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Vivarium

Volume

24

1986

Reprinted

ith he

permission

fthe

original ublisher

by

Periodicals Service

Company

Germantown,

NY

2013

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Printed

n cid-free

aper.

This

eprint

as

reproduced

romhe

best

riginal

dition

opy

vailable.

NOTE O

THE

REPRINTDITION:

In

ome ases

full

age

dvertisements

hicho not dd o

the

cholarly

alue f his olume

ave een mitted.

As

result,

ome

eprinted

olumes

ay

ave

rregular

agination.

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VIVARIUM

AN

INTERNATIONAL

OURNAL

FOR

THE

PHILOSOPHY AND

INTELLECTUAL

LIFE

OF THE

MIDDLE

AGES AND

RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXIV

(1986)

*

<

/1Ш1 j

E.

J.

BRILL

-

LEIDEN

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VIVARIUM

AN

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL

FOR

THE

PHILOS-

OPHY

AND

INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE

MIDDLE

AGES AND RENAISSANCE

vivarium s

devoted

n

particular

o the

profane

side

of

mediaeval

hilosophy

nd

the ntellectualife

f

heMiddle

ges

and Renaissance.

editors

C.

J.

de

Vogel, Utrecht)

L. M. de

Rijk, Leyden)

H. A. G.

Braakhuis,

Nijmegen)

F. F.

Blok,

Amsterdam)J. IJsewijn,

(Louvain)

С. H.

Kneepkens,Nijmegen).

Secretaryf heEditorial oard: rof. . M. deRijk.All

ommunications,

xcept

hose f businessature,houlde

addressed o

С.

H.

Kneepkens,

Katholieke

Universiteit,

Erasmusplein

, 8.20,

P.O. Box

9103,

500HD

Nijmegen,

he

Netherlands.

advisory

Marie-Therèse

'Alverny,

Paris-Poitiers)

Tullio

Gregory,

committee

(Rome)

-

Paul

Oskar

Kristeller,

New

York)

Jan

Pinborgj,

(Copenhagen)

Albert

immermann,

Cologne).

publishers

E.

J.

Brill, eiden,

he

Netherlands.

published

Twice

yearly, ay

and

November;

a 160

pagesyearly.

Contributionsubmittedo vivarium houldpreferablye

written

n

English,

renchr German. he

manuscripts

hould

be

typewritten

nddouble

paced, xcept

or

ong uotations

nd

footnotes.

dequate

margins1 /4inch)

hould e eftt ach

dge

of the sheet.

Footnotes houldbe numbered

ontinuously

throughout

ach rticle.

heymay

e

placed

ithert the

oot

f

the

page

r at the ndof he ext.

Contributors

eceive 5

off-prints

ree f

harge.

ISSN 0042-7543

Copyright

986

by

.

J.

Brill

LeidenTheNetherlands

All

rights

eserved.

o

part f

his ook

ay

e

eproduced

r

translated

n

ny ormby rint,

hotoprint

microfilm,icrofiche

or

ny

ther

eans ithoutritten

ermissionrom

he

ublisher

PRINTED

NTHENETHERLANDS

YE.

J.

BRILL

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CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

XXIV

(1986)

Irene Rosier:

Relatifs

et

relativesdans

les traités

Paris

terministes

es Xlle et

Xllle siècles

(

deuxième

artie)

1

L. M.

de

Rijk:

Walther

Hurley's

De

exceptivis.

Leiden

An Edition

22

Steven

J.

Livesey:

The

Oxford

Calculatores,

Quan-

N orman,Oklahoma tificationf Qualities and Aristotle's

Prohibition

/Metabasis

50

J.

M.

M.

H.

Thijssen:

Buridan

Albert

f

Saxony

nd

Oresme

Nijmegen

and

a

Fourteenth-

entury

ollection

f

Quaestiones

n

the

Physics

nd

on De

Generatione

et

Corruptione

70

L. M.

de

Rijk:

Peter

Abelard' Semantics

and

His

Leiden DoctrinefBeing 85

Cary

J

Nederman

TheAristotelian

oncept

f

he

Mean

and

Christchurch,

ew

Zealand

John

f

alisbury's

onceptf

Liberty

128

Jan

A. Aertsen:

Review

Article

(W.

Kühn,

Das

Amsterdam

Prinzipienproblem

n der

Philosophie

es

Thomas on

Aquin

1

43

Review:

Egbert

P.

Bos,

Marsilius

of

Inghen:

Treatises

on the

Properties

f

Terms

(E.J.

Ashworth)

158

Books Received

83

Announcement

civícíma

163

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Vivarium

XIV,

1

1986)

Relatifs

t relatives

ans les traités erministes

es

XHe et XlIIe siècles

IRENE

ROSIER

Deuxième

artie:

ropositions

elatives

mplicationes

.

Distinction

ntre

estrictives

t non-

restrictives.

Dans

notre

première

partie,

nous

avons

abordé

différentes

uestions

ayant

trait

l'anaphore (

relatio

et aux

termes

anaphoriques,

nous

at-

tachant particulièrementà décrire le fonctionnementdes règles

d'anaphore

et

de leurs

contre-exemples,

ans

distinguer

'anaphore

nominale

de

l'anaphore pronominale.

C'est

ce

qu'il

va nous

falloir

faire à

présent

pour pouvoir

traiter

de ces

' 4

phrases

relatives

(i.e.

contenant

un

terme

relatif)

articulières

ue

sont

es

implicationes

pro-

positions

commençant

par

un

nom

elatif

ex.

qui)

et

auxquelles

seules

nous

réservons

e

nom

de

propositions

relatives.

Les

problèmes

iés

à

celles-ci

ne

sont

pas

abordés

dans les

chapitres

ou

traités

que

nous

avons

analysés précédemment

De

relativis

De

relatione.

)

mais dans

des traités

pécifiques

De

implicationibustractatusmplicitarum...).

1

Anaphore

ominale

t

pronominale

Les

définitions

u

nom

et du

pronom

font

'objet

de

nombreuses

discussions

chez

les

grammairiens

des

XHe

et

XlIIe siècles.

Il

s'agit

en

particulier

d'éclaircir

le sens

des

notions

de

substance

et

qualité,

utilisées

par

Priscien

dans

ces définitions.

a

distinction

ntre

nom

et

pronom

est

surtout

difficile

établir

pour

les noms

générauxinter-

rogatifs,

ndéfinis,

relatifs).

Ce

problème

remonte

à la difficulté

ue

rencontre

Priscien

pour

reclasser

ce

qu'Apollonius

Dyscole

range

sous

l'article,

catégorie

qu'il

n'accepte

pas

pour

le latin:

ce

qui

fait

fonction

'article

prépositif

n

latin,

c'est

le

pronom

hic haec

hoc

dit

Priscien

et

après

lui

les

grammairiens

médiévaux.

La différence

ntre

le

pronom

et l'article

est

cependent

que

l'article

est seulement

anaphorique,

alors

que

hic

signifie,

en

tant

que

pronom,

une

substance.

La

classe nominale

comprenait,

chez

Apollonius,

outre es

noms propres et les noms communs (héritage stoïcien), des inter-

rogatifs,

ndéfinis

t

corrélatifs.

C'est

avec

ces

derniers

que

Priscien

rangera

les

relatifs,

ui

correspondent

ux articles

postpositifs.

Con-

1

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trairement Donat

et aux

autres

grammairiens

atins,

et contraire-

ment

à la

terminologie

rammaticale

ctuelle,

qui

est

donc,

pour

Pris-

cien etles médiévaux, un nom elatif.Pierre Hélie donne de nombreux

argumentspour

montrer

ue quis-qui

non

seulement

st un même mot

ayant

les

trois fonctions

indéfinie, nterrogative

t

anaphorique)

mais

est bien un nom non

un

pronom1.

l

restaitnéanmoins

des

divergences

sur

le

type

de substance

et de

qualité signifiée ar

les

noms

généraux.

On

acceptait

souvent

'idée

qu'ils

signifient

ne

qualité

indéfinie t/ou

une substance indéfinie2.

L'

anaphore

posait

un

problème

difficile. i Г

anaphore

a,

avec

la

deixis,

pour

rôle de

permettre

u

pronom

de

désigner

un

individu

déterminé, st-ceque l'anaphore nominalene le permettraitas aussi,

rendant alors le

nom relatif

parfaitement

éterminé,

ce

qui

est

con-

traire à

la

propriété

générale

de

tous les

noms,

de

signifier

'confusé-

ment .

