Walt - Revolution and War

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Revolution and WarAuthor(s): Stephen M. WaltSource: World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Apr., 1992), pp. 321-368Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010542

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REVOLUTION AND WARBySTEPHEN M. WALT*

I. INTRODUCTIONREVOLUTIONS are more han ritical ventsnthehistoryf n-dividual states; hey re oftenwatershed vents ninternational ol-itics. Revolutions ause abrupt shiftsn the balance ofpower, place alli-ance commitments nd other nternationalgreementsn jeopardy, ndprovide nviting pportunities orother tates o improve heirpositions.Although true revolutions re a relatively are occurrence, heireffectson international olitics re worth tudying or t least two reasons.First, revolutions nvariablytriggerdisagreementsover how otherpowers should respond.These disputes, ypically etweenadvocates ofappeasementand advocates of intervention o overthrowthe new re-gime, are strikingly imilar,whether one considers the European re-sponseto the French and Bolshevik revolutions r U.S. reactions o therevolutionsnMexico, China, Cuba, Iran,and Nicaragua. Yet little fforthas been made to assemble the theoretical ropositions r empiricalevi-dence to resolve or at leastadvance) the variousdisagreementshatun-derliethesepolicydebates.Second,from purely cholarly erspective,tudyinghe nternationaleffects frevolutionary hange is an obviouswaytocomparethe meritsofsystemicnd unit-level xplanations f statebehavior.Systemic heo-ries suchas neorealist alance-of-power heory ocuson theconstrainingimpactof internationalnarchy nd the effectsfdifferent istributionsofpower,while downplayingtheimpactofdomesticpolitics, deology,or otherunit-level actors.'Butrevolutions re a unit-level henomenon;they re violentpolitical struggles ver the basic principles ywhichso-ciety s organized.Not onlydo they ffect omesticpolitical structures,but revolutions ften dvance novelpolitical deas and ambitious nter-nationalobjectivesbased upon them.* I thankthe following ndividuals or heir omments n earlierdrafts fthis rticle:JamesFearon, Charles Glaser, Jack Goldstone, JudithGoldstein,Louisa Bertch Green, RobertJohnson, avid Laitin, JohnMearsheimer, ndrewMoravcsik,Kenneth Oye, JackSnyder,Rebecca Stone,and StephenVan Evera. I am also grateful o Elizabeth Boyd and JamesMarquardt forresearch ssistance, nd to the JohnD. and CatherineT. MacArthurFoun-dation, he CarnegieEndowmentfor nternational eace, and The Brookings nstitution orfinancial nd logistical upport.I The locusclassicusremainsKennethN. Waltz, Theory f nternationaloliticsReading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 979).

World olitics 4 (April 1992), 21-68


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322 WORLD POLITICSYet even when the revolutionaries ejecttraditional tategoals andquestion the legitimacy f thestate-systemtself, heybegin by seekingcontrolof an existing tate. f they re successful, hey utomatically e-

come partofthe arger ystem f states nd are subjectto the constraintsand opportunities epictedby systemic heories.As a result, he studyofthe foreignpoliciesofrevolutionarytateshelpsone to understandhowsystemic orcesmodify ehaviorarisingfromdomesticprocesses.At thesame time, tcan also reveal how unit-level actorsmayalter theimpactof systems-levelonstraints.n otherwords,studying evolutions s oneway to explorethe links between domestic nd international nfluenceson statebehavior.Despite itsobviousimportance, owever, hesubjectofrevolutionaryforeign olicy s underexplored.Althoughthe iterature n revolutionsenormous,virtually ll of itfocuseson either hecausesofrevolution rthedomestic onsequencesof revolutionaryhange.2There are valuablecase studieson individualrevolutionarytatesbutveryfewcomparativeor theoreticalworkson the internationalmplications f revolutionarychange.3To begintofillthisgap, thispaperexaminesthefollowing uestions:Why do revolutionarytates ight oreignwarsalmost mmediately ftergaining power? Are revolutionary egimes nherently ggressive, r arethey implyvictims f otherpowers?Are theseconflicts directresultof therevolutionary rocess, r is theassociationbetweenrevolution ndwar largely purious?In brief, argue thatrevolutions ause war by increasing he level ofthreatbetween therevolutionarytate nd its rivalsand by encouragingboth sides to view the use of force s an effectiveway to eliminate thethreat.By altering he balanceofpowerand makingitmoredifficult orstates o measure the balanceaccurately, evolutionsncreasethe danger

2 For surveys f the literature n revolution,ee PeterCalvert,Revolutionnd Counter-RevolutionMinneapolis:UniversityfMinnesotaPress,1990); JackA. Goldstone, Theoriesof Revolution:The Third Generation,"World olitics 2 (April 1980);Rod Aya, "TheoriesofRevolutionReconsidered:ContrastingModelsofPoliticalViolence," TheoryndSociety(July1979); Mark N. Hagopian, The PhenomenonfRevolutionNew York: Dodd Mead,1974);and EkkartZimmermann, oliticalViolence, rises nd Revolutions: heories nd Re-search Cambridge: SchenkmanPublishing, 983).3 I knowofonlytwotheoretical orkson this opic,neither fwhich s fully atisfactory:Peter Calvert, Revolution nd International olitics New York: St. Martin's,1984); andKyung-WonKim, Revolution nd InternationalystemNew York: New York UniversityPress, 1970). Excellent case studies nclude T. C. W. Blanning, The Origins fthe FrenchRevolutionaryWars New York: Longman,1986);Edward HallettCarr,TheBolshevik ev-olution,1917-1923,vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan,1953); Peter Van Ness, Revolution ndChinese oreign olicy:Peking's upportforWars fNationalLiberationBerkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress, 1970);and FriedrichKatz, TheSecretWar nMexico:Europe, heUnitedStates,nd theMexicanRevolutionChicago: UniversityfChicago Press, 1981).


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 323of miscalculation.Revolutions also encourage both sides to exaggeratethe other's hostility, hus furtherncreasing each side's perception ofthreat.Finally, revolutionsead bothsides simultaneously o exaggeratetheirown vulnerabilityo attack or subversion nd tooverstate he vul-nerability f the other ide.As a result,war is likelytobe seen as neces-saryto reduce the threat nd also relativelyasytowin. These expecta-tions are usuallymistaken,however.Revolutions re harder to reverseor to exportthan either ide expects;that s,the ncreased evel ofthreatthat ccompaniesa revolution s in part llusory.These dynamicsarise fromthe characteristics f revolutionary rga-nizations and ideologies and the domesticand international ffects frevolutionaryhange. International onflict s thusoverdetermined: l-thoughwar does not occur in every case, strongpressuresforwar arepresent ven when otherfactorsntrude oprevent t.This is not to imply hatrevolutions re a unique cause of war or thatthedynamicsthat ead revolutionarytates owar do notapplyto otherstates as well. Indeed, several of the causal links outlined below aredrawn from familiarpropositionsn international elations heory. n-stead, argue thatrevolutions re an especiallypowerful ource ofthesefamiliarphenomena;as a result,war is extremelyikely n theaftermathof a revolutionarypheaval.The main goal of this article s to advance a set ofhypotheses nd toillustrate hem withappropriatehistorical xamples.Section I describesthe association between revolution nd war and evaluatesseveralalter-nativeapproaches forexplainingthisrelationship. ection III summa-rizes the nature of the revolutionary rocessand identifies ome of itslikelyeffects. ection IV presentsmy argument n detail and explainswhy the interactionbetween revolutionary tates and other powersmakes war very ikely.The conclusion,SectionV, considersthe impli-cations of thesearguments, akes note of some possible qualifications,and suggestswhat thesehypotheses ell us about the recentchanges intheformer ovietempire.

II. REVOLUTION AND WAR: COMPETING EXPLANATIONSDEFINITIONSA revolution s thedestruction f an independent tatebymembersofits own society nd itsreplacementbya regimebased on new politicalprinciples.4 he "state," s used here,meansadministrative nd coercive

4 For similar onceptions,ee Franz Borkenau, Stateand Revolution n theParis Corn-


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324 WORLD POLITICSagenciespossessing egitimate uthority ver a specific erritorialrea.5A revolution s more than just a rearrangement f the administrativeapparatus or thereplacement fold elite. nstead, a revolution reatesnew stateresting n differentocial groups,new social and political n-stitutions, ifferentegitimatingmyths,nd novelconceptions fthepo-litical community.This definition xcludes both simple coups d'etat(where one elite faction eplacesanother) nd national iberationmove-ments wherea colonized groupestablishes n independent tatebyex-pelling a foreignruler).6 t also excludes cases where the ruling eliteleaves officevoluntarily,s in therestoration f civiliancontrolafterperiodofmilitary ule.As notedabove,revolutions re nottheonly oreventhemost mpor-tant)cause of international onflict. hey are an unusuallypotentone,however.Accordingto one recent tudy, tatesthatexperience "revo-lutionary"regimechange (defined s anyviolentchangeofthegovern-ing system) re nearlytwice as likelytobe involved n war in theinitialperiod followingthe change as are statesthatemergefroman "evolu-tionary"politicalprocess.7 he patterns even morestriking orrevolu-tions thatfitthe more restrictiveefinition ffered bove. As shown inTable 1,out of tenuncontroversial ases (i.e.,wherethere s a clear con-sensus that revolution ccurred), ightfoughtwarswithinfiveyearsofthe revolution.Moreover,the two exceptions re nearmisses:althoughopen warfare did not occur,the revolutionary overnmentbecame in-volvedin a "militarized nterstate ispute"soonafter akingpower.8What explains thestrong ssociationbetweenrevolution nd war? Atthe riskofoversimplifyingheexisting iterature,healternative xpla-nationscan be groupedinto severalbasicfamilies.mune,the RussianCivil War,and theSpanishCivil War,"SociologicalReview 29 (January1937); JohnDunn, ModernRevolutions: n IntroductionotheAnalysisfa PoliticalPhenom-enon Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1972),xi; and Samuel P. Huntington, olit-ical Order nChanging ocietiesNew Haven: Yale University ress,1968),264-65.

