver une ex-cuse dans les événements de l’époque historique. Dans cetensemble de rapports autant psychologiques que littérairesse trouve la raison principale du recours constant à lamétaphore et à la périphrase dans Le cirque de famille.Sombres et puissants, les sentiments du narrateur requièrentla délicatesse du style, même si, paradoxalement, elle doitsous-entendre l’ironie ricaneuse ou le calembour allègre.

*

La description du martyre familial dans Jardin, cendrelaisse transparaître par moments un rapport nouveau entrele narrateur et son père. Quand la famille Sam quitte la ruedes Marronniers pour se réfugier dans le quartier pauvre dela ville et quand Edouard Sam est débusqué par les gen-darmes qui l’obligent à travailler au déblaiement des ruines,son fils tombe dans une sorte de mélancolie suivie de perted’appétit et de diarrhées fréquentes. Le choc psychologiqueprovoqué par le déménagement, l’appauvrissement subit et

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irrévocable du foyer, la conscience du danger de mortimminente liés à la forte sensibilité de l’enfant expliquenten grande partie la réaction d’Andi. Pourtant, le narrateurest préoccupé par un phénomène que le récit n’a, jusqu’àlors, jamais abordé : les accès d’hystérie qui poussentl’enfant à détruire les objets auxquels il tientparticulièrement. Son comportement présente desressemblances frappantes avec la folie du père : lerenfermement dans un monde coupé de la réalité, l’angoisseconstante, la violence suivie d’un apaisement subit et inex-plicable. Ainsi, Andi Sam, dont le visage sain se profile enrelief sur le fond de la maladie paternelle, se voit-il acculédans l’impasse de la folie héréditaire : Ce n’est que plustard que nous comprîmes qu’elles (léthargies et diarrhées)étaient causées par la peur que j’avais héritée de monpère. (JC, 130)

C’est pratiquement l’unique fois où le narrateurexprime ses craintes concernant la santé mentale de sonpersonnage. Bien que tout au long de la trilogie familiale, ouplus précisément dans les deux premiers volets, le narrateurmarque une distance envers lui-même enfant, la crainted’une maladie héréditaire dépasse le domaine diégétiquepour se répandre dans le présent de la narration et envahirl’âge adulte de l’homme qui écrit. Si, dans Le cirque defamille, existe un passage entre le monde décrit et le mondeoù l’on écrit, c’est bien l’identité physique de l’instancenarrative.

Aussitôt la crainte d’une déclaration de la maladie etde son caractère congénital verbalisé, le narrateur modifiesa proposition en mettant l’apparition des symptômes sur lecompte du surmenage de (son) âme, maladivement liée à(son) corps, et dont les ébranlements se répercutaientaussitôt sur (son) son système sympathique et (son)appareil digestif (J,C, 130) En revanche, l’explication quede telles épreuves physiques ont eu un effet bienfaisant,car elles furent suivies d’une apathie générale de (son)organisme, et que par conséquent il s’endurcit et maigritrappelle trop l’état d’Edouard Sam qui subit une

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métamorphose qui tenait du miracle : il s’endurcit (...).Épuisé par le dur travail de la journée, le soir, il étaitcalme et silencieux et n’avait plus d’accès de misanthropie.Son excédent de force, ce qui s’appelait sa folie, il ledépensait complètement, ou bien il l’apaisait, je ne sais,au cours de la journée. (J,C, 130)

Le passage que nous venons d’examiner est porté parun mouvement narratif simple : à une constatationconcernant le fils, succède son refus implicite en formed’explication du père. Car, si la diarrhée et la léthargiemaladive sont expliquées d’une manière convaincante etramenées au plan du normal, à un syndrome qui peut frappertout un chacun, la peur héréditaire, seul élément réellementinquiétant et inhabituel, reste irréfutée. Le mouvementnarratif, aboutit donc, non pas à une explication mais à unescamotage sous l’apparence d’un raisonnement rationnel.

Le passage en question est d’autant plus important queles deux premiers livres de la trilogie familiale de Kis sontfondés sur l’opposition entre la folie du père et la santémentale du reste de la famille. Le personnage central estconstamment observé par les yeux d’un enfant ou dunarrateur adulte sain d’esprit. Une telle position permet unedouble approche : d’un côté le personnage du père peut êtrejugé dans toute sa folie (c’est un sain d’esprit qui juge unfou), de l’autre côté les liens de la filiation permettent unebienveillance , un plus haut degré de compréhension et unesorte de pénétration émotive du personnage principalinterdite aux autres(3). Ainsi, le changement de focalisationet de distance dont Kis use abondamment dans Le cirque defamille, contribue-t-il à la formation d’un portrait nuancédu père. La folie paternelle est mise sur le devant de la scènepar opposition avec la réalité historique et les exigences dela vie quotidienne. Que cela soit la vision de l’enfant oucelle de l’adulte, la figure du père est invariablement placéedans un au-delà temporel et culturel, en contraste avec lessouffrances réelles de son plus proche entourage. Quandl’Ahasvérus Edouard Sam condescend à s’adresser à safamille, son comportement finit, le plus souvent, dans une

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affligeante rustrerie campagnarde le privant de l’auréoleprotecteur.

De sorte que l’attachement du narrateur à sa mère estcompréhensible. Pourtant, en se rangeant du côté de lapartie saine de sa famille, Andreas Sam n’abandonne pascomplètement son père. Son entreprise consiste toujours àcomprendre la filiation et à déceler dans son proprecomportement l’héritage dangereux à double titre : en tantque dysfonctionnement mental génétiquement transmissi-ble et en tant que judéité car la judéité est une conditionhumaine, tout à fait exceptionnelle, qui a pour l’individuqui en est marqué - quels que soient l’époque, le lieu et lesystème social - des conséquences négatives (4).

*

Le courant de l’hérédité est atténué dans Le cirque defamille par une prise de distance ostentatoire de la part dunarrateur et de son reflet diégétique qu’est Andréas Samenvers le père. Néanmoins, un moment fort marque le cycleet définit clairement l’appréhension qui traverse l’oeuvrede Kis. Il s’agit de la nouvelle Le jeu où Andréas Samdevient la réincarnation de son grand-père, marchand deplumes. La description du jeu d’enfant auquel Andi se livredans la solitude de sa chambre montre clairement qu’ilignore le passé. Il convient de remarquer le renversementde rôles que le narrateur opère dans Le jeu. Cette fois, c’estle père qui observe son fils : L’homme regarde par le troude la serrure et pense Ce n’est pas lui; ce n’est pas Andréas.Il reste plié en deux, pensant Ce n’est pas Andréas (CP,25) L’apparition des traits des aïeux juifs sur le visage del’enfant est perçue par Edouard Sam d’une manière ambiguë: d’un côté il est meurtri, de l’autre il cède à une satisfactionmalveillante.

Au moment où il met sur son épaule un oreiller ets’imagine qu’il est en train de vendre de la plume auxpassants, Andréas Sam ne soupçonne pas le poids de sesgestes : car, ce jeu, il le sent, n’est pas dangereux (...) (CP,

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26) Bien que l’enfant ignore la portée du jeu, cette espècede rituel ancestral souligne la force du sang et dépeint lajudéité dans des couleurs sombre d’une force souterraine:

Le verre de ses lunettes (du père) effleure un instant laserrure et il recule un peu la tête. Il faut que je montre çaà Maria, pense-t-il méchamment, sans être conscient de lepenser ni d’y mettre de la méchanceté. Il faut que je montreà Maria Max Ahasvérus, le marchand de plume. Il ne saitpas pourquoi, mais il a besoin de l’humilier. Et cela val’humilier, pense-t-il avec plaisir. Il faut que je montre àMaria le cheminement souterrain et mystérieux du sang.Qu’Andréas, en fait, n’est pas son Petit Garçon Blond(comme elle le croit), mais son sang à lui, le petit-fils deMax l’Errant. (CP, 25)

Pour Edouard Sam le réveil du passé familial estinattendu. La démarche de son fils, courbé sous le poidsimaginaire du sac de plumes, l’humilité avec laquelle ilapproche ses “clients”, le mélange de langues (l’espagnol,l’allemand, le serbo-croate et l’hongrois) produit un effetdésagréable sur le père. Il ne faut pas se méprendre: ce n’estpas l’humilité outrageante avec laquelle l’enfant offre samarchandise imaginaire, mais bien la déclaration de sajudéité endormie qui est conçue comme un danger. Enobservant le comportement de son fils, Edouard Sam laisseéchapper une pensée amère, ironique, qui dans la bouche dequelqu’un d’autre pourrait prendre une tournure raciste : Ettout au bout de ce couloir, dans une perspective lointaineet trouble, comme au crépuscule, il est là, Max Ahasvérus,le marchand de plume, et il vante sa marchandise,habilement, en bon Juif. (CP, 26) Le vocabulaire, trèssuggestif, met en relief l’éloignement et la profondeur(tout au bout de ce couloir), l’avènement et l’émergence(perspective lointaine et trouble) enfin, la naissance ou larésurrection (crépuscule) tout attelé à rendre plus poignantce rejaillissement du sang juif longtemps contenu parl’éducation et le mode de vie de la famille, cette confirma-

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tion de son éternelle appartenance au flot de bon(s) Juif(s)en train d’être amenés au four crématoire. De la part desdeux parents, le jeu est conçu comme dangereux et avilissant.Après avoir longuement observé la scène, le père réagitviolemment pour choir, vaincu et épuisé, sur une chaise.Les mains de Maria tremblent lorsqu’elle s’approche de lachambre d’enfant et Andi, lui-même, pressent qu’il est entrain de se livrer à un drôle de jeu. Qui ne serait pas venuà l’idée d’Anna. (CP, 26)

Ainsi, au sein de la famille se forme-t-il une nouvelleopposition masculin/féminin, réplique fidèle du rapportentre les parents. Anna, la soeur du narrateur, est prise pourune sorte de parangon de bienséance et du respect del’éducation familiale. D’ailleurs, tout au long de Chagrinsprécoces et de Jardin, cendre, c’est le calme de la soeur quifait écho à la fébrilité d’Andréas Sam. Si le personnage deMaria Sam et toujours obscurci par la folie de son mari,dans le monde des enfants c’est la soeur qui est l’ombred’Andi. La structure qui porte le récit exige que l’écart de lanorme soit le motif central à partir duquel se développel’ensemble du texte. Plus encore, l’élément saillant estinvariablement masculin et sa différence avilissante ousentie comme telle.

La deuxième partie de la nouvelle confirme notrelecture. Ici, l’histoire d’un jeune prince d’origine gitane,que la mère raconte à Andi avant de le coucher, prend laforme d’un enseignement et de l’explication à peine voiléedu mécontentement des parents. Ainsi, par l’entremise denombreux parallèles, l’enfant est décrit comme un jeunehomme à qui ses parents s’efforcent de cacher ses originespour le faire accéder au monde des “heureux”. Sachant que,dans la tradition populaire des Balkans, le Gitan symboliseun homme errant, de la plus basse position sociale, souventnimbé de pouvoirs ténébreux (voyance, prédictions,ensorcellement, etc.) sanctionnés par la religion chrétienne- qu’elle soit orthodoxe ou catholique ) donc, un être qui nefait pas honneur à ses amis, le parallèle avec Andréas Samqui, à l’instar du prince de la fable jouant au mendiant dans

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sa somptueuse chambre, refuse inconsciemment le mondesécurisant de son entourage pour régresser dans les aires ducommerce ou le Juif endosse le rôle d’un être sans attacheni patrie se mettant à dessin dans une position inférieure,devient clair. En d’autres termes, le message del’enseignement maternel ne consiste pas à dire : ne sois pasobséquieux, mais bien: ne sois pas Juif mon fils. Le paradoxeest justement dans cette volonté affichée d’ensevelir unepart de l’être de son enfant.

Les troubles du narrateur montrent que l’enseignementparental s’est transformé, au fil des années, en fardeau dontil se défait péniblement. Entre la folie de son père,l’agressivité de son entourage, et le refus imposé de lajudéité, sa colère s’émousse. Il n’est plus en mesure dedésigner avec assurance la source de la déchéance familialeet de proposer la réponse au tumulte belliqueux qui aspirelentement son foyer. Son impuissance est accentuée par laprésence indirecte du meurtre. Aucune ligne du Cirque defamille ne dépeint directement la guerre, le combat ou lecamp de concentration. Ici, la mort est présente par procu-ration : elle est annoncée par les coups de villageois coléreuxà la porte de la maison, par les déménagements fréquents,par le départ définitif du père ou par l’image des soldatspartant au front. Aucune ligne de Danilo Kis n’évoque lesang des victimes et pourtant il est omniprésent. Dans cettehabileté qui permet au narrateur de parler d’événementsparticulièrement meurtriers sans jamais tomber dans lapornographie du malheur est lovée l’impuissance dujugement de l’enfant. L’atmosphère oppressante ainsi créeincite Andi Sam à narguer son père ou plus encore àl’accabler inconsciemment de reproches. L’histoire dechevet que sa mère lui raconte le soir du jeu interdit, neconcourt-elle à l’éclosion d’un complexe et au jugement deson propre père comme l’une des causes principales dumalheur familial ? Plus encore, le narrateur, lui-même, nevoit-il dans la folie et dans la judéité paternelles le signe dumalheur transmis de génération en génération et dont ilessaie de se défaire ou plutôt de s’assurer que lui, le jeune

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romancier, a fait un pas en dehors du cercle vicieux del’hérédité.

Le secret de son malheur doit être consommé pourque son écriture et son présent soient purifiés. Ainsi, enreflet à la trilogie, au début de Chagrins précoces, dans unecourte période, éclôt le verbe de la malédiction dont l’oeuvreentière de Danilo Kis reprend les éléments en variationsnombreuses. Le jeu est une sorte de coupe verticale dumonde romanesque de l’auteur. Elle permet au lecteur desaisir l’organisation émotive de l’ensemble, de désigner sabase et de prévoir sa construction. En un mot, elle travaillesa réceptivité qui sera mise à contribution dans Jardin,cendre et Sablier.______________________________________________(1) Danilo KIS. Le cirque de famille. Paris : Gallimard, éd. L’imaginaire, 1989.(2) Ainsi de façon tout à fait inattendue et imprévue, cette histoire, ce conte devientde plus en plus l’histoire de mon père, l’histoire du génial Edouard Sam. (C,P, 182)(3) Nous insistons sur l’aspect émotif de l’approche du narrateur qui est lacaractéristique la première de son expression et non pas sur la “pénétrationpsychologique” relevant d’un autre domaine et impliquant des considération del’ordre qualitatif.(4) Danilo KIS. Je cherche pour le doute une place au soleil. in Le résidu amer del’expérience. Paris : Fayard, 1995. p. 122.

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ALETTRES DE L E T T E R S

PISMA

“Mitovi, simboli, ritualiIstorijska mo} “znakova” u jugoisto~noj Evropi

u 19. i 20. veku”

Izveštaj sa simpozijuma odr‘anog u Bonnu od 15. do 17.septembra 1997.

Milan Kosanovi}, Bon

Jugoisto~na Evropa ve} više godina u‘iva posebnuaktuelnost u društvenim naukama. Ta zainteresovanost je na‘alostprouzrokovana i dogadjajima, koji su se poslednjih godina zbili natlu bivše Jugoslavije. Jedan od segmenata bavljenja jugoisto~nomEvropom je i istra‘ivanje nastanaka i uticaja mitova medju narodimatog dela Evrope. Bonski simpozijum je upravo na tom polju trebaloda da svoj doprinos istra‘ivanju društvenih tokova u jugoisto~nojEvropi. Simpozijum, koji su organizovali profesor Wilfried Potthoffsa Slavisti~ke katedre i profesor Dittmar Dahlmann sa Katedre zaIstoriju jugoisto~ne Evrope Univerziteta u Bonnu, je bio zamišljenda ima interdisciplinarni karakter. Ukupno je bilo 17 referata iz

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oblasti slavistike, moderne istorije, sociologije, etnologije, istorijeumetnosti, romanistike i klasi~ne istorije rasporedjenih u ~etirisekcije u trajanju od tri dana.

Uvodni referat je odr‘ao profesor klasi~ne istorije Hans-Joachim Gehrke sa Univerziteta u Freiburgu sa naslovom “Mit,istorija i kolektivni identitet. Anti~ki primeri i njihovo poznodejstvo”. On je referisao o odnosu prema istoriji u antici. Tada nijepostojala jasna granica izmedju istorije i pesništva. Herodotove“Istorije” ili Tukididov “Peloponeski rat” imali su pribli‘no istodejstvo na stvaranje jedne kolektivne istorijske svesti kao i Eshilove,Euripidove i Sofokleove tragedije. Gehrke je uveo terminintencionalna istorija, što zna~i da je zadatak istorije bio da integrišeodredjene etni~ke i nacionalne ciljeve u kolektivnu istorijsku svestjedne etni~ke grupacije. Persijski ratovi i pobede Atinjana su u tomkontekstu samo logi~an nastavak jedne slavne istorije u kojoj suAtinjani ve} pobedili titane, amazonke i gigante. Pobede nadPersijancima su bile samo privremeni kraj jedne monumentalneistorije. Istorija je po pravilu pisana sa pozicija sadašnjosti i tojsadašnjosti je bila prilagodjavana. Ona je u svojoj funkciji slu‘ilasadašnjosti. Jedan, takodje, veoma rasprostranjen mit medjuHelenima je i pravljenje razlike izmedju Helena i Varvara. Uoriginalnom zna~enju su Varvari bili Neheleni, to jest, narodi ~iji sebo‘anski panteon razlikovao od helenskog, narodi koji ne govoregr~ki i koji ne pripadaju ni jednom od tri mitološka helenska naroda- Joncima, Dorcima ili Aolcima. Kasnije se time ozna~avala razlikaizmedju slobode i despotije, izmedju kulturnih Grka i primitivnihnaroda. To preneseno zna~enje se i do danas odr‘alo gotovo kodsvih evropskih naroda, koje bi anti~ki Grci, po prvobitnom zna~enju,svakako svrstali medju Varvare, dok se u modernim evropskimjezicima taj pojam u kasnijem zna~enju i pod odredjenimkonotacijama i resentimanima koristi, izmedju ostalih, i za sameGrke.

Prva sekcija sa temom “Proizvodnja modernih mitova ipoliti~ka romantika” otvorena je referatom profesora etnologijeVitomira Belaja sa Univerziteta u Zagrebu. Naslov je bio “Mit oPrahrvatima i njegova svojstva”. On je ne bez podsmeha i na zabavuprisutnih opisao razli~ite mitološke teorije o poreklu Hrvata. Sveteze, kojih je znatno više, sveo je na tri grupe:

1. Hrvati vode poreklo od Avara. Po toj tezi pre VII veka i

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nije bilo Hrvata, ve} samo Avara. Ime Hrvati poti~e od jedneavarske titule.2. Hrvati poti~u od kavkaskih naroda. Postoje jezi~keetimologije sa nazivom Hrvati, ali i sa nazivima Poljaci, ~esii Srbi.3. Poreklo od Persijanaca. U jednoj verziji se kao argumentuzimaju jezi~ke etimologije s pojedinim geografskimnazivima u današnjem Iranu (regija Horawati). Takveetimološke sli~nosti je, medjutim, mogu}e na}i i sageografskim nazivima u Centralnoj Aziji, Afganistanu,Indiji... Druga verzija je nastala radi distanciranja od Srba.Dok Hrvati poti~u iz Persije, dotle Srbi od rimskih robovaporeklom iz Afrike, što se dokazuje navodnom tamnombojom ko‘e i kovrd‘avom kosom. Hrvatsko poreklo seizvodi iz persijskih dokumenata iz XIV veka pre rodjenjaHrista u kojima se navodno spominju Hrvati. Zatim su oninapustili svoju postojbinu i kolonizovali celu isto~nu ijugoisto~nu Evropu sve do Urala. Tako da Sloveni po tojtezi svoje poreklo vode od Hrvata.

Belaj je naveo da su takva mitološka dokazivanja u poslednje vremeposebno aktuelna. Ona ne samo da slu‘e objašnjenju poreklaHrvata, ve} i kao argument za nemogu}nost su‘ivota sa Srbima ujednoj dr‘avi, o bratstvu da se i ne govori.

Dr Wolfgang Kessler iz Hernea je dr‘ao drugi referat sanaslovom “Od stale‘a do dr‘avnosti: staleška ideologija i otkri}esrednjovekovne istorije u hrvatskoj nacionalnoj ideologiji”. Kesslerje naveo da je ilirizam jedna predjugoslovenska ideja i da je potekaouglavnom iz gradjanskog hrvatskog miljea, koji su prihvatili i Srbi.Napomenuo je da je povezanost Hrvata i Srba bila znatno ve}a pre1860. godine. Srpski patrijarh Vla~i} je ~ak intronizovao hrvatskogBana Jela~i}a. Ideja ilirizma je, medjutim, izmedju 1860. i 1870.godine izgubila svoj intenzitet i smisao pojavom jakog hrvatskognacionalnog pokreta, koji je, pak, delimi~no prouzrokovan~injenicom da je tadašnja srpska politi~ka elita postala glavninosilac jugoslovenske ideje. Preambula ustava moderne hrvatskedr‘ave se u velikoj meri oslanja na postulate tadašnjeg hrvatskognacionalnog pokreta. Takodje je mogu}e tra‘iti paralele s periodomod 1860. do 1916. godine pri razmatranju problema Krajine.

Profesor slavistike Wilfried Potthoff sa Univerziteta u Bonnuje obradjivao temu “Istorija i istorijski mitovi u ju‘noslovenskoj

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literaturi”. Profesor je po~eo izlaganje s jednim od mitova koji jeimao najviše posledica za istoriju ju‘noslovenskih naroda - ilirskimmitom. Potthoff je nastanak ilirskog pokreta vezao za VinkaPribojevi}a iz 16. veka. Iliri su smatrani pranarodom Slovena. Poštosu Makedonci i Rimljani svrstani u Ilire, tako su makedonskikraljevi, Aristotel kao i rimski carevi bili slovenskog porekla. UDubrovniku se u otprilike isto vreme po~inju izdavati knjige grbovau kojima su se kao naj~eš}i simboli pojavljivali polumesec i zvezda.Ti simboli su, medjutim, znatno starijeg korena, jer su mogli da senadju ve} na ste}cima u Bosni. Oni su potom preko dubrova~kihknjiga grbova došli u kasniji grb Ilirije i postali glavni simboliilirskog pokreta. Za nastanak mitova je od odlu~uju}e va‘nosti inedostatak pouzdanih istorijskih izvora. Delo Mavra Orbinija“Kraljevstvo Slovena” tako predstavlja jedini izvor za neke periodesrpske srednjovekovne istorije, kao na primer za Kosovski boj.Mogu}nosti provere su stoga veoma ograni~ene. Orbinijevo delo jei ilirskom pokretu slu‘ilo kao izvor. Potthoff je spomenuo i prvipokušaj stvaranja jednog ilirskog jezika od strane Juraja Kri‘ani}a.Kasnije je Vitezovi}, oko 1700. godine, izjedna~io Iliriju i Hrvatskui pri tom u Hrvatsku svrstao Dalmaciju, Slavoniju, UnutrašnjuHrvatsku (Croatia Uterior), Krajinu, Bosnu, Hercegovinu i Srbiju.Za razvoj ilirskog mita su bili posebno zna~ajni Jezuiti, ~iji se red uBosni i Hrvatskoj i zvao Collegium Illyricum. Prvi politi~ki rezultatviševekovnog stvaranja i gajenja ilirskog mita je osnivanje IlirskeProvincije od Napoleona 1809. godine. Ilirski mit nije bio ograni~ensamo na hrvatske pisce, pesnike i hroni~are, jer su se slovena~ki isrpski intelektualci kasnije priklju~ili. Slovenac Valentin Vodnik jepo~etkom XIX veka napisao odu o Iliriji u kojoj Napoleon ka‘e“Ilirijo ustani!”. U Srbiji je razvoju ideje ilirskog pokreta, iako poddrugim imenom, doprinelo “Na~ertanije” Ilije Garašanina iz 1844.godine u kome se tra‘i ponovno stvaranje Dušanovog carstva. KodSrba je medjutim kosovski mit bio od daleko ve}eg zna~aja sve dosavremenog doba. Potthoff je, pri tom, spomenuo memorandumSANU i izjavu njenog tadašnjeg potpredsednika Antonija Isakovi}a,koji je jednom prilikom rekao da se Srbi, kad god se nadju uteško}ama sete Kosova, Karadjordja i narodne epike. On je kaoretke kriti~are kosovskog mita pomenuo Crnjanskog,Konstantinovi}a, Pavlovi}a i Popovi}a.

Slede}i referat je podneo profesor Helmut Keipert, kojitakodje predaje slavistiku na Univerzitetu u Bonnu. Profesor Keipert

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je referisao o prvoj gramati~koj kodifikaciji srpskog jezika -“Pismenici serbskog jezika” Vuka Karad‘i}a iz 1814. godine. Onse skoncentrisao na predgovor u kome je Vuk opisao principe kojihse dr‘ao pri pisanju Pismenice. Keipert je izdvojio:- naglašavaju}i u tadašnjim nema~kim zemljama popularan koncept“maternjeg jezika” (Muttersprache) Karad‘i} je pokušao da svojedelo prika‘e kao svoju patriotsku obavezu, koju su drugi zapostavili- on skromno naglašava, da je samo delimi~no kvalifikovan zakodifikatora- Karad‘i} jasno podvla~i jednostavnost svoje kodifikacije

- ona se ni ne pribli‘ava kodifikacijama nema~kog i ~eškogod Adelunga i

Dobrovskog, što i nije njegova (Karad‘i}eva) namera- ona obuhvata samo jedan deo, jer nedostaje sintaksa- ona samo treba da ohrabri druge, koji su kvalifikovaniji- u ortografiji se koristi jednostavan princip “piši kao što

govoriš i ~itaj kao štopiše”- radi se o opisu onog srpskog jezika koji se naglašeno

govori “daleko od gradova”Keipert je svojim referatom ‘eleo da poka‘e da se u predgovoru“Pismenice serbskog jezika” radi o ponavljanju argumenata, koje jeJernej Kopitar u svojoj zamisli o standardizovanju slovena~kog,gr~kog i srpskog jezika naveo pre nego što je upoznao VukaKarad‘i}a. Kopitar je na odlu~uju}i na~in uticao na stvaranjepomenute kodifikacije, ne samo svojom recenzijom, ve} i kroz svojuticaj na druge recenzente (J. Grimm, J. S. Vater). Time je stvorenajedna pozitivna slika o Vuku Karad‘i}u, koja je u znatnoj meridoprinela “Legendi o Vuku”.

Prva sekcija je završena referatom dr Katrin Boekh, nau~nesaradnice Isto~noevropskog instituta iz Münchena. Njena tema jebila “Mit stranog na Balkanu”. Osnovna teza je da medjuju‘noslovenskim narodima postoji mitološko verovanje o zaveramastranih dr‘ava protiv njih. Njena analiza se pre svega odnosila naSrbe. Ona je dalje naglasila da njena hipoteza va‘i i za druge narodejugoisto~ne Evrope. Srbi smatraju Turke, Albance, Nemce iliuopšteno Zapad, i Rim, to jest Papu, kao sau~esnike u jednoj velikojzaveri protiv srpskog naroda. Zatim je konstantovala da je klju~narazlika izmedju Srba i tih naroda - vera. Pravoslavlje, koje nijeprošlo kroz reformatorski proces, je nosilac kulturnog razvitka.