Nous n'avons

pas

trouvé

de

réponse

satisfaisante

ce

pro-

blème.

On

peut

citer

un

cas

intéressant

ù

apparaît

bien

la

différence

e

fonctionnement

ntre le

nom

et le

pronom

dans

le

phénomène

d'anaphore,

c'est

celui de

la

mutua

relatio u

anaphore

réciproque,

comme

ille

qui

currit

isputât.

Lambert

d'Auxerre

discute

de

cette

anaphore

de manière cohérenteavec la définition u nom et du

pro-

nom:

ille en

tant

que

pronom,

signifie

un

réfèrent,

n

suppôt

déter-

miné,

et

définit

insi le nom

relatif

ui quant

au

suppôt; qui

en

tant

que

nom,

signifie

une

qualité

(générale)

et

définit

lle

quant

à

la

qualité,

i.e.

définit

'individu

auquel

ille

réfère

ar

une

propriétépar-

ticulière

celle,

en

fait,

qui

est

exprimée

par

la

relative).

Ille

est donc

définissant

uant

au

réfèrent

c'est

un

pronom)

et

défini

quant

à la

qualité

alors

que

qui

est

définissant

uant

à

la

qualité

(c'est

un

nom)

et

défini

quant

au

réfèrent3.

La

différence e

fonctionnement

ue

nous

avons

recontrée

entre

anaphore

nominale

et

pronominale

dans notre

première

partie,

à

pro-

pos

du

problème

de

la

restriction

emporelle,

st

ustifiée

e

plus

sou-

vent en

disant

que

le

nom

ontient n

lui-même un

élément

conjonctif

(par

ex.

DIAL.

MONAC.

II,

2

p.

631

4).

1

Summa

uper

riscianum

onstructionum

ed.

dans es

Cahiers

e

l'Institut

u

Moyen

Age

Grec t Latin

7-28) .

48 et

67

et sv.

2 Cf. De Rijk, ogicamodernorumAssen), ol. I, 1chapV.

3

Summa

amberti

ed.

F.

Alessio

1971),

p.

239.

4

Nous

brégeons

n

majuscules

es textes

ités,

f.

la fin

e

'article

a

liste.

2

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2 L

'implicatio

2.

1

Définition

Les traités sur les

'

'implicites'

sont,

selon

De

Rijk

{Logica

moder-

norum

II,

1

p.

400),

une

nouveauté

en

logique

en cette

seconde

moitié

du Xlle siècle

et

n'existent

pas

du

temps

d'Abélard. Sur les différents

sens

non

techniques

d

'implicite ,

nous

renvoyons

à l'introduction

de

F.

Giusberti5.

p.

24

et sv.

Nous

retiendrons

e sens

de Boèce où il

donne

opinio

mplicata

duplex ropositio

c'est-à-dire

une

proposition

qui

en contientune

autre

en

elle-même,

étymologie ui

est

parfois

f-

fectivement

onnée,

nous

le

verrons. Dans un de ces

premiers

raités

sur les implicites, dité par Giusberti, es propositions mplicites ont

définies

comme des

propositions

dans

lesquelles

deux

propositions

sont

contenues6,

a

règle

étant

que

toute

implicite

contientdeux

ex-

plicites

.e.

que

'

'toute

implicite

équivaut

à

une

copulative

résultant

d'explicites 7.

On

appelle

ici

implicites

es

propositions

ontenantnon

seulement

des termes relatifs

id

quod

ea

que)

mais

d'autres termes

commes

les

exclusifs,

exceptifs,

etc.

(solum,

tantum

praeter incipit

desinit

nunc

rimo

nunc

ultimo).

Par la

suite,

seules des

propositions

contenant une

relative

(implicatio)

eront

appelées

implicites

et

le

traitement es autrestermes nécessitantune reformulation e la pro-

position

dans

laquelle

ils se trouvent

era

renvoyée

aux traités

ur les

syncatégorèmes

u

aux

traités

sur les

exponibles.

La

définition

ouvent donnée

pour implicare

st:

implicare

st

liquid

pro

constanti

relinquere

(DIAL.

MONAC.

II,

2

p.

631,

De

inplicationibus8p.

100).

La

DIAL.

MONAC.

développe

cette

défini-

tion

ibid):

Unde

cum

dicitur:

omo

ui

urrit

isputât

hecdictio

ui

irca une erminům

homoursum

nplicat,

dest

ro onstantielinquit.

Ce

passage

s'explique

si on retient

pour

implicare tymologie

ouvent

donnée: intus

licare

placer

à

l'intérieur.

l

signifie

lors

que qui

place

à

l'intérieur

de

'homme'

la

course,

et

laisse cela

comme constante.

On

est

près

des

thèses modernes du

pré-asserté

ou

du

pré-construit:

a

5

F.

Giusberti,

1982),

Materials

or

Study

n

Twelfth

entury

cholasticism

Napoli;

Tractatus

mplicitarum,

.

43-58.

6

Implicitae

ropositiones

dialecticis

ppellantur

n

quarum

ualibetmplicantur

uel nuolunturuae

p. 43, 0.0).

7 Iuxta mplicitasrimoabeturaec egula: mnismplicitaabet uas xplicitas.

Item:

mnis

mplicitaequiualetopulatiuae

onstantix

explicitisibid

.

43,0.1).

8

Ed.

par

de

Rijk,

Vivarium

V, 2,

1966.

3

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phrase

commençant

par qui

est

une

assertion

rapportée

la

première,

et

c'est

à

propos

du

sujet,

ainsi

disposé ,

qu'est

faite 'assertion

prin-

cipale. C'est exactement la définitionque donne Roger Bacon de

l'implication:

elle lie le

sujet

avant

que

ne

se

fasse a

prédication

prin-

cipale) (XIV

p.

200

ou

202).

Cette

interprétation

n termes de

pré-

construit

u,

comme

dira

Port-Royal,

d'assertion

incidente,

apparaît

bien

dans

le Traité

De

inplicationibus

p.

100):

Implicare

c'est

ignifier

ne chose

omme

onstantet de

manière

bscure,

comme

orsque

'on

dithomo

ui

st lbus

urrit.

e

dis

comme

onstante'

arce

que,

outre

u'ici

a

course st

ffirméee

homme',

uelque

hose stdonné

entendre,

savoir

ue

'hommest

lanc;

e

dis de

manièrebscure

arce

ue,

outre

e

qui

est

ci

proprement

t

principalementignifié,

savoir

ue

'homme

court,uelque hose st omprisl'intérieure cetteignification,savoir

ue

l'hommestblanc.

e

cecidécoule

ue

mplicare

c'est

lacer

l'intérieur

ntus

plicare).

e

que

nous

plaçons

l'intérieur,

ous

e

laissons

omme

onstante9.

Le

restedu

passage

confirme ien

que

c'est

le

sujet

dans

cette

dispo-

sition ,

avec ce

qui

est

contenu en

lui,

qui

est

concerné

par

l'assertion

proprement

dite

{proprie

ou

principale

(principaliter

:

De là suit

ue

mplicare

'est

ien

'autre

ue

aisser

e

sujet

ous

uelque ispo-

sition

omme ne

onstante,

t de celui-ci

insi

isposé

ffirmer

uelque

hose.

Donc une

mplicatio

'estun

placement

l'intérieurntus

licatio

(ibid.).

Une

implicatio

st la

conjonction

de

trois

éléments: ce

qui

est

impli-

qué

(

=

placé

dans),

ce de

quoi

il

y

a

implicatio

t

un

signe d'implica-

tion.

Dans

homo

ui

est albus currit

homo

st ce

qui

est

concerné

par

l'implication,

donc

ce

qui

contient

quelque

chose

en

lui,

albus

est

ce

qui

est

impliqué,

qui

le

signe

d'implication

(ibid

p.

102).

Les

signes

d'implication

sont tous les

relatifs en

q :

(...)

Tous esmots

ui,

dansune

xpression

ans

aquelle

ls e

trouvent,

ais-

sent

uelque

hose omme

onstantecôté

e ce

qui

est

ignifié

rincipalement

(ibid).

Cette

définition

e

V

mplicatio

st

cohérente

vec

celle

des

noms

rela-

tifs.

Qui

en

effet,

ontient

n lui

l'expression

d'une

substance indéfi-

nie

et

de l'article

subjonctif,

fonction

naphorique:

9

Implicare

st

pro

onstanti

t nvolute

liquid ignificare.

t

cum

dicitur:homo

qui

est

lbus urrit'.