5 See Theda Skocpol, tatesndSocial Revolutions: Comparativenalysis fFrance,Russia,and China Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityress,1978),29.6 Due to themany similarities etweennational iberationmovements nd revolutionaryorganizations, uccessfulwars of national iberation nd successful evolutions re likelytogenerate imilar nternationalffects.7 See Zeev Maoz, "Joining he Club ofNations: PoliticalDevelopment nd InternationalConflict, 816-1976," nternationaltudiesQuarterly3 (June1989).Maoz carefully howshow regimechangeaffects heprobabilityfwar,buthe does notoffer n explanationforthisassociation. ee also Jonathan . Adelman,Revolution, rmies,nd War:A PoliticalHis-toryBoulder,Colo.: LynneRienner, 985), -6.8 The near misses re the MexicanRevolution,where theUnitedStates ntervened wiceon a modest scale and considered full-scale nvasion n 1916,and theCuban Revolution,where the United Statessponsored numberof effortso overthrow r assassinateFidelCastro.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 325TABLE 1

WAR AND REVOLUTIONRevolution PostrevolutionaryarFrance 1789) Austria-Hungary,russiaSpain,England 1792-93)Mexico 1910) [U.S. Intervention1916)]aRussia 1917) Allied ntervention1919)Poland 1920)Turkey 1919) Greece 1920)China 1949) Tibet 1950)KoreanWar 1950)Cuba (1959) [BayofPigs nvasion1961)]aEthiopia 1974) Somalia 1978)Cambodia/Kampuchea1975) Vietnamesenvasion1979)Iran 1978) Iraq (1980)Nicaragua 1979) United tates1981)b

a Conflictsn brackets reborderline ases.b I includethecontrawarbetween heUnited States nd Nicaraguadue to itsscope-at least30,000 deaths,or approximately % of Nicaragua's population.Although theU.S. troopsdid not participate irectly,he United States minedNicaraguan harbors nd organizedand equipped thecontra rmies.REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGYOne popularapproachviewsrevolutionaryoreign olicyas primarilyresult of the ideology of the revolutionarymovement.The logic isstraightforward:evolutionarytates ause war by trying o exporttheirideological principles o other ountries. hey do thisbecause the move-ment'scorebeliefsprescribe uchefforts,ontraryo the usual norms ofsovereigntynd nonintervention.9Not surprisingly,his nterpretationfrevolutionaryoreign olicy sespeciallypopular with the opponentsof the new regime.AftertheFrench Revolution,forexample,Edmund Burke argued thatEngland"was at war withan armed doctrine," ust as U.S. leaders blamed theexpansionist hrust f Sovietforeign olicyon therevolutionarydeologyofMarxism-Leninism.10n much the sameway,someanalysesof ranian

9E.g., theEgyptianNationalCharter f1962proclaimed hat Egyptwas boundto spreaditsmission nd put its]principles .. at thedisposalof all the Arabs,disregardinghe worn-out notionthat n doingso it is interferingn otherpeoples'affairs." uoted in Adeed Da-wisha,Egyptn theArabWorldLondon: Macmillan,1976),35.10See Edmund Burke,"FirstLetteron a RegicidePeace," in The Works f theRt.Hon.


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326 WORLD POLITICSforeignpolicyhave attributed ts bellicose character o theexpansioniststrands fthe AyatollahKhomeini's Shiitetheology."Despite itspopularity, owever, his pproachis an inadequate expla-nation for war. To begin with, t is one-sided: war is seen as a directresult of the revolutionary egime's "aggressive" beliefs.There is littleempirical supportfor thisview, however,as revolutionarytatesoftenbehave withrestraintnd are usuallythe victimsrather han theinitia-tors of aggression.French foreignpolicy,forexample,was remarkablypassivefrom1789 to 1792, eading manycontemporariesoviewtheRev-olution as a serious blow to France's international osition.'2 It was thePoles who began the Russo-Polish War in 1920, and the Soviet Unioncontinued oavoid significantonflictsrinternationalommitments n-til the eve of World War II.'3 Iraq started hewar withrevolutionaryIran; Somalia attackedrevolutionary thiopia; and theChinese inter-vention n Korea was a reluctant esponse o the U.S. advance to the YaluRiver rather hanan aggressive ttempt oadvance ideological objectives.Had revolutionarydeologybeen the directcause of conflictmplied bythis perspective, hese stateswould have been theaggressors ather hanthevictims.'4In additionrevolutionarydeologiesare generallymore flexible hanthis perspective mplies. nsteadofprescribing dogmatic campaign ofexpansion,most stressthe need for tacticalflexibilityn the pursuitofgeneral goals. If so,thenbothwar and peace can be justified n ideolog-ical grounds.'5EdmundBurke Boston:Little,Brown,1869), :250. On Western ppraisals f Sovietconduct,see George F. Kennan [Mr.X], "The SourcesofSovietConduct," ForeignAffairs 5 (July1947); Nathan Leites,A Study fBolshevismGlencoe, ll.: Free Press, 1953);and "U.S. Ob-jectives nd Programs orNationalSecurity"NSC-68), reprintednThomas H. Etzold andJohn ewis Gaddis, eds.,Containment:ocuments nAmerican olicy ndStrategy,945-1950(New York: Columbia University ress, 1978),386-96. More recently residentReagan ar-gued that it was difficultforAmericans] o understand he Soviet] deologicalpremise hatforce s an acceptable way to expand a political ystem." ee "Text of PresidentReagan'sUnited Nations Speech,"Washingtonost,October25, 1985,p. A23." See R. K. Ramazani,Revolutionaryran:ChallengendResponsentheMiddleEast (Bal-timore:JohnsHopkinsUniversity ress, 1986), 19-26;Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg,Khomeini,he slamicRepublic f ran, ndtheArabWorldCambridge:HarvardCenter forMiddle East Studies, 1987);and CherylBenard and Zalmay Khalilzad, "TheGovernmentfGod": Iran's slamicRepublic New York: ColumbiaUniversity ress,1984),147-55.

12 Blanning fn. 3), 79-80, 132-35; J.H. Clapham, The Causesofthe Warof1792 (1892;reprint, ondon: Octagon Books, 1969), 15-18; and StevenT. Ross, EuropeanDiplomaticHistory, 789-1815:France gainst urope GardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday,1969),25.13 The SovietUnion did sendmilitary id to the republicanforces n theSpanish CivilWar, butthismodestcommitment as motivated ydefensive oncerns nd lastedonlyoneyear.14 Of course, revolutionaryegimesmayinvitewar throughprovocative ctions, ven ifother tates nitiate he use ofmilitary orce.15 For examples,see Nathan Leites,The Operational ode ofthe PolitburoNew York:


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 327As we shall see, ideologydoes affect ow revolutionary tatesbehaveand how they are perceivedby others. By itself,however, t does notadequately explain the connection etween revolution nd war.

DOMESTIC POLITICSA second approach tounderstanding evolutionary oreign olicydrawson the literature inking domestic and international onflict.'6 n thisview, conflictswithintherevolutionary tate are believed to encourageaggressivebehavior toward others.The greater hedivisionswithintherevolutionary tate either withinthe elite or between thegovernmentand the populationat large),the more bellicose tsforeign olicywillbe.

This hypothesis akes twodistinct orms.One focuses n eliteconflict:contendingfactionswithinthe revolutionarymovementpromotecon-flictswithotherstates n orderto secure greaterpower forthemselves.For example, the Brissotinfaction n the French National Assemblysought war withAustria nd Prussia nordertodiscredit hemonarchyand eliminate tsotherdomesticrivals.'7 imilarly, adical factionsn theIranian Revolution are believed to have exploited conflict with theUnited States as a waytounderminemoremoderateforces.'8A second hypothesis rgues thatrevolutionaryeaders seek conflictswith other states n order to rally popular support,to justifynternalrepression,nd toprovidea scapegoat should domesticproblemspersist.Thus, the radicalsin France used the threat f a vast "aristocratic on-spiracy"to justify uppression f theclergy nd nobility, ust as Castroin Cuba and the Sandinistas n Nicaragua used theirconflictswiththeUnited States to justifyherepression fdomesticopponents nd to ex-cuse their own policymistakes.'9 n each case, an externalenemywasMcGraw-Hill, 1951), 32-35; and Tang Tsou and MortonH. Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung'sRevolutionary trategy nd Peking's nternational ehavior,"American olitical cienceRe-view 59 (September1965),89-90.

16 For a summary nd critique fthesetheories,ee Jack . Levy, "DomesticPolitics ndWar," in RobertRotberg nd TheodoreRabb, eds., The Origins nd PreventionfMajor Wars(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityress,1989);and idem,"The Causes ofWars: A Reviewof Theories and Evidence," n PhilipTetlocket al., eds.,Behavior, ociety,nd Nuclear War(New York: OxfordUniversity ress,1989), 1:262-73.17 For a superb analysisof the Brissotin ampaignforwar,see Blanning fn.3), 99-113.See also Clapham (fn. 12), 114-15, 135-36; and GuntherE. Rothenburg, The Origins,Causes, and Extension f the Wars of theFrenchRevolution ndNapoleon," in Rotberg ndRabb (fn. 16),209-12.18 See Said Amir Arjomand,The Turban orthe Crown: The Islamic Revolution n Iran(London: OxfordUniversity ress,1988), 139-41; and Gary Sick,"Iran's Quest for Super-power Status,"ForeignAffairs5 (Spring1987),698-99.9 The damage from hecontrawar notwithstanding,he Sandinistas'defeat n the 1990electionreveals hat heyultimatelyailed omakethe UnitedStates convincing capegoatfor heirdomestic rrors. ee Dennis Gilbert, andinistas: hePartyndtheRevolutionLon-don: Basil Blackwell, 1988),94-95,119,183.


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328 WORLD POLITICSused tosolidifyheregime'snternalosition ndblamedfor ontinuedinternal roblems.Bothhypotheseshare he ssumptionhat evolutionaryoreignol-icy sdeterminedargelyydomesticolitics. espite ts ntuitiveppeal,however,heapproach asserious laws s an explanationorwar. Aswith he deologicalpproach,his xplanationssumes hat herevolu-tionary tate s theprincipalggressor. ut such an assumption efiessimple ogic: state hathas ustundergone revolutionsrarely eadyforwar, nd t wouldbefoolhardyor ts eaders o risk heir ewlywonpositionsn a test f trengthith foreign ower.Although evolution-aryregimesmay xploit ensions ith ther tates ocement heir oldon power, ne wouldexpect hem ofocusprimarilyn theirnternalchallengesnd totry oavoid direct lash farms.The empirical videnceupportshisview.Revolutionaryeaders f-tenseek at least ordial elations ithpotentialnemies,fonly obuytimeuntil hey ansecure heirnternalositions.20he Bolsheviks,orexample,mademany oncessionso their oreignivals n an effortoavoidwar, nd MaoZedongwasextremelyeluctantoenter heKoreanWar for ear f eopardizinghemore mportantask fnational econ-struction.2'imilarly,obert astor rgues hat heSandinistasnitiallysought modusvivendiwith heUnited tates, goaltheCarter dmin-istrationhared.22 lthoughtheserevolutionaryovernments id use ex-ternal hreatso ustifyheirctionsndrally opular upport,hey lsotriedunsuccessfully)oavoidconflictshat ould eopardize heir oldon power.On both ogical nd empirical rounds,herefore,omesticpolitics rovidesn incompletexplanationor he inkbetween evolu-tion and war.23REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITYA thirdpproach ocuses n thepersonalityraits frevolutionaryead-ers.24tsproponentsegin y rguinghateaders frevolutionsreusu-

20 For example,Lenin insisted hatSoviet weakness eft hemno choice but to ratify heharshTreatyof Brest-Litovskn 1918.See Louis Fischer,TheLife ofLenin (New York:Harper Colophon,1964),190-223;and Lenin,"The ChiefTask of Our Day," and "Reporton Ratification f thePeace Treaty," nLenin,SelectedWorksMoscow: ProgressPublishers,1970),2:618-21,626-40.21 For other xamplesof Bolshevik oncessions,ee Carr (fn.3), 47, 57, 87-88. On Mao'sdecisionson Korea, see MelvinGurtov and Byong-MooHwang, ChinaunderThreat:ThePolitics fStrategyndDiplomacy Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversity ress,1980),25-29.22 See Pastor,CondemnedoRepetition: he United tates ndNicaragua Princeton: rince-tonUniversity ress,1987),191and passim.23 More extensive ffortso test hehypothesesinkingdomestic onflict ith nvolvementinwar have beenlargelynconclusive. ee Levy fn.16,"Causes ofWars"),273-74.24 Basic works n thisgenre nclude E. VictorWolfenstein, heRevolutionaryersonality:


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 329ally elf-confident,tubborn,uspicious,nd ruthless. hese traits lleg-edlymake revolutionaryeaders ifficulto deter nd prone o recklessforeign olicies, ither ecause hey reconvincedftheir wninfalli-bility r because hey epeatedlyeekto perform ew actsofrevolution-ary heroism.25This approach s most ommon n biographiesnd journalisticc-counts; o date, erious cholarshipn the "revolutionaryersonality"has largely gnoredssues fforeignolicy.26iventhe nherent eak-nesses fthis pproach, his missionsperhaps ot urprising.he maindifficultys the ack of a strongheoreticalonnection etween erson-ality raitsndforeign olicy references.ven fwe knew hat leaderpossessed "revolutionaryersonality"whatever hatmay be), thisknowledgewould not tellus verymuch bouthisorher choicewhenfacing specificecision orwarorpeace.Forexample, lthough obes-pierre its he classicprofilef a revolutionaryeader,he opposedtheFrenchdeclarationf war in 1792.27 or was hisopposition nusual.Revolutionarylites requentlyisagree boutforeign olicy, s theBol-sheviks idover heTreaty fBrest-LitovskithGermanyndthemer-itsof "permanent evolution" ersus socialismn onecountry"nd asIran's eadersdid over theexport f Islamicfundamentalism,hewarwith raq, or thepossibilityfseeking mproved ies with the West.28In addition, hepopular tereotypefrevolutionaryeaders s ofteninconsistent:hesamerevolutionaryeaders re sometimes ortrayedboth s irrationalndfanaticndas disciplined,alculating,ndcrafty.Lenin, Trotsky, andhi Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1971); Bruce Mazlish, TheRevolutionaryscetic: volution fa Political Type New York: Basic Books, 1976); JamesHaskins,Revolutionaries:gents fChange Philadelphia:J.B. Lippincott, 971);and MostafaRejai and Kay Phillips,WorldRevolutionaryeaders New Brunswick,N.J.:RutgersUniver-sityPress, 1983).For summaries, ee Thomas H. Greene,Comparative evolutionary ove-ments: he Search or TheoryndJustice,d ed. (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 984),chap. 4; and Hagopian (fn.2), 318-33.

25 See HenryKissinger, DomesticStructure nd Foreign Policy," nKissinger, mericanForeignPolicy, xpandeded. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), 39-41; JohnH. Kautsky,"Revolutionarynd ManagerialElites nModernizingRegimes,"Comparativeolitics July1969); and Patrick Morgan,Deterrence: ConceptualAnalysis BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage,1977),162.26 An exception sArthur chlesinger'sttempt o attributehecold war inpartto Stalin'sparanoid personality,s well as to Leninist deology nd the domestic tructure f the Sovietstate. ee Schlesinger,The OriginsoftheCold War,"ForeignAffairs6 (October1967),4650. For background, ee also Robert C. Tucker,Stalinas Revolutionary: Study n HistoryandPersonality,879-1929 New York: W. W. Norton,1973).27 See J.M. Thompson,RobespierreOxford:Basil Blackwell, 1935),202-8; and GeorgesMichon,Robespierret la guerre e'volutionnaire,791-1792 Paris:MarcelRiviere,1937),51-55.28 See Carr (fn.3), 38-39; Ramazani (fn. 11), 47; and RobinWright,n thePathof God:The Khomeini ecade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 989),93-95, 136-37.


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330 WORLD POLITICSIn short,his pproacheems speciallyimited s anexplanationorwhyrevolutionarytatesre sowar-prone.Each of these erspectivesffersnsightsnto hebehavior frevolu-tionarytates-even if thepictures incomplete-and cholarswithineachofthese raditionsften ecognizeherole fother ariables. one-theless,hese pproaches ocusprimaryttentionn therevolutionarystate tself ather hanon the arger ettingnwhichforeign olicy smade;war s seen ofollowmore r essdirectlyromhe haracteristicsoftherevolutionaryegime. utthedecision ogotowardoesnotoccurina vacuum;war s ultimatelyresponseo problemshat risebetweentwoor more tates. hissuggestshat nderstandingevolutionndwarrequires,nstead,ninternational-politicalerspectivehat ocuses n therelationshipetween herevolutionarytate nd theothermembers fthe ystem. systemicpproachsneeded, hen, oexplainwhyrevolu-tions eadbothides o favor heuse offorce.The obvious laceto startsrealism,nd specifically,ith alance-of-powertheory.n its modernneorealistorm, alance-of-powerheoryignoreshe ndividualharacteristicsfstates nd focusesnstead n thedistributionfcapabilitiesmongthem.Can balance-of-powerheoryadequately xplain herelationshipetween evolutionnd war? fnot,can t be improved?REALISM AND REVOLUTIONBALANCE-OF-POWER THEORYBalance-of-powerheoryssumes hat tates reessentiallyational c-torswhoseprimaryoal s survival. ecausenosovereignuthorityxiststoprotecttates rom achother,nternationaloliticss a "self-help"systemn which ecuritys thehighest oal.As a result,tates trive oincrease heir elativeower, rovidedheyan do sowithout rovokingothers orespondnways hatwill eavethemworse ff hanbefore.In theneorealist ersion fbalance-of-powerheory,hedistributionofpower s theprimaryxplanatoryariable.29ower s conceived nterms f materialssets uch s population,NP, militaryapability,ndsoforth,ndeach tate'securityltimatelyepends n tspower elativetoothers. ecausewar salways possibilityif t thebest f times nlya remotene), tates ompete-and fnecessaryseforce-either o n-

29 See Waltz (fn. 1), chap.6. For otherversions fbalance-of-powerheory, ee EdwardV. Gulick,Europe'sClassicalBalanceofPower New York: W. W. Norton, 1967); Hans J.Morgenthau, olitics mongNations New York: AlfredA. Knopf,1973); Inis L. Claude,Power nd nternationalelationsNew York: RandomHouse, 1962);and MortonA. Kaplan,Systemnd Process n InternationaloliticsNew York: Wiley, 1957).


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 331crease their wn power or toweaken potential ivals.Wars occurbecausestates re temptedto exploit mbalances of power ("windows of oppor-tunity") o improvetheirpositionsfurther.Wars also resultfrom mis-calculation; states ometimesgo to war because theybelieve thebalanceof power is favorablewhen itin fact s not.30According to this perspective, evolutions ause war in two ways.First,revolutionsmay alter thebalance of power and thus createan op-portunity or states to increase their power even more. If a revolutionincreased state'srelativepower,for xample,thenew regimemighttryto exploit this advantage by attacking nother state.Alternatively,f astate'spoweris weakened bya revolution, ther tatesmightbe temptedtoimprove heir wn positions t itsexpenseor at theexpenseof ts llies.Second,revolutions lso increasethedangerofmiscalculation, ecause itis more difficulto predict he outcomeofa war after ne state has un-dergonea major politicalupheaval.This explanation s an obvious improvement ver the unit-level p-proachesdiscussedearlier. t correctly mphasizesthe mportance f se-curity nd identifies ome of thewaysthat revolutionsmake war morelikely. t is also consistentwith a number ofhistorical ases,such as thePolish and Japanese nvasions of the Soviet Union in 1919-20 and theIraqi invasionofIran in 1980.Despite thesestrengths, alance-of-power heoryhas two importantlimitations. irst, by itself, shift n the balance of power could makewar eithermore likelyor less likely. f a revolution ncreased a state'srelativepower,for xample,thestatemightbecome moreaggressive ndthuswar would be more likely.But greaterpower mightalso make astatemore secure and better ble todeter ttack,whichwould lowertheodds of war. Similarly, lthoughother statesmightattacka revolution-arystate fthey hought tspowerhad declined,theymight ustas easilyconclude that it was no longer a threat nd turn their attention lse-where. In short, tateswill notgo to war simplybecause the balance ofpowerhas changed; theymust also believethatdoingso willmake themmoresecure n the ongrun.3'

30The importance fmiscalculationsapparent nthe neorealist nalysis f stability. en-neth Waltz and JohnMearsheimer rguethat bipolaritys morestable than multipolarity,becauseincreasing he number fgreatpowersmakes t more difficultor tates o assess thebalance ofpowerand predict he ikelyoutcome of war. Similarly, hey rgue that nuclearweapons increase tability y making teasyto calculatewhat an all-out war would mean.See Waltz (fn. 1),163-76; dem, The Originsof War in NeorealistTheory," nRotberg ndRabb (fn.16), 39-52; and JohnJ.Mearsheimer,Back to the Future: Instabilityn Europeafter he Cold War," Internationalecurity 5 Summer1990),13-19.31 See Robert Gilpin,"Theories ofHegemonicWar," in Rotberg nd Rabb (fn. 16), 26;


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332 WORLD POLITICSSecond, althoughbalance-of-power heory cknowledgesthe role ofmiscalculation s a cause ofwar,we stillneed toexplain whyrevolutionsmake thisproblemparticularly cute. As GeoffreyBlainey points out,

wars occur when two or more statesdisagreeabout theirrelative bar-gaining power; if states could measure each other'spower and resolveexactly and thuspredictthe outcomeof a war in advance), theycouldadjust theirdemands accordingly nd avoid theinconvenience ffight-ing.32 ven ifa revolution lters hebalance ofpower significantly,ow-ever,an outbreak of war impliesthat theopponentsdisagreeabout thedirection r magnitudeof thechange. In particular,we need to explainwhy both sides conclude thatfightingwill improvetheirrelativeposi-tions.BALANCE-OF-THREAT THEORYThese problemscan be overcomebyabandoningbalance-of-power he-ory in favorof what I call balance-of-threatheory.As I have arguedelsewhere,balance-of-power heory ncorrectlyssumes that states re-spond solelyto shifts n the distribution f aggregate power. But it ismore accurateto sayinstead that tatesrespondto threats.33ower is animportant omponentof threat, ut it is not theonly one. In addition,there re twootherfactors hat states onsider n gaugingtheir ecurityand decidingwhethergoingto war will enhance t.First, hegreater state's ffensiveower, hegreater hethreat tposesto others. ome types fpowerare morethreateninghanareothers, ndstates re lesssecure when theformer apabilities re easytoacquire andwhen otherspossess themin abundance.34Offensivepower is usuallydefinedin terms of specificmilitary apabilities e.g., does technologyfavorattackingor defending?),but politicalfactors an be equally im-portant. n particular, he abilityto undermine a foreigngovernmentthroughpropagandaor subversion an be an equally potentformof of-fensivepower. In general, hegreater hethreat, he argertheincentivefor other statesto take action (includingthe use of force) n order tocontain or reducethedanger.and Jack . Levy,"DecliningPower and the PreventiveMotivation orWar," World olitics40 (October1987),83-86.32 See Geoffrey lainey,The CausesofWar, d ed. (New York: Free Press,1988), hap. 8.