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Nedostaje spremnost za razgovor i zbog toga je mogu}e da se sjednim pravoslavnim, zatvorenim društvom lakše manipuliše negos jednim otvorenim. Razlog tome le‘i u neprosve}enosti balkanskihnaroda, ~ije je društvo prete‘no selja~kog karaktera. U Srbiji se Srbismatraju bo‘ijim narodom, kome su se desili genocid i egzodus,vodi se sveti rat... Grobovi postaju glavni nacionalni simboli i patnjesrpskog naroda se poistove}uju s patnjama Hrista. Boekh je u tomkontekstu spomenula ikonizaciju modernih politi~ara, ~ije slike senose na masovnim demonstracijama. Tom prilikom je spomenulaproslavu 600-godišnjice kosovske bitke 1989. godine na kojoj sunošene slike Miloševi}a, kao i razne demonstracije po Bosni nakojima su nošene slike Radovana Karad‘i}a i Biljane Plavši}.Druga strana tog mita o nenaklonosti stranaca je mitologizacijapojma “Evropa”. Srbi vide svoju pravoslavnu crkvu kao naslednicuvizantijske crkve i u tom kontekstu nalaze svoje mesto u Evropi. Tuje spomenula srpske teologe Justina Popovi}a i NikolajaVelimirovi}a. Period osmanlijske vlasti u Srbiji se do‘ivljava kaostanje 500-godišnjeg permanentnog pa}enja i mu~enja. Boekhmisli da istorija u svojim efektima dopire kod Srba do sadašnjosti.Na kraju je kao argumente za svoju hipotezu navela nerazumevanjeSrba za uvedene sankcije kao i mit o pravednom ratu koji je vodjenu Hrvatskoj i Bosni. Ona je završila svoje predavanje zaklju~komda mit sam sebi stvara svoj narod.

Posle predavanja, Boekh je bila izlo‘ena veoma oštrojkritici. Suppan je rekao da su Srbi sekularizovan narod i da je Boekhuticaj vere na narod precenila. Kritikovane su isto i istorijskeneta~nosti, kojih u predavanju nije bilo malo. Napomenuto je daSrpska pravoslavna crkva nije listom protiv Zapada, ve} da kao i udrugim crkvenim organizacijama ima razli~itih strujanja.

Profesor nove istorije Johannes Burkhardt iz Augsburga jeu okviru simpozijuma odr‘ao javno predavanje sa naslovom“Nacionalni mitovi i nastanak ratova”. Burkhardt je istakao damitovi mogu pod odredjenim okolnostima izazvati ratove.Predavanje je po~eo s hipotezom da je kosovski mit jedan odsaizaziva~a jugoslovenskih ratova. Pri tome mu je promakla jedna“istorijska” greška, naime konstatacija da je rat u Sloveniji po~eo28. juna 1991. godine, što se poklapa s proslavom Vidovdana pogregorijanskom kalendaru i time se uklopilo u pri~u o kosovskommitu, koji u medjuvremenu kru‘i medju nekim nema~kimistori~arima i slavistima. Suština tog mita je da je JNA svoj napad na

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Sloveniju planirala za 28. jun i da se atentat na austrijskogprestolonaslednika takodje odigrao 28. Juna 1914. godine, naVidovdan. Iz toga se izvodi zaklju~ak da su i Prvi svetski ijugoslovenski rat prouzrokovani kosovskim mitom. Medjutim, ratu Sloveniji je po~eo 25. juna i taj datum su izabrale skupštinerepublika Slovenije i Hrvatske. Predavanje, medjutim, i nije štetilood te “mitološke” greške, jer se Burkhardt bavi istorijom Novogveka u nema~kim zemljama, te je svoje predavanje i usmerio višena taj period, zna~i na tridesetogodišnji rat izmedju protestanata ikatolika, koji je usitinu po~eo zbog proslave jedne mitološkestogodišnjice.

Greška koju je Burkhardt napravio na po~etku predavanjabila je u diskusiji izlo‘ena kritici, ali je napomenuto slaganje sgeneralnom intencijom predavanja.

Druga sekcija imala je za temu “Dr‘avne ideje i nacionalnimitovi” i otvorio ju je profesor Sergio Bonazza sa Univerziteta izVerone sa temom “Habsburški mit kod ju‘nih Slovena”. Bonazzaje postavio hipotezu da medju ju‘noslovenskim narodima postojimit o Habsburškoj monarhiji, koji u sebi sadr‘i više mitova. Prvi jemit o Austria felix, zatim mit o sre}noj višenacionalnoj dr‘avi i oo~inskoj pojavi monarha. Ti mitovi su stvoreni u XIX veku skonkretnim ciljem da se oja~a habsburška dinastija. Pošto su uHabsburškoj monarhiji ‘iveli i ju‘ni Sloveni, Slovenci, Hrvati i Srbi,zadatak referata je da ustanovi na koji na~in se medju tim narodimarazvio habsburški mit. Bonazza je to pokušao da doka‘e uz pomo}literarnih tekstova, polaze}i od toga da je literatura proizvod kulturejednog naroda i da u jednom odredjenom periodu na najbolji na~inprikazuje istorijske vrednosti tog naroda. On je svojom analizompokazao da se taj mit posebno razvio kod Slovenaca (FrancePrešern), u manjoj meri kod Hrvata (Ivan Ma‘urani}), koji su sailirizmom imali jednu drugu alternativu, dok je kod Srba (LukijanMušicki) prisutan samo kao sporedna pojava.

Keipert je u diskusiji napomenuo da suština hipoteze moradobro da se osmisli jer se takve pojave mogu pratiti u gotovo svimevropskim literaturama toga vremena. Tom mišljenju su se pridru‘iliSuppan i Steinke.

Drugi referat dr‘ao je profesor Peter Bartl sa Univerziteta uMünchenu, koji je referisao o istorijskom mitu kod Albanaca.Nacionalno budjenje kod Albanaca, poznato kao Rilindija (Preporod)je nastupilo kasno, tek u drugoj polovini XIX veka. Stvaranju

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albanske nacionalne dr‘ave nisu se protivili samo susedni narodi,ve} i Albanci muslimanske veroispovesti koji su ‘eleli da ostanu uOsmanlijskoj dr‘avi. Iz tog razloga je politi~ko rukovodstvoAlbanaca, pošto nije bilo nikakve srednjovekovne istorijske tradicije,pokušalo da konstruiše istorijski mit o poreklu Albanaca. Suštinatog mita je da su Albanci jedan vrlo stari, ako ne i najstariji narod naBalkanu, koji je oduvek ‘iveo na svojim današnjim ognjištima, inije postojao nikada prekid u albanskoj istoriji, jer strane okupacijenisu bile u stanju da prekinu nacionalnu tradiciju. Bartl je naveo tripublikacije u kojima je tokom XIX veka razvijen taj mit. To su“Discorso sull´origine, costumi, e stato attuale della nazionealbanese” (Rasprava o poreklu, folkloru i sadašnjem stanju albanskenacije / prev. M.K.) od Angelo Masci-a (Napulj 1807. godine),zatim “Albanien und die Albanesen. Eine historisch-kritische Studie,von Wassa Effendi, Beamter der Kaiserlich Türkischen Regierung,Christlich-Albanischer Nationalität” (Albania i Albanesi. Jednaistorijsko-kriti~ka studija, od Vase Efendije, slu‘benika carsko-turske vlade, hriš}ansko-albanske nacionalnosti / prev. M.K.) (Berlin1879. godine) i program albanskog nacionalnog pokreta “Was warAlbanien, was ist es und was wird es werden? Gedanken undBetrachtungen über die unser geheiligtes Vaterland Albanienbedrohenden Gefahren und deren Abwendung” (Šta je bila Albanija,šta je i šta }e da bude? Razmišljanja i razmatranja o strašnimopasnostima, koja ugro‘avaju našu prosve}enu domovinu Albanijui odbrana od istih / prev. M.K.) od Sami Frashërija (Bukarest 1889.godine, nema~ki prevod Be~, Leipzig 1913. godine). Masci opisujeAlbance kao naslednike Ilira i Makedonaca, za koje on smatra da suistog porekla. Albanci shodno tome govore makedonski. Od rimskogosvajanja Albanci više nisu pravili, ve} samo trpeli istoriju. Jediniizuzetak albanske istorije je bio Skender Beg. Masci je bio italijansko-albanskog porekla i viši ~inovnik grada Napulja za vremeNapoleonove vladavine. Rasprava Vase Efendije je po~ela odPelazga, kojima, kao najstarijem narodu Evrope, on pripisuje pravoprvenstva na Balkanu. Iliri, Epiri i Makedonci su bili Pelazgi.Osmanlijsku vladavinu, kao njen ~inovnik, opisuje u globalupozitivno, osim Tanzimat perioda, jer se Albanci nisu priklju~ili tompokretu modernizovanja Osmanlijskog carstva. U svom delu jetra‘io da se sva teritorija nastanjena Albancima ujedini u jedanvilajet. Vasa Efendija, ~ije je kršteno ime Paško Vasai i koji nijemenjao veru, kao visoki ~inovnik osmanlijske dr‘ave postao je paša

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i kao takav poslat na mesto guvernera Libana. Sami Frashëri se uvelikoj meri oslonio na Vasino delo. On poreklo re~i arban nalaziu albanskom nazivu za polje, iz ~ega zaklju~uje da su Albanciporeklom seljaci-poljoprivrednici. Oni su u predanti~kom periodunaseljavali ne samo Balkan, ve} i Malu Aziju i Italiju. Etrurci vodeporeklo upravo od tih prvih kolonista Italije. Heleni i Makedonci,takodje, vode poreklo od Albanaca, tako da su i Aleksandar Velikikao i njegov otac Filip II bili Albanci. Dolaskom Slovena na BalkanAlbanci koji su ‘iveli u Trakiji i Makedoniji morali su da napustesvoju zemlju, dok su se Albanci iz Bosne, Dalmacije i Crne Gorepomešali sa Slovenima i primili njihov jezik. Frashëri, kao i Vasa,ocenjuje osmanlijsku vladavinu pozitivno i naglašava ve} pomenutialbanski kontinuitet. On smatra da su Albanci uvek radili za druge(Sinan-paša i Mehmet-Ali-paša) i da se zato albanska istorijapogrešno razvila. Jedini, koji je radio za Albaniju je bio SkenderBeg. Novonastala albanska istoriografija je posle drugog svetskograta uglavnom preuzela teze iz vremena Rilindije.

Tokom diskusije je, na pitanje koliko je nastanak albanskogistorijskog mita odgovarao Austrougarskoj, Bartl odgovorio da jeodmah posle objavljivanja Frashërijevog dela nastala sumnja da jeono plagijat austrijske obaveštajne slu‘be i da je poznato da je samFrashëri poricao da je autor pomenute rasprave.

Tre}a sekcija se bavila temom “pretvaranje mitova u simbole irituale”. Prvi referat te sekcije je dr‘ao profesor istorije umetnostisa Univerziteta u Bonnu Heinrich-Josef Klein, koji je svoje predavanjeposvetio “Mileneumskim proslavama u Madjarskoj 1896.”. Tada jeu Budimpešti slavljeno hiljadu godina od madjarskog, mitološkognaseljavanja Panonske nizije. Za tu priliku je Budimpešta prošlakroz opširnu urbanisti~ku transformaciju. Izgradjeni su razli~itireprezentativni objekti, medju kojima su Parlament, Vrhovni sud,Dr‘avna banka i Muzej primenjenih umetnosti, kao i zaobilaznamagistrala (Andrássy-út) sa Trgom heroja. U sklopu proslava je bilapriredjena velika izlo‘ba u stilu svetskih izlo‘bi na jednom arealuu blizini Trga heroja. Mese~no je izlo‘bu posetilo oko 1.000.000ljudi, a do njenog kraja broj posetilaca je narastao na oko 5.000.000.Pošto su iz Madjarske bile organizovane ekskurzije, mo‘e lako dase predpostavi u kom obimu je organizacija predstavljala logisti~kiproblem. U centru proslave je stajala Kruna sv. Stefana, kao simboljedinstva Madjarske. Kruna, koja se ~uvala u dvorcu na Budimu,

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bila je sve~ano preneta u Parlament, ~ime je otvoreno zasedanjeParlamenta; potom je kruna, u takodje sve~anoj procesiji, vra}enau dvorac na Budimu. Sto godina kasnije, 1996. godine, slavio se“Milecentenarium” (1.100 godina) i tom prilikom je u potpunoizmenjenim politi~kim okolnostima proslavljen isti jubilej kao i stogodina ranije, sa znatno skromnijim sadr‘ajem. U centru je opetstajala procesija prenošenja krune od dvorca do Parlamenta i nazad.Medju prvima je iza krune kora~ao bivši predsednik SAD JimmyCarter, koji je za vreme svoje predsedni}ke du‘nosti Madjarskojvratio krunu. Za vreme Drugog svetskog rata kruna je bila izneta izMadjarske i kasnije se našla u SAD. Snimljen je film o mitološkomArpadovom osvajanju Panonske nizije. (Glavnu ulogu je igraoitalijanski glumac Franco Nero). Bili su organizovani koncerti,izlo‘be, pozorišne predstave i sl. Klein je tokom svog referataprikazao slajdove starih fotografija sa Mileneuma, kao i ise~ke izfilma o Arpadovom osvajanju i video-snimke sa razli~itihmanifestacija sa Milecentenariuma.

Peter Hasslinger, nau~ni saradnik Univerziteta u Freiburgudr‘ao je slede}i referat sa temom “O kontinuitetu i prekidima: slikaAustrije u madjarskoj karikaturi 1895-1990. godine”. On je naosnovu pomenutog primera pokušao da prika‘e uticaj karikatura nanastanak, razvoj i dejstvo politi~kih mitova. Te‘ište referata su~inile karikature iz perioda od 1895. do 1914. godine, u kojima jeslika Austrije i Austrijanca bila podvrgnuta izvesnoj transformaciji.Na po~etku tog perioda se Austrijanci prikazuju kao izrabljiva~iMadjara. Od 1900. godine se slika menja i Austrijanci se predstavljajukao jadni i siromašni. Madjari se za sve to vreme prikazuju kaozdraviji, puniji i pametniji od Austrijanaca. Hasslinger je naglasioda bez obzira na prikazane karikature, koje su uzete iz nekolikorazli~itih ~asopisa, slika Austrije u pomenutom periodu nijekonkretna. Ona je podlo‘na dnevnim izmenama, koje su proizvodpoliti~kog procesa. Ustanovio je da je slika Austrijanacaheterostereotipna, dok je slika Madjara autostereotipna i na osnovutog primera zaklju~uje da je prikazivanje konkurentnog i konfliktnogpotencijala uglavnom na štetu drugoga.

Profesor slavistike Klaus Steinke sa Univerziteta u Erlangenubavio se tipologijom preporodnih pokreta u jugoisto~noj Evropi injegov referat je nosio naslov “Bugarski preporod i Scoalaardealeana”. On je uporedio razvoj bugarskog i rumunskogpreporoda, koji su po~eli u drugoj polovini XIX veka. Poredjenje ta

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dva procesa nije uobi~ajeno jer nije postojala nikakva direktnapovezanost. Steinke, medjutim, navodi da postoji mnogo tipološkihsli~nosti, koje dozvoljavaju takvo poredjenje. On se, pri tom,ograni~io na dva aspekta, na narod i jezik. Jezik je bitna komponentau oba procesa. Klju~ne li~nosti su za Bugare Pajsije Hilandarski sadelom “Istorija Slavjano-Bulgarskaja” i Gheorghe Sincai, kao iPetru Maior kod Rumuna. Poseban zna~aj pripada i autorima prvihgramatika i bukvara. Kod Bugara su to Peter Beron i Neofit Rilski,a kod Rumuna Gheorghe Sincai i Samuel Klein-Micu. Za razliku odBugarske, gde je postojala jaka srednjovekovna tradicija, u Rumunijinije postojala tako re}i nikakva tradicija. Rumunski slu~aj je biotoliko nepoznat da još na po~etku XIX veka zapadni romanisti ~aknisu ni znali za rumunski jezik. Poreklo Rumuna je bilo izlo‘enoširokoj mitologizaciji. Treba izdvojiti dve struje: prvo, da Rumunivode poreklo od Da~ana i drugo, da vode poreklo od Rimljana.Dimitrije Kantemir je zastupao drugu tezu, dok je prva bila ukasnijim periodima rasprostranjenija, posebno u periodu posledrugog svetskog rata. Ta hipoteza je ~ak išla dotle, da se i poreklolatinskog jezika izvodilo od Da~ana. Zna~ajna je i takozvana“Transilvanska škola” (Siebenbürgener Schule) iz XIX veka.Pripadnici tog pokreta su tra‘ili korene rumunskom jeziku ulatinskom i pri tom menjali ortografiju re~i koje su slovenskogporekla da bi ih što više pribli‘ili latinskom. Tako, na primer,slovenska re~ razboi (rat) se pisala res belli. Steinke se uglavnomoslonio na rad modernog rumunskog nau~nika Lucian Boiae, ~ijeje delo izašlo 1997. godine.

Profesor istorije jugoisto~ne Evrope Arnold Suppan saUniverziteta u Be~u je referisao o “Karikaturi kao izvoru modernihmitova. Srbi, Hrvati i Slovenci u poredjenju”. On se ograni~io nasliku Austrije i Austrijanaca kod Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba u perioduod 1885. do 1995. godine. Najve}i broj pomenutih karikatura je izSlovenije i Hrvatske. Suppan je na po~etku referata pojasnio sampojam karikature i njen zna~aj za istorijsku nauku. Pri tom je rekao,da je karikatura zbog toga zna~ajna, jer se ono što ‘eli da se prika‘esu‘ava na najva‘nije simbole i da, pošto se oduzme njen komi~ankarakter, ostaje onaj “ozbiljni” prikaz konkretne teme. Cilj karikaturaje da javnosti prika‘u odredjene socijalne i politi~ke pojave, odnose,procese i drugo, na jedan posebno uproš}en na~in. Suppan je citiraoHaralda Olbricha, koji se bavio teorijom karikature. Kad se karikaturaposmatra kao istorijski izvor mora se uzeti u obzir njen poseban

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karakter i njena specifi~na intencija. U protivnom bi korisnostkarikature kao istorijski izvor bila negativna, jer bi davala jednuiskrenutu i preteranu sliku odredjene teme. Suppan je prikazaorazli~ite karikature i na konkretnim primerima demonstriraodinamiku slike o Austriji i Austrijancima u tri razli~ita dela bivšeJugoslavije u raznim periodima. On je pokušao da ilustruje metodjedne takve analize.

Poslednji referat tre}e sekcije o “Pretvaranju mitova usimbole i rituale” je dr‘ala Dorothea Schell, nau~na saradnicaEtnološkog seminara Univerziteta u Bonnu. Referat je bazirao nanjenim empirijskim istra‘ivanjima u Gr~koj u periodu od 1990. do1995. godine, koje je sprovela uglavnom na ostrvu Samos i nosioje naslov: “Perspektive etnološkog istra‘ivanja simbola i rituala –primeri iz gr~ke periferije”. Ona je u uvodu dala neka opštaobjašnjenja da bi pripremila slušaoce na suštinu svoga rada, naimena pitanje koliko mitovi slu‘e da se odredjene nacionalne zajedniceu svom politi~kom delovanju ujedine. Kao primer je navela funkcijuhimne i zastave, kao nacionalnih simbola, da stvore jedan kolektivninacionalni ose}aj. Spomenicima nacionalno-politi~ke konotacijeona daje isti smisao. Njeno istra‘ivanje je bilo usmereno na najnovijedogadjaje u Gr~koj vezane za nastanak Bivše JugoslovenskeRepublike Makedonije i razvijanje politi~kog MI-ose}aja medjuGrcima. U tu svrhu su i odredjeni istorijski simboli dobili nacionalnoobele‘je. Najva‘niji od tih simbola je takozvana Zvezda iz Vergine,koja je postala osnovni simbol jedinstvenog gr~kog prava na imeMakedonija. Ona je nadjena u jednom grobu u gr~kom deluMakedonije, za koji se veruje da je grob oca Aleksandra Velikog,Filipa II, makedonskog kralja. Arheološki, medjutim, nije dokazanoda se radi o grobu Filipa II, ve} se uglavnom polazi od toga da je re~o grobu Filipa V. Simbol je naširoko popularizovan i postao nesamo politi~ki, ve} i modni i stilski simbol devedesetih godina uGr~koj. Porcelanski servisi, nakit i drugi ukrasni predmeti noseZvezdu od Vergine, ra~uni za telefon, struju i vodu su na poledjinibili obele‘eni s pomenutim simbolom. Carinski slu‘benici su nasvojim kabinama imali nalepnice sa tim simbolom i parolom da jeMakedonija deo Gr~ke. Schell, medjutim, ne smatra da se radiisklju~ivo o jednom odozgo iskonstruisanom mitu, ve} se u velikojmeri on sam od sebe razvijao uz pomo} “dobronamernih diletanata,koji su se u dobronamernom maniru trudili da u~estvuju u nastankunovih i razvoju starih mitova”. Svoja empirijska istra‘ivanja vodila

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je u formi razgovora sa “informantima”, koji nisu imali oblikintervjua. Ona zastupa mišljenje da s jednim unapred pripremljenimupitnikom nije mogu}e da se oseti intenzitet i dubina posmatranogfenomena. Neposredno posle razgovora sa osobama, koje je li~nopoznavala, zapisivala je svoje utiske o tim razgovorima.

~etvrta sekcija nosila je naslov “Stari i novi mitovi”. Prvireferat je dr‘ao profesor romanistike Klaus Heitmann sa Univerzitetau Heidelbergu. On se bavio “Lucian Blagainom stilskom analizomrumunstva”. Lucian Blaga (1895-1961) je bio liri~ar, dramati~ar ifilozof i jedan od klasika rumunske Moderne. On je stvorio jednumitološku teoriju o rumunstvu, koja je do danas ostala najpopularnijiprilog rumunskom samospoznanju. Njegovo delo “Spatiul mioritic”(Mioritski prostor) je izdato 1936. godine. Naslov dela se nadovezujena narodnu baladu “Miorita” (Janje) i u njemu je opisao Mioritskiprostor kao jedan blago brdovit predeo u kome le‘e raštrkanarumunska sela. U tom prostoru autor je opisao rumunski duh, kojise pro‘ima kroz narodnu epiku. Blaga je stvorio jednu filozofskukonstrukciju kroz koju je objasnio bit rumunstva. U tu svrhu jedefinisao nekoliko determinanti:1. Ose}aj prostora2. Ose}aj sudbine3. Ose}aj zajedništva determinisan kroz pravoslavlje, koji je uporediosa organizmom, i ponovo podelio na nekoliko determinanti krozkoje objašnjava razlike sa katoli~kom i protestantskom religijom:

- svest o crkvi- svest o naciji- forme jezika- razlike u kulturnom smislu- forme misionarske delatnosti- predstave o spasenju- opreme crkvenog prostora- na~ini crkvenog rituala

4. Sofijanska svest- u pravoslavlju dolazi transcendentalnost odozgo na dole(primer: Sveta Sofija u Istanbulu)- u katoli~anstvu obrnuto, odozdo na gore (primer: gotika)

5. Umetni~ka orijentacija ka geometrijskim i linearnim formama6. Nepobediva naklonost ka pitoresknim motivima7. Smisao za meru i nijansuLucian Blaga je svojim kontroverznim delom izazvao duboku

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diskusiju, koja je i danas u Rumuniji aktuelna.Simpozijum je završen prilogom dr. Antona Sterblinga, sa

Univerziteta Nema~ke vojske u Hamburgu. Naslov njegovog referataje bio “Potla~enje, ideologija i potisnuti opstanak mitova”.Prestankom komunisti~ke vlasti u jugoisto~noj Evropi nije se samo“ponovo probudila istorija”, u suštini se radi o revitalizaciji skoronestalih ili u svom smislu preokrenutih nacionalnih mitova i simbola.Sterbling se pitao koje su specifi~ne okolnosti dovele do ponovnognacionalnog budjenja, koje se u ne malom broju zemalja,transformiralo u otvoreni nacionalizam. Njegova osnovna hipoteza,koja daje odgovor na to pitanje, je da su se nacionalni mitovi odr‘alikroz zabrane i da su oni zahvaljuju}i zabranama ~ak gajeni bezizgleda da dodje do jednog konstruktivnog dijaloga o njima. Na tajna~in su zabrane imale u potpunosti negativan efekat i dovele dotoga da su nacionalni mitovi bili negovani u višenacionalnimdr‘avama, ali i u mononacionalnim primarnim sredinama. Glavniefekat zabrana je bio da je spre~en dijalog s neistomišljenicima ipripadnicima drugih nacija, iako su kratkoro~no imale ‘eljeniefekat, one su dugoro~no bile veoma povoljne za subkulturalnirazvoj starih i ~ak nastanak novih mitova.

Bonski simpozijum je pokazao da u razmišljanju obalkanskim mitovima još ima puno potencijala. Na ‘alost, profesoriHolm Sundhausen i Wolfgang Höpken su u poslednjim trenucimapred po~etak simpozijuma otkazali svoja u~eš}a. Höpken je trebaloda referiše o mitu rata na Balkanu, dok je Sundhausen bio najavioda }e da izveštava o kosovskom mitu. Tako je najva‘niji mit narodas centralnom geografskom pozicijom na Balkanu i sa istorijskimtokovima vezanim za tu poziciju, ostao neobradjen. Taj nedostatakse na ‘alost, ose}ao tokom simpozijuma, posebno u diskusijama,koje su sledile svakom referatu. Bez obzira na tu nesretnu okolnost,kao i ~injenicu da je bilo svrsishodno da je došao neki stru~njak izJugoslavije, organizatorima pripada ~estitka za zamisao,organizaciju i raspored referata. Tri dana intenzivnog bavljenjamitovima iz cele jugoisto~ne Evrope su sigurno ostavila ne maliutisak na sve prisutne. Uvodna primedba profesora Edgara Höscha,da sve nacije te‘e stvaranju mitova, a posebno male nacije, moglabi se posle ovog nau~nog skupa revidirati - da su velike nacije vrlorevnosno pomagale malim nacijama da stvore ili razviju mitove. Nakraju bi moglo da se zaklju~i da se o razvoju balkanskih mitova imajoš puno da izu~ava a u zavisnosti od toga bi se ponegde morale

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praviti i korekture aktuelnih verzija istorije i posebno da se preispitauticaj ove ili one “velike sile” na stvaranje i razvoj mitova narodaovih prostora. Po~etkom 1998. godine bi trebalo da izadje knjiga sakompletnim prilozima sa simpozijuma.

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TRAG ZMAJEVE SAPE(zbirka kratkih prica)

Antonije Zalica

(Radio B 92, Beograd 1995.)

Antonije Zalica je rodjen u Sarajevu I959.godine.Diplomirao je opstu knjizevnost i filozofiju.Objavio jeknjigu pjesama “Tilt” (“Svjetlost,Sarajevo 1984.).Pisepjesme,price i drame.Snimio je nekoliko kratkih filmova(nagradaFelix 1994.).U decembru 1993. napustio je Sarajevo.Danas ziviu Amsterdamu.

VI BISTE HTELI,GOSPODO, DA VAM POKAZEM SVOJU RODNU KUCU?ALIMOJA SE MAJKA PORODILA U BOLNICI U FIJUMI, I TA JE BOLNICA VECSRUSENA.NECETE USPETI DA STAVITE PLOCU NA MOJ DOM JER JE ION VALJDA SRUSEN.ILI BISTE MOGLI STAVITI TRI- CETIRI PLOCE SAMOJIM IMENOM: U RAZNIM GRADOVIMA , RAZNIM DRZAVAMA, ALINI TU VAM NE BIH MOGAO POMOCI, JER NE ZNAM KOJA JE BILA MOJARODNA KUCA, NE SECAM SE VISE GDE SAM ZIVEO U DETINJSTVU,JEDVA ZNAM KOJIM SAM JEZIKOM GOVORIO.

pri~a 1.