Precontentum'

ico,

uia

preter

oc

uod

sseritur

bi ursus e

homine,

liquid

atur

ntelligi,

cilicet

ominem

sse

lbum;

involute'ico

uia

pre-

ter

hoc

quod

bi

proprie

t

principaliterignificatur

ominem

urrere,

liquid

ntus

intelligitur,

cilicet

ominemsse

lbum. erhoc

patet uod

mplicare

st ntus

li-

care. d enim uod ntus licamusiveponimus,ro onstantielinquimus .ous

sommes 'accord

vec

Giusberti

our

ne

pas

corriger

ro

onstanti

n

precontentum

commee

suggère

e

Rijk.

4

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 Dans homo

ui

urrit

isputât

'article

ui

est n

quiprend

a

substance

u'il

com-

porte

n

ui-même,

n

tant

u'elle

st éterminée

ar

e

verbe

ui

suitcurrit

et a

conjugue

ce terme

omo

qui

est on ntécédent

...),

ce

qui

e

spécifie.

'est

pourquoiomoe uppose uepour eux uicourent DIAL.MONAC. I, 2p.

631).

Cette définition

e

Yimplicatio

ermet

de rendre

compte

de

la

pro-

priété

de

la relative d'être

restrictive,

omme

Г

adjectif par

exemple.

Elle sera

cependant

contradictoire avec un fonctionnementnon-

restrictif

e

la

relative,

car dans ce cas l'assertion réalisée

par

la rela-

tive n'est

plus

considérée

comme antérieure

à

l'assertion

principale,

mais

indépendante

de

celle-ci.

(cf. infra).

2. 2 Les

propositions

mplicites

Les

propositions

dites

4

'implicites ,

c'est-à-dire contenant

une

implicatio

u

proposition

relative

sont

généralement nalysées

comme

un

type

de

proposition

hypothétique.

Ainsi dans

Г

ARS MEL.

elles se

rangent,parmi

les

hypothétiques, près

1)

les

conjonctives,

2)

les dis-

jonctives

et avant

4)

les

continuatives

ou conditionnelles vec si. Il

nous

est

pourtant rapporté

dans l'ARS

EMER.

que

'

'certains

les

appellent

hypothétiques,

d'autres

catégoriques (H>

2

p.

159)10.

Il

serait intéressantde connaître ces textes pour savoir si l'hésitation

entre

hypothétique

t

catégorique, pour

le classement des

propositions

relatives,

ne

vient

pas

d'une double

interprétation

e celles-ci.

On

sait

que

les restrictivesont souvent

glosées

par

des

hypothétiques

au

sens

moderne)

et

les

non-restrictives

ar

des

conjonctives11.

our

les deux

interprétations

e la

relative,

nous

n'avons trouvé dans nos

textes

que

des

gloses

par

une

conjonctive

du

typequi

=

et

ille),

glose

parfois

efu-

sée

pour

l'interprétation

on-restrictive,

ans

qu'une

autre

glose

soit

proposée,

nous

y

reviendrons.

10

Dansce

texte,

l est

proposé

'autres

ypes

e

propositions,

elon e

type

u

relatif:

les

quantitativesavec

tantus.

quantus),

es

qualitatives

avec

qualis

,

les

substantives

(ex.

d

uod

st

Marcusst

ulliusau

cas,

joute-t-on,

ù onvoudrait

ppeler ypothéti-

ques

ces

propositions

ibid

p.

160-161).

11

Dans

sa Grammaireénérale

1767),

Beauzée

st,

emple-t-il,

e

premier

gloser

e

relatifes incidentes

xplicatives

relatives

on-restrictives,

ans

a

terminologie

ci

utilisée)

oit

ar

t

mais

donc,

r,

oit

ar

ar,

uisque,arceue,

u

ue

etc.

e

relatif

es

incidenteséterminatives

relativesestrictives)

st

glosépar

si,

quand

lorsque,

pourvu

ue.

lus

récemment,

arris

nalyse

es

pronoms

elatifsomme

rovenant

e

la

conjonction

t 'ils

ntroduisentnenon-restrictivetde

a

conjonction

i,

condition

que 'ils ntroduisentneexplicative.elleestégalement'attitudee Geach,par

exemple.

f.

M.

Dominicy,

eauzée

critique

e ort-

oy

l,

a théorieu

relatif,

ans:Etu-

des sur e XVIIIe

siècle, III,

éd. de

'université

e

Bruxelles,

981,

p.

104

t sv.

5

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En

effet,

e fait

de dire

qu'une implicite

oit une

proposition

onte-

nant

en

elle-même

une

autre

proposition

n

puissance

(

continet

t

mpli-

cai vim lteriusropositionisRS MEL. II, 1p. 354) pose le problèmedu

rapport

de la

valeur de vérité

de

l'implicite

à

celle des

propositions

qu'elle

contient.

Ce

problème

apparaît

traité,

d'une

part,

dans les

dis-

cussions

sur es

inférences

ermises

entre a

proposition

mplicite

t les

différentes

ropositions

qu'elle

contient

ex.

est-ce

que

homo urrit

ui

disputât

mplique

homo

isputât

t/ou

homo

urrit?),

'autre

part

sur

les

équivalences

possibles

entre une

proposition mplicite

t

une

conjonc-

tion de

deux

propositions

ssertives

est-ce

que, par

exemple,

homo ur-

rit

qui

disputât

quivaut

à

homo urrit t

ipse

disputati).

Dans

le cas où

l'équivalence estreconnuepossible, ily a hésitation ntredeux ' 'expo-

sitions

possibles

de

l'explicite.

Ainsi

dans

le

Tractatus

mplicitarum

on

se

demande

si

la

bonne

décomposition

de

(1)

est

(Г)

ou

(1 ):

(1)

Socrates

non est id

quod

est

homo

(Г)

Aliquid

est homo

et

Socrates

non

est

illud

(1 )

Aliquid

est homo

et

Socrates

non est homo

(ed.

par

Giusberti,

P- 50)

Dans le cadre

de

ces traités ur les

implicites,

n admet

généralement

que

certaines

nférences

t

certaines

équivalences

sont

possibles.

Ceci

tient au fait que, dans un tel contexte, c'est l'interprétationnon-

restrictive e

la

relative

qui

est

envisagée.

Les inférences

ont

rejetées,

en

particulier,

orsque

la relativeest clairement

restrictive.

Mais

pour

comprendre

es

analyses

faitesdans

ce

type

de

traités,

l nous

faut

ller

chercher

dans

d'autres

traités,

eux

portant

ur a

restriction,

es

critè-

res

proposées

pour

opposer

les

relatives

restrictives

t non-restrictives

(§3).

Nous

reprendrons

nsuite en détail

la

question

des inférences

t

équivalences (§4).

3 La restriction

ar

implication

3.1

Définition

Un

terme

st

dit

restreint

orsque,

dans un

contexte

donné,

il

dénote

un

nombre

d'individus

inférieur celui

qu'il

dénote

par

lui-même. A

l'inverse

il est dit

amplifié

lorsqu'il

dénote

un nombre

d'individus

supérieur

à

celui

qu'il

dénote

par

lui-même.

Ces

notions bien sûr

ne

s'appliquent

qu'au

terme

commun dans

son

usage significatif,

'est-à-

dire

quand

il dénote

effectivement

es individus.

Deux

types

de restriction

ont

souvent

distingués:

a restriction

ar

l'usage

et la restriction

ar

la

signification

des

termes

cf.

par

ex.

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SUM. MET

II,

1

p.

463

ou Pierre

d'Espagne,

Tractatus

.

207).

Les

exemples

de

restriction

ar l'usage

sont

en

particulier

du

type

rex enit

(il s'agit nécessairementdu roi du pays où l'on est) ou mons stparvus

(cette

montagne

est

petite

en

comparaison

des

autres

montagnes).

Le

second

type

de restriction

épend

de

l'action de

la

signification

es ter-

mes

de l'énoncé sur

e

nom

appellatif.

Un

des

premiers

facteurs

être

noté est

le

temps

du

verbe. Un autre

facteur

st

l'adjectif:

en disant

homo

lbus

currit

l'adjectif

albus

restreint

e

terme homo

ne

supposer

que pour

des hommes blancs.

On

remarque

cependant que

tous les

adjectifs

ne

restreignent as.

