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FALL 2007 - Volume 54, Number 3

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Wakes of War: Contrails and the Rise of Air Power, 1918-1945Part II: The Air War over Europe, 1939-1945Donald R. Baucom

The Short But Interesting Life of a Plane Called Rivet TopWilliam Cahill

A Visionary Ahead of His Time: Howard Hughes and the U.S. Air ForcePart I: The Air Corps Design CompetitionThomas Wildenberg

The U.S. Air Force Response to Hurricane KatrinaDaniel L. Haulman 40

A Mighty Fortress: Lead Bomber over Europe.By Charles Alling Reviewed by David F. Crosby

Almanac of World War IBy David F. Burg and L. Edward Purcell Reviewed by Robert B. Kane

Boys’ Books, Boys’ Dreams and the Mystique of Flight.By Fred Erisman Reviewed by Bruce Ashcroft

Lost Black Cats: Story of Two Captured Chinese U–2 Pilots.By H. Mike Hua . Reviewed by Jeffrey P. Joyce

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the First Indochina War, 1947-1959.By Office of Joint History, JCS Reviewed by Curtis H. O’Sullivan

Fire from the Sky: Seawolf Gunships in the Mekong Delta.By Richard Knott Reviewed by Stu Tobias

The Smell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot’s OdysseyBy Donald Mallick with Peter Merlin Reviewed by Curtis H. O’Sullivan

Reflections of a Technocrat: Managing Defense, Air, and Space Programs during the Cold WarBy John L. McLucas with K. Alnwick & L. Benson Reviewed by Thomas C. Lassman

The Iraq War: A Military HistoryBy Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr. Reviewed by Jeffrey P. Joyce

Isaiah’s Eagles Rising: A Generation of AirmenBy Bernard Thomas Nolan Reviewed by Robert E. Vickers

The Effectiveness of Airpower in the 20th Century: Part Three (1945-2000)By John F. O’Connell Reviewed by Scott A. Willey

The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New DirectionBy Keith B. Payne Reviewed by Stéphane Lefebvre

Les Français du Ciel: dictionnaire historiqueBy General Lucien Robineau, ed. and

French Arms.By Ronald L. Tarnstrom Reviewed by Robin Higham

OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence AgencyBy Richard Harris Smith Reviewed by Curtis H. O’Sullivan

The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War TwoBy Barrett Tillman Reviewed by James A. Painter

The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedomfrom the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command ReportBy Kevin M. Woods Reviewed by John L. Cirafici

Books Received & Coming UpFoundation Board of Directors Election NoticeSymposium DetailsLetters, News, and ReunionsIn MemoriamHistory Mystery

Departments

Book Reviews

COVER: Contrails by Samantha R. Mandales.

Features

2 AIR POWER History / FALL 2007

Board of Directors, 2006-2007Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Richard E. Brown III, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Russell C. Davis, USAF (Ret)CMSgt Rick Dean, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF (Ret)Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF (Ret)Brig Gen Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret)Maj Gen Silas R. Johnson, Jr., USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Timothy A. Kinnan, USAF (Ret)Mr John F. KreisMaj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret)Mr Jacob NeufeldGen John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Maj Lawrence Spinetta, USAFMaj Willard Strandberg, Jr., USAF (Ret)Col Jere Wallace, USAF (Ret)Col Darrel Whitcomb, USAF (Ret)

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Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret) 1st Vice ChairmanGen John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)2nd Vice Chairman and Chair,Development CommitteeMaj Gen Silas R. Johnson, Jr., USAF (Ret)Treasurer and Chair, Finance CommitteeLt Gen Richard E. Brown III, USAF (Ret)Chair, Membership CommitteeMaj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Chair, Services CommitteeMaj Willard Strandberg, Jr., USAF (Ret)Chair, Technology CommitteeLt Gen Timothy A. Kinnan, USAF (Ret)PublisherBrig Gen Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret) Secretary and Executive DirectorCol Tom Bradley, USAF (Ret)

Contributing Members

The individuals and companies listed are contributingmembers of the Air Force Historical Foundation. TheFoundation Directors and members are grateful fortheir support and contributions to preserving, perpetu-ating, and publishing the history and traditions ofAmerican aviation.

2007Lt Col (Dr) Robert S. Barmettler, USAF (Ret)Mr and Mrs Lawrence BensonLt Col and Mrs Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret)Maj Gen and Mrs Richard T. Boverie, USAF (Ret)Mr Joel K. CaultonGen and Mrs John T. Chain, Jr, USAF (Ret)Brig Gen and Mrs James L. Crouch, USAF (Ret)Maj Gen and Mrs David W. Miller, USAF (Ret)Gen James P. Mullins, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen and Mrs Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen William R. Nelson, USAF (Ret)Col Helen E. O’Day, USAF (Ret)Mr William L. ShieldsCol and Mrs Charles B. van Pelt, USAF (Ret)

The Journal of theAir Force Historical FoundationFall 2007 Volume 54 Number 3

PublisherAlfred F. Hurley

EditorJacob Neufeld

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorScott A. Willey

Layout and TypesettingRichard I. Wolf

AdvertisingTom Bradley

CirculationRichard I. Wolf

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is produced in March, June, September,and December by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation.

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3AIR POWER History / FALL 2007

In this issue, historian Don Baucom concludes his two-part series, “Wakes of War: Contrails andthe Rise of Air Power, 1918-1945,” with “Part II: The Air War over Europe, 1939-1945.” Here, he demon-strates the importance of the science of contrails and how airmen on opposing sides of the war exploit-ed contrails to their advantage. By war’s end the advent of radar had begun to eclipse the significanceof the phenomenon.

Based on newly declassified sources, Major Bill Cahill’s article sweeps away some of the decades-long mystery surrounding the EC–121 aircraft called Rivet Top that flew during the War in SoutheastAsia. Readers will learn how Rivet Top’s continual modification of equipment, tactics, and proceduresmet the war’s needs for on the spot information and intelligence. Though short-lived, Rivet Top’s devel-opers and operators contributed mightily to advances in air power.

The image most people have of Howard Hughes is that of an intrepid aviator and gifted aircraftdesigner; he has a reputation as a brilliant but eccentric personality. In the first of a three-part series,biographer Tom Wildenberg reveals the “real” Howard Hughes. In “Part I: The Air Corps Design,”Wildenberg debunks some of the myths surrounding his subject and introduces us to a different mea-sure of the man.

The fourth article, by Air Force historian Daniel Haulman, details the timely and effective human-itarian relief that the U.S. Air Force provided to the victims of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.While other Government agencies incurred a barrage of criticism for their neglect during the crisis,the military, especially the Air Force, came through in mitigating suffering and saving lives.

We are saddened over the deaths of several members of our community during the past threemonths: General Howell M. Estes, Jr., one of the makers of Air Force history, and in retirement formany years an energetic member of the Air Force Historical Foundation; Brig. Gen. Edwin H.Simmons, USMC (Ret.), who was both a wartime combat leader and later the director of Marine Corpshistory; Rear Adm. Eugene B. Fluckey, a Medal of Honor recipient, who sank a record number ofenemy ships and later recorded his wartime service; and Dr. Dennis F. Casey, a thirty-year Air Forcehistorian, who specialized in research and writing the history of Air Force intelligence and education.They will be sorely missed. See “News” and “In Memoriam” in the Departments Section.

Members of the Air Force Historical Foundation are urged to review the recommendations ofthe nominating Committee, concerning election of directors for next year. Please see page 60 and thestapled postcard ballot.

In this issue, too, you will find all the information necessary to sign up for and attend one ofthe year’s major celebrations of the Air Force’s Sixtieth Anniversary, the Symposium on The Evolutionof Air and Space Power: Know the Past—Shape the Future. Whether you are an airman, soldier, sailor,or Marine; military historian or analyst; air power enthusiast; or simply interested in the subject, youmust not miss this important event. Many active and retired Air Force leaders will participate, includ-ing the current Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff, the noted aviation artist Keith Ferris,and leading spokesmen and women from throughout the Air Force. See the prospectus beginning onpage 61, and the program starting on page 62 and sign up right away, as space will be limited.

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sentan agreement and an assignment of copyright.


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AIR POWER History / FALL 2007 5

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Behind the engine-carrying body (fuselage ornacelle) a turbulent region or wake is formed as theairplane flies. The exhaust moisture and some of theengine heat are discharged into this wake andbecome diffused throughout the wake as a result ofthe mixing action of the turbulence. The moistureand heat do not, however, mix with the air outsidethe wake because there the air is “smooth.” . . .

It is easy to see that, if the air is so cold that itcannot hold much water as vapor, the water in theexhaust may be sufficient, when added to the mois-ture already in the atmosphere, to raise the humid-ity in the turbulent wake to or beyond the saturationvalue. If this condition exists, some of the watervapor will condense and a visible trail will form.

Richard V. Rhode and H. A. Pearson,Condensation Trails,

NACA Wartime Report, September 1942 1

Introduction

A s we saw in the first part of this paper, con-trails were observed as early as October1918. Yet, they remained a rare phenome-

non of relatively little interest across the 1920s and1930s, despite developments that steadily raisedthe operational ceiling of military aircraft. By thetime of the Spanish Civil War, state-of-the-art fight-ers could engage in combat in the upper regions ofthe troposphere where engine exhausts routinelyturn into contrails. Francisco Tarazona’s September1938 report of contrails generated by dogfightingaircraft was a harbinger of things to come.

Within a year of Tarazona’s report, Germanyplunged Europe into a general war when sheinvaded Poland. In the months between the fall ofPoland and the German invasion of France in May1940, German pilots clashed in desultory combatwith French and British airmen as both sides flewpatrol and reconnaissance missions over WesternEurope.2 From these air operations and those thattook place when Germany overran France in thespring of 1940, it was apparent that contrails wereintrinsic to modern air combat and had importantoperational implications. These early months ofthe air war also spawned what may be the firstpublished account of contrails in air combat.

The Battle for France and Saint-Exupéry’sTrain of Frozen Stars

At the time Germany invaded France, Frenchaviation pioneer and famed author Antoine Saint-

Exupéry was just short of his fortieth birthday, wellpast the age when men were considered fit for aircombat duties. Given his age, his literary achieve-ments, and health problems caused by earlier air-craft accidents, Saint-Exupéry was not expected tovolunteer for combat duty and could easily havehonorably avoided it. However, he believed Francewas in grave danger and that all Frenchmen whocould were obliged to come to her defense.3

True to his convictions, Saint-Exupéry man-aged to secure an assignment flying reconnais-sance planes, specifically, the Potez 63. Such anassignment was a serious challenge for a man ofhis age and physical condition due to the difficul-ties and discomforts associated with flying in thecold cockpits of high altitude aircraft.4

Saint-Exupéry survived his combat missionsagainst the Germans and escaped to the UnitedStates after France surrendered, settling intoNew York in January 1941. Here, he wrote abouthis wartime service and worked to build supportfor the war against Nazi Germany. After theUnited States captured North Africa, Saint-Exupéry was allowed to sail aboard an Americantransport to Oran, Algeria. He then secured per-mission from French authorities to rejoin his oldFrench reconnaissance unit, Group 2 of the 33dReconnaissance Wing, and began flying combatmissions after being retrained to fly the unit’s air-craft. Shortly after he rejoined the 2/33, it wastransferred to Colonel Elliott Roosevelt’s 3d PhotoGroup, which flew the reconnaissance version ofthe P–38. By this time, Saint-Exupéry was overforty-two years old, and regulations establishedthirty as the maximum age for pilots inRoosevelt’s unit. Only through the intercession ofa high-ranking French general with GeneralDwight Eisenhower’s headquarters was this agerequirement waived for Saint-Exupéry. Afterbeing trained in the American P–38, he flew thisaircraft on reconnaissance missions out of NorthAfrica beginning in July 1943 and continuinguntil he was killed during a mission on July 31,1944.5

In February 1942, while still living in NewYork, Saint-Exupéry had published Flight to Arras,a memoir of his service against Nazi Germany in1939 and 1940. Here, he described the challenges ofhis high altitude reconnaissance missions: the coldthat could freeze the controls of his aircraft, findingand photographing enemy targets under fire, andthe anxiety of knowing his plane was tailing awhite streamer that pinpointed his position for


Donald R. Baucom is a 1962 USAF Academy graduate, who earned his Ph.D. in the History ofScience from the University of Oklahoma in 1976. During twenty-eight years in the Air Force, heserved tours as a communications-electronics officer in Spain and Thailand, taught history at theAir Force Academy, and established the official history program for President Reagan’s StrategicDefense Initiative. Upon retirement from the Air Force in 1990, he returned to federal service as thecivilian historian for DOD’s missile defense program. His book, The Origins of SDI, was awardedthe 1992 Leopold Prize by the Organization of American Historians. Dr. Baucom retired from DODin 2003 and now lives in El Prado, New Mexico. Part I of this article was published in Air PowerHistory, Vol. 54, No. 2, Fall 2007.

(Overleaf) The performanceenvelope of the SecondWorld War’s first-line com-bat aircraft transformedcontrails from a littleknown phenomenon to amatter of life-and-deathurgency in the openingdays of the air war overEurope. In this photo-graph, American bombersare generating contrails asthey fly toward their targetswhile Allied fighters flyingcover for the bombers gen-erate a pattern of curvingvapor trails as they criss-cross above the bombersthey are protecting.

IT WASAPPARENTTHAT CONTRAILSWEREINTRINSIC TOMODERN AIRCOMBAT ANDHAD IMPORTANTOPERA-TIONALIMPLICA-TIONS

enemy fighters and gunners. Regarding this lastchallenge, Saint-Exupéry’s wrote:

The German on the ground knows us by the pearlywhite scarf which every plane flying at high altitudetrails behind like a bridal veil. The disturbance cre-ated by our meteoric flight crystallizes the wateryvapor in the atmosphere. We unwind behind us acirrus of icicles. If the atmospheric conditions arefavorable to the formation of clouds, our wake willthicken bit by bit and become an evening cloud overthe countryside.

The fighters are guided towards us by theirradio, by the bursts on the ground, and by the osten-tatious luxury of our white scarf. . . .

The fact is, I have absolutely no idea whether ornot we are being pursued, and whether from theground they can or cannot see us trailed by the col-lection of gossamer threads we sport.

Gossamer threads set me daydreaming again.An image comes into my mind which for themoment seems to me enchanting. “ . . . As inaccessi-ble as a woman of exceeding beauty, we follow ourdestiny, drawing slowly behind us our train offrozen stars.”6

This passage in Flight to Arras may be the ear-liest first-hand account of combat-related contrailsto be published. Although Tarazona recorded hisobservation of contrails in September 1938, asnoted in part I of this paper, his diary was not pub-lished until the 1970s. Flight to Arras may also bethe first published apprehension that contrailshave major implications for air combat operations,although the significance of contrails was obvious

in the Royal Air Force long before the publication ofSaint-Exupéry’s memoir.

The Boffins Come to Grip with Contrails

Like Saint-Euxpéry, Flight Lieutenant M. V.Longbottom was a pilot in an aerial reconnaissanceunit, in this case, the RAF’s No. 2 Camouflage Unit,a designation chosen to conceal the unit’s mission.7Furthermore, like Saint-Euxpéry and his com-rades, Longbottom and the members of his unitdepended upon the speed of their planes and thestealthiness provided by high altitude flight to pro-tect them against enemy defenses. Therefore, itshould come as no surprise that Longbottom waskeenly interested in condensation trails.

Thus, on Christmas day 1939, over two yearsbefore the publication of Flight to Arras, Long-bottom issued a SECRET report titled “Condensa-tion Trails at High Altitudes” which begins byexplaining the major implication of contrails for airwarfare: a contrail aids enemy defenders by betray-ing the position of an aircraft that might otherwisebe invisible. In Longbottom’s words:

It has been found that, at high altitudes over about8000 meters (27,000 feet), under certain conditions,aircraft in flight leave behind them a dense whitetrail of condensation. In its most marked form thiscondensation, starting from the engine exhausts,forms a dense white trail behind the aircraft, whichrapidly spreads to a band many times the width ofthe aircraft, stretching across the sky like a longwisp of well marked cirrus cloud. From the ground,this trail appears to come to a point, sharply


High flying P–47s and theB–17s they are escortingdraw their “trains of frozenstars” through the skiesover Germany.

A CONTRAILAIDS ENEMYDEFENDERSBY BETRAY-ING THEPOSITION OFAN AIRCRAFTTHAT MIGHTOTHERWISEBE INVISIBLE

defined, at the exact position of the aircraft, so thatalthough the machine itself may not be visible, everymovement it makes—every turn and zig-zag—iseasily visible to the naked eye of an observer on theground, and may be very accurately plotted,enabling accurate A.A. fire to be opened.8

To bolster this point, Longbottom recountedthe experience of a Spitfire pilot who was trailing apronounced contrail at about 32,000 feet when hecame under accurate antiaircraft fire near Trier, atown on the Moselle River near Germany’s borderwith Luxemburg. He also noted that although anti-aircraft fire had been encountered at altitudes ashigh as 33,000 feet, this occurred only when thetarget aircraft was generating a contrail.9

Longbottom was clearly interested in findingsome means by which RAF pilots could keep theirplanes from producing contrails. To this end, heexamined the experiences of pilots who flew mis-sions on December 20, 21, and 22, 1939. While onepilot flying on December 22 noticed only “slightwisps of condensation,” the other four, including onewho also flew on December 22, reported heavy con-trails. All four of the pilots reporting contrails wereable to eliminate them by throttling back theirengines and descending one or two thousand feet.10

In an effort to correlate weather conditionswith the experiences of these pilots, Longbottomconsulted a French meteorologist regarding condi-tions in No. 2 Unit’s mission area on the appropri-ate days. This consultation suggested a correlationof contrail formation with conditions of low tem-perature and high humidity aloft. When these con-ditions prevail at the altitude where a plane is fly-ing, “the rapidly expanding gases from theexhausts” of the plane cause “sudden condensa-tions to form in [the plane’s] wake.”11

The information that Longbottom assembledalso indicated the possible existence of layers in theatmosphere some of which would support contrailformation while others would not. The existence ofsuch layers would account for contrail terminationwhen a pilot reduced his altitude. It also suggestedthat a pilot might be able to stop contrail genera-tion by climbing out of a layer conducive to contrailformation, provided such a climb was within thecapabilities of his plane.12

In addition to the work carried out byLongbottom, several later contrail studies werecompleted under the auspices of England’sAeronautical Research Committee (ARC) that hadbeen founded in January 1935. This was the samecommittee that spawned the British radar pro-gram.13 Once radar was more fully developed andapplied to the control of anti-aircraft systems, itlargely nullified the importance of contrails as ameans of locating high-flying aircraft and directinganti-aircraft fire. However, as we shall soon see,radar did not eliminate the significance of contrailsfor air operations. A measure of the continuingimportance of condensation trails is the series ofcontrail studies sponsored by the ARC.

On February 3, 1941, the ARC’s High Altitude

Subcommittee issued a report that provides aglimpse of the state of knowledge of contrails in theBritish scientific community. “Until very recently,”the report begins,

the data available on “vapour trails” was so meagerthat no positive conclusions could be drawn as toformation. War operations at high altitudes andhigh speeds have made the phenomenon more com-mon, and data is [sic] now being accumulated ingreater volume. The absence of essential informa-tion, however, makes it impossible, at present, to domore than put forward tentative ideas on the natureof the phenomenon.

As more information becomes available and knowl-edge of contrails increases, the subcommittee said,additional reports would be issued.14

At this stage, the subcommittee believed thatthere were three mechanisms that might account forthe formation of contrails. One was the “precipita-tion, as ice, of water vapour previously present in theatmosphere in a supersaturated state.” This precipi-tation would be caused by the cooling effect associ-ated with the reduction in local pressure that is pro-duced by the motion of propeller tips and airfoils. Ifthe atmosphere were less than saturated, either nocondensation would occur or the condensationprocess would be quickly reversed in the unsatu-rated air near the propeller and airfoil. In eithercase, no visible condensation trail would form. If, onthe other hand, the air was supersaturated, the con-densation produced by propellers and air foils wouldpersist, and a vapor trail would form.15

A second possible mechanism was the “freezingof water vapour present in the products of combus-tion ejected from the engine exhaust.” In this case,calculations had shown that there was sufficientwater in aircraft engine exhaust to spawn “a visibletrail.” However, this water would not necessarilyproduce a contrail, since one must also consider theheating effects of high temperature engineexhaust.Where this mechanism was concerned, thesubcommittee cautioned that the presence inengine exhaust of sufficient water to produce a con-densation trail did not necessarily verify this mech-anism as a cause of vapor trails.16

The third candidate mechanism was “the ejec-tion from the engine exhaust of nuclei of condensa-tion.” While subcommittee members were certainthat injecting nuclei into a supersaturated atmos-phere could cause condensation, they noted hereagain that the effects of high temperature exhaustgases had to be taken into account in determiningwhether or not a visible contrail would be pro-duced.17

Overall, the subcommittee wrote, it was appar-ent from a “number of excellent records” that air-craft engine “exhaust is often intimately connectedwith trail formation.” In the words of the subcom-mittee report:

Clear evidence exists that adjustment of the throttleor mixture controls effects [sic] trail formation;


ONCE RADARWAS MOREFULLYDEVELOPEDAND APPLIEDTO THE CONTROL OFANTI-AIRCRAFTSYSTEMS, ITLARGELYNULLIFIEDTHE IMPOR-TANCE OFCONTRAILS

opening throttle, or richening the mixture oftenincreases the density of a trail. This effect may bedue either to the water, or to the nuclei present in theexhaust, since opening throttle or richening mixturewill increase both. Opening throttle will alsoincrease the possibility of trail formation due tolocal reduction of pressure on the airscrew orwings.18

Moreover, there was sufficient information avail-able to warrant suggestions as to how contrail for-mation might be curtailed.

It is difficult to advance any cure for a trail causedby the action of airscrew or wings in reducing thelocal pressure; on the other hand, an exhaust-formedtrail can undoubtedly be affected in certain cases byan adjustment of throttle and mixture controls.Then, should it be vitally necessary to avoid forminga trail, the pilot should try these adjustments as soonas he is conscious that his aircraft is forming one.The very tentative suggestion may be advanced thata special fuel (producing few nuclei and less water)might be used with success on special high altitudeflights. Such a fuel would be a “benzene rich” spirit(containing little lead) but before a definite state-ment can be made on this point, much experimentalwork would be necessary.19

One final point of interest from this report isits discussion of the altitudes where one mightexpect aircraft to spawn contrails. British anti-air-craft gunners had used range finding equipment todetermine accurately the altitude of aircraft gener-ating contrails. In no cases had they encounteredan aircraft with a vapor trail below the altitude of17,000 feet. As of the time of this report, there wasno indication of the existence of an upper altitudelimit on the formation of contrails.20

Four days after the issuance of the report of theHigh-Altitude Subcommittee, G. M. B. Dobson, Fel-low of the Royal Society, issued another report oncontrails, this one sponsored by the ARC’s Meteor-ology Subcommittee. Of central interest in thisFebruary 7 report were vapor trails spawned byengine exhaust and the atmospheric conditionsthat would permit their formation. Dobson beganhis report with the following observation regardingcontrails.

While trails may possibly be formed from otherscauses, there is little doubt that a large proportionare due to water vapour from the exhaust of theengine. Since the effect of the engine is (1) to heat theair in the trail behind the aeroplane and (2) to addwater vapour to this same air, we can calculate theconditions when condensation would be expected tooccur behind the aeroplane. We shall assume thatboth the heat and the water vapour are distributedthrough the same air in the trail but this may not bestrictly true: if it is not true then condensation willoccur at temperatures above those given here.

The density of the trails observed is not unrea-sonable on the assumption that all the water comes

from the engine exhaust. If the trail consisted ofwater droplets 2 µ diameter [sic] and the trail con-tained 0.1 gm/m3 of liquid water, then light passingthrough it would be reduced to about one hun-dredth in 50 m.21

The Dobson report further states that the con-densate that produces contrails could be eitherwater droplets or ice particles. He based this con-clusion on the observation that the tail-plane sur-faces of an aircraft that had produced a dense con-trail would sometimes be “varnished” with ice.However, for a contrail composed of droplets to beat all persistent, the droplets would have tofreeze.22

Since temperatures drop as altitude increases,Dobson concluded that that the rate of contrail for-mation would probably increase as altitudeincreased. “However,” he wrote, “once the stratos-phere is entered trails would be expected to formmuch less frequently as the temperature no longerfalls with height and the relative humidity proba-bly decreases with height.”23

Additionally, concerning the variables involvedin contrail formation, Dobson provided severalcharts showing the expected relationship betweenthe cross-sectional area of contrails generated asrelated to free air temperature, relative humidity,throttle setting, and flight attitude. Three chartswere specific to 20,000 feet, while a fourth dealt withthe relation between the variables at 35,000 feet.24

If the views he presented were valid, Dobsonbelieved that there was little that could be done topreclude contrail formation when flying through aregion of the atmosphere where meteorological con-ditions favored their formation. In his words:

It would probably be too difficult to condense thewater vapour before it leaves the exhaust. A petrolrich in benzol [benzene] would produce less watervapour for a given power but the improvementwould not be very great. Any construction by whichthe heat lost from the engine does not go to heat thesame air that receives the water vapour is bad fromthis point of view: Thus radiators placed some dis-tance out on the wings would be bad.

Nevertheless, Dobson offered some suggestions asto how pilots might minimize the contrails pro-duced by their planes.

Partially closing the throttle considerably decreasesthe temperature which just gives condensation,while climbing slightly increases it. Hence throt-tling down would tend to decrease trail formationand would certainly decrease the density of anytrail formed owning to the smaller amount of waterper cubic metre in the trail. Climbing, on the otherhand, would have the reverse effect, but the changewould be less marked.

Additionally, leaning the engine’s fuel-air mixturewould also reduce the density of the contrail gener-ated.25


DOBSONCONCLUDEDTHAT THATTHE RATE OFCONTRAILFORMATIONWOULDPROBABLYINCREASE ASALTITUDEINCREASED

If, as Dobson suspected, contrails were aninevitable concomitant of high altitude operations,then the ability to forecast where contrails wouldbe encountered could be advantageous. This wasespecially true for RAF photo reconnaissancepilots, who depended on speed and high altitude toprotect them from enemy fighters. In support ofdeveloping the means of predicting contrail forma-tion, Dobson called for increased flight testing togather data on high altitude atmospheric condi-tions and observe how conditions affected the for-mation of vapor trails.26

Some testing, at least, was already underwaywhen Dobson issued his report. In fact, the sameFlight Lieutenant Longbottom who had submittedthe Christmas 1939 report was engaged in a lim-ited test program. Flying a Spitfire at BoscombeDown, Longbottom had already completed fourflights to 40,000 feet and gathered some data oncontrail formation. Although flight operationsabove 35,000 feet were rare in February 1941,Dobson believed that regular test flights to 40,000feet were essential, since operational ceilings weresteadily increasing.27

Finally, Dobson concluded that it was alreadypossible “to issue forecasts of the danger of trailformation whenever cirrus was expected and thetemperature was below, say, 220o a [absolute] atthe height of the cirrus.” However, such forecasts“would not be entirely reliable since the humiditymight be high even when no cirrus was pre-sent.”28

Nine months after the submission of theDobson report, Dr. A. H. R. Goldie of theMeteorological Subcommittee issued a report inwhich he summarized the status of the subcom-mittee’s understanding of contrails. Here, Goldienoted that the British had determined that if oneknows

what portion of the total energy in the fuel becomesavailable as heat to the air into which the exhaustvapor is being discharged it is possible to calculatefor any given height the critical air temperature atwhich the passage of the aircraft results in a posi-tive rather than negative contribution to the relativehumidity of the air in its wake. If the atmospherebefore the passage of the aircraft was saturatedwith respect to ice then short trails ought to form atthe critical temperature as determined in this waybut not at a higher temperature.29

This knowledge allowed British scientists toestablish a relationship between the percent of fuelenergy that heated the exhaust trail and the criti-cal atmospheric temperature for contrail forma-tion. For example, if 100% of the energy went towarming the trail, the critical temperature atwhich contrails would form would be 235o absoluteor Kelvin (K). If only 25% of fuel energy heated theexhaust trail, the critical temperature for contrailformation would be 254o K.30

Reasonable corroboration for these relationshad been found in a hundred test flights of a

Spitfire III at Boscombe Down. These flights hadalso provided information that pointed toward arelationship between the “consumption of petrolper meter of flight” and how soon contrails wouldform after the critical atmospheric temperaturewas encountered and how dense and persistent theresulting trails would be. Additionally, thereseemed to be a correlation between the presence ofcirrus and cirrus-stratus clouds and persistent con-trails, while the absence of high clouds indicatedthat only light contrails would be formed.31

Regarding possible contrail suppression,Goldie took note of Dobson’s theory that exhaustvapor first condenses as water and only laterfreezes. Should this prove to be the case, a systemmight be developed that would trap and retain thewater vapor before it passes over the tail plane.Accomplishing this would require diverting theexhaust flow

over some part of the rear end of the machine so thatthe water drops would ice up on that part of themachine. Nearly the whole water content of theexhaust would need to be deposited in this way topreen trail formation and it would amount to 50kgof ice per 100 km. traveled by the plane during thetime the device was in operation.32

Goldie went on to note that “the information whichis still chiefly wanted is precise measurement of thehumidity of the high atmosphere.” Goldie providedthe following explanation of why these data were socritical.

From the variation in the height at which persistenttrails begin and from the temperatures at whichthey cease in the stratosphere it seems probable thatconsiderable variations in humidity can occur, butit is not possible to infer anything with precisionbecause the cross sections of trails or extent of dilu-tion at the point where they vanish are not knownwith any exactness and there are other unknownfactors such as variability of nuclei for sublima-tion.33

One final point of interest surfaces in Goldie’sreport. It is that wingtip vortices were evidentlybeing generated by the RAF’s Sterling bombings.However, these did not seem to be a major problem,since they generally dissipated a few hundredyards behind the bombers. Furthermore, at themoment, no other aircraft in the RAF inventorywas reporting this phenomenon.34

About two months after Goldie’s report on thestate of British understanding of contrails, theMeteorology Subcommittee issued a collection ofpilot reports on contrail formation. Apparently, theBritish had requested information from theCanadian government on the Canadian experiencewith contrails. As a result of this request, theCanadian Committee on Aeronautical Researchasked the Air Transport Association of Canada tosurvey its members for input on four specific ques-tions:


A SYSTEMMIGHT BEDEVELOPEDTHAT WOULDTRAP ANDRETAIN THEWATERVAPORBEFORE ITPASSESOVER THETAIL PLANE

1.Are the vapour trains associated with the wing tiptrailing vortices or do they originate from the engineexhaust?2. At what altitudes have they been observed?3. What were the weather conditions at the time?4. Any knowledge of the air temperature andhumidity at the height at which the trails wereformed.35

The pilot reports out of Canada added little towhat the British already understood about con-trails. While a number of pilots reported seeingwing-tip vortices, the vast majority of respondentsbelieved that contrails were caused by engineexhaust. One point that varied significantly fromwhat was being observed in Europe was the lowlevel at which contrails were encountered in thefrigid climate of Canada. Here, contrails could beencountered from the surface on up. Additionally, anumber of pilots noted that the contrails theyobserved tended to persist for lengthy periods, anobservation that certainly would not have sur-prised the British.36

By the time the British received the results ofthe Canadian survey, the Battle of Britain was longover. Lasting from July 20, 1940 to October 31 ofthe same year, this intense air campaign pitted theRAF against the Luftwaffe in a battle for control ofthe air over England and the English Channel.Without control of the air, Germany could not exe-cute Operation Sealion, an invasion of the BritishIsles that was designed to take England out ofWorld War II. British victory in this air campaignwas signaled by the indefinite postponement ofSealion and a shift in Luftwaffe targeting from thedestruction of the RAF to attacks against Britishcities.37

The Battle of Britain and the continuing air

battles between the Luftwaffe and the RAF madecontrails a dramatic feature of the British skyscapebetween 1940 and 1943. The intrusion of this man-made phenomenon into the natural setting of theheavens was documented by numerous pho-tographs and captured on canvas by artists likePaul Nash, Richard Eurich, and Walter Monning-ton.38 It is not surprising, then, that whenAmerica’s top airman, General Henry H. “Hap”Arnold visited London in the spring of 1941, hewould notice these telltale signs of aerial combat.