SARAJEVSKI UVOD U FILOZOFIJU

1. Upoznao sam srapnel,satima sam drzao u ruci tajkomadic laganog i tvrdog,nazubljenog metala od nekakvemefistijanski smisljene legure,pomisljam kojom brzinomleti kroz zrak kad se pôrodi iz majke-granate,kojomlakocom prolazi kroz drvena vrata i sa kakvomnonsalancijom prodire kroz ljudsko tkivo,kao da je covjekni od cega.Jednom sam u ruci drzao kameni nozic izneolita,isti oblik,ista nazubljenost.U svakom

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artiljerijskom punjenju kriju se stotine kamenihsjekira.Nagoni su isti,ista je ideja.Vatreno oruzje nepostoji,svako je jednako krvavo i hladno. Bas je to cudno kako malo ljudi poznaje taj predmet ukome se,valjda,krije sustina nase civilizacije.

2. Zato sto je okruzeno koncentricnim krugovima.Zatosto je nepokretno,okovano u godisnja doba koja sesmjenjuju u pravilnim razmacima,jer se samo ovdjeistinski vraca isto u istovjetno,jer se iz ogoljenosti predprisutnim Nista u zaledjenosti bilo kakve pomisli oprogresu,survava i ponistava svaki koncept zemlji iuzicima odane civilizacije koja pokusava isplatiti josjednu ratu svog vjecitog i nikad izbrisivog nagona kagrijehu.Okovanost,privilegija odvojenosti,koncentriseDuh koji se nakuplja u mjestu koje prestaje biti prostor,utrajanju koje gubi obiljezje vremena.

3. Mislim da je Galilej izmislio teleskop.Ne znam kolikoje puta uvecavao ,ali priblizio je zvijezde.Kao dijete,zeliosam da postanem astronom,pokusavao sam napravititeleskop kombinujuci nekakva sociva u cijevi odsmotanog kartona prikacenog gumicama skinutim samaminih viklera.Nikad nisam uspio dobiti uvecanje islika je uvijek ostajala mutna i izvrnuta.Nikad nisamimao teleskop,imao sam neke knjige i kartu zvjezdanogneba.Nemam ga ni danas.Oni imaju mocnu optiku,a inalaze se na mjestima pogodnim za opservatorije.Neznam da li je nocu okrenu ka nebu i da li gledaju uzvijezde.Po danu znam:okrenu je dole,prema zemlji istavljaju krstove na ljude.

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prica 2.

PRICA O ZRAKU

O zraku je najteze napisati pricu. O vazduhu je mnogolakse. Vazduh je ono sto se dise a kroz zrak se lebdi.To jetako,ma kako ko tumacio svoj bijes. Na primjer,granata:prozvizdi kroz zrak a onda te baciudar vazduha.I tresne te o zid,naravno,ako imas srece. Sjediti u kaficu “London”,piti pivo koje te pocastijednom u desetak dana.Kafic zeli bitiobican,sarajevski,kao nekada,klijentela se pokusavaponasati uobicajeno,cak sve izgleda normalno:muzika“Crvena jabuka”,djevojke su se uredile,smjeskajuse,razgovara se,cak se i smije.Momak sto sjedi sa mnomza stolom kaze:”Ma,ima li ista ludje na svijetu?Iznadprolijecu projektili,tuku granate,minobacaci,tenkovi,sarasnajper,tuku svim sto postoji,jebala te IvoDzima,Hirosima,malo je reci Hirosima,a oni sjede u bastii piju kafu.Jebalo te vedro nebo.Polako,srk po srk,dokgore gori trebevic,bitka.Osvrnes se na to kao da gledas uekran televizije ili kao da je za cosak promakla nekadobra koka.Palis cigaru,rastezes kafu jer ti fali pola markeza jos jednu.To nema nigdje”. Piti kafu.(Piti kafu poslije kraja svijeta?) Nema to veze sto su mnogi u uniformama,sto uz stonaslanjaju “kalasnjikove”,to je sada normalno,tako sedanas nosi.To nije vazno. Ali ,zasto onaj djecak zna da izvuce drvce i kresnesibicu samo jednim rukom? Zasto za svakim stolom nedostaje bar po jedan dioruke ili noge?Ni to vise ne skrece paznju,jebi ga,kao daje i to neka moda.Koliko oziljaka i rupa,parotina pokozi,krije odjeca?Koliko je metaka,gelera,proslo kroztijelo?Zaobislo srce?Otkinulo pramen kose i nije doprlodo mozga?To se ne vidi,to se samo zna.

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Proljece 1993.Boze moj,voljeli smo zimu vise-manje,ali voljeli smo bjelinu snijega,pahulje unoci,sankanje niz strme ulice,slicure,SnjeskaBijelica,disanje ispod vunenog sala koji bocka poobrazima,skijanje na Jahorini,Olimpijadu.I prosla zimabila je lijepa,snjegovita,ali niko u Gradu nije uzivao utome;mozda bi se djeca malo zanijela na ligurama,ali i toje rastureno.Petoro djece na sankanju.Krv se zaledi pa jevidis mjesecima,svaki put kada prolazis tu,ubrzaskorak,pokusas skrenuti pogled,ali ljudske oci suneposlusne.Crveni led.Baska to sto ti se i ziva krv ledi uvenama,sto nam se zima okamenila oko kostiju.A glad?Zedj?Za to se gubi osjecaj,kao i za strah.Kako mozesnazvati strahom nesto sto je stalno? Parabola o pasulju:Almir,brat i ja.Oskudno svijetlomalene sijalice prikljucene na akumulator.Jeli smo,mozdajucer,u montazi nismo imali vode.Rovimo po kuci,u kojusvratimo samo ponekad.Imamo malo pasulja i dva litravode.Skuhati pasulj ili napiti se vode?Pola litra podijelimona nekoliko gutljaja svakome,a onda skuhamopasulj.Napucamo se tog pasulja u koji smo kapnuli mrvuulja,malo bibera i sol.Bez kruha.Tek tada nas napadazedj.Najstrasnije je nocu,sama pomisao da nemas ni kapivode ispija ti mozak.A mozak te nagoni da mislis otekucini.Uzimam kanister,naginjem,mozda je zaostalakoja kap:samo vazduh na koji se nalijepio mirisplastike.Jedna kap putuje niz zidove kanistera.Dugoudisem unutrasnjost plasticne posude.Zaspim,sanjampotok,vrelo,bunu,pijem i pijem i sto vise pijem,zedjpostaje veca.Skacem sa spuzve prostrte na podu.Otvaramsirom prozor,zimski vazduh potonuo duboko ispod tezamisljene “nule” reze kao sonda niz pluca.Almir setrese od zime ispod tri jorgana i jebe mi sve po spisku.Salima na prozoru grabim ostatke snijega. Zderem prljavisnijeg. Sada paganski slavimo boginju proljeca Vesnu.Opetje procvjetalo,barem ono sto je ostalo.Ispred nas je pustatrava,prazan pogled do kuca u Kralja Tomislava,ko moze

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u tom zraku zamisliti krosnje drveca,lisce sto treperi navjetru? Park? Nema ni panjeva,zima ih je iscupalasmrznutim rukama.Kroz prazan prozor bivseg parka zujesnajperski meci,dosadni kao muhe ili komarci. -Daj jos jednu kafu, mala! Ono sto zovemo “kafa” samo je braonkasta voda bezukusa.Ali, nije vazno, kelnerica se smjeska, spusta soljicu,naplacuje. Uostalom, pravimo i majonezu koja nikad nijevidjela jaja.Muckamo ulje i brasno. -Isto prava majoneza,majke mi! Pravimo i sir:mijesamo brasno,ulje i nekoliko kasikamlijeka u prahu: -Ovo je bolje od svih onih sirnih namaza. -Ja cu ovo praviti i poslije rata,’ocu zivota mi. Ukus je bio u nama.Ukus je bio u zraku.U zamisljanjuonoga cega nema,kao kad se djeca zaigraju. I sad moram pronaci jedan od rijetkih zapisa koje samnapravio u Sarajevu;glupo je bilo pisati bilo sta,ono stoje bilo-bilo je samo po sebi dovoljno,djelic toga mozdamozes uhvatiti kamerom,pa smontirati.Ali,pisati,bilo jebespredmetno,mozda bas zato sto se cinilo da se to nikomene moze ispricati,da niko to nemoze i nece nikadarazumjeti.Naravno,i sada znam da je to tako i istinito,aliljudi moraju pisati knjige,ovdje to mogu barempokusati.Da li ovo hocu i zelim da opisem sebi i nikomevise? I tu se stvarno ne moze pobjeci od patetike.A tamo jenije bilo.Tamo je bilo “nesto”. I tamo je to “nesto” samo po sebi razumljivo.Zasto jeovdje sve drugacije?Zasto sam prvi tren na otvorenomprostoru,na aerodromu u Ankoni,pomislio,sasvim iskrenoi bez foliranja,da je stvarni zivot ostao tamo na drugomkraju leta RAF-ovog “herkulesa”?Zasto sam osjetio mukuu stomaku kada sam prvi put ponovo usao usupermarket?Cemu sluze stotine vrsta namaza,hiljadevrsta vina?Cijeli jedan zid prepun hrane za pse imacke?Zasto sam postidijeo svoju prijateljicu u

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Amsterdamu kada me je pitala koju vrstu sira zelim i kadasam odgovorio,iskreno i spontano:”Just cheese”? Tamo u Sarajevu sve je bilo samo ono sto jeste,istinitoi neposredno:sir je bio samo sir(ako ga je uopste bilo),hljebje bio hljeb,voda je bila voda,stolica je stolica,zid je biozid,a jebaji ga,zivot je bio samo zivot,a smrt je naprostobila smrt. Zasto sam istog momenta pozelio da se vratim uSarajevo?Mozda bih se i vratio da moj zivot pripadasamo meni. Umjesto tog povratka ,iskopao sam ovaj zapis izmemorije kompjutera.Ipak,kao i sve u Sarajevu,tako je itaj jedan mali,rijetki zapis,koji sam ko zna zasto,iz kojeli upornosti ili tvrdoglavosti,bio samo to:samo jedanmali zapis koji sam kasnije nazvao “Kratkom pricom ozraku”:

KRATKA PRICA O ZRAKU Vatra.Voda.Zemlja.Zrak.Najstrasniji je zrak.Vatra sugranate i pozari,rafali i raketni bacaci,vatra je cigaretakoje nema,vatra je pregrst granja da se skuha sakarize,kada je nema,vatra je hladnoca.Vatra je strasna,alistrasniji je zrak.Voda je muka,tegljenje kroz ulice odvatre,voda je i krv na ulici.Strasna je voda kada je zedj,alije zrak najstrasniji od svih.Zemlja je sljaka fudbalskogterena u koji zakopavamo mrtvace,zemlja su zradesmrskane udarcima ,zemlja su vrece na prozorima,blatou kosi,rovovi i transeje.Strasna je ledena zemlja,alistrasniji je zrak: Zrak je drvo iznad panja u posjecenom parku, zrak jefantomski bol u ruci koju je odsjzkla granata.

U Sarajevu,oktobra 1993.

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“PAPIRNI ANDJELI MILETEPRODANOVICA”

LOGOS - KOLAZI

Desanka SandulovicBeograd

NIJE LI SE SPUSTIO NI JEDAN ANDJEODA GA SPASE DOK SU SVE KAPIJEBILE JOS ZATVORENE, NIJE LI SETU POJAVIO NEKI ZNAK ZBOG NJEGA.

Kjerkegor (1)

“Ono sto je duh, u vizijama, otkrio prorocima”(1) preteciglas doneo je do nas - rat, osuda, uzasna propast: vreme nastankakolaza Milete Prodanovica. Pecat sigurnosti - znak Logosa navratima bio nam je ponovo potreban:

“Verujuci u sigurnu moc cudotvornih znakova koji utvrdjujucrvu, oni stavljaju - ispod pandantifa - osam diskosa. Svaki odnjih naslikan je kao tri koncentricna kruga koji se okrecu usuprotnim pravcima. Te cudne ploce, trepereci u svom kruznomkretanju, lebde kao simboli Logosa, - bozanske reci, na kojojpociva sve.”

Svetozar Radojcic_____________________________________________

Umetnost podrazumeva i prolazno i vecno, slobodui nuznost, teznja umetnika - strast za beskonacno(2) -povremeno je prekidana opstim nesrecama. Tamo gdeput skrece nasao se Mileta Prodanovic. Nebo je bilozatvoreno i ni jedan andjeo nije poslat, umetnik je bioprinudjen da preuzme ulogu andjela. Moderno vreme uz

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kategorije uzvisenog i lepog, dodaje i termin “estetskogheroja”. Zar se nikada nismo plasili sami sebe, zar nam nijedan greh nije izgledao tako tezak, da se ne bi mogaouvuci u nas i zavladati kao strana sila:

“Samo umetnost moze da zautavi takvo rusenje,samo Andjeo Umetnosti moze da se odupre cepanju, dastvori klin koji se umece medju delice i stvara otpornost,trajnost, primirje.”

A. B. OlivaZato umetnik progovara - da bi se odagnao strah i

probudila nada. Priblizno u isto vreme kada i kolazinastala je knjiga Pas prebijene kicme - fuga za jedan glas- umetnika koji nije mogao da precuti.

U slucaju Milete Prodanovica sklop okolnosti bio jepresudan. Ranija sklonost umetnika ka skupljanju (makarto bili i knjigovezacki papiri), sistematizovanju lepihkomada i konacna odluka da nesto “preduzme” dali sukao rezultat ovu seriju kolaza. Dekorativni knjigovezackipapiri koji dugo sluze za koricenje knjiga, u delu MileteProdanovica umesto svoje prvobitne vrednosti dobijajunovu umetnicku namenu.

Napustajuci podrucje stvarnosti stupamo napolje umetnosti - prostor otelotvorenja “spiritualnog umaterijalnom”(3). Slika univerzuma koju za nas odvijaProdanovic povezuje vremenski udaljene licnosti, spajadva odvojena sveta: ideju onoga sto je naprosto vecno -metafizicku kategoriju lepog sa njenom realizacijom -tehnikom umetnosti (4). “Pretvaranje osecanja lepog uosecaj zajednistva sa bozanskim”(5), kao pouka izproslosti do nas dolazi u izmenjenom obliku.Konstruisanje umitnickog dela u savremeno doba nijeprosta sinteza meterije, idealnog i svetog, danas seumetnik postavlja iznad (realnog, lepog i dobrog) - da bis najvecom slobodom preneo svoje subjektivno (kriticko)misljenje o stvarnosti.

Kolazi Milete Prodanovica zamisljeni suprvenstveno kao dekorativna slika koja nastaje uz

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minimalnu intervenciju samog umetnika. Kombinovanjemelemenata preuzetih iz proslosti stvorena je jedna pseudo- prica ciji sadrzaj “citamo” u prelivima pastelnih i zarkihboja dekorativnog knjigovezackog papira.

Prodanovic svoje kolaze definise pre svega kao ne- narativne oslanjajuci se na “slikarstvo uzorka” i pokretpattern paintinga (6). Koriscenjem motiva koji seponavljaju, umetnik prolazi kroz “predvorje niza odaja”- do centra - gde su sabrani svi korisceni elementi odnastanka ideje do njenog konacnog otelotvorenja.

Prvi radovi odisu jednostavnoscu. Isti papir bivaupotrebljen za podlogu kao i za krugove -”slika” - kojanastaje je svedena, ograniceno kretanje jos vise usporavatitranje razlivenih boja, koje nezavisno od autora,formiraju sopstveni dekorativni svet. Naravno, dobijenapredstava nije rezultat slucaja, vec vestina umetnika imaste koja rasklapa “gotov proizvod” i pretvara ga unovu papirnu fantaziju.

U celokupnom stvaralastvu Milete Prodanovicapostoji izvestan red, krecuci od odredjenog ijednosmernog uspinje se ka udaljenom i skrivenom.

Logos -kao osnovna ideja zauzima centralno mesto.Koncentricni krugovi koji se krecu u suprotnim pravcimau nekoliko slucajeva bice umnozeni. Pored tri rotirajucakruga u centru, dodata su jos po dva veca spolja _ ne bili mozda pojacali njihovu moc. Ili ako ih posmatramodrugacije, dobicemo dva “Logosa” upisana jedan u drugi,tako sto ona tri manja diskosa ujedno formiraju centralnu,pocetnu rotirajucu loptu drugog kruga.

Istom tipu najjednostavnijih kolaza pripadaju i“predstave munja” - tri vertikalne izlomljene linije kojese suzavaju pri dnu i srecu na nekom mestu koje se nalazivan okvira slike. Krecuci se brzinom “munje” - bozja recnas pogadja snagom “groma” - da bi vec sledeceg trenutkanastavila da lebdi negde iznad nas - nepromenljiva. Prvimedju radovima ovoga tipa ponavljaju uproscena resenjasa diskosima - podloga i predstava na njoj jesu jedno,celina na kojoj su vidljiva samo mala prilagodjavanja

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isecenog stampanog ornamenta, ne bi li kolaz dobio nautisku i jacini.

Pocetna strogost kompozicija bice uskoro razbijena.Raznobojni papiri su strpljivo isecani i lepljeni za osnovu- stvarajuci privid jednog do vrha ispunjenog herbarijuma.Nostalgicno ponavljanje motiva Prodanovica dovodi doniza novih zanimljivih resenja - krugova koji se poklapajui dupliraju, linija koje se mnoze i lome da bi na kraju uovaj geometrijski svet uplovile i figure andjela.

Andjeli ostaju omiljena tema Milete Prodanovica -finale kolazirane price u kojoj je ponisteno vreme isazete teme prethodnih vekova. Svako vreme pamti svojeandjele, nama su izgleda “zapali” ovi napravljeni odpapira.

Andjeli nisu prirodna bica, ne poznaju ogranicenja- za Prodanovica oni su manifestacija i odraz vidjenjaumetnika, pokusaj da se predje iz konacnog u beskonacno:

“Andjeo - onaj koji vidi razlicite poretke -ili”prostor” u kome su stvari koje zajednicki vidimomesta i odjeci, jer obicno vidjenje ciji je jezik istovremenoi izraz i vodic - jeste jednako iskljucivanje, vise ishodIZOSTAVLJANJA nego DOBIJANJA”.

Pol Valeri

Sa tako velikim, univerzalnim smislom umetnik seuspesno “nosi” - krecuci se po poznatom terenu, izabiranajlepse i najdraze primere iz srednjevekovnogvizantijskog slikarstva - kombinuju ih slobodno, beznapora igrajuci se i mastajuci lako ulazi u svet ovihuzvisenih bica.

Na kolazima svoje mesto ce naci andjeli izKurbinova, Decana, Lesnova i nesto dalje Sicilije. IdejaLogosa - znakova koji utvrdjuju crkvu, preuzeta izMileseve kao polazna tacka u nastavku kolaza - brizljivoje “dopisivana”, upotpunjavana andjelima iz Blagovesti(Kurbinovo), temom Stvaranja sveta (Monreale) iliandjelima koji razvijaju nebeski svod (Decani). Elegantnapredstava andjela koji nam “donosi” bozju poruku -

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Logos, preneta je iz Lesnova.U osnovi, Mileta Prodanovic stvaranju pristupa

temeljno, njegova dela - makar se ticala bestelesnog inematerijalnog daju nam, kao iskazi svedoka, jasnu slikustvarnosti. Prihvatajuci tvrdnju autora da je u ovomslucaju njihova namena samo dekorativna, uneocekivanoj i iznenadjujucoj lepoti - nasuprot osnovnojideji Prodanovicevog stvaralastva koje je u celinisimbolicko i “viseznacno” - dolazimo do formule nakojoj protivurecnost pociva: sinteza estetskog, etickog ireligioznog. Vratimo se u onaj “prethodni” svet andjela:

“Srednjevekovni covek je stvarno ziveo u svetugusto naseljenom znacenjima, uputstvima, duhovnoscu,obnavljanjem Boga u stvarima, u prirodi koja jeneprestano govorila heraldickim jezikom, u kojem lavnije bio samo lav, a orah samo orah, u kojem je krilatikonj bio stvaran kao i lav, jer je, kao i ovaj, bio znak,egzistencijalno zanemarljiv, jedne vise istine”.

Umberto EkoMnoga su preklapanja ovog nestvarnog sveta

i onoga sto nam pruza na uvid o njemu Mileta Prodanovic.I njegovi andjeli, nevidljivi heruvima i nedokucivi diskosikoji pokrecu svet pocivaju na kontraverznom jedinstvusrednjevekovne crkve, nauke i umetnosti - cije poreklotrazimo kako na Istoku, u Carigradu, tako i na Zapadu, uItaliji. Predznanja koja nije mogao ni u ovom slucajueliminisati - prikrivena spoljnom dekorativnoscu - utisnulasu svoj trag “viseznacnosti”. Dakle, sklonost umetnikaka rekonstruisanju proslosti na kolazima - istorijskosmesta u okvire dekorativnog. Uprkos tome “prica”zadrzava kontinuitet, i davno ponudjena slika stvarnostiprethodnom vremenu daje vrednost buduceg.

U neizrecivom prostoru lebde andjeli od papira.

1. Seren Kjerkegor: Molitva2. “Umetnicko delo nije nista ako ne pokazuje neku beskonacnost neposredno”: Seling, Filozofija umetnosti

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 211

3. Mileta Prodanovic: Putopisi po slikama i etiketama4. “Tehnika je u tom slucaju i duhovna disciplina, a ne samo poznavanje manuelne vestine”: A.B.Oliva5. Umberto Eko: Umetnost i lepo u estetici srednjeg veka6. Pattern painting - neologizam koji je oko 1975. prvi put upotrebio slikar MarioYrrisarry, doslovno prevod znacio bi “slikarstvo uzorka”; pattern - obrazac, uzorak,sablon, mustra. Vezuje se za grupu umetnika (Ned Smith, Robert Zakanich, RobertKushner, Kim Mac Cornel, Joyce Kozloff) koji su pocinjali da rade sredinomsedamdesetih, posavsi od razrade nekih postavki koje je njihova generacija nasledilaod amaricke umetnosti sezdesetih.

L I T E R A T U R A

1. .Jesa Denegri: Mileta Prodanovic (pref. cat. izlozbe “Canticum cantikorum”),Galerija Doma omladine, Beograd 1983.2. Jesa Denegri: Mileta Prodanovic (pref.cat.),Galerija Sebastian, Dubrovnik 1988.3. Katalog izlozbe Milete Prodanovica “Logos”- kolazi, Srecna galerija, SKC,Beograd 1992.4. Lidija Merenik: Mileta Prodanovic (intervju povodom izlozbe “Prefiguracije”),Galerija centra za kulturu “Olga Petrov”, Pancevo 1993.5. Gordana Stanisic Ristovoc: (pref.cat. izlozbe “Price o Arhetipima”), Galerija 73,Beograd 1993.6. Jovan Cekic: Mileta Prodanovic (pref.cat.), Galerija Pribojske banke DD, Priboj1994..7. Casopis POLJA, br. 289, Novi Sad 1983.8. Likovne sveske br. 8, Univerzitet umetnosti u Beogradu, 1985.9. Pol Valeri, Sveske 2, Glas, Banja Luka 1989.10. Mileta Prodanovic, PUTOPISI PO SLIKAMA I ETIKETAMA, Matica srpska,Novi Sad 1992.11. Umberto Eko, UMETNOST I LEPO U ESTETICI SREDNJEG VEKA, Svetovi,Novi Sad 1992.12. Akile Bonito Oliva, PRIRUCNIK ZA LETENJE< Svetovi, Novi Sad 1994.

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998212

IMAMO ISKUSTVO MIRNOGPRIJENOSA VLASTI

Ivan Supek, Zagreb

___________________________________________________________________________Izlaganje za okruglim stolom POLITI^KI PLURALIZAMU HRVATSKOJ - Zagreb, 26 01 1998. Uzeto iz ~asopisaERASMUS__________________________________________________________________________

Jo{ u travnju 1990. kada smo za prve slobodneizbore stvorili Koaliciju narodnog sporazuma, rekao samda HDZ-ov politi~ki avanturizam vodi u katastrofu,imaju}i na umu ponajprije ~injenicu da se ta strankaoslonila na prousta{ku skupinu u inozemstvu. Podkatastrofom sam mislio na tri elementa : poricanjepovijesnoga, dr‘avnopravnoga i politi~koga identitetaBiH i njenu podjelu, uvodjenje nedemokratskih procesau doma}i politi~ki ‘ivot i izravan napad na prava {to suih radnici stekli u komunizmu, radni~kimsamoupravljanjem. Ko je poznavao te ljude i njihoveideje, znao je ve} onda da }e oni zamisliti pretvorbu kaopuku kradju narodne imovine, i to formalno legalnimputem, odlukama Sabora i Vlade. . .

Upozoravao sam da }e vi{estrana~je biti samo dekorza fakti~no jednostrana~je bolj{evi~kog tipa, {to se svemanje-vi{e obistinilo, na‘alost, iz razloga za koje smo isami dijelom odgovorni.

Nije to~no da u Hrvatskoj nemamo iskustva s mirnimtranzicijama. Osobno sam prije {ezdeset godina do‘iviomirnu tranzicijsku situaciju kada su se, nakon sporazumaCvetkovi} - Ma~ek, mnoge ovlasti sredi{nje vlastiKraljevine Jugoslavije prenosile na institucijenovostvorene Banovine Hrvatske kao upravnog sustavau kojem je o‘ivljavala hrvatska dr‘avna ideja po{to je

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 213

Ma~ek kao predsjednik Bloka narodnog sporazumapobijedio na izborima. Takodjer, i hrvatska komunisti~kapartija, odnosno reformirani komunisti predali su uprolje}e 1990. godine na miran, demokratski na~in vlastHDZ-u. Dakle, na{i bira~i ni po kojem kriteriju nisu ispodeuropskih ili ameri~kih, na{ narod spreman je i sposobanstvoriti po{tenu parlamentarnu demokraciju.

^elnici na{ih opozicionih stranaka danas su u na~eluistodobno saborski zastupnici ({to je, na kraju krajeva, iprili~no unosno zanimanje). Tako se kod njih rodilailuzija da je Hrvatska vi{e-manje poluparlamentarna iligotovo demokratska dr‘ava koja se onda lako mo‘eprevesti u istinsku demokraciju nekakvim suradnjama ilis blagim pretvorbama. Mislim da je to nemogu}e.

Haris Silajd‘i} jednom je mudro rekao kako u BiHne}e biti demokracije sve dok je ne bude u Hrvatskoj. Tase misao mo‘e pro{iriti dopunom da na cijelom Balkanune}e biti mira sve dok su na vlasti sada{nje nacionalisti~kestranke. To bi trebalo da shvate i oni koji danas uredjujuodnose i ~uvaju mir na Balkanu ; posao im je uzaludan nedodju li na vlast ljudi koji zaista misle u duhu zapadnedemokracije.

Bitno je da se sva opozicija i svi demokrati uHrvatskoj slo‘e na osnovnim demokratskim na~elima,prije svega u tome da parlament mora biti glavni autoritet.Takodjer, mora se provesti revizija op}e plja~ke koja sezove pretvorba, provesti potpuna depolitizacija vojske ipolicije, te uspostaviti puna samostalnost i autonomijasvih kulturno-znanstvenih institucija, dakle i Akademijei Sveu~ili{ta, kao i naravno, medija. [to se ti~egospodarstva, danas u svijetu vi{e ne dominirapro{lostoljetni ideal njegove potpune liberalizacije negotrend socijalno-tr‘i{noga gospodarstva. U njegovukorijenu nije nikakva naglo probudjena sentimentalnostili samilost prema bijednima nego posve hladna spoznajada }e se proizvodnja mnogo ja~e razvijati ako su oni kojirade motivirani i ako su sa~uvali svoje ljudsko i dru{tvenodostojanstvo. Takva je ideja budu}nost i za na{u zemlju.