Ainsi

lorsque

l'on dit

corvus

iger

u homo

rationalis,

'adjectif,

dans les deux

cas,

signifiant

uelque

chose

qui

est

un accident inséparable de ce qui est signifiépar le substantif, e

restreint

as

(SUM.

MET

II,

1

p.

464)

12

.

Un autre facteur

de

restric-

tion est un cas

oblique, par

exemple

le

génitif:

ans

asinus

Sortis urrit

le

génitif

ortis estreint sinus ne

supposer que pour

l'âne de Socrate.

Enfin,

on a

restriction

ar

la relative

restricto

er

implicationem)

ex.

homo

ui

currit

isputât.

3.2 Facteurs

loquant

a

restriction

ar implication

Les facteursbloquant la restriction ar implicationfont pparaître

un

fonctionnement

on-restrictife

la

relative.

Anticipant

sur ce

qui

sera dit

ensuite,

nous

parlerons d'interprétation

restrictive

t

non-

restrictive,

même si ce n'est

pas

en

ces termes

que

les auteurs

raison-

nent

immédiatement.

12

Ceci

anticipe

ien a

distinction

xplication/détermination

u'on

trouvera

ans

a

logique

e

Port-Royal.

our

e

même

xemple

omme

st

n nimaloué eraisonoù

l'on dit

u'il

y

a

pas

restriction

arce ue

douéde raison

ignifie

n

accident

inséparable ,ndira ans echap.VIII de adeuxièmeartiee aLogique: Cette

addition

e

peut

ppeler

eulement

xplication,

uand

lle

ne fait

ue développer,

u

ce

qui

étoit nfermé

ans

a

compréhension

e 'idéedu

premier

erme,

u

du moins

ce

qui

ui

convient

omme n

de

ses

accidents,

ourvu u'il

uiconvienne

énérale-

ment dans oute

on

tendue

• .)'

• Le

second

ôle

de

'opposition,

a

détermina-

tion,

std'autre

art

e

plus

ouvent éfiniomme ne restriction

ibid):

L'autre

sorte

'addition,

u'on

peut

ppeller

étermination,

st

uand

e

qu'on

ajoute

un

mot

énéral

n

restreint

a

signification,

fait

u'il

ne e

prend

lus our

e mot

éné-

ral

dans oute

on

tendue,

ais

eulement

our

ne

partie

e cette tendue

Il

est

mportant

e

constater

ue

a

distinctionntre eux onctionnementsu

relatifst

liée

hez

ort/Royal

l'oppositionxplication/détermination

ui

ne

vaut

as

quepour

lui et

que,

comme

ous llons e

voir,

'opposition

estrictive/nonestrictive

our

a

relativeetrouve,ans estextesmédiévaux,iscutéexclusivementans estraités

sur

a

restriction,

onc

propos

u

phénomène

énéral

e a restriction

ui

ne

con-

cerne

galement

as

seulement

a

relative.

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3.2.1

Ampliation

restriction

distributionu terme

L'auteur anonyme de la SUM. MET. formuled'abord la règle

générale:

un

termecommun ne

peut

être

restreint

'il est

antérieure-

ment

amplifié

ou restreint

II,

1

p.

465).

Ainsi

par

exemple

homo lbus

potest

sse Antichristus

ù

albus

ne

restreint

pas

homo

parce qu'il

est

amplifié

par

potest.

On

retrouve

par

ailleurs

le

problème

des

antécé-

dents distribués

que

nous

avons

discuté dans la

première partie.

L'exemple type

est

omnis

omo lbus

currit.

u

fait

que

homo

st

distri-

bué

par

omnis

ui

le fait

supposer

pour

l'ensemble des

hommes,

il

ne

peut

être restreint

ar

l'adjectif. Cependant

l'auteur

ajoute

ensuite

une autreopinion, qui est en fait 'opinion la plus généralement dop-

tée,

à savoir

que

la

phrase

ci-dessus est double . De

même

que

pour

l'anaphore

pronominale

'un terme

distribué,

où

on

disait

que

l'ana-

phore

pouvait

suivre ou

précéder

a

distribution,

ci,

pour

la

détermi-

nation

restrictive

ar

un

adjectif

u

une

relative,

on

dit

que

la détermi-

nation

peut

précéder

ou

suivre

la

distribution.

Un

phrase

comme

omnis

omo lbus

currit

ura donc deux

interpréta-

tions:

(a)

La

distribution

père

avant

la

détermination

par

l'adjectif

(sens

composé)

et la

glose

est: omnishomo

qui

omnishomo st lbuscurrit u

omnishomo

st lbus

et

omnishomo

urrit

(b)

La

détermination

opère

avant la

distribution

sens

divisé)

et

la

glose

est: omnis

homo

cui

inest

lbedo currit

la

détermination

opère

d'abord et

la

distribution e fait ensuite sur la

classe

des

hommes

blancs).

Il

s'agit

clairement

des

deux

interprétations

estrictive

t

non-

restrictive e la relative ou

de

l'adjectif.

En

(a)

l'adjectif

ou

la

relative

ne

restreignent as

et

constituent

une assertion à

part

entière alors

qu'en

(b)

ils

restreignent.

Chez de nombreux

auteurs

cettedouble

interprétation

e

la

relative

ne se

trouve discutée

que

lorsque

l'antécédent est

un

terme

distribué

(cf.

Tractatus e Pierre

d'Espagne p.

200,

le

traité

De

Inplicationibus.

103,

etc.).

Le fait

que

cette

double

interprétation

oit

admise,

lorsque

l'antécédent est

distribué,

pour

la

relative,

donc

pour

l'anaphore

nomi-

nale et

pas

pour

l'anaphore

pronominale

st

intéressant.

On se souvient

en

effet

ue

Pierre

d'Espagne

ou

Lambert d'Auxerre admettaient

ni-

quementla solution selonlaquelle c'était l'antécédent distribuéui était

anaphorisé

(

omnishomo

urrit t

ipse

moveturomnishomo

urrit

t omnis

homo.

)

en vertu de la

règle générale d'anaphore

selon

laquelle

le

rela-

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tifd'identité

suppose

pour

les mêmes individus

que

son antécédent.

Or

cette

règle,

posée pour

toute

anaphore, qu'elle

soit nominale ou

pronominale,fonctionne n faitprioritairement our Гanaphore pro-

nominale

par

ille,

pse),

puisque

dans

le

cas

de Г

anaphore

nominalevec

la

relative,

l

est

admis

que

la

détermination

estrictive

père

avant

la

distribution:

'est donc

un antécédent nondistribué

ui

est

anaphorisé,

le relatif

t

l'antécédent

n'ayant pas

dans

ce cas

la

même dénotation.

Le

fait

que

l'on considère là

le

phénomène

de

la relatio

ait

que

l'on

analyse

ensemble

anaphore

nominale

et

pronominale

en

tentant

d'en

donner

une

règle générale,

alors

que

le

fait

que

l'on considère

ici le

phénomène

de la restrictioonduit

à traiter

nsemble

les

adjectifs

t

les

propositionsrelatives,qui contiennentune anaphore nominale, sépa-

rant

par

là

le

traitement

e

celle-ci

de celui

de

Г

anaphore

pronomi-

nale.

3.2.2

Implicationsausses

Le

problème

posé par

les

implications

fausses était

'objet

de discus-

sions,

dont

témoignent

n

particulier

a DIAL.MONAC.

et le

traité

De

Inplicationibus

Trois solutionsétaient

proposées:

(i)

une

implication

fausse est incorrecte; ii) une implicationfausse est correcte; iii) une

implication

fausse

est

fausse.

De

plus,

le

problème

se

scinde

en deux

dans

la

DIAL.MONAC.,

selon

que

l'on a

implication

d'un

faux

impossible

ex.

homo

ui

est sinuscurrit

homo

rrationalis

urrit)

u

d'un

faux

possible

ex.

homo

ui

est

lbus

currit

lorsqu'il

n'y

a aucun homme

blanc).

On trouve

trois

rguments

donnés

en

faveurde

la thèse

que l'impli-

cation

d'un faux

impossible

est cause

d'incorrection.

Dans un

énoncé

comme

homo

ui

est

sinusest il

y

a

conflit

repugnantia

entre

ce

que

le

termedénote de par sa nature à savoirdes hommes) etce que le terme

dénote

de

par

l'implication

à

savoir

des

ânes).