Arnold had come to the British capital on a mis-sion for President Franklin Roosevelt. While there,he was to gain a firsthand appreciation of England’ssituation, to include an understanding of Britishrequirements for American-made aircraft. Arnoldwas also to consult with British airmen as to howthe Air Corps might in the future provide activesupport for the British war effort. The ultimate goalof Arnold’s appraisal was to determine “the num-bers and types of US aircraft to be produced” andhow they were to be allocated between America’s airservice, the RAF, and other “claimants.”39

On April 18, 1941, near the mid point of histwo-week stay in England, Arnold received a first-hand impression of what the air war looked like toLondoners. In his travel diary for that date, hedescribed this experience as follows: “An air combatover London at 20,000 feet or more. Ribbons of con-densed vapor twisting and intertwining over thecity. Real sky writing but who wins?”40

The sight of these contrails may have piquedArnold’s interest in contrails, an interest thatapparently dated back as far as the period between1928 and 1931 when he was serving in the AirCorps’ materiel development and procurementorganization. During this time, he reportedlydirected a project that would have reduced aircraft


During a two-week visit toEngland in April 1941,General “Hap” Arnoldobserved “ribbons of con-densation vapor twistingand intertwining” in theskies over London as theRAF and Luftwaffe foughtfor control of the air.Arnold is shown here iswith RAF Air Marshal SirCharles Portal.

PILOTREPORTSOUT OFCANADAADDED LITTLE TOWHAT THEBRITISHALREADYUNDER-STOOD

vulnerability to “enemy gunners” by dissipatingtheir contrails.41

An interest on Arnold’s part in mitigating theeffects of contrails may have prompted a request tothe National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics(NACA) for a study of contrails. For whatever rea-son, in September 1942, NACA’s Langley MemorialAeronautical Laboratory issued a report on con-densation trails.

Described as a “brief, nontechnical discussionof condensation trails . . . for flying personnel,” thisreport began by explaining that there were threebasic types of contrails:

Exhaust trails—Formed by condensation of mois-ture from the engine exhaust.Convection trails—Formed under certain atmos-pheric conditions as a result of rising of [sic] airwarmed by passage of the airplane.Aerodynamic trails—Formed by precipitation ofatmospheric moisture as a result of adiabatic tem-perature drop associated with air flow past the air-plane.42

Of these three, the first was the most impor-tant from the standpoint of military operations,since this type of condensation trail was “consis-tently encountered” at high altitudes. These trailswere produced by the condensation of water in theexhausts of aircraft engines, which produce about1.25 pounds of water for each pound of aviation fuel

burned. The study provides the following detaileddescription of how this water vapor is transformedinto a contrail.

Behind the engine-carrying body (fuselage ornacelle) a turbulent region or wake is formed as theairplane flies. The exhaust moisture and some of theengine heat are discharged into this wake andbecome diffused throughout the wake as a result ofthe mixing action of the turbulence. The moistureand heat do not, however, mix with the air outsidethe wake because there the air is “smooth.”

The vortices in the wake grow and rotate moreslowly as they pass downstream from the airplane.Thus the wake expands and decays. During thisprocess the energy of the turbulence is dissipated asheat as a result of viscosity or friction, and finally somuch energy has been dissipated that the wake canno longer continue to grow. This point is reached ata mile or more behind the airplane, the exact dis-tance being somewhat indefinite and dependentupon the speed and power of the airplane. By thistime, because of the action of wing-tip vortices, thewake has changed in form from its original compactcross section to a more or less flat ribbonlike formwith curled-up edges, but this change in form doesnot involve any further mixing of the water vaporwith the air.

It is easy to see that, if the air is so cold that itcannot hold much water as vapor, the water in theexhaust may be sufficient, when added to the mois-


This photograph of con-trails being generated byB–17s illustrates the com-plex interaction that couldtake place between con-densation vortices formedby propellers and the vaportrail produced by engineexhaust.

INSEPTEMBER1942, NACA’SLANGLEYMEMORIALAERONAU-TICALLABORA-TORY ISSUEDA REPORTON CONDEN-SATIONTRAILS

ture already in the atmosphere, to raise the humid-ity in the turbulent wake to or beyond the saturationvalue. If this condition exists, some of the watervapor will condense and a visible trail will form.

Since the turbulent wake is narrow near theairplane, the density of moisture will be greatest atthis location. Farther away, where the wake islarger and the exhaust moisture is more widely dif-fused, there will be less moisture density. Thus,under some conditions, a short trail may form thatevaporates where the wake cross section becomes toolarge to maintain 100-percent humidity. If theamount of moisture is great enough to more thansaturate the wake at its final and greatest cross sec-tion, however, the trail will be persistent and willnot disappear until it is finally blown away by thewind or dissipated by atmospheric turbulence.43

Based on this discussion, the report then listedthe factors that favored the formation of contrails.These include low temperature, high atmospherichumidity at low temperature, and high fuel con-sumption such as that associated with high enginepower settings. Additionally, low drag, which wouldresult in lower turbulence and a narrower wake,would be conducive to contrail formation, sincemoisture from an engine would tend to remain con-centrated in a smaller volume of the atmosphere.Similarly, low speed also favored contrail produc-tion, since it would produce less energy for turbu-lence.44

The NACA report also provided several mapsshowing regions of the world where engine-exhaustcontrails were likely to develop across differentperiods in the year. These were based on the atmos-pheric changes produced by a B–17E aircraft “innormal heavy cruising condition,” which shouldprovide a reasonable standard for judging howother types of aircraft might interact with theatmosphere when flying through the zonesshown.45

Additionally, a section of the report discussedthe possibility of suppressing condensation trails.Where the exhaust trails were concerned, thereport stated that the only reliable means of pre-venting their formation was to remove the waterfrom engine exhausts by means of a water-recoverysystem. Unfortunately, such a device was not thenpractical. The study then recommended threecourses of action for contrail abatement, recogniz-ing that these might not be practical under combatconditions.

1. If reduction of altitude is permissible, throttleengines and glide at high speed to a lower level.

2. If net loss of altitude is not permissible, go into ashallow power dive at substantial increase in speed.Regain altitude by zooming. (Short lengths of per-sistent trail may be formed during latter part ofzoom.) Alternative: Fly at reduced power.

3. If some reduction in speed is permissible withsame power output and fuel consumption, as during

climb, open engine cowl flaps as wide as possible.(Airplanes without cowl flaps could be equippedwith similar drag-producing devices.)46

Finally, the authors of the NACA report dis-agreed with a British study’s conclusion that “per-sistent exhaust trails would cease a short distanceabove the tropopause.” In the view of the NACAresearchers, the cessation of contrails suggested inthe British report was a function of “reduced powerand amount of moisture discharged per unit vol-ume of trail.” These “trails probably could havebeen made to cease at any elevation below thetropopause by throttling the engines in accordancewith rule 1 or 2 governing the suppression ofexhaust trails.”47

Contrails and World War II CombatOperations

By the time the NACA report was issued, thebuild-up of American air power in England wasunder way and Eighth Air Force had already com-pleted its first bombing attacks against targets onthe European continent. As the size of the Ameri-can force grew and its operational tempo increased,the significance of contrails became increasinglyapparent to American airmen.

One point was obvious: regardless of the grow-ing importance of radar in air defense operations, acondensation trail could still pinpoint the locationof an airplane that might otherwise go unnoticed.As a result, it could be unnerving to realize thatone’s plane was trailing a “pearly white scarf,” espe-cially if you were aboard an American bomberabout to penetrate enemy air space. Thus, we notea tone of anxiety when Wally Hoffman tells us thatthe B–17s of the 351st Bomb Group formed up at28,000 feet on October 14, 1943 and then crossedthe English channel en route to Schweinfurt with“contrails following behind us for the Luftwaffe tosee.”48

Air crews also felt that vapor trails increasedthe danger to bombers at their most vulnerablemoment: the bomb run when planes flew straightand level to ensure bombing accuracy. Regardlessof radar’s role in controlling German flak batteries,during this time of heightened danger, crewmenbelieved that contrails pointed to them “like fin-gers” in the sky, making it easy for German anti-aircraft guns to locate their targets.49

These fears were not unfounded. The Ger-mans, like the British and Americans, had indeeddeveloped gun-laying radar for their anti-aircraftartillery. The German gun-laying process can bebroken down into three main steps. First, aircrafttrack data were acquired from either radar or opti-cal rangefinders and then fed into a fire con-troller/director. Next, the fire controller, a primitivecomputer, used these data to produce a firing solu-tion. And finally, the firing solution was transmit-ted to a battery where it was used to aim and firethe battery’s guns. Throughout the war, trackingdata obtained from German optical rangefinders


FACTORSTHATFAVOREDTHE FORMATIONOF CON-TRAILSINCLUDELOW TEM-PERATURE,HIGH ATMOS-PHERICHUMIDITY ATLOW TEM-PERATURE,AND HIGHFUEL CON-SUMPTION

were more accurate than radar tracking data.Therefore, when optical data were available,German gunners used these to generate their fir-ing solutions. This may explain why Eighth AirForce’s report on flak losses for the month ofDecember 1943 showed that American bomberssuffered twice the losses when bombing on cleardays as compared to bombing from above a cloudlayer. According to Edward Westermann’s excellenthistory of German anti-aircraft defenses, “through-out the war, optical targeting procedures using afire director remained the most effective method fortracking aerial targets. One estimate found thatengagements by visual means were five times moreeffective than engagements using radar control.”50

Contrails could even be a problem for the RAFduring its nighttime attacks against Germany.During a raid in March 1944, the eight hundredRAF bombers carrying out a mission againstNuremberg were flying below 25,000 feet and ordi-narily would not have generated contrails. Forwhatever meteorological reason, aircraft in theraiding formations left a heavy stream of contrailsthat could easily be seen in the evening’s brightmoonlight. These contrails guided German fightersto the bombers, allowing the fighters to down sixty-four Lancaster and thirty-one Halifax bombers.51

Vapor trails did not always work againstbomber crews. In 1943, Andy Rooney, long-time res-ident curmudgeon on CBS’s “Sixty Minutes,” was acorrespondent for the European edition of Stars

and Stripes. On February 26 of that year he flew ona bombing mission against Wilhelmshaven. Hisarticle about this mission included a description ofhow contrails could telegraph the presence ofGerman fighters. “Fighter planes were alwaysthere while we were making our run,” he wrote.“They come in so fast it’s hard to tell where they’recoming from, but frequently you could see a vaportrail start to form, like a cloud standing on end. Youknew that was a fighter starting a run.”52

Rooney was not the only one to note the impor-tance of contrails where spotting the presence ofenemy fighters was concerned. After his first mis-sion, a crewmember of the 91st Bomb Group noted:“The flak was still bursting everywhere, and in thedistance I could see vapor trails of single enginefighters, and it began to look as [if] trouble wasreally falling down on us. . . . Fighters were in alldirections by this time although many were out ata distance and probably we couldn’t even have seenthem had it not been for their vapor trails and weshot a flare to call in our fighter escorts.”53

In addition to helping bombers and fighterslocate each other, contrails at times impededbomber operations. An attacking force of a thou-sand heavy bombers included four thousand pow-erful engines that were pumping moisture into theupper atmosphere. As a result, large Americanbomber formations were literally capable of chang-ing the cloud cover along the routes they traversed.At times, planes near the end of the bomber stream


Dogfights often producedcomplex patterns of con-trails that were clearly visi-ble from the ground. Here,members of an Americananti-aircraft crew watch theloops and knots of con-trails formed as Alliedfighters tangle with theLuftwaffe high above theBattle of the Bulge. LikeGeneral Arnold during hisvisit to London in 1941,these American soldierscould not tell from the con-trails who was winning theair battle. However, at thislate date in the war, it wasa safe bet that Allied pilotsare prevailing, since mostof Germany’s best pilotshad already fallen in thewar.

AMERICANBOMBERSSUFFEREDTWICE THELOSSESWHEN BOMB-ING ONCLEAR DAYSAS COMPAREDTO BOMBINGFROM ABOVEA CLOUDLAYER

had to complete their bomb runs by flying throughcondensation trails “so dense that it was no differ-ent than flying in clouds.” Furthermore, thesevapor trails could be so persistent that bomber for-mations sometimes took different routes on theirreturn legs to avoid “the contrail clouds that we cre-ated.” Apropos of this point, a pilot in the 457thBomb Group later wrote: “We often said that wecreated weather over Europe.”54

What may be the quintessential example ofcontrails impeding bomber operations is found in aMarch 4, 1945 mission that was to attack Germanjet airdromes and a tank depot. Contrails affectedthis mission from the point of aircraft assemblyover the continent of Europe right through thebomb runs made by B–24 Liberators of the 2d AirDivision.55

During this operation, the chief of staff, 96thCombat Wing, was responsible for the properassembly of the division as it penetrated Germanairspace. Commenting on efforts to form up theattacking units, he noted that the vapor trails gen-erated by the wing’s aircraft made the assemblysignificantly more difficult. In his words:

The weather as it appeared to the weather scoutswas not insurmountable but . . . the contrails cre-ated by the First and Third Divisions plus the ini-tial units of the Second Division created a cloudlayer which units could not climb over nor descendbelow, for they created their own weather. It is unbe-lievable that so many units could fly so long in suchconditions, turn around and withdraw withoutheavy losses from collision.56

Affected by “thick, twisting contrails,” theassembly of the division’s 14th Bomb Wing was alsoa confused affair. According to plans, the primarytarget for the 14th was the large Nazi tank depot atAschaffenburg. After assembling as many of itsplanes as possible, the 14th struggled on looking forits target while continuing to be hampered by con-trails and clouds. Poor visibility, along with failuresof electronic bombing aids, created a confusing sit-uation in which six B–24s involved in the missiondropped their bombs on Zurich in neutralSwitzerland, causing extreme embarrassment forthe United States and Eighth Air Force.57

Similar remarks about large bomber forma-tions creating their own weather appear in thewartime diary of Sergeant Harley Tuck of the447th Bomb Group. Commenting on a mission toSchweinfurt on February 22, 1944, Tuck wrote:

Bombing altitude was going to be 24000, . . . Wefooled around over England until 10:45, when weclimbed to 24000 ft. The planes up there had formedthousands of vapor trails; we couldn’t see more than100 yds,—couldn’t form groups—wings. The groupleader couldn’t find the rest of the 3rd . . . [W]e losteach other going thru all the cloud banks—vaportrails on the way back home. 58

Another account of contrails impeding bomber

missions appears in the mission diary of StaffSergeant Earl G. Williamson, Jr. According toWilliamson, clouds and “dense contrails” at missionaltitude kept bombers from forming up properly fora March 3, 1944 mission against Berlin. William-son reported similar problems during a mission thefollowing day, this one against a ball bearing fac-tory at Eckner in the outskirts of Berlin. Becausethe vapor trails and clouds were so bad, the missionwas diverted to Cologne. Even then, Williamsonwrote, “appalling weather, [along] with condensa-tion trails that made formation flying virtuallyimpossible, forced the recall of the bulk of theforce.”59

The problem with vapor trails was especiallybad for aircraft further back in the bomber stream.A pilot in the 381st Bomb Group reported that on amission to Munich on July 16, 1944, the sky was sofull of contrails in the target area that his forma-tion had to climb to 30,200 feet for its bomb run.60

Vapor trails could also be a problem evenbefore aircraft took to the air. As already noted inPart I of this paper, condensation trails had beenencountered at ground level in Canada as early as1930.Army Air Forces units ferrying aircraft boundfor the Soviet Union also experienced the phenom-enon of ground-level contrails. The route flown byferry aircrews took them from Great Falls,Montana, to Fairbanks, Alaska, where they handedtheir aircraft over to Soviet pilots who took theplanes on across the Bering Strait and Siberia toMoscow, 6,000 miles away. Surface temperatures atLadd Field near Fairbanks could be as low as -50o

F, creating conditions in which taxiing aircraft attimes left “ice-crystal contrails behind them, just asFortresses do at 30,000 feet over Germany.” In onecase, a bomber taxiing out and taking off “fogged inLadd Field . . . so that no one else could land orleave for hours.”61

Contrails could also be used to turn air combatinto a deadly cat-and-mouse game. During a 91stBomb Group mission to Romily, the pilot of aGerman FW 190 tried to use the group’s contrailsto cover his attack on the rear of its formation. Thefighter entered the heavy contrails about a mileback from the formation and stayed in them untilhe was about a hundred feet back. However, analert tail-gunner had spotted the German and shothim down as he popped out of the contrails.62

The pilots of Germany’s jet fighter, the Me 262,seem to have regularly used contrails to mask theirapproach to American bomber formations.According to Roger A. Freeman, historian of“Mighty” Eighth Air Force, one such attack tookplace on March 18, 1945, when the Eighth sent1,328 bombers against Berlin. “The jets took fulladvantage of the hazy day with contrails at alti-tude persisting and merged. Concentrating first onthe rearmost groups of 1st Division as its bombersneared Berlin, between ten and twenty Me 262sapproached unseen in the contrails before climbingto press their attacks in which two B–17s were shotdown.”63

Similar tactics were again reported about a


PILOTS OFGERMANY’SJET FIGHTER,THE ME 262,SEEM TOHAVE REGULARLYUSED CONTRAILSTO MASKTHEIRAPPROACHTOAMERICANBOMBERFORMATIONS

month later. On this occasion, the attack came afterthe 91st Bomb Group’s run against Dresden onApril 17, 1945. A crewman described this attack asfollows: “An element of three Me 262s had attackedour element of three B–17s coming in through andhidden by our contrails until the last moment.” TheMe 262s knocked two B–17s out of formation dur-ing this pass.64

German pilots were not the only ones who usedcontrails to mask attacks on enemy planes. OnNovember 11, 1944, Lt. Col. John C. Meyer, a lead-ing American ace who would later become a four-star general, used a similar tactic to down aGerman FW 190. In this particular case, Meyerflew in the German fighter’s contrail, firing themachine guns of his P–51 before he could actuallysee the FW 190. Then, as he continued his ap-proach to the target, he could at last see the flashesmade as his bullets began striking the enemyfighter. Finally, he broke off his attack just in timeto avoid the burning German plane.65

Contrails offered fighter pilots another impor-tant advantage against their opponents. In air com-bat, the pilot who sees his opponent first gains adecided edge. Spotting an enemy first offers afighter pilot the opportunity to attack under themost advantageous conditions: from above andbehind with the sun at the back of the attacker.

Several top pilots have commented on thisadvantage in their memoirs. For example, CharlesE. “Chuck” Yeager claimed that he and his wing-

man, Clarence E. “Bud” Anderson, “had the besteyes in the group, and could pick up specks in thesky from fifty miles away.”66 A similar view wasexpressed by Adolf Galland, one of Germany’s topfighter aces and a leader the Luftwaffe’s fighterforces.

The first rule of all air combat is to see the opponentfirst. Like the hunter who stalks his prey andmaneuvers himself unnoticed in the most favorableposition for the kill, the fighter in the opening of adogfight must detect the opponent as early as possi-ble in order to attain a superior position for theattack.67

Obviously, a fighter dragging a “train of frozenstars” can be spotted much more easily than onewho is not. Therefore, an important factor in aircombat becomes finding a layer of the atmospherewhere one’s plane does not produce a vapor trail,yet one that is high enough not to seriously com-promise the advantage of superior altitude.Johannes “Mackie” Steinhoff, another top Germanace, made this point in his memoir of air combat inthe Mediterranean Theater: “A delicate white con-densation trail, plainly visible against the blue ofthe sky, began to form behind Bachmann’smachine. Clearly I would have to lose height atonce; otherwise we would give away our position tothe Spitfires and Lightnings.”68

Knowing that contrails could be easily seen


During a raid on Cologneon October 14, 1944, B–17sgenerate contrails of mod-est density. At other times,when contrails weredenser, Luftwaffe pilotsused the thick, white vaporto mask their attacks onthe rear of bomber forma-tions.

BUT, REALLY,MY BIGGESTTACTICALADVANTAGEWAS MYEYES. ISPOTTED HIMFROM GREATDISTANCES,KNOWING HECOULDN’TSEE MEBECAUSE HEWAS ONLY ADIM SPECK

YEAGER, P. 85

from a distance and would attract enemy aircraftwas the idea behind a trap the Luftwaffe set forAmerican escort fighters during an Eighth AirForce mission to Berlin on March 8, 1944. The baitwas twenty to twenty-five German fighters makingcontrails at 30,000 feet. Unknown to the P–47pilots of the 56th Fighter Group (Zemke’s Wolf-pack) who went for the bait, lurking just below thecontrail level were several squadrons of Germanfighters. The planes of these other squadrons“remained unseen until they commenced a viciousattack upon the 56th,” inflicting on the crack Ame-rican unit its heaviest losses in almost a year.69

Avoiding layers of the sky where vapor trailsformed was especially critical to the success ofreconnaissance missions and to the very survival ofreconnaissance pilots whose planes were usuallyunarmed. That Saint-Exupéry had learned this les-son in 1939 and 1940 should be apparent to anyonereading Flight to Arras. The point was driven homeagain when he returned to flying reconnaissancemissions in 1943 and 1944.

Like the other reconnaissance pilots in ColonelElliott Roosevelt’s unit, Saint-Exupéry relied onthe speed and stealthiness of his high-flying P–38to protect him from enemy fighters. To avoid pro-ducing telltale contrails, these pilots would climb towhere their P–38s first produced contrails andthen descend a few hundred feet to a point whereno contrail was generated. The logic behind thistactic has been aptly described by Curtis Cate, oneof Saint-Exupéry’s biographers:

By flying just below the vapour-trail ceiling the pilotstood a better chance of spotting the enemy if aGerman fighter climbed up to attack him. For sofast was the Lightning that only if theMesserschmitt or the even speedier Focke-Wulfclimbed above it, could it hope to drive home itscobra-like strike; but this it could not do withoutunfurling its long white “bridal train”, more easilydetectable in the rear-view mirror than the fighter’sbug-like blackness.70

Finally, there is the intangible, psychologicalimpact of masses of contrails on those undergoinga strategic bombing campaign. As noted earlier, airpower theorists believed that a strategic air assaultcould break the popular will, prompting an earlyend to hostilities. While I have uncovered very lit-tle direct evidence of the effects of contrails on civil-ian morale, there is at least some tangential evi-dence that the German people were aware that thedense contrails overhead heralded the passage of amassive bomber formation and understood thatthese contrails were harbingers of an imminentattack, if not on their own neighborhood, on townsand cities in other parts of Germany.

As a boy, Roger Freeman experienced firsthand the awe-inspiring passage overhead of a mas-sive bomber formation. “Seeing hundreds of air-craft trailing formations [contrails?] was an extra-ordinary sight.” He was especially impressed dur-ing a “freezing” morning early in 1945 when at theage of fifteen he saw the “contrails of a thousandbombers forming in the sky at one time.” Althoughthere were literally more planes than he couldcount, he knew that the number of bombers form-ing up had to be about a thousand because he couldcount twenty-eight groups and knew that eachgroup consisted of thirty to forty bombers.71

A German description of a massive raid bymore than 1,100 American bombers againstLeipzig on July 7, 1944, noted that the Germanpopulation was warned of the attack as the bomberforce approached the Münster-Osnabruck area.According to this report, “it was a beautifully clearday. Dense condensation trails could be seen up inthe stratosphere. There was a continuous deeproaring of the bomber formations.”72

A more direct suggestion of the psychologicalimpact of massive bombing operations came fromLt. Col. John B. “Jack” Kidd, who served as opera-tions officer for the 100th Bomb Group at ThorpeAbbott, England. Kidd wrote:

Groups bombed individually, separating at an“Initial Point” for the bombing run, then regainingthe wing formation. Wings, as well as Divisions, fol-lowed each other in trail, all taking up an enormousamount of airspace, normally flying between 20,000to 28,000 feet (over five miles high). To the enemypopulation on the ground it must have been afrightful sight, wondering if the bombs were meantfor them, particularly when contrails were formedwhich became long tubes of cloud visible at greatdistances.73

Perhaps the most powerful description of thepsychological effects of contrails came from ElmerBendiner who earned a distinguished flying crossand purple heart as a navigator on a B–17 in theEuropean theater. Concerning the contrails gener-ated by American bombers during a June 1943 raidagainst Bremen, Bendiner wrote:

Ahead and above us the armada on dress parade let


During the last months ofthe air war over Europe,Eighth Air Force routinelysent forces of over a thou-sand bombers to attack tar-gets inside Germany. Withfour thousand powerfulengines pouring watervapor into the damp, coldskies, it is easy to under-stand how a bomber forma-tion could create its ownweather.

THE GERMANPEOPLEWEREAWARE THATTHE DENSECONTRAILSOVERHEADHERALDEDTHE PASSAGE OFA MASSIVEBOMBERFORMATION

fly vapor trails like royal plumes. Mechanical thingswhen they are grand as plumed fortresses flashingin the morning become endowed with divine invin-cibility.74

Finally, for Bendiner at least, contrails weresymbolically intertwined with that terrible strugglethat took place in the skies of Europe over sixdecades ago. His Fall of Fortresses is clearly one ofthe best memoirs of modern warfare. Its title comesfrom the fallen Fortresses that formed a line offuneral pyres marking the deadly paths to and fromtargets like the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt.Of contrails and death, Bendiner had seen his share,and he mingled the two in some of the most power-ful descriptions of air warfare. The air war “was not,then, a game which we played with death in the sky.It was not all gallantry and white contrails againstthe blue.” While “death creates the splendid illusionof brotherhood,” it cannot forever mask the horrorsof war. The grandeur, the horror, the brotherhood,the illusions of the European air war would seem tobe summed up in the following passage.

At 1315 the entire formation was in place. Gleamingin silver with white contrails spinning behind them,

the Fortresses pulsed and throbbed. The sound ofengines beat a rhythm for which my mind devisedmelodies. We strung out for perhaps ten miles ormore across the sky as we left Orfordness.

I exulted in that parade. I confess this as an actof treason against the intellect, because I have seendead men washed out of their turrets with a hose.But if one wants an intellectual view of war onemust ask someone who has not seen it.75

Epilogue: Symbol of the Aviation Age

By the end of World War II contrails were acommonplace in the skyscape of warfare and hadcome to have serious implications for air combat.While relatively rare in the United States, contrailswere entering the wider public consciousness, asarticles and photographs featuring contrails beganappearing in popular magazines like The SaturdayEvening Post and National Geographic.76

Following the war, military aircraft engagedin operational and training flights would con-tinue to mark their passage through the heavenswith the long, white streamers of contrails.However, not until the advent of the jet age incommercial aviation would contrails become a


“Ahead and above us thearmada on dress parade letfly vapor trails like royalplumes.”

BY THE ENDOF WORLDWAR II CON-TRAILS WEREA COMMON-PLACE INTHE SKY-SCAPE OFWARFAREAND HADCOME TOHAVE SERI-OUS IMPLICA-TIONS FORAIR COMBAT

1. Richard V. Rhode and H. A. Pearson, CondensationTrails: Where They Occur and What Can Be Done aboutThem,” National Advisory Committee for AeronauticsWartime Report, Sep 1942, p. 2. This report may be down-loaded at http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19930093080_1993093080.pdf.2. The Germans alone flew over 500 reconnaissancemissions against France between the fall of Poland andthe invasion of France. Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle:France, 1940 (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 232.3. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Flight to Arras, Trans. byLewis Galantière (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company,

1942;A Harvest Book), pp. 15-18, 31. See also, Curtis Cate,Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (New York: Paragon House,1990), pp. 379-80; Stacy Schiff, Saint-Exupéry—ABiography (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994;AnOwl Book), pp. 327-29.4. For a glimpse of what it was like to fly a 1930s vin-tage aircraft at 30,000 feet where the temperaturesreached 55o F below zero, see Saint-Exupéry, Flight toArras, pp. 19-20. High altitude flight, with its discomfortsand outright pain where Saint-Exupéry was concerned,seems to have become a special form of sacrifice that heoffered as part of his own special crusade to defend Franceagainst the German invasion and later free her from theyoke of Nazi oppression. According to Schiff, Saint-Exupéry, pp. 320-21, Saint-Exupéry was a physicalwreck—his left shoulder was virtually immobile, otherparts of his body were stiff because of old fractures, and hesuffered from headaches. Schiff also stated that his oldfractures pained him at high altitudes where human tis-sue could swell. In Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, WartimeWritings: 1939-1944 (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1986), pp.70-71, the author tells us that in one severe crash he suf-fered a skull fracture, a fractured sternum, a broken wrist,and several wounds caused by splinters from the woodenstructure of the plane. For Saint-Exupéry’s obsession withflight at 35,000 feet, see Wartime Writings, pp. 20, 23-24,37, 141-142, 147, 199, 207.


common feature in the skies over North America,Europe, and much of the remainder of the world.What had been a novelty in World War I, acuriosity across the twenties and much of thethirties, and a deadly serious matter in air com-bat during the Second World War, has become asymbol of our mastery of flight—the fulfillmentof a dream that has haunted man since the leg-endary flight of Icarus.

Today, there is virtually no place in the UnitedStates where the skies are unmarked by contrails.Joggers at the Pentagon, monks in their isolatedmonasteries, hikers at the Ghost Ranch in north-ern New Mexico, tourists on the floor of Canyon deChelly in Arizona—all may at some time duringthe day hear the dull rumble of jet engines andlook skyward to see an aircraft writing its gos-samer signature across the heavens. . ■

NOTES

Dr. Baucom is interested in extending his contrailsresearch. In addition to receiving information on addi-tional sources related to the period covered in “Wakes ofWar,” he would like to explore reactions to contrails in thepost-World War II era in which the advent of the modernjetliner has made contrails a regular feature in theworld’s skies. If you know of any post-1945 writtensources, fictional or non-fictional, please send biblio-graphical information and page references to [email protected] or to the following U.S. Postal address:

Donald R. BaucomHCR 74, Box 21854El Prado, NM 87529

During World War II, vaportrails had heralded theadvent of air power as amajor element of modernwarfare. After the war,operational and trainingmissions by high-flyingmilitary aircraft wouldgradually spread aware-ness of contrails until theadvent of commercial jet-liners made them a routinefeature of skies around theworld.

WHAT HADBEEN A NOVELTY...HAS BECOMEA SYMBOLOF OUR MAS-TERY OFFLIGHT

5. Saint-Exupéry, Wartime Writings, pp. 120-21, 124-25,128-29, 208-17. For a reconstruction of the circumstancessurrounding Saint-Exupéry’s last mission, see Cate,Saint-Exupéry, pp. 549-52.6. Saint-Exupéry, Flight to Arras, pp. 44-46. Accordingto Saint-Exupéry, Wartime Writings, pp. 88-89, 101-02,Flight to Arras first appeared in serialized form inAtlantic Monthly prior to the publication in Feb 1942 ofthe English translation by Lewis Galantière. The Frenchedition of this book did not appear until near the end ofNov 1942, when it was published under the title Pilote deGuerre.7. For information on No. 2 Camouflage Unit, see RAFMuseum, “Milestones of Flight: British Military Aviationin 1939,” Part 3, at www.rafmuseum.org.uk/milestones-of-flight/british_military/1939_3.html. The RAF’s “first dedi-cated photographic reconnaissance unit” was known asthe Heston Flight and was formed in No. 11 Group of RAFFighter Command. The Heston Flight was renamed No. 2Camouflage Unit on Nov 1, 1939.8. M. V. Longbottom, “Condensation Trails at HighAltitudes,” Dec 25, 1939, United Kingdom Archives,Document AIR 20/321, p. 1. Later in his report, Long-bottom describes the appearance of two aircraft overNancy on December 21, 1939, noting that “the aircraftthemselves were not visible to the naked eye, but the twotrails left no doubt as to their exact position.”9. Longbottom, “Condensation Trails,” pp. 1-2.10. Ibid.11. Ibid., p. 3.12. Ibid..13. Hough and Richards, Battle of Britain, pp. 49-51.14. High Altitude Sub-Committee of the AeronauticalResearch Committee, “Interim Note on ‘Vapour Trails’Started by the Passage of Aircraft,” February 3, 1941,United Kingdom Archives, Document DSIR 23/10792, p.1.15. High Altitude Subcommittee, “Interim Note,” pp. 1-2.16. Ibid.17. Ibid., pp. 1-3.18. Ibid., p. 3.19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. G. M. B. Dobson, Meteorology Subcommittee of theAeronautical Research Committee, “Condensation Trailsfrom Aeroplane Engine Exhaust and MeteorologicalConditions,” Feb 7, 1941, United Kingdom Archives, Docu-ment DSIR 23/10802, p. 1. Dobson noted that burning onepound of petrol produced one pound of water vapor.22. Ibid., p. 2.23. Ibid.24. For these curves, see figures 1 through 4 at the end ofDobson, “Condensation Trails.”25. Ibid., pp. 2-326. Ibid., p. 3.27. Ibid., pp. 2-3.28. Ibid., p. 3.29. A. H. R. Goldie, Meteorology Subcommittee of theAeronautical Research Committee, “Condensation Trailsfrom Aircraft: Summary of Present Position,” November20, 1941, p. 1.30. Ibid., p. 2.31. Ibid.32. Ibid., p. 3.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. United Kingdom, Meteorology Subcommittee of theAeronautical Research Committee, “Formation of VapourTrails behind Aircraft: Copy of Pilots’ Replies toQuestionnaire Issued by the National Research Council ofCanada,” nd [early 1942], United Kingdom NationalArchives document DSIR 23/11406, pp. 1-2.36. Meteorology Subcommittee of the ARC, “Copy ofPilots’ Replies,” pp. 2-15.37. Hough and Richards, The Battle of Britain, passim.