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998214

BALKANOLOGIE

Nouvelle revue sur les Balkans, édité par HOMO BALKANICUS,deux numéros déjà parus : N° 1 (juillet 1997) et N° 2 (décembre1997)Directeur Patrick Michels, e-mail : michels@u-paris10.frSecrétaire Yves Tomic, e-mail : Yves.Tomic@u-paris10.frAdresse : Balkanologie c/o Patrick Michels, 18 rue de la Guesle,78125 Poigny-la-Forêt, FranceAbonnement annuel (2 numéros) : 120FF, institutions 200FF.

Ivo Andritch

SIGNESAU BORDDU CHEMIN

Traduit du serbe parHarita Wybrands

EDITIONS L’AGE D’HOMME

sveske^asopis za knji‘ev-nost, umetnost i kulturuIzd: Zajednica knji‘evnikaPan~eva, tel. (013) 43 177Trg kralja Petra 10, Pan~evoGod. pretplata za 6 brojeva180 din. Za inostr. 90 dm

KNJI@EVNE NOVINE

List za knji‘evnost i dru{tvena pitanjaOsniva~ i izdava~: Udru‘enje knji‘evnikaSrbije, Francuska 7, Beograd,Po{tanski fah UKS br 617. Faks 626 278God. pretplata (za 24 broja) 80 din,

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 215

INTERVJU

Odakle poti~u Slaveni ?

Magdalena MaczynskaLodz, Poljska

Stru~njak za istoriju Evrope prvih vekova na{e ere, profesoruniverziteta u Lodz-u, Magdalena Maczynska predaje i nauniverzitetima u Zürichu, Be~u i Kielu. Ovaj intervju, koga vodiPawel Wronski, objavljen je u GAZETA WYBORCZA, Var{ava

Pawel Wronski : Prema jednoj legendi iz 14 veka,nekada davno ‘ivela su tri brata. Jednog dana, oni su serastali da bi svaki osvojio jednu zemlju. ^eh je krenuo kajugu, Rus ka istoku, a Leh, Poljak, ostao je na mestu. Gdesu se oni stvarno rastali ?

Magdalena Maczynska : Ako ova legenda stvarnogovori o po~etku {irenja Slavena, lak{e je govoriti odatumu nego o mestu gde se to stvarno zbilo. Oni sukrenuli u osvajanje Evrope izmedju 5° i 6° veka na{e ere,sa prostora du‘ Dnjepra, blizu Kijeva.

Po jednoj teoriji koja nije opovrgnuta u zadnjih 50godina, kolevka porekla Slavena se nalazi na teritorijidana{nje Poljske.

Do nedavno, bilo je poku{aja da se prvi Slaveniidentifikuju sa «Lu`i~kom kulturom» (1), kulturom kojojpripada naselje Biskupin (2). Ali, ni{ta ne dokazuje da sestvarno radi o Slavenima. Kada poku{amo da pove`emotu kulturu sa bilo kojom etni~kom grupom, poljske zemljesu pre dolaska Slavena bile nastanjene Venetima, jednimstarim indoevropskim narodom, kao i Keltima iGermanima, kojih je bilo svuda u Evropi. Povremeno su

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998216

sa istoka nailazili nomadi. U vreme velikih migracija(koje se u Zapadnoj Evropi zovu invazije), jug Poljske jebio pod uticajem Atiline kraljevine Huna. U na{oj zemljise nalazi pepeo mnogobrojnih naroda a ne samo pepeo«na{ih predaka». To istra`ivati nema nikakvog smisla,ina~e bi mogli da se pitamo i koje nacionalnosti je biopitekantrop ~iji su ostaci kod nas nadjeni.

Pre 10 godina, na Jagelonskom univerzitetu uKrakovu, jedan profesor je izjavio da Biskupin nije bioslavenski. To je bilo iznenadjenje.

Ve}ina istra‘iva~a danas se sla‘e sa time. Ideja oproto-slavenskom karakteru Biskupina poti~e iz 30-tihgodina, kada je prof Jozef Kostrzewski ~inio protivte‘unema~kom arheologu Gustavu Kossinna, prvomeistra‘iva~u koji je iskopine vezivao za nacionalnost.Prema Kossinni, poljske zemlje su bile nema~ka ba{tina,nastanjene Germanima. U vreme Nacista, to jeopravdavalo Drang nach Osten. To je kao kada bi Poljskaisticala pretenzije na Berlin, pod izgovorom da je onnekada bio slavenski posed. Kostrzewski je bio u~enikKossinne, svoju doktorsku tezu pisao je na nema~kom.Obojica su se slu‘ila istom metodologijom ali su stigli dopotpuno suprotnih rezultata. Otkri}e Biskupina godine1933, grada lu‘i~ke kulture, i koji je star 2 500 godina,bilo je dobrodo{lo Kostrzewskom da objavi svoju teorijuo neo - autohtonizmu Slavena. Taj lepo organizovanigrad iz vremena anti~ke Gr~ke raspaljivao je ma{tu.[ezdesatih godina, kada se vlast spremala za slavljehilljadugodi{njice Poljske (3), istra‘ivanja u Biskupinusu postala prioritetna.

Mo‘e li se re}i da je Kostrzewski interpretiraoistorijske ~injenice prema politi~kim ciljevima ?

On je bio veliki arheolog i stvarno je u to verovao.Mada je vodio ra~una o drugim narodima na tlu Poljske,

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 217

na primer Gotima (4), smatrao ih je za prolazni element,dok je Slavene smatrao stalno prisutnim. On naravno nijekriv za zloupotrebe njegovih radova od strane politi~ara.Njegovi radovi su kao neka odbrana od radova Kossinne.A radovi Kossinne su pre svega, i sa njegovim pristankom,poslu‘ili ideologiji. Osim toga, nije bio u pravu.

Kada ?

Kossinna je ve}inu naroda Centralne Evrope smatraoGermanima. Bio je veoma harizmati~an i njegov uticaj uNema~koj je bio ogroman. On je «porodio» nema~kipanteon, probudio kod Nemaca ose}aj ponosa, i pokazaoim put ekspanzije. Pokazao je Hitleru «svastiku», ponjemu, tipi~ni germanski simbol. Zna se da je «svastika»veoma stari simbol svih indoevropskih naroda, prematome i Lu`i~ana i Slavena. Te teorije su bile popularne ikod drugih, poljski arheolog Wlodzimierz Antoniewicsih je prihvatio na primer u svojim radovima o gor{tacimau Tatrama (na Karpatima na granici poljsko-slova~koj).Ustanovio je da njihove fibule neobi~no li~e nagermanske. I izveo zaklju~ak da su na{i brdjani jednogermansko pleme izolovano u slavenskoj masi. Za vremenema~ke okupacije, ova grupa je od strane nacista bilanazvana Goralenvolk (Goral = brdjannin na nema~kom,volk = narod). Posle rata Antoniewicz je bio optu`en zakolaboraciju.

Teza Kostrzewskog je posle rata postala vrlopopularna, skoro «dr`avna», kako bi se opravdala pravaPoljske na aneksirane teritorije na zapadu.

Svi narodi imaju potrebu da budu usidreni u istoriji.Rimljani su i{li ~ak do Eneja, trojanskog ratnika. KraljOstrogota (isto~na grana Gota) Teodorik (5) ~iji semauzolej nalazi u Raveni (Italija), nije imao takvugenealogiju. Da bi ga zadovoljio, rimski istori~ar Kasiodormu je izfabrikovao jednu novu, po kojoj on poti~e direktno

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998218

od Goga i Magoga, iz Biblije. [to da ne ? Nedavno je«Karpatski Genije», Nikolae Caucesku, davao ozbiljne«nau~ne» dokaze da su Rumuni potomci Da~ana (6). Ustvari, posle velikih invazija, malo je {ta ostalo od Da~ana.Rumunski narod je konglomerat raznih etni~kih grupa.Ali, jezik, koji poti~e iz vremena Rimske imperije jepre`iveo, mada sadr`i oko 40% staro-slavenskog re~nika.Poljsko plemstvo je smatralo da poti~e od Sarmata (7) jersu oni upotrebljavali tang, neku vrstu porodi~nog grba.Plemi}i su bili ponosni da mogu da izjave da su im sepretci borili protiv Rimskih legija. Medjutim, Slaveninemaju nikakve veze sa Sarmatima.

Sve teorije prihvataju da su se narodi radjalitokom invazija ili migracija, da su odnekud stizali. Jedinoje Kostrzewski tvrdio da smo «mi tu ve} bili» . Da li jezato bio popularan ?

Pretpostavljam da je njegova teza odgovaralao~ekivanjima onda{njeg dru{tva. Poljaci su imali ose}ajnestabilnosti. Tokom 123 godine (1795-1918), poljskadr‘ava nije postojala, zemlja je bila podeljena izmedjuAustrije, Rusije i Pruske, a zatim je do{la nema~kaokupacija. Poljska dr‘ava se bez prestanka pomerala namapama. Ljudi su imali potrebu da se skrase i arheologijaim je pru‘ala ose}aj sigurnosti. Mo‘e se re}i da smozahvaljuju}i Kostrzewskom na{li svoje mesto. Svi sumogli da ka‘u : mi smo odavde, ova zemlja nam pripada.

Sve teorije invazije sugeriraju aristokratski karakterdr‘ave. Potrebni su pobednici i pobedjeni. Medjutim uBiskupinu su sve ku}e bile identi~ne, {to je navodilo nazaklju~ak da je vladala jednakost. U komunisti~kojPoljskoj to je odgovaralo marksisti~koj ideologiji.

Pronadjeni su takodje grobovi Lu‘i~ke kulture, kojiukazuju na zna~ajnu dru{tvenu slojevitost, no mi neznamo za{to su sve ku}e u Biskupinu identi~ne. Naravno,

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 219

nau~nici su svoje radove za~injavali magi~nim formulamasa marksisti~kim sosom, ali ne verujem da su izvodilisamo zaklju~ke koji bi odgovarali ideologiji.

A odakle poti~u prvi Slaveni ?

Profesor Godlowski, koji nije jedini sumnjao u teorijeKostrzewskog, smatrao je da bi njihovi po~etci mogli bitivezani za kulturu ^ernjakova (dolina ju‘nog Buga igornji tok Dnjestra). Prvi tragovi te kulture nadjeni su u19° veku, a otada je pronadjeno otprilike 2 700 naselja.Arheolozi izjedna~uju tu kulturu sa velikim carstvomOstrogota iz 4° veka (prestonica na mestu dana{njegKijeva), ~iji je kralj bio Hermanaric. To nije bilo samocarstvo Gota. U federaciji je bilo i negermanskih plemena,kao na primer Sarmati. Prema nekima, prostiralo seizmedju Balti~kog i Crnog mora, na prostoru dana{njeUkrajine i Belorusije. Prof. [~ukin iz St Petersburga je tonazvao nekom vrstom onda{njeg Sovjetskog Saveza.Kada se 375. godine pro~ulo za dolazak Huna na isto~negranice, zavladala je panika. Znaju}i da ne mo‘e dazadr‘i agresore, kralj se ubio. Njegova plemena su u‘urbi krenula ka zapadu, ka granicama Rimske imperije.Tako su po~ele velike migracije naroda. Iskopavanja u^ernjakovu pokazuju da je ta oblast do‘ivela raseljavanje,smanjenje stanovni{tva. Kasnije, vrlo postepeno, javljujuse tragovi sasvim novih plemena. Najverovatnije Slavena.Tragovi prvih kultura koje smatramo slavenskim,pronadjene su i prou~ene u selima Penkovka i Kor~ak, ai blizu Kijeva (Kolo~in).

Kako razlikovati slavenska od neslavenskih naselja?

Zasada garancija nema. Ali po svemu izgleda da suto bili oni. Germani su svoje kolibe gradili sapravougaonom osnovom. Ovde se radi o do pola ukopanimkolibama sa kvadratnom osnovom, kao {to se kasnije

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998220

nalaze kod Slavena. Ono {to zovemo «materijalnomkulturom», kod ovog naroda je veoma siroma{no. Oninisu poznavali grn~arski to~ak i njihova grn~arija jeprimitivna i ru`na, tragovi metalnih predmeta su retki. U6° i 7° veku, Slaveni po~inju da se {ire na opustelekrajeve Centralne i Ju`ne Evrope, na mesta napu{tena odGermana. Gotski istori~ar Jordanes ih je zvao Anti iSklavini. Pazite, ne treba brkati Slavus, Slave, sa latinskimsclavus, {to je zna~ilo rob. U nekoliko jezika ono «c» jenestalo. Otuda hitlerovska teza da su Slaveni narodrobova.

Ovakva geneza ne budi u meni neki naro~iti ponos.

To je razumljivo. Ruska nauka je dugo poku{avalada «iskoristi» kulturu ^ernjakova, jer ovako kasni ineslavni po~etci Slavena, nisu odgovarali vlastima. Rusisu tek nedavno prihvatili ovu skromnu istinu. Se}am sekako je pr. Boris Ribakov, na mnogobrojnim nau~nimskupovima, prikazivao jednu bogato ukra{enu gotskuposudu. I tvrdio da ornamenti na njoj predstavljajuslavenski kalendar, da posuda dokazuje kulturni razvojSlavena. Tu svoju teoriju je on branio sa toliko `ara, danije bilo mogu}e uveriti ga da se vara. Ta posuda senalazila u ruskim ud`benicima arheologije do 1993.godine, istina sa znakom pitanja. . . {to se ti~e njenogporekla. Ali, ako ba{ govorimo o plemenskom ponosu,za{to ne ista}i da su Slaveni na{li svoje mesto u Evropi.Da su iskoristili svoju {ansu i osvojili pola kontinenta. Upro{losti su se mnogi narodi pojavljivali kao komete iubrzo nestajali kao recimo Avari (Proto-Mongoli), Hunii Hazari (Turko-Mongoli).

Kada se govori o Slavenima, to je uvek uz «mo`da»,verovatno», «izgleda». . . Za{to arheolozi znaju mnogovi{e o Germanima ?

Zahvaljuju}i tada{njim istori~arima. Germani su

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stigli do Rimske imperije na zapadu gde su stvorili svojedr‘ave (vizigotske). Tamo su ostavili mno{tvo tragova, uzemlji. Da bi upoznali neki narod, arheolozi prou~avajunjegove pogrebne obi~aje. Iz svoga ranog perioda, Slaveniuop{te nemaju nekropola. Mo‘da su oni pepeo svojihmrtvih bacali u vetar, ili ga stavljali u posude od nepe~enezemlje. Na taj na~in su oni doslovno uni{tili ve}inutragova o sebi. Za arheologe su oni jedan vrlo misteriozannarod.

Rekli ste da su Slaveni zauzeli prostor Germana. Aodakle poti~u Germani ?

Prema Tacitu, oni se pojavljuju iz «Thulé», vaginanationes, Skandinavije, koja je u ono vreme smatrana zaostrvo. Preko ostrva Bornholm, Burgondi su pre{liBalti~ko More i krenuli ka jugozapadu i zaustavili se naRajni. Tu su stvorili Ep o Nibelunzima. Dolaze}i iz[vedske, drugi Germani su se zadr`ali na Visli a zatim,kroz mo~vare stigli do stepa Ukrajine. Obzirom da nisubili nomadi, njihov put je trajao 150 godina. Oni su usputsejali, deca su se radjala, stari umirali. Napredovali su umiru, u kontaktu sa lokalnim narodima. Svoj identitet susa~uvali. Trgovali su sa Rimljanima koji su dr`ali oblastiprodukcije }ilibara, vrlo cenjenog u Imperiji. Verovatnosu prodavali i plave kike svojih `ena, koje su, premaPliniju, rimske lepotice rado nosile. Nedavno, prilikomizgradnje gazovoda Yamal (izmedju Sibira i ZapadneEvrope), pronadjeno je vi{e gotskih naselja. Ali,iskopavanja samo potvrdjuju ono {to mi ve} znamo.

Za{to su oni napustili Skandinaviju ?

Da bi ‘iveli u toplijim krajevima, kao {to mi zimiidema na Kanarska ostrva. Njih mesto nije dr‘alo. Osvojilisu Rim, osnovali kraljevinu u Africi. Francuskiambasador na Porti, Ogier-Ghislain de Busbecq, ostavionam je jedan interesantan zapis iz 16° veka. Prilikom

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jedne posete Krimu, sreo je ~oveka koji se se}ao gotskogjezika i koji mu je ~ak i otpevao jednu uspavanku.

Jesu li se odr‘ali na Krimu ?

Zadnji su raseljeni za vreme Katarine Velike.Ostrogota vi{e nema a Slaveni jo{ uvek postoje.

Uo~i osvajanja uni{tenog kontinenta, krajem 5°veka, {ta su oni znali o Evropi ?

To nije bio kraj Evrope, kao {to neki ka‘u. Mada jeona bila osvojena od Atile, Rimska imperija (Zapadna) jepala tek 476 (8). Medjutim, narod to nije prime}ivao.Rimljani su i dalje ‘iveli na periferiji, putevi su i daljepostojali, mada u lo{em stanju. Ogromno bogatstvo jenapustilo granice Imperije. Kao otkup, Atila je nekiputuzimao i dve tone zlata. Ali, njega bogatstvo nijeprivla~ilo. U svojoj hronici iz godine 449. Grk Priokos,koji se na{ao za stolom sa Atilom, pi{e da je Atila, i poredsverasko{i koja ga je okru‘ivala, pio iz drvenog pehara.Zlato je i{lo Germanima, njegovim saveznicima (mada suse oni borili i u suprotnom taboru).

Kako su se oni sporazumevali ?

Mada nisu imali mobilne telefone, verujem da supuno znali. Karakteristi~no je jedno pismo Sv. Jeroma izgodine 406. Iz Betlehema, on pi{e jednoj udovici u Galiju,o njenoj eventualnoj preudaji. Germani osvajaju zemlju,granice Imperije su u plamenu, a on pi{e jednoj udoviciudaljenoj hiljade kilometara. Mo‘e se re}i da u 5° i 6°veku rimska po{ta vi{e ne funkcioni{e, ali kontakata jebilo. Teodorik je iz Ravene odr‘avao diplomatske vezesa vodjom plemena Harias u oblasti Mazurije (danasSeveroisto~na Poljska, biv{a Isto~na Pruska).

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Jesu li to bili Slaveni ?

Ne, Balti.

Zna~i da su Balti ve} bili tu ?

Da, oni su bili u Evropi, dosta pre Slavena. Ina~e,Slaveni su bili u kontaktu sa civilizacijama na jugu. U~ilisu brzo. Snaga i brzina njihovog {irenja svedo~e o njihovojvitalnosti. Vizantijski istori~ar Prokop pi{e da jegermansko pleme Heruli, godine 512. krenuv{i na istok,na{lo teritorije posednute Slavenima. To se moglo desitii u Ukrajini. Prvi tragovi Slavena u Poljskoj datiraju iz 6°veka, na Visli.

Kada se oni prvi put pominju ?

Prve kontakte sa Slavenima uspostavili su istori~ariiz Konstantinopolja kada su se Slaveni po~eli primicatigradu u njihovim u drvetu izdubljenim ~amcima. Vi{epomena nalazimo kod Teofilakta Simokata i uStrategikonu Pseudo-Mavrikija u 7° veku. Opisane suuglavnom bitke a vrlo malo njihovi obi~aji.

Kakvo su mi{ljenje o njima imali ?

Grozno ! Ono ne odgovara ideji koju mi danas oSlavenima imamo kao idili~nim, mirnim narodima.Smatraju ih divljim, nepredvidivim, krvo‘ednim. Osvojilisu deo vizantijskog carstva, prekinuli veze sa Rimom,stigli do Krita. Izvori pominju da su u cilju mu~enjaderali ‘ive zarobljenike. Slaveni su vi{e puta napaliKonstantinopolj, sami ili sa Avarima. Ta me{ana, avarsko-slavenska vojska, izazivala je tada strah kao Atilinehorde.

Da li je njihovo pona{anje bilo druga~ije od onoga

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koji je u to vreme vladalo u Evropi ?

Verovatno da ne, takav je bio sudar civilizacijaZapada i divljeg Istoka. Vidite, od doba velikih migracija,taj kli{e invazije sa Istoka jo{ uvek va‘i. Ona je opasnostza bogati Zapad koji se boji sudara kultura. Na primer,prilikom raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, ponovo se pojaviotaj strah. Neki su tada predvidjali talas od 25 do 30miliona gladnih i o~ajnih ljudi. Ba{ u to vreme, jedna{vajcarska izdava~ka ku}a mi je tra‘ila da napi{em knjiguo velikim migracijama. To je bio i po~etak rata uJugoslaviji. Iskreno re~eno, gledaju}i slike iz Hrvatske ikasnije iz Bosne, videla sam sli~nosti sa opisimavizantijskih istori~ara. . .

Nema~ki istori~ari i arheolozi su pre rata isticalislavensku sklonost anarhiji. Tvrdili su da su Slaveninesposobni da naprave dr‘avu (ova teza se nalazilapolovinom {ezdesetih godina i u velikom Larusu). Prvuslavensku dr‘avu u Moraviji napravio je Samo (umro oko658.), trgovac ~ije poreklo ne poznajemo. Bugari su biliorganizovani od strane turskih plemena i kana Asparuha.Prema ruskom predanju, Rusija je kreacija Vikinga.

Ima dosta primera koji osporavaju ovu teoriju. Tu jeMojmirova Velika Moravija, dr‘ave Vislana (Ju‘naPoljska), Obodrita (izmedju Elbe i Baltika), Veleta(izmedju Elbe i Odre, na nema~kom Wiltzen), Srba iHrvata : suvi{e primera da bi nema~ka teorija o anarhijibila istinita. [to ni{ta ne menja u slu~aju vikin{kog poreklaruskog vojvodstva. Ta teza je bila sasvim prihva}ena odruske istoriografije 19° veka. Do promene je do{lo posleDrugog svetskog rata. Posle svih stradanja, razumljiv jepoku{aj da se izbri{u i najmanji germanski tragovi uruskoj istoriji. Ali, mo‘e li se na osnovu toga tvrditi da suSlaveni inferiorni u odnosu na Germane ?

Vratimo se ideologiji. Jasno je da je politika prava

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opasnost za arheologiju. [ta se mo‘e nau~iti iskopavanjemgrobnica, remete}i mir mrtvih ?

Arheologija postoji jer je ~ovek ‘ivotinja kojaposeduje radoznalost. Ako arheologiju posmatramo kaoizu~avanje promena, ona nas u~i toleranciji. Kadarazmi{ljamo o hiljadama prohujalih godina, shvatamo dokoje mere su razlike izmedju naroda bezna~ajne, i u kojojmeri su sme{ni slogani o pravima jednih na teritorijedrugih. ^itavi narodi po~ivaju pod zemljom i mi pojmanemamo kojim su jezicima govorili. Re~ «nacija» jeizmi{ljena tek pre 150 godina. To je veoma kratko uodnosu na ljudsku istoriju. Plemena o kojima smo migovorili, branila su svoju teritoriju a njihov ose}ajpripadnosti bio je vezan za kulturu.

Vi govorite o pro{losti, dok se politi~ari stalnotrude da doka‘u pravo na oblasti koje pripadaju njihovojnaciji, kao {to je to ~inio Pr Kossinna.

Ja mislim da se tim jezikom ne mo‘e i}i dalje.

Setimo se Jerusalimskog tunela (9). Tom prilikomse govorilo o «nacionalnim korenima».

To su uglavnom svadje politi~ara. Tom prilikomnisu izneti nau~ni argumenti, ve} oni koji bi odgovaraliodredjenim planovima. Verovatno sam ja suvi{e optimistai ovaj svet gledam o~ima arheologa, a ne politi~ara.

Postoji li u dana{njim dru{tvima ose}aj veze saplemenskim kulturama od pre hiljadu godina ?

Ponekiput mislim da postoji. Naro~ito kod narodakoji su u pro{losti ‘iveli pod stalnim pretnjama. Na primerkod Poljaka, Iraca, koji su Kelti, Madjara, koji sunaslednici Huna. Oni vi{e isti~u kontinuitet nacionalne

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tradicije i podvla~e razlike u odnosu na susede.To jesasvim prirodni oblik odbrane. A drugde u Evropi ? Ljudise ustvari ne odri~u svesno svojih korena. Uspomena nastaru istoriju poprima nekiput ~udne oblike. Keltskakultura je ponovo u modi zahvaljujuci irskoj, engleskoji new age muzici. Asteriks potse}a Francuze na ‘ivot uGaliji. Danas se budi interes za Gote. I pored stalnihsvetskih poreme}aja, ljudska ose}anja se ne menjaju.Se}am se da sam u jednoj grobnici otkrila pored ~ovekai psa. Pas je imao povredjenu {apu i ~ovek ga je o~igledno~uvao i negovao i ~ak tra‘io da pas bude sahranjen sanjim. Grobnica je imala vi{e hiljada godina. Jednomdrugom prilikom, otkrili smo grobnicu jednog para.Njihova tela su bila posuta osu{enim prahom. To su bilelatice cve}a. I, ono {to je ~udno, to je da savremenicipo{tuju sveta mesta pro{losti.

Tako, na primer, za vreme iskopavanja na jednomgotskom groblju, prona{li smo fragment posude na vrhujednog kurgana (tumulus u Isto~noj Evropi). ^emu je onmogao da slu‘i ? Mo‘da nekoj ceremoniji ? U vezi sakultom predaka ? Nekoliko dana kasnije, primetili smoda je neko iz toga kraja obesio jedan mali krsti}. Za{to ?Nemam pojma.

1 - Lu‘i~ka kultura, nazvana po Lu‘icama, oblastijugozapadno od Berlina, gde su se naselili , relativnokasno, Zapadni Slaveni - Sorabi.2 - Biskupin, naselje datirano izmedju 1 400 i 700 godinapre nove ere, u Poljskoj, zapadno od Visle.3 - Mieszko I je 960. godine prvi put ujedinio Poljake.4 - Goti su stari Germani poreklom iz Skandinavije.5 - Teodorik Veliki (454 - 526), kralj Ostrogota, vladaovelikom imperijom iz svoje sjajne prestonice Ravene.6 - naroda koga je pokorio Trajan 101 - 107 godine na{eere.7 - Nomadi koji su po~etkom nove ere stigli na Dunav iz

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Azije.8 - Kada je varvarski kralj Odoakar uklonio zadnjegrimskog imperatora.9 - Probijanje od strane Izraela jednog tunela u bliziniJerusalimske d‘amije, septembra 1996, izazvalo jeburne proteste Palestinaca i 75 ‘rtava.

Sa francuskog preveo Dj. Konjikovi}Napomena prevodioca : Po nekim izvorima, ime (ovenajbrojnije grupe indo-evropskih naroda u Evropi - oko270 miliona) Slaveni ili Sloveni poti~e od re~i «slovo»(la parole, the word, das Wort), ili od re~i «slava» (lagloire, the glory, der Ruhm). Sve o Slavenima, mo`e sena}i u biblioteci u Institut d’études slaves - 9, rue Michelet75006 Paris, tel. 01 43 26 50 89.