De

ce

fait

e

terme est

4

'déchu de sa

supposition ,

ce

qui

rend la

phrase

incorrecte13. e

second

argument

donné

dans

le

traité

De

inplicationibus

n

faveur de

cette thèse

explicite

en fait e

premier

en en donnant

la

raison,

qui

est

la

règle

générale

de

l'anaphore que

nous avons

déjà

discutée:

puisque,

13

Quia

cum icitur:

homo

ui

st sinussť

iste erminus

Лото' x sui

natura abet

supponere

ro

hominibus,

x vi

nplicationis

abet

upponerero

sinis,

t ta

bi

st

repugnantia.tpropteruiusmodiepugnantiamicuntuodterminusadit sup-

position,

t ta

bi st

ncongruitas

t

propter

uiusmodi

ncongruitatem

icunt

uod

inplicite

alsi unt

ncongrue De

nplicationibus

p. 101).

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selon

celle-ci,

le

relatif

doit dénoter

ce

que

dénote son

antécédent,

et

que

dans un

tel

cas,

c'est

impossible,

a

phrase

est

incorrecte14. ans

la DIAL.MONAC., l'argument proposé, qui amène l'auteur à adop-

ter cette

thèse,

est

qu'il

y

a

incorrection

'parce qu'on

voit

des

signifiés

qui

ne

sont

pas

compatibles

l'un

avec l'autre être

rapportés

'un

à

l'autre 15.

La

seconde solution

selon

laquelle

les

implicites

fausses sont

cor-

rectes

est

simplement

énoncée dans

le Traité De

inplicationibus

p.

102).

Il est

simplement

jouté

que

les

tenants de

cette

opinion

distin-

guent

deux choses

dans

non

homo

ui

est

sinus

st

une

composition

de

homme

t

de

âney

t une

composition

de homme

t du

verbe

être. e

ce fait

la négationne portepas sur chacune des deux compositions rise ndé-

pendamment on

ne

peut

donc conclure

de

l'énoncé ci-dessus

ergo

omo

est sinus

,

mais

sur

l'une

en

rapport

avec

l'autre16,

ce

qui

donne

une

interprétation

de

la

négation

assez

proche

de

l'hypothétique.

Les

tenants

de

la

première

solution

analysaient

différemmentet

énoncé:

en disant nonhomo

ui

est sinus st n ne

pose pas

la vérité

de

l'homme

est

un

âne ,

mais

seulement

a correctionde cette

prédication.

C'est

parce que

celle-ci

n'est

pas

ici

respectée que l'implication

fausse

est

dite cause

d'incorrection

p. 101).

Le problèmedes locutions impliquantun fauxpossible est plus

complexe.

L'auteur de

la

DIAL.MONAC.

rejette l'opinion que

celles-ci seraient cause d'incorrection.

Dans homo

ui

est albus

currit

même

s'il n'existe aucun

homme,

il

peut cependant

en

exister,

et

humanité t blancheur

e

sont

pas

des accidents

opposés

comme

l'étaient

humanité

t

asinité.

De

ce fait

on n'a

pas

incorrection,

mais

fausseté

p.

633:5).

Ceci

s'appuie

sur

un

argument

grammatical:

Un

changement

dans

les choses ne

peut

rien modifierdans

le

discours

sinon le

vrai et le faux

(ibid p. 635:15).

Si

l'énoncé

Socrate

'assoit st

correct

orsque

Socrate

s'assoit,

il l'est

également

lorsque

Socrate ne

14

Vel

alia

regula,

uod

hocrelativum

qui

ex

vi

relationisabet

upponere

ro

o

pro

uo

suum

ntecedens;

t ta

pro

ominibus

xvi

nplicationis

abet

upponerero

asinis;

t

ta

bi

est

repugnantia

t ta

ncongruitasibid).

15

(•••)

Нес est

ncongrua:

homo

ui

st

sinuscurriť

t homorrationalisurriťt

onsi-

miles,

oquod

opposite

orme on

e

compatientes

irca

dem

stenduntur

sse

n

eodem.Unde

ntellectusalis mnis assus

st

t

vanus

DIAL.MONAC.

II,

2

p.

632:16).

16

Et

notandum

uod

secundum

uod

negatio

espiciattramque artem,

on

sequitur:ergoomost sinusquiacum bi int uecompositiones,na essentiaum

homine,

lia asinitas um

homine,

egatio

on

negat

lteram

artem

antum,

ed

unam

espectu

lterius

De nplicationibus

. 102).

10

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s'assoit

pas.

Il

est

donc

faux de

dire

que

le

terme serait

4

'déchu

de

sa

signification ,

du

fait

que

l'implication

ne lui convient

pas.

A ce problèmedes locutions impliquant un faux impossible deux

solutions

sont

en

fait retenues:

(1)

l'implication

d'un faux

possible

rend a

proposition

fausse;

(2)

une

implicationqui

ne

convient

pas

ne

restreint

as

(p.

633:6).

La

logique

de

ces deux

solutions se trouve

dans

le

passage

qui

suit

immédiatement eur

formulation,

t

où

sont

clairement

osées

les

deux

interprétations ossibles

de toute relative17.

3.

2. 3

Interprétation

estrictive

t

non-restrictivee

la

relative

Ce

passage explicite

clairement

es critères

ermettant

e

distinguer

les

deux

types

ď

implicatio:

Notandum

uod

omnis

propositio

n

qua

ponitur

nplicatio,

otest

istingui

dupliciter,

x eo

quod

verbum

umptum

in

nplicatione

otest

ndicareem

uam

simpliciter

el n

respectu

d

consequens

Il

faut

oter

ue

toute

roposition

ans

laquelle

e trouve ne

mplicatioeut

tre

distinguée

e deux manières

elon

ue

(1)

le verbe

misdans

'implication

ndi-

que

sa

chose,

implement

u

(2) qu'il

17

La

règle énérale

e

l'anaphore,

elon

aquelle

e relatif

t

'antécédent

oivent

dénoter

esmêmes

ndividus,

été

ouvent

ise

n

défaut,

omme

ous 'avons oté

dansnotreremièreartie,propose asuppositioimplexdes ntécédentssupposi-tion

onfuse,

t ci vec e

problème

es

mplications

ausses.l

faut oter

ue

c'est

propos

e

ce dernier

roblèmeue

es

uteurs

ui

en

traitent,

ans e

traité

e

nplica-

tionibust dans la

DIAL.MONAC.

la

remettentn cause.

Ainsi dans

la

DIAL.MONAC. il

estditclairement

ue

le

relatife

suppose as

nécessairement

pour

es

mêmesndividus

ue

'antécédent:

Dicendum nim st

uod

cum ic

dici-

tur: homoidensstum

st',

hocrelativumistum

referturd hune

erminůmhomo

secundum

e,

nonhabito

espectu

d

ipsum

ecundum

uod

positus

st

n

ocutione.

Et

secundumocrefertominem

ommuniterondeterminando

ro liquo.

Unde

idem st homo

idensstum

quod

homoidens

ominem

(...).

Cum nim

elativumefe-

rat

ominem

ommuniter,

i

fiat

escensus

n

hoc ermino

homo

pro

orte,

on

por-

tet

uod

relativumeferát

ro

Sorte,

ed

potest

eferre

ro

alio

a

Sorte

II,

2

p.

635:24).La formulationu traité e inplicationibusstdifférente.'auteur istingue

entre

a

suppositio

e

'antécédent

t

onmodus

upponendi.

ans un

énoncé omme or

qui

st

lbus

currit,

a

supposition

e Sor e

peut

tre ouchée

uisqu'il

'agit

'un erme

discret,

ais onmodus

upponendi

st

ffecté,

uisqu'il

uppose

our

ocrate

n

tant

que

blanc.

Un

termeommun

omme omost

estreintla

fois

uant

sa

supposition

(il suppose our

eshommes

lancs)

t

quant

sonmode

e

supposition

il

suppose

pour

eshommesn tant

ue

blancs).

ette

istinctionntre

uppositio

tmodus

uppo-

nendi

ermet

e

rendre

ompte

e

a

double ituationù se trouve

'antécédent,

éter-

miné,

uant

sa

référence,

'une

part

n

tant

ue

sujet,

'autre

art

n

tant

u'ana-

phorisé.

ette istinction

ermet

l'auteur

'expliquer

'ambiguïté

es

énoncés

antécédent

istribué,

omme

mnis

omoidetd

quod pse

idei,oithomo

strestreint

quant

son

mode

e

supposition,

ais

as

quant

sa

supposition,

arce u'il

est is-

tribué;oit omostrestreintuant sonmode esuppositiont uant sa supposi-

tion,

e

qui

revientdire

ue

a

distribution

père

la

fois

ur

'antécédenttY

mplica-

tio

sens:

mnisomo

ui

videtidet

d

quodpse

idet).

pp.