For specific dates of the battle, see pp. 121, 30138. For reproductions of Nash and Eurich paintings, seethe section of colored illustrations between pp. 142 and143 in Hough and Richards, The Battle of Britain.Examples of Monnington’s paintings may be viewed at theUK’s Imperial War Museum website: http://www.iwm.org.uk/server/show/conArtist.1795. Of special interesthere is Monnington’s “Southern England, 1944, SpitfiresAttacking Flying Bombs.”39. Henry H. Arnold, American Airpower Comes of Age:General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s World War II Diaries, ed.John W. Huston, Vol. I (Maxwell Air Force Base[Montgomery], Ala: Air University Press, January 2002),pp. 129-65. Arnold arrived in England during the after-noon of April 12, 1941 and departed the morning of April27. Editor John Huston makes the point that Rooseveltwas on the verge of forcing Arnold to retire over the lat-ter’s resistance to allocations of newly produced Americanaircraft to the Royal Air Force. The reason for Arnold’sresistance was his perception that the RAF allocation washindering the buildup of America’s own air arm that wasunderway at the same time.40. Arnold, American Airpower, I, 148. In note 130, p.194, Huston said that Arnold was here comparing the con-trails with sky-writing in which pilots “released a vapor tospell out their commercial messages to those below.”Huston also stated that Arnold’s sighting of contrails overLondon “was his first experience with contrails.” This con-flicts with Dik Daso’s account of Arnold’s earlier involve-ment with a contrail suppression project (see next para-graph in text above and next footnote below).41. Dik A. Daso, Architects of American Air Supremacy:Gen Hap Arnold and Dr. Theodore von Kármán (MaxwellAir Force Base [Montgomery], Ala: Air University Press,1997), pp. 24, 32. See especially note 47, p. 32. I haveincluded this information even though it is a minor pointin Daso’s book. The evidence offered on this matter is anoral history interview completed several decades after theevent.42. Rhode and Pearson, Condensation Trails, p. 1.43. Ibid., p. 2.44. Ibid., p. 3.45. Ibid., pp. 4-5. Four charts are provided at the end ofthe report, one each for January, April, July, and October.46. Ibid., p. 7.47. Ibid. Although not specifically cited, the Britishreport here referred to is probably G. M. B. Dobson’s reportof February 7, 1941.48. Wally Hoffman, “From Fantasy to Reality to B–17Mission to Schweinfurt: 1943,” downloaded from(http://www.magweb.com/sample/ww2/wl003sch.htm).49. Mike Banta, “A Story of Ruptured Duck,” “Storiesfrom the 91st,” 91st Bomb Group Memorial AssociationWebsite (http://www.91stbombgroup.com), downloadedfrom http://www.91stbombgroup.com/rupturedduck.html.50. Edward B. Westermann, Flak: German Anti-aircraftDefenses, 1914-1945, Modern War Studies, Gen. Ed.Theodore A. Wilson (Lawrence, Kansas: University Pressof Kansas, 2001), pp. 215, 230, 249.51. History Learning Site, “World War II—BomberCommand 1944,” at http://historylearningsite.co.uk/bomber_command_1944.htm.52. Andy Rooney, “How it Feels to Bomb Germany... ,”Stars and Stripes, European Edition, Feb 27, 1943, repro-duced at: http://www.pbs.org/weta/reportingamericaat-war/reporters/rooney/wilhelmshaven.html.53. James W. Brady, “Our First Mission” at http://www.91stbombgroup.com/firstmission.html.54. Willard Reese to Jay Reynolds, Undated Message,downloaded on July 28, 2006 from website http://www.goodsky.homestead.com/files/deception5.html.55. Jonathan E. Helmreich, “The Bombing of Zurich,” AirPower Journal, Summer 2000.56. Ibid., pp. 92, 94, 96-97 The quoted material is from


p. 97.57. Ibid., pp. 92, 97-102.58. Harley Tuck, “Combat Diary,” entry titled“Rattlesden,” Feb 22, 1944. The three parts of Tuck’s diarymay be found at the home page for the 447th Bomb Groupwebsite (http://www.447bg.com/index.html). At the homepage for the 447th site, click on “Combat Crews,” and thenselect “Combat Diary—Sgt Harley Tuck.” The quotationgiven here is contained in part 2 of the Tuck diary. Tuckwas a radio operator/gunner on a B–17 of the 708th BombSquadron. His plane was shot down on Apr 22, 1944, andhe was taken prisoner.59. Earl G. Williamson, Jr., “My Lucky Thirty,” Diary ofEighth Air Force Missions in 1944, ed. by Robert S. Morris,located at http://www.91stbombgroup.com/williamson.html.60. Lloyd Sunderland, “A B–17 Mission to Munich,”downloaded from the Official 381st Bomb Group (Heavy)Memorial Association and Triangle-L Society Web Site,http://www.381st.org/stories_lloyd-munich.html.61. Wesley Price, “Ice in the Moscow Pipe Line,”Saturday Evening Post, Jan 13, 1945, pp. 18-19.62. Bill Goodman to Richard Goodman, et. al., Letter, Mar31, 1995. This letter is one of ten that Goodman wrote tohis sons and two grandchildren. These letters may beaccessed through the section on World War II AviationHistory of the All Aviation Flightline OnLine Site athttp://aafo.com/library/history/index.html. The March 31,1995, letter is part IX of the section on Goodman’s letters.63. Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: Units, Menand Machines—A History of the US 8th Army Air Force(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970),p. 214.64. Banta, “A Story of Ruptured Duck.”65. John Frisbee, “Four-Star Ace,” Air Force Magazine,May 1989. This article can be downloaded fromhttp://www.afa.org/magazine/valor/0589valor_print.html.66. [Charles E.] Chuck Yeager with Leo Janos, Yeager:AnAutobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), pp. 68,72, 85-86.67. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last: The Rise andFall of the German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945 (New York:Bantam Books, 1954), p. 21. For other comments about theimportance of keen eyesight and seeing the enemy first,see Gordon M. Graham, Down for Double: Anecdotes of aFighter Pilot (White Stone, Virginia: Brandylane Publi-shers, 1996), p. 32; Richard Hillary, The Last Enemy (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1969), p. 98; Larry Forrester, Flyfor Your Life: The Story of R. R. Stanford Tuck, D.S.O.,D.F.C., and Two Bars (Garden City, N.Y.: Nelson Double-day, 1973), pp. 23-24; and James Slater, The Hunters (NewYork: Random House, Inc., 1997; Vintage Books), pp. 8-9.Although The Hunters is a novel that focuses on air com-bat during the Korean War, its author is a West Point grad-uate who flew F–86s in the Korean War. In addition tokeen eyesight, several autobiographical and biographicalworks stress the importance of the instincts (including theunhesitating willingness to kill) and skills developedthrough hunting as being important to the successful ace.See Forrester, Fly for Your Life, pp. 23-24, 28-29. Gallandstressed the analogy between hunters and fighter pilots,see First and Last, pp. 21, 54. Chuck Yeager stressed hishunting background in his autobiography. See Yeager,Yeager, pp. 7, 9, 13, 19, 22, 28. At one point Yeager wrote:“Dad was an expert mechanic, and I just understoodmotors—a natural ability, like having exceptional eyes andthe coordination to be a crack shot. Hand a rifle to a hill-billy and he’ll hit a bull’s eye every time. So, without know-ing or even caring, I had the talents needed for flying incombat.” (p. 22) Finally, Baron Manfred von Richthofen, thetop German fighter ace of World War I, was also an avidhunter. See Peter Kilduff, Richthofen: Beyond the Legend ofthe Red Baron (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993),passim, but especially pp. 119-21, 157-58.68. Johannes Steinhoff, Messerschmitts over Sicily: Diary

of a Luftwaffe Fighter Commander (Mechanicsburg,Penn.: Stackpole Books, 2004), p. 138. James Salter madea similar point about air combat in the Korean War. In TheHunters, Cleve, the protagonist, is leading his flight northto the Yalu when, Salter tells us: “At thirty-four thousandfeet they began to leave smooth, persistent trails in theair. Cleve stopped climbing and dropped down severalthousand feet to remain below the contrail level wherethey would be less visible.” (The Hunters, p. 81.) See alsoJames Salter, Burning the Days: Recollection (New York:Random House, Inc., 1997; Vintage Books), p. 147, whereone reads: “The sky that day was clear and deep. Headingnorth at forty thousand feet, there were smooth, straightcontrails streaming out for miles behind us which could beseen from far off.”69. Freeman, Mighty Eighth, p. 126.70. Cate, Saint-Exupéry, pp. 546-47.71. Freeman is quoted in Pat McKenna, “The MightyEighth: U.S. Airmen’s Sacrifices in Europe Helped ForgeToday’s Air Force,” Airman Magazine, August 1996. Thisarticle may be downloaded from http://www.af.mil/news/airman/0896/eighth.htm. For the perspective of an Ameri-can airman who was impressed by the massive formationof which he was a part and the contrails that formationgenerated, see James W. Brady, “Our First Mission”(http://www.91stbombgroup.com/firstmission.html).Brady wrote: “We heard later that this had been thelargest force ever sent out to date. The planes were leav-ing long vapor trails. It was a very interesting thing to see,and it gave one the feeling this was really a great show.”72. “Oschersleben: 7 July 1944,” Part 1, located athttp://members.aol.com/falkeeins/Sturmgruppen/blitz-luftschlacht.html. This report is included in Neil Page,Kaczmarek: a German View of the Air War—An EnglishLanguage Reader located at http://members.aol.com/falkeeins/Sturmgruppen/contents.html. Mr. Page’s sitestates that it “aims to present selected short accountsfor the Luftwaffe and air-combat enthusiasts from avariety of French and German sources including books,magazines, unpublished diaries and correspondence -most of the accounts you can read here have neverappeared anywhere in English before.”73. Jack Kidd, “World War II” at http://www.100thbg.com/mainpages/history/history2/kidd_ww2.htm. Kidd rose to the rank of major general after the war.74. Elmer Bendiner, The Fall of Fortresses: A PersonalAccount of the Most Daring—and Deadly—American AirBattles of World War II (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons,1980), pp. 97-98.75. Bendiner, Fall of Fortresses, pp. 168-69, 250-51.VictorDavis Hanson, one of today’s leading military historians,rates Fall of Forces one of the top five books on 20th-cen-tury combat. See Hanson, “FIVE BEST: Fighting Words—The Definitive Books on the Battles of the 20th Century,”Wall Street Journal On-Line, March 25, 2006.76. An article in the Saturday Evening Post has alreadybeen cited. Additionally, contrails were discussed by F.Barrows Colton in “Weather Fights and Works for Man,”National Geographic, December 1943, p. 655. Colton’sarticle included a picture of contrails over England pro-duced by German and British aircraft (p. 650).The captionunder this photograph as well as Colton’s article stressedthe fact that contrails could give away the position of air-craft that might otherwise be too high to see. The sourceof these vapor trails was said to be condensation of watervapor in aircraft engine exhausts. Another photograph inNational Geographic showed contrails forming elaboratecurves. For this photograph, see F. Barrows Colton,“Aviation in Commerce and Defense,” NationalGeographic, Dec 1940, p. 690. The caption under this pho-tograph reads: “This grim ‘skywriting’ reveals breath-tak-ing maneuvers of British and German planes during a‘dogfight’ over the Kent coast, Aug 28, 1940. So high arethe fighters that they are mere specks in the sky.”



The Short But Interesting Lifeof a Plane Called Rivet Top


William Cahill

T he ominous growl of the slow moving Lock-heed Super Constellation disrupted the sul-try autumn evening in 1967 at Korat Royal

Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). The United StatesAir Force (USAF) maintenance personnel and Thaicleaning staff paid scant attention to the EC–121 asshe taxied onto the Constellation portion of theramp and took her place among the parkedEC–121Ds and EC–121Rs. From all outside appear-ances she was just another EC–121D assigned toDetachment 1 of the 552d Airborne Early WarningWing. Yet the crew that climbed down the air stairswore patches denoting assignment not to AirDefense Command, as one would expect, but to thefighter-owning Tactical Air Command. The aircraftwas assigned to Detachment 2 of the Tactical AirWarfare Center and was a one-off modifiedEC–121K known as Rivet Top. Until recently hermission of direct support to fighters over NorthVietnam has been shrouded in the mystery associ-ated with classified signals intelligence (SIGINT)operations, but now her story can be told in full.

Genesis of a Program

Originally designated Sea Trap, Rivet Topevolved out of a series of studies in early 1966designed to counter the SA-2 surface-to-air missile

(SAM) system that was being used to great effectin North Vietnam. In May 1966, HeadquartersUSAF revised the mission of the program frommerely locating SAM sites and directing strikesagainst them to also providing warning of SAMsand fighter aircraft hostile to USAF strike aircraftin the area. The updated plan was staffed throughheadquarters as a formal project re-named RivetTop and approved in November 1966.1 The finalevolution of the Rivet Top plan centered on a con-cept called Airborne Tactical Air CoordinationCenter, where intelligence collection and commandand control functions were fused on a single air-frame.

Work on the design and development startedimmediately using a single EC–121K originallydelivered to the U.S. Navy as Bureau Number (BuNo) 143184. Modifications designed by E-Systemsand managed by the Big Safari Program Officeproceeded briskly and the aircraft was deliveredfor operational test and evaluation in March 1967.The EC–121K gained a USAF serial based on herprior Navy Bu No, being carried on Air Force booksas 57-143184.2 The original plan called for theTactical Air Warfare Center to test the Rivet Topaircraft for ninety days in the U.S. followed by acombat evaluation in Southeast Asia.3 Though herconversion work was completed in a relativelyshort amount of time, 57-143184 was far from asimple aircraft when she rolled off the modifica-tion line at the Greenville, Texas, plant of E-Systems.

Originally delivered to the U.S. Navy as a WV-2, 57-143184 was similar to the USAF airborneearly warning EC–121D aircraft operated by AirDefense Command. However, 57-143184’s air-frame and interior received few major alterations,reducing the amount of flight test required forfielding the system. Previously in 1958, the Navyhad modified eleven of 57-143184’s WV-2 brethrenfor the SIGINT role and designated the newmachines EC–121Ms.4 E-Systems took advantageof this work and many of the subsystems that flewon Rivet Top were developed for the EC–121M pro-gram. The WV-2’s ventrally-mounted AN/APS-20surveillance radar was disabled and the antennaturned into a large receiver for electronic intelli-gence (ELINT) purposes. This modification, simi-lar to that used in the Navy’s Big Look EC–121Maircraft, allowed the Rivet Top crew to develop pre-cise location data against the SA-2’s Fan Songradar via accurate direction-finding (DF) cuts. Thenew aircraft also benefited from the fitting of theEC–121M Brigand system which allowed theRivet Top crew to accurately DF early warningradars.5 Unfortunately, both systems required up


Major Bill Cahill is an active duty Air Force intelligence officer currently assigned to USSTRAT-COM in the Washington D.C. area. He is an Intelligence Weapons Officer with squadron and wing-level experience and has served on the Air Staff in the Pentagon. He is a graduate of San Jose StateUniversity and has MS degrees from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University and the NationalDefense Intelligence College. Maj. Cahill has been published in the USAF Weapons Review andC4ISR Journal.

An EC–121 takes off atKorat AB, Thailand.

1.Laos

Thailand

China

North Vietnam

Gulf of Tonkin

Hanoi

Key

1. EC-121D Bravo Station,

11,000 ft altitude

2. EC-121 Charlie Station,

15,000 ft altitude

3. – 5. EB-66C Orbits, 30,000

ft altitudes

2.4.

5.

3.20

North

18

North

Korat RTAFB

HER MISSIONOF DIRECTSUPPORT TOFIGHTERSOVER NORTHVIETNAM HASBEENSHROUDEDIN THE MYS-TERY, BUTNOW HERSTORY CANBE TOLD

to five minutes to develop an accurate location ofthe radar. While this timeline was effective againstearly warning radars that tended to stay active fortens of minutes at a time, it did not work wellagainst the Fan Song radar, which would stay onthe air for much shorter periods.6

To allow 57-143184 to track fighter aircraft,the QRC–248 and AN/APX-49 IdentificationFriend or Foe (IFF) systems, also fitted to USAFEC–121D aircraft, were carried.7 The AN/APX-49IFF system allowed the weapons controllers in theback of the aircraft to identify U.S. aircraft by adistinct coded response to the AN/APX-49’s elec-tronic query, while the QRC–248 gave a similarcapability against Soviet IFF systems used by theNorth Vietnamese.8 The final bit of kit on RivetTop was arguably the most important. 57-143184was fitted with eight positions for communicationsintelligence (COMINT), with specially-trainedUSAF airborne linguists operating Ultra HighFrequency (UHF) and Very High Frequencyreceivers to intercept communications betweenground controllers and pilots assigned to NorthVietnam’s Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF).9The ELINT and COMINT capabilities—lumpedtogether as “SIGINT”—were becoming critical tosupport the increasingly technical air war inSoutheast Asia.

Initial SIGINT Efforts

USAF airborne SIGINT missions supportingthe Vietnam War were about as old as the waritself. The 6091st Reconnaissance Squadron intro-duced SIGINT to Vietnam in July 1964 when itdeployed two C–130B-II SIGINT aircraft toThailand to fly COMINT missions off the coast ofNorth Vietnam.10 Originally operating under themission name Queen Bee, the C–130B-II aircraftwould orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin to gather infor-

mation on VPAF air defenses as USAF strike air-craft bombed North Vietnam under OperationRolling Thunder.11 The tenuous relationshipbetween the operations community and the intelli-gence community flared as the Second AirDivision, the USAF organization controlling theair war at the time, fought with the SIGINT com-munity over tasking of the SIGINT aircraft andthe releasability of their intelligence information.The original method to “sanitize” and relay threatwarnings derived from SIGINT was deemed cum-bersome and a contributing factor in the loss oftwo F-105 aircraft on April 4, 1965.12 The fallout ofthis incident was overwhelming and within onemonth the USAF approved the Queen Bee crews toprovide enemy fighter (or “MiG”) threat warningdirect to the strike aircraft over UHF radio on the“Guard” channel;13 by August the warnings wereexpanded to include information on active VPAFSA-2 batteries.14 In mid-September 1964 twoadditional C–130B-II aircraft arrived in theater,allowing the 6091st to fly a total of two missionsper day under the new mission name of SilverDawn.15

Silver Dawn SIGINT support continuedunabated for the next two years with the C–130B-II mission crews refining threat warning formatand procedures. At the same time USAF EC–121Daircrews were also brought into the threat report-ing chain with the command and control crewsrelaying threat warning from ground-based SIG-INT sites to strike aircraft.16 As the air wardragged on, the number of strike aircraft overNorth Vietnam increased as did the amount ofthreat reporting. Soon the warning information onthe Guard channel was starting to lose its effec-tiveness as fighter crews repeated threats theysaw, EC–121D crews relayed ground-based SIG-INT and C–130B-II crews voiced their own intelli-gence. It was not uncommon for a single SAM inci-


The EC–121K Rivet Topparked on the ramp atGreenville, Texas..

AS THE AIRWARDRAGGEDON, THENUMBER OFSTRIKE AIR-CRAFT OVERNORTHVIETNAMINCREASEDAS DID THEAMOUNT OFTHREATREPORTING

dent to appear as multiple active missile batteriesdue to the duplicative nature of the Guard channelreporting net.

Off to War

The Rivet Top Task Force, designatedDetachment 2 of the Tactical Air Warfare Center,arrived at Udorn RTAFB with their EC–121K onAugust 9, 1967. Their stay at Udorn was shortwith Detachment 2 joining the College Eye TaskForce (CETF) EC–121Ds at Korat RTAFB later inthe year. Once settled into their initial quarters atUdorn, the Rivet Top crews started flying combatmissions in late August with their SIGINT sortiesover the Gulf of Tonkin protected by Navy fightersoperating a Combat Air Patrol (CAP).

Seventh Air Force, the follow-on organizationto the Second Air Division, was authorized to taskwhich missions were to be flown by the Rivet Topaircraft. Until this time, all SIGINT aircraft mis-sion tasking was done by the National SecurityAgency (NSA). The switch from NSA tasking, asused by Silver Dawn, to the organization thatmanaged the air war was a fundamental change inthe way of doing business with SIGINT aircraftand allowed greater integration of intelligencewith operations.

Rivet Top initially flew in support of a widevariety of missions to enable a broad data samplefor her combat evaluation. Early Detachment 2missions included support to Rolling Thunderoperations near Hanoi, Iron Hand Suppression ofEnemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions in southernNorth Vietnam and B–52 missions along the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ).17 A standard missioninvolved the aircraft launching to cover morningstrikes into North Vietnam, landing to refuel at Da

Nang, South Vietnam, then taking off for after-noon strikes—a fourteen-hour mission to cover thetwo four-hour strike periods.18

During September, Rivet Top crews wereassigned to support three Rolling Thunder raidsagainst VPAF airfields.19 The plan called for theEC–121K crews to pass on threat information—both for SAMs and MiGs—to a ground-based com-mand and control (C2) node or EC–130 AirborneCommand and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraftthat worked C2 of armed reconnaissance sortiesnear the DMZ and southern portions of NorthVietnam. The airborne or ground-based C2 nodewould add the Rivet Top-derived data to otherthreat information and provide warnings tofriendly aircraft operating under their control.Rivet Top could also pass ELINT-derived locationdata for SA-2s and early warning radars to thesame agencies for prosecution of emerging tar-gets.20

The ABCCC–directed SEAD missions cued byRivet Top worked well and soon procedures wererefined to a science. As soon as Rivet Top derivedan accurate Fan Song location it would be passedto ABCCC personnel who would immediatelydirect an F–100F “Misty” Fast Forward AirController and F–105D Iron Hand aircraft to findand destroy the offending SAM site while at thesame time routing armed reconnaissance aircraftflying interdiction missions away from the threatarea.21

A Change in Focus

By early October 1967 the Rivet Top missionhad started to change. After gaining Seventh AirForce approval and coordinating with theThailand-based 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW),


An EC–121 with sensorbulges top and bottom.

RIVET TOPDERIVED ANACCURATEFAN SONGLOCATION[AND] WOULDIMMEDIATELYDIRECT ANF–100F“MISTY”FASTFORWARDAIRCONTROLLERAND F–105DIRON HANDAIRCRAFT TOFIND ANDDESTROYTHE OFFEND-ING SAM SITE

on October 9 Rivet Top crews started to provideMiG threat information directly to the strike forceand protective anti-air “MiG CAP” aircraft viatheir respective “strike” and “CAP” discrete fre-quencies. These radio channels, used only by a lim-ited number of aircraft, were less cluttered andeasier to monitor for all players involved.Procedures continued to be polished throughoutthe month, with Rivet Top settling into a warningformat that provided range and bearing of thethreats—both SAMs and MiGs—to the alertedfriendly aircraft.22 Rivet Top now relayed threatinformation to the C2 elements via an encrypted“secure” UHF radio and to the fighter aircraft viaunencrypted UHF radio. The new warning proce-dures were a big hit with the fighter crews.

Rivet Top’s change in threat reporting proce-dures came just in time as these critical warningswere getting lost in the noise of the UHF Guardchannel. Norm Nielsen, an F-4 pilot who flew withthe 366th TFW out of Da Nang AB in 1967 and1968, described the frenetic nature of Guard whenhe stated, “You’d hear SAM calls, you’d hear bull’seye [MiG] calls, and of course you would hear a lotof calls from guys in trouble coming back.”23 A raidon the VPAF airfield at Phuc Yen underscored theissue further—two F-105s were shot down by MiG-21s because three MiG warnings broadcast byCollege Eye were garbled by competing C2 com-munications.24

The feedback from the fighter wings on thenew warning system was immediate, with theRivet Top command staff receiving verbal andwritten comments noting the exceptional supportin combating MiGs.25 Another factor that con-tributed to the success of the Rivet Top missionwas the approach taken by the commander of Det.2, Colonel Thomas Morris. He briefed each of theThailand-based fighter wings about the capabili-ties of his aircraft and repeated the briefing everythree months to cover pilot rotation. Even with thevagaries of schedules, Morris estimated 50 percentof the pilots in the three fighter wings had anunderstanding of the capabilities and proceduresemployed by Rivet Top.26 The final factor was cul-ture: Rivet Top was sponsored by Tactical AirCommand, the host command of all CONUS-basedtactical fighters, and was seen as a friend to helpkill MiGs, while College Eye belonged to AirDefense Command and was perceived as an ill-tempered traffic cop with the job of keeping fight-ers away from the Chinese border.27

The Rivet Top crews also worked to refinetheir internal crew coordination. Experienceshowed the best way to fuse tracking data withCOMINT was for the lead airborne linguist, theAirborne Mission Supervisor (AMS), to standbehind the lead of the C2 crew. The AMS wouldpoint to targets on the radar tracking scope andconvert data coming from his linguists over hisheadset to tactical information such as, “These aretwo MiG–21s out of Gia Lam and they are going toengage these F–4’s over here.”28

By the end of 1967 Rivet Top had racked up an

impressive score, passing twenty-five MiG threatwarnings to the strike force and providing rangeand bearing information on ninety-five separateMiG flights to the strike force and MiG CAP. 29

Leadership in all three fighter wings involved inRolling Thunder operations praised the Rivet TopMiG warnings, the 388th TFW Deputy Comman-der for Operations noted the Rivet Top system ofthreat warning relative to the position of the strik-ers as, “… a tremendous step forward in the MiGwarning system.”30 More importantly, Rivet Topassisted in eight MiG engagements resulting ineight confirmed and four probable kills, the major-ity being MiG-17s downed by 8th TFW F–4s.31 Inaddition, ten Fan Song radars were DF’d andpassed to C2 agencies as high threat areas andwere subsequently nominated as lucrative tar-gets.32

1968

Rivet Top continued to fly at a high operationstempo to support Rolling Thunder and DMZ strikeoperations. January 1968 found the VPAF in one ofits characteristic growth/renewal stages. New tac-tics started to appear, with experienced MiG–21Fishbed pilots being vectored into the general areaof a U.S. strike package and being allowed toengage as they saw fit. At times these single-shipformations would fly without their IFF on, lower-ing the probability of SIGINT forces to detect thembecause of reduced ground controller communica-tions and no active IFF squawk for the QRC–248to receive.

These aberrations aside, early victories for theMiG–21 force in January turned into losses inFebruary as the USAF continued MiG sweeps dur-ing the monsoon season. The northeast monsoonseason was an annual occurrence, the USAF usingthe time to concentrate on air-to-air operationswhile its predominantly clear-weather strike forcesat out the bad weather with a lighter tasking.33

Taking advantage of their growing experience inworking together, the Rivet Top crews aided theThailand-based F–4 community in three of the fiveconfirmed kills logged in February 1968.34 MiGkills aside, February was light in activity as theEC–121K crews only observed twenty-five MiGflights and passed two MiG threat warnings tostrike packages.35 The VPAF had scaled back itsflight activity for a couple months, preferring tonot engage USAF assets because targets in NorthVietnam were not at risk. The lack of MiG activitycaused the Rivet Top crews to concentrate more onDF’ing the SA–2s that started to move into south-ern North Vietnam.36 This activity increased thealready effective Wild Weasel force operating inthe SEAD role and also aided in threat reporting.

Coincident with the scale back in VPAF opera-tions was a change in the U.S. strategy on the war.Battered by Congress, the American public and prin-cipal advisors including Secretary of State DeanRusk, President Lyndon Johnson announced abombing halt over North Vietnam on March 31,


COLONELTHOMASMORRIS.BRIEFEDEACH OF THETHAILAND-BASEDFIGHTERWINGSABOUT THECAPABILITIESOF HIS AIR-CRAFT ANDREPEATEDTHE BRIEF-ING EVERYTHREEMONTHS

1968. Johnson, reaching out to offers of peace talksfrom Ho Chi Minh, directed all Air Force and Navystrike missions north of the 19th parallel to stopimmediately.37 Once the Paris Peace Talks started, itwas only a matter of time before this changed and onNovember 1st a bombing halt was ordered for all ofNorth Vietnam with operations over the communistairspace restricted to reconnaissance missions.38

The College Eye fleet entered 1968 flying twoorbits—the Bravo track over the Gulf of Tonkinand the Charlie track over Laos. Due to the bomb-ing restrictions in North Vietnam the CETF placedmore emphasis on support to Barrel Roll interdic-tion efforts over Laos. After March 31stDetachment 2 split the duties of flying the Bravotrack with CETF and the EC–121K started to flymissions over the Gulf of Tonkin on every otherday. In May an EC–121D fitted with the RivetGym COMINT package performed in-theaterflight tests, leading to deployment of the system inJune with six aircraft being modified by June 30,1968.39

Rivet Gym was a direct result of the success-ful Rivet Top experience of late 1967 and early1968. Seventh Air Force, enamored with the MiG-killing benefits of the EC–121K, conducted a studyon providing a Rivet Top-like capability to cover allstrike missions. A requirement calling for a mini-mum of seven new airframes was the recom-mended solution; time and money never beingeasy commodities in war-time, the USAF decidedthe best answer was to modify the eleven in-the-ater EC–121D aircraft with a stripped-down capa-bility.40 Air Defense Command, eager to recoverfrom the black-eye College Eye was acquiring asan ill-tempered traffic cop, quickly agreed.41 Soonplans were made to fit Rivet Gym, essentially thesame COMINT capability flown in the Rivet Topaircraft, to in-theater EC–121D aircraft.

The End

The end of Rolling Thunder did not mean thehalt of air operations over North Vietnam as recon-naissance missions were flown to monitor NorthVietnamese logistics activities and defensive capa-bilities. President Richard Nixon continued U.S.

bombing and interdiction efforts against NorthVietnamese forces in Laos and South Vietnam,even approving B–52 missions into Cambodia inan effort to decrease the flow of communist sup-plies. The stepped-up bombing efforts were in partto aid the withdrawal of U.S. forces; in June 1969President Nixon announced the first of many U.S.Army troop reductions in South Vietnam.42

USAF forces also started to draw down inSoutheast Asia in 1969, with Detachment 2 atthe front of the charge. On January 9, 1969 RivetTop Task Force closed up shop and sent itsEC–121K back to the US. The long serving 57-143184 was considered excess by Seventh AirForce after the CETF EC–121Ds were fully fittedwith the Rivet Gym modification.43 The EC–121Kwas already long overdue for return, its originalsix month deployment stretching to seventeenmonths.44

Thus, 57-143184 returned to the U.S. and, asthe final test reports were written, was flown backto Texas for “de-modification.” Stripped of thesecret black boxes that made her a lethal asset inSoutheast Asia, the once-proud lady was flown toDavis Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona andunceremoniously relegated to “the Boneyard” to besold for scrap—an unfitting end for such an accom-plished bird.

Ripples to Today

The Rivet Top Task Force’s seventeen monthsof action with a single aircraft account for a smallfraction of the total missions flown in the air warin Southeast Asia. Yet the sole EC–121K had a farreaching impact on the future conduct of air supe-riority operations. The Rivet Top crews aggres-sively worked to integrate their intelligence infor-mation real-time into actionable data, blazing apath soon followed by the RC–135M and subse-quent RC–135 variants.

Before the arrival of the Rivet Top Task Force,intelligence flowed through a convoluted pathenroute to the cockpit of friendly fighters, usuallyarriving too late to affect the outcome of engage-ments. Though the C–130B-II Queen Bee crewswere the first to relay signals intelligence informa-tion direct to the cockpit, the Rivet Top crews werethe first to work “blue force” integration. Throughthe technical integration of radar tracks withintelligence on board their EC–121K aircraft tothe doctrinal integration of intelligence with thewarfighter through “road show” briefings andtasking outside NSA channels, the Rivet Top TaskForce broke down doors and created a paradigmshift in aerial warfare.