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Kriti~ke refleksije o povratkuregulisanja prava nacionalnih manjinau Isto~no/Zapadne Evropske poslove

Adam BurgessDarwin College, University of Kent at Canterbury

SummaryNational minority rights has once again become an issueof central concern to Europe. The focus for this concernis not Europe as a whole however, but principally thosewho 'rejoined’ in 1989 with the collapse of communism.Historical experience suggests that the enforcement ofnational minority rights in central and eastern Europecannot be divorced from the self interested power poli-tics which have dominated the continent this century. Ina sense, the contemporary revival of the West Europeanscrutiny of East European treatment of national minori-ties is no different. Today however, more than direct selfinterest, it is the elevation of a moral agenda whichsuggests that 'the West’ can judge the conduct of 'theEast’ regarding the treatment of their minority citizensthat is the particular appeal of this agenda. In a post ColdWar world where the West lacks international focus,elevating the alleged backwardness of the 'post-commu-nist’ 'East’ has proven irresistable.’_____________________________________________RezimePrava nacionalnih manjina su ponovo postala pitanje odcentralnog zna~aja za Evropu. Fokus ovog interesovanja,me|utim, nije Evropa kao celina, nego prvenstveno onikoji su joj se "ponovo pridru‘ili" 1989 nakon kolapsakomunizma. Istorijsko iskustvo sugeri{e da sprovo|enje

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prava nacionalnih manjina u Centralnoj i Isto~noj Evropine mo‘e da bude odvojeno od samo-zainteresovanepolitike sile koja je dominirala kontinentom u ovomveku. U izvesnom smislu, savremeno o‘ivljavanjeZapadno Evropskog kontrolisanja Isto~no Evropskogtretiranja nacionalnih manjina nije razli~ito. Danasme|utim, vi{e nego neposredan samo-interes, dovo|enjemoralnog pitanja na dnevni red sugeri{e da "Zapad"mo‘e da procenjuje pona{anje "Istoka" u pogledutretiranja njihovih manjinskih gra|ana i to ~ini ovajdnevni red naro~ito privla~nim. U post hladnoratovskomsvetu, u kojem Zapadu nedostaje me|unarodnousredsre|enje, uzdizanje navodne zaostalosti post-komunisti~kog "Istoka" pokazalo se kao neodoljivo._____________________________________________

Novi fokus na prava nacionalnih manjina

Zaklju~ni be~ki dokument o humanitarnoj dimenzijiKonferencije o Bezbednosti i Saradnji u Evropi (KEBS,sada OEBS), iz 1989, ozna~io je obnovu pridavanjacentralnog zna~aja pitanjima prava nacionalnih manjinau Evropi. Novembra 1991, Pariska Povelja je potvrdilaodlu~nost KEBS da pobolj{a sudbinu manjina i po prviput u svojoj istoriji Konferencija je upotrebila izraz'manjina’ sam za sebe (izostavljaju}i uobi~ajenu dopunu"tamo gde one postoje"). Decembar 1991 je doneo izjavuEvropske Zajednice da pored pridr`avanja vladavineprava, demokratije i po{tovanja ljudskih prava uop{te,garantije za manjine predstavljaju tako|e preduslov zapriznavanje novih dr`ava. Evropski parlament je istotako usvojio dokumente o manjinama, posebnoRezoluciju o jezi~kim i kulturnim manjinama u EvropskojZajednici iz februara 1994. Kasnije iste godine, EvropskiSavet je doneo Okvirni sporazum za za{titu nacionalnihmanjina. On obavezuje potpisnike da preduzmu {irokemere da pozitivno unapre|uju interese manjina, a ne

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jednostavno da se uzdr`e od diskriminacije. Kaoposledica takvih mera, pitanje prava nacionalnih manjinaje postalo tema za sebe. Vi{e nije bilo podvedeno podrubriku brige za ljudska prava uop{te, kao {to je to bioslu~aj posle Drugog Svetskog Rata, nego je"emancipovano od ljudskih prava". (Christopulos1994:172) Gledaju}i na 1990-te istorijski, Koch je upravu kada sugeri{e da '...nije nerazumno opisati sada{njiperiod kao plimu unapre|enja i za{tite manjinskih prava".(Koch 1993:253) Toliko je ova briga postala nagla{enada se Catherine Lalumiere, tada Generalni sekretar SavetaEvrope, osetila sigurnom da izjavi da }e "o Evropi bitisu|eno na osnovu toga kako ona re{ava problememanjina". (Christopulos 1994:173) Pitanje manjina sevi{e ne bavi jednostavno aktualnim tretmanom i statusommanjine o kojoj je re~, nego je postalo mera moralnognapretka evropskih nacija i kontinenta kao celine.

Dr'ave su obavezane od strane Saveta Evrope izme|uostalih, da unapre|uju manjinsku kulturu kroz mere kao{to su obezbe|ivanje pristupa manjina medijima, kao iohrabrivanje upotrebe manjinskog jezika. Nasuprotvi|enju manjina kao potencijalno problemati~nih zadr`avni autoritet, ohrabrivanje manjina u ovom stilu sesagledava kao "oboga}enje" raznolikosti pluralisti~kedemokratije. Prakti~nije, me|unarodna za{tita manjinaje postala centralni sastojak "prevencije sukoba" -ekspanzivnog akademskog i politi~kog sektora unutarsavremene Isto~ne Evrope. Poku{aji asimilacijemanjinske kulture s druge strane, naj~e{}e su vi|eni kaonepo‘eljni - kao deo anahroni~no monolitske politi~kekulture koju Evropa ostavlja iza sebe. To je mera naosnovu koje Lalumiere izme|u ostalih `eli da se sudi oEvropi, a njen centralni sastojak je za{tita, ~akohrabrivanje manjina. Mo`da donekle ~udno, zrelost(ve}inske) demokratije }e od sada biti procenjivana naosnovu razmera ovakvih mera: "...tretiranje manjina jeprobni kamen demokratskog napretka". (Lievich1996:84)

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Me|utim, predmet brige nije celokupna Evropa, nitije u njoj tretiranje manjina ustoli~eno kao merademokratskih akreditiva. U evropskom kontekstu, ufokusu su najve}im delom nove demokratije Centralne iIsto~ne Evrope. Doista, nedavna rehabilitacija pravanacionalnih manjina uglavnom se razvila kao posledicabrige za sudbinu ne-dominantnih grupa u regionu koji sesmatra zrelim za uskrsnu}e nacionalisti~ke netolerancijenakon kolapsa komunizma. Tu se bez razlike nedominantne grupe smatraju "nacionalnim majinama"umesto da im se dodeli status "imigranata" kao Arapimau Francuskoj, ili Turcima u Nema~koj na primer. To sutako|e zemlje koje se nalaze izvan glavnih evropskihinstitucija. Insistiranje na po{tovanju prava manjina stogase mo`e iskoristiti kao va`na {argarepa i {tap pomo}ukojeg "prava Evropa" treba da usmerava dru{tva vi|enakao da su deformisana poluvekovnim komunizmom.Prilika da se postave takvi zahtevi se pojavila krozo~ajni~ki napor novih demokratija da pobegnu odmarginalizacije. Kao {to je to formulisao nedavno jedanistori~ar: "Po{to sve ovde dr`ave gledaju u smeru Zapada,ka ve}oj integraciji sa Evropskom unijom, to je sada, kaou 1920tim, Zapadu mogu}e da zahteva neke dokaze opravima manjina... kao deo cene za prihvatanje Isto~noEvropskih dr`ava u {iru evropsku zajednicu". (Cornwall:1966)

Bilo je malo komentara, a jo{ manje kritike povratkaprava nacionalnih manjina na centralnu pozornicu odnosaEvrope sa njenim "Istokom". Malo ih se ~ak pitalo za{tosu prava nacionalnih manjina uop{te bila uklonjena saistorijskog dnevnog reda, da bi njihov povratak biozahtevan 1990tih. Ovo je za~u|uju}e, imaju}i u vidutegobnu istoriju perioda u kojem je "re`im nacionalnihmanjina" poslednji put vladao Evropom - u me|uratnimgodinama. Zahtev da se Centralna i Isto~na Evropapovinuju spolja nametnutim standardima koji se ti~utretiranja vlastitih gra|ana, istorijski je povezan spolitikom velikih sila, kao i sa moralnim pot~injavanjem

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ovih dru{tava, koji nisu koristili ni njihovim manjinamaniti njihovim ve}inama. Jedini korisnici bile se glavnesvetske sile - isklju~ene iz ovakvog nadzora i sposobneda ubiru moralne dividende iz svojeg izdignutog statusaevropskih policajaca u ime potla~enih. Ima razloga da severuje da se iznova pravi ista arogantna gre{ka.Uspon, pad i povratak nadgledanja prava nacionalnihmanjinaIzvan-nacionalna intervencija "radi podr{ke" Isto~noevropskim manjinskim nacionalnostima ima zna~ajnuistoriju. Napoleon Bonaparta je utro put ovom pristupuusvajaju}i Poljake (protiv Rusije), a kasnije sponzori{u}iJu`no Slovensku "Ilirijsku" dr`avu protiv Habzburga.Rusi su sledili Napoleona podr`avaju}i Srbiju i (zajednosa Britanijom) Gr~ku. Samozainteresovano sponzorisanjepojedinih manjina i njihovih (tada naj~e{}e religioznih)prava, bilo je blisko povezano s "Isto~nim pitanjem" kojeje dominiralo devetnaestovekovnom Evropskomdiplomatijom. Dok je izvestan stepen saradnje velikihsila postignut pri kraju veka, ogoljeni dr`avni patronatnad nacionalnim manjinama se osvetni~ki vratio ume|uratnim godinama. Ovo je bilo najjasnije me|u onim"revizionisti~kim" silama koje su najvi{e bile pogo|enesporazumom postignutim nakon Prvog svetskog rata ikoje su namerno krenule u podrivanje Versajskog sistemaputem ohrabrivanja aspiracija o{te}enih manjina.Pobedni~ke sile su tako|e politizovale ovo pitanjeinstitucionalizuju}i sistem regulisanja manjinskih pravaza nove dr`ave Isto~ne Evrope. Njegova klju~naposledica bila je kodifikacija njihovog podre|enogpolo`aja i u krajnjoj liniji utilitarnog statusa u novomevropskom poretku organizovanom oko ograni~avanjabolj{evi~ke Rusije i nestabilne Nema~ke.

Poput jasnog dana{njeg odjeka, gde je "sastavnideo cene" koju treba platiti da bi se uop{te zaslu`ilouzimanje u razmatranje za prijem u evropske institucije,nove dr`ave Isto~ne Evrope ".. .su sve uveravane,nagovorene ili zapla{ene da potpi{u Ugovore o manjinama

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kao uslov njihove diplomatske legitimacije od straneSaveznika" (Pearson 1983:142). Stvoreno je Odelenje zamanjine unutar Lige naroda radi tretiranja svakog kr{enjaobaveza o kojima izveste ne-dominantne grupe. Samire`imi su se `estoko suprotstavljali ovakvom stanju stvari.Hannah Arendt je istakla u Poreklu totalitarizma da suoni "..gledali na Ugovore o manjinama kao na otvorenokr{enje obe}anja i na diskriminaciju po{to su njima bileobavezane samo nove dr`ave, a ~ak ne ni pora`enaNema~ka" (Arendt 1973:270-1). Nije se ovde radilo tolikoo prakti~nom uticaju preporuka komiteta - kona~no, samo14 slu~ajeva je ikada poslano na ispitivanje Savetu Ligeod strane Sekcije za manjine. Radilo se oinstitucionalizaciji nejednakosti izme|u Istoka i Zapadakoje je bilo u srcu Isto~no Evropskih prigovora novomsistemu regulisanja manjina.Ma koliko se pri~alo o pravima, pokreta~ka snaga iza ovenove forme regulisanja bila je mo}. Kao {to Pearsonobja{njava: "Velike sile sebe uspostavljaju kao ~uvareme|unarodne pravde ne na temelju dokazanekompetentnosti niti neopozive ispravnosti, nego krozsvoj politi~ki i vojni pritisak". (Pearson 1983:138) Doksu novi re‘imi Iso~ne Evrope ostali efektivno na probnomradu, klju~ni ~lanovi Lige, uklju~uju}i Nema~ku, bili suizuzeti od bilo kakvog nadzora. Ovaj dupli standard imajasnu ideolo{ku tendenciju. Kao {to je jedan stru~njakpisao o argumentima povodom ove diskriminacije, jednapropozicija je bila isticana s "posebnim ‘arom": To jebila "...ideja da iako bi pravda zahtevala identi~neobaveze za svakoga, u praksi su neke zemlje, koje u‘ivajuvi{i standard civilizacije, ‘ve} prerasle’ periodnetolerancije, pa stoga one nisu zaslu‘ile da budu podbilo kakvim ograni~enjima".(Sierpowski 1991: 28). Savetnije bio prijem~iv za sugestiju Poljske da Britanija,Francuska i Sjedinjene Dr‘ave potpi{u sli~ne obaveze sobzirom na Irce, Al‘irce, crne Amerikance i drugekolonijalne podanike.

^ak i na prakti~nom nivou, sistem je bio vi{e nego

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beskoristan. Takvo jasno naru{avanje suverenitetanavodilo je dr‘ave da reaguju s jedva prikrivenimizbegavanjem novih du‘nosti kako bi afirmisale svojautoritet podriven pot~injeno{}u Ligi. Same manjine subez razlike bile neprijateljske prema instituciji koju susmatrale potpuno neefikasnom. Mada je bio pristalicaprocesa nadgledanja, britanski istori~ar C.A. Macartney,u mo‘da najautoritativnijem pregledu me|uratnogiskustva, zaklju~io je da iskustvo nije bilo "vrloohrabruju}e" (Macartney 1934:490). Tamo gde je bilo"efikasno", ono je jedino obezbedilo legitimnost zamanevrisanje velikih sila: "...klju~ni slu~ajevi u kojimaje izvr{en pritisak na Ligu bili su oni u kojima bi neka silaprote‘irala odgovaraju}u manjinu ~ak i bez Lige". Delomkao rezultat takve neefikasnosti, ali jo{ va‘nije kaosredstvo argumentacije protiv pro{irivanja nadgledanjana glavne sile, ovaj autor dalje tvrdi da "...iskustvonesumnjivo opravdava misao da me{anje od strane jedneili vi{e dr‘ava u pitanja druge izaziva razdra‘ljivost ilo{e ose}aje i ne bi ga trebalo preduzimati bez velikograzloga". (Macartney: 491)

Sistem me|uratnog nadgledanja prava manjina jebio "efikasan" za kodifikovanje inferiornog i uslovnogstatusa novih demokratija. Ovaj smisao nejednakosti jeopstao bez obzira na aktivnosti komiteta Lige. Macartneyje smatrao da se radilo samo o "posebnom kvalitetu" (a neo "nejednakosti") Isto~ne Evrope, koji je opravdavaotakve mere. U korenu, ovaj "poseban kvalitet" bila jemoralna nedovoljnost koja je zahtevala njihvonadgledanje od strane nadre|enih. O~ekivano, Nema~kaje bila istovremeno zabavljena i zadovoljna na~inom nakoji su njihovi novi susedi, navodni prijatelji Saveznika,‘igosani kao ni‘a klasa time {to su bili obavezni dapola‘u ra~une Ligi za svoje pona{anje premastanovni{tvu. To je s pravom protuma~eno od Nema~kekao signal (zajedno sa mnogim drugim) da nije pitanje dali }e "nezavisna Isto~na Evropa" biti upravljana od stranedrugih, nego samo od strane koga. Nacisti~ka

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kolonizacija regiona od sredine 1930tih pro{la je velikimdelom bez protivljenja od strane njenih evropskih rivala,i tada je ve} izgledala kao gotovo prirodan ineproblemati~an razvoj. U skladu s time, mo‘daodlu~uju}i momenat ovog procesa je opravdan potrebamamanjine, kao {to se invazija ^ehoslova~ke tobo‘e ticalaza{tite sudetskog nema~kog stanovni{tva u toj zemlji.

Me|utim, upravo je povezivanje s Nacizmom dovelodo diskreditovanja me|unarodne primene prava manjina.Nema pomena manjinskih prava u Povelji UN iz 1945,niti u Univerzalnoj deklaraciji o ljudskim pravima. Kao{to je ugledan britanski akademik James Mayall primetio,"[ta vi{e, pojam prava manjine iza{ao je na lo{ glas po{tose Hitler pozivao na njega kao na opravdanje za svojuekspanziju u Centralnu i Isto~nu Evropu". (Mayall1994:9) Imaju}i pre svega na umu ratno iskustvo Nacizma,jedan diplomata je dao slavnu izjavu za vreme diskusijekoja je dovela do Povelje UN da "Ono {to je sada potrebnosvetu, to nije za{tita manjina, nego za{tita od manjina"(Koch 1993:257). Dr‘ave su bile za{ti}ene Poveljom UNod me{anja u njihove unutra{nje poslove, uklju~uju}iono u ime potla~enih manjina. Izraz "manjina" je ispu{teniz liste zabranjenih osnova za diskriminaciju kako uPovelji tako i u Deklaraciji o ljudskim pravima. Sve do1980tih ~ak je i definisanje manjine i dalje smatrano zaproblemati~no. Istra‘ivanje koje je sproveo FrancescoCapotorti za UN, koje je ostalo vode}a studija odiskriminaciji manjina, prvobitno se spotaklo nanedostatak saglasnosti o definiciji manjine.

Bez obzira na prate}e te{ko}e definisanja, me|utim,pitanje manjina se vratilo na centralnu pozornicuevropskih odnosa.. i vi{e od toga. Sporazum o za{titimanjina iz 1991 je predlo‘io uspostavljanje ma{inerijeza za{titu manjina koja je neobi~no sli~na onoj Ligenaroda. Komitet prima peticije i nastoji da postigne"prijateljsko re{enje" izme|u manjine i vlade. Madapostoje neki jasni istorijski kontinuiteti izme|ume|uratnog i savremenog iskustva, trenutna moda

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sprovo|enja manjinskih prava ide puno dalje od svega upro{losti. Naglasak nije na jednakom tretmanu, nego napodsticanju identiteta manjina. Dr‘ave se sada obavezujuda pozitivno poma‘u manjinama, a ne da se jednostavnouzdr‘e od diskriminacije. Tako Deklaracija Generalneskup{tine UN iz 1992, u paragrafu 33. "...zahteva dadr‘ave preduzmu mere za stvaranje povoljnih uslova zaomogu}avanje osobama koje pripadaju manjinama daizraze svoje karakteristike..." (naglasak A.B.) (Mullerson1994: 109) Novina be~kog zaklju~nog dokumenta bila jeu tome {to je on "pro{irio tradicionalnu klauzulu o ne-diskriminaciji na pozitivnu afirmativnu akciju u koristmanjina ... drugim re~ima, dr‘ave nemaju samo obavezuda se uzdr‘avaju od politike koja bi mogla da {tetimanjinama ... one treba da stvore uslove za unapre|ivanjeidentita manjina" (naglasak A.B.) (Christopulos1994:164). U me|uratnom periodu, naprotiv, "mada sumanjinama mogla da budu garantovana neka osnovnaprava, njih nije trebalo ohrabrivati u verovanju da oneimaju privilegovan polo‘aj unutar novih "nacionalnihdr‘ava" ...(Cornwall: 1992)

Posledice ovakvog razvoja su zna~ajne. Sa~injen jezahtevniji test na temu "{ta ste uradili da unapreditemajine?" u isto vreme kada je tretiranje manjina postalomera "Isto~nog" demokratskog napretka. Pa ipakpomeranje od "pukih jednakih prava na obavezu da se"pozitivno unapre|uje" identitet manjina, uklanja svakujasnu meru kojom se "progres" mo‘e meriti. Jednakotretiranje sviju se relativno neposredno mo‘e utvrditi, upore|enju sa u krajnjoj liniji arbitrarnom merom o tome"ko je dovoljno u~inio" za nekolicinu.

Do me|unarodne izolacije Slova~ke, na primer,do{lo je velikim delom na osnovu percepcije da je onazaostala u pogledu za{tite znatne Ma|arske manjine uzemlji. Nema pomena o tome da su im uskra}ena jednakaprava, niti da su sistematski diskriminisani, me|utim.Kritika se odnosi na navodnu sporost dr‘ave u potsticanjuidentiteta manjine - posebno s ozirom na jezi~ke mere.

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Evropa zahteva da Slova~ka vlada odvoji spcijalnasredstva za potsticanje identiteta manjine. Dok se neproceni da je ona pokazala dovoljno spremnosti u ovompogledu, ona }e verovatno ostati marginalizovana.Percepcija pa‘nje koja je posve}ena ‘eljama manjinaodlu~uje o sudbini nacija, a ne o sudbini majina.

Spre~avanje "Eurogeddon-a" i ograni~avanjekulturnog nasle|a?

Za{to je regulisaje prava manjina tako hitnozahtevano u savremenoj Isto~noj Evropi? ^injenicu dase me|uratni re‘im manjina nije samo vratio, nego jeoti{ao puno dalje, treba smestiti u svetu koji je dalekootvoreniji prema zahtevima kulture i potencijalnih ‘rtava.Konkretnije, povratak prava manjina je utemeljen narasprostranjenim pretpostavkama kako o Isto~noj tako io Zapadnoj Evropi. Za "Istok" se pretpostavlja da jekulturno predisponiran u smeru netolerantnosti svakevrste - najozbiljnije prema drugim etni~kim i rasnimgrupama. Zapad za to vreme u ovom kontekstu figurirakao odgovaraju}i ukrotitelj takvih opasnih strasti naosnovu tvrdnje da je on na doma}em popri{tu ostavionetolerantnost iza sebe a da na me|unarodnom planuvi{e nije motivisan starom sebi~nom politikom sile.

Prava manjina vi{e nisu vi|ena jednostavno kaounutra{nja stvar samih dr‘ava, nego se smatrajume|unarodnom brigom zbog njihovog tobo‘njegpotencijala da izazovu {iri sukob. Moskovski sastanakKonferencije o humanitarnoj dimenziji 1991. na primer,izri~ito je upu}ivao na pitanje manjina iz perspektivemiroljubivog razre{enja sukoba. Ova perspektiva jeutemeljena na navodnoj mogu}nosti da se regionsunovrati u "Jugoslaviju u velikom izdanju". Posebno uranim devedesetim, kao {to je Liebich opisao: "U ovomtrenutku tvorci Zapadne politike, sada potstaknuti odstrane ~itave horde recikliranih specijalista za pitanja

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bezbednosti, po~eli su da daju poverenjenajalarmantnijim iskazima". (Liebich: 1996) Najgorislu~aj scenarijskog mentaliteta "recikliranih stru~jakaza pitanja bezbednosti" odrazio se u medijskompokrivanju regiona (bizarno, u Slova~koj je ~ak anticipiransukob - videti Burgess 1997b). Rezimiraju}i konsenzus,magazin New Statesman (Novi dr‘avnik), na primer,omogu}io je da se ovaj alarmizam jasno izrazizaklju~uju}i da "... jedino obuhvatno re{avanje pitanjaodnosa izme|u manjinskog i ve}inskog stanovni{tva u~itavoj Isto~noj Evropi i biv{em Sovjetskom Savezu mo‘eda spre~i {irenje ratova u ovom {irokom regionu..." (NewStatesman:: 1992) U me|uvremenu je ova percepcijaakademski teoretizovana u brojne mehani~ke formuleprema kojima "uspavani" etni~ki nacionalizam mo‘e daeksplodira usled ~injenice da je bio potiskivan od stranekomunizma ~etrdeset godina.

Strahovi od "Eurogeddon-a" kao {to je toformulisano u New Statesman, pokazali su se kaoo~igledno pogre{ni. Francis Fukuyama je na primerprimetio: "Ukoliko pa‘ljivo posmatramo, ono {to jefrapantno, to nije silina netolerantnog nacionalizma, negonaprotiv njegova slabost... Bilo je ve} puno sukoba kojise do sada nisu materijalizovali u biv{em Sovjetskombloku" (Citirano u Griffiths 1993:1). DezintegracijaJugoslavije, ~ak i da je interpretiramo kao jedan iznutravo|eni "plemenski rat", bila je o~igledno vi{e izuzetaknego pravilo. Te{ko je izbe}i zaklju~ak da su ovastrahovanja pretstavljala vi{e izraz Zapadnja~keanksioznosti, nego Isto~nja~ke stvarnosti. U bilo kojemspecifi~nom zna~enju, ni na koji na~in nijesamorazumljivo za{to se smatra da Isto~ni Evropljaniposeduju jedinstvenu sklonost prema tla~enju manjina.To su bili Jugosloveni, na primer, koji su u stvariprednja~ili u vra}anju prava manjina na me|unarodnidnevni red. Njihov nacrt za Potkomitet UN za prevencijudiskriminacije i za{titu manjina iz 1978, sugerisao jedeklaraciju o obavezivanju u odnosu na {iru definiciju

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prava majina. Jo{ {ire, izvan konteksta istorijskih intrigavelikih sila u regionu, i posebno ako uzmemo u obzirrelativno otsustvo etni~kih konflikata od kraja Drugogsvetskog rata, ima malo specifi~nih dokaza koji bipotvrdili bilo kakvu posebnu predispoziciju za etni~kunetolerantnost.

Povi{ena Zapadnja~ka osetljivost premaIsto~nja~koj etni~koj netoleranciji zasnovana je vi{e natvrdnjama nego na evidenciji - pre svega na navodnojmo}i kulturne zaostav{tine iz pro{losti. Mnogikomentatori su se pozivali na navodno trajnu reakciju naOtomanski i Habzbur{ki uticaj u XIX veku. Jo{ jepopularniji argumenat da je iskustvo komunizmaoblikovalo ljude nesposobne da prihvate razli~itost idisponirane da se vrate njima poznatijem svetu"autoritarnosti". Ken Jowitt-ov uticajni New World Dis-order (Novi svetski nered) na primer, dijagnosticirao jepostojanje stanovni{tva u tolikoj meri osaka}enogiskustvom "Lenjinizma", koje bi na{lo da je"...Protestantski liberalni kapitalisti~ki na~in ‘ivotadosadan, poni‘avaju}i i velikim delom nerazumljiv".(Jowitt 1992:291) ^itavo bogatstvo drugih procesa jebilo "obja{njeno" unutar istovetnog okvira. Ovde nemadovoljno prostora da se sistematski dovede u pitanjeargumentacija "kultunog nasle|a" (videti Holmes 1996,Burgess 1997). Promiskuitetan na~in na koji je navodnokulturno nasle|e, umesto pritisaka svakodnevneegzistencije, upotrebljavano za obja{njenje svih vrsta(~esto potpuno kontradiktornih) fenomena, sugeri{e datuma~enja koja sve obja{njavaju, na isti na~in neobja{njavaju ba{ ni{ta.

Bezbrojne "kulturne karakteristike" mogu seekstrapolisati iz iskustva ‘ivota pod komunizmom. UIsto~noj Evropi nakon 1956, mo‘emo da identifikujemostanovni{tvo indiferentno prema svakom obliku politi~kemobilizacije i neposrednog uticaja dr‘ave ("Lenjinizam"je bio {ala ~ak i za elitu) - u ime proletarijata, nacije ilirase. Jo{ uop{tenije, "komunizam" je stvorio jedan

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intenzivno privatizovani narod zaokupljen vi{epreduzetni~kim mogu}nostima u sivoj ekonomiji negomanjinama kao ‘rtvenim jarcima. Ne iznena|uje da se~ak i privla~nost anti-centralisti~kih "nacionalizama",koja je bila o~igledna nakon raspada starih re‘ima, ubrzosmanjila.

Uop{tavanja o Isti~nim Evropljanima, koji su vodili‘ivot nedodirnuti slu‘benom ideologijom i politi~komakcijom, barem su isto toliko verodostojna kao ona ozaostalom "Isto~nom" mentalitetu, izvedena iz starihteorija o "totalitarizmu". Nije ~udo da su se apokalipti~napredvi|anja o "Eurogeddon-u", na temelju kojih je bilazasnovana neophodnost me|unarodnog nadgledanjatretiranja manjina, pokazala tako pogre{nima. Kao i uslu~aju stvaranja sli~nih kulturnih stereotipa, oni suarbitrarni i podlo‘ni da budu svedeni na ne{to {to je jedvave}e od pukog straha i predrasude, za koje se tvrdi daodlikuju one "druge".

Kraj real politike?