33 See StephenM. Walt, The Origins fAlliances Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversity ress,1987),21-26, 263-66,275-80; and also idem,"TestingTheories ofAllianceFormation:TheCase of SouthwestAsia," nternationalrganization2 (Spring1988).34 See GeorgeQuester,OffensendDefensen the nternationalystemNew York: Wiley,1977); RobertJervis,CooperationundertheSecurity ilemma," World olitics 0 (January1978); StephenVan Evera,"Causes ofWar" (Ph.D. diss.,UniversityfCalifornia,Berkeley,1984),77-171; and idem,"The Cult of theOffensive nd theOrigins of the FirstWorldWar," Internationalecurity (Summer1984).


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 333Second,the level of threat s also affected yother tates' ntentions.fa state is believed to be unusually aggressive,potentialvictimswill bemorewillingto use force o reduce itspower,tomoderate tsaggressive

aims,or to eliminate t entirely. y contrast,fstatesview each other'saims as relatively enign, heywill be less likely ogo towar even whenthe balance ofpower is favorable.By focusing n threats ather han on power alone, balance-of-threattheory rovides morecomplete xplanation fwhyrevolutionsncreasethe likelihood of war. In addition to changingthe overall balance ofpower and making it more difficultorstatesto measure it accurately,revolutions lso reduce each side's ability o assess theother's ntentionswith confidence. ndeed,revolutionsncouragebothsidesto believethatthe other's ntentionsre evenmorehostile hanthey re,and theuse offorceto reduceor eliminatethethreatbecomes a moreattractive ptionas a result.Revolutions lso producea particular ormofoffensive ower,basedprimarily n each side's fearof ideological subversion. f a revolutionembodiesnovel political deas, theruling lites n stateswhose domesticorders are differentmay feel that their egitimacys threatened.At thesame time, herevolutionaryeadersusuallyface continueddomesticre-sistance nd worry bout thepossibilityf a counterrevolutionaryesur-gence. Each side thus fearsthat t is vulnerable o ideological challenge,yeteach also tends to believe that tsopponents re vulnerable as well.Accordingto balance-of-threatheory, herefore,evolutionsmake warmore likelyby increasingperceptions f threat n both sides and byen-couragingboth sides to believe thatthe threatwillbe easytodefeat.Theoriginsof theseeffects re found n theparticular haracteristics frev-olutionary tates nd the variouswaysthat revolutions ffect ach side'sability o evaluatethreats nd opportunities.To explain preciselywhythisoccurs,thenext sectionconsidershowthe revolutionaryprocess shapes the belief systemsof revolutionarystates.The essaythendescribeswhyrevolutionsncreasetheuncertaintyfacingbothrevolutionarynd nonrevolutionarytates, efore urning oa detailedexplanationof the inkagebetween revolution nd war.

III. THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESSRevolutions are deadly seriouscontests orextremely igh stakes.Thecollapseof internal uthority laces all membersofsociety t risk: untila new order is established,conflicts an be resolvedonly by tests ofstrengthnd no one's interestsnd safetyre assured.Winners will take


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334 WORLD POLITICSall and losersmay lose everything;s a result,mass revolutions re al-mostalways bloodyand destructive.35A revolution s more thanthereplacement f one set of rulersbyan-other: "a completerevolution nvolves the creation of a new politicalorder."36 y definition, revolutionarytate restson new principlesoflegitimacy, isplaysnew symbols fauthority nd identitynames, flags,anthems,etc.), adopts new rules for eliterecruitment,nd creates newpolitical nstitutionsnd governmental rocedures. n short, evolutionsredefinehe political communitywithina given territory y creatinga"new state" that restson principles nd procedures hat are a sharp de-parturefrom hoseof the old regime.REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE "FREE-RIDER PROBLEM"Successfulrevolutions re rare,because even weak and corrupt statesusually controlfargreater esources han do their nternal pponents. nparticular, tatespossess greater ccess to the means of violence,whichtheycan use tomonitor, uppress, r co-opt potential hallengers.Thisadvantage is greatestduringtheearly stagesof a revolution,when theopposition s weak and isolated and when thearmed forces nd policeare still oyalto theold regime.37t is thusnotsurprising hat most rev-olutionarymovements ie rapidand obscuredeaths. ndeed, it sperhapsmoresurprisinghat nyever succeed.The inherentdifficultyf overthrowing n existingstate is com-pounded bythe "free-rider" roblem.38 ecause thealleged benefits f asuccessfulrevolution re collectivegoods that are in theory vailable toall, individual citizenscan benefit roma revolution ven if theyhavedone nothing ohelp bring t about.Moreover, ach individual's contri-bution s too small to affect heoutcome, o a rational ctorwould inev-itably hoose to freeriderather han ncur therisks nd costs of joininga revolutionarymovement.39ndeed, ifpeople weremotivated olely by

35 Note the followingdeath tolls in modern revolutions: rance, 15,000 dead; Russia,500,000; China, 3 million; Cuba, 5,000; Iran, 17,000; Mexico 250,000; Nicaragua, between30,000 and 50,000. See MelvinSmall and J. David Singer,Resort oArms: nternationalndCivil Wars, 816-1980 BeverlyHills,Calif.: Sage, 1982).36 See Huntington fn.4), 266.37 Indeed, some theorists ssert hat tis impossible or revolution o succeed so long as

the armed forces etain heir oyaltynd cohesion.See KatherineC. Chorley,Armies nd theArt fRevolutionLondon: Faber and Faber, 1943).For additionalbackground, ee Adelman(fn.7).38 On the free-rider roblem, ee Mancur Olson, The Logic of CollectiveAction Cam-bridge:HarvardUniversity ress, 1971).For extensions nd revisions f Olson's arguments,see Russell Hardin,Collective ctionBaltimore:JohnsHopkins University ress/Resourcesfor heFuture, 1982).39 Works thatapply collective-goods heory o the studyof revolution nclude SamuelPopkin,The Rational Peasant: The PoliticalEconomy fRuralSocietyn Vietnam Berkeley:


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 335narrow self-interestnd guided bya completely bjectiveassessment fcosts and benefits, evolutionswould be largely mpossible,for ack ofwilling participants.40

Drawing inparton collective-goodsheory,everalscholarshave sug-gestedthatrevolutionarymovementsovercomethe free-rider roblemeitherby offering ositive nducements r by threatening egativesanc-tions.41 et thisexplanation sonlypartly atisfying. lthoughtheabilityto provide specific ncentivesforexample, food, protection rom and-lords,rural organization) may help convinceuncommittedndividualsto support revolutionarymovement, hesebenefits o notexplain howtheorganization getsstarted n the first lace (i.e.,before t was able toprovidethesebenefits) r why ndividualswill risk their ives to expandthe movement.Given thehighprobability f failure nd therisks thatrevolutionaries ace imprisonment,xile,death),thepayoffswould haveto be enormous to make joininga revolutionarymovement a rationalchoice.42 nd testimonyrom everalrevolutionaryeaderssuggests hattheydid not expectto be rewardedat all.43Thus, thepuzzle remains:how are individualspersuadedto bear the costsand risksofrevolution-ary activity, nd how do theysustain theircommitment n the face ofprolonged uncertainty, anger, nd otherdifficulties?44University f CaliforniaPress,1979);MichaelTaylor, "Rationalitynd Revolutionary ol-lectiveAction," nTaylor, d.,Rationalitynd RevolutionCambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988), 63-97; Gordon Tullock, "The Paradox ofRevolution," ublic Choice 11 (Fall1971); PhilipG. Roeder, Rational Revolution: xtensions f the By-Product'Model of Rev-olutionary nvolvement,"WesternoliticalQuarterly5 (March 1982);MorrisSilver, Politi-cal Revolution nd Repression:An EconomicApproach,"Public Choice17 (Spring 1974);and Edward N. Muller and Karl-DieterOpp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious CollectiveAction,"American olitical cienceReview80 (June1986).40 See Muller and Opp (fn.39),472.

41 See Jeffreyace, "Toward an Exchange TheoryofRevolution,"nJohnWilson Lewis,ed.,PeasantRebellion nd Communist evolutionn Asia Stanford, alif.:StanfordUniversityPress, 1974); Joel . Migdal,Peasants, olitics nd RevolutionPrinceton: rincetonUniversityPress, 1974);and the referencesn fn.39.42 As Charles Tilly notes, "Why and how ... thegroup committedfrom the starttofundamentalransformationfthe tructurefpower .. forms emains neof themysteriesofour time." See Tilly,FromMobilization o RevolutionNew York: RandomHouse, 1978),203.43 Revolutionaries re often urprisedwhen theygain power,which suggests hat theywerenotmotivated yexpectationsfpersonal uture ain.Lenintold socialist outh roupin January 917that"we oftheoldergenerationmaynot ive to see the decisivebattles fthis coming revolution"; he Sandinista eader Daniel Ortegaadmitted hat as late as July1979 he did notexpectto see the revolutionucceed n Nicaragua; and theAyatollahKho-meini was reportedlyurprisedbythespeed with which the Shah's regimecollapsed. SeeWilliam Henry Chamberlain,The BolshevikRevolutionPrinceton: PrincetonUniversityPress,1987),1:131, 23; Pastor fn. 2), xiv;and MarvinZonis,"Iran: A Theoryof RevolutionfromAccounts f theRevolution,"World olitics 5 (July 983),602.44 In the words ofDouglass North: "How do we accountfor .. thewillingness fpeopleto engage in immense acrificewithno evidentpossiblegain (theendlessparade of individ-


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336 WORLD POLITICSPart of the answerlies in therecognition hatrevolutionaryction ismotivatedas much bymoral commitment s by narrow self-interest.45Those who approach the abolition of thepresentorder as a moral im-

perativewill view thepromiseof individualbenefits s secondary r ir-relevant.46urthermore, erceptions f costs nd benefits ltimately eston subjectivebeliefs bout theconsequencesofdifferenthoices; if ndi-viduals believe hat revolution spossible nd willbringgreatbenefits-irrespective fthe truepossibilities-theywill be more likelyto supportit, particularly f theyalso believe that success requires their participa-tion.47Revolutionarymovements therefore ryto convince potentialmembers 1) thatseekingto overthrow heexisting rder s themorallycorrectposition, 2) thatdoing so will bring significant enefits, nd (3)that he probabilityfsuccess shigh.48 ersuadingtheuncommitted ndreassuring xistingmembersof these "facts" s a principalfunction f arevolutionarydeology.REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGIESAn ideologyis a normative heory f action. Ideologies "explain" pre-vailing social conditions and provide guidelines for how individualsshould react to them. In nonrevolutionary ocieties,forexample, thedominant deology helps discouragedisobedience and freeriding suchas taxevasion) by persuadingcitizens "to conceive of usticeas coexten-sive withtheexisting ules, nd accordingly,oobeythemout of a senseofmorality." deology mproves fficiencyy reducing he"enforcementcosts" of obtaining supportfor the prevailingorder.By contrast, theobjectiveof a successful ounter-ideologys to convincepeople notonlythat the observed njustices re an inherentpartof the systembut alsothat just system an come aboutonly byactiveparticipationf ndivid-uals and groupswho have incurred risonordeath for bstract auses)?" See North, truc-ture nd Change nEconomicHistoryNew York: W. W. Norton,1981), 10-1.