The fusion of E–3 AWACS track data with all-source intelligence data that today’s generation ofaerial warriors takes for granted owes its originsto the innovative and hard charging men of theRivet Top Task Force. Intelligence was no longersomething to be analyzed post-mission—it hadbecome a powerful weapon for the fighter pilot touse in day-to-day air combat. ■


The EC–121K takes off fromGreenville, Texas runway.

THE FUSIONOF E–3AWACSTRACK DATAWITH ALL-SOURCEINTELLI-GENCEDATA...OWESITS ORIGINSTO RIVETTOP

1. Stanley Burkinshaw, History of the PacificSecurity Region, 1 July – 31 December 1967 (UnitedStates Air Force Security Service, 9 September 1968),p. 78, Air Intelligence Agency (AIA hereinafter)Historians Office, Lackland AFB, TX; classified docu-ment, portions declassified by National SecurityAgency, 14 March 2007. 2. E-mail correspondence, Archie DiFante, Archivist,Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA here-inafter), with author, 20 November 2006.3. Interview, Thomas Morris, Commander, Rivet TopTask Force, for Project CORONA HARVEST, 4 February1969, p. 2, Call # K239.0512-092, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB,Ala.4. Rene Francillon, “Lockheed Constellation MilitaryVariants,” Wings of Fame 20 (2000): p. 127. 5. Headquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toTactical Air Command, subject: “Proposal for anImproved Capability of Rivet Top (Airborne Commandand Control System),” 5 May 1969, p. 2, Call #K417.0732-6, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.6. Morris interview, pp. 4-5.7. Headquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toTactical Air Command, p. 2.8. Carl Reddel, Project CHECO Report: College Eye(Pacific Air Forces, 1 Nov 1968), p. 18, Call # 717.0413-44. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.9. James Pierson, History of the Pacific SecurityRegion, 1 January – 30 June 1967 (United States AirForce Security Service, 31 January 1968), p. 60, AIAHistorians Office, Lackland AFB, Tex: classified docu-ment, portions declassified by National Security Agency,14 March 2007.10. Robert Futrell, The United States Air Force inSoutheast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, (Washing-ton, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 228.11. Billy Thomas, Classified Unit History, 1 January1964 – 30 June 1964 (United States Air Force SecurityService, 20 August 1964), p. 7, AIA Historians Office,Lackland AFB, Tex.: classified document, portionsdeclassified by National Security Agency, 14 March 2007.Title “Classified Unit History” is not actual title but NSAdetermined actual unit designation is still classified. 12. James Pierson, History of the Pacific SecurityRegion, 1 July 1964 – 30 June 1965 (United States AirForce Security Service, 7 February 1966), pp. 31-32, AIAHistorians Office, Lackland AFB, Tex.: classified docu-ment, portions declassified by National Security Agency,14 March 2007. Title “Classified Unit History” is notactual title but NSA determined actual unit designationis still classified. 13. Ibid., p, 34.14. Billy Thomas, Classified Unit History, 1 July 1965 –31 December 1965 (United States Air Force SecurityService, 2 May 1966), 6, AIA Historians Office, LacklandAFB, Tex.: classified document, portions declassified byNational Security Agency, 14 March 2007. Title“Classified Unit History” is not actual title but NSAdetermined actual unit designation is still classified. 15. Pierson, History of the Pacific Security Region, 1July 1964 – 30 June 1965, p. 42. 16. James Pierson, History of the Pacific SecurityRegion, 1 July 1965 – 30 June 1966 (United States AirForce Security Service, 10 January 1967), pp. 77-78, AIAHistorians Office, Lackland AFB, Tex: classified docu-ment, portions declassified by National Security Agency,14 March 2007. 17. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letters

to Headquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 22August, 18 September and 2 October 1967 with the sub-ject of “Rivet Top Activities Report,” Call # K417.0732-4,AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.18. Morris interview, p. 3.19. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 2October 1967 with the subject of “Rivet Top ActivitiesReport for Period 16 Sep – 30 Sep 67,” Call # K417.0732-4, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.20. Morris interview, p. 4.21. Thomas Morris, Report of RIVET TOP SEAOperations (Department of the Air Force, Directorate ofOperations), 8 April 1970, p. 6, Call # K168.06-186,AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.22. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 3November 1967 with the subject of “Rivet Top ActivitiesReport for Period 1 – 31 Oct 67,” Call # K417.0732-4,AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.23. Interview, Norman Nielsen, F–4 pilot, 366th TFW,with author, 8 September 2004, Rosslyn, Virg.24. Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. AirForce and North Vietnam, 1966-1973 (Washington, D.C.:Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), p. 103.25. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 3November 1967.26. Morris interview, p. 13.27. Thompson, To Hanoi and Back, p. 99.28. Interview, Neal Cooper, Rivet Top Airborne MissionSupervisor, with author, 23 February 2006, Bolling AFB,D.C.; classified interview, portions declassified byNational Security Agency, 14 March 2007. 29. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 6January 1968 with the subject of “Rivet Top ActivitiesReport for Period 1-31 Dec 67,” Call # K417.0732-4,AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.30. Morris, Report of RIVET TOP SEA Operations, p. 5.31. Ibid., pp. 1-2.32. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 6January 1968.33. Earl Tilford, Setup—What the Air Force Did inVietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air UniversityPress, 1991), p. 166.34. Morris report, Report of RIVET TOP SEAOperations, p. 2.35. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 4March 1968 with the subject of “Rivet Top ActivitiesReport for Period 1-29 Feb 68,” Call # K417.0732-4,AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 36. Detachment 2, Tactical Air Warfare Center, letter toHeadquarters, Tactical Air Warfare Center, dated 8 April1968 with the subject of “Rivet Top Activities Report forPeriod 1-31 Mar 68,” Call # K417.0732-4, AFHRA,Maxwell AFB, AL.37. Thompson, To Hanoi and Back, pp. 136-140.38. Ibid., pp. 150-152.39. Reddel, Project CHECO Report: College Eye, pp. 24-27.40. Morris interview, pp. 8-10.41. Thompson, To Hanoi and Back, p. 100.42. Ibid., pp. 156-166.43. Morris Report of RIVET TOP SEA Operations, p. 1.44. Reddel, Project CHECO Report: College Eye, p. 35.


NOTES


A Visionary Ahead of His Time: How—Part I: The Air Corps Design Comp


Thomas Wildenberg

ward Hughes and the U.S. Air Forcepetition

H oward Hughes, was one of the greatest avia-tion personalities of the 20th Century. Hewas the only American to win the Harmon

Trophy twice as the world’s most outstanding avi-ator in an age when the public was captivated byairplanes and airmen. Hughes set a number of avi-ation records in planes that he built or modified,pioneered transcontinental air routes, was a majorforce behind one of the world’s great airlines, andestablished an aircraft manufacturing concernthat became one of the leading aerospace compa-nies in the 20th Century. Though he won manyawards and received numerous accolades from theaviation community, he is usually remembered asan eccentric, philandering billionaire who built theSpruce Goose.

In 2004, The Aviator, released by the MiramaxFilm Corporation, re-awakened the public’s inter-est in Howard Hughes. Some of the most spectac-ular scenes of this popular movie involved thecrash of the XF–11, an experimental photo-recon-naissance plane built for the United States ArmyAir Forces by Hughes Aircraft. Howard Hugheswas at the controls of the XF–11 on its maidenflight and was severely injured when it smashedinto a residential area in Beverly Hills, California,while Hughes was attempting to make an emer-gency landing on a nearby golf course.

While information on the development of theXF–11 and the events leading up the crash arereadily available, very little has appeared in printon Hughes earlier attempts to secure a productioncontract for a military version of the H–1 Racer orthe privately funded D–2, which served as the pro-totype for the notorious XF–11. Even less has beenwritten on how Hughes transformed HughesAircraft from an unsuccessful airframe manufac-turer to a leading supplier of radar, electronic fire-control systems, and air-to-air guided missiles.

As the title suggests Howard Hughes was avisionary ahead of his time. Although he was aself-taught engineer with little if any formal train-ing, Hughes embraced a broad range of cuttingedge technologies that he applied in his variousaviation projects. He was obsessed with streamlin-ing and the need to fly ever faster, was enamouredwith high altitude flight, and made use of the lat-est oxygen gear and meteorological expertise in histranscontinental record breaking flights. Hughesled the way in intercontinental air travel, pio-neered the use of composite materials for aircraftconstruction, built the first “wide body” transport,and always made use of the latest in radio tech-nology. In just twelve years — from 1935 to 1947—Howard Hughes built and flew the fastest land-plane in the world, set three transcontinentalspeed records, established a new record for

around-the-world flight, and built and flew thelargest airplane in the world. Along the wayHoward Hughes garnered enough accolades for alifetime including: two Harmon InternationalTrophies, a Collier Trophy, the Ghanute Award, aCongressional Medal, the keys to several cities,and a ticker-tape parade down New York’sBroadway.

But this story is about Hughes involvementwith the U. S. Air Force, a relationship thatspanned seventeen years. It began in 1935 whenhe submitted the design for the XP–2 pursuitplane and ended in 1953 when he gave all thepatents, trademarks, and goodwill of the HughesTool Company’s Aircraft Division, along with all ofthe stock of the newly established Hughes AircraftCompany to the Howard Hughes MedicalInstitute. In the interim Hughes Aircraft proposedfour different aircraft designs to the Air Force,obtained a contract to develop the Falcon air-to-airmissile, supplied the radar for the first all-weatherAir Force jet interceptors, and build the firsttotally integrated airborne fire control system.

The article that follows is divided into threeparts: Part 1, which appears in this issue of AirPower History, will discuss Hughes attempts toenter the military airframe business by enteringthe design competitions sponsored by the Army AirCorps in the 1930s. Part 2, which will appear in afuture issue, will discuss Hughes attempts to sellhigh performance military aircraft to the Army AirForces. A venture that culminated in the develop-ment of the XF–11, which some claim to be one ofthe most beautiful piston powered airplane everflown even though it was obsolete by the time itwas finally accepted by the Air Force in 1947. Part3, will discuss how Howard Hughes’s life-longinterest in radio electronics led to the establish-ment of the electronics laboratory that laid theground work for transforming Hughes Aircraftinto the Air Force’s premier supplier of radar,guided missiles and fire-control systems.

Part 1: The Air Corps Design Competitions

Howard Hughes involvement with the AirForce began in the spring of 1935 when he decidedto enter the design competition for an experimen-tal single-seat fighter. In January of that year, theMaterial Division of the Army Air Corps (prede-cessor to the U.S. Air Force), circulated proposalsinviting the aviation industry to submit designsfor one and two-place pursuit planes having an all-metal monocoque fuselage with cantilever mono-plane wings.1 The submittals were divided intotwo categories: a design competition to produce aconcept aircraft that would form the basis for a


Thomas Wildenberg is the co-author of Howard Hughes: An Airman, His Aircraft and His GreatFlights (Paladwr Press, 2006). He is a former Smithsonian Fellow having served successive termsas a Ramsey Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum in 1998 and 1999. Mr. Wildenberg isthe recipient of a number of awards recognizing his scholarship. These include the Surface NavyAssociation Literary Award, the Edward S. Miller History Award, and the John Laymen Award.

(Overleaf) Jackie Cockran'sNorthrop Gamma, takenjust before Howard Hughes"Lunch to Dinner" recordsetting flight betweenChicago and Los Angeleson 14 May 1936. (Photocourtesy of the Library ofCongress.)

VERY LITTLEHASAPPEARED INPRINT ONHUGHES’ATTEMPTSTO SECURE APRODUCTIONCONTRACTFOR A MILI-TARY VER-SION OF THEH–1 RACER

long term development project, and a productioncontract competition to provide a sample aircraftthat would become the prototype for the produc-tion of new Air Corps fighter. Entrants in thedesign competition did not have to build an air-craft. They only had to submit engineering dataand preliminary drawings based on a comprehen-sive set of the specifications established by theMaterial Division for each type. Bids for the designportion of the competition were to be opened onMay 6, 1935.

The design submitted by the Hughes teamwas a variation on the H–1 racer then under con-struction by another team of Hughes engineersworking out of a leased warehouse building acrossthe street from the Grand Central Airport inGlendale, California.2 The idea for the H–1 wasconceived while Hughes was attending the All-American Air Races in Miami, Florida, in midJanuary 1934. James R. Wedell, holder of theworld’s land plane speed record of 305 mph wasthere too. On January 12th, Wedell gave an exhi-bition flight in his record setting airplane, theWedell-Williams 44, that involved three circuits ofthe event’s 5-mile pylon racecourse.3 Hughes wasscheduled to fly the course himself in a few daysand it is inconceivable that he would not havewanted to be present for the exhibition. HowardHughes had an insatiable interest in the latestadvances in aviation and would not have passedup an opportunity to observe Wedell’s demonstra-tion flight and examine the Model 44 up close. Aswill shortly become evident, Hughes was notimpressed.

Two days after Wedell’s flying exhibition,Hughes flew his highly modified Boeing 100A inthe Sportsman Pilot Free-For-All race. Hugheswon handily, nearly lapping his nearest competitoraveraging 187.5 miles per hour over the 20-miletriangular course.4

Glenn Odekirk, Hughes’ mechanic, was onhand to congratulate him. It was the first aviationprize to be won by Hughes.

“Hell Glenn, there isn’t a decent plane in thelot,” Hughes was purported to have said after themeet.5

“Howard,” Odekirk responded, “you won’t besatisfied until you build your own plane ...”

In the months that followed, Hughes studiedthe technical data flowing out of the aviationindustry on proposed inventions and designs forincreased speed. As Paul Matt, the noted aviationhistorian explained in his classic article onHoward Hughes and his racer, these “were busymonths, with visits to Hartford to see what Pratt& Whitney had in the latest engines and a similarassessment at the Wright Aeronautical plant inPatterson, New Jersey.”6 While still in the East,Hughes sent a telegram to Dick Palmer inCalifornia asking the 30-year old engineer if hewas willing to take on the task of designing the“fastest plane in the world.”

Palmer, known for his advanced theories inaeronautical engineering, had further streamlinedHughes Boeing 100A after the Douglas AircraftCompany had finished modifying the plane toHughes’ specifications in 1931. Unhappy withDouglas’s work, Hughes had taken it to theLockheed Aircraft Company where Palmer wasassigned the task of “cleaning it up.” Palmer, whowas now working for the Aircraft DevelopmentCorporation, agreed to take on the project on apart-time basis working in the evenings and dur-ing weekends. As the project progressed and theamount of work increased, Palmer chose to leavethe Airplane Development Corporation in order todevote his full attention to the Hughes project.

In the early part of February, Palmer hired asmall team of airplane designers and engineers tobegin work on the wind tunnel models that hewould use to validate the design for Hughes’ Racer.Palmer had already discussed the choice of powerplants with Hughes. Both men had agreed to usethe new twin-row, 14-cylinder R-1535 Twin WaspJunior engine developed by Pratt & Whitney. Theengine, rated at 750-hp, had a relatively smallfrontal area that would significantly reduce theamount of drag produced by the engine.

In mid-April, Palmer and his six-man teamwere ready to begin testing the wind tunnel mod-els that now included two different set of wings,two aft fuselage sections and tail surfaces, four


Hughes H–1 Racer (shortwing version). Note theextreme similarity to theXP–2 shown on page 37.(Photo courtesy of theFlorida Air Museum.)

HUGHESINVOLVE-MENT WITHTHE AIRFORCEBEGAN INTHE SPRINGOF 1935WHEN HEDECIDED TOENTER THEDESIGN COM-PETITIONFOR ANEXPERIMEN-TAL SINGLE-SEATFIGHTER

mid-ship fuselage sections and five engine cowls.Palmer loaded the models in his old Ford anddrove over to his alma mater, the CaliforniaInstitute of Technology, for testing in the Insti-tute’s 10-foot wind tunnel. The tests, which beganon April 20, 1934, were conduced under the title ofPalmer Racing Plane, assigned to the HughesDevelopment Company of Glendale, California,and continued until July 31, 1934. The resultswere checked by Dr. Theodore Von Kármán, headof the Caltech Guggenheim’s Aeronautical Labo-ratory and one the leading aerodynamicists in theworld.7

By then Palmer’s design team had moved intoa warehouse building leased from aircraft dealerCharles Babb by the Hughes Aircraft Company.Hughes Aircraft had been formed in 1932 to pro-vide a convenient means of funding the expensesassociated with Hughes’ personal aircraft and hisinterest in flying.8 The company was a division ofHughes Tool Company, the cash cow that permit-ted Hughes to indulge in his various aviationendeavors and owned all of his aircraft. Hughesassigned Glenn Odekirk as shop superintendentand, in keeping with his well known penchant forsecrecy, had a temporary plywood wall constructedaround the work area and saw to it that an armedguard protected the building at night.9

The H–1 racer was still under constructionwhen the Material Division released its circularletter of January 15, 1935, announcing the pursuitplane design competition. Without notifying DickPalmer or his team, Hughes quietly gatheredanother small group of aviation experts to draw upa proposal for a military version of the H–1. By theend of April, Hughes’ second team had preparedthe preliminary drawings and a detailed set ofspecifications. It was similar to the H–1, except it

was of all metal construction and had a higheraspect ratio, longer span, elliptical shaped wing.10

The new design was designated the Hughes XP–2for experimental pursuit, model 2. It had provi-sions for two machine guns in each of the wing fil-lets, which were larger than those on the H–1, andconformed to the military equipment require-ments listed in Army Specification No. X–603(Table I).11

When the bids were opened on May 16, 1934,the Hughes proposal (submitted under the HughesTool Company name) was one of sixteen designsoffered to the Material Division by various firms.During the next five months several evaluatingboards were convened at Wright Field to assessthe merits of each design. The outcome remainedin doubt until October 1, 1935, when the Wedell-Williams company was declared the winner of thedesign competition and awarded a study contractfor a 4,350 pound fighter powered by a Pratt &Whitney R-1535 engine capable of 286 mph at10,000 ft.12

The design submitted by the Wedell-WilliamsAir Service Corporation was based on the Model45 racer, which had been enthusiastically endorsedby Capt. Claire L. Chennault, then an instructor atthe Air Corps Tactical School. Chennault inspectedthe new plane in February. He was impressed by“its extraordinary speed” and by the fact that itappeared to be readily adaptable as an intercep-tor.13 No details of the Wedell-Williams designhave survived and no records of the evaluationsconducted by the Material Division been found,making it impossible to determine why the Wedell-Williams design—with a minimum speed contractrequirement of 286 mph—was selected over theXP–2.

In all likelihood, the Material Division feltthat the Wedell-Williams company was a morequalified airframe manufacturer. It had alreadybuilt several successful racers and had beenexchanging technical data with the engineers atWright Field, whereas the Hughes Tool Company(at the time the evaluation was conducted) hadnever constructed a single airplane. In short, theAir Corps’ engineers may have concluded that theWedell-Williams design was more attainable. Iro-nically, the XP–34 never came to fruition, whereasthe H–1, upon which the XP–2 was based, set newspeed records under Hughes airmanship.14

While the Material Division was decidingagainst the XP–2, Hughes’ team of engineers wassecretly putting the finishing touches on the H–1racer. On Friday, September the thirteenth—Hughes wasn’t superstitious—Hughes piloted theH–1 to a new landplane speed record of 352 milesper hour. He made seven passes through the tim-ing gates of the three-kilometer timing course thathad been set up alongside the Eddie Martin FlyingField near Santa Ana, California, before his enginecut out for lack of gas. Hughes make a wheels up,dead stick landing in a nearby beet field that theofficial observers deemed sufficiently controlled forthe record to stand.


Table ISPECIFICATIONS X603

Desired Minimum(1) High speed at 10,000 feet

(Design useful load) m.p.h. 325 260(2) Operating speed, at 10,000 ft, m.p.h. 285 225(3) Endurance at operating speed at

10,000 ft (with design useful loadand 1/3 of the full load required forthe specified endurance,as an overload 3 hours 3 hours

(4) Take off characteristics to clear a 50 ftobstacle with design useful load within, feet 500 1500

(5) Service ceiling (design useful load) feet 30,000 25,000(6) Time to climb 10,000 ft

(with design useful load) 3 min. 5 min.(7) Stalling speed Time to climb 10,000 ft 60 65(8) Path angle 10° 10°(9) Rate of climb (sea level) 2200 2200

Source: “Detailed Specification for Model XP-2 Airplane TypeSingle-Engine, Single Place Pursuit,” p. 21A.

HUGHESAIRCRAFTHAD BEENFORMED IN1932 TO PRO-VIDE A CON-VENIENTMEANS OFFUNDING THEEXPENSESASSOCIATEDWITHHOWARD’SPERSONALAIRCRAFTAND HISINTEREST INFLYING

The similarity between the XP–2 and the H–1has never been fully understood, nor the reasonswhy the Army rejected the Hughes’ design. Somewriters have suggested that the H–1, like otherracers of the era, where not designed for the highstress maneuvers required of Army fighters and“couldn’t carry the weight of a combat type.”15 Butthe H–1 was “stressed for pursuit work,” and wasreported to be able to take 9 Gs in a dive.16 It istrue that R-1535 Twin Wasp Junior had been spe-cially tuned to burn 100 octane gasoline boostingthe engine’s horsepower to between 900-1,000horsepower, but engine technology was advancingrapidly and there is no reason why a military ver-sion of the H–1 built to the XP–2 design could nothave been powered by the same R-1830 that wassubsequently selected for the XP–34.17

One can only speculate as to the possible out-come had Hughes been selected in the design com-petition and then given the go ahead to develop amilitary version of the H–1 using the more power-ful R-1830 engine. The design would have been fin-ished well before the end of fiscal year 1936, givingthe Material Division sufficient time to awardHughes a construction contract for an experimen-tal model (XP) or service test model (YP) based onthe XP–2 design. Had this aircraft proved success-ful, which is highly likely given quality of Hughesdesign team and the proven performance of theH–1, the Air Corps would have had its first 300mph fighter a year earlier (Table II).

Having accomplished his goal of building thefastest airplane in the world, Hughes now set outto break Roscoe Turner’s transcontinental speedrecord using a redesigned version of the H-1 mod-ified with larger wings and a greater fuel capac-ity.18 It would take several months, however, beforethe H–1 could be fitted out with the new wing. Inthe interim Hughes decided to attempt the recordusing Jackie Cochran’s Northrop Gamma, leasedat a price that Cochran could not to refuse.

The Gamma was taken over by Hughes inNovember and trundled into the “secret” hangarthat housed the H–1. There, Palmer’s crew went towork installing new gas tanks and a new 850-hpWright R-1820-G5 Cyclone engine with a three-bladed constant speed propeller. The R-1820-G5engine, which had a special high altitude super-charger under development for the Army, had notbeen released to the public and Hughes had to getspecial permission to use it.19

Hughes began the record-breaking transconti-nental flight at 12:15 p.m. on January 13, 1936,when he took off from Burbank airport. Nine hoursand 15 minutes later, he landed the Gamma atNewark Airport breaking Roscoe Tanner’s trans-continental mark by 47 minutes. When inter-viewed by the press, Hughes, who was very modestabout his flying achievements, refused to talkabout himself referring only to the equipment heused and the results obtained.

He continuously gave credit to the United StatesArmy Air Corps for permitting him to use the 1,000hp Wright Cyclone engine, which was then on therestricted list, and insisted that the credit for thesuccessful flight was due to his chief engineer,Richard Palmer, his factory superintendent, G. E.Odekirk, his meteorologist, W. C. Rockefeller, andhis other employees.20

Hughes sought the Air Corps’ help again inJuly when Albert Lodwick, Hughes’ flight man-ager, requested the services of Lt. Thomas Thurlowto serve as the navigator on a flight that Hughesplanned to make from Shanghai to New York inthe DC–1 that he had recently purchased fromTranscontinental and Western Air.21 Thurlow, anexpert in celestial navigation had just reported toWright Field for assignment to the Instrumentand Navigation Unit and could not be spared.22

On August 9 Hughes sent a wire to Brig. Gen.Austin W. Robbins, chief of the Material Divisionasking permission to land the next day at WrightField so that he could stop and see him.23 Hugheslanded the DC–1, dubbed the “flying laboratory,” atWright Field at 5:44 p.m. on August 10 accompa-nied by a five man team that included HarryConner, navigator: Richard Stoddard, radio opera-tor: Harry Lund, flight engineer: W. C. Rockefeller,meteorologist: Al Lodwick, flight manager.24

Hughes meet with General Robbins the next dayto talk about the equipment that Hughes wantedfor the long distance flight.25 We don’t know thedetails of their discussions, but it seems likely that


Table IIHughes Tool Co. Ltd.

Model XP–2

PERFORMANCE

Full speed at 10,000 feet 347 mphStalling speed at sea level 70 mphClimb in 10 minutes from sea level 22,000 ft.Service ceiling 31,000 ft.Endurance at full speed 1.61 hrs.Endurance at (economical) cruising speed 2.57 hrsRange at full speed 560 milesRange at economical cruising speed 1,553 milesHigh speed at 10,000 ft. 347 mphEndurance at operating speed at 10,000 ft.with design useful load and 1/3 of the fullload required for the specified endurance, as an overload, in hours Max. Min.

5.67 2.57Take off characteristics to clearand land over a 50 ft. obstacle withdesign useful load within 541 ft. (no wind)Service ceiling (design useful load) 31, 700 ft.Time to climb to 10,000 ft. 4 min.Stalling speed 70.5 mphPath angle 17 degreesRate of climb at sea level 2500 ft. per minute.

Source: “Detailed Specification for Model XP-2 Airplane TypeSingle-Engine, Single Place Pursuit,” p. 21.

ONE CANONLY SPECU-LATE AS TOTHE POSSIBLEOUTCOMEHAD HUGHESBEENSELECTED INTHE DESIGNCOMPETITION

Hughes requested Thurlow’s assistance along withthe use of the latest radio and navigation aidsbeing developed by the Air Corps. The flight fromShanghai never took place, but Thurlow, with theAir Corps’ permission, was part of the crew thatparticipated in Hughes’ record-breaking around-the-world flight of 1938. Hughes must have hadvery good relations with the folks at Wright Field,because they let him take along the FairchildMaxon Line of Position Computer; the first timethis confidential device had been permitted forcivilian use.26

The August meeting with General Robbins issignificant because it illustrates the close relation-ships that existed between Army aviators andtheir civilian brethren. There were relatively fewpeople in aviation at this time and “direct commu-nications and mutual trust were normal andinstinctive.” 27 As Brig. Gen. Benjamin S. Kelseypointed out in his book The Dragon s Teeth, patrio-tism and integrity were the guiding principlesbehind the cooperation between the military andthe civilian sectors.28

Although Hughes was busy preparing for bothanother transcontinental record and a futureflight of long duration, he had not given up on get-ting the Army to accept a militarized version of theH–1. He justly claimed that it was the most aero-dynamically efficient airplane ever built. “It hasthe lowest ‘drag’ any ship in the air,” he explained

to the press, adding that they were makingchanges to the H–1 that would make it more suit-able for military use.29

Hughes had not given up on the aircraft busi-ness. He had assigned the task of managingHughes Aircraft to J. B. Alexander. Alexander hadgiven Hughes some of his first flight lessons beforemanaging the air force that Hughes assembled tomake Hells Angels. At the end of March 1936,Alexander wrote to Wright Field requesting“recent design studies of pursuit types … in con-nection with investigations which we are making,particularly any multi-engined studies that mightbe available.”30 Lt. Col. Oliver P. Echols, chief of theEngineering Section responded on April 22, 1936,forwarding Alexander a series of Army designstudies “selected because they indicate the trendin present day thought.”31

Within a month, Hughes’ team of engineerscame up with the design for a two-engine pursuitthat was good enough to be of interest to the Army.On May 26, Alexander went to Wright Field tobrief Maj. J. G. Taylor on the Hughes AircraftCompany’s proposal to build a twin-engine pursuitplane. Hughes Aircraft, Alexander stated, wasready to proceed with the final wind tunnel modeltesting and to undertake construction of a devel-opment prototype if the Army would give the goahead.32

Major Taylor believed the design was goodenough to warrant a development contract. “Itwould be to the advantage of the Government toenter into a limited competition development withthis Company and one other,” he wrote in a mem-orandum addressed to Echols.33 Taylor felt that itwas a waste of time and money for the Air Corps toissue a circular design proposal as planned. Designcompetitions in the past had “amounted toabsolutely nothing,” and would only result in the“Hughes’s design …being thrown into competitionwith many sketchy designs with unwarranted per-formance claims.”34

Unfortunately for Hughes, the Air Corps hadno money. In a long distance telephone call madeon July 31, 1936, General Robbins informedAlexander that the President had impounded$250,000 of the Air Corps’ development program.It was unlikely, he informed Alexander, that theAir Corps would be able to act on any developmentproposal until 1938 [fiscal year of].35

If Hughes Aircraft wanted to produce a twin-engine pursuit for the Air Corps it would have towait for the next year’s design competition. In theinterim the engineering staff continued to work onthe design the Air Corps was now calling an “inter-ceptor” airplane. The initial design developed byHughes Aircraft incorporated two Curtiss V-1570inline engines rated at 700 hp each.36 It had anestimated top speed of 375 mph at 20,000 feet (310mph at sea level) and would climb to 20,000 feet in5 minutes. Although the design team had made“several reductions in the performance estimatesbased upon conferences with the MaterialDivision,” the Air Corps believed that the theoreti-


Lt. Thomas L. Thurlow.(Photo courtesy of theLodwick Collection,Lakeland Public Library.)

HUGHES HADNOT GIVENUP ON GET-TING THEARMY TOACCEPT AMILITARIZEDVERSION OFTHE H–1

cal gross weight calculated by the Hughes engi-neers was over optimistic and that more reduc-tions were necessary.37

Before these changes could be submitted forcomment however, the engineers at Hughes beganto make the changes that would be necessary forthe new 1000-hp Allison V-1710 inline engine thatthe Material Division had decided to include in thecircular proposal that they were planning to issuein January 1937. Lockheed and Vultee were devel-oping their own proposals around this engine andhad also submitted their designs to Wright Fieldfor comment. Although the Lockheed Aircraftdesign, which was based on their Model 12 air-plane, required “considerable modification indetails to conform to Air Corps standards,” it, likethe designs from Hughes and Vultee were consid-ered feasible and had performance characteristicsthat fell within the bracket considered satisfactory.

In January 1937, the Material Division issuedCircular Proposal X-608 for a high-altitude inter-ceptor, capable of 360 miles per hour at an altitudeof 20,000 feet that could to 20,000 ft. in 6 minutes.The Allison V-1710, an inline liquid cooled V- 12engine, equipped with the new General Electricturbocharger for high altitude performance, wasspecified along with a tricycle undercarriage, largeinternal fuel capacity and a very heavy armamentthat included a 37 mm cannon and four 50-cal.machine guns.

After the bids were received, it became clearthat the most promising design was that submit-ted by Lockheed Aircraft, with Hughes coming in aclose second. Primary source records documentinghow the evaluation was conducted have neverbeen located, but other sources show that theTechnical Subcommittee of the Board evaluating

the twin-engine fighter interceptor design compe-tition awarded the Lockheed Aircraft design a fig-ure of merit of 65 percent, while the Hughes designreceived only 47.3 percent. The difference wasattributed to “ the greater high speed and shortertime of climb, which could be expected from theLockheed design.”38 Lockheed Aircraft had wonthe competition and with it a contract to build oneprototype (later designated as the XP–38).

In later years he would accuse Lockheed ofstealing his design, but there is no evidence forthis.39 Even his design team felt that theLockheed design was far superior.40 After losingthe interceptor design competition Hughesbecame obsessed with the idea of designing anairplane that “would be so sensational in its per-formance that the Army would have to accept it,”but for the time being he was too busy pursuingother projects.41

That summer, Hughes quietly applied to theBureau of Air Commerce in Washington, D.C. forpermission to circumnavigate the globe. Not con-vinced that there was any scientific merit in sucha flight, the Bureau turned him down.Characteristically, Hughes was not easily dis-suaded, and with the help of Al Lodwick, continuedto pester the Bureau for the needed approvals.42

While he was waiting, Hughes continued to pre-pare his Sikorsky S–43 for the world flight that heplanned to make at the end of May 1938. Alwayscurrent on the latest aircraft developments,Hughes became interested in a new transport air-plane, the Model 14 Super Electra that had justbeen introduced by Lockheed Aircraft. He hadHughes Aircraft order one of the planes onNovember 3, 1937.43 Hughes took delivery of theplane on April 2, 1938.