102-103).

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verbum. i

primo

modo,

uelibet

alis

locutio

on

rit

impliciter

na,

ed

plu-

res. Unde

si

talis

ocutio rit

era,

non

tarnenrit naveritateera, edpluri-

bus,

vel

si

falsa,

alsitate

lurium,

el

etiam

rit era t falsa.Verbi

ratia,

i

dicatur:homo

ui

currit,

isputât',

i

hoc verbumcurrit'

n

hac

ponat

rem

suam

simpliciter,

unc

nplicatio

on

cadit ub

conpositione

uius erbi dis-

putât',

ed

hoc

qui

currit'rit

era

ra-

tio

per

e nec

potest estringere

une

er-

minům

homo'cumit

n

aliqua

ratione

positum.

i vero oc

verbumcurrit' on

ponat

em

impliciter

ed n

respectu

d

consequenserbum,uncnplicatioadit

sub

onpositionem,

t

unc

otest

estrin-

gere

ubiectum,

i sit

conveniens,

ub

hoc

sensu: homo

currens

isputât'

(DIAL.MONAC.

p.

633:10)

l'indique

omme

tant n relationvec

e

verbe

onséquent.

ans le

premier

as,

une

expression

e

cette orte e

sera

as

une,maismultiple.ar conséquenti

cette

xpression

st

vraie lle

ne

sera

as

vraie

elon

ne

unique

érité,

ais

elon

plusieurs,

t

si

elle est

fausse,

lle

sera

fausse

elon

plusieurs

aussetés

t

elle

pourra

même

tre raie t

fausse. i on

dit:

homo

ui

currit

isputât',

e

verbe

'currit'

ignifie

a

chose

implement

t

l'implication

'est

alors

pas

concernée

par

la

composition

du sujet)

avec le

verbe

disputât':qui

currit'

era une

phrase

raie

ar

lle-même

tne

pourra

restreindreetermehomo' uisqu'ilst

dans

une autre

phrase.

Si le verbe

'currit',

ar

contre,

e

pose

pas simple-

ment a

chose,

mais

a

pose

omme

tant

en

relation

vec e verbe

uivant,

lors

l'implication

st oncernée

ar

a

compo-

sition,

t

peut

onc

estreindree

sujet,

i

elle

convient,

vec

ce

sens: homo ur-

rens

isputât'.

Nous

résumons

ci-dessous les

critèresdonnés

dans

ce texte:

-

Il

n'y

a

pas

restrictionu

sujet

par

l'implication

-

Le

verbe

de

l'implication

ignifie

e

manière

ndépendante

-

L'implication

e

trouvedans une

phrase

ifférente

e

celle

où se trouve

l'antécédent

-

L'implicite

ontienteux

propositions

de valeurs e

vérité

ndépendantes:

lle

peut

tre

oublement

raie,

oublement

fausseu vraie tfausse

-

L'implication

'est

pas

concernée

ar

la

composition

rincipale

-

Une

mplication

ausse

end

'implicite

fausse

-

Elle

n'équivaut as

à

un

participe

ou

un

adjectif)

<2>

-

Il

y

a

restrictionu

sujet

ar 'implica-

tion

-

Le

verbe e

l'implication

ignifie

n

relation

vec e

verbe

onséquent

-

L'implication

e

trouve

ans a même

phrase

-

Il

n'y

qu'une

eule

hrase

-

Elle

est concernée

ar

a

composition

principale

-

Une

mplication

ui

ne

convient

as

ne

restreint

as

-

Elle

équivaut

un

participe

Une

conséquence

importante ui

se

dégage

des

critères i-dessus

est

qu'une phrase

contenantune relative

n'aura

pas

les

mêmes

conditions

de vérité selon que la relative est restrictive u non-restrictive. i la

relative

est

non-restrictive

il

faut

que

celle-ci

soit vraie

pour

que

la

phrase

soit

vraie,

puisqu'elle

équivaut

à une

conjonction

de

deux

pro-

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positions:

si on

a

une

implication

fausse

(ex.

qui

est sinus la

phrase

sera donc

fausse,

alors

qu'elle

ne

le

sera

pas

si

la

relativeest restrictive

puisqu' alors la restriction,mpossible dans un tel cas, n'opérera pas

( une

implicationqui

ne convient

pas

ne restreint

as )18.

Ces critères

ont

ntéressants

arce

qu'on

les retrouve n

partie

dans

d'autres

textes

à

propos

d'autres

problèmes.

Ainsi

la

SUM.

MET.,

à

côté de

diversfacteurs e

blocage

de

la

restriction

mpedimenta

estrictio-

ns)

énonce

le suivant:

la

restriction st

empêchée lorsque

ce

qui

est

restreint t ce

qui

restreint ont

dans des lieux

divers ,

c'est-à-dire

lorsque

la relative

est

hors

de

la

proposition

contenant 'antécédent

(II,

1

p. 465).

Pour

que

la

relative

restreigne,

l

faut

qu'elle

soit

ointe

immédiatement à son antécédent, ce qui est la règle également

pour

l'adjectif:

on

sait

qu'il

est

admis

que

l'adjectif

ne restreint

e

substantif

ue

lorsqu'il

lui est

joint

immédiatement

=

en

position

épithète)

et

non médiatement

=

en

position

de

prédicat)19.

Pierre

d'Espagne

mentionne

également

dans

sa

règle

de restriction

que

18

La

position

doptée

ans

a

Logique

e

Port-Royal

st ifférente.n

considère

ue

la faussetée

a

proposition

elative

incidente ),

ans e

cas où e

qui

st

xplicatif

(

=

non-restrictif),

'empêche

as

en

général

a vérité

e

a

principale.

eci tient

u

fait ue 'on considèreue 'assertionpérée ar a relativest,précisément,inci-dente . ndisant lexandre

ui

ste

ils

e

Philippe.

il

y

a bien ne ssertion:lexandre

est e

ils

e

Philippe

assertion

ui peut

tre

raie

u

fausse.Mais

cette

ssertion,

nci-

dente,

'empêche

as

l'assertion

rincipale

'être

raie

chap.

VII

2e

partie

Par

exemple,

lexandre

ui

été

ils

e

hilippe

a

vaincues ersescette

roposition

oit

asser

pour

raie

uand

Alexandree eroit

as

fils

e

Philippe,arce

ue

'affirmation

e

a

propositionrincipale

etombe

ue

surAlexandrece

qu'ony

a

oint

ncidemment,

quoique

aux,

'empêcheoint

u'il

ne soit rai

u'Alexandre

vaincues

Perses ).

Dans e

cas

du

qui

déterminatif

=

restrictif),

a relative e

peut

tre

usceptible

e

fausseté

parce ue

'attribut

e

a

proposition

ncidente

'y

st

pas

affirmé

u

sujet,

auquel

e

qui

e

rapporte .

ependant,

ême

i,

ndisantes

sprits

ui

ont

uarrés

on

n'énonce ucune convenance

ctuelle ntre

sprits

t

quarrés

on

a

cependant

ne

idéede convenanceossible,oncune affirmationacite t virtuellet de ce fait

l'idée

de

quarré

de

rond

tant

ncompatible

vec

'idée

ď

esprit

ris our

e

principe

de a

pensée,

'estime

ue

ces

propositions

ncidentesevraient

asser our

ausses .

Nousn'avons

as

trouvé

e

passage

ù

l

soit

récisé

i a

proposition

otale ontenant

une ncidenteéterminativeonsidérée

omme ausse

st

elle-même

raie,

omme

c'est e

cas

pour

ne

proposition

ontenant

ne

ncidente

xplicative

ausse.

n

peut

ajouterue

a

conception,ui,

de Beauzée

Geach,

lose

a relativeéterminative

ar

une

hypothétique,

es

spritsui

ont

uarrés.

=

si es

sprits

ont

uarrés.

est menée

poser ue

a

proposition

otale stnécessairement

raie i 'antécédent

donc

a rela-

tive)

st

fausse,

e

par

esconditions

dmises

our

a vérité

es

hypothétiques,

e

qui

est

peu

conformel'intuition

inguistique.

19

Cf.

par

exemple

IAL.MONAC.

II,

2

p.

618:4.