45 See James Rule, Theories f Civil Violence Berkeley: University f California Press,1988), 35, 39. For a more general discussion fthese ssues, ee JonElster,The Cement fSociety: Study fSocial OrderCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress,1989), hap.5.46 For example, ee thedescriptionf Lenin's "intense aith" nMarxism nChamberlain(fn.43), 1:135,140.47 This argument s consistentwith recent ociologicalresearch uggesting hat politicalorganizations ncouragecollective ctionby promoting articular eliefs bout theserious-ness of the problem, he locus of causality r blame,the image of the opposition, nd theefficacy fcollective esponse. ee David A. Snow etal., "Frame Alignment rocesses,Mi-cromobilization, nd MovementParticipation," merican ociologicalReview 51 (August1986).48 Thus, Sandinista eader HumbertoOrtega admittedto deliberately xaggerating hefeasibilityf revolution: Tryingto tell the masses that he costwas veryhigh and that heyshould seekanotherwaywould have meant hedefeat f therevolutionary ovement." eeTomas Borgeetal.,Sandinistaspeak New York: Pathfinder ress, 1982),70-71.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 337uals in the system."49 evolutionary deologies critiquethepresent ys-tem as Marx's analysisof capitalismdid) and offer strategy orreplac-ing it with some morallypreferable rder.50n short, deology erves "toenergize groups to behave contrary o a simple, hedonistic ndividualcalculus of costs and benefits . . since neither maintenance of the exist-ing order nor its overthrow s possible without uch behavior."51 o thisend, revolutionarydeologiestend toemphasizethreekey themes.

ENEMIES ARE EVIL AND INCAPABLE OF REFORMRevolutionary roups usuallyportrayheir pponents s intrinsicallyviland incapableofmeaningful eform: f the current ystems unjust andcannotimprove,thenefforts t compromise re doomed, leavingrevo-lution as the only morally possible alternative.Lenin broke with the"Economists" in Russia and withSocial Democrats like Karl Kautskyover the possibility f reforming sarism nd capitalism, nd Mao Ze-dong told his followers hat" 'imperialisms ferocious.' r[Itsnaturewill never change, the imperialistswill never lay down their butcherknives, .. theywill never becomeBuddhas."52 imilarly, heAyatollohKhomeiniopposed compromisewith the Shah bywarning ranians that"ifyou give thisfellowa breathing pell,neitherslam noryour countrynor your familywill be leftforyou.Do notgivehim thechance; squeezehis neck until he is strangled."53n each case reform nd compromisewererejected n favorof a radical solution.

VICTORY IS INEVITABLEUnless potential supporters elieve theirsacrificeswill eventuallybearfruit, revolutionarymovementwill notget veryfar.Revolutionaryde-ologies are thus nherently ptimistic: hey nvariably ortray ictory sinevitabledespitewhatmay appearto be theoverwhelming dds against

North fn.44),53-54.50 According oMarkHagopian, "There are three tructuralspects frevolutionaryde-ology: critique,which aysbaretheshortcomingsfthe old regime; ffirmation,hichsug-gestsor even spellsout in detail that better ocietys notonly desirable, utpossible;andin recent imes, trategicuidance,whichtells the bestway tomake a revolution." ee Ha-gopian fn.2),258.51 See North fn.44),53-54.52 See Carr (fn.3), 1:11;andMao Zedong,"Cast Away Illusions, reparefor truggle,"nMao Zedong,SelectedWorksfMao Tse-Tung Peking: Peking LanguagesPress,1961),4:428.Aftergaining power,Lenin argued that "the [imperialists'] triving o take advantageofevery pportunityo attackRussia is incorrigible." uoted in Leites fn. 10),406.53 Quoted inArjomand fn.18),102. See also Nikki Keddie,Roots fRevolution: n Inter-pretation ftheHistory fModern ran (New Haven: Yale University ress,1981),207. Ra-mazani arguesthatKhomeini'shostilityowardthe United States nd the Soviet Union wasbased in parton his belief hat onflictwiththese dversarieswas both desirable nd impos-sible to avoid. See Ramazani (fn.11),20-21.


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338 WORLD POLITICSit. Furthermore, he deologymayreinforce hisbeliefby invoking rre-sistible r divine forces o justify aith n victory.Marxists, orexample,saw the "laws" of capitalistdevelopment s leading inexorably owardproletarian evolution nd theemergence f socialism.Khomeiniand hisfollowersrested theiroptimismon religiousfaith.Revolutionariesmayalso invoke the successesof earlier movements o sustainconfidence ntheirown efforts; hus,the Sandinistassaw Castro's victoryn Cuba asevidencethattheirown effortsnNicaragua could succeed.54Optimismcan also be encouragedby depicting ne's enemy s a papertiger.Mao Zedong argued,for xample,that reactionaries"were"papertigers"who "in appearance . . . are terrifyingut in reality.. are notso powerful," nd Marshal Lin Biao assertedthat "U.S. imperialism sstronger, utalso more vulnerable, hanany imperialism fthepast."55Lenin's assessmentof imperialismwas similar: as the "highest tage ofcapitalism," mperialism ontainedboththepowertodominatetheglobeand the seeds of ts nevitable estruction t thehandsof theproletariat.56The method san obviouswayto sustain ommitment: oweverhopelessthings ppear tobe,success s neverthelessssured fonlytherevolution-aryforcespersevere.At the same time the real difficultiesf thestruggle emand thatrev-olutionarymovements emper heiroptimism: ven ifvictorys inevita-ble, for instance, t still requires heroic effort nd repeated sacrifice.Thus, Khomeini argued that"it is only through heactive, ntentionalpursuitofmartyrdomhatunjustrulerscan be toppled,"and Lin Biaoremindedhis readersthatalthoughU.S. imperialismwas vulnerable,"the task of the national-democratic evolution can be fulfilled nlythrough ongand torturoustruggles."57imilarly,Mao Zedong warnedhis followers o"despisetheenemy trategically hiletakingfull ccountof him tactically,"meaningthatovercoming heenemywould requirecarefulpreparation nd repeatedsacrifice ut thatvictorywas assured

54 See thetestimonynGilbert fn.19), 5,56.5 See Van Ness (fn.3), 40-41; and Lin Biao, "Long Live Victoryn thePeople's War," inSamuel B. Griffith,d., Peking ndPeople'sWar New York: Praeger,1966),101.56 See V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: heHighest tage of Capitalism,n Lenin (fn. 20), 1:675,

745-68. Asked what he would do ifhe gained power,Lenin replied, We would at oncesystematicallytart o incite ebellion mongall thepeoplesnowoppressed . . [and] raise nrebellion the socialistproletariat f Europe." Quoted in Theodore H. von Laue, "SovietDiplomacy:G. V. Chicherin, eople's CommissarforForeign Affairs, 918-1930," n Gor-don A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, ds.,TheDiplomats, 919-1939 Princeton:PrincetonUni-versity ress, 1953),236. See also Carr (fn.3), 3-4, 7.57 See Zonis and Brumberg fn.11), 27-28; and Lin Biao (fn. 55), 97. Such beliefsnicelycounter hefree-riderroblem: fpotentialmemberswereconvinced hatvictorywas inevi-table regardless fwhether hey oinedornot, hetemptationo freeride would increase.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 339because theenemywas vulnerable.58 enin similarlywarned his follow-ers against overconfidence; ictory, hough assured, could not be wonwithout etbacks nd tacticalretreats long the way.59

Thus, theworldviewof mostrevolutionarymovementsbetrays ten-sion betweenoptimism nd prudence.An important uestion, herefore,is which of these tendencies xerts hegreater nfluence n the percep-tions and behavior of the new state.The history f the movementmayplay a role in this regard; fthe path to power is short nd smooth, hentheoptimistic spectsof the deology re likelyto be reinforced. ycon-trast,when powercomes in the wake ofa protracted truggle, herevo-lutionaryeadersare more ikely o be aware ofpotential itfalls nd thusmorelikelyto behavewithrestraint.

OUR REVOLUTION HAS UNIVERSAL MEANINGAlthough exceptionsdo exist such as Kemalist Turkey, revolutionaryMexico, or theMeiji restoration n Japan), he ideologiesofmost revo-lutionarystates contain strong"universalist"themes.Specifically, heprinciples f the revolution re believedtoapplytoother ocieties s well.In the extremecase, the ideology may go so far as to rejectthe nation-state s a legitimate oliticalunitand call for he eventualelimination fthestate-systemtself.During theFrenchRevolution, or xample,theprowarfaction ed byBrissot de Warville called for a "universal crusade of human liberty,"arguingthatthe"liberty fthe entireworld"was worth fewthousanddeaths.60 rthodoxMarxists aw the "inevitable" riumph f socialism sa worldwide processthat would bringabout a classless, tateless om-monwealthof peace. Chinese officials mphasized that "world revolu-tion relieson thethought f Mao Tse-tung.. . [It] belongsnotonlytoChina but also has its nternationalmplications."61nd Khomeini'sver-sion of Shiite theologyforesaw the eventual establishment f a global

58 See Van Ness (fn. ),40-41.On another ccasionMao toldhis followers hat mperialismwas "rotten nd had no future,"nd "we have reason odespise hem."Yet he also cautionedthat "we shouldnevertake theenemy ightly . . and [should]concentrate ll our strengthforbattle."See Mao Zedong,"On Some Important roblems f theParty'sPresentPolicy,"in Mao Zedong (fn.52), 4:181; and Tsou and Halperin fn. 15),89.59 In "LeftwingCommunism,"Lenin warned that"we may suffer raveand sometimeseven decisivedefeats.... If, however,we use all the methodsof struggle, ictorywill becertain." ee Lenin (fn.20),3:410-11. At theEighthPartyConferencen 1919,he stated, Aslong as we have not yet chievedfullvictory,eversals fthe situation repossible nd hencenot even the smallestdoubt or lightmindednessan be tolerated."Quoted inLeites fn. 10),442.60 See T. C. W. Blanning,The FrenchRevolutionnGermany: ccupation ndResistancentheRhineland, 792-1802 London: OxfordUniversity ress),63; and Blanning fn.3), 111.61 Quoted inTsou and Halperin fn. 15),82.