Balance Diagram takenfrom Model XP–2 specifica-tions. (Photo courtesy ofthe Florida Air Museum.)

UNFORTU-NATELY FORHUGHES, THEAIR CORPSHAD NOMONEY

AFTER THEBIDS WERERECEIVED, ITBECAMECLEAR THATTHE MOSTPROMISINGDESIGN WASTHAT SUB-MITTED BYLOCKHEED

Note on Sources: Much of the information in publishedsources on Howard Hughes is contradictory, misleading,incorrectly dated, or taken out of context. I have tried touse primary source material whenever possible. Thereare many gaps in the official record however, and muchof the most interesting and informative material onHoward Hughes’ aviation career is anecdotal. I haveselectively included such information only when it is inagreement with the historical record and Hughes per-sona.

1. Irving B. Holley Jr., Buying Aircraft: MaterialProcurement for the Army Air Forces (Washington, D.C.:

Department of the Army, 1964), p. 139; Ray Wagner,American Combat Planes of the 20th Century (Reno,Nevada: Jack Bacon & Co., 2004), pp. 274-75. In 1941 theU. S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) became the U. S. ArmyAir Forces, which in turn became the U. S. Air Force in1947.2. Paul R. Matt, “Howard Hughes and the HughesRacer,” Historical Aviation Album, Vol. XVI, (Temple City,California: Historical Aviation Album, 1980), pp. 9-10.3. Reginald M. Cleveland, “Plane Hits Ground,” TheNew York Times, December 13, 1934.[6th Annual All-Ame-rican Air Races File, National Air and Space Archives,Washington, D.C.]


Preparations for the world flight shifted to theLockheed after the Bureau of Air Commercedeclined to approve the Sikorsky for safety rea-sons.44 With the scheduled time of the flight fastapproaching, Hughes began to devote a great dealof time to the project. He usually arrived aroundnoon, spent the entire afternoon working on theairplane, and continued long into the night, takingcare of the many details that were associated withthe forthcoming flight.45

The details of Howard Hughes’ record settinground-the-world flight would fill many pages (seeHoward Hughes: An Airman, His Aircraft, and HisGreat Flights by Thomas Wildenberg and R. E. G.Davies) and are beyond the scope of this article. Itsuffices to say that the flight, which took placebetween July 10-14, 1938, generated worldwideattention and acclaim for Hughes and his four-man crew that included Lt. Thomas L. Thurlow,co-navigator.

Thurlow, a recognized authority on aerial nav-igation, was a 33-year old Army flyer on leavefrom the Material Division at Wright Field wherehe was in charge of the Instrument andNavigation Unit.46 A graduate of the Air CorpsTechnical School at Chanute Field, Illinois, he hadtaught navigation at Rockwell Field, California,

and was the inventor of a number of navigationaids including a periscope drift indicator.

The Fairchild-Maxson Line of Position Com-puter used during the flight was developed andmanufactured for the Army Air Corps by theFairchild Aerial Camera Corporation and wasused to simplify the calculations needed “for thereduction of celestial observations.”47 Thurlowdescribed its use in a two page article thatappeared in the Air Corps News Letter publishedon November 1, 1938.

As a result of the flight, Howard Hughes andthe members of his crew were honored recipientsof Collier Trophy for 1938. The highly prestigiousaward was bestowed for having made the mostsignificant achievement in the advancement ofaviation in that year. The citation accompanyingthe award stated that:

Their around-the-world flight involved notableadvances in aerial navigation, communicationand engineering; demonstrated the value of orga-nization; and planning in long range aircraft oper-ation and a world wide demonstration of the supe-riority of American aviation products and tech-niques.48

Although Howard Hughes had won world-wide acclaim as an aviator who had made notablecontributions to aeronautical progress, HughesAircraft had yet to produce a commercially viableaircraft design. Howard Hughes was still search-ing for the proper mix of technology and marketreadiness needed for economic success.

As Charles Barton noted in Howard Hughesand His Flying Boat, “aviation success was an eco-nomic matter; an aircraft had to be marketable,which meant that it had to be useful to a signifi-cant number of aircraft buyers.”49 By 1939 it wasapparent that such success in the near futurewould depend almost exclusively on building air-craft useful in war.

Still riled by the Army’s selection of theLockheed twin-engined interceptor, Hughes“decided to build from the ground up with my ownmoney an entirely new airplane, which would beso sensational in its performance that the Armywould have to accept it.” This was to be the D–2. ■

NOTES

Howard Hughes leaningagainst the H–1 racer hav-ing just made an emer-gency wheels up landing atthe conclusion of hisrecord setting speed flightof 13 September 1936.(Photo courtesy of theFlorida Air Museum.)

HUGHESAIRCRAFTHAD YET TOPRODUCE ACOMMER-CIALLYVIABLE AIRCRAFTDESIGN

4. Charles Barton, Howard Hughes and His FlyingBoat (Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.: Tab Aero, 1982), p. 34.5. Matt, “Howard Hughes and the Hughes Racer,” p. 9.6. Ibid.7. Telegram from Howard Hughes to Dr. Theodore VonKarman, dated September 18, 1935, thanking VonKarman for his cooperation and the wind tunnel predic-tions that agreed with the speed attained by the H1, VonKarman Papers, Institute Archives, California Instituteof Technology; Charles Hoppe, “Breaking the Record,”Aero & Airways, November, 1935, P.30-31 (copy inHoward Hughes File, American Institute of AeronauticsCollection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).8. Peter Mitcel, “Hughes Aircraft and Electronics,” Anexhibition from UNLV Special Collections, UNLV Libra-ries, Las Vegas, Nevada, http://www.library.unlv.edu/hughes/pages/aircraft.html.9. No outsiders were allowed in the hangar, neitherwas nay information given out. Hughes was extremelysecurity-minded since Clarence Reed, an engineeremployed by Hughes Tool Company, had walked out oneday with some company blueprints and set up a rivaldrill bit manufacturing company (See Barton, Note 12,page 252).10. Matt, “Howard Hughes and the Hughes Racer,” p. 10.11. “Detailed Specification for Model XP–2 AirplaneType Single-Engine, Single Place Pursuit,” dated April28, 1935, Hughes Collection, Florida Air Museum (here-after XP–2 specification).12. Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes (New York:Hanover House, 1960), p. 275; Birch Matthews, Racewith the Wind: How Air Racing Advanced Aviation(Oscela, Wis.: MBI Publishing, 2001), p. 105. The allegedvisit by J. B. Alexander to Wright Field in August 1935has numerous errors and is unlikely to have occurred asdescribed. Instead, its likely that those relating theevent, as described in Matt’s article, had in mind thevisit made the following year. There is no evidence thatthe so-called misunderstanding caused a rift betweenHoward Hughes and Lt. Col. Oliver P. Echols, then chiefof the Engineering Section at Wright Field. On the con-trary, the evidence suggests that Howard had very goodrelations with Echols, otherwise he would not have got-ten the Army’s cooperation in his future flights, norwould Echols have later recommended the procurementof the D–2 (see Echols to Arnold memo of May 27, 1942in official project history).13. Claire L. Chennault to Chief of the Air Corps,February 14, 1934, Wedell-Williams Folder, RD-3284,U.S. Army Air Forces Research and Development Files,National Archives, College Park, Md. (hereafter SaraClarke Collection).14. Jimmy Wedell was a seat-of-the-pants designer,engineer and builder who had long term financial back-ing from Louisiana millionaire Harry Williams. Jimmy,his brother Walter and Harry Williams were all killed inairplane crashes before the XP–34 design could bebrought to fruition.15. Ray Wagner, American Combat Planes of the 20thCentury, (Reno, Nevada: Jack Bacon & Co., 2004), p. 275.16. Hoppe, “Breaking the Record,” p. 31.17. After awarding the contract to the Wedell Williamscompany, the Army realized that the performance of theWedell plane would be inferior to either the SeverskySev–1 or the Curtiss Model 75 that had been submittedin the production competition. This led to a negotiatedcontract calling for the use of the 850-hp Pratt &Whitney Twin Wasp R-1830 twin-row radial engine anda speed of 308 mph. The death of Harry Williams, thesole survivor of the Wedell-Williams team, on May 19,1936, forestalled further work on the XP–34 and thecompany was unable to complete the contract.18. According to The New York Times article “WorldSpeed Mark Set by Coast Flier,” of September 14, 1935.

19. The New York Times, January 15, 1936; New YorkAmerican, January 15, 1936.20. U. S. Air Services, April 1937, p. 26.21. Al Lodwick to Brigadier General A. W. Robins,telegram dated July 7, RD-3277, Sara Clarke Collection.22. Transcript of long distance call to Washington datedJuly 8, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3277, SaraClarke Collection; “Hughes’ Flight Navigators andNavigation Procedure,” Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 63.23. Howard Hughes to General A. W. Robbins, telegramdated August 9, Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3277, SaraClarke Collection.24. “Hughes Lands in Ohio Non-Stop From Coast,” TheNew York Times, August 11, 1936.25. Flight Tribune, August 11, 1932.26. “Hughes’ Flight Navigators and Navigation Proce-dure,” Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 63; “Hughes TestedArmy Robot Navigator; First Use of Device on a CivilianPlane,” Army Times, July 15, 1938.27. Benjamin S. Kelsey, The Dragon s Teeth (Washing-ton, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1982), p. 94.28. Ibid., p. 107.29. The New York Times, April 26, 1936.30. J.B. Alexander, Manager, Hughes Aircraft Company,to Wright Field, March 31, 1936, Hughes Aircraft Folder,RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.31. Oliver P. Echols to J. B. Alexander, April 12, 1936,Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.32. J. G. Taylor to O. P. Echols, Conference on Two-Engined Pursuit Airplane Design, May 27, 1936, HughesAircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.33. Ibid.34. Ibid.35. Transcript of long distance telephone call betweenGeneral Robbins and Mr. Alexander, July 31, 1936,Hughes Aircraft Folder, RD-3406, Sara Clark Collection.36. A. W. Robins to Chief of the Air Corps, Two-EngineInterceptor Designs, November 11, 1936, Twin EngineInterceptor Folder, RD-3305, Sara Clark Collection.37. Ibid.38. Barton, Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat, p. 49.39. In the four-month period between the Alexander’stelephone conversation with General Robbins and thecircular proposal, Hughes was forced to lay off some ofhis engineers who then went to work for Lockheed. In1947 while testifying before Congress, Hughes insinu-ated that Lockheed had gotten the idea for two-enginefight from his former employers.40. Untitled manuscript, Project III Binder [hereafterD2 Project Book], no page numbers, Howard HughesCollection, Florida Air Museum, Lakeland, Florida41. U.S. Congress. Senate. Special Committee to Inves-tigate the National Defense Program Hearings. 80thCongress, 1st Session, Part 40: Aircraft Contracts(Hughes Aircraft Co. and Kaiser-Hughes Corp.), p. 24370.42. Donald L. Bartlett and James B. Steele, Empire: TheLife, Legend, and Madness of Howard Hughes (W.W.Norton, 1979), p. 89.43. Robert E. Gross, President to Hughes AircraftCompany, confirmation letter signed by Noah Dietrict,November 3, 1937, Hughes Collection, Florida AirMuseum.44. Bartlette and Steele, Empire, p. 90.45. “Round-the-World Flight,” p.3, Project II Notebook,Howard Hughes Collection, Florida Air Museum,Lakeland, Florida.46. “Hughes’ Flight Navigators and NavigationProcedure,” Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 63.47. “Hughes Tested Army Robot Navigator; First Use ofDevice on a Civilian Plane,” Army Times, July 15, 1938,p.2; John D. Peace, Jr., “The Fairchild-Maxon Line ofPosition Computer,” Aero Digest, August 1938, p. 67.48. New York Times, November 17, 1939.49. Barton, Howard Hughes and His Flying Boat, p. 45.



The U.S. Air Force Respons


Daniel L. Haulman

se to Hurricane Katrina

M edia images of destitute flood victims inNew Orleans in the wake of HurricaneKatrina generated the impression of an

unresponsive federal government. Critics under-standably took aim at the mayor, the Louisianagovernor, the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency, and the President. Some also criticized theDepartment of Defense as if it had failed to furnishthe quick and massive humanitarian relief whichthe American people had come to expect after anatural disaster. Some suspected that Pentagonresources were stretched thin for an adequateresponse because of ongoing combat operations inIraq and Afghanistan on the other side of theworld. This paper will explore the validity of thatimpression by focusing on the response of the U.S.Air Force, as part of the larger Department ofDefense, to the crisis posed by Hurricane Katrina.1

The Air Force was involved even before thestorm hit. During late August 2005, the HurricaneHunters of the 53d Weather ReconnaissanceSquadron (403d Wing) in their WC–130 airplanestracked and measured Katrina’s intensity andlocation as it crossed the tip of Florida and grewinto a category 5 monster in the Gulf of Mexico.Between August 23 and 29, squadron aircrewsflew more than 109 hours tracking the storm. AsKatrina approached the central Gulf coast, thesquadron dispersed its aircraft, which were sta-tioned at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, tobases beyond the projected storm path.2

Early on Monday morning August 29,Hurricane Katrina hit southeast Louisiana withwinds up to 140 miles per hour. After making land-fall near Buras, it followed a northward track tothe Louisiana-Mississippi border. East of there,the counterclockwise winds pushed a 28-foot stormsurge from the Gulf of Mexico northward into thetowns of coastal Mississippi and southwesternAlabama. A combination of wind, rain, and stormsurge destroyed countless buildings, leaving ascoured landscape, but the floodwaters therereceded almost as rapidly as they had come. Westof the storm center, the winds blew from north tosouth, pushing a swollen Lake Pontchartrain intothe canals of New Orleans. Failures of floodwallsalong those canals and overtopping of levees in theeast left 80 percent of the city flooded for weeks. Ofsome 485,000 residents, approximately 100,000who had not evacuated awaited rescue as theystruggled to survive without adequate food, water,shelter, plumbing, electricity, and communications.All the parishes east and south of New Orleanswere also flooded. Hurricane Katrina eventually

caused 1,304 deaths and some $50 billion indestruction and damage.3

President George W. Bush waited for Loui-siana governor Kathleen Blanco’s request for fed-eral assistance before committing the defenseforces already prepared. That request was delayed,in part because initial news reports prematurelydeclared that New Orleans had “dodged the bullet”and escaped another big hurricane. The brokenlevees and resultant flooding did not becomeapparent until after the storm had passed. OnAugust 31, Governor Blanco asked for federalintervention. That same day, the President cutshort his Texas vacation and returned toWashington. Aboard Air Force One, the Presidentflew low over the coastal disaster area so that hecould see the destruction for himself.4

Once the governors of the affected statesrequested federal assistance, the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA), tappedthe Department of Defense for military assistance.The same day, the U.S. Northern Command set upJoint Task Force Katrina under Lt. Gen. Russell L.Honore, the commander of the First U.S. Army, atCamp Shelby, Mississippi. Maj. Gen. M. ScottMayes, commander of the First Air Force, servedas the task force’s joint forces air component com-mander (JFACC). General Mayes established the1st Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force-Katrinaat Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. The task forceset up various air expeditionary groups for a mas-sive disaster relief operation. For example, the97th Air Expeditionary Group was activated atKeesler. By September 7, the Air Force, Air ForceReserve, and the Air National Guard had deployedsome 8,000 personnel for the emergency.5

USAF helicopters took part early in the disas-ter relief effort. Their role was most important inthe New Orleans area, where only helicopterswere allowed to fly below 20,000 feet. Late onAugust 30, the Air Force Reserve Command’s 920th

Rescue Wing from Patrick AFB, Florida flew largeHH–60 Pave Hawk helicopters to Jackson,Mississippi in order to deliver FEMA damageassessment teams to the disaster zone. On August31, they and other HH–60s from wing’s 943dRescue Group from Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona,began flying search and rescue missions. HC–130tankers, staging at Patrick AFB, Florida, refueledthe helicopters.6

At the same time, other HH–60s and HC–130sfrom the Air Force Special Operations Command’s347th Rescue Wing from Moody AFB, Georgia and563d Rescue Group from Davis-Monthan AFB,


Dr. Daniel L. Haulman is a historian at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, at Maxwell AFB,Alabama, where he has worked since 1982. He earned his Ph.D. in history from Auburn Universityin 1983 after earning previous degrees from the University of Southwestern Louisiana and theUniversity of New Orleans. In the course of his degree work, he taught high school history for fiveyears. Since 1982, Dr. Haulman has taught several history courses as an adjunct professor atHuntingdon College, Auburn University in Montgomery, and Faulkner University. He is the authorof two books, four Air Force pamphlets, has published many historical articles and has presentedpapers at more than a dozen historical conferences.

A U.S. Air Force ReserveC–130 Hercules from the910th Airlift Wing atYoungstown Air ReserveStation, Ohio, spraysDibrom, a pesticideapproved by the U.S.Environmental ProtectionAgency, over the city Sept.13, 2005.

THE 1STAEROSPACEEXPEDI-TIONARYTASK FORCE-KATRINA...SET UP VARIOUS AIREXPEDI-TIONARYGROUPS FORA MASSIVEDISASTERRELIEFOPERATION

Arizona, performed similar search and rescue mis-sions in the disaster area. The Pavehawk heli-copters flew their missions from Jackson,Mississippi, refueled by HC–130s. MH–53 heli-copters refueled by MC–130 tankers from the 16thSpecial Operations Wing, home based at HurlburtField in Florida, also took part in the search andrescue operations in the disaster zone. Like the AirForce Reserve helicopter assets, they served underthe 347th Expeditionary Rescue Group under TaskForce Katrina. The Air National Guard’s 106thRescue Wing also took part in the helicoptersearch and rescue operations.7

Air Force Space Command deployed eightUH–1 helicopters, two each from Minot AFB,North Dakota; F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming;Malmstrom AFB, Montana; and Vandenberg AFB,California, for Hurricane Katrina search and res-cue missions. Smaller than the MH–53s or theHH–60s, the UH–1s were in some ways more ver-satile. They came from the Air Force SpaceCommand’s 37th, 40th, 54th, and 76th HelicopterFlights. From Columbus AFB, Mississippi, theycarried food, water, medicine, and other supplies tohurricane victims along the Mississippi GulfCoast. The UH–1s served in the 620th AirExpeditionary Squadron of the 347th

Expeditionary Rescue Group. Two other UH–1stook part in relief efforts, one from the Air ForceMateriel Command and one from Air Force SpecialOperations Command.8

Between August 31 and September 10, USAFhelicopter crews rescued 4,322 people, 2,836 ofthem by HH–60s, 1,461 by MH–53s, and 25 byUH–1s. On September 4, the 347th ExpeditionaryRescue Group rescued a record 791 persons in oneday. Some missions lasted up to 11 hours at a time.The helicopters at first concentrated on search andrescue missions, hoisting victims stranded on roofsin flooded areas of New Orleans to dry ground, butlater they carried refugees from shelters within

New Orleans, such as the Superdome andConvention Center, to the New Orleans (LouisArmstrong) International Airport, where therewere medical treatment personnel, equipment andsupplies, and where air and surface transportationresources were being concentrated for evacuationto designated shelter areas beyond the disasterregion.9

Besides helicopters, USAF fixed wing aircraft,including C–130s, C–17s, and C–5s, flew crucialairlift missions to transport both people and equip-ment and supplies. The Eighteenth Air Force’sTanker Airlift Control Center (Air MobilityCommand) coordinated airlift flights. Col. JeffFranklin served as lead controller for Katrina mis-sion taskings. Many of the same aircraft that flewequipment, supplies, and emergency personnelinto the disaster area also flew medical patientsand displaced persons out.10

By mid-September, the Air Force had air-evac-uated a total of 2,602 medical patients from theHurricane Katrina disaster area to medical facili-ties across the United States. The busiest day wasSeptember 4, when Air Force transports evacuatedsome 1,500 patients from the New OrleansInternational Airport in 24 hours. Many of themedical evacuees flew to San Antonio or Houston,Texas. For example, a C–5 of the 433 Airlift wingshuttled more than 1,200 patients from NewOrleans to San Antonio. Two C–130s of the 139th

Airlift Wing flew 31 children and their familiesfrom the New Orleans Children’s Hospital toMercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas City. As earlyas August 30, a C–17 and a C–130 landed atKeesler to evacuate hospital patients and preg-nant women to Lackland Air Force Base’s WilfordHall Medical Center in Texas.11

Not only patients, but those made homeless byHurricane Katrina, needed airlift from the disas-ter area. The Air Force airlifted 26,943 displacedpersons from New Orleans to temporary or new


The pararescueman is from38th Rescue Squadron atMoody Air Force Base, Ga.,and was deployed to NewOrleans for HurricaneKatrina search-and-rescueoperations.

USAF HELICOPTERCREWS RESCUED4,322 PEO-PLE, 2,836 OFTHEM BYHH–60S, 1,461BY MH–53S,AND 25 BYUH–1S

homes in more than 35 states across the country.In 55 hours, 89 aircraft moved almost 10,000refugees from New Orleans to Kelly Field, SanAntonio, Texas, where Lackland Air Force Basepersonnel had set up temporary shelters. C–17sthat had delivered emergency personnel andequipment to New Orleans, instead of returning totheir home bases empty, carried refugees fromNew Orleans to Dobbins AFB, Georgia, as well asSan Antonio, Texas. Other C–17s of the 97th AirMobility Wing, after having delivered generatorsto Keesler, airlifted 437 USAF technical studentsfrom Biloxi, Mississippi, to Sheppard AFB, Texas.A total of 1,100 USAF technical students weremoved from Keesler to other Air Education andTraining Command facilities.12

Besides airlifting displaced persons andpatients from the disaster area to other parts of thecountry for housing and medical treatment, the AirForce also transported large numbers of emergencypersonnel to the New Orleans and surroundingareas, including medical and communications per-sonnel, engineers, and armed troops. USAF aircraftmoved 30,412 Air National Guard passengers and5,414 Air Force Reservists, and a total of 43,713Joint Task Force support personnel.13

Many of the airlifted emergency personnelcame to restore infrastructure. As early as August30, two C–5s from the 60th Air Mobility Wing atTravis AFB, California, delivered tanker airliftcontrol elements and search and rescue teams tothe disaster area. A C–17 from the 305 AirMobility Wing from McGuire AFB, New Jersey, air-lifted contingency support groups to New OrleansInternational Airport. Between August 31 andSeptember 3, other C–17s airlifted emergency

response personnel and equipment from NewJersey and Michigan to New Orleans. C–5 trans-ported the 615th Contingency Response Wing fromTravis AFB, California, to Lafayette, Louisiana, asadvance team to receive aircraft and cargo. OnAugust 31, the 621st Contingency ResponseWing’s 818th Contingency Response Groupdeployed from McGuire AFB to New OrleansInternational Airport with combat controllers andmedical teams to establish bare base operationsthere. An AFSOC MC–130 took a team of combatcontrollers and a medical team to New OrleansInternational Airport on the same day. The 822dContingency Response Group also deployed there.Meanwhile, the 615th Contingency ResponseWing’s 571st Contingency Response Groupdeployed from Travis AFB to Keesler for bare baseoperations in the Biloxi area of Mississippi. A C–5moved equipment for fire and rescue personnel toNew Orleans International Airport.14

The 49th Materiel Maintenance Group, theonly USAF Base Expeditionary Airfield Resources(BEAR) group, deployed personnel and equipmentto New Orleans and Biloxi. On September 4, fourC–5s each carried a BEAR Base set and more than550 personnel from Holloman AFB, New Mexico, toNew Orleans International Airport. On September5, the 4th Air Expeditionary Group under Col. Leo-nard Coleman bedded down at a tent city there.15

On September 2, a 60-member contingencyaeromedical staging facility team from LacklandAFB deployed to New Orleans, where it set up a25-bed tent facility manned by 182 medical per-sonnel to care for patients. The 932d Airlift Wingmoved medical teams by C–9 to the medical stag-ing area in New Orleans, where 80 doctors, nurses,


Several Air Force SpaceCommand UH–1N Hueyhelicopters and crewsdeployed in support ofJoint Task Force-Katrina.Crews, as part of the 620thAir ExpeditionarySquadron, providedsearch, recovery and relieffor displaced persons.

USAF AIR-CRAFTMOVED30,412 AIRNATIONALGUARD PASSENGERSAND 5,414AIR FORCERESERVISTS,AND A TOTALOF 43,713JOINT TASKFORCE SUPPORTPERSONNEL

and medical technicians of the 375th MedicalGroup served. A mobile aeromedical staging facil-ity from Lackland AFB operated in an airport con-course at New Orleans to treat patients awaitingevacuation.16

Absence of adequate communications in thewake of Hurricane Katrina required the importa-tion of equipment and expert personnel to operateit. The 139th Airlift Wing flew military communi-cations personnel from Colorado to Gulfport,Mississippi, while the 5th Combat Communica-tions Group deployed resources from Robins AFBto nearby Keesler AFB. At the request of U.S.Senator “Kit” Bond, the 139th Airlift Wing(Missouri ANG) flew members of National GuardCommunications Element from Buckley ANGStation in Colorado to Gulfport.17

On September 2, President Bush, flyingaboard a VC–25 from the 89th Airlift Wing,returned to the disaster area he had flown overtwo days earlier in Air Force One,. He landed atLouis Armstrong International Airport in NewOrleans, where he met with the Louisiana gover-nor and the mayor of New Orleans about control ofthe Louisiana National Guard and federal troopsalready active in the area. The same day he alsolanded at Keesler to meet with state and local offi-cials in coastal Mississippi.18

The first week in September exposed a growingbreakdown of law and order in New Orleans.Thousands of refugees, lacking adequate food,drink, plumbing, air conditioning, and space,crowded at the Superdome and the convention cen-ter, where violence threatened to erupt. Desperatepeople broke into grocery and drug stores in searchof necessities, while others looted clothing and elec-

tronics stores for items to sell or barter. During thefirst nine days of September, hosts of USAF C–130sand Air National Guard KC–135s airlifted U.S.Army and Army National Guard troops from vari-ous parts of the country to New Orleans. BetweenSeptember 3 and 8, thirty-three C–17 missions air-lifted troops of the 82d Airborne Division from FortBragg, North Carolina, to New Orleans. C–5s, thelargest airplanes in the Air Force, also airlifted divi-sion troops to the city.19

The Air Force airlifted not only emergency per-sonnel into the disaster area, but also some 11,450tons of equipment, supplies, and vehicles. For exam-ple, between September 8 and 11, four C–17s andtwo C–5s carried large water pumps from RamsteinAir Base in Germany to New Orleans to expel floodwaters from the city. Other C–5s imported vehiclesand relief cargo from New York and New Jersey toNew Orleans and Gulfport between September 5and 8. On August 31, C–17s from the 97th AirMobility Wing of Altus AFB, Oklahoma, transported200-watt generators to Keesler. On September 7, aC–17 delivered more FEMA generators to NewOrleans. C–17s delivered engineering equipmentand supplies from other USAF bases to Keesler.Food was one of the most important of airlifted emer-gency supplies. Between September 1 and 9, the155th and 185th Air Refueling Wings of the AirNational Guard delivered 66,000 Meals, Ready toEat (MREs) from Nebraska to New Orleans, usingKC–135 tankers as transports. On September 4,C–5s transported huge quantities of MREs fromNorfolk, Virginia, to Gulfport. To Keesler Air ForceBase in coastal Mississippi went 182,640 mealsready-to-eat, 243,507 gallons of water, and 92 tons ofsupplies. On Sept 6, a C–5 airlifted 27,300 British


An Air Force ReserveCommand WC–130Hercules sits on the run-way at Dobbins AirReserve Base. TheHurricane Hunters from the53d Weather Reconnais-sance Squadron evacuatedtheir home at Keesler AirForce Base, Miss., beforeHurricane Katrina slammedthe Gulf Coast.

THE AIRFORCE AIR-LIFTED...SOME 11,450TONS OFEQUIPMENT,SUPPLIES,AND VEHICLES

MREs from RAF Mildenhall, UK, to Little RockAFB, Arkansas, the base designated for delivery offoreign relief supplies.20

Insects, breeding profusely in the floodwaters,posed a disease threat to New Orleans and itsvicinity. Between September 12 and 20, twoC–130s of the 910th Airlift Wing, Ohio, sprayedinsecticide over disaster area, staging out of DukeField, Florida. Flying 44 aerial spray sorties, theytreated more than 2.8 million acres, using 13,775gallons of insecticide. They served under the 153dAir Expeditionary Group.21

Specialized Air Force aircraft performed othercrucial missions. E–3 AWACS aircraft and crewsfrom 552d Air Control Wing (960 Air ControlSquadron) provided air traffic control for morethan 1,000 helicopters between September 3 and19, flying eleven sorties. The 99th ReconnaissanceSquadron from Beale AFB, California, flew U–2sover the disaster area for aerial photography andimagery, while the 45th Reconnaissance Squadronfrom Offutt AFB, Nebraska, flew OC–135s for thesame purpose. The Air Force flew 361 intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance sorties during theHurricane Katrina operation. Two 145th AirliftWing C–130s equipped with the Modular AirborneFire Fighting System deployed from NorthCarolina to Pensacola for possible use against firesthat had broken out in New Orleans.22

The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) also responded to thecrisis, in league with Defense Department elements.CAP Personnel from seventeen states flew 68 air-craft on hundreds of sorties over southeasternLouisiana and southern Mississippi to survey thedamage and help determine the need for rescuesand relief. They also used 71 ground vehicles. BySeptember 19, they had surveyed 4,266 houses.23

Statistics support the quantitative significanceof the Air Force (including the Air Force Reserve

and Air National Guard) role in Hurricane Katrinarelief operations. USAF helicopters flew 648 sorties,599 of these on search and rescue missions that res-cued 4,322 people. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft flew4,095 sorties, 3,398 of these on air mobility mis-sions. USAF aircraft evacuated 26,943 displacedpersons from New Orleans and surrounding areasto airports and bases outside of the disaster area.The Air Force air-evacuated more than 2,600 med-ical patients to medical facilities across the country.USAF medical teams at the New Orleans Inter-national Airport treated 16,714 patients, includingmore than 5,500 in two days. The Air Force airlifted11,450 tons of relief cargo from various parts of thecountry to the disaster zone. Transports carriedthousands of emergency personnel, including engi-neers, electricians, doctors, nurses, cooks, and troopsfrom all over the country to New Orleans and south-ern Mississippi. Among the Air Force aircraftinvolved were 49 C–130s, 31 KC–135s, 25 HH–60s,16 C–5s, 15 C–17s, 31 KC–135s, 9 UH–1s, and 5MH–53s, as well as HC–130s, MC–130s, WC–130s,U–2s, and OC–135s.24

The immense contribution of the Air Force inHurricane Katrina disaster relief represents onlya fraction of the total Defense Department effort,which involved elements of the National Guard,the Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps. Althoughnot part of the Defense Department, the CoastGuard also played a major role. The DefenseDepartment flew 12,786 helicopter sorties, rescu-ing 15,000 and transporting 80,000 in one of thelargest mass evacuations in history. From nineregional military bases, the Defense Departmentdistributed huge quantities of equipment and sup-plies, including more than 30 million meals. ThePentagon’s response to Hurricane Katrina was thelargest deployment of military forces for a civil-support mission in U.S. history. ■


An R–11 jet fuel truck dri-ves through the floodedstreets of New Orleans toits operating location. Afuels team from BarksdaleAir Force Base, La.,deployed to New Orleansto assist with refuelingoperations in the city, toinclude refueling genera-tors and stranded vehicles.