De

même

ue l'adjectif

oint

immédiatement,onc npositioneprédicat,erestreintasdufaitue précisément

il

est

ffirmé

u

sujet,

e

même a

relative

on-restrictiveonstitue

ne

assertion

part

ntière.

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Vimplicatio

oit être

ointe

immédiatement 20,

sans

préciser

ce

qu'il

advient

lorsque

la

jonction

est médiate. Cet

auteur,

par

ailleurs,

a

recours à Tordre des mots pour marquer les deux interprétations:

omnis omo

ui

est lbus

currit

s omnis omo urrit

ui

est lbus Tractatus

.

202).

4

Inférences

t

équivalencesossibles partir

es

propositionsmplicites

Les

critères

donnés dans la

DIAL.

MON

AC.

permettent

e

com-

prendre

pourquoi

certaines nférences

t

équivalences

sont

autorisées,

alors

que

d'autres

sont

rejetées.

Comme nous

le

disions

plus

haut,

contrairement

ce

que

l'on trouve dans les

traités

ur a restriction

ù

-

le titre même

du traité

l'annonce

-

la relative est considérée

d'abord comme

restrictive,

'interprétation

non-restrictive

pparais-

sant comme

une

exception,

il

semble

que

l'on ait'l'inverse

dans

les

traités ur les

implicites

ou

sur les

équivalences

entre

propositions.

Ainsi

par

exemple,

alors

que

dans

le

chapitre

sur

qui

de son

traité

sur la

supposition,

l'auteur

anonyme

du

TRACT. ANAG. refuse

l'équivalence

entre

omnis

omo urrit

ui

moveturt omnis omo

urritt

pse

movetur

cf.

notre

premièrepartie),

il

l'accepte

sans

difficulté ans

son

chapitre ur es équivalences {De equipollentïbus)tpourles quatre types

de

propositions

considérées

II,

2

p.

240):

Omnis omo

st nimal

uod

st

risibile;

rgo

mnis omo st nimal

t

psum

estrisibile.

Aliquod

nimal

ivit

uod

necvivet

ec

movetur;

rgo

liquod

nimal ivit

t

ipsum

ecvivit ecmovetur.

Aliquid

on

st

nimal

uod

st

homo;

rgo liquid

on st nimal

t

psum

st

homo.

SolusSocrates

st

nimal

uod

est

Socrates;

rgo

olus ocratesst

nimal

t

ipsum

st

Socrates21.

Cependant

les

équivalences

et inférencesdonnent

lieu,

le

plus

sou-

vent,

à des

discussions et des controverses.

Si

on se

reporte

ux

critères éfinis

dans

la

DIAL.MONAC.,

le

fait

20

Omnis

mplicatio

mmediatediuncta

erminoommuni

estringit

psum

icut t

suum

diectivum

Tractatus

. 202).

21

I nous

aut oter

ue

es

xemples

i-dessus

nt ne

elativeont'antécédentst e

prédicat

animal),

t

non e

sujet.

ousn'avons

as

trouvé

e

ustificationui permet-

trait

'accepter'équivalence

ans e

premier

as etnon

as

dans

e

second.

ar

on-

tre,

n e verra

§4-1),

dans es

traités

ù

ce

type

'équivalence

st iscuté

ystémati-

quement,toùon ignalees xemplesùVimplicatiooncerneesujet,td'autresù

elle

concernee

prédicat,

e

traitement

e ces

exemples

st

dentique

on

a les

deux

interprétations

ossibles

ans es

deux

as).

14

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d'accepter

Г

nference

e

Г

mplicite

la

proposition

principale

<

liquid

quod

currit

isputât

rgo liquid

disputât

et/ou

de

l'implicite

à

Y

mplicatio

(<liquid uodcurritisputât rgo liquidcurritrevient considérerque la

propositionprincipale

et la

relative

sont

de valeurs de vérité

ndépen-

dantes,

à

analyser

donc la relative comme

non-restrictive,

t

à

accep-

ter

l'équivalence

du nom relatif

ex. qui)

en

et

л-

pronom

relatif

ex.

ille)

Si l'ARS

MEL.

accepte

le

premier

type

d'inférence,

e

second

type

est

rejeté:

de

l'implicite

uit

a

simple

obtenue

par

suppression

du rela-

tif t du verbe

qui

lui

correspond

ex.

si

Socrates

st

liquid quod

currit

Socratesst

liquid)

mais

de

l'implicite

ne

suit

pas

Y

mplicatio

ex.

si

homo

qui curritisputâthomo urrit 'est pas acceptée)22.Dans le chapitreDe

aequipollentia

x

relationibus u Tractatus

de

locis

Argumentationum23

l'auteur

discute

tous

les

types

d'inférences

t

d'équivalences

possibles

et leurs

contre-exemples.

l est

intéressant

de

noter

que

ces

contre-

exemples

peuvent

se

ramener à

deux

types,

d'une

part orsque

la

rela-

tive

est

restrictive,

'autre

part

orsque

le

temps

de la

principale

n'est

pas

le même

que

celui

de

la

relative.

4.1 Inferences

Les

trois

types

d'inférences

qui

nous intéressent ont les

suivants:

(a)

une inference

'une

proposition

ontenantune

anaphore

nominale

à

une

proposition

contenant

une

anaphore

pronominale:

ex.

(TLA

A76)

Homo

qui

currit

disputât

ergo

homo currit

t ille

disputât

cette nférence st

considérée comme

probable .

(b)

Une inférencede

l'implicite

à ce

qu'elle implique ,

donc

à la

relative,

considérée comme de

plus

grande

probabilité :

22

Sauf

'il

y

a habitudo

erminorum

c'est-à-dire

i

Г

nférencest

ossible

e

par

es

pro-

priétésémantiques

es

termes. insi i

aliquid

uod

st

ciens

st

rammaticus

rgoliquid

est ciensst

possible,

'est

parce ue

'on

a le

droit

'inférer,

e

par

a

structuree a

propositionliquid

st

rammaticus

t

que

es

propriétés

estermescienst

grammaticus

sont elles

ue

tout

rammairien

st

homme. ar ontrei

quod

st

rammaticus

st ciens

aliquid

st

rammaticus

st

mpossible

ARS

MEL.

И,

1

p.

354).

Cf.

a même

rgumenta-

tion

ansTLA

p. 53,

ex. A

86a à

A

86d.

23TractatuseLocisArgumentationumed. par ukio wakuma,nstantiae.Studyj

Twelfthechniquef

Argumentation

ithn

Edition

f

Ms. Paris N lat.

674

.

1-5,

dans:

Cahiers

e

l'Institute

Moyen

ge

Grec t

Latin,

8

1981)

abrégé

n

TLA].

15

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ex.

(TLA

A78)

Aliquid

quod

currit

disputât

ergo

aliquid

currit

Cette

inférence,

nous l'avons

dit,

est

rejetée par

l'auteur de l'ARS

MEL.

(с)

Une

inférence

de

l'implicite

à ce

que

nous

appelons

proposition

principale Ç'illud

quodpropositioroponit ),

onsidérée

comme

'

néces-

saire ,

bien

qu'il

y

ait ici

aussi des

contre-exemples,

omme

nous

le

verrons:

ex.

(TLA

A81)

Aliquis

homo

currit

ui

disputât

ergo

aliquis

homo currit

Ce

type

ď

inférence

eut

se

produire orsque

Г

mplicatio

e

rapporte

u

sujet:

ex.

(TLA

A82)

Aliquid quod

currit

disputât

ergo

aliquid

disputât

ou au

prédicat:

ex.

(TLA

A83)

Aliquid

currit

uod

disputât

ergo

aliquid

disputât.

Les

contre-exemples

ontiennent

oit

des relatives

qui

ne

peuvent

être

que

restrictives:

ex.

(TLA

I

81.3)

Socrates

est fortior

uam

homo

qui

est Plato

ergo

est

fortior

uam

homo

soit des relatives

dont

l'interprétation

st

en

général

restrictive,

ar

exemple

avec unus olus

homo

ui

ou unum olum

uod

TLA

I

76.

1 I

78.

1, 181.2, 182.2,

184.3),

soitdes

relatives

dont 'antécédent

est

pré-

cédé d'un signe distributif:

ex.

(TLA

I

76.2)

Omnem

hominem

quem

video

diligo

ergo

omnem hominem

video

et ilium

diligo

(cf.

les

contre-exemples

imilaires

78.2,

I

81.1,

I

84.1).