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340 WORLD POLITICSMuslimcommunity ummak)following heabolitionof the"un-Islamic"nation-state ystem.62That revolutionary deologies tend to include universalist lementsshould not come as a surprise.Such views promiseadherents n addi-tionalrewardfor their acrifices: revolution s good notonlyforone'sown country, ut it will be beneficial orothers s well.Moreover, fthefailures fthe old regime re the resultof externalforces suchas "capi-talist mperialism"), henactionbeyondone's own bordersmaybe nec-essary o eliminate heseevils once and for ll. Finally, n order toattractpopular support,revolutionarydeologiestendto portraynew politicalideas as self-evident ruths-which createsa bias toward universalism.How, that s,can a self-evident oliticalprinciplebe valid forone groupbut not for others?Could the Jacobins rgue that the Rightsof Manapplied onlytoFrenchmen?63ould Marx'sdisciples ntheSovietUnionclaim that his "laws ofhistory"were valid in Russia alone? Could theIranian revolutionariesrgue thatan Islamic republicwas essentialforPersiansbut not forotherMuslims?CAVEATSThese ideologicalthemes re neithernecessarynorsufficientonditionsforrevolutionary uccess,and one or more of these elementsmay bemissing n certain ases. Nor do revolutions ccurwhenever omegroupadopts these deological formulas; helikelihoodof a successful evolu-tion s also affected ya host of otherdomestic nd internationalondi-tions, ncludingthe challengers'abilityto providematerialbenefits otheirfollowers.64till, t is hardto imaginea mass revolution ucceedingwithout n ideological programthatboth ustified evolt nd gave par-ticipants omereason to believetheywould win.65ndeed, it s a strikingfactthatthe deological programs frevolutionarymovements s variedas those of the AmericanFounding Fathers,the Russian and Chinesecommunists, r the Iranian fundamentalistsll incorporatedvariationson these threeprinciples. n short, lthoughthe inherentdifficulty frevolution nd the logic of the free-rider roblemdo not require thatrevolutionarymovements doptthe deologicalformulas utlinedabove,

62 See Ramazani (fn. 11), 19-21;and Zonis and Blumberg fn. 11), 6,24.63 See Simon Schama,Citizens: ChronicleftheFrenchRevolutionNew York: AlfredA.Knopf, 1989),592."I See Migdal (fn. 41), 226-56; and Theda Skocpol,"What Makes Peasants Revolution-ary?" Comparativeolitics 4 April 1982).65 According to Franz Borkenau: "If violence s the father f everygreat upheaval, itsmother s illusion. The beliefwhich s alwaysreborn n everygreatand decisive historicalstruggle s thatthis is the last fight, hatafter hisstruggle ll poverty, ll suffering,lloppressionwill be a thing f thepast."See Borkenau fn.4), 74-75.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 341such beliefs re likelytogive theman advantageover rivals who lack asimilar et of ideas.Of course, revolutionarydeologies shouldnot be seen as wholly dif-ferent romotherforms f politicalbelief. n fact, hey re usually ustamore extremeversionofthepatrioticdeals thatestablishedregimesuseto encourage individual sacrifice.Just s revolutionarymovementsen-courage similar sacrificesthrough the ideological themes describedabove, so statesat war portray heirenemiesas evil, victory s certain,and theirown goals as pureand idealistic e.g.,"to make theworldsafefordemocracy," to promote new worldorder").Butbecause the risksare great and the odds of successare low, revolutionarymovements relikely to indoctrinatemembers even more enthusiasticallyhan moststatesdo.REVOLUTIONS AND UNCERTAINTYRevolutions ncreasethe evel of uncertaintyn the nternationalystem.First, fter revolutionneither ide can reliably stimate he other's n-tentions.Withouta record of past behavior to guide them,other statescannot knowwhether rior greementswill be honored; thus, mportantcommitmentsnd understandingsre called intoquestionas soon as thenew leaders take power. Second, revolutions lso magnify ncertaintiesabout the balance of power. The chaos thataccompaniesa revolutionreduces the state'scapabilities n certainrespects, ut the new regimemay be more effectiven mobilizingnational resources han itsprede-cessorwas. Because themagnitudeof these different ffects annotbeknown inadvance-particularlywhen thenew regimerepresents rad-ical departurefrom the old order-neither side is able to gauge theirrelative apabilitieswith muchconfidence.Third, revolutions lso damage the normal channels ofcommunica-tion between statespreciselywhen the need foraccurate nformationsgreatest; his makes it moredifficult orthemto understand he infor-mationtheydo have.Diplomatic representativesre oftenwithdrawn rreplaced and intelligence etworks re disrupted,which makes it moredifficult or each side to determinewhat the other is doing and why.Afterthe BolshevikRevolution,forexample,the U.S. diplomaticstaffleftMoscow and had only irregular ontactwith the Soviet leadership,leavingofficialsn Washingtonto relyon conflicting eports rom va-riety f unofficial ources.66n the same way,therevolutionary overn-

66The confusion esulting rom ack of informationnd communication s a recurringtheme n GeorgeF. Kennan,Soviet-Americanelations,917-1920, vols. Princeton: rince-ton University ress,1956and 1958).


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 343own experience.Eager to redresspast wrongs as is oftenthecase), therevolutionarymovementwill be especiallywaryof any foreignpowersthat t sees as responsibleforthem.Thus, Mao Zedong's suspicions ofthe United States were based in part on past WesterninterferencenChina, and revolutionary orces n Mexico, Nicaragua, and Iran werepreoccupied with thepossibility fU.S. intervention ormuch thesamereason.70Under such circumstances evolutionaryegimes tend to assume theworstabout other states nd to interpret mbiguousor inconsistent ol-iciesin a negative ight: threats r signsofopposition onfirm he hostileimage, whereas concessions or signsof approval are seen as insinceregesturesmaskingtheopponent'strue hostile) ntentions.71 nd indeed,the policiesofother states re virtually ertain o be ambiguous, fonlybecause ittakestime for hosestates o decide how torespondto the newsituation.This problem s compounded bythedifficultyn understand-ing how a new politicalorderworks,by gnorance bout thebeliefs ndbackgroundof thenew regime, nd bytheabsenceofreliable nforma-tionthataccompaniesa revolution.72ven whenforeign owersare notespecially hostile,therefore,ome of theiractions and statementswillreinforcehesuspicions f therevolutionaryegime.Third, spiraling s more likely f theelite or a factionwithin t) ex-aggeratesa foreign hreat n order to improve ts nternalposition, hatis, byrallyingnationalist upportforthe new leadersor to justify arshmeasuresagainst nternal pponents. uch effortsre especially ffectivewhen there s some truth o theaccusations, or xample, fforeign ow-ers had been allied with theold regime nd ifthey re clearly uspiciousof the new government.This tactic can be dangerousif itmagnifiesconflict hatmightotherwisehave been avoided orminimized. The riskcan be contained,however, f therevolutionarylite remains ware thatit is engaging n a purelydomesticgambit, o that tsactual policy deci-

70 See Mao Zedong, "Friendship rAggression?" nMao Zedong (fn. 52),4:447-50; Gil-bert fn. 19), 153-75; and JamesA. Bill,TheEagle and theLion: The Tragedy fAmerican-IranianRelationsNew Haven: Yale University ress,1988),96-97.71 On thetendency o fit mbiguous nformationntoexisting eliefs, ee Jervis fn. 68),143-54.72 For example, gnorance f nternal oliticsn Francewas an important ause of the warof 1792.Followingtheroyalfamily's ailedescape attemptn June1791,EmperorLeopoldof Austria warnedtheFrenchAssemblynottoharmLouis XVI and hisfamily.n Septem-ber, Louis' acceptanceof thenew constitutionave moderateforces n theAssembly em-porary scendancy ver the radical factions. his developmentwas due primarilyo eventsin Paris, but Leopold mistakenlyaw it as a directresultofhis threats.When he tried torepeat the maneuverby issuing notherwarning n December,he merelydiscredited hemoderates nd helpedbring heprowarBrissotin action o power.See Blanning fn.3), 86,89, 102-3.


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344 WORLD POLITICSsions re basedon its rue ssessmentfothers'ntentionsather han nthemytht has manufactured.Butmaintaininguchfine ontrols difficult.lthoughheir reatorsmayknow hat hese remyths,he ampaignmaybe soconvincinghatit becomes he basis forpolicy.Moreover,ffortso enhancedomesticsupport yexaggeratingxternalhreatsan beself-fulfilling:fforeignpowersdo notrecognizeherealmotive ehind uch campaign, heymay ake herevolutionarytate's ccusationsnd threatseriously. ndifthey hen eact efensively-as ne would xpect-itwillmerely on-firm hebellicosemage hat therslready old.WHY FOREIGN POWERS SPIRAL WITH REVOLUTIONARY STATESOther states ontributeo thespiralofhostilitys well, byfailing ounderstandhat ach sidewill nevitablyold to tsownversion fhis-tory-all states fter ll tendtoview their wnhistoryn a favorablelight.The revolutionarytatewillnaturallymphasize ast njustices,such as resentmentverforeignnterference.utforeign owerswillnot understand hy henewregime eesthem s objects f hatred ndsuspicionnd will view theregime's efensiveesponsess evidence fits aggressivententions.73or example,U.S. Secretaryf StateDeanAcheson aw Chinese nterventionn the KoreanWar as evidence fcommunistxpansionismnd Soviet ontrol,laiminghat nopossibleshred fevidence ouldhaveexistedn theminds f theChineseCom-munist uthoritiesboutthe[peaceful]ntentionsf theforces f theUnitedNations." ikemostAmericans,cheson elievedhatU.S. pol-icy n theFar East had been n China'sbest nterest. sa result, efailedtorecognize ownegativenimageWestern ctionsntheFarEast hadproducedn the mindsof China'snewleaders.74imilarproblems f-flicted .S. relations ithCastro: ecauseU.S. leaders uch s PresidentDwightD. Eisenhower elieved hatU.S. policy ad beenbeneficialorCuba, they aw Castro's ostilitys unjustifiedggression ather han san understandableeactionopastU.S. behavior.75venwhere egiti-mategrounds or onflictxistas they id nboth hese ases), gnoranceof thehistorical asisfor uspicion ncouragesheforeign owers oex-aggeratehebellicosityf therevolutionarytate.Foreign owersmay lsospiralf henewregime's omesticrograms

73 On the tendency f states o distort heir wnhistory,ee Van Evera (fn.34, diss.),399-451.74 See RichardNed Lebow, BetweenPeace and War: The Natureof International risis(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins University ress,1981),205-16; Jervisfn.68), 70-72.75 See RichardWelch,ResponseoRevolution: he United tates nd theCuban Revolution,1959-1961 Chapel Hill: Universityf North CarolinaPress, 1985),41.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 345affect heir nterestsdversely.This situation salready legitimate asisfor onflict,ut, s discussed bove,the threatwillbe magnifiedf ctionstakenfor nternalreasonsare also viewed as evidenceof aggressive n-tentions. n hopes of obtaining diplomaticor military upport,groupswhose interests re affectedsuch as foreign orporationswhose assetshave been seized) may try o convincetheirhomegovernments hatthenew regime s a threat o nationalsecurity. hus, Castro's land reformprogramexacerbatedthe spiral of hostility etweenthe Untied Statesand Cuba, and Arbenz's land reformsn Guatemala led theUnited FruitCompany to organize a public relationscampaign that provided thebackdropfortheU.S.-led coup thatoverthrew im.76EXACERBATING FACTORSTo make mattersworse,revolutionslterrelations etween tates n sev-eralotherwaysthat ncourageexaggerated erceptions fhostility. irst,each side tends to underestimate he other's sense of vulnerability.naddition to the burdens of organizinga government nd rebuildingadamaged society, evolutionarytatesoftenface continueddomesticop-position.77earfulthattheirhold on power is precarious, hey re morelikelyto overreact o threats.78espite this senseof vulnerability, ow-ever,revolutionarytates ttempt oportray hemselves s firmlyn con-trol, n ordertodiscouragecounterrevolutiont home and to attract ec-ognitionabroad. If thispublic relations fforts successful, ther stateswill underestimate heextent o whichtherevolutionarytate s drivenbyinsecuritynd will view itsdefensive ctionsas a signof aggressiveintentratherthanas a reactionto legitimatefears.Furthermore, therstatesmaynotrecognizethata new regimemust build a reputation ordefending ts interestsn orderto deterfuture hallengesand that thismotivewill encouragethemtorespondvigorously ochallenges.The reversemayoccur as well. Fully aware oftheirown weaknesses,revolutionary tatesmay find it hard to understand why others view