SPECIALIZEDAIR FORCEAIRCRAFTPERFORMEDOTHER CRUCIALMISSIONS

1. Amanda Ripley, “How Did This Happen,” Time, vol.166, no. 11 (Sept 12, 2005), 54-59; “The Lost City,”Newsweek, vol. CXLVI, no. 11 (Sept 12, 2005), 43-52;Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge (New York:HarperCollins, 2006), 633.2. “Hurricane Hunters Rebound, Gear Up for NextStorm,” Air Force Link, 2 Sep 2005; Lt Col Bob Thompson,“Rebuilding of Hurricane Hunter’s Home Begins,” Air ForcePrint News, 23 Sep 2005, story ID=123011890; “HurricaneKatrina and Hurricane Rita, By the Numbers,” Report ofFirst Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force/Joint ForceAir Component Commander, Maj Gen M. Scott Mayes,USAF, p. 3; “Last WC–130H Departs Keesler,” Air ForceLink, 18 Jan 2006, story ID=123014553; Douglas Brinkley,The Great Deluge (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 72.3. Hurricane Katrina: The Storm That Changed America(New York: Time, Inc., 2005); CNN Reports: Katrina; Stateof Emergency (Kansas City: Andrews McMeel, 2005);Hurricane Katrina: The One We Feared (Harahan, LA:Express Publishing, 2005); Brinkley, Deluge, 627-629.4. Brinkley, Deluge, 633; 7 June 2007 e-mail from LtCol Al Koenig, First Army, to Dr. Daniel Haulman, sub-ject: Draft on relief efforts.5. Donna Miles, “Military Providing Full-ScaleResponse to Hurricane Relief Effort,” Air Force PrintNews, 31 Aug 2005, storyID=123011498; “1st AF ProvidesCommand, Control for Katrina Relief Efforts,” Air ForcePrint News, 6 Sep 2005, storyID=123011640; “97 AEGStands Up at Keesler,” Air Force Link, 12 Sep 2005.6. “Air Force Reserve Flies Missions to Storm-RavagedAreas,” Air Force Print News, 31 Aug 2005, storyID=123011510.7. Louis A. Arana-Barradas, “Helicopter MissionChanges as Rescue Tempo Slows,” Air Force Print News,7 Sep 2005, storyID=123011674; Director of MobilityForces After Action Report, Joint Task Forces Katrinaand Rita, 18 Oct 2005, Appendix C; “Rescue WingFeatured on Outdoor Network,” Air Force Link, 16 Feb2006, story ID=123016394; “347 Rescue Wing SupportsHurricane Relief Efforts,” 347 Rescue Wing Public AffairsNews Release no. 090105 issued 1 Sep 2005; 347th

Expeditionary Rescue Group, “Joint Task Force-Katrina:Lessons Learned,” 22 Sep 2005, issued by 347 RQW/CC;JTF Katrina ANG Chronology, 25 Aug-7 Sep 2005.8. Director of Mobility Forces After Action Report, JointTask Forces Katrina and Rita, 18 Oct 2005, Appendix C.9. MSgt. Mitch Gettle, “Geren Lauds Total AF KatrinaEffort,” Air Force Print News, 7 Sep 2005, storyID=123011671; Louis A. Arana-Barradas, “Helicopter Mis-sion Changes as Rescue Tempo Slows,” Air Force PrintNews, 7 Aug 2005, storyID=123011674; “Air Force RescuesTop 4,000 Mark,” Air Force Link, 8 Sep 2005; 347 Expe-ditionary Rescue Group, “Joint Task Force-Katrina: Les-sons Learned,” 22 Sep 2005, issued by 347 RQW/CC, p. 5.10. MSgt Paul Fazzini, “AMC Answering HumanitarianCall in Aftermath of Katrina, Air Force Print News, 31Aug 2005, story ID=123011497; Director of MobilityForces After Action Report for JTF Katrina and JTF Rita,18 Oct 2005, 8.11. “AMC Focusing on Katrina Aeromedical Evacuations,Air Force Link, 1 Sep 2005; “Airmen Evacuate Veterans,”Air Force Link, 1 Sep 2005; “Hurricane Katrina PatientsEvacuated to Wilford Hall,” Air Force Link, 31 Aug 2005;“Joint Task Force Katrina Photographic Chronology,” FirstAir Force History Office; “Reservists Charge IntoAeromedical Evacuation Effort,” Air Force Link, 8 Sep2005; “Aeromedical Evacuation Hub Established atLackland,” Air Force Link, 3 Sep 2005; “AeromedicalEvacuation Hub Established at Kelly Field, Texas,” AirForce Link, 2 Sep 2005; “139th Airlift Wing CompletesHumanitarian Mission,” Air Force Link, 1 Sep 2005.

12. Tim Barela, “Come Hell and High Water,” Torch,(Sep-Oct 2005) 8-10; “Joint Task Force KatrinaPhotographic Chronology,” First Air Force History Office.13. “Air Force Support to Hurricane Katrina/Rita ReliefOperations: By the Numbers,” Aug-Sep 2005, p. 21.14. “Joint Task Force Katrina Photographic Chrono-logy,” First Air Force History Office; “AMC ResponseGroups Establish Airfield Operations for HurricaneRelief,” Air Force Link, 2 Sep 2005.15. “Air Force BEAR Base Deploys Supporting JTF-Katrina,” Air Force Link, 4 and 6 Sep 2005.16. “Air Combat Command Airmen Provide Huma-nitarian Relief,” Air Force Link, 3 Sep 2005; “Air CombatCommand Supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,”Air Force Link, 2 Sep 2005; “80-Member ExpeditionaryMedical Support Team Deploys to New Orleans,” AirForce Link, 1 Sep 2005.17. “Communication Units Deploy to Support HurricaneRelief,” Air Force Link, 7 and 9 Sep 2005; “Airmen ProvideCommunications Capabilities,” Air Force Link, 3 Sep 2005.18. Matthew Cooper,” Dipping His Toe Into Disaster,”Time, vol. 166, no. 11 (Sept 12, 2005) 51.19. “Airmen, Soldiers Provide Hurricane Support,” AirForce Link, 9 Sep 2005.20. “Air Force Reserve Flies Missions to Storm-RavagedAreas,” Air Force Print News, 31 Aug 2005, storyID=123011510; “Little Rock AFB Hub for InternationalKatrina Aid,” Air Force Print News, 7 Sep 2005, storyID=123011664; “Joint Task Force Katrina PhotographicChronology, “ First Air Force History Office; “AMCAircraft, People Continue Hurricane Relief Efforts,” AirForce Link, 7 Sep 2005.21. “Reservists Reducing Hurricane-Borne Insects,” AirForce Link, 29 Sep 2005, story ID=123011664; “ReserveConducts Aerial Spray Mission Over Louisiana,” AirForce Link, 13 Sep 2005.22. “960 AACS Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF)Summary, “Memorandum for 552 Operations GroupCommander, 6 Feb 2006, from Lt Col Gregory D. Roberts,USAF, 960 AACS/CC; “Joint Task Force KatrinaPhotographic Chronology,” First Air Force History Office;e-mail from Paul McAllister of ACC/HO to DanielHaulman of AFHRA/RSO dated 24 Jan 2006, subject:“Hurricane Katrina Relief Operations,”; “U–2 Aids inKatrina Relief,” Air Force Link, 13 Sep 2005;“Observation Aircraft to Deliver Pictures of the GulfCoast,” Air Force Link, 1 Sep 2005; “From the Air Force,A Swift and Overwhelming Response,” Air ForceMagazine, vol. 88 no. 10 (Oct 2005), 28.23. Civil Air Patrol Hurricane Katrina ComprehensiveTimeline as of 1500 CDT Sep 19, 2005, sent as attach-ment to 7 June 2007 e-mail from Lt Col Al Koenig of FirstArmy to Dr. Daniel L. Haulman.24. “Air Force Support to Hurricane Katrina/Rita ReliefOperations; By the Numbers,” Aug-Sep 2005, from Officeof Air Force Lessons Learned (USAF/A9L), Washington,DC; “Air Force Support to Hurricane Katrina/Rita ReliefOperations; Katrina/Rita Successes and Challenges,”Aug-Sep 2005, from Office of Air Force Lessons Learned(USAF/A9L), Washington, DC; “Hurricane Katrina andHurricane Rita, By the Numbers,” First Air and SpaceExpeditionary Task Force (1 AETF)/Joint Air Force AirComponent Commander (JFACC) report of M. ScottMayes, Major General, USAF, Commander; “Lifted toSafety,” Airmen, vol. XLIX, no. 7 (Fall 2005) 18.25. Sgt. Sara Wood, “DoD Leaders Report on HurricaneResponse,” American Forces Information Service NewsArticles, 10 Nov 2005 (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2005/20051110_3310.html). Director of Mobility ForcesAfter Action Report, Joint Task Forces Katrina and Rita, 18Oct 2005, Appendix B: Mobility Metrics Overview.


NOTES


A Mighty Fortress: Lead Bomber overEurope. By Charles Alling. Philadelphia:Casemate, 2002 and 2006. Illustrations.Maps. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. xiii,186. $19.95 Paperback ISBN: 1-932033-59-9

This book is the author’s personalaccount of his service as pilot of an EighthAir Force B–17 lead bomber based in theEuropean Theater of Operations (ETO)during World War II. The Eighth flewstrategic bombing missions deep intoenemy territory. To survive enemy fighterattacks the B–17s had to fly in tight for-mations and use the overlapping coverageof their .50-caliber machineguns to defendthe formation. Lead bombers headedthese formations and held a commandpilot—usually a major or lieutenantcolonel—and had radar installed thatallowed the B–17 to drop its bombs byradar should the target be obscured byweather or smoke. Only lead bombers hadradar installed. The other bombardiers inthe formation simply dropped their bombswhen the bombardier in the lead bomberdropped his. The Germans knew this andunderstandably focused their attacks onlead bombers. Despite the added responsi-bility and danger lead-bomber crewsfaced, they had to fly more missions beforerotating home because of the critical needfor their skills. Author Charles Allingcommanded the lead bomber Miss Prudywhile flying with the 34th Bomb Group.

Captain Alling flew 27 combat mis-sions in Miss Prudy before the war endedin Europe in May 1945. He earned theDistinguished Flying Cross and the AirMedal with four oak leaf clusters alongthe way. After the war, Alling went to Yaleand excelled in civilian life as he had inthe skies over Europe. In 1989, he found-ed the Alling Institute of Ethics. Today hecontinues to support air power by servingon the Board of Visitors of the AirUniversity at Maxwell AFB.

Alling has organized the book like adiary with historical recollections writtenin chronological order beginning with theattack on Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, and progressing to the end of WorldWar II. The narrative flows well and is anentertaining and easy read. Each chapterbegins with a poem that reflects the emo-tion of the coming narrative. While of lit-tle research value, the book is an excellentbook for persons interested in World WarII air combat from the individual airman’spoint of view.

The author provides about 50 pho-tographs of people discussed in the textand of B–17s in action over Europe—mostfrom the 34th Bomb Group. He alsoappends copies of operations orders for

missions flown by Miss Prudy. A map isincluded to orient the reader to the EighthAir Force’s battleground. Diagrams areused to show the stations of the air crew.

A Mighty Fortress offers the readeran index, which always aids in locatingincidents and items quickly. While thebook provides no footnoted documenta-tion, it does have an endnotes section thatthe reader can use for further reading.Unfortunately, the endnotes also revealthat A Mighty Fortress offers no new his-torical information.

This book is meant for readers of mil-itary history looking for entertainmentand a better understanding of the heartand psychology of the young men whoflew B–17s into harm’s way during WorldWar II.

David F. Crosby, former USAF historywriter and a doctrine developer for theArmy Air Defense Artillery School

Almanac of World War I. By David F.Burg and L. Edward Purcell. Lexington:University Press of Kentucky, 1998. Pp. vi320. Maps. Illustrations. Photographs. Ap-pendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 320.$22.00 Paperback ISBN 0-8131-9087-8

With all of the books about World WarI, one would think that nothing more couldbe written about this war. Yet, although thewar ended almost a century ago in 1918, itstill fascinates historians—perhaps more soamong Europeans than Americans. ForEuropeans, World War I is still the “GreatWar” in which about 8 million soldiers died,18 million were wounded, and almost 2 mil-lion were missing in action. An additional6.5 million civilians died and much ofEurope was devastated for years after thewar. Europe still bears the scars of thistremendous war even today after anothermore devastating war. Given this continu-ing interest in the Great War, historians,teachers, and fans of the war would appre-ciate an almanac—a publication that pro-vides useful information and data, often incharts and tables—that encompasses allmajor facets of this conflict.

Burg and Purcell’s almanac is one ofmany works that have appeared since thelate 1990s on this fascinating topic. Burgis a freelance writer and editor with a B.A.and M.A. in English and an M.A. andPh.D. in American civilization. He hasauthored or coauthored six other books,including Facts on File’s The AmericanRevolution. Purcell has written Who WasWho in the American Revolution and TheVice Presidents: A Bibliographical Dictio-nary; and the two coauthored the World

Almanac of the American Revolution. As aresult, both are well acquainted with thistype of historical work.

This book provides a chronologicalchronicle of this great conflict on all fronts.It begins with the pre-war Europeanalliances and then presents a virtuallydaily account of the major and lesserevents of the war to the end of 1918.Although the authors emphasize militaryand political events, they do give someattention to the effect of the war on civil-ians. They arrange the chronology by year,theater, campaign, operation, and battle.As a result, the reader gets a basic sketchof the war’s events and its milestones. Thebook also has many photographs anddrawings, six maps, and eighteen sidebarson various topics from “Naval Strength” to“The Literature of the War.” At the end,there are short biographies of many of thewar’s important military and civilian lead-ers and a select bibliography.

Although, this book fulfills its purposeas an almanac, it has some problems. Fromthe daily entries, one gets a sense of the mil-itary and political progression (or lack of it)but with a sterility that prevents the read-er from truly sensing the overall large-scaledeath and destruction of the war—a basicproblem of most “almanacs” of any conflict.The sidebars are helpful in introducingtheir topics but are too brief to offer in-depth insights to the issues they address.Additionally, while the book covers the warin the Middle East and Africa, the majorityof the entries are about the Western Front.One finds similar emphasis in the biogra-phy section—Lawrence of Arabia is therebut not Sharif Hussein, Faisal, Sir HenryMacMahon, or other key players in theArab Revolt, individuals of equal if notgreater stature than some who rate a biog-raphy. The six maps are insufficient to con-vey the global nature of this war.

In other words, Burg and Purcell mayhave intended this to be a fairly compre-hensive almanac of the “Great War,” but itfalls short of that goal. It is essentiallyonly a basic overview of the war’s militaryaspects with some entries of its politicalaspect. As a result, this book is mainly forthe general reader.

Dr. Robert B. Kane, Assistant Historian,Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, Florida

Boys’ Books, Boys’ Dreams and theMystique of Flight. By Fred Erisman.Fort Worth: TCU Press, 2006. Photo-graphs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx,346. $29.95 ISBN: 0-87565-330-8

I’ve been an aviation historian for

Book Reviews

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twenty years and, while there are a num-ber of books I have truly enjoyed, therehave been only a handful that I wish I hadwritten—Joseph Corn‘s Winged Gospeland Robert Wohl‘s A Passion for Wings, areexamples. I just added Boys’ Books, Boys’Dreams to the list. Authors often specializein the technical details of aviation and/oraerial warfare. And that’s fine. But myinterests are in how aviation changed ourperception of the world around us, the waywe think, the way we live, the things towhich we most aspire. Fred Erisman’s bookdetails the influence of books on three gen-erations of boys, from the earliest days offlight to the rocket age.

I have books from more than a dozenof the series discussed by the author, andI love the pseudonyms and heroes invent-ed by some of the series writers (RoyRockwood’s (pseudonym) Dave Dashawayis my favorite). Sure, many of the earlystories were formulaic, but you knew whothe good guys were and that, somehow,despite all odds, they would triumph.Aviation was new when the first booksappeared, and the authors often discussedrecent advances in the technology ornewly set speed and distance records.Series were often described as “thrillingand scientifically correct” or “absolutelymodern.”

World War I, with larger-than-life-size heroes, helped establish the cult ofthe aviator and celebrity. The “ace,” a pilotwho shot down five or more enemy air-craft, became the modern gunslinger inthe tradition of America’s Old West. Eventhe “Red Baron,” Manfred von Richthofen,who shot down 80 Allied aircraft, becamean iconic figure, remaining so even todayas he lives on in the Peanuts comic stripand as brand name for a pizza.

When Charles Lindbergh, an All-American boy, became the first to fly theAtlantic solo (in 1927), he inspired theinterwar generation to become “air-mind-ed.” Commercial airlines found a place inthe Boys’ Books as the first airlines tookhold; and aviators, in general, establishedan intimate culture, a “world of spruce,fabric, lighted cabins, and friendly men.”During the interwar years, speed andendurance records fell regularly. This wasthe era of the great speed races and greatadventure, all celebrated in books foryoung readers.

World War II brought significantchange: the rise of aircraft carriers, devel-opment of long-range bomber and fighteraircraft, the atomic bomb, and rockets.Tried-and-true formulas, especially thestaple good guys versus bad guys; theimportance of friends and teamwork; andthe virtues of perseverance, loyalty, anddoing right carried through from the ear-

liest days. And as before, the Boys’ Booksdiscussed new technologies and aviationadvances. While many authors are con-tent to discuss aviation through the end ofWorld War II, I was especially gratified tosee how Erisman takes the story farther.First he introduces two of my favoriteauthors, Isaac Asimov and RobertHeinlein, as Boys‘ Book authors, and thendescribes how some Boys’ Books seriesbecame some of the first television seriesof the early 1950s.

Though there is much materialErisman necessarily had to leave out, Ifound this a most enjoyable read. I felt asif I was having a conversation with afriend. Erisman shows how aviationmoved from novelty to part of everydaylife and draws a larger lesson—that theadvances of the atomic and space age willlikely create “a world of staggering com-plexity, far removed from that of ‘TheAirship Boys’ and ‘The Boy Aviators’.”

Bruce Ashcroft, Ph. D., Air Education andTraining Command History Office

Lost Black Cats: Story of Two Cap-tured Chinese U–2 Pilots. By H. MikeHua. Bloomington, Ind.: Author House,2005. Photographs. Pp. x, 208. $14.95Paperback ISBN: 1-4184-9917-X

H. Mike Hua is a retired Republic ofChina (ROC or Taiwan) Air Force generaland pilot. In Lost Black Cats he tells thestory of two ROC Air Force U–2 pilots shotdown over mainland China during theCold War who did not return home until1990. Hua was one of the Taiwanese U–2pilots and had been a roommate of one ofthe downed airmen.

In the early 1960s, a joint UnitedStates and ROC squadron of high-altitudeLockheed U–2 reconnaissance aircraft,called the “Black Cat Squadron,” wasestablished on Taiwan. Overflights of thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) byTaiwanese pilots began in 1962 and con-tinued until 1974. These flights targetednuclear, missile, and other military facili-ties. During this period the ROC Air Forceconducted over 100 overflights, losing fiveU–2s in the operation. Three U–2 pilotswere killed and two captured: Yeh Changtiin 1963 and Chang Liyi in 1965. This com-pares with the CIA-sponsored U–2 flightsover the Soviet Union starting in 1956that culminated with Gary Powers’ shoot-down and capture in May 1960.

The book focuses on Yeh Changti, theauthor’s former roommate, who survived 19years in the PRC until released with ChangLiyi in 1982. During his incarceration in

mainland China, Yeh endured solitary con-finement, interrogation, “re-education” at acommunal farm, and work as a teacher.Lost Black Cats describes life in the PRCduring the turbulent period of the CulturalRevolution, the opening of the PRC to theWest following President Nixon’s visit in1972, and the death of Chairman Mao in1976. The reader learns about the lives ofordinary Chinese Yeh encounters, from illit-erate peasants to Communist functionar-ies. While incarcerated in mainland China,Yeh’s wife in Taiwan remarried and hisfamily remained uncertain of his fate. In1982 he and Chang were allowed to relo-cate to Hong Kong, eventually immigratingto the United States. It was not until 1990,with support from former ROC Air Forcepilots and the CIA, that both returned toTaiwan to be reunited with their familiesand received belated recognition from theROC Air Force.

Occasional grammatical problems, afew minor errors, and the lack of an indexand bibliography detract from an other-wise engaging story. Lost Black Cats is asimple but moving account of courage andperseverance. Besides describing anintriguing aspect of U–2 operations dur-ing the Cold War, the book provides thereader with valuable insight into Chineseculture and the rivalry between mainlandChina and Taiwan.

Maj. Jeffrey P. Joyce, USAF (Ret), DocentNASM’s Udvar-Hazy Center

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and theFirst Indochina War, 1947-1959. By theOffice of Joint History, JCS. Washington,D.C.: Office of Joint History, 2004. Maps.Photographs. Notes.Appendices. Glossary.Index. Pp. xi, 285. ISBN: 0-16-072430-9

That the JCS has its own historyoffice and publication program (as do thefour service components of that staff) is anindication that, after 63 years, it is here tostay! This may not have seemed certainwhen it was established on January 23,1942. It was an expedient at that time tomatch the British Chiefs of StaffCommittee and to form the CombinedChiefs of Staff. Up to that time, the JointBoard (JB, aka Joint Army and NavyBoard) had seemed to serve our purposes,though it hadn’t been called on to do muchin the First World War, despite the fact wewere an associate power with inter-ser-vice and international concerns. The JBhad been formed in 1903 as one of thereforms after the Spanish-American War(with the Navy’s General Board and theArmy’s General Staff and War College).

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That war had shown a need for improvedcoordination among the three services ofthat time.

Joint operations started early in U.S.history, though the War of 1812 was thefirst significant conflict of that type.Operations on the Great Lakes showedthat better results might have beenachieved there with improved cooperationbetween the Army and Navy. Narrowparochial service interests were a big partof this, but there were also personalityclashes. The Mexican War was the oppo-site. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott and Com-modore Connor at Vera Cruz shared inter-ests and had a friendly rapport. The CivilWar had a variety of inter-service cam-paigns with an equal assortment of suc-cess and failure; personalities againplayed a role. Even though those in com-mand during the Spanish-American Warhad served in that earlier conflict andshould have learned something, theCuban Expeditionary Force representedthe nadir of our joint operations. One goodthing that came out of that war was adegree of cross-fertilization by attendingand teaching at each other’s war college(actually, this had started in 1885 whenfuture Chief of Staff Tasker Bliss starteda three-year tour as Instructor at theNaval War College).

By 1947, when this book begins, theJCS had proven itself in World War II.Along with the National Security Council(NSC, which was to play a dominant rolein the events that were to unfold inVietnam and elsewhere), it had beenauthorized by Congress as part of thepost-war establishment. This nationaldefense structure was about to be testedin a very different environment. It isamazing that so little attention has beengiven to Indochina when one considersthe reams of paper spent on our laterinvolvement there from 1964 to 1973. It istrue that there was competition for atten-tion during the period covered—the hotwar in Korea and the build-up for theCold War with NATO. We started inIndochina with mixed feelings and poli-cies. FDR had been strongly opposed torestoring French colonial rule there.There was a fatigue and distaste for deal-ing with Asiatic matters. Our mantra hadlong been to avoid ground operations onthe mainland there—not changed by ourparticipation in the Boxer Rebellion,Siberian Expeditionary Force, or Merrill’sMarauders/Mars Task Force. Our initialpreference for non-involvement graduallyeroded, however, as we began to seeevents there as part of the global struggleagainst communism. The book gives alucid account of the step-by-step move-ment to where we essentially replaced

France as the major power in the area. Weprovided an immense amount of militaryaid before that but could not buy our wayout of assuming responsibility.

The book starts with an excellent sum-mary of events in Indochina before 1947.The appendices summarize the AidProgram, several important NSC Direc-tives, and the Geneva Declaration.An inno-vation is the list of principal officers, butthis is connected to one disappointment.This is an official history, yet there is virtu-ally nothing about the interplay among theJoint Chiefs. Many aren’t even mentionedin the text. Though familiar names disap-peared with the passage of time after WorldWar II, these were all powerful men withstrong convictions (their own and/or theirservice’s). Their debates must have beenexciting, but we’re presented with only theconclusions. The one map (repeated frontand back covers) is adequate for this level ofexplanation. The notes indicate a thoroughsearch of American sources but are largelylimited to those.

This is an important contribution tothe neglected subject and is highly recom-mended.

Brig. Gen. Curtis Hooper O’Sullivan, ANG(Ret), Salida, California.

Fire From the Sky: Seawolf Gunshipsin the Mekong Delta. By Richard Knott.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,2005. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Glossary.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 260. $29.95ISBN 1-59114-447-7

Richard Knott is eminently qualifiedto write the history of the “Seawolves,”Helicopter Attack Squadron (Light) 3(HAL-3), the U.S. Navy’s first and onlyhelicopter gunship squadron of theVietnam War. A thirty-year Navy veteran,he flew several thousand hours in a vari-ety of aircraft and is the author of otheraviation books. He compiled the story ofthe Navy’s most decorated squadron fromhistorical documents and recollections ofmore than sixty Seawolf veterans.

Following an exciting introduction,Knott skips to a detailed description of theMekong Delta and “Charlie,” the VietCong enemy. In the first two chapters thereader learns about the intense sea-airpatrols along the South Vietnamese coast-line using destroyers, destroyer escorts,minesweepers, gunboats, Coast Guardcutters, SEAL teams, and new fast patrolboats (swift boats). Aircraft included thecarrier-based A–1 Skyraiders and P–3Orions.

In December 1965, the Navy estab-

lished Task Force 116. Although the riverboats were heavily armed, Charlie alsoboasted heavy weaponry. This eventuallybrought helicopter gunships (BellUH–1Bs) into play. They were flown byNavy and Army pilots from landing shipdocks (LSD’s) based on the waterways. Asaction heated up in the spring of 1966,the Navy took over full control of theoperation. Gen. William Westmorelandprovided his battle-scarred Hueys andthe Navy supplied the crews. While thosepersonnel in Vietnam received on-the-jobtraining from the Army, the Navy formeda helicopter combat support squadron(HC–1) at Ream Field in Imperial Beach,California. Training was quick and furi-ous and by August 1966 Navy crewsarrived in country to begin their opera-tions with Army crews.

The various detachments were keptbusy not only patrolling the rivers andsurrounding river banks but also flyingtroop insertions. In 1965 and 1966 thepatrols had done a great job of interrupt-ing the enemy’s seaborne supply lines.Charlie was forced to change his supplyroutes, eventually moving to areas inwhich our forces were not allowed. Knottoffers outstanding descriptions of both airand boat attacks that wreaked havoc onthe enemy.

As operations expanded, the Navy’snew volunteers (which they had no prob-lem obtaining) first went to the BellHelicopter factory in Texas. Basic pilottraining was finally taken over by theArmy at Ft. Benning. That was followedby survival school in California and smallarms and self-defense training with theMarines at Camp Pendleton. While theattack detachments were in heavy fight-ing, action was going on in Washington toestablish a full-fledged gunship squadron.HAL-3 officially stood up on April 1, 1967.

As the years went by, helicopters,armament, and other systems wereupgraded. Air crews of HAL–3 were get-ting into some extremely dangerous situ-ations along with the swift boat crews andSEAL teams. But U.S. participation in thewar, including in the Delta, started towind down; and HAL–3 was officiallydeactivated on March 16, 1972.

Knott’s book recounts the story of theSeawolves from the dawn of an era untilthe last commander turned off the lights.His research was extensive, and the resultis a comprehensive history that givesnames, detachment numbers by actioninvolved, crew members, types ofweapons, and much, much more. This isexciting history and an excellent read!

Stu Tobias, Indianapolis, Indiana

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The Smell of Kerosene: A Test Pilot’sOdyssey. By Donald Mallick with PeterMerlin. Washington D. C. : NASA HistoryOffice, 2004 [NASA SP 4108]. Photo-graphs. Notes. Glossary. Appendices. In-dex. Pp xi, 252. $22. 00 ISBN-030-000-01270-5

What does one have to show for a 30-year career as a NASA test pilot duringthe “golden age” of NASA’s Dryden FlightResearch Center? Answer: an aviationbiography that reads like a fantasy list ofincredibly varied aircraft test flown fromthe late 1950s through the late 1980s.This book chronicles the career of DonaldMallick, a military aviator turned civiliantest pilot, who was there in the waningdays of NACA and the early years of itssuccessor, NASA. Trained in the early1950’s reciprocating-engine Naval avia-tion, Mallick then flew some of the Navy’searliest carrier-based jet attack/fighteraircraft. All of that would be a sufficientstory upon which to predicate a fine book,yet it was just the beginning of this pilot’sstoried career.

A key value of this well written workis its acknowledgment of the human ele-ment of test flying: the emotions, loss offriends, test victories, and moments ofhigh adrenaline to name only a few. Fromhumble western Pennsylvania roots,Mallick went flew some of this nation’smost advanced platforms such as theApollo program’s lunar-lander simulator,YF–12A, and XB–70. However, his NACAcareer began at the Langley ResearchCenter flying a venerable stable of fixedwing aircraft such as the C–47 and F2H–1and quickly moving to extensive rotarywing time in several Sikorsky modelssuch as the HO3S–1 and HRS–1.

With his transfer to the DrydenResearch Flight Center in 1963, Mallickended his rotary wing test days andmoved on to test a diverse number of fixedwing aircraft from the B–52/57/58bombers, to the F–100/104/106/15 fightersto name yet a few more of the 125 aircraftin his logbook. However, it was his partic-ipation in the nation’s high speed/altitudetest programs in the YF–12A and XB–70which provided the book’s most com-pelling chapters.

As a career fighter pilot interested inthe mechanics of high altitude flight, Iwas not disappointed by the engagingwriting style. Not overpopulated withtechnical test pilot jargon nor loaded withexcessive aviation factoids, Mallick andhis NASA archivist partner, Peter Merlin,successfully bring to life the thrill of flightat the edges of both human and aircraftperformance envelopes. They deftly trans-port those sagas from the cockpit to the

written page. What aviation aficionadohas not wondered what it was like to fireup the YF–12A/SR–71 for the first timeand feel the raw power of the two Pratt &Whitney J58s as they ripped the skyapart? Mallick vividly recalls the sensa-tions, feelings, and perceptions as he rodeone of, if not the, hottest aircraft in avia-tion history.

Equally interesting to anyone whoappreciates the Edwards and Dryden testenvironments during the 1960s and 1970swill be Mallick’s accounts of flying thebeautiful and complex XB–70. His mis-sion narratives combined with his insightinto the 1966 aerial collision between anXB–70 and an F–104 (an accident thatultimately doomed the XB–70 program),was the most gripping portion of the book.His first-hand behind-the-scenes descrip-tion of the mishap, aircrews involved, andhis take on likely causes is the sort ofdetail that professional pilots crave butseldom find.

Those interested in that golden timein test aviation when everything wasabout bigger, faster, higher, and more chal-lenging should read this wonderfully writ-ten book. The smell of kerosene—anunforgettable flightline smell that spellshome.

Lt. Col. Vincent Alcazar, Commander 479Operations Support Squadron, MoodyAFB, Georgia

Reflections of a Technocrat: Mana-ging Defense, Air, and Space Pro-grams during the Cold War. By John L.McLucas, with Kenneth J. Alnwick andLawrence R. Benson. Maxwell AFB, Ala.:Air University Press, 2006. Photographs.Notes, Appendices. Glossary. Bibliogra-phy. Index. Pp. xxvi. 367. Paperback

In his autobiography, Reflections of aTechnocrat, John McLucas effectively car-ries the reader through a network ofinterlocking events and institutions thatframed his multifaceted career in acade-mia, industry, and government during theheight of the Cold War. Born in ruralSouth Carolina in 1920, McLucas demon-strated an early interest in science andtechnology, studying physics and engi-neering at Davidson College and TulaneUniversity before serving in the Navyduring World War II. His wartime experi-ence working on radar technologies setthe stage for a productive career in indus-try, first at a small start-up firm—HRB(Haller, Raymond, and Brown)—in cen-tral Pennsylvania and later at the MITRECorporation near Boston and COMSAT

General Corporation in Washington, D.C.It was also through his industrial experi-ence that McLucas gained entrance intothe Department of Defense (DoD), servingin several high-level positions, mostprominently Undersecretary and Secre-tary of the Air Force in the 1960s and1970s.

Among the myriad subjects andevents that McLucas examines in thebook, perhaps the most interesting is hisdiscussion of the founding and growth ofHRB. The firm had been established bytwo physics professors (George Haller andDick Raymond) and one of their graduatestudents (Walter Brown) at nearby Penn-sylvania State College in 1946. All threemen had acquired extensive electronicsexpertise in the Army during World WarII. McLucas joined HRB in 1948, less thana year after he arrived at Penn State topursue a Ph.D. in physics. At that time,HRB designed and built electronic coun-termeasures equipment for the Air Forceand later moved into the development ofaerial reconnaissance technologies. Inabsorbing detail, McLucas shows howHRB grew into a successful businesswhile also recruiting top-notch resear-chers, including William Perry, anotherPenn State Ph.D. who later founded hisown successful electronics company inCalifornia and later served as Secretary ofDefense in the mid-1990s.