Kada se gleda na pretpostavke u pozadini povratkaspoljmjeg nadgledanja prava manjina, ni{ta manjeproblemati~na nije ona da je ogoljeni vlastiti interes, kojije odlikovao sprovo|enje od strane velikih sila upro{losti, prevazi|en. Internacionalizacija pravanacionalnih majina bila je odba~ena nakon rata da bi sespre~ile ambicije sli~ne onima koje je sprovodila Nema~kakroz "za{titu manjina". Povratak prava manjina u evropskeodnose pretpostavlja da su takve opasnosti pro{le. Ovonije opravdano.

Kao u me|uratom periodu, Zapadna Evropa jeostala imuna na bilo kakvo nadziranje s obzirom nanacionalne manjine, zahvaljuju}i trajnoj definicijivlastitog "ne-domorado~kog" stanovni{tva kao"imigranata" - ~ak i kada se arapski stanovnici Francuskesuo~avaju sa znatno vi{e socijalnih prepreka nego Ma|ari

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u Slova~koj, na primer. Tamo gde ostaje mogu}nost da sereflektori usmere na mo}nije igra~e u evropskimposlovima, oni koji su u polo‘aju da uti~u na pravila igreostaju u prednosti. Na primer, Visoka komisija KEBS zanacionalne manjine dobila je mandat da prima informacijeiz bilo kojeg izvora ali, "..ne}e priznavati saop{tenja odbilo koje osobe ili organizacije koje praktikuju ili javnoopravdavaju terorizam ili nasilje". (Christopulos1994:173) Prema Christopulosu, ova klauzula jeuklju~ena nakon pritiska iz Britanije i Turske. Njima senisu dopali izgledi da predstavnici Kurda i irskihrepublikanaca izazovu neprilike. Irci unutar UK i turskiKurdi ovde su redefinisani ~ak ne ni samo kao "imigranti",nego kao "teroristi", kako bi bila izbegnuta pa‘nja OEBS.

^ak i kada bi prihvatili da "Istok" treba da predstavljaisklju~ivi fokus pa‘nje prema manjinama, ostaje jasnageopoliti~ka logika koja odre|uje da su neke manjinevi{e jednake u o~ima Zapada nego druge. Do nedavnoveoma je malo kazano o najve}oj manjini u biv{emIsto~nom bloku - o samim Rusima u biv{im sovjetskimrepublikama. Ova slepa mrlja u sprovo|enju pravamanjina nije neobi~na samo zbog veli~ine ove manjine,nego i zato {to se mnogi Rusi suo~avaju sa otvorenomlegalnom diskriminacijom, a ne samo sa nedostatkomdr‘avne odlu~nosti da se ohrabruje njihov identitet.Podr{ka Estoniji, uprkos isklju~ivanju "strane" ruskemanjine, pretstavlja dobar primer. ^ak i nakon promenakoje su ostavile Ruse kao ne-gra|ane koji se nisu moglikandidovati za dr‘avne polo‘aje, Evropska Politi~kaKooperacija je izdala Deklaraciju u kojoj ona preporu~ujeEstoniju za saradnju sa evropskim institucijama, hvale}i"...privr‘enost Estonije demokratskim principima i njenuodanost dijalogu i kompromisu i ne-konfrontiranju sanjenim zajednicama i susednim zemljama". (Mullerson1994:183-4). Vr{enje pritiska na mo}nu Rusiju izgledada je diktiralo manje nego konzistentan evropski stavprema ovoj konkretnoj manjini.

Jo{ uobi~ajeniji od ovakvih slepih mrlja su slu~ajevi

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kada su sile upotrebile pitanja neke vrlo specifi~nemanjine da bi postigle diplomatske ciljeve. Slovenija jebila prinu|ena od strane OSCE da stvori sistem za{titemanjina s obzirom na svoju malenu italijansku manjinu -pod pretnjom isklju~ivanja iz me|unarodnih organizacija,na primer. Italija je sada zna~ajno popustila svoj pritisakna Slovence, po{to je pokazala "ko je gazda" me|u ovimJadranskim susedima izmi{ljaju}i problem Slovena~kepolitike prema manjinama. Istaknuta i jednostranaintervencija Austrije u biv{oj Jugoslaviji bila je posebnoironi~na. Austrijska intervencija je bila toliko glasna ukorist Hrvata i Slovenaca, da je njihova delegacija nasastanku KEBS Juna 1991. u Berlinu uklju~ilaslovena~kog ministra za spoljnje poslove me|u svoje~lanove. U isto vreme, Austrija je poku{avala da asimilujeslovena~ku manjinu u Klagenfurt-skom basenu i Hrvateu Bergenland-u, s malo obzira prema svojim obavezamau odnosu na manjine predvi|ene Dr‘avnim ugovorom iz1955.

Dva od klju~nih doga|aja u post-hladnoratovskojIsto~noj Evropi bili su obele‘eni i doista oblikovanisli~nim dvojnim pristupom pitanjima manjina. Uprkossvoj pri~i o pravima manjina, sada diskreditovani biv{iPredsednik Albanije Berisha je bio podr‘avan posebnood strane Amerike i Nema~ke, na osnovu toga da nepolitizuje situaciju etni~kih Albanaca na Kosovu iMetohiji. Implozija Albanije je bila tesno povezana sprodu‘enom me|unarodnom podr{kom koju je u‘ivaore‘im, koja je sa svoje strane bila proizvod njegove ulogeu zadr‘avanju a ne u politizaciji pitanja manjina (kao i uokru‘ivanju Srbije). Jo{ kriti~niji je bio visoko selektivanpristup manjinama koji su zauzeli glavni me|unarodniigra~i u biv{oj Jugoslaviji. Defini{u}i ~in obnovljeneNema~ke pozicije u regionu, priznavanje Hrvatske, bioje sproveden bez obzira na zna~ajnu srpsku manjinu uKrajini (kasnije "etni~ki o~i{}enoj" od strane Hrvatske uOperaciji Oluja - uz ameri~ku i nema~ku pomo}).

Evropske sile su prihvatile insistiranje Nema~ke na

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priznavanju Hrvatske decembra 1991, samo pet nedeljapo{to je Zajednica izjavila da bi se nezavisnost moglazamisliti jedino u kontekstu op{teg poravnanja. Ona jemehani~ki prihva}ena nakon simboli~kog, a sada kakose tvrdi "izgubljenog" pisma hrvatskog predsednikaTu|mana prema kojem }e on po{tovati srpsku manjinu unezavisnoj Hrvatskoj. Uprkos potpuno ta~nompredstavljanju nasilja koje bi usledilo nakon odobravanjahrvatskog nacionalizma, i na ogor~enje tada{njeg EZpregovara~a Lorda Carington-a izme|u ostalih, drugesile su pristale uz Nema~ku. Sa pomaljanjem Maastricht-skog samita, izgleda da ostale evropske sile nisu htele dase suprotstave Nema~koj povodom njenog novoprona|enog prote‘iranja hrvatskog nacionalizma, iodgovaraju}eg napu{tanja Srba - bez obzira da li sumanjina ili ne. Priznanje je tako|e koincidiralo s pritiskomkoji je izvr{en na Bugarsku da spre~i, ili barem da odlo‘i,svoje priznavanje Makedonije. Kao {to je Garton Ashsugerisao: "Da li bi to mo‘da mogla da bude pogodba:Nema~ka ne bi (jo{ uvek) podr‘ala priznavanjeMakedonije ukoliko se Gr~ka ne bi suprotstavilapriznavanju Slovenije i Hrvatske? Oh, vrli novi svet!"(Garton Ash, 1994:396). Isto se mo‘e re}i za nema~koobeshrabrivanje nezavisnosti za balti~ke dr‘ave, pristupkoji je opet bio u o{troj suprotnosti sa podr{komslovena~ke i hrvatske secesije od Jugoslovenskefederacije.

Ovakvi primeri ne mogu da budu jednostavnootpisani kao nesretne nedoslednosti u jednom ina~evaljanom projektu vra}anja prava nacionalih majina nacentralnu pozornicu evropskih odnosa. Postojikonzistentan obrazac pove}anog interesovanja zapritisak koji takav naglasak vr{i na odabrane ne-Zapadnedr‘ave, a ne za apstraktnu brigu za manjine po sebi."Me|unarodno", u stvari "Zapadno" nadgledanjepona{anja drugih dr‘ava neizbe‘no }e odra‘avati, i postativezano stvarnim i nejednakim odosima mo}i koji opstajuunutar Evrope i {ireg sveta.

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Ovim se ne sugeri{e da je nedavno u~e{}e velikihsila u regionu jednostavno sledilo klasi~ni 19-vekovniobrazac "Balkanizacije", prema kojem jedna silapodr‘ava zahtev jedne manjine, dok njen rival podr‘avadrugu. Tokom jugoslovenskog rata naro~ito, uspostavljenje izuzetan stepen me|unarodne saglasnosti. Svi su seslo‘ili o izolaciji Srba, bez obzira da li su manjina ili ne.Svaki takmi~arski impuls se mogao prepoznati pre svegakroz rivalstvo u tome ~ija je orijentacija najglasnije anti-srpska i pro-bosansko Muslimanska. Primeri ~istopojedina~nog vlastitog interesa kao u slu~aju Italijana injihovog disciplinovanja Slovenaca, sada su relativnomarginalni u odnosu na {iri trend “Zapad protiv ostalih”u svim va‘nim pitanjima.

Tako|e je va‘no, me|utim, podsetiti se da ovakvostanje stvari nije bez presedana. U stvari, ono je upotpunosti saglasno sa ranijim obrascima Isto~no/Zapadne dominacije. Na na~in koji podse}a na dana{njizajedni~ki protektorat nad Bosnom, krajem XIX veka“velike sile su sve vi{e implicitno umanjivale zna~ajpromocije vlastitih interesa od strane pojedinih dr‘ava ukorist zajedni~ke akcije povodom Isto~nog pitanja”.(Pearson 1983: 128) Privremena me|unarodna saglasnost,“dogovor” glavnih sila, bili su uspostavljeni izme|u1878 i 1914. Kao {to je to opisao istori~ar Andrew Janos,ovaj re‘im je nastojao da spre~i po‘ar me|u samim velikimsilama “... i, kao korelat, da ohrabruje 'civilizovane’oblika vladavine na teritorijama novo nezavisnih dr‘ava... Glavni instrumenti ovog me|unarodnog re‘ima bili suad hoc kongresi koji bi dodeljivali jednom ili vi{eu~esnika posebne misije odr‘avanja mira i civilizovanja“ (Janos 1994:11). Upravljanje poslovima sveta, baremprivremeno, sprovo|eno je kroz podelu rada zasnovanuna zajedni~kom dnevnom redu. Ono nije bilo manje samo-zainteresovano, jedino je “Zapad” bio dovoljno siguranu svoju dominaciju da uop{ti specifi~ni vlastiti interes u{iru moralnu misiju “civilizovanja”. Tada, kao i sada,policijsko pra}enje postupanja prema manjinama je bilo

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u centru dnevnog reda na osnovu kojeg se te‘ilo ovomcilju.

Jedna Evrope ili dve?

Ostaje nekoliko ozbiljnih razloga za brigu povodompolo‘aja ne dominantnih grupa unutar Isto~ne Evrope.Prevashodno albanska provincija Kosovo je potpunootu|ena od svoje nominalne nacije, Srbije. Nema navidiku o~iglednog re{enja za ovaj problem. Polo‘aj Roma(mada socijalna, a ne nacionalna manjina) tako|e jeproblemati~an u ~itavom regionu. Pobolj{avanje njihovogmarginalizovanog polo‘aja unutar dru{tva je te{kozamisliti osim u okviru op{teg preobra‘aja ovih dru{tava.Nema iskustava, me|utim, koja bi sugerisala da ovakote{ki problemi poput ovih, pa ni oni manje ozbiljni, moguda budu re{eni kroz spoljnu intervenciju. Istorijskoiskustvo sugeri{e da politizovanje koje sledi spoljnome{anje ima pre tendenciju da eskalira doma}e protiv-stavove u {ire sukobe, a lokalno suparni{tvo u {irapitanja me|unarodnog poretka kljucanja, nego {to donosemir i harmoniju jednim zamahom magi~nog {tapi}a za"re{avanje sukoba". Bez obzira koliko te{ki, unutra{njiproblemi se jedino mogu re{iti od strane unutra{njihaktera - bez "disciplinuju}e" snage spoljnjih sila koje sepomaljaju iznad njih.

Verovatno indikativno, zahtevi savremenogsprovo|enja prava nacionalnih manjina, me|utim, nepo~ivaju prvenstveno na zahtevu da se razre{i sukob.Zagovara se uglavnom "spre~avanje sukoba" a ne"re{enje". Su{tinski cilj sprovo|enja prava nacionalnihmanjina je krupniji. Vra}aju}i se zahtevima Lalumiere-a,regulisanje "Istoka" preko prava manjina usmerava premaharmonizaciji pluralisti~nih evropskih normi i vrednostina ~itavom kontinentu. [irenje poruke prava predstavlja(potencijalno) sredstvo uklju~ivanja u novu Evropuutemeljenu na odbacivanju ksenofobije i netolerancije.

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Celokupna Evropa }e biti procenjivana na osnovu svojegtretiranja manjina, a svi oni koji udovolje kriterijumima}e zaslu‘iti uklju~ivanje.

Uslovno uklju~ivanje odabranih ("Centralno"evropskih) prijatelja predstavlja doista aspekt procesa"demokratizacije" u kojem tretiranje manjina jeste takoklju~an sastojak. Barem isto toliko va‘an je korelat ovihselektivnih uklju~ivanja - isklju~ivanje onih koje seprocenjuju kao da "nisu dostojni". Kako izbe}i ovumarginalizaciju nije jasno. Ko treba da ka‘e, i kako damerimo kada je Slova~ka, na primer, "u~inila dovoljno"za svoju ma|arsku manjinu, da bi zadovoljila evropskeinstitucije? Razotkrivaju}a je ~injenica da je stalna kritikaneke zemlje retko propra}ena listom specifi~nih idosti‘nih ciljeva, jedino se ka‘e da "vi{e treba da budeu~injeno". Pokretne ciljne stanice "demonstrirajdemokratsko pona{anje ili }e{ biti proklet" za Isto~neEvropljane su u krajnjoj instanci nedosti‘ne.

Ko }e biti uklju~en i isklju~en, u stvarnosti jepovezano s Zapadnim geopoliti~kim brigama. Bliskiodnosi Nema~ke sa ^e{kom Republikom, na primer,izgleda da su odredili njen privilegovani tretman. Uprkos~e{kom tretmanu vlastitog romskog stanovni{tva koji imnije obezbedio ~ak ni punu formalnu jednakost. Napadina Rome u ^e{koj Republici bili su ~esti. Na drugojstrani, Nema~ka je odredila od po~etka da slova~ki deobiv{e federacije predstavlja zonu u koju se ne ide(Kancelar Kohl odbija ~ak i da razgovara sa slova~kimpremijerom Meciar-om) i beskrajne pritu‘be nanedostatak demokratije su usledile.

Savremena, kao i ona me|uratna moralna podela naone koji prosu|uju da su prevazi{li "netoleranciju" i onekoji su ostali u njenim kand‘ama, ne povla~i se pred~injenicama niti pred bilo kojom komparativnomperspektivom. Nije jasno na kojoj osnovi veliki brojameri~kih policijskih oficira trenutno predaju"toleranciju" i "civilne vrednosti" svojim Isto~noevropskim parnjacima. Ameri~ke policijske snage su

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bile u pravom ratu sa doma}im crnim stanovni{tvom injihov odnos prema crnoj "manjini" je dokazano izrazitonetolerantan. Malo prime}ena preporuka EU da se ukinepravo azila unutar zemalja ~lanica iz juna 1997. jeargumentovana na osnovu tvrdnje da neme opasnosti odizbeglica, po{to su sve zemlje ~lanice potpuno dokazanedemokratije koje brane civilne slobode - u me|uratnomre~niku, njihov "vi{i civilizacijski standard" je zna~io dasu one "prerasle" netoleranciju. Ako su one ranije bilenejednako demokratske, te{ko je videti kako bi to ovedr‘ave ostale posle ukidanja prava na azil. U stvarnosti,ova akcija i {iri okvir "civilizovanja Istoka" izgledao bikao puko samo-laskanje koje odvra}a pa‘nju odnedemokratskog pona{anja na Zapadu, kroz uzdizanjeuro|eno anti-demokatske "kulture" "Istoka". Ukratko,savremeno o‘ivljavanje Zapadnog kontrolisanja Isto~noevropskog tretiranja manjina predstavlja kodifikovanjeilegitimne moralne podele Evrope koja je obele‘avalaHladni rat, rat koji je ovo o‘ivljavanje izgleda zamenilo.______________________________________________

Reference:Arendt, Hannah (1973 drugo izdanje) The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York,Harvest)Burgess, Adam (1997 a) Devided Europe: The New Domination of the East,(London, Pluto Press)———————— (1997 b) "Writing Them Off to the East? British Quality PressCoverage of Slovakia", Nationalities Papers, Vol? No?Christopulos, Dimitros (1994) "Minority Protection: Towards A New EuropeanApproach", Balkan Forum, Vol. 2, No.1 (March)Cornwall. Mark, (1996) "Minority Rights and Wrongs in Eastern Europe in theTwentieth Century", The Historian, No.50 (Summer)Editorial (1992) "Eurogeddon?" New Statesman and Society, (19 June)Garton Ash, Timothy (1994) In Europe’s Name (London: Vintage)Griffiths, Stephen Iwan (1993) SIPRI Research Report No.5 Nationalism and EthnicConflict (Oxford, Oxford University Press)Holmes, Stephen (1996) "Cultural Legacies or State Collapse? Probing thePostcommunist Dilemma", u Mandelbaum, Michael (ur.) Post"Communism: FourPerspectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press)Janos, Andrew C. (1994) "Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies ofPost-Communist Politics", East European Politics and Society, Vol.8, No.1 (Winter)

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Jowitt, Ken (1992) New World Disorder- The Leninist Extinction, (Berkeley, CA:University of California Press)Liebich, Andre (1996) "Getting Better, Getting Worse", Dissent (Summer)Mayall, James (1994) "Soveregnty and Self Determination in the New Europe" uHugh Miall (ur.) Minority Rights in Europe (London: Pinter)Macartney, C.A. (1934) National States and National Minorities (London: OxfordUniversity Press)Mullerson, Rein (1994) International Lasw, Rights and >Politics, (London:Routledge)Pearson, Raymond (1983) National Minorities in Eastern Europe 1848-1945(London: Macmillan)Sierpowski, Stanislaw (1991) "Minorities in the System of the League of Nations", uPaul Smith (ur.) Ethnic Groups in International Relations (Aldershot: EuropeanScience Foundation)

Prevod: Vera Vratu{a-@unji}______________________________________________________________________ Deo ovog ~lanka je utemeljen na ~lanku A. Burgess, "Prava nacionalnih manjina i"civilizovanje" Isto~ne Evrope", "Contention", Vol.5, N0.2 (Winter 1996)

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Iz Hrvatske {tampe

SKUP LIJEVIH STRANAKAu Novom Sadu

U Novom Sadu su se 28. o‘ujka (marta) 1998. susrelipredstavnici deset stranaka socijal-demokratskeorijentacije iz SR Jugoslavije, Bosne i Hercegovine iHrvatske, triju dr‘ava koje su raspadom SFRJ do‘ivjeleoru‘ane sukobe, goleme migracije stanovni{tva, ‘rtve, ana podru~ju Hrvatske i BiH i neprocjenjiva razaranja iuni{tenja dru{tvene i privatne imovine.

Doma}in skupa bila je Reformska demokratskastranka Vojvodine. Kao gosti prisustvovali su ipredstavnici Foruma gradjana Tuzle, Beogradskog kruga,Vojvodjanskog kluba i njema~ke Fridrich Ebert fondacije.

Iz Hrvatske skupu su prisustvovali predstavniciAkcije socijaldemokrata Hrvatske, Socijalisti~ke radni~kepartije i Dalmatinske akcije.

Vodstvo SDP odbilo je pak da nekoga po{alje jer je“to skup krajnje lijevih stranaka” i da “ne pristaje naokupljanja kojima su zadani okviri biv{e Jugoslavije, teda u tim okolnostima ne}e i}i ni na kavu”.

Cilj ovog okupljanja je bio dogovor o saradnjinavedenih stranaka na planu normalizacije odnosa trizemlje koje su potpisnice sporazuma u Daytonu, a u ciljui utjecaja na javnost i parlamente da se taj sporazum br‘ei u cijelosti provede.

Na skupu je jednoglasno, a nakon rasprave izajedni~ke redakture, usvojeno deset teza, kojima sepodr‘avaju mirovni spoprazumi iz Daytona i svi drugimirovni aran‘mani koji se odnose na sporna podru~ja, astvaraju realne pretpostavke za stabilizaciju mira,rje{avanje problema izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba, uzpriznanje avnojskih granica, suvereniteta i nezavisnostiosamostaljenih dr‘ava.

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Nagla{eno je da jedino demokratske i ekonomskeprosperitetne dr‘ave mogu uspje{no rje{avati pitanjeizbjegli{tva i bitno ubla‘iti i prevladati posljedice rata ietni~kog ~i{}enja, te da se svim izbjeglicama moragarantirati njihovo izvorno pravo da se vrate na svojaognji{ta.

Sudionici konferencije zalo‘ili su se zausagla{avanje propisa o dr‘avljanstvu u trima dr‘avama,na principima utvrdjenim u Vije}u Evrope, kako bi sezagarantiralo puno po{tovanje ste~enih prava ljudi isloboda izbora mjesta ‘ivljenja.

A posebno su se zalo‘ili i za po{tivanje onog djelasporazuma iz Daytona koji se odnosi na zaklju~ivanje iprovedbu medjudr‘avnih sporazuma o lak{em protokuljudi, roba i informacija, te obnavljanju prekinutihprivrednih veza.

Dogovoreni su i oblici daljnje suradnje stranaka.G.M.

(Iz “Hrvatske ljevice”, broj 5, 1.-31.5.1998)________________________________________________

O Kosovu

Mahmut Bakali:

Nekada{nji ~elnik kosovskih komunista, MahmutBakali o opasnosti da oru‘ani sukobi na Kosovu eskalirajui prerastu u rat:

- Uvjeren sam da iza tih oru‘anih skupina ne stojinijedna albanska stranka. Nisam, ipak, spreman tvrditi da}e, kao {to neki pri‘eljkuju, ovdje izbiti rat ili {iri konflikt.Po~ne li pregovara~ki proces odmah i obustavi li sepolicijsko nasilje na Kosovu, marginalizirat }e se inasilni~ke grupe Albanaca. No ipak ne treba zaboravitida uprkos mnogim mirovnim inicijativama medjunarodnezajednice postoje politi~ari na Kosovu, u Srbiji, ali i ususjednim dr‘avama koji izravno prizivaju rat na Kosovu.

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Nedavno je makedonski predsjednik Kiro Gligorov izniovrlo morbidan koncept navodno dogovoren spredstavnicima NATO-a o stvaranju nekakvog koridorakroz Makedoniju kojim bi se u slu~aju oru‘anog konfliktapola milijuna kosovskih Albanaca iselilo u Albaniju. Toje vrlo uvredljivo za Albance. Prije svega, ako bi do{lo dorata na Kosovu, Albanci se ne bi pretvorili u izbjegli~kinarod, ve} bi branili svoju zemlju._______________________________________________

Mihajlo Mihajlov

Jedan od nekada najpoznatijih jugoslovenskihdisidenata (uz Milovana Djilasa), Mihajlo Mihajlov,trenutno vi{i znanstveni suradnik Instituta zamedjunarodnu politiku u Washingtonu, o politi~arima naKosovu spremnim na dijalog:

- Adem Dema}i ima mnogo skromnije ciljeve negoIbrahim Rugova. Izbore na Kosovu bojkotirale su trialbanske politi~ke stranke na ~elu s Parlamentarnompartijom Kosova Adema Dema}ija. Mihajlova saDema}ijem ve‘u i “zatvorske uspomene”. Dema}i vidiKosovo kao tre}u federalnu jedinicu, {to je jo{ i u vrijemeTita stalno tra‘eno. Svojevremeno sam pisao da je u‘asnoglupo ne dati Kosovu republiku. Nije ni tada, a ni sadabilo nikakve opasnosti da }e se Kosovo priklju~itiAlbaniji. Kosovo je i sada u ekonomskom i svakomdrugom smislu Amerika za Albaniju. To Kosovari znaju.Mislim da je ~ak to, {to Rugova ho}e nezavisno Kosovo,da je to savr{eno iskreno. U toj konstelaciji Dema}i jeumjerena snaga, a sa njim su i veoma umjereni, i sa njimase mo‘e razgovarati, {to je paradoksalno, biv{ikomunisti~ki rukovodioci, Azim Vlasi, Ka~u{a Ja{ari,Ilijaz Kurte{i i Mahmut Bakali. Svi su oni veoma umjereniu odnosu na ekstremiste koji ne}e da razgovaraju ni o~emu osim o otcjepljenju.

( Iz “Hrvatske ljevice”, broj 4, 1.-30.4.1998)

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Vi{e nego Istorija

Nenad V. Petrovi}

Dimitri je Djordjevi}, O@ILJCI I OPOMENE, izdanje BIGZ(Beogradski izdava~ko grafi~ki zavod), Knjiga prva, Beograd1994,Knjiga druga, Beograd 1995.SCARS AND MEMORY - Four Lives in One Lifetime; East EuropeanMonographs, Boulder, Distributed by Columbia University Press, NewYork, 1997.

Akademik Dimitrije Djordjevi} izdao je svojememoare u Beogradu u dve knjige 1994. i 1995. godine asada su ti memoari iza{li u Americi na engleskom ujednoj knjizi u te~nom prevodu Kosare Gavrilovi}. Ovodelo je od prvorazredne va‘nosti za razumevanjeproblema i atmosfere jedne generacije srpske omladinesredinom ovog na{eg XX veka koja se suprotstavljalatotalitarizmu ekstremne desnice i ekstremne levice i kojojpreti opasnost da bude zaboravljena ili prosto ignorisanau dana{njem postkomunisti~kom vremenu. Otuda,posebno treba pozdraviti pojavu ovih memoara naengleskom jeziku. Jer, oni treba da poslu‘e kao lektirapotomcima Srba emigranata, iseljenika i izbeglica posleDrugog svetskog rata i ovog poslednjeg gradjanskog ratanastalog posle raspada Druge Jugoslavije kako bi u ovomnovom svetu masovnog potro{a~kog dru{tva grube borbeza opstanak mogli da nadju objektivno svedo~enje ojednom vremenu o kojem su od svojih predaka samoslu{ali ali u kojem nisu ‘iveli.

Za{to toliko podvla~im ovu potrebu izno{enjavlastitog iskustva potonjim generacijama? Zato, {to seba{ u na{e vreme, kada je do{lo do poslednje tragedijena{eg naroda u ovom gradjanskom ratu, zapadna medijasu pokazala koliko su reporteri i novinari koji suizve{tavali o zbivanjima na tlu na{e zemlje pokazali

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nepoznavanje ne samo pro{losti nego i mentaliteta na{egnaroda kao {to su i mnogi na{i ljudi u na{oj zemlji imalisasvim pogre{nu sliku o imid‘u koji smo mi imali naZapadu. Srbi su verovali da }e svaki Francuz otvoriti{iroko vrata onom koji samo ka‘e da je Srbinzaboravljaju}i da je proteklo tri ~etvrti veka od Prvogsvetskog rata kada su njegovi pradedovi prihvatali srpskeizbeglice i divili se njihovoj hrabrosti u odbrani svojeotad‘bine. Podlo‘ni mitovima mi smo ‘iveli u iluzijama.Ali, nepoznavanje na{e istorije od strane zapadnih medijadolazilo je i od na{e strane kada se uzme u obzir {ta su ikako su zvani~ni organi obave{tavali svet o na{ojstvarnosti u toku komunisti~ke vladavine. Re‘imskiaparat hvalio se kako je navodno pravilno re{ionacionalno pitanje na tlu Jugoslavije uveravaju}i svojesugradjane da je Jugoslavija vode}a zemlja Tre}egvanblokovskog sveta koja ima presudnu re~ u svetskimorganizacijama da bi se samo nekoliko godina docnijeuverili u besmislenost takvih tvrdjenja. Mi smo zavaravaline samo sebe nego i druge i ne bi trebalo da se ljutimo {todrugi o nama imaju pogre{nu sliku.