76 On Cuba, see Moss (fn. 68), 160-64, 193-94.On Guatemala, see Richard H. Immer-mann,The CIA in Guatemala:The Foreign olicy f nterventionAustin:Universityf TexasPress,1982);and StephenSchlesingernd StephenKinzer,Bitter ruit:The Untold tory ftheAmerican oup nGuatemalaGardenCity,N.Y.: AnchorBooks, 1983).77 One Chinesesourcereports s many s 400,000 ounterrevolutionarybandits"remain-inginChina in 1950. See Gurtov nd Hwang (fn.21),31. The French revolutionariesacednumerousuprisings nd a civil war in the Vendee,and the Iranian,Bolshevik,Ethiopian,Nicaraguan,and Cuban revolutionswere also characterized y lingeringnternalviolenceafter heseizure ofpower.78 As George Pettee once observed, Revolutionists nterthe limelight, ot like men onhorseback, s victorious onspiratorsppearing n theforum, ut like fearful hildren, x-ploring n emptyhouse,not surethat t sempty." ee Pettee,The Process fRevolutionNewYork: Harper,1938),100-101.


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346 WORLD POLITICSthemas dangerous.79 ccordingly, heymayview theopposition f otherstates as evidence of intrinsic ostility atherthan as a responseto therevolutionarytate's wn actions.Foreign powerswillbe concernedwithbuildinga reputation s well, n order to teach thenew regimethattheycannot be exploited.Both sides, then,may interpretven purelydefen-sivepoliciesas signsofaggressive ntentwhich s nottodenythat theremayalso be real conflicts f nterest).A second exacerbatingfactor s the pernicious nfluenceof exiles.80Revolutions nvariably roducea large populationthatflees oescape itsconsequences. Many are supporters r members of the old regime andare likely to be hostile to the revolutionary overnment nd eager toreturn o power. They tend to settle n countries hat re sympathetic otheirplightand try o obtain foreign ssistancefor their ounterrevolu-tionary fforts. o this nd, they ortrayhenewregime s a gravethreatto other states and characterize t as illegitimate nd unpopular (andtherefore ulnerable to counterrevolutionaryction). Moreover, despitetheirobvious biases, emigresare often een as expertson conditions ntheirhomecountry.As a result, heir estimonyslikely o be overvalued,particularlywhen other ourcesof nformationre scarce.The more cre-dence they re given,the moretheywill shift ttitudesn the host coun-try gainst therevolutionary egime.8" hus, duringthe French Revo-lution emigres fromFrance and its "satelliterepublics" purveyed avarietyof myths bout the aggressive mbitions of the revolutionariesand were at least partly uccessful n stoking foreign uspicionof therevolutionary overnment.82 ore recently, uban, Iranian, and Nica-

79As Lenin toldtheTenth PartyCongress n 1921, For a long time we are condemnedmerely oheal wounds."Quoted inChamberlain fn.43), 2:446.80 See Yossi Shain,The Frontierf Loyalty: oliticalExiles n theAge oftheNation-State(Middletown,Conn.: WesleyanUniversity ress,1989).81 This ishardly newphenomenon.n the sixteenthentury,Machiavelliobserved:How vain the faith nd promises f menare who are exiles from heir wncountry.Asto theirfaith, . . whenever hey an return o their ountry yothermeans thanyourassistance, heywill abandonyouand look totheothermeans,regardless f theirprom-ises to you. And as to theirvain hopes and promises, uch is their xtremedesiretoreturn o theirhomes that heynaturally elievemany hings hat re nottrue, nd addmanyothers n purpose;so that,withwhattheyreallybelieveand whatthey aytheybelieve, heywillfillyouwithhopesto thatdegreethat fyou attempto actuponthem,youwill incur fruitlessxpense, r engage n an undertaking hatwill involveyou inruin.

See Niccol6 Machiavelli,ThePrince nd theDiscourses, rans.Luigi Ricci and rev. E. R. P.Vincent New York: ModernLibrary, 950),388-89.82 See JacquesGodechot,TheCounter-Revolution:octrine ndAction, 89-1804 (Prince-ton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1971), hap. 9; and R. R. Palmer,TheAge oftheDemocraticRevolution: PoliticalHistory fEurope ndAmerica, vols. Princeton: rincetonUniversityPress,1959and 1964),2:556-58,568.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 347raguan emigres n the United Stateshave used domestic mythmakingand political obbying o reinforce .S. opposition o these revolutionaryregimes.83 nd themore visibleand vocal such groupsare, the greaterthe tendency or herevolutionarytate oconcludethat he host countrysupports hecounterrevolutionaryims of theexpatriates.The same processoccursin reverse, f course: revolutionary ympa-thizersflockto thenew capital after herevolution, ither o learnfromits experiences, o providedirect upport, r to obtain assistancefortheirown struggles ack home.84 ike theemigres, hesegroups portray heirhome countries s both hostile nd ripeforrevolution,n ordertoobtainexternalsupportfortheirefforts. ven if the new regimedeclines tosupport them,other stateswill view theirpresence n therevolutionarycapitalas evidencethatthe new regime eekstospread ts deals abroad.Taken together, he parallel migration f counterrevolutionarymigresand prorevolutionary ympathizers nd the testimony hey provide totheirhostsreinforces ach side'sperceptions f the other'shostility.A third xacerbating actor s the ossofexpertise hat ccompaniesarevolution.Not onlyare many revolutionarylitespoorly prepared forrunninga government nd managingitsdiplomacy,but revolutionarygovernmentslso oftenpurgeindividualswithclose ties to potential n-emies.85 hus, the Iranian revolutionaries emoved officialswith closeties to the United States,and the communistChinese persecutedtheirown "America hands" in the 1950s.Ironically, s the treatment f theStateDepartment's China hands" suggests, he sameprocessmayoccurwithinotherstates s well.86 y removing xperienced ndividuals, achside further educes tscapacity o understand he other.Thus, theper-

83 On Iran,see Bill (fn. 70),276-77. On Cuba, see Phillip Brenner, romConfrontationoNegotiation: .S. RelationswithCuba (Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1988),71-75; and JoanDi-dion,Miami (New York: Simon and Schuster, 987).Additional research n the lobbyingactivities f exiles s badlyneeded.84 Examples are ubiquitous: Thomas Paine traveled o France in the 1790s, long withwould-be revolutionariesrom he restofEurope,and socialists uch as JohnReed, LouiseBryant, nd Emma Goldman journeyed o Russiafollowing he Bolshevik eizure ofpowerin 1917. Havana, Tehran,and Managua have been minor meccas forforeign evolutionaryelites s well.85 As Lenin once admitted, he Bolsheviks'main deficiencieswere "lack of cultureandthatwe reallydo notknow how to rule."Quoted in Dunn (fn.4), 47. In November 1918 hedeclared, We are not often hort fpropagandists,ut our mostcrying hortage s the ackof efficienteadersor organizers."Quoted in PieroMelograni, enin and theMyth fWorldRevolution Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 989), 1. See alsoChamberlain fn.43), 1:351.86 The "China hands" were a groupof China experts ccused ofdisloyalty nd purgedfrom he StateDepartment uring heMcCarthy ra. See MichaelSchaller,TheUnited tatesand China in theTwentieth enturyNew York: OxfordUniversity ress, 1979), 130; andE. J. Kahn, Jr.,The ChinaHands: America's oreign erviceOfficersnd WhatBefell Them(New York: RandomHouse, 1975).


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348 WORLD POLITICSsonnel changes set in motion by a revolution xacerbate the prevailinguncertainty nd reinforce uspicionon both sides.To summarize: revolutionsunleash a variety f forcesthat make itmore difficultortherevolutionarytate nd itsneighbors o assess eachother's intentions ccurately.Both sides lack information,nd each islikely oview the other s more hostile han treally s.Such a conclusionmakes it more difficult orthem to reach a satisfactory odus vivendiand strengthenshe position fthosewho favordirect ction to eliminatethethreat.The tendency or piralingdoes not explain whywaroccurs,however.After ll, the UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion were extremely ostilethroughoutmuch ofthecold war,but neither aw war as an attractiveoptionfordealingwith theother.Thus, the finalquestiontoconsider swhywar is seen as a reasonableresponse.OFFENSE, DEFENSE, REVOLUTION, AND WAROther thingsbeing equal, war is more likelywhen nationalleaders be-lieve that offense s easier thandefense.When offense s easy,all statesare less secure i.e.,theoverall evelofthreat s higher) nd will be morestronglymotivated o find waytoimprove heirpositions.At the sametime,using forcepromisesgreater enefits ecauseitoffers hepossibilityof winning a decisive victory ver one's opponents.The result is in-creased internationalompetitionnd a greaterrisk ofwar.87This general hypothesis elps explain whyrevolutionsead to war. Inaddition to creating xaggeratedperceptions fhostility,evolutions lsoencourageboth sidesto exaggerateboth their wn vulnerabilitynd thevulnerabilityf theiropponents.This tendency s partlydue to the in-herentdifficultyf estimating he balance of power after revolution,whichmakes itmore ikely hatboth sideswill exaggerate heirmilitaryprospects. Furthermore,perceptionsof vulnerabilityre increased byfearsthattherevolutionwill either pread to othercountries r readilysuccumbto counterrevolutionaryressure.For bothmilitarynd politi-cal reasons, therefore, evolutionheightens ach side's sense of threatsand opportunities.

Taken together, hese factors ncouragebothpartiesto believe thatthe otherpresents grave threat,yet they lso encouragethebeliefthatthethreat an be eliminatedfairly asily.Once again,thesedynamics rebestunderstoodby examining revolutionarytatesand foreignpowersseparately.87 See thereferencesnfn.34.