Historians of science and technologywill find McLucas’s discussion of HRBrefreshing, especially given that much ofthe post-World War II history of the elec-tronics industry in the United States hasfocused overwhelmingly on either the bigEast Coast electronics firms (e.g.,Westinghouse, RCA, and IBM) orCalifornia’s Silicon Valley and the entre-preneurial culture that thrived there.McLucas’s discussion of firms—HRB (andalso COMSAT General, where he servedas president in the 1980s)—outside thisexplanatory framework highlights theextent to which more historical researchis needed to flesh out even further theinterrelated historical patters of institu-tional growth, regional economic develop-ment, and technological diversificationthat defined the commercial and militaryelectronics industries during the ColdWar.

Through the contacts he developed atHRB, McLucas left industry for a careerin government in 1962, first as head ofTactical Warfare Programs in the Office ofthe Director of Defense Research andEngineering and finally as Secretary ofthe Air Force a decade later. McLucas cov-ers this period through a detailed discus-sion of his involvement in the manage-ment and development of key weapons

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programs, such as the F–111 fighter-bomber, C–5A transport aircraft, and theF–15 tactical fighter. He also reflects atsome length on the key personalities pre-sent when he worked in the Pentagon andthe strategies they used to run theDefense Department. Robert McNamara’spredilection for centralized administra-tive control of DoD activities in the Officeof the Secretary of the Defense contrastedsharply with the decentralized manage-ment structure implemented later in thedecade by Melvin Laird and his deputy,David Packard. McLucas himself favoreddecentralization and applauds Laird andPackard for their efforts to streamline theweapons acquisition process.

In 1969, while serving as Undersec-retary of the Air Force, McLucas also di-rected the National Reconnaissance Of-fice, thereby maintaining his long-stand-ing interest in aerial reconnaissance thathad begun at HRB two decades earlier.Significantly, as NRO director, McLucaspresided over the shift from film-basedsatellite reconnaissance—embodied insuch pioneering programs as CORONA—to its real-time equivalent. Although hedoes not discuss specific programs and thetechnologies behind them because of theirclassified status, McLucas does provide aninteresting look at the inner workings ofthe NRO organization during what hecalls its “golden age.” He left the NRO tobecome Secretary of the Air Force in 1973.

Other themes discussed in the book’slater chapters include McLucas’s serviceas head of the Federal AviationAdministration after leaving thePentagon and his abiding interest inspace exploration and international coop-eration in the field. Although many of hisspace-related efforts largely provedabortive, McLucas nevertheless remainedcommitted to the scientific and commer-cial exploitation of space through hisinvolvement and membership in variousbusiness ventures, conferences, founda-tions, and educational institutions.Representative examples discussed atlength include the Arthur C. ClarkeFoundation, the International SpaceUniversity, and the Mission to PlanetEarth program sponsored by the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration.

McLucas began writing his autobiog-raphy in the late 1990s, just a few yearsbefore he died. In addition to recallingpersonal memories of key events, individ-uals, and organizations, McLucas alsorelied on documentary sources. To helphim sort through and organize the papers,books, and other materials he had collect-ed over the years, McLucas collaboratedwith Kenneth J. Alnwick, a retired AirForce pilot and defense analyst, and

Lawrence R. Benson, a retired Air Forcehistorian. Together, Alnwick and Bensonhelped McLucas draft and edit the chap-ters, and they also completed the remain-ing sections of the book left unfinished atthe time of his death in December 2002.The book also includes a foreword by for-mer Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

Thomas C. Lassman, U.S. Army Center ofMilitary History, Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington, D.C.

The Iraq War: A Military History. ByWilliamson Murray and Robert H. Scales,Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Pressof Harvard University Press, 2003. Maps.Tables. Photographs. Notes. Appendices.Bibliography. Index. Pp. 312. $24.95ISBN: 0-674-01280-1

Written by two military historians,The Iraq War: A Military History, is one ofseveral books published since 2003 focus-ing on the military aspects of OperationIraqi Freedom, the American-led invasionof Iraq. After an overview of Iraq’s historyand the rise of Saddam Hussein, Murrayand Scales examine the Gulf War(Operation Desert Storm in 1991) and theevents leading up to the invasion of Iraqin March 2003.

To set the stage for the military cam-paign, the authors examine howAmerica’s armed forces evolved duringthe 30 years after the end of the VietnamWar, describing the proliferation of preci-sion guided weapons and the growingimportance of special forces. Of particularinterest is how General Franks and hisstaff planned the 2003 Iraqi campaigntaking into account lessons learned fromDesert Storm and the operations inAfghanistan in 2001. One noticeable dif-ference was the decision to begin the airand ground campaigns simultaneously,unlike in 1991 when the air campaignbegan a month earlier. The authors areparticularly good at describing the organi-zation and capabilities of the coalitionground forces (both American and British)as compared to the Iraqi forces.

Both the ground and air campaignsduring March and April 2003 are present-ed in some detail, with the role of theBritish in southern Iraq and special forcesin the north and west included with theUS Army and Marine drive north fromKuwait. Ending with the capture ofBaghdad and fall of Saddam Hussein, theauthors then consider some of the mili-tary lessons learned from the invasion. Anappendix with details on air, ground, andsea weapons is included. The book is well

illustrated with color photographs andmaps.

Unfortunately, since the book waswritten in 2003, there is little insight intothe Iraqi military experience and nodescription of the ongoing Coalition andIraqi fight against the Sunni insurgency.Also, there are several minor errors,including misspelling the name ofGeneral Richard Myers, the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Iraq War: A Military History isrecommended for readers interested in astraightforward military examination ofthe 2003 invasion. A complete history ofthe war, unfortunately, will have to waituntil the final “end state” of America’sinvolvement in Iraq is known.

Reviewed by Major Jeffrey P. Joyce,USAF (Ret.)

Isaiah’s Eagles Rising: A Generationof Airmen: By Bernard Thomas Nolan.Alexandria, Va.: Bernard T. Nolan, 2002.Photographs. Diagrams. Charts. Appen-dices. Pp. 268. $27.00 ISBN 1-4010-5309-2

They came in waves from factories,farms, and city streets—some driven bypatriotism, but most with a dream in theaftermath of Pearl Harbor. Bernard Nolanwas one of these young men and one of thenearly 200,000 U.S. pilots who earnedwings during World War II. He relates hisjourney as a boy with a strong passion forflying airplanes, a poorly educated young-ster from a fractured, almost dysfunction-al home environment who finessed hisway into the Army’s Aviation CadetProgram in 1942. Beginning with hisearly life and its troubling challenges,Nolan has framed his experiences alongthe way with the vivid backdrop of histo-ry surrounding the fierce combat air bat-tles of the U.S. Eighth Air Force over Nazioccupied Europe during the stressfulyears of 1943 and 1944. Assigned to the487th Bomb Group (H) at Lavenham,England, Nolan successfully completed 33combat missions in the B–24 and, later,the B–17.

His very articulate accounts explorethe battle of attrition with the Luftwaffein 1943 and continue as the tide wasturned into triumph during the spring of1944. In his mission accounts, he relateswith gut-wrenching realism little knowndetails of flying combat in those times. Heconcisely discusses the ever changing tac-tics of both sides; the prospects of abomber crew surviving a full combat tour;the trauma of being shot down; and per-formance comparisons of the B–24 Libe-

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rator and B–17 Flying Fortress.Nolan vividly recalls his aviation

cadet flying experiences—experiencesmany of us in pilot training encountered:airplanes we flew, instructors encoun-tered along the way, “wash out fears,” andaspirations we had in hopefully getting tofly the combat planes of our dreams upongraduation. Nolan’s narrative about hisoperational days is excellent and wellreviews the Eighth’s early combat trialsand those of its bomb groups from the ini-tial Combined Bomber Offensive plan setat the Casablanca conference (theUSAAF’s case for precision daylightbombing), the tragic results of the 1943Schweinfurt ball bearing industry andRegensburg enemy aircraft plant raids,and finally the “Big Week” mission effortsin February 1944 leading to the gaining ofAllied air supremacy over the Europeanskies and battlefields on the eve of D-Day,June 6, 1944.

Nolan went on to complete an AirForce career of 22 years before retiring inDecember 1965. He then joined NASA inprogram management assignments for 15years before again retiring and becomingan independent consultant to NASA.

This book is extremely well written,easy to read, and very well articulated.Nolan’s historical research references andfootnotes are scholarly throughout, factualand well documented. As an Eighth AirForce B–24 aircraft commander who flew30 combat missions with the 392nd BombGroup in England, I found this book extra-ordinarily interesting and memory-laden.It is one which I feel most every Eighth AirForce aircrew member would enjoy. Hisexperiences in many instances paralleledmy own, some very poignant to rememberin those stressful times of our young livesduring air combat with The Mighty Eighth.Without any qualifications whatsoever,this book is a must-read for every Eighthveteran and certainly for any air war his-torian regardless of age or era.

Col. Robert E. Vickers, USAF (Ret.),Director Emeritus, the Eighth Air ForceHistorical Society.

The Effectiveness of Airpower in the20th Century: Part Three (1945-2000).By John F. O’Connell. New York: iUni-verse, 2006. Tables. Notes. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xi, 193. $16.95 Paperback.ISBN: 0-595-40353-0

As indicated by the subtitle, this isthe third of a three-volume work that willcover air power in its first century of use.The series was written as a single volume,

but publishers felt it was too large. So,O’Connell broke it into three parts anddecided to publish the most current sec-tion first. If this part is any indication ofwhat is coming in the first two parts, Ican’t wait until they are published. This isgood history and marvelous analysis.

Although O’Connell was primarily asubmariner during his long career, heshows a deep understanding of not onlymilitary tactics and strategy but also fornational strategic goals. What mostimpressed me was the writing style. It iscrisp and doesn’t contain a lot of extrane-ous information. He packs in a lot of his-tory, backs it up with copious notes, pro-vides analysis, and moves on. In this vol-ume, he takes six major military efforts inwhich air power played a role during thelast half of the 20th century and givesabout as concise an overview of the war orcampaign as I have read. Interweaved inthis is an emphasis on air power opera-tions and their effectiveness—some excel-lent, some not so good—on the overallobjectives of the war. Many books havegrandiose goals buried within their titlesor subtitles: O’Connell hits his title’savowed purpose right on target.

The chapters cover the Korean War,Second Vietnam War (as opposed to theFrench effort against the Viet Minh), andthe USSR’s war in Afghanistan, Malvinas/Falklands, Gulf War I, and Kosovo. Each ofthese chapters is then broken down intodistinct periods. For example, the Vietnamchapter’s sections cover Rolling Thunder,the change in administrations (and strate-gies), Linebacker I, and Linebacker II.

O’Connell’s analyses will undoubtedlynot sit well with many air power advocates.Those looking for vindication of Mitchell’sor Douhet’s predictions that air power isthe be-all and end-all of military operationsare going to be sorely disappointed. InVietnam, for example, Rolling Thunderresulted in more bomb tonnage beingdropped than in all of World War II, yet air-power failed to stop the flow of supplies tothe South. It did not do so in Korea either.Therefore, since the goal was to seriouslyhinder military operations in the South, airpower was not totally effective. However,with the change in goals in 1972 to endAmerican involvement in the war, airpow-er in the form of Linebacker II was highlyeffective. A short campaign drove theNorth back to the negotiations, and accordsfollowed shortly thereafter. Only in Kosovodid air power by itself bring about a suc-cessful conclusion to national strategicdesires.Air power is a tremendous tool thatis an integral part of joint and combinedoperations. It has and will continue to havedifferent degrees of applicability and effec-tiveness depending on many, many factors.

O’Connell well shows this.My only complaint with O’Connell’s

efforts is the lack of maps. One map foreach of the chapters with the place namesmentioned would have been a great help.

In summary, for those looking for abook with lots of rip-roaring dogfights andtales of bombing raids and the like, thisisn’t it. I look at this book, and the two tocome, as an order of magnitude abovethat. Plenty of books have explored theeffectiveness of air power elements indetail in various scenarios. But for anyonewanting an excellent big-picture look atsome of the combats of the last fifty yearsand how air power played in them, this isa book to read.

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.), NASMDocent and Volunteer

The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrenceand a New Direction. By Keith B.Payne. Lexington: The University Press ofKentucky, 2001. Bibliography. Index. Pp.xiv, 225. $19.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-8131-9015-0

In this easy-to-read book, Payneasserts that U.S. policies have too oftenbeen shaped by the expectation that chal-lengers would act reasonably and pre-dictably, rather than by the available evi-dence on these challengers’ particularbeliefs and filters. In other words, “leaderscan hold to distorted, self-serving inter-pretations of reality, rely on dubioussources of information, be motivated byextreme emotions and goals, and esteemsome values more highly than their ownlives and positions.”

With respect to nuclear deterrence, ill-founded U.S. expectations, based on mirror-imaging assumption, could have cata-strophic consequences. For example, Paynenotes that during the Cold War the SovietUnion did not share the United States’ def-inition of rationality, deriving its expecta-tions of U.S. behavior on Marxist-Leninistideology instead. Luckily, no nuclearexchanges between the then two super-powers occurred. Payne argues that deter-rence is essentially a psychological process.As such, how challengers would react tofuture U.S. deterrence policies is not likelyto be based on force capability comparisonsor well-informed and unbiased cost-benefitcalculations, but rather on the beliefs andthought filters that define their thinking.This would be particularly true in crisis sit-uations when “decisions tend to be basedon fairly simplified cognitive structures,which tend to reduce the range of optionsperceived by the leaders involved.”

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Rather than the deductive logicheretofore used in the formulation andassessment of deterrence policies, Payneproposes an inductive approach based onthe analysis of key factors divided into sixanalytical steps (each with detailed subdi-visions): (1) identify antagonists, issues,objectives, and actions; (2) identify anddescribe those factors likely to affect theadversary’s decision-making in the con-text of this specific flashpoint and U.S.deterrent threats; (3) construct a strategicprofile of the adversary with regard to thecrisis in question; (4) assess whether thechallenger is likely to be susceptible todeterrence policies in this particular case,and, if so, the nature of those policies; (5)identify available U.S. deterrence policyoptions; and (6) identify the gap betweenthe likely requirements for deterrenceand available U.S. deterrence policyoptions. Describe different, new, or addi-tional military capabilities and policiesthat may be needed.

Payne tests his deterrence frame-work through the analysis of a potentialU.S.-Chinese crisis over Taiwan. He showsthat China would not necessarily actrationally in terms expected and under-stood by Washington, but rather in accor-dance with its particular beliefs andthought filters. To wit, “China appears toview Washington as vulnerable toChinese deterrent threats with regard toTaiwan, based on the perceptions that thestakes involved are inherently lower forWashington.” Therefore, Payne draws fourlessons: (1) the U.S. must deter China’sdeterrent; (2) U.S. regional deterrencepolicies must reduce risks; (3) an empiri-cal framework has more value than onebased on mirror-imaging; and (4) preparefor the failure of deterrence because it isinherently unreliable. Indeed, as Payneconcedes, a better understanding of anopponent’s behavior may not necessarilylead to successful U.S. deterrence policies,but it can perhaps improve them.

Written before 9/11, this book propos-es a useful framework that would meritbeing used in current debates on whetherterrorist organizations can be deterred ornot. Payne’s argument is solid and shouldassure his book a lengthy shelf life. I rec-ommend it to those interested in the prob-lem of deterrence and intelligence analysis.

Mr. Stéphane Lefebvre is Section Head,Strategic Analysis, at the Centre for Opera-tional Research and Analysis (CORA),Defence Research and DevelopmentCorporation (DRDC) Canada.The opinionsexpressed are his own and do not reflect theofficial position of the Government ofCanada or any of its agencies.

Les Français du Ciel: dictionnairehistorique. Edited by General LucienRobineau. Paris: la cherche midi for theAcademie Nationale de l’Air et de l’Espace,2005. Photographs. Tables. Pp. 783. 3 5Paperback ISBN: 2-74910-415-1 andFrench Arms. By Ronald L. Tarnstrom.Lindsborg Kans.: Trogen Books, 2001.Illustrations. Index. Pp. 850 ISBN: 0-922037-16-7.

These two books provide researchersand authors in French aviation historywith the precise details that writers wantand editors demand. However, they arevery different in conception, structure,and contents. Further, Robineau’s book iswritten in French and, thus, will not be ofinterest unless one is fluent in that lan-guage.

Tarnstrom’s fifteenth volume in hisArmed Forces Handbooks series includesthe French-speaking peoples of Belgiumand Luxembourg as well. The very briefhistory of the Armée de l’Air is set into themilitary history of France.

Robineau’s contribution is muchmore concise in scope, but much more use-ful for French aviation history.Two impor-tant acronym lists are included. The firstdeals with schools and special institu-tions, while the second covers abbrevia-tions with the dates when they came intobeing. In the work as a whole, 512 pagesare devoted to over 2000 civil and militarybiographical sketches from the early avia-tion pioneers to participants in the pre-sent space program. The remainder of thebook is devoted largely to thematic topicssuch as the evolution of the Air Ministry,military aviation with names and dates,Chiefs of Staff of both the Armée de l’Airand of the Defence Staff, and the like,together with the history of the airschools, air industry, and special organiza-tions.

Compiling an encyclopedia or an his-torical dictionary is a daunting task, nomatter how many collaborators cooperate.A long list of subjects has to be weeded,and in this case there is the burden of alack of historical literature in the field.General Robineau has had the advantageof a career as a fighter pilot, from P-47s toMirages, and then a tour as Chief of theService historique de l’Armée de l’Air, andnow as head of the historical section of theAcademie Nationale de l’Air et de l’Espace.He has brought professional knowledge intwo disciplines to this near definitivework.

Robin Higham, Editor Emeritus, Aero-space Historian, Kansas State University

OSS: The Secret History of America’sFirst Central Intelligence Agency. ByRichard Harris Smith. Guilford CT: TheLyons Press, 2005 [copyright 1972].Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index.Pp. xxx, 413. $16.95 Paperback ISBN: 1-59228-729-8

My only direct contact with the OSSwas during a recon mission in SouthernFrance to one of their teams which wassupporting the Free French. I did, howev-er, spend considerable time in intelligenceand intelligence gathering, so I had highhopes of leaning more about the Office ofStrategic Services. I wonder what today’sdemand is for a reprint of a 30-year-oldbook, though the intelligence communityhas been in the public eye recently.

I’m not in a position to comment onthe accuracy of the contents (though Ifound a few errors in areas where I havesome familiarity), but I found it enter-taining. I always enjoy a good historicalnovel and don’t worry about exactness.The author makes the point that this is arealm of deception and subterfuge. Hisbook is a collection of “war stories” but nota cohesive account of OSS operations andhow they fitted into the larger picture; it’sa series of disconnected vignettes. Thereis an unnecessary amount about that pic-ture not pertinent to OSS which seems tofit the political orientation of the authorrather than history. He has a liking forthe ideological crusades that agentsbecame involved in that had little to dowith their assigned missions and were, insome instances, counter-productive. Inhis updated preface, Smith makes com-ments about very current intelligenceissues which he attempts to relate to theOSS—with a certain amount of editorial-izing.

Repeated mention is made of suchthings as “operations in the Balkans”without elaboration of the nature or pur-pose. The obvious purpose of defeat of theAxis seems overshadowed and entangledwith tales of political rivalries. Smithseems unaware of the preeminent princi-ple of war of the “objective.” He organizedthe book basically by geographicalarea/theater of operation. But these didnot exist in a vacuum, and there is littleeffort to show the relationships amongthem. Each chapter is a history of its own,and the World starts over again. Achronology with parallel columns wouldhave clarified the connections.

There is a problem with the dual (andoften conflicting) missions of the OSS andCIA: intelligence gathering and covertoperations. That dichotomy is not wellcovered. As today’s CIA is only one in thenetwork of intelligence agencies, in World

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War II OSS was also not alone in thatfield. In particular, there could have beenmore about relations with Army G-2 andthe Office of Naval Intelligence. Maj. Gen.“Wild Bill” Donovan tapped a wide rangeof talent from capitalists to communists.There was a mystique about the AbrahamLincoln Brigade, an outfit which hadmany idealists but also more than theirshare of adventurers and social misfits.Contrary to popular opinion, they weren’ttrained in guerrilla warfare or intelli-gence gathering, though they had sometough fighters. Donovan fitted such dis-parate parts into an effective wholethough there were inevitable cases ofdisharmony. Trouble with other agencies(e.g., FBI, State Department, US militaryservices, and the British Special Opera-tions Executive and MI-6) was a problem,although there was begrudging recogni-tion on most sides that the others servedsome purpose.

The book ends with a chapter on theOSS and CIA. Smith suggests that thepolitical activities of the former were aprelude to the invisible government of thelatter, where the influence on US foreignand military policy has continued. Thefootnotes give a fascinating view of whathappened to many individuals mentionedin later years, but not all (which is frus-trating). The photos are mostly casualgroup shots rather than formal portraits,but it might have been more meaningfulto show more of the main actors. Mapsaren’t essential but would have beenhandy. There is an extensive bibliographywhich always suggests research in depth.Obviously, much anecdotal material wasmined, but the writer didn’t have access tomany official records. Though the index is21 pages long, it has some surprisingomissions.

Despite being critical in spots, Ienjoyed this work and extracted somenuggets of trivia for my collection. Smithdid a diligent job of bringing materialtogether. His short employment with theCIA aroused his interest in the predeces-sor ISS as a subject for his master’s thesis,and he has provided some backgroundabout it. This is not the definitive historyor even history in a strict sense, and it iscertainly not a secret one with its heavyreliance on open sources.

Brig. Gen. Curtis Hooper O’Sullivan, ANG(Ret.), Salida, California

The Dauntless Dive Bomber of WorldWar Two. By Barett Tillman. Annapolis,Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976 [paper-back edition 2006]. Photographs. Appen-

dices. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x,232. $19.95 Paperback ISBN: 1-59114-867-7

This book is a paperback reprint of aNaval Institute Press hardback book copy-righted in 1976. It has been reprinted atleast once before this version. Mr. Tillmanis a well known author on aviation mat-ters, concentrating on United States NavalAviation.This is one of a series of his booksabout World War II naval aircraft. Othersare the Grumman F4F Wildcat and theGrumman TBF Avenger.

Tillman starts with the U.S. Navy’sdesign competition in the summer of1934 for a light scout-bomber. NorthropAviation won the competition with theXBT-1. However, Northrop could not meetthe Navy’s production requirements. As aresult, the Northrop design and plantwere sold to Douglas in 1938. The XBT-2became the XSBD-1, with a productioncontract for 144 SBDs. In keeping withthe Douglas policy of naming their planeswith words starting with the letter “D,”the SBD was nicknamed “Dauntless.” Inaddition to the physical plant, many per-sonnel left Northrop to go to Douglas,including the chief engineer.

The book follows the SBD throughthe six versions which enjoyed a total pro-duction run of 4,923 aircraft. In addition,the U.S. Army bought 1,013 A-24s, theirversion of the SBD. The first XBT-1 wasdesigned and built for $85,000, while thelast production SBD cost $29,000. Thebook is full of such interesting items.Other examples include how to operatethe diving and landing flaps together (asopposed to just the landing flaps); whyoptical aiming telescopes did not workand were replaced by reflecting sights;where the very few surviving SBDs werein 1975; and what the American pilotrecord for combat dives is (107 is theanswer).

The main thrust of the book, howev-er, is the Pacific naval campaigns. TheSBD was the only aircraft type to partici-pate in all of the five major carrier bat-tles. In 1942, it was responsible for sink-ing six Japanese carriers, the record. Allof the major engagements are describedwith dates and action descriptions, alongwith the personnel who accomplished thedeeds. But the SBD also participated inAtlantic operations, and these are alsoincluded.

All in all, for readers interested inNaval Aviation, particularly in the Pacificin World War II, this is an excellent read.

James A. Painter, Docent, National Air &Space Museum

The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Sad-dam’s Senior Leadership on Opera-tion Iraqi Freedom from the OfficialU.S. Joint Forces Command Report.By Kevin M. Woods, et al. Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 2006. Illustrations.Photographs. Notes.Appendices. Glossary.Bibliography. Pp. xxi, 205 PaperbackISBN: 1-59114-457-4

What were Saddam Hussein and hisclosest advisors thinking and doing aswar clouds gathered over Iraq on the eveof Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)? TheIraqi Perspectives Report figurativelyputs the reader into Saddam’s shoes tobetter understand the rationales thatdrove Iraqi decision-making not only inthe period immediately prior to OIF andcontinuing until Iraq collapsed, but alsoduring much of Saddam’s stormy rela-tionship with the United States. His mis-judgments about America’s willingness touse force are better understood in light ofhis inadequate assessment of U.S. perfor-mance in Vietnam, Somalia, the air cam-paign against Serbia, and OperationsDesert Storm and Desert Fox.

Why is an understanding of Iraq’sactions and military operations impor-tant now that the Saddam regime isgone? His Iraq in many ways resemblesother problematic regimes that remain apart of the current geopolitical landscape.Perhaps a better understanding of thedecision-making process common toauthoritarian regimes will better enablethis country to more effectively react tochallenges from that quarter. On theoperational level there is valuable insightinto why an authoritarian regime main-tains alternate paramilitary formationsand, importantly, how they should beaddressed in the planning for a militarycampaign against such a country.

What goal did the United StatesJoint Forces Command (JFC) have in pro-ducing this valuable study? The authorsof this report paralleled the JFC’s LessonsLearned Report on the conduct of majorcombat operations during OIF but, in thiscase, from the adversary point of view.Consequently, OIF lessons learned areenhanced by an appreciation of the foe’sdecision-making process and employmentof forces and, thus, better understood.This study draws heavily on informedinterviews with senior Ba’athists andIraqi general officers and is supported byIraqi documentation. To assist the reader,the opening section provides a brief cul-tural immersion in Ba’athism, Saddam-ism, and the geopolitical environment inwhich Iraq existed leading up to OIF.

U.S. national security strategy is dri-ven by vital national interests and by per-

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ceived threats to this nation’s well being.In this context, Iraq was no different inthat it (Saddam) determined similar con-cerns. The authors explore the interestsand threats that were driving Saddamand his closest advisors in the formulationof policy. Saddam’s highest priority waspreservation of his regime. In his view theUS was not a concrete threat to regimesurvival. He concluded that the U.S.would rely on air campaigns to punishIraq, a method of warfare that in his esti-mation could be weathered and did notconstitute a threat to his hold on power.He did not believe that it was in the U.S.interest to launch a major ground offen-sive into Iraq in light of perceived U.S.intolerance for large-scale casualties. Thethreats as assessed by Saddam were, indescending order: an uprising within Iraq;a military coup; an invasion by Iran, an

attack by Israel, a U.S.-led air campaignagainst Iraq, and lastly, and unlikely, aU.S.-led coalition ground attack ultimate-ly targeting Baghdad. All of this droveregime policies and military planning.

This leads to the issue of Weapons ofMass Destruction (WMD) and the dilem-ma Saddam faced as he attempted toaccommodate his two mutually exclusivepolicies. The two most threateningnations from Saddam’s perspective wereIran and Israel, nations that possessWMD. He sought to intimidate thosecountries by creating ambiguity aboutIraq’s WMD program. Additionally, WMDhad been used in suppressing Shiite andKurdish resistance to his regime, againproving their value as weapons of intimi-dation. On the other hand, he wanted toend WMD-driven UN sanctions. To do thishe had to conclusively demonstrate that

all such weapons no longer existed in hisarsenal and that WMD development hadended. This study, while not focused onWMD, does shed light on how Saddamincongruously attempted to accommodatethe two opposed objectives.

Another question that is addressedconcerns the origins of insurgent presencein Iraq.The authors could find no evidencethat Saddam had constituted paramilitaryforces (i.e., the Fedayeen Saddam, the Al-Quds Army, and the Ba’ath militias) forthe purpose of counter-occupation opera-tions, simply because he did not anticipatethat Iraq would be occupied by Coalitionforces. Yet, one might conclude it wasinevitable that highly motivated andfanatical irregular forces trained in gueril-la operations and possessing numerouscaches of munitions throughout Iraqwould continue the struggle with growingconfidence against an under strengthoccupying force.

Kudos to JFC for producing this valu-able work and making it available to ageneral readership. It provides a morecomplete understanding of importantdynamics at work in Iraq before and dur-ing the campaign against Saddam’sregime. Having said that, the inclusion ofan index would have improved the utilityof this book. Cross referencing issuesraised by one interviewee with the sameissues raised elsewhere in the book wasdifficult without an index.

Col. John L. Cirafici, USAF (Ret.),Milford, Delaware

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Available atWWW.GPO.GOV

Dear Readers:

Have you read any of the booksreviewed above? If so, do you have adifferent opinion of the book? Writeand tell us.. Send your comments to:

EditorAir Power History11908 Gainsborough Rd.Potomac, MD 20854E-mail: [email protected]

Leon Bennett explores the combat sequences, the arts of aerial gunnery, and the weapons and planes used by the World War I fi ghter pilots. He gives the lowdown on why it was so hard to score a hit and what qualities helped the aces succeed. Bennett uses his detailed insight into the mechanics of air warfare to search for the answer to the enduring controversy of what fi nally brought the Red Baron down. 156 pp. 65 b&w photos. 67 drawings. 20 graphs. $29.95 cloth

TEXAS A&MUnivers i ty Press

www.tamu.edu/upress

800-826-8911

Fax: 888-617-2421

Albert Helfrick traces the paired history of modern aviation and electronics, or avionics, from its earliest years to the indispensable tool it is today. He provides a thorough account of the roles played by the famous and the obscure, from Edwin Howard Armstrong to David Sarnoff , in the successful creation of aviation technology.224 pp. 16 b&w photos. 1 line drawing. $37.95 cloth. $19.95 paper

James Davis piloted a B-24 on more than thirty missions in the European Th eatre during World War II. He fl ew support missions for Operations Cobra and Market Garden and numerous bombing missions over occupied Europe in1944. “Th is marvelous story will take you there with [Davis] and his crew.”—LTC Charles H. Freudenthal, USAF Ret. 304 pp. 22 b&w illus. 1 map. $27.95 cloth

Brigadier Gen. Haywood “Possum” Hansell and Maj. Gen. Curtis “the Eagle” LeMay pioneered the concepts of strategic airpower and high-altitude precision bombing. Th is book off ers a rare insider’s perspective. “Simply the best original work I have read in thirty years.”—Tom Britton, National Air and Space Museum368 pp. 24 b&w photos. 2 maps. $29.95 paper

University of North Texas and Texas A&M books available through

DOMINANCE of the

SKIES

Kaufman, Robert G. In Defense of the Bush Doctrine.Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2007.Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 251.$35.00 ISBN: 978-0-8131-2434-6

Lebensen, Len. Surrounded By Heroes: SixCampaigns with Divisions Headquarters, 82ndAirborne Division, 1942-1945. Philadelphia:Casemate, 2007. Photographs. Pp. 213. $32.95Paperback ISBN: 1-932-033-58-8

Leversedge, T.F.J. Canadian Combat and SupportAircraft: A Military Compendium. St Catherines,Ont., Canada: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 2007.Tables. Photographs. Bibliography. Pp. xv, 348.$50.00 (Cdn) ISBN: 1-55125-116-7

Rabasa, Angel, et al. Ungoverned Territories:Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks.Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007. Maps. Tables.Diagrams. Illustrations. Notes. Appendices.Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxxii, 352. $44.00Paperback ISBN: 0-8330-4152-4

Statler, Kathryn C. Replacing France:The Origins ofAmerican Intervention in Vietnam. Lexington: TheUniversity Press of Kentucky, 2007. Notes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 378. $45.00 ISBN: 978-0-8131-2440-7

Watt, George. Escape from Hitler’s Europe: AnAmerican Airman behind Enemy Lines. Lexington:The University Press of Kentucky, 1990.Photographs. Index. Pp. 158. $17.95 PaperbackISBN: 978-0-8131-91768

Wilson, James. propaganda Postcards of theLuftwaffe. UK: Pen and Sword, 2007. Photographs.Appendix. Bibliography. Pp. 224. $32.95 ISBN: 1-84415-491-2


Bowman, Martin W. Clash of Eagles: AmericanBomber Crews and the Luftwaffe, 1942-1945.Barnsley, South Yorkshire, UK: Pen and Sword,2006. Photographs. Glossary. Index. Pp. xi, 254.$50.00 ISBN: 1-84415-413-0

Brokaw, Tom. The Greatest Generation. New York:Random House, 1998. Photographs. Index. Pp. xxx,412. $34.95 ISBN: 0-375-50202-5

Davis, William E. A Navy Pilot’s Story—Sinking ofthe Rising Sun: Dog Fighting & Dive Bombing inWorld War II. St. Paul, Minn.: Zenith Press anImprint of MBI Publishing, 2007. Illustrations.Photographs. Pp. 304. $25.95 ISBN: 0-7603-2946

Fields, Kenney Wayne. The Rescue of Streetcar 304:A Navy Pilot’s Forty Hours on the Run in Laos.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.Photographs. Pp. xviii, 311. $29.05 ISBN: 1-978-1-59114-272-0

Graham, Thomas Jr. and Keith A. Hansen SpySatellites and Other Intelligence Technologies thatChanged History. Seattle: University ofWashington, Press, 2007. Photographs. Notes.Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi,159. $14.95 Paperback ISBN: 978-8131-9275 03 176

Hilliard, Jack B. Capronis, Farmans and SIAs: U.S.Army Aviation Training and Combat in Italy withFiorello La Guardia, 1917-1918. Trento, Italy:LoGisma in collaboration with Museo Aeronautico.Illustrations. Photographs. Notes. Appendices.Glossary. Bibliography. Pp. 615 E 27,00 PaperbackISBN: 88-87621-60-8

Holloway, James L., III. Aircraft Carriers at War: APersonal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and theSoviet Confrontation. Annapolis, Md.: NavalInstitute Press, 2007. Photographs. Glossary. Index.Pp. xiii, 479. $34.95. ISBN: 1-978-1-59114-391-8

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listedabove is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)3704 Brices Ford Ct.Fairfax, VA 22033Tel. (703) 620-4139e-mail: [email protected]

* Already under review.