Ali, postojala je jo{ jedna zabluda koju valja ista}i.Mi smo potcenjivali snagu komunisti~kog “pranjamozgova” na mlade generacije koje je zaveo re`im posleDrugog svetskog rata. Pola veka od malenih nogu douniverziteta istorija se predavala u {kolama onako kakoje to politi~kom vrhu nosilaca vlasti odgovaralo. Pokretotpora generala Mihailovi}a smatran je nepostoje}impo{to je bio okategorisan kao izdajni~ki tako da i dan-danas ~injenica da su pripadnici demokratskognepartizanskog otpora bili u nema~kim koncetracionimlogorima zvu~i {irim neupu}enim mladjim krugovima una{oj zemlji neubedljivo. Re`im se trudio da po svakucenu izbri{e iz istorijskog se}anja sve druge `rtve uDrugom svetskom ratu na tlu Jugoslavije osim onih kojeje on pripisivao partizanskoj borbi protiv okupatora takoda je prose~nom mladom ~oveku bilo skoro nemogu}e dasazna istinu. Memoari profesora Dimitrija Djordjevi}a,

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pisani bez mr`nje i politi~ko-partijske isklju~ivosti,predstavljaju nezaobilaznu gradju za istoriju na{egnedavno minulog vremena koji }e se ~itati i onda kadamnogobrojne pri~e i bajke o sedam ofanziva utonu uneminovni istorijski zaborav.

** *

@ivot Dimitrija Djordjevi}a satkan je od ~etirirazli~ita ‘ivota koje je on opisao u svojim memoarima.Prvi pokriva njegovo de~a{tvo u Beogradu kada je kaodete imu}nih roditelja i potomak uglednih porodica imaoprilike da upozna najuglednije ljude starog Beograda.Bio je briljantan odli~an u~enik (kao i njegov mladju bratMihailo) u Tre}oj mu{koj realnoj gimnaziji - o ~emu nepi{e u svojim memoarima - gde je maturirao pred sam rat1940. i upisao se na Pravni fakultet ali rat je spre~ionjegove studije. Pripadao je Srpskom kulturnom klubu u~ijem je osnivanju njegov otac Vladimir, koji je dobiodoktorat na Berlinskom univerzitetu jo{ 1907, aktivnou~estvovao. Odu{evljeno je pozdravio vojni pu~ 27. marta1941. i posle izbijanja rata pridru‘io se sa svojimprijateljima iz Srpskog kulturnog kluba koji su obrazovali[tab 501 u pokretu otpora generala Mihailovi}a. Taj prvideo Djodjevi}evog ‘itija, taj prvi ‘ivot, skra}en je uengleskom izdanju od {ezdesetak na tridesetak stranica,po{to verovatno za engleskog ~itaoca nije tolikointeresantan iako ima u sebi privla~nost ruskog romanakoji bi opisivao aristokraciju ruskogpredrevolucionarnog vremena.

Drugi ‘ivot u kojem je pisac opisao na potresanna~in patnje i stradanja u logoru na Banjici kada je biouhap{en od Gestapoa, njegov odlazak u “zemljuraspolu}enih glava”, kada je bio sproveden u nema~kikoncentracioni logor Mauthauzen, pisan je na osnovubele|aka pisanih po povratku iz ovog logora smrti ukojem je izgubio 25 kilograma u te‘ini i oboleo od

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hroni~nog zapaljenja bubrega. Do‘ivlaji u logoru ispisanisu u detalje i ~itaju se kao stranice iz nekogsol‘enjicinskog romana. Po povratku u zemlju, Djordjevi}se posle bolovanja vratio u {umu u [tab 501, u odred kojije nosio ime Lazara Maksimovi}a poginulog u borbi sadobrovoljcima. Taj odred brojao je svega petnaestakomladinaca, ve}inom u~enika Tre}e beogradskegimnazije. Ulaskom sovjetskih trupa na teritoriju Srbijesudbina demokratskog otpora bila je zape~a~ena. Bio jeto i kraj drugog ‘ivota Dimitrija Djordjevi}a i mo‘da je inajsadr‘ajnije i najkonciznije ta tragedija izneta unekoliko re~enica u srpskom izdanju (str. 255-256) - uengleskom izdanju (str. 213-214) ona je kondenzovana usvega nekoliko redova - zato je navodim u originalu:

“Bila je to i na{a labudova pesma. PokretJugoslovenske vojske u otad`bini, Ravnogorski pokret,~etnici ili kako smo ve} bili nazivani, bio je osudjen.Nema~ki okupatori videli su u nama opasnost da imsko~imo za gu{u ~im se uka`e prilika obra~una; Saveznicisu podr`avali na{e ideolo{ke protivnike. Bio je tosvojevrstan paradoks: Ravnogorski pokret je bujaopribli`avaju}i se uni{tenju. Bitka nije bila izgubljena uSrbiji - ona je bila izgubljena u trgovini Saveznika sasovjetskim partnerom i njegovim eksponentima naukupnom podru~ju Jugoslavije, kao i u ve{toj politi~kojigri komunisti~kog vodjstva, gradjenoj na“Jugoslovenstvu” i na `rtvama sopstvenog naroda. Bilismo prosto nadigrani u krvavom gradjanskom ratu. Jo{uvek smo se zavaravali, nagnuti nad ambisom koji seotvarao pred nama. Negovali smo nekakvu donkihoteriju:juri{anje na vetrenja~e, u nadi da }e se sudbina okrenuti.Bili smo uvereni u pravednost na{e stvari: svoj slom smovideli kao slom Srpstva i onoga {to je na{ narod vodilokroz istoriju. Bili smo spremni da potonemo s njim.”

Tre}i ‘ivot Dimitrija Djordjevi}a pokriva njegovo‘ivljenje u Beogradu posle dolaska komunista na vlast i

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poku{aj produ‘enja politi~ke borbe. U tom cilju on jenapisao tekst “Na{ ideolo{ki polo‘aj” gde je izneoshvatanja o nacionalizmu i demokratiji koja su zastupaliuglavnom ~lanovi Srpskog kulturnog kluba gde se re{enjeza nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji videlo u stvaranjuJugoslavije kao konfederacije tri dr‘ave: Srbije, Hrvatskei Slovenije sa ustavnom parlamentarnom monarhijomdinastije Karadjordjevi}a. Komentari{u}i taj tekst sada,posle pola veka kada se Jugoslavija raspaka, Djordjevi}ne odstupa od tih istih ubedjenja i demokratskih na~elaali priznaje da bi sa rezervom govorio o velikimSaveznicima u koje je nekada tako idealisti~ki verovao.Uhap{en od Ozne u jesen 1945. zbog formiranja tajneorganizacije Nacionalne revolucionarne srpske omladineu grupi od 17 omladinaca od kojih su samo poslednjadvojica oslobodjena, Djordjevi} je bio jedan od petoricekoji su dobili najdu‘e vremenske kazne: po ~etiri godinerobije. Teretilo ih je {to su bili osumnji~eni da su bili uvezi sa ~etni~kim komandosom Mihailom Stankovi}em-Stanlijem koga je Ozna ubila u zatvoru. Petodnevnosudjenje odigralo se krajem maja 1946. Memoari detaljnoiznose, dan po dan, proces u Beogradu gde je optu‘enebranio Dragi} Joksimovi} koji }e samo mesec dana docnijebraniti samog generala Mihailovi}a. Ovaj procesomladincima ostao je skoro nezapa‘en van zemlje,verovatno zato {to je proces protiv generala Mihailovi}azaokupio daleko ve}e interesovanje i stranih posmatra~a.Memoari, zatim, u detalje opisuju pi{~evo tamnovanje uZabeli kod Po‘arevca gde se susreo sa dr RadivojemVorkapi}em. Iz Zabele Djordjevi} je bio preba~en uMitrovicu da bi bio amnestiran u maju 1947. Posle izlaskasa robije, po{to je bio li{en gradjanskih prava koja suuklju~ivala pravo na zaposlenje, Djordjevi} se bacio naizu~avanje istorije iako u po~etku nije mogao da se upi{ena univerzitet nego je morao da slu‘i vojsku. U to vremedo{lo je do izbacivanje Komunisti~ke partije Jugoslavijeiz Kominforma i komunisti~ki re‘im je postao jo{ o{trijiprotiv srednje klase i imu}nijih seljaka kako bi se pokazao

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dosledan komunisti~kim principima. Djordjevi}eviroditelji su bili uhap{eni, otac osudjen na pola godinezatvora, i samo pomo}u podmi}ivanja slu‘benika Ozne,porodica se nekako spasila jo‘ te‘ih proganjanja.

^etvrti ‘ivot autora ovih potresnih memoara u stvarizapo~inje njegovim studijama istorije kada je 1950, posleodslu‘enja vojnog roka, pre{ao na Filozofski fakultetBeogradskog univerziteta gde je diplomirao sa najvi{omocenom 1954, doktorirao 1962, radio kao nau~ni saradniki savetnik u Balkanolo{kom institutu Srpske akademijenauka i umetnosti, ~iji je ~lan docnije postao. Godine1970. pre{ao je kao redovni profesor Kalifornijskoguniverziteta u Santa Barbari da predaje istoriju gde jeostvario briljantnu karijeru kao predava~, pisac, nau~niki akademik koji je napisao ili uredio 11 knjiga i objaviopreko stotinu ~lanaka. Medjutim, o tome ~etvrtom ‘ivotuDjordjevi} ne pi{e u svojim memoarima.

** *

Valja ista}i razliku srpskog i engleskog izdanjaDjordjevi}evih memoara. Na engleskom jeziku za mladogAmerikanca srpskog porekla data je jedna bolna istorijastradanja jedne generacije i stoga su u celosti prevedeniodeljci o ‘ivotu politi~kih zatvorenika u logoru na Banjici,Mauthauzenu, a posle u Zabeli i Mitrovici. Izostavljenisu odeljci od manjeg interesa za ~itaoce kojem pozadinakomplikovanih politi~kih sukobljavanja na Balkanu nijepoznata. Time se dobilo u upro{}avanju ‘ivotne pri~e.Djordjevi}evi memoari ~itaju se kao roman sli~nomemoarima Mihajla Pupina izdanim pre skoro ~etvrtineveka “From Immigrant to Inventor” (New York, 1923).

U tom cilju u engleskom izdanju izostavljen jePogovor prvoj knjizi “O`iljaka i opomena” od nekih 40strana u kojem se autor posle pola veka osvrnuo napodu`u analizu istorijskih zbivanja “pri~e jedne mladosti”i posebno omladinske organizacije Jugoslovenske

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ravnogorske omladine (JURAO) [taba 501 kao sastanomdelu Jugoslovenske vojske u ota`bini. Pisao je sada kaoistori~ar bez emocionalnosti, zanesenosti i romantizmakoji prate mlade ljude na pragu njihovog `ivota. Bio je iostao veran uspomeni lika generala Mihailovi}a koji jeprema mladim bio naklonjen o~inski za razliku od Titakoji je bio prekaljan enkadeovac, nemilosrdan uispunjavanju revolucionarnog zadatka i cilja.. BranaStranjakovi} jednom je uporedio generala Mihailovi}asa popularnim liderom Demokratske stranke LjubomDavidovi}em. Dra`a je bio ~ika Ljuba u uniformi. Otudaje general Mihailovi} bio poznat kao “^i~a” kao {to jeDavidovi} bio nazvan “^ika Ljubom”. Mihailovi} je bioduboko vezan za svoj narod i posle ulaska sovjetskihtrupa u Srbiju kada se povukao u Bosnu, ({to Djordjevi}smatra katastrofalnom odlukom) on je ostao do kraja uzsvoje jedinice mada je mogao da napusti zemlju, dok jeTito, posle desanta na Drvar, napustio svoje borce ipre{ao na ostrvu Vis za{ti}en od strane zapadnihsaveznika. Kao bitne faktore koji su odigrali sudbonosnuulogu u istoriji na{e zemlje tokom Drugog svetskog rataDjordjevi} isti~e poraz Jugoslovenske vojske u aprilskomratu i odlazak Mihailovi}a na Ravnu Goru, pojavukomunista tek posle nema~kog napada na Sovjetski Savez22. juna 1941, represalije nema~kog okupatora u Srbijikada je stotinu srpskih talaca strelajno za jednog ubijenognema~kog vojnika i, ~etvrto, genocid nad Srbima uHrvatskoj. Dok smo se mi ponosili milionskim {rtvamadotle su “mudri zapadnoevropski narodi isticali svojpasivni otpor koji je smanjivao njihove `rtve”, pi{eDjordjevi} (knjiga I, str. 307). Ravnogorski pokret imaoje dva cilja: borbu protiv fa{izma i borbu protivkomunizma, ali vremenom prevagnuo je drugi ciljoslanjaju}i se na ra~unicu da }e Saveznici slomiti fa{izama komunizam je ostajao kao najopasniji protivnik.Medjutim, ra~unica da }e zapadni saveznici sti}i na Bal-kan pre Sovjeta pokazala se pogre~nom a za zapadneSaveznike borba protiv fa{izma u tom razdoblju imala je

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prioritet. Kona~no Kraljeva izjava 12. septembra 1944,kojom se pod pritiskom Britanske vlade opredilo zapartizane i odrekao Mihailovi}evog pokreta, imala jefatalnog uticaja na potonji razvoj dogadjaja.

U ovom Pogovoru prvoj knjizi “O`iljci i opomene”,Dimitrije Djordjevi} podvukao je i razliku izmedjuomladinske grupe oko {taba 501 koja je dolazila izpodmlatka Srpskog demokratskog kluba i Srpskedemokratske omladine koja je sledila ideologijuDemokratske stranke koja je bila na gradjanskoj levici.“[tab 501 bio je nacionalno agresivniji u odnosu nasrpsko pitanje u budu}oj Jugoslaviji”, pi{e Djordjevi} ismatra da se “{tab 501 nalazio na gradjanskoj desnici”;dok je “omladina Demokratske stranke bila nacionalnopomirljivija u odnosu na budu}oj Jugoslaviji” (str. 284).Ali, {to se ti~e stava prema fa{izmu i prema komunizmu,razlike nije bilo. Obe grupe omladinaca podnele su te{ke`rtve u ratu.

** *

Memoari akademika Dimitrija Djordjevi}a pisanisu bez mr‘nje iako je iskusio patnje i stradanja od nacistakoji su ubijali telo i komunista koji su hteli da ubiju du{uu njihovoj ideolo{koj mr‘nji prema onima koji su im sesuprotstavljali. Sa~uvati prisebnost i ose}anje mere retkisu kvaliteti ljudi koji su uspeli da prodju kroz iskustvakroz koju je pro{ao u svoja prva tri ‘ivota DimitrijeDjordjevi} koji svojim memoarima ostavlja poruku svojimpotomcima o strahotama rata i tragi~ne pro{losti jednegeneracije kako bi mogli razumeti, osuditi i oprostiti.

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998260

Jozo Uvodic

JEDNA NOVA INICIJATIVAIZDAVACKE DELATNOSTI U SRBIJI

Jugoslovenska stampa nam je vrlo dugo jednostrano pretstavljalanasu istoriju i nas svakodnevni zajednicki zivot. Najbolji nacini da sedodatnim informacijama koriguju ti nedostatci su zvucni zapisi samihucesnika kljucnih dogadjaja nase istorije koje je novinar Radio Beogradai izdavac Dragoslav Simic skupio u seriju od osamdesetak ‘‘KNJIGAKOJE GOVORE’’ (na odio kasetama u pojedinacnom trajanju od po 60ili 90 minuta). Te knjige su sastavljene od zvanicnih govora, intervjuai kazivanja poznatih licnosti iz nase neposredne proslosti. Taj cilj, dase sacuva od zaborava nasa autenticna istorija dvadesetog veka, naveoje izdavaca da se pored elektronskog kataloga Narodne BibliotekeSrbije obrati i onim gradjanima koji su samoinicijatiovno snimali namagnetofonsku traku govore koje su smatrali od istorijskog znacaja ikoje su cuvali kao svoju privatnu kolekciju. Ono sto je posao institucijau Srbiji jos uvek rade pojedinci ili niko. Zato su valda sva kompletnaradiofonska izdanja Dragoslava Simica prihvacena od NarodneBiblioteke SANU-a i cine od sad integralni deo njene biblioteke.

Kada je kralj Aleksandar Sredinom 1934 godine posetio Bugarskuobratio se svom domacinu caru Borisu Koburgu sa ‘‘Vase Velicanstvo’’.Smirenim i odlucnim glasom ponudio je bugarskom carstvu prijateljstvo,ne navodeci krivicu njegovog prethodnika cara Ferdinanda za uvlacenjeBugarske u prethodni rat narocito protiv Srbije. Ovo je samo jedandetalj iz zvucne knjige ‘‘JUGOSLAVIJA 1918 - 1991 - KRATAKPREGLED RASPADANJA.’’

Milovan Djilas, revolucionar i komunista, kriticar birokratskogsocijalizma i kulta licnosti, koji je zbog svog politickog misljenja dugorobijao, u intervjuu koga je dao 1990 godine, rekao je da mu odpolitickih prijatelja ama bas niko nije ostao.

Vladimir Dedijer istice Titov hedonizam, nezajazljivu sklonostka luksuzu, cime je po Dedijeru ‘‘tukao sve od reda’’. Pitajuci se zarje to komunizam, Dedijer kao Titov biograf zakljucuje : ‘‘Svaka castTitu za period do raskida sa Staljinom. Ali od tada sva nasa revolucionarnaetika je od silnog zdranja otisla niz Brozova creva’’.

Dragoslav Mihajlovic, autor romana ‘‘Kada su cvetale tikve’’napisao je dramu po motivima svog romana koja je 1969 godine petputa igrana u Jugoslovenskom Dramskom Pozoristu. Tada je doslo domnogobrojnih napada na politickim skupovima, u stampi, na radiju iteleviziji, licne intervencije Edvarda Kardelja i javnog govorapredsednika Tita. Igrani film prema vec otkupljenom scenariju nijesnimljen. Drama je skinuta sa repertoara da bi posle 14 godina bilaobnovljena u Narodnom Pozoristu.

Apelujemo na sve citaoce koji poseduju fono dokumenta (zvucne

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zapise), ili koji mogu da svedoce u vezi istorijskih dogadjaja nasezemlje, da se obrate autoru, da bi svojim doprinosom obogatilibiblioteku ‘‘KNJIGA KOJA GOVORI’’.

Sledi DOKUMENTARNI PROGRAM audio izdanja o ljudimai dogadjaima, koji su kod nas obelezili XX vek. Taj sadrzaj zvucnebiblioteke koje citaoci mogu pojedinacno da poruce kod izdavaca iautora Dragoslava Simica na adresu : - Branka Krsmanovica 21 - 11000Beograd - Jugoslavija. Cena jednog primerka je 20 nemackih marakapromenjena u dinare po zvanicnom kursu plus postanski troskovi. Josje povoljnije ako to za vas urade vasi rodjaci i prijatelji koji zive uJugoslaviji.

SPISAK NASLOVA:

1.- JUGOSLAVIJA - KRATAK PREGLED RASPADANJA. - Govorikralj Aleksandar Karadjordjevic i najznacajnije licnosti sa politickescene Jugoslavije od 1918 do 1991 godine.2.- KNJIZEVNIK DRAGOSLAV MIHAJLOVIC - TITO I JA. - Izvoriza ovo delo bili su Titova osuda pisca golootocke tragedije i drame‘‘Kad su cvetale tikve ’’.3.- KNIN I REPUBLIKA SRPSKA KRAJINA OD 1988 DO 1991GODINE. - Snimci javnih manifestacija u Kninskoj Krajini do 1991 itragedija izbeglica 1995.4.- POLJSKA VEZA. - Prica o ljubavi dvoje mladih u vremekomunisticke Poljske i Srbije.5.- MILJUSA SA GOLOG OTOKA I. i II. - Sestra generala ArseJovanovica, Miljusa govori o najznacajnijim ljudima komunistickeJugoslavije koji su stvorili Goli Otok.6.- SRBI I JEVREJI. - Snimljeno u Izraelu 1989. Secanja jugoslovenskihjevreja na zemlju porekla.7.- PROFESOR RASKO DIMITRIJEVIC. - Intervju sa jednim odnajpoznatijih besednika beogradskog univerziteta o vrednostima zivereci. (Vib: ‘‘On nam je sluzio slatko od reci a mi smo uzimalikasicicom, pazljivo da nista ne prospemo ‘’).8.- SRBIN MOJSIJEVE VERE. - Benko Danon, najugledniji Jevrejinmedju srpskom emigracijom u Australiji.9.- STA JE ‘‘ROTARI KLUB?’’ - O osnivanju, istorijatu, organizacijii programu Rotari kluba u Beogradu govore clanovi ovog poslovnogudruzenja.10.- SRETEN BOZIC VONGAR ‘‘OD UDBE DO AUSTRALIJE’’ -Intervju snimljen u Australiji 1993 godine sa najvecim australijskimpiscem o Aboridzanima koji je rodjen na Bukulji.11.- ITA RINA. - Zvezda nemog filma, mis Jugoslavije i Evrope 1930godine.12.- LUJO LOVRIC - OCI ZA JUGOSLAVIJU. - Istorija hrvatskogjugoslovenstva u prvim decenijama XX veka.13.- EMIGRANTSKI GOLI OTOK U MADJARSKOJ 1948 GODINE.- Govore informbirovci koji su pobegli iz Jugoslavije. Snimljeno u

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Madjarskoj.14.- SUDJENJE DRAZI MIHAJLOVICU. - Govore: Draza, Tito,istoricar Dejvid Martin, odbrana i tuzioci.15.- PORTRET DECIJEG PISCA DRAGANA LUKICA.16.- VANE IVANOVIC. - Intervju atleticara i ucesnika na Olimpijadiu Berlinu 1936 godine, o svom zivotu brodovlasnika u Londonu, ojugoslovenskoj politickoj emigraciji od 1945 do 1991 godine i ojugoslovenskoj demokratskoj alternativi.17.- TAKMICENJE U BESEDNISTVU. - na pravnom fakultetu uBeogradu 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997 - Integralni snimci.18.- MART I APRIL 1941. - Secanja adjutanta kralja Petra II i knezaPavla, majora Nikole Pece Pomorisca.19.- ENGLESKINJA U RUSNJU. - Kako nas je videla i opisala LujzaRajner boraveci tokom okupacije u selu Rusanj kraj Beograda. Njeneuspomene snimjene su na srpskom jeziku.20.- CUDESNI ZIVOT ALEKSANDARA BALABINA. - Doktorhemije i kumce kralja Aleksandra Karadjordjevica spominje kakvu suulogu u njegovom zivotu imali kralj Aleksandar, logor Jasenovac,kardinal Stepinac, Tito, Draza Mihajlovic, Tesla, masoni, Australija.21.- MILAN PANIC I STUDENTI. - Predizborni susret u Sali Herojana Filoloskom fakultetu u Beogradu 1992 godine.22.- PREDRAG GOJKOVIC CUNE - PRIVATNO. - Dok prica o svomzivotu, o muzici, on peva i prati sebe na gitari.23.- JA, VLADIMIR DEDIJER. - Secanja akademika, istoricara iTitovog biografa. Snimljeno u Ljubljani 1990 godine.24.- GOVORI JOVANA RASKOVICA. - Intervjui: predvidjanja upredvecerje gradjanskog rata 1989 godine u Sibeniku i 1992 godine uBeogradu.25.- AKADEMIK LJUBOMIR SIMOVIC - IZBOR BESEDA. - Program u jednoj tacci - Osnivacka skupstina DEPOSA 10/10/1992: - Sterija medju maskama - pristupna beseda SANU 29/05/1995 - Beseda o molitvi - u manastiru Zici 19/08/199526.- OSAM VEKOVA MANASTIRA STUDENICE. - Na proslavigovori patrijarh German, vajar Nebojsa Mitric. Pevaju Pavle Aksentijevici crkveni horovi.27.- AKADEMIK MATIJA BECKOVIC - IZBOR BESEDA. - Vukov sabor u Trsicu - septembar 1990 - Demokratski pokret Srbije, pismo Slobodanu Milosevicu - jun 1992 - Miting opozicije pred izbore - 17 decembar 1992 - Drugi sabor Srpskog Pokreta Obnove - 6 mart 199328.- MILAN PANIC I DOBRICA COSIC U KOSTAC SAJUGOSLAVIJOM I. i II. -Snimak govora predsednika Republike Jugoslavije Dobrice Cosica uNarodnoj Skupstini 14 jula 1992. Zakletva i govor Milana Panicapovodom izbora za predsednika savezne vlade 14 jula 1992. Izjavesefova politickih stranaka o izboru Panica i Cosica 1992 godine.29.- MUZIKA ZA DUSU. - Autenticni snimci starogradske muzike izvojvodjanskih kafana snimljenih sezdesetih godina XX veka.30.- URUCIVANJE ZICKE HRISOVULJE LJUBOMIRU SIMOVICU.