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 349WHY REVOLUTIONARY STATES ARE INSECURE BUT OVERCONFIDENTTo begin with,theinherent ptimismofmostrevolutionarydeologiescan encourage them to overstate heirmilitary apabilities. Thus, theBrissotin action hat ed France towar in 1792 argued thatthe Revolu-tion had createda powerthatwould crush ts enemieseasily.As Brissottold the National Assembly: "Every advantage is on our side, for noweveryFrenchman s a willingsoldier! . . [W]here s thepoweron earth... who could hope to master sixmillionfreesoldiers?"88 his sort ofargument s difficult o challengewithout ppearing unpatriotic; fop-ponentsare destinedfor the "ash-heap of history," xpressingdoubtsabout thecertaintyfvictory etrays lack of confidence n the revolu-tion tself.The optimismofrevolutionarytates lso rests n the beliefthat citi-zens in other countrieswill riseup to supportthem. This hope reflectstheuniversalism ommontomany revolutionarydeologiesand impliesthat theiropponents, acking popular support,will be unable to fighteffectively.he Brissotinsused this argumentto great effect:Brissotclaimedthat each soldierwill sayto hisenemy: Brother, am notgoingto cutyour throat, am going to showyou theway tohappiness." Andhis associateMaximin Isnard predictedthat "at the moment that theenemyarmiesbegin to fightwithours,thedaylightofphilosophywillopen theireyes and thepeoples will embrace each other n the face oftheir dethronedtyrants nd an approvingheaven and earth."89ManyBolsheviks believed similarly hat their success in Russia would sparkthelong-anticipated evolution n Germanyand a cascade ofupheavalsin the restofEurope. Even Lenin,who had rejected this view in 1917,supportedthe Russian invasionofPoland in 1920 because he believed itwould trigger n uprisingbysocialistforces here.90 ao's claim that"asingle sparkcan ignite prairiefire"conveys similarfaith n thecata-lytic ffects frevolutionaryction.Thus, theoverconfidence f revolu-tionary tates s fueledbythe faith hatthe irresistiblepreadof revolu-tionarydeas will undermine heir pponents.Revolutionary tatescan be furthermislediftheygive too much cre-dence to the testimonyf foreign ympathizers. he latter, esirous ofexternalsupport, re prone to exaggeratethe prospectsforrevolution

88 Anotherdeputy uggested hat"in the face of our bravepatriots,heallied armies willfadeaway like theshade ofnight nthe faceoftherays f thesun."Quoted in Blanning fn.3), 108-9.89 These quotations re from chama (fn.63), 597; and Blanning fn.3), 109-10.90 ee Carr (fn. 3), 3:209-12; and Chamberlain fn. 43),2:305-8. For an alternativenter-pretation,ee Thomas C. Fiddick,Russia'sRetreatrom oland,1920: FromPermanent evo-lution oPeacefulCoexistenceNew York: St. Martin'sPress, 1990).


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350 WORLD POLITICSback home. In 1792,forexample,theNational Assembly n Paris wasbombardedwithoptimistic eports rom oreign missaries laimingthattheir ountrymenried out for iberation nd thatthe old regimewouldcollapse quickly fattacked.91Furthermore,uccessful evolutionaryeaders may be convinced thattheycan triumphover seemingly mpossibleodds. The strength f thisfactor s likelyto be affectedby the ease or difficulty ith which therevolutionarytrugglewas waged. The unexpected ollapseof royal au-thoritynFrance mayhave encouragedthe Brissotinsn theirbelief hattheir deas would attract niversal cceptance, ustas the relative ase ofCastro'sfinalcampaign againstBatistaconvincedChe Guevara and oth-ersthatrevolutionaryorces n Latin America could triumph ven whenconditionswere unfavorable.92y contrast, oth Lenin and Mao tem-pered theiroptimistic roclamationswithrepeatedwarningsthat revo-lutionsmust be conducted autiously.93 ao explicitlywarned his follow-ers to avoid both"rightdeviations" passivity nd fear of struggle) nd"left deviations" (overconfidentrecklessness).94 imilarly, althoughLenin was optimisticbout the ong-term rospects orworldrevolution,once in power he usuallyrejecteddirect ffortso promotethis end. Inhis 1920pamphlet"'Left-Wing' Communism: An InfantileDisorder,"he warnedagainst ll-timed ffortso seize power,and his speechtotheSecond CominternCongress in the same year emphasized long-rangerevolutionaryrospects ather han mmediate fforts o foment evolu-tionaryupheaval in othercountries.95aving personally ed prolonged

91For example,theGerman exile AnacharsisCloots,self-proclaimedrateur e genrehu-main, oldthe FrenchAssemblyn December 1792that n theeventofwar "theGerman andBohemian peasantswill resumetheirwar againsttheir . . seigneurs; he Dutch and theGermans,the Italians and theScandinavians,will shake off nd shatter heirchainswithfury."Quoted inBlanning fn.3), 109-10.See also Palmer fn.82),2:55-57.92 According o Theodore Draper,"In 1957 and the firstmonths f 1958,no one, not venCastro, hought hatBatista ouldbeoverthrownymeans ofguerrillawarfare." ee Draper,Castroism: heorynd PracticeNew York: Praeger,1965),24; emphasis dded. Che Gueva-ra's strategy ffocoismlaimed that ctsof violencebya smallguerrilla and (thefoco) ouldsparka successful evolutionrrespectivef theprevailing olitical onditions. he strategywas a dismalfailure nd Guevaradiedtryingo implementt nBolivia. See Guevara, Guer-rilla WarfareNew York:MonthlyReviewPress,1961).93 As Lenin told the SeventhPartyCongress nMarch1917:"Yes, we shall see the worldrevolution, utforthetimebeing t is a verygood fairy ale.... Is it properfor serious

revolutionaryobelieve nfairy ales?" See Lenin (fn.56),2:589.94 See RichardH. Solomon,Mao's Revolution nd the Chinese oliticalCulture Berkeley:Universityf CaliforniaPress, 1971),179-89.AlthoughMao stressed hattheChinese revo-lutionwas a usefulmodel forothers, e avoidedtheobligation oengagein costly nterven-tionselsewherebystating hat a revolutionarymovementmustultimately elyon its ownefforts. ee Van Ness (fn.3), 72; and Michael Yahuda, China'sRole in WorldAffairsNewYork: St.Martin'sPress, 1978),35.95 AlthoughLenin supported he Soviet invasionof Poland, he warned that "if the ex-pected uprisingdoes not occur, . . would it be fittingo push military perationsmore


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REVOLUTION AND WAR 351revolutionary truggles, othLenin and Mao had learned thatsuccesswas often lusive and nevereasy.This discussion suggeststhatrevolutionarytates are more likely toresist mpetuous efforts o export therevolution f the leadership s ex-periencedand unified nd the movementhighlydisciplined.Thus, theSoviet Union and thePeople's Republic of China behavedprudentlynmost cases, despitetheir nherently ptimisticdeologiesand the fact hatprominentmembersof bothregimesfavored moreassertive pproach.By contrast, he factional nfightingn France and Iran encouragedex-tremists ouse foreign olicy-and specifically upportfortheexportofrevolution-as a litmus testfordevotionto the revolution tself. n theabsence of a strongcentralauthority, hosewho opposed such a policyrisked appearing disloyalto the universalist deals of therevolution ndthuscould not contain those who advocated a more aggressiveforeignpolicy.The radicals n turnwereoverconfidentegarding heir bility oexportthe revolution nd to overcome theopposition ucheffortswerecertain oprovoke.96Finally, and somewhatparadoxically, heveryvulnerabilityfa rev-olutionary tatemaycreate additional ncentive oraggression.Alreadyfearful hat their hold on power is fragile, evolutionaryeaders viewdomesticopponents s a potential ifth olumn. In lightofforeign up-port forcounterrevolutionaryroups in France, the White armies inRussia, the Kuomintangin China, and the contras n Nicaragua, suchworriesare hardly fanciful.)Exportingthe revolutionby striking irstmaybe seen as theonly waytopreserve owerat home: unlessopposingstatesare swiftly verthrown, he argument runs, theywill eventuallycombineto crushtherevolutionarytate.Thus, theBolsheviks who ad-vocated greaterefforts o exportthe revolutiondid so in part becausetheybelievedthatcapitalist tateswould join forces nd destroy he newSoviet stateunlesstheywereswiftlyverthrown ythespreadof social-ism.97At a minimum, he revolutionariesmay hope that he merethreatof revolutionaryubversionmay deter attacks and forceopponentstoadopt more conciliatory olicies.)98 his general argumentwas also athoroughly, isking dangerousturnofevents?Withoutdoubt,no!" See Fiddick (fn.90),123-24.

96 On France, ee Blanning fn.3), 98-113. On Iran,see Bill (fn.70),302-3.97 Trotsky rguedthat "without he direct tatesupport f theEuropean proletariat heworking lass ofRussia cannot remain npowerand convert tstemporary omination ntoa lasting socialistdictatorship. f thistherecannotfora momentbe anydoubt." Fiddicknotes hat many Bolsheviks ully xpected heir park o be extinguished yan internationalcounter-revolutionaryeluge if the combustiblematerial n the moreadvanced,industrialnationsfailed o catch fire." ee Fiddick (fn.90),75.98 Piero Melograni arguesthat"to help convincethe Allies to negotiate, enin brought


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352 WORLD POLITICSpotentngredientn theBrissotinecipe orwar n 1792.After escribingFrance s besetbya conspiracyf foreign owers nd internal raitors,Brissot old heAssembly,It s notmerely ecessaryothink fdefense,the [counterrevolutionary]ttackmustbe anticipated; ou yourselvesmust attack."99WHY FOREIGN POWERS ARE INSECURE BUT OVERCONFIDENTOther stateswill fearthespreadofrevolutionarydeas-especially whenthose ideas challengetheirown formofgovernment irectly.But theyalso tend to view this as an easy problemto solve. To begin with,thedisorderthataccompaniesa revolution ncouragesotherstatesto viewthe new regimeas weak and vulnerable.For example, most Europeansbelieved that the Revolution had reduced French power considerably,leading Edmund Burke to describe the French as "the ablestarchitectsof ruin .. in the world."100When war broke out in 1792,both Franceand itsopponentsexpectedan easy campaign.Where the Frenchdepu-tiesbelievedthat despotismwas in its death throes nd a prompt ttackwill precipitatetsfinalagony,"101 Prussiandiplomatcommented that"France is without disciplined armies,withoutexperienced generals,withoutmoney, nd thehighestdegreeofanarchyreigns n all depart-ments." Anotherofficial redictedthat"the comedywill not last long.The Frencharmyof awyerswill be annihilated nBelgiumand we shallbe homebythe autumn." As T. C. W. Blanningremarks,Withall threecombatantsbelievingtheir ide to be invincible nd theiropponent(s)tobe on the verge of collapse, the scene was set for the final lurch intowar. 102This tendency o overestimate he vulnerabilityf the revolutionarystate s notsurprising, iventhe nherent ifficultyfcalculating ts abil-ityto fight.By definition, evolutionarytatesreston novel forms ofsocial organization, nd revolutionarymovements ucceedbecause theyinto being a communist nternationalwhich could createwidespread unrest, specially nAsia." Similarly, ovietForeignMinisterGeorgeChicherin nstructed Soviet emissarynLondon to "make it clear thatwe are able to cause [England]seriousdamage in theEast ifwe so wish.... Have thempicturewhatwould happenif we sent a Red Army to Persia,Mesopotamiaand Afghanistan.... [I]t is onlythe moderation fourpolicywhichcauses aslow development ofthe revolutionaryituation here]."See Melograni fn. 85), 108; andFiddick (fn.90)

Walt - Revolution and War

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