Books Received


Oct 16-17The Air Force Historical Foundation will hold aseminar in the Washington, D.C. area on the theme“The Evolution of Air and Space Power: Know the Past,Prepare for the Future.” See http://afhistoricalfounda-tion.org

Oct 18-21The Society for the History of Technology will holdits annual meeting in Washington, D.C. See http://www.historytechnology.org/annualmtg.html

Oct 24-28The Oral History Association will hold its annualmeeting at the Marriott Oakland City Center in Oakland,California. The theme is: “The Revolutionary Ideal:Transforming Community through Oral History.” Seehttp://omega.dickinson.edu/organization/oha/org_am.html

2008January 3-6

The American Historical Association will hold itsannual meeting in Washington, D.C. See http://www.his-torians.org

Readers are invited to submit listings of upcomingevents Please include the name of the organization,title of the event, dates and location of where it will beheld, as well as contact information. Send listings to:

Air Power History11908 Gainsborough Rd.Potomac, MD 20854E-mail: [email protected]

The Best of 2006

The Best Article

A team of three judges has selected Lt. Col. John Plating’s “Cannon, Egg, Charlie and Baker:Airlift Links between World War II and the Chinese Civil War” as the best article to appear in AirPower History during 2006. Lt. Col. Mr. Plating’s article appeared in the Fall issue of the magazine.

Seven articles were nominated for this year’s award, with the judging being very close. In theend, only a few points separated the top three in the scoring, with the judges noting that each of thearticles presented important new information on air operations worldwide, not just of the U.S. AirForce.

This year’s judges were Lt. Col. Raymond Fredette, USAF (Ret.); General Hansford T. Johnson,USAF (Ret.), of the Institute for Defense Analyses; and Dr. Perry Jamieson, of the Office of Air ForceHistory.

The Best Book

We have completed the judging for the 2006 Air Force Historical Foundation Book award. Thewinner is Sabres over MiG Alley, by Kenneth P. Werrell.

Judges this year were Major Lawrence Spinetta, USAF; Dr. Torger Anderson, of the Institute forDefense Analyses; and Col. William Erikson, USAF (Ret.), of the Institute for Defense Analyses. Thejudges were unanimous in selecting Sabres, citing the book as dealing not only with the F-86Sabrejet, but more fully representing an exploration of the air war in Korea. Dr. Werrell’s book is anexceptionally well documented work that brings up questions that could have relevance now and inthe future on how conflicts are prosecuted. The book also explores how well the military and politi-cal leaders prescribed the geographical employment limits of air power in the Korean War, and whatcharacteristics distinguished between “good” and “bad” combat pilots.

All of the judges praised the readability of Sabres over MiG Alley, recommending it for anyoneinterested in understanding modern air warfare.


AIR FORCE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

Election of Members of the Board of Directors

October 17, 2007

The Bylaws of the Air Force Historical Foundation call for a Board of Directors of18 members, elected in three classes of six each; the terms of six Board members(the “Class of 2008”) will expire at the annual meeting in Spring 2008. ANominating Committee of at least three members not currently serving on theBoard, chosen by the Chairman of the Board, is responsible for nominating a slatefor each election. The Nominating Committee is appointed by the Chairman of theBoard, and this year consists of General Hansford T. Johnson, USAF, (Ret),Herman Wolk (Air Force civilian historian, retired), and Lt Gen Raymond Johns,USAF. According to a June 4, 2007 letter from General Johnson, “the Committeebelieves that the Foundation’s future for the near term would be best served bythe continuance of these board members.” Therefore, the Committee recom-mended that the following six directors be nominated to a full three-year term onthe Board:

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Russell C. Davis, USAF (Ret)Mr John F. KreisMaj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret)Lt Col Lawrence A. Spinetta, USAF

A pull-out post card is enclosed in this (Fall 2007) issue of this journal, and theBoard of Directors urges you to fill it out, mark your vote, and return it to theFoundation office before the next Board of Directors meeting on October 17, 2007,where the votes will be counted and announced. The results will be announced inthe Winter 2007 issue.


The Air Force Historical Foundation

Proudly Presents

A Symposium Celebrating the60th Anniversary of the United States Air Force

Tuesday, October 16 and Wednesday, October 17, 2007

Sheraton Crystal City Hotel1800 Jefferson Davis Highway

Arlington VA 22202

The Evolution of Air and Space Power:Know the Past—Shape the Future

Panels: War in the Shadows, Conventional War, andSpace and Cyber War

Register online at www.afhistoricalfoundation.org/symposium

Featured speakers include the senior leaders of the U.S. Air Force:

Hon. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary of the Air ForceGeneral T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, USAF

General John D. W. Corley, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

The Air Force Historical Foundation is able to producethis symposium thanks to the generous support of our

corporate sponsors

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

EADS NORTH AMERICA DEFENSE


The Program

Tuesday, October 16, 2007

7:30 Registration, Coffee, and Networking

8:30 Introductions and Welcome: Col Jere Wallace, Symposium Chair

Opening Remarks: Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, President andChairman of the Board, Air Force HistoricalFoundation

Keynote Address: Dr (Col, USAF, Ret) Philip Meilinger

9:00 Panel A: War in the Shadows

Chair: Maj Gen Richard L. Comer, USAF (Ret)

9:05 Paper 1: Dr Michael P. MayThe Forgotten Air Force Strategy for Limited Wars

9:30 Paper 2: Major Gregory P. RobertsJolly Green and the Long War: AsymmetricallyLeveraging USAF Combat Search and RescueCapability across the Range of MilitaryOperations

9:55 Paper 3: Dr John A. GloverWhither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense: AnUpdate and a Way Ahead

10:20 Break

10:50 Paper 4: Dr Timothy R. Keck, Operation Unified Assistance: A Historical Assessment of the 2004-2005 Tsunami Humanitarian Relief Operation

11:15 Questions & Answers

12:00 End Panel A

12:30 Buffet Luncheon

Luncheon Address: Gen John D. W. Corley, Vice Chief of Staff,USAF (Nominated Commander, Air CombatCommand)

2:00 End Luncheon

2:30 Panel B: Conventional War

Chair: Mr C. R. “Dick” Anderegg, Director, USAF Historyand Museums Program

2:35 Paper 1: Lt Col Christopher M. ReinGeneral John K. Cannon and the Twelfth AirForce in the North African Campaign

2:55 Paper 2: Dr Thomas HughesThe Cactus Air Force in World War II

3:15 Paper 3: Dr Paul D. Gelpi, Jr.To Shape the Postwar Debate: “Opie” Weyland, theFar East Air Force, Air University QuarterlyReview, and Tactical Airpower, 1951-1954

3:35 Break

4:05 Paper 4: Dr Alan D. Meyer and CMSgt David AndersonThe Air National Guard’s Evolving Role in Low-Intensity Conflict: Engaging Non-State Actorsboth at Home and Abroad

4:25 Paper 5: Dr James D. PerryAerospace Power and the Sanctuary Problem


5:30 End Panel B

6:00 Reception

7:00 Banquet

Introduction of SecAF: Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, President andChairman of the Board, Air Force HistoricalFoundation

Remarks: The Honorable Michael W. Wynne, SecAF

Dinner Served

Banquet Address: Mr Keith Ferris, famed aviation artist

Award Presenter: The Honorable Michael W. Wynne, SecAF

Air Force Historical Foundation’s – First Annual General Carl “Tooey”Spaatz Award. The award is presented to an individual or group for extra-ordinary, sustained contributions to the making of Air Force history.

10:00 Banquet Ends


Wednesday, October 17, 2007

7:30 Coffee and Networking

8:30 Start Second Day of Symposium

8:30 Panel C: Space and Cyber War

Chair: Ms Natalie Crawford

8:35 Paper 1: Dr Robert M. DieneschMIDAS: The Birth of Early Warning

9:00 Paper 2: Dr David G. SmithDARPA Rising: The Race for Space and the EarlyYears of the Advanced Research Projects Agency,1958-1960

9:25 Paper 3: Mr Chris M. MayseHigh Altitude ISR, Meeting the Needs of the WarFighter: An Evolution in Operations

9:50 Break

10:30 Paper 4: Dr Rick W. SturdevantFrom Satellite Tracking to Space SituationalAwareness: The USAF and Space Surveillance,1957-2007


11:45 End Panel C

12:00 Buffet Luncheon

Luncheon Address: Gen T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, USAF

Award Presenter: Gen T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, USAF

The Air Force Historical Foundation’s – First Annual Major General I. B.Holley Award. The award is presented to an individual or group for extra-ordinary, sustained contributions to the documentation of Air Force his-tory.

1:30 End Luncheon

5:00 End Displays in AtriumEnd Symposium


Symposium Registration Fees:Register online at www.afhistoricalfoundation.org/symposiumThe registration fees depend upon military status and membership in the Air ForceHistorical Foundation (AFHF). Members of the military in uniform, from any ser-vice or any nation, are charged lower prices, as are members of the Foundation.———————————————————————————————————————————MILITARY IN UNIFORM (ANY SERVICE, ANY NATION), MEMBER OF AIR FORCE HIS-TORICAL FOUNDATION (AFHF)

Presentations only, no meals FREETuesday Luncheon $ 25Wednesday Luncheon $ 25Banquet $ 40Program and all three meals $100———————————————————————————————————————————MILITARY IN UNIFORM, NOT A MEMBER OF AFHF

Presentations only, no meals $25Tuesday Luncheon $35Wednesday Luncheon $35Banquet $50Program and all three meals $150———————————————————————————————————————————CIVILIAN (INCLUDING RETIRED MILITARY), MEMBER OF AFHF

Presentations only, no meals NOT AN OPTIONTuesday Luncheon $35Wednesday Luncheon $35Banquet $50Program and all three meals $180Program, two luncheons, no banquet $155———————————————————————————————————————————CIVILIAN (INCLUDING RETIRED MILITARY), NOT A MEMBER OF AFHF

Presentations only, no meals NOT AN OPTIONTuesday Luncheon $50Wednesday Luncheon $50Banquet $65Program and all three meals $230Program, two luncheons, no banquet $205———————————————————————————————————————————DISPLAY TABLE Members: $50 Non-Members: $100———————————————————————————————————————————

Info: [email protected]: www.afhistoricalfoundation.org/symposium


Hotel Registration:

Sheraton Crystal City Hotel1800 Jefferson Davis HighwayArlington VA 22202(703) 486-1111

The Air Force Historical Foundation room block is open for registration on the Web through thisWeb site:http://www.starwoodmeeting.com/StarGroupsWeb/booking/reservation?id=0704113123&key=886A7

The room rate is $220 single or double, plus applicable state and local taxes, currently 10.25%,for a total of $242.55 including tax. To get the best available rate, mention the Air ForceHistorical Foundation room block. Check-in time is 3:00 pm and check-out time is 12:00 noon.When the room block is full, many other fine hotels are available in the Crystal City area. Toensure availability, make your room reservation NOW.

Parking: Available in the hotel’s underground garage at a special rate of $10 per day. Vehiclesover 6’8” cannot fit into the garage. Guest parking is on a space-available basis.

Metro: The Crystal City Metro Station exits onto 18th Street, two blocks from the hotel.

What to wear: For the business sessions and luncheons, military may wear the uniformof the day, either service dress, Class A, uniform informal, or utility uniforms such as BDUs,ABUs, or flight suits. Civilians will wear business attire. For the banquet on Oct 16, mili-tary will wear service dress, Class A, or uniform informal. Civilians will wear business attire.(NO mess dress or black tie.)

Info: [email protected]: www.afhistoricalfoundation.org/symposium



Tuskegee Airmen

Congratulations on the excellent cov-erage of the President’s presentation ofthe Congressional Gold Medal to theTuskegee Airmen [Air Power History, Vol.54, No.2, summer 2007]. But I believe Dr.Gropman is unnecessarily hard onRoosevelt, citing the President’s need toget re-elected as the only reason heapproved establishing the Tuskegeeexperiment. How about the role EleanorRoosevelt played after the ride she tookwith Chief Anderson, which someTuskegee Airmen believe was the realimpetus? How about just recognizing andacceding to the pressure from anoppressed minority?

Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland. USAF (Ret.)

Atlas ICBM and PERT

As mentioned by book reviewer Dr.Rick Sturdevant, Chuck Walker, theauthor of Atlas: The Ultimate Weaponand a senior Convair-Astronautics (laterGeneral Dynamics) Atlas planning andcontrol manager 1953-1963, points outthat employment of the computerizedProgram and Evaluation ReviewTechnique (PERT) required by the AirForce for activation of operational Atlassites helped prevent schedule slips. [AirPower History, Vol. 54, No.2, summer2007.]

That prompts me to recall anotherearly use of PERT by the Air Force. In1961-1962, PERT was implemented andoperated with effectiveness in the devel-opment of the Satellite Interceptor(SAINT) at the then new Air Force SpaceSystems Division. The unmanned SAINTwas being developed to rendezvous with atarget satellite and inspect it with varioussensors. I was a junior project officer inthat program, Program 621A, and wasinvolved in the PERT implementation.For the record, I would like to note that Ithink that the highly competent estab-lishment and useful employment ofPERT in the SAINT program were main-ly the result of the excellent work of theAerospace Corporation PERT implemen-tation team, led by Michael Lesh. Theprime contractor, RCA, also did very wellin this.

As a separate historical observationon the SAINT program, just weeks beforethe SAINT’s scheduled first launch in

December 1962, Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara canceled the program.

Maj. Gen. Richard T. Boverie, USAF (Ret.),West Palm Beach, Florida.

Dr. Dennis Floyd Casey 1941-2007

Dr. Dennis F. Casey died in NewBraunfels, Texas on June 19, 2007 follow-ing a seven- month battle with cancer. Hehad retired from civil service in March,2007.

Born on August 9, 1941 in Baker-sfield, California, he attended CaliforniaState University at Los Angeles, earningBA and MA degrees in history. He earneda PhD in Latin American history from theUniversity of Kansas, where he was alsonamed a Fulbright-Hays Research Fellow.

Dr. Casey became a staff historian atFifteenth Air Force in 1976, and ChiefHistorian in 1983. Under Dr. Casey’s lead-ership, the Fifteenth garnered the Out-standing USAF Numbered Air Force levelHistory Program Award three years run-ning from 1984 through 1986. He served

as a visiting faculty member with AirUniversity and the Air Force HistoricalResearch Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama,as well as an adjunct Professor at theUniversity of Redlands.

In 1983, Dr. Casey moved to RandolphAFB, Texas, to join the HQ AETC historyprogram. He researched and wroteReshaping the Future: from ATC to AETC,which earned the Air Force Excellence inHistorical Publications Award for 1994. Healso worked as an adjunct Professor withthe Alamo Community College District,teaching at both St. Philips and San Anto-nio Colleges. In 1995, Dr. Casey becamethe Chief Historian, HQ AIA in San An-tonio.Where he developed and implement-ed the Air Force Intelligence Oral HistoryProgram. Dr. Casey also wrote and pub-lished three editions of the “USAFSS, ESC,AFIC AIA Continuing Legacy” brochurewhich outlines AIA’s nearly six decades asthe Air Force’s air intelligence arm. Dr.Casey received the Outstanding CivilianCareer Service Award and was the firstrecipient of the Grant Hales HistoryProgram Career Achievement Award.

Dr. Casey is survived by his wife ofnearly 40 years, Suzy, son Andy and hiswife Saori, grandson Dean and son Ryan.His son SSG David A. Casey, U.S. Army,(Ret.) preceded him in death in February2003.

Letters

News


Ceremony Honors American WW IIPlane Crash Victims

On June 14, 2007, the Embassy ofAustralia, in cooperation with the BakersCreek Memorial Association (USA) andthe Washington Sub-Branch of the Re-turned and Services League of Australia,hosted a ceremony at a memorial markerhonoring 40 American servicemen killedin a tragic airplane crash at BakersCreek, near Mackay, Australia, duringWorld War II (Above).

Professor Robert S. Cutler of GeorgeWashington University, whose late father,Capt. Samuel Cutler, supervised the load-ing of the passengers on that fatefulflight, wrote in his book, Mackay’s FlyingFortress (CQU Press) that the incidentoriginally was deemed a “military secret”to prevent wartime disclosure. “In recentyears, however,” Cutler said, “thanks tothe tireless work of people in Australiaand the United States, the full magnitudeof the disaster finally was uncovered andthere is increased recognition of this his-toric event.” The marker stands as a sym-bol of the bond of friendship betweenAustralia and the United States thatstarted during the Second World War andhas endured to this day.

Fifteen years ago, some fifty yearsafter the tragic crash, citizens of Mackay,Australia, marked the crash site atBakers Creek with a permanent memori-al. Eight years later, in the United States,a group of retired U.S. military veteransand family relatives of the crash victimsformed the Bakers Creek MemorialAssociation (USA). It took a handful ofhistorians years to find out anythingabout the Bakers Creek crash. There waslittle to be found in military archives. TheAssociation wanted to place a memorialmarker in the United States, as one mem-ber put it — “to set the record right.”

Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey,1913-2007

Rear Adm. Rear Eugene B. Fluckey,USN (Ret.), winner of the Medal of Honorand four Navy Crosses for the destructionof twenty-nine enemy ships in World WarII, , including several submarines, an air-craft carrier, a cruiser, and a destroyerdied on June 28, 2007. He was ninety-three.

As commander of the submarine USSBarb in 1944 and 1945, he launched dar-ing attacks on Japanese submarines andother ships along the China coast.Admiral Fluckey graduated from theNaval Academy in 1935. After the war, hewas an aide to Fleet Admiral Chester W.Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations. Later,Fluckey became director of naval intelli-gence and commanded amphibious unitsand the Navy’s Pacific submarine force.

He wrote Thunder Below (Universityof Illinois Press, 1992) an account of hisexperiences as a submarine commander.In July 1995, Admiral Fluckey was thefeatured banquet speaker at a World WarII symposium held at the Bethesda NavalMedical Center, which was co-sponsoredby the Air Force Historical Foundation.

The C-7A Caribou Association willhold a reunion September 6-9, 2007, inSan Antonio, Texas. Contact:

Bill Buesking(210) 403-2635e-mail: [email protected]: c-7caribou.com/reuniondex.htm

The 27th Air Transport Group (310th,311th, 312th, and 325th Ferrying Squa-drons; 86th, 87th, 320th, and 321stTransport Sqdns; 519th and 520thService Sqdns) will hold a reunionSeptember 27-30,2007, in Washington,D.C.Contact:

Fred Garcia6533 W. Altadena Ave.Glendale, AZ 85304(623) 878-7007

The 7499th Squadron, 7499th Group,7405th Squadron, 7406th Squadron,7407th Squadron, 7575th Group and7580th Squadron of the United StatesAir Forces Europe will hold a reunionOctober 4-8, 2007 at the Double TreeHotel in Crystal City, Virginia. Contact:

Alan Brown at 703-455-3828, or John Bessette at 703-568-1875 web: www.7499thgroupreunions.com

The Air Force Officer CandidateSchool is planning a reunion open to allwho attended AFOCS from 1943 to 1963.The reunion will be held November 11-15,2007, in Tucson, Arizona. Contact

Dave Mason910-287-1754e-mail: [email protected]

2008

UPT Class 68-08, Laredo, Texas willhold a reunion in June 2008, location to bedetermined. Anyone interested contact:

Putt Richards(808) 638-0268e-mail: [email protected]

Strategic Air Command AirborneCommand and Control Association(SAC ACCA) will hold a reunion October15-19, 2008, in Dayton, Ohio. Contact:

Wilton Curtis(804) 740-2290e-mail: [email protected]

Reunions

Readers are invited to submit listings ofupcoming or reunion events Pleaseinclude the name of the organization, titleof the event, dates and location of where itwill be held, as well as contact informa-tion. Send listings to:

Air Power History11908 Gainsborough Rd.Potomac, MD 20854E-mail: [email protected]


General Howell M. Estes, Jr.1914-2007

Air Force General Howell M. Estes, Jr. died onJuly 2, 2007, at his home in Bethesda, Maryland.He was ninety-two.

The son of an Army officer, he was born in 1914 atFt. Oglethorpe, Georgia. He was a 1936 graduate ofthe U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. andwas captain of its championship polo team. Afterreceiving his commission in the Cavalry, he enteredpilot training school in June 1939 and upon comple-tion, transferred to the Army Air Corps in April 1940.

During World War II, he was a flight instructorand then director of training at Brooks Field, Texas.Subsequently, he was appointed Commandant ofCadets, Director of Flying, and Director of Training.In February 1944, General Estes assumed com-mand of Blackland and then Lubbock Army AirFields. In January 1946, he became Chief of Plansand Policy, Operations Division, U.S. Air Forces inEurope. After joining the newly-established U.S. AirForce in 1947, General Estes rose to Assistant Chief

of Staff Plans at USAFE. In June 1949, he completed the Air War College course.During the Korean War, he was vice commander of the Far East Air Forces Bomber

Command flew twenty-five combat missions in B-29s, with a total of 328 hours. After the war,he commanded Air Task Group 7.4 Joint Task Group Seven, which was responsible for theOperation Castle nuclear testing at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. He held numer-ous command positions in weapon system development and air defense, including Commanderof the 22d Bombardment Wing, 44the BW, the 320th BW, and the 12th Air Division,

In 1961, as Deputy Commander Aerospace Systems (AFSC), he oversaw the construction ofsilos and installation of ICBMs. From 1964 to 1969, during the Vietnam War, General Estes ledthe Military Air Transport Service, (later Military Airlift Command and now the Air MobilityCommand). In addition to responsibilities for air delivery of cargo, he had oversight of aeromed-ical evacuations, air rescue, air weather, photography, and mapping services world-wide.

Among his medals and decorations are thee Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, theArmy Distinguished Service Medal, three awards of the Legion of Merit, the DistinguishedFlying Cross, and two awards of the Air Medal. In 1967, he was presented the general H.H.Arnold Trophy for outstanding contributions to military aviation and aerospace programs.

After his retirement form the Air Force, on August 1, 1969, he served brief terms as presi-dent of World Airways in Oakland, California, and the Federal Express Corporation inMemphis, Tennessee. General Estes was an active member of the Board of Directors of the AirForce Historical Foundation.

He is survived by three sons, General Howell M. Estes, III, Michael S. Estes, and CharlesD. Estes; a sister, Katherine Estes; ten grandchildren; and eleven great-grandchildren.

In Memoriam


Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons1921-2007

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC(Ret.) passed away on May 5, 2007. Born and raisedin Paulsboro, New Jersey, he earned a BA degree injournalism from Lehigh University and an MA fromOhio State University. Prior to accepting his commis-sion as a Marine second lieutenant on June 12, 1942,he held an Army Reserve commission.

During World War II, he trained at Marine CorpsSchools, Quantico, Va. and Camp Lejeune, N.C., priorto serving overseas with the 5th Field Depot in theSouth and Central Pacific. He took part in combatduring the capture of Guam and later served with the7th Service Regiment on Okinawa and in China. Hewas promoted to captain in January 1944 and tomajor in June 1949.

Following the war, he served for three and one-halfyears as Managing Editor of the Marine Corps Gazette,then completed the Amphibious Warfare School,Junior Course, Quantico, in 1950. At the outbreak ofthe Korean conflict, he was serving with the Weapons

Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, Camp Lejeune. In August 1950, with his unit (part of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines), he was ordered to Korea and participated in the Inchon Landing thatSeptember. He continued in combat as a weapons company commander during the North KoreanAggression, the Communist China Aggression and the First UN Counter Offensive; and as a bat-talion operations officer and executive officer during the Communist China Spring Offensive.

Returning to the United States in July 1951, he served in various assignments with the Trainingand Replacement Command at Camp Pendleton, Calif.; with the Naval ROTC unit at Ohio StateUniversity; and with the G-4 Division at Headquarters Marine Corps. He was promoted to lieu-tenant colonel in December 1954. From August 1959 until October 1960, he served as Naval Attachéto the Dominican Republic. Prior to returning to the Dominican Republic in September 1961 as U.S.Military Liaison Officer, U.S. Embassy, Santo Domingo, he was assigned as Senior Editor,Publications Group, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico. In January 1962, he joined the Strategic PlansSection, G-3 Division at Headquarters Marine Corps, and in July 1963 was promoted to colonel.

From July 1965 until July 1966, he served in Vietnam, first as G-3 of III Marine AmphibiousForce, and later, as Commanding Officer, 9th Marine Regiment. Returning from Vietnam, he wasa student at the National War College for the next year prior to reporting to Headquarters MarineCorps where he served as Deputy Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps from August 1967 until May1970. He was advanced to the rank of brigadier general on June 1, 1968.

General Simmons returned to Vietnam for another one year tour, and served as AssistantDivision Commander, 1st Marine Division (Rein), and subsequently as Deputy Commander, IIIMarine Amphibious Brigade. He returned to Headquarters Marine Corps July 20, 1971, where hebecame Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Strategic Studies. On December 1, 1971, he

In Memoriam


We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which arewell-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articlessubmitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publicationat the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate thisat the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historicalcontext, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page.

Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the Chicago Manualof Style (University of Chicago Press). Use civilian dates and endnotes. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously,the author’s name should appear only on the title page. Authors should provide on a separate page brief biographicaldetails, to include institutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages,including those containing illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables mustbe clearly produced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should benumbered consecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end.

If an article is typed on a computer, the disk should be in IBM-PC compatible format and should accompany the man-uscript. Preferred disk size is a 3 1/2-inch floppy, but any disk size can be utilized. Disks should be labelled with thename of the author, title of the article, and the software used. Most Word processors can be accommodated includingWordPerfect and Microsoft Word. As a last resort, an ASCII text file can be used.

There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide.Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, 11908

Gainsborough Rd., Potomac, MD 20854, e-mail: [email protected].

Guidelines for Contributors

assumed duties as Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. He went on the retired list onJuly 1, 1972, but continued on active duty without interruption of service as Director of MarineCorps History and Museums. On July 1, 1978, he reverted to inactive status on the retired list. Inlate October 1978 he returned as a Civil Service employee to his previous position as Director.

General Simmons wrote for numerous military and general publications, including the NavalReview, Naval Institute Proceedings, Marine Corps Gazette, Sea Power, and Army. He is the authorof the short history, The United States Marines, (published London, 1974, and New York, 1976) andhas contributed extensively to various histories and standard works including the EncyclopediaBritannica and the Dictionary of American History. He was a fellow, governor, and treasurer of theCompany of Military Historians and a member of the boards of trustees of the American MilitaryInstitute, the Marine Corps War Memorial Foundation, and the United States Commission onMilitary History. He is also a past president of the 1st Marine Division Association, a life memberand past president of the American Society of Military Comptrollers, and a former vice-president ofthe National War College Alumni Association. In 1970, he received a Centennial DistinguishedGraduate Medallion from Ohio State University.

Among his medals and decorations are: the Distinguished Service Medal, the Silver StarMedal, the Legion of Merit with Combat “V” and two gold stars, the Bronze Star Medal withCombat “V” and gold star, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal withCombat “V”, the Purple Heart, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Presidential Unit Citation withthree bronze stars, the Navy Unit Commendation with one bronze star, the World War II VictoryMedal, the National Defense Service Medal with one bronze star, the Korean Service Medal withone silver star indicative of five bronze stars, the Vietnam Service Medal with one silver star, andthe Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with silver star and two palms.

General Simmons is survived by his wife, the former Frances G. Bliss of Denver, Colorado, twosons, Edwin H. Jr., and Clarke V., and two daughters, Bliss and Courtney.

Appreciation by Charles D. Melson, Chief Historian, U.S. Marine Corps.


Our summer mystery aircraft, as many APHreaders knew, was the Navy’s McDonnell F3H–2Demon fleet interceptor. First flown August 7,1951, the initial Demon, built in XF3H–1 andF3H–1N versions, was crippled by the engineproblems that stymied the Navy during theKorean War era. The Westinghouse J40 turbojetwas plagued with reliability issues. In an unusualgesture that was tantamount to admitting the pro-gram was in mortal danger, McDonnell urged thatthe 9,300-pound thrust Allison J71 be installed ina completely revised version of the Demon.

Of 56 J40-powered F3H–1Ns, 25 never flew.Navy leaders made the difficult decision to groundall of them. They sent most to Memphis, Tenne-ssee, for ignominious duty as ground instructionaltrainers.

On April 23, 1955, a Demon took off from theMcDonnell plant at Lambert-St. Louis MunicipalAirport, Missouri, powered by the J71. This “dashtwo” Demon had more power. “Dash two” Demonshad broader wings with power-operated slats andlarge flaps that enhanced performance at highaltitude and during carrier landing.

The Navy acquired 239 F2H–2, 142 F3H–2N,

and 80 F3H–3M Demons, a total of 461. Theyequipped 25 squadrons from 1956 to 1964. “It wasan interceptor,” said retired Comdr. John “China”Newlin, 69, of San Diego, California, who flewDemons in the early 1960s. “It was designed to goout and intercept raids by Russian Badger andBear bombers.” Newlin remembered that the APG-51 radar-guided weapons system that used theSparrow air-to-air missile “was a fantastic system.”

The Demon the first Fleet warplane to carrythe AAM-N-6 Sparrow and AAM-N-7 Sidewindermissiles, later called the AIM-7 and AIM-9 andubiquitous in Vietnam. When designations werechanged in 1962, the F3H–2, F3H–2N, andF3H–2M Demons became the F–3B F–3C, andMF–3B respectively. The last Navy unit to operatethe Demon exchanged its F–3B Demons for F–4BPhantom IIs in Sept. 1964. Demons are on exhibitat three U.S. museums today.

Our “History Mystery” winner, among thetwenty-six readers who identified the Demon cor-rectly, is retired Air Force MSgt. George Swansonof Dallas. Plane captain Allan Meyne took our fol-low-up photo of the Demon. Our new “HistoryMystery” photo comes to us from Thomas Hegre.

Can you identify our latest “mystery” aircraft?Enter our contest and become the owner of a newbook on aviation history.

Last time around, two APH readers had to bedisqualified because they didn’t include a tele-phone number in their correspondence. Don’t beone of those guys. Remember the rules, please:

1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail thepostcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,Oakton VA 22124. Entries may also be submittedvia e-mail to [email protected].

2. Correctly name the aircraft shown here. Alsoinclude your postal mailing address and telephonenumber.Providing an e-mail address is optional buthelpful.

3. A winner will be chosen at random fromamong those who correctly identify the aircraft, and

send the winner an aviation book.This feature needs your help. Do you have a

photo of a rare or little-known aircraft? Does any-one have color slides? We'll return any photos pro-vided for use here.

ThisIssue’sMysteryPlane

History Mysteryby Robert F. Dorr

Please vote for or against each candidate, marking clearly,and sign and date the card prior to mailing.

FOR AGAINST NAME

_____ _____ Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)_____ _____ Lt Gen Russell C. Davis, USAF (Ret)_____ _____ Mr John F. Kreis_____ _____ Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)_____ _____ Lt Gen Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret)_____ _____ Lt Col Lawrence A. Spinetta, USAF

________________________ ________________________(Signature of AFHF Member) (Date)

________________________________________________________________________________________________

The Air Force Historical Foundation1535 Command Drive Suite A-122Andrews AFB MD 20762-7002

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