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- Govore vladika zicki Stefan, teatrolog Jovan Cirilov i akademiciPredrag Palavestra i Ljuba Simovic.31.- RUSI U SRBIJI. - Price ruskih emigranata koji su spas odboljsevicke revolucije nasli u Jugoslaviji.32.- NIKOLA PASIC. - Unuk politicara Nikole Pasica prica o svojojporodici i o drugom svetskom ratu.33.- RAJA RODIC. - Kako je privatni biznis srusio samoupravljanje uJugoslaviji.34.- KOD TITA I DRAZE. - Licna istorija seljaka Milenka Sandicakod partizana i cetnika.35.- DOBROVOLJAC PETAR JOVIC. - Austrougarski vojnik Jovicbezi u Rusiju 1916 godine i postaje srpski dobrovoljac.36.- IGRANKE U BEOGRADU SEZDESETIH GODINA. - Prvi rokend rol u Srbiji, vreme kad su drugaruce birale. Intervjui i pevanje sazvezdama estrada kojih vise nema.37.- TOLA MANOJLOVIC. - Zivot i pozoriste u liku glumca PetraKralja.38.- VEVCANI. - Voda i politika u makedonskom selu Vevcani 1987godine.39.- PRINC TOMISLAV KARADJORDJEVIC. - Moji roditelji, mojabraca i ja. Snimljeno u Topoli 1993 godine.40.- BIO JEDNOM 9 MART 1992 GODINE.41.- STUDENTSKI PROTEST 1992 godine.42.- VIDOVDANSKI SABOR 1992 godine I . i II . - MitingDemokratskog Pokreta Srbije pred Saveznom Skupstinom u Beograduna kome su najmasovnije izrazeni stavovi opozicije prema vladajucojstranci 1992 godine.43.- PRVA SKUPSTINA DEPOSA OKTOBRA 1992 godine I., II. iIII. - Opozicioni prvaci, javni i kulturni radnici govore o politickimprilikama u Srbiji. Govore slikar Mica Popovic, knjizevnici SlobodanSelenic, Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz i drugi.44.- PREDIZBORNA KONVENCIJA DEMOKRATSKE STRANKEdecembra 1992. - Govore : Micunovic, Djindjic, Tosic, Panic i drugi.45.- MITING MILANA PANICA PRED IZBORE 1992 godine. -Integralni snimak najjaceg opozicionog skupa pred SaveznomSkupstinom decembra 1992 godine.46.- DJILAS O SEBI. - Beckovic, Kalezic, Barovic, Tosic, VaneIvanovic i supruga Stefanija o Djilasu.47.- DISIDENTI. - Mihajlo Mihajlov i Lazar Stojanovic - rediteljfilma ‘‘Plasticni Isus’’.48.- PODJELJENA CRNA GORA SA PJEVANJEM I PUCANJEM. -Miting liberala na Cetinju za samostalnu Crnu Goru februara 1992godine.49.- SRPSKA EMIGRACIJA.- Govore ljudi kojima je bio zabranjendolazak u Jugoslaviju za vreme komunizma. Snimljeno u Americi iAustraliji.50.- PRVE SLOBODNE POSLERATNE DEMONSTRACIJESELJAKA U NOVOM SADU 1988 godine.- Integralni snimak.51.- TITO OPET MEDJU NAMA. - Pisma gradjana Jugoslavije

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upucena Titu u Ljubljani 1980 godine. Vlado Djukanovic: Tata je hteoda budem Titov pionir.52.- RADIO MOST KLIVLEND - BEOGRAD. - Prenos sa prvogsabora srpskog ujedinjenja u Klivlendu decembra 1990 godine. RADIOMOST SIDNEJ - BEOGRAD 1991 godine. Pitanja odbrane grupesrpskih iseljenika upucenih Beogradu pred pocetak gradjanskog rata uJugoslaviji. Ovo su prve interkontinentalne emisije uzivo u istorijisrpskog radija.53.- SVEDOK ISTORIJE NIKOLA KOSIC - I. - Jedini zivi organizatorpuca 27 marta 1941 godine prica o pucu i o nasim raskolima uzarobljenickim logorima u Nemackoj. RADIO CAS NIKOLE KOSICAU MILVOKIJU II. - Nikola Kosic je i najznacajniji organizator srpskogradija u Americi.54.- NIKOLA TESLA. - Govore diplomata Milos Tosic koji je Teslipozajmljivao novac i seljak - pesnik Zivadin Stevanovic koji je prodaosvoje imanje 1939 godine da bi otisao na Svetsku Izlozbu u Njujork dapozdravi Teslu.55.- IZBORI U JUGOSLAVIJI 1996 GODINE - STVARANJEKOALICIJE ZAJEDNO. - Promotivna konferencija u hotelu Hajat1996 godine. Govore Avramovic, Draskovic, Kostunica, Djindjic iPesiceva - integralni snimak.56.- ANTIKVAR JANKO HRKALOVIC. - Kako ja vrsenanacionalizacija knjizara 1948 godine uz komentar Dejana Medakovica.KNJIZEVNIK MILOS CRNJANSKI : LAMENT NAD BEOGRADOM.57.- CERACEMO SE JOS. - Svoje stihove kazuje pesnik MatijaBeckovic.58.- ZVONACKA BANJA. - Mala Svajcarska na jugu Srbije. Receptza dug zivot.59.- GENERAL TRIFUNOVIC.60.- BRUKA U NEGOTINU. - Besedom Ljubomira Simovica trebalaje da otpocne proslava ‘‘Mokranjcevih dana’’ 1996 u Negotinu. Zastosu akademici Ljubomir Simovic i Dejan Despic proterani iz hotela kaodrzavni neprijatelji.61.- SLIKAR MICA POPOVIC. - Od prvog razgovora sa profesoromLazarom Trifunovicem 1965 do obracanja studentima u Beogradu nademonstracijama 1996 god.62.- ARHEOLOG ZLATNIH PRSTIJU - DRAGOSLAV SREJOVIC.- Covek koji je otkrio Lepenski Vir govori o sebi. O njemu govore VidaOgnjanovic, Milorad Pavic, Nikola Tasic i Jovan Cirilov.63.- NOVINAR MIROSLAV NIKITOVIC - MOJAKRIMINALISTICKA RUBRIKA U POLITICI 1935 - 1936.64.- APRILSKI RAT 1941 GODINE U SECANJIMA PREZIVELIHPILOTA.65.- DESIMIR TOSIC. I. - MOJI PRIJATELJI I MOJ POLITICKIRAD. II.- JUGOSLOVENSKA DEMOKRATSKA ALTERNATIVA -Vizija buducnosti.66.- RASKOL SRPSKE CRKVE U AMERICI. - Prema svedocenju idokumentaciji Nikole Kosica. Govori patrijarh German.67.- DOBRILA SMILJANIC - SIROGOJNO. - Kako sam kreirala

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dzempere poznate u citavom svetu. RAJKA BOROJEVIC. - OsnivacDragacevske skole tkanja.68.- AMERICKA FONOTEKA NIKOLE KOSICA. - ‘’Cerska bitka’’,prva srpska radio drama snimljena u Americi 1955 godine. Prvi snimaknarodne pesme Smrt majke Jugovica 1936 godine u Americi. Snimakpredavanja iz 1956 godine profesora Radoja Knezevica ‘‘Jugoslovenskapoliticka emigracija’’.69.- VLADAN GOVORI. - Cetri govora doktora Vladana Vasiljevicau Beogradu, uz komentar doktora Vojina Dimitrijevica.70.- KOSOVO : PREKALE - SELO NA PRODAJU 1988 godine. PredVidovdan 1989: raspolozenje ljudi pred proslavu 600 godina Kosovskebitke.71.- U PREDVECERJE GRADJANSKOG RATA U JUGOSLAVIJI.- Zvucni zapis proslave Kosovske bitke na Dalmatinskom Kosovu.Sudjenje Jovi Opacicu u Sibeniku 1989 godine i propagandni ratamerickih Srba i Hrvata na radio talasima.72.- Doktor DJORDJE NESIC 1873 - 1959. - Lekar osnivac moderneoftalmologije u Srbiji, osnivac prvog biciklistickog i automobilskogkluba u Beogradu na pocetku XX veka. Delo radjeno na osnovuistrazivanja Z. Kecmanovica i autenticnih tekstova doktora DjordjaNesica.POSEBNA IZDANJA :1.- GOLUB DOBRASINOVIC. - Neumorni istrazivac zivota i delaVuka Karadzica.2.- UGLJESA KRSTIC. - Izdavac, pisac, prevodilac i osnivac knjizevneZadruge Vajat.3.- LUKICI - ISTORIJA CIRKUSA U SRBIJI - Porodicna ispovest oistoriji cirkusa u Srbiji.4.- DEDA IGNJAT. - Devedesetogodisnji drvoseca iz Han Pijeska injegov zivotni roman.5.- MLEKARA ZLATIBOR - LAZOVIC. - Nas sistem uspeha.6.- ISTORIJA OCNOG LEKARSTVA U SRBIJI. - Govore poznatilekari.7.- MOJ SISTEM USPEHA. - Branislav Bacovic - menadzer godine1996.8.- O CINCARIMA. - Gordana Doroslovac i Zoran Plaskovic.

GOVORNO - MUZICKA IZDANJA :

1.- OPERA KARMEN. - Radio adaptacija. Tekst cita glumac MilosZutic.

MOC ZIVE RECI - SRPSKI PISCI CITAJU SVOJE PRICE :

1.- MILOVAN DANOJLIC - ( Ivanovci kod Ljiga - 1937 )2.- ALEKSANDAR TISMA - ( Horgos - 1924 )3.- ZIVOJIN PAVLOVIC -( Sabac 1933 )4.- VIDA OGNJENOVIC - ( Dubocke kod Niksica 1941 )5.- MILISAV SAVIC - ( Raska 1945 )6.- MATIJA BECKOVIC - ( Senta 1939 )

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_______________________________________________________________________________UPUTSTVA AUTORIMA

(stampana u svakom broju "Dijaloga")

"DIJALOG" je tromese~ni ~asopis o idejama, time podrazumevaju}i sve ideje.Po{to je sadr`aj veoma raznovrstan i zahvata sve {to u naj{irem smislu spada u dru{tvenei prirodne nauke, kulturu i umetnost, autori bi trebalo da su svesni da je malo ~itaoca kojisu eksperti za sve oblasti. Treba izbegavati nepotrebne stru~ne izraze, a tamo gde su takviizrazi nu`ni detaljno ih objasniti prilikom prve upotrebe. Prilozi bi trebalo da budu urednokucani pisa}om ma{inim ili laserskim {tampa~em, sa duplim proredom samo sa jedne stranepapira. Tekstovi pra}eni kompjuter disketom i pisani u ASCII, Word ili nekom uobi~ajenomformatu i bez posebnog oblikovanja teksta (bez komplikovanih tabela i grafi~kih prikazau samom tekstu) olak{avaju posao redakciji i imaju vi{e {ansi da budu {tampani. Urednicismatraju da jezik slu`i komunikaciji i zato vas molimo da upotrebljavate dijalekt koji ve}ina~itaoca razume. Ukoliko sama forma jezika ~ini ono {to se ̀ eli saop{titi, takav tekst spadau literarni odeljak na{eg lista.

Autori bi trebalo da imaju na umu da }e "analize i du`i komentari" kao i "originalni~lanci" biti pregledani od vi{e (naj~es}e 2 - 3) ~lanova uredni{tva i stru~nih savetnika odkojih neki ̀ ive u udaljenim krajevima sveta. Putovanje po{tanske po{iljke mo`e da trajeod tri nedelje do nepuna dva meseca. S toga bi sadr`aj tekstova trebalo da bude takav daostane aktuelan i posle 6 meseci od njihovog podno{enja redakciji.

Svi tekstovi moraju biti potpisani, navedena profesija i afiliacija (institucija) autora- ukoliko je nau~ni rad iz oblasti profesije autora a ne sasvim nezavisan autorski tekst, datapuna adresa, broj telefona i eventualno faksa i e-mail adresa.

AUTORSKE IZJAVE. i) Autor bi morao da u propratnom pismu ili u posebnomparagrafu odvojenom od teksta ~lanka dâ kratku pismenu izjavu da dati tekst podnosi za{tampu "Dijalogu" i da ~lanak nije u istoj formi i na istom jeziku podnesen drugom ~asopisuza ~tampu. ii) Ukoliko to nije druk~ije ugovoreno, AUTORSKA PRAVA (copyright)zadr`ava "Dijalog", Ukoliko autor ̀ eli da zadr`i autorska prava morao bi to posebno danaglasi.KATEGORIJE ^LANAKA I RUBRIKE

1. PISMA ^ITALACA. 1/2 strane po pismu.2. ORIGINALNI ^LANCI.. To su argumentovana izlaganja novih vidjenja

pojedinih problema sa eventualnim originalnim re{enjima. Du`ina i struktura kao "analizei duzi komentari". Autori bi trebalo da vode ra~una da naslov opisno odgovara sadr`aju~lanka. ̂ lanak bi trebalo da po~ne kratkim rezimeom (80 do 100 re~i). Naslov i rezime bitrebalo prevesti na francuski i engleski. Jedan ili vi{e po~etnih paragrafa bi trebalo daposlu`e ~itaocu, koji nije stru~njak za predmet o kome se pi{e, kao uvod, kako bi razumeokasniji tekst, a stru~njaku da poslu`i kao vodi~ kroz relevantnu nau~nu literaturu iz oblastikoja se obra|uje. Tekst treba da se zavr{i kratkim zaklju~kom. Ako je vi{e elemenatazaklju~ka, treba spomenuti samo one najva`nije. Ograni~ena relevantna literatura je datana kraju, citirana po redosledu po kome je spomenuta u tekstu. Fusnote, koje ne spadajustriktno u literaturu, su takodje dozvoljene. Autorima se preporu~uje da, u idealnom slucaju,u ~lanku dokazuju samo jednu ~injenicu, pri tom koriste}i argumente koji su u nauci opsteprihva}eni i koje ne treba naknadno dokazivati. Tekst mora da ima oblik ZAKLJU^IVANJA.Posebno je va`no da se uzme u obzir da "Dijalog" objavljuje kao centralne ~lankeargumentovane studije koje nekad mogu i da budu ne dva suprotna MI[LJENJA (kojaobjavljujemo u posebnoj rubrici "kratki komentari") ve} dva suprotna argumentovanaZAKLJU^IVANJA. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju~uje moraju zadovoljiti kriterijumerelevantnosti, prihvatljivosti, biti dovoljno osnovane za zaklju~ivanje, a zaklju~ivanje mora

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 267

da poseduje elemente za uspe{nu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji.3. KOMENTARI.i) KRATKI KOMENTARI. To su kra}i komentari, napisani od strane urednika,

ure|iva~kog saveta, ili izuzetno, ~italaca. Odnose se na va`nije ~lanke u datom "Dijalogu"ili na momentalno aktuelne probleme. Po{to autor izra`ava svoje MI[LJENJE, strukturaje slobodna, novinarska, mada je po`eljno da tekst ima izvesne elemente ZAKLJU^IVANJA(videti opis originalnih ~lanaka, kao i ni`e "Posebne napomene"). Literatura, ako je citirana,data je u tekstu. Du`ina teksta je prose~no 1 strana "Dijaloga".

ii) KOMENTARI ^ITALACA. To su komentari (1 do 2 strane "Dijaloga" pokomentaru), koji imaju strukturu ~lanaka, ali ne produbljuju}i suvise predmet o kojem seradi. Rezime nije potreban, mada je citiranje literature po`eljno.

iii) ANALIZE I DUZI KOMENTARI. Komentari{u najnovija dostignu}a uizvesnoj oblasti. Po`eljno je da ne budu du`i od pet stranica "Dijaloga". Struktura kaostruktura ^LANAKA.

4. AKTUELNOSTI.. Prikazi, bez dublje analize, povodom kulturnih i nau~nihdogadjaja (1 strana po prikazu). Prikazi novih knjiga koje ne spadaju striktno u literaturu(1 strana po knjizi).

5. LITERATURA I UMETNOST. Proza i Poezija. Originalna neobjavljenaknjizevna ostvarenja. Maksimalno ukupno 10 strana "Dijaloga". Izuzetno bi}e omogu}enoobjavljivanje du`ih priloga ili ODLOMAKA knjiga u nastavcima. Knji`evna i umetni~kakritika. Obuhva}ene su sve umetnosti. ̂ lanci 3 do 5 strana "Dijaloga" Likovna kritika.3-5 strana. Likovni prilozi. Kratki prikazi Prikazi novih knjiga koje spadaju u literaturuu {irem smislu (1/2 do 1 strane "Dijaloga" po prikazanoj knjizi).

6. DOGA\AJI.. Kalendar kulturnih i nau~nih dogadjaja.7. OGLASI. Spiskovi i cenovnici novih knjiga. Reklame i oglasi.

Posebne napomeneMada se bavi svim temama od op{teg zna~aja, ~asopis }e

pokazivati malo ve}i interes za teme koje se ti~u Evrope i Balkana.^lanci bi trbalo da imaju prete`no formu argumentovanih zaklju~ivanja.Mi{ljenja, li~na uverenja, neargumentovai stavovi nisu tipi~ni za"Dijalog" i autorima savetujemo da izbegavaju takve forme. Mi{ljenja,stavovi, deklaracije, izlivi psiholo{kih stanja, i sve neargumentovanetvrdnje, ili suvi{e op{te - te nepogodne za dokazivanje, ili konkretne -ali nepoduprte dokazima, ostavljaju malo ili ne ostavljaju uop{teprostora za dijalog. Op{te prihva}ene ~injenice nije potrebno posebnodokazivati sem kad se radi o specijalnim znanjima. Nasuprot, sve novetvrdnje moraju biti poduprte argumentima. Kori{}eni argumenti mogubiti druge op{te prihva}ene ~injenice, ali i nove ~injenice koje, ako nepredstavljaju direktna iskustva, moraju biti poduprte argumentima.

[ta su "op{te" prihva}ene ~injenice nije uvek jednostavno odrediti.Snaga rezonovanja na kojima te ~injenice po~ivaju ~ini ih "op{te"prihva}enim. Broj ljudi koji ih prihvata nije sam po sebi kriterijum.^esto samo ponavljanje nekih "~injenica" (u {iroko uticajnim medijima)ostavlja la`an utisak da su one "op{te" prihva}ene. U tom smislu o snazirezonovanja mo`e se suditi samo ako se prika`e ceo tok rezonovanja tj.ako tvrdnja bude pra}ena kompletnim dokazivanjem - ako ima dijalo{kuformu. Dijalo{ka forma je tipi~na forma u kojoj dolazi do merenjaargumenata, upore|ivanja, proveravanja i najzad zaklju~ivanja o tomekoje je rezonovanje bolje.

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998268

Pisani tekst, u odsustvu direktnog sagovornika, rekonstrui{e tu"dinamiku" dijaloga unapred eksponiraju}i celo rezonovanje i timeeksponira najja~e ali i najslabije delove rezonovanja, omogu}avaju}imerenje argumenata od strane ~itaoca. Kompletano argumentovanozaklju~ivanje omogu}uje ~itaocu potpunu rekonstrukciju saznajnogprocesa autora. Snaga dokaza ne le`i u koli~ini dokaza (recimo citiranjudugih listi kori{}ene literature), ve} u njihovoj snazi kao primenjenogrezonovanja tako|e sa~injenog od sna`ne argumentacije. Ima tekstovakoji sadr`e kompletne argumentacije te tu nije potrebna dodatna listadokaza, izvora tj. literature. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju~ujemoraju zadovoljiti kriterijume relevantnosti, prihvatljivosti, bitidovoljno osnovane za zaklju~ivanje, a zaklju~ivanje mora da posedujeelemente za uspe{nu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji. Sama ~injenica daje jedna tvrdnja snabdevena eksplicitno svim elementima koji su dovelido njenog nastajanja otkriva potencijalne slabe ta~ke argumenata te~italac mo`e da proveri sam argument ne bi li verifikovao njegovuvalidnost i uporedio sa eventualnim li~no razvijenim argumentom.

Sadr`aj i formma teksta su jedini faktori koji se procenjujuprilikom odlu~ivanju o objavljivanju. Li~nost autora, autoritet ireputacija, u pozitivnom ili negativnom smislu, nisu uzeti u obzirprilikom dono{enja odluke o prihvatanju ili odbijanju teksta za {tampu.Svi tekstovi podle`u najmanje dvema recenzijama. Preporu~ujemoautorima, bez obzira na njihov eventualni autoritet za oblast kojom sebavi njihov tekst, da u idealnom slu~aju prihvate, ili odgovoreargumentovano na SVE primedbe recenzenata. Ignorisanje primedbirecenzenta mo`e da dovede do definitivnog odbijanja teksta, ili, ako seradi o solitarnim primedbama, tekst bude objavljen ali pra}enkomentarom urednika koji bi ukratko izra`avao mi{ljenja stru~nihrecenzenata. Takodje, ~ak i u retkim slu~ajevima kad autor striktnopo{tuje "uputstva autorima", trebalo bi o~ekivati ponovljene kontaktesa urednikom i, gotovo redovno, zna~ajne izmene i dopune tekstova.

Objavljivanje autorskih tekstova u "Dijalogu" primarno ostvarujeveoma va`nu informativnu funkciju ~asopisa i nema, samo po sebi,karakter odavanja priznanja autoru za njegov, veoma ~esto, zna~ajanistra`iva~ki i nau~ni rad.

Prilozi se redovno ne honori{u sem posebno naru~enih tekstova,~ije je honorisanje predmet posebnog dogovora.Tro{kovi {tampe,ukoliko zahtevi ne prevazilaze redovnu formu lista, se ne napla}uju.Ako prilozi zahtevaju posebne {tamparske usluge (preduga~ak tekstkoji zahteva pove}anje broja strana broja, posebne sveske, prilozi uboji, posebni grafi~ki prikazi), ukoliko odobreni od uredni{tva,napla}uju se po specijalnoj ekonomskoj tarifi.

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 27-28, Dec. 1998 269

Et si on persistaità croire en l'homme...

KOSSOVO, VERITE POETIQUE

Boris Lazitch

Quatre poètes pour exprimer une fin de siècle douloureuse et lourdede questions dans les Balkans, pour donner corps à une vérité poétiqueautrement plus complexe que l’actualité politique, tel est le propos de cechoix de poésies qui ose joindre des voix serbes et albanaises en un effortqui se voudrait commun d’ouverture et de dialogue. Quatre poètes pourexprimer l’attachement commun aux valeurs intrinsèques de l’âme humaine;liberté, créativité, amour. Pour exprimer ce qu’Anne Yelène nommaitjudicieusement “Les droits de l’âme” - se référant à la défense de l’immensepatrimoine culturel serbe du Kossovo -, nous avons choisis de présenter ence numéro de “Dialogue” quatre voix poétiques singulières venues deSerbie et d’Albanie. Darinneka Yévritch (1947) et Ali Podrimja (1942) sonttous deux originaire du Kossovo et da la Métochie et témoignent, chacunà sa manière, d’un attachement profond à la terre d’origine, à la culturefondatrice de leur communautés respectives et une aspiration au respect età la reconnaissance de la valeur humaine, des droits de leurs âmes en terrede Kossovo. Stèvane Tontitch (1947), qui survécut à Sarajevo, offre un ditd’amour baigné d’ironie noire et de compassion à ce peuple serbe dont il estoriginaire et dont l’histoire meurtrie est, dans ses poèmes, particulièrementévocatrice. Visar Zhiti (1952), qui connut de longues années durant lescachots de l’Albanie hodjienne, fils de poète lui-même, évoque cette fin desiècle sous l’image de la mort des forêts, figures symboliques de la mort desrelations humaines traditionnelles, de l’extinction de l’amour et de la hontesacrifiés à l’autel de la religion du Capital, dernièrement vivement acclaméepar les hérauts du néolibéralisme dont les armées ont dévasté la RépubliqueFédérale de Yougoslavie.

Serbes et Albanais, Goranes, Serbes musulmans et Roms (Tsiganes)partagent une et même terre au Kossovo et en Métochie. Puisse venir le jourou plus aucune forme de répression ne s’exercera à l’encontre de leurscommunautés respectives qui toutes revendiquent, à juste titre, un droit devie au Kossovo. Vienne le jour des chants de réconciliation, des chants depardon. Vienne le jour de chants d’ouverture à ce qui est altérité.

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Darinneka Yévritch

LES CLOCHES DE DETCHANI

J’énonce,j’énonce ton nom depuis des siècles,je pressent ta caresse maladive sur mes cheveux après lapluie,comme le cri de tes cloches aveugle et rend muette !lorsqu’après ton front je m’effondre dans les gouffresje ne comprends même plus les prières.

Pour toi les filles de Jérusalemsont toutes douces veuveset des oies sauvages blessent les toiles d’araignées quirêventde picoter le vin de tes joues,elles égrènent les ducats d’or pur et amersdes épousées lorsqu’en de mauvais temps ceux-ci arrivent.

Sous la plus profonde des pierres de Detchani mes mainspourrissent :toi sainte et peste bibliquetoi septième moine du mont Athosmes neuf Yougovitch et douleur de la tsarine Militsa,beauté que ne virent les yeux du tsar de césarni de la Goykovitsa !

Mon amour, les filles de Jérusalem te visitent-elles,si seulement tu posais ta main sur mes hanchesje pourrais à chaque printempsêtre enceinte et refleurirsi seulement tu effleurais ma gorge de ton souffleje pourrais même allaiter les neuf Yougovitch(malheur si les cloches de Detchani s’écrientet troublent ton image sur les fresques).

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Mais parfois l’oiseau oubli son envolabandonne la montagne et rêve d’autelles brodeuses lui volent les yeuxet alors que son sang pourrait dompter toutes les chutesd’eau du mondeelles lui font traverser assoiffé la rivière par fourberie pure.

Mais des yeux bourgeonnaient sous les murailleset la Goykovitsa m’enviale flux que je devais au sang ;Pécheresse, je reviens à la demeureavec le serment des cloches de Detchani dans les oreilles.

Pardonne, amour._______________

Ali Podrimja

VAS-TU ENFIN TE DECIDER A PARLER, O ALIPODRIMJA

L’étoile s’éteint dans ta paumetu prête serment les yeux dans les yeux puis disparais en toi-mêmesans pourtant nous dédaigner ô Ali Podrimja

Voilà des années que tu gardes le silence là-bas, sous le cielfroid

tu persistesà croire en l’homme

Et pendant ce temps on falsifie tes nomprénom signature et date de naissancele nom de tes père et mère et de la terre originelleles contes de ton enfance les danses les jeux

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les héros les chants les pleurs les fêtes rituelles

Sur ta langue millénaire sur ta lignéese ruentse déversent de noirs torrents

Et malgré cela tu te tais ô Ali Podrimjatu persistesà croire en l’homme

Dans des gouffres d’ombre des souterrains moyenâgeuxse préparent des plans savants d’étranges épithètes des

ruinesdes malédictions des aboiements des hallali les piègesd’une chasse sauvage

La flamme des cierges vacille une odeur d’encens suintedes mots

des humains parqués dans les réservessous l’aisselle du destin les enfants battent la terrel’épouse tisse et lisse sa toiledans une Kulla de papier

Corneilles et corbeaux étendent leur ombre sur le cieltu démêles tes boucles blondeset fourrant dans ton sein une poignée de terretu nous quittes pour un long très long voyage

Pour l’Europe mondaine tu es albanaisarbëresh en Italie arvanitis en Grècearnaut chez les Turcs - hamdurlah! -conserve de viande en Amérique

et rien de pluset rien de plus

Qui sait combien de langues parle ton dieuEt tu ne brises ton silence ô Ali Podrimja

tu persistes

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à croire en l’homme

Pourtant pourtantsi un jour enfin tu allais parler ô fière engeance de la terreà moins que tu ne doives d’abord venir au monde

On ne voit plus ton toit mangé de la mousse________________

Stèvane Tontitch

LA MORT TISSE POUR MON PEUPLE DES CHE-MISES ET DES CALECONS

La Mort tire les oreillesde mon peuplemon peuple est soi-disant à l’Ecoledont elle est l’Institutrice

Elle se retrousse les deux manchespuis tire de mon peupleQUELQUE CHOSEDieu sait quoi

Mon peuple à de la cervellemon peuple à des couilleselle vient le traire- puis en distillede l’or pur

Lorsque les maris de mon peuplepartent en guerrela Mort couche avec leurs femmes

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La Mort tisse pour mon peupledes chemises et des caleçons.

Visar Zhiti

ELEGIE DES FORETS

Les forêts voient se réduire leur étenduetandis que s’élargit celle de la peur,les forêts voient se réduire leur étendue,il y a moins de bêtes désormais,

moins d’audace et moins d’éclairs,moins de beauté,et la lune n’a plus de voilepucelle violés que la bruteabandonne à son sort,

les forêts voient se réduire leur étendue,tout comme vont se restreignantla poésie, les soupirs, les mots faits de feuilles

tandis que croissent les cancans.

La superficie des forêts s’est réduite,les fleuves ne sont plus envoûtés,les fleuves interdits

nous prennent pour des zèbres de parc zoologique,la superficie des forêts s’est réduiteet celle aussi de la honte -comme on a peu de honte aujourd’hui,le remords ne touche plus,l’on n’accorde qu’un temps infime au répentir.les rues se multiplient,

les publicités et les dilemmes,les magasins, les cinémas et les éloges,

les villes se sont agrandiescomme s’est étalée la honte,

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toutes ces grandes hontes que les pages des journauxne sauraient contenir,qui se prolongent dans le numéro suivantet pour les abonnés d’une autre année de démence.

La superficie des forêts s’est réduitemais on grossi les centres directeurs des domainesforestiers,s’est réduite de même la zone d’amour

et les oiseaux disposent de moins d’espace en leursidylles,eux qui ne savent faire l’amour dans les bureaux,et s’est réduite aussi l’airedes visages.Un gosse dessine des arbres sur les murs,il dessine ces arbres sous mes yeux,il se tatoue un arbresur la peau du bras,

aussi maigre que cette fin de siècle.Il plante si profond l’aiguille brûlante, humectée d’encre,

que ronfle le sang de la forêtcomme d’une large et vive blessure.

Poèmes traduits du serbe par Boris Lazitchet de l’albanais par Alexandre Zotos

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