Or

nous

avons vu

ailleurs

que

ces

exemples

avec

omnis taient

fré-

quemment

discutés,

soit

dans

les

traités ur

a

restriction,

ù on recon-

naissait

à leur

propos

une

double

interprétation

ossible

de

la

relative,

soit dans les discussions sur l'anaphore où diverses solutionsétaient

envisagées,

certains

auteurs refusant

a

possibilité

qu'un

termedistri-

bué

soit

anaphorisé

et

qu'un

énoncé

comme le

second

membre de

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rinférence

i-dessus

soit

correct.

Les

contre-exemples

onnés

ici sans

justification,

'expliquent

si on

les

rapporte

ux

cas

généraux que

nous

avons discutésprécédemment.

4.

2 Restriction

emporelle

Nous

avons donné dans

notre

première

partie

es

deux

règles,

énon-

cées en

particulier

dans

le

TRACT.

DE

PROPR.

SERM.

(II,

2

p.

724),

du

fonctionnement

e

la

restriction

emporelle

pour

les

proposi-

tions

contenantun

relatif,

t

que

nous

reprenons

par

les schémas

sui-

vants:

RI:

pronom

relatif homo fuit

t

ille non est

R2:

nom relatif

homo fuit

qui

non est

Selon les critères

donnés

dans la

DIAL.MONAC.

supra,

R2

n'est

acceptable

que

si la

relativeest

restrictive,

es deux

assertions

n'étant

pas

indépendantes,

l'assertion homo

ui

non

est

précédant

l'assertion

homo

uit.

Certains

auteurs donnent e fait

que

les

temps

des deux

propositions

soient différents omme un argumentcontre'équivalence et ille

=

qui

comme

dans

le TRACT.

DE

PROPR.

SERM.

(qui

refuse

Г nfe-

rence:

homo

uit

t lle

non st

rgo

omo

uit

ui

non

st ou

dans le

TLA,

cf.

le

contre-exemple

uivant:

(TLA

I

77.1)

Aliquid

fuit t illud

non est

ergo aliquid

fuit

quod

non est.

Dans le Tractatus

mplicitarum

ar

contre,

on

accepte

une

des

deux

équi-

valences

possibles (1 )

mais

pas

l'autre

(1')

(p. 55):

(1)

Aliquid

quod

non est homo eritAntichristus

(1')

Aliquid

non est

homo et

illud

erit

Antichristus

(1 )

Aliquid

erit

Antichristus t

illud

non

est

homo

Les

arguments

donnés

pour ustifier

1 )

contre

1')

reposent

sur

une

acceptation

de la

règle

RI mais sur un

rejet mplicite

de R2.

L'auteur

chercheen

effet

montrer

ue, pour

que

la restriction

emporelle

oit

conservée dans

(1)

et

sa

glose,

il

faut

que

les mêmes

sujets

soient

iés

aux mêmesverbes: aliquiddoit donc rester ujetde erit, erbeau futur

et

le relatif oit rester

ujet

de

non sthomo

verbe au

présent,

même si

de nom relatif

quod),

il

devient

pronom

relatif

illud).

De

ce

fait,

dit

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l'auteur,

les

mêmes

sujets

étant liés aux

mêmes

verbes,

Yappellatio

induite

par

le

temps

de ces

verbes sur ceux-ci sera

identique24.

L'auteur du Tractatusmplicitarumenddonc à fairedes deux propo-

sitions contenues dans

Г

mplicite

1)

des

propositions ndépendantes

quant

au

fonctionnement e la restriction

emporelle.

D'autre

part

il

est

clair dans

cette

analyse que

la

prédication

principale

Aliquid

erit

Antichristus

est non

seulement

ndépendante

de

la

prédication

faite

par

la

proposition

relative,

mais

également

antérieure

celle-ci:

la

prédi-

cation

n'est

pas

faitedu

sujet

<

liquid)

n

tant

que

modifié

par

Y

mplica-

tion

mais

indépendamment

et

antérieurement cette

modification.

Tous ces

arguments

nous

montrent

ien,

si

on les

rapporte

ux

critè-

res donnés dans la DIAL.MONAC. que, implicitement ans ce texte,

en retenant

a

glose

(1 ),

l'auteur considère la

proposition

relative

dans

(1)

comme

non-restrictive. e choix de

(1 )

est

en fait

mposé

par

le sens de

la

phrase:

si

(1) signifiait

Г),

l'explicite

(Г)

étant

fausse,

l'implicite

(1)

le serait

aussi.

Par

contre

1 )

étant

vraie,

(1)

l'est aussi.

C'est bien reconnaître

ue

deux

interprétations

ont

possi-

bles.

Le fait

qu'une

proposition

implicite ,

c'est-à-dire contenantune

proposition

relative,

ne

puisse

être

glosée par

une

explicite que

si

l'interprétation e la relativeest non-restrictive,st bien ustifiéepar

un

autre

passage

du même

traité,

à

propos

de

l'exemple

Omne

nimal

quod

est

homo

strisibile

p.

58).

Puisque

la seule

interprétationccepta-

ble de

cette

phrase

est

l'interprétation

estrictive,

lle

n'admet

pas

d'être

glosée:

Itemdubitatur

e

explicita

uius

mplicitae:

Omne

nimal

uod

esthomo

strisibile

Ad hoc

dicimus

uod

haec

propositio

ullam abet

xplicitam...

La seule glosequi seraitacceptablemet bien en lumière cette nterpré-

tation restrictive:

(...)

vel

i

habet,

ic

sse umendam:

Aliquorum

nimalium

uodlibet

st

homo

t

nullumsthomo

uod

non it

isi-

ble. 25

24

Et

estratio

uare

ic sumendait

xplicita,

uia

iste erminus

liquid

upponit

uerbo

uturi

emporis,

cilicet

rit,

t

sortitur

b eo

appellationem

5a-i) .

et

Item,

alia

ratio: umnomen elatiuum

upponat

erbo

raesentis

emporis,

t

n

explicita

loco

llius ominis

elatiui

onatur

ronomen

elatiuum,

llud

pronomen

ebet ta

uerbo

upponere

ui

upponit

omen elatiuum

ositum

n

mplicita

5a-iii)

Tracta-

tusmplicitarump. 55).

25

Cette

lose

st ien

roche

'une

hypothétique

u

type:

mnenimal

st isibilei

llud

est omoce

qui

confirme

'interprétation

estrictive

cf.

upra).

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Contrairement

ce

que

Ton avait

dans

la

glose

(1 )

pour

(1),

l'asser-

tion

première

st ici celle

qui

fait

porter

'assertion

réalisée

par

la rela-

tive sur le sujetde la principale,et l'assertionprincipaleest seconde et

dépendante

de la

première.

Conclusion

Nous

avons

cherché

à montrer

ue

Ton

trouvaitdans les traités

er-

ministes

une

opposition

entre deux

fonctionnements e la

proposition

relative. Nous avons vu

que,

si

des

critères

sont,

dans un traité au

moins,

énoncés clairement

comme

permettant

e

distinguer

un fonc-

tionnement estrictiftun fonctionnement on-restrictife la

relative,

ces critères restent souvent

implicites

ailleurs,

mais influent

sur

l'adoption

de telle

ou telle

solution

d'un

problème

logico-sémantique

(comme

celui des

inferences

ossibles

à

partir

des

implicites)

et,

dans

d'autres

cas,

semblent

s'effacer,

'une ou

l'autre

interprétation

e la

relative

restant

seule en

jeu,

ce

que

le

type

de

question

traitée

à

cet

endroit

permet

d'expliquer.

D'autre

part

il

nous

a

paru important

e

montrer

ue,

même si cette

opposition

apparaissait

analysée

dans

nos

textes de diverses manières (restriction/nonrestriction, sens

composé/divisé,

iaison

médiate/immédiate,

relative

située

dans

la

même

pas

dans

la

même

phrase,

etc.),

elle

restait

néanmoins

liée au

contexte

de la théoriede

la

restriction e la doctrine

erministe.

e

ce

fait,

e traitement

e la relative e trouve

ié

à

celui de

l'adjectif

et

il

est

intéressant

de noter

que l'opposition

entre les deux

interprétations,

dans la

Logique

de

Port-Royal,

a

pour origine

a

distinction

xplica-

tion/détermination

ui,

elle

aussi,

n'est

pas posée uniquement

pour

la

relative,

mais

également

et d'abord

pour l'adjectif26.

nfin,

a

spécifi-

cité du traitement e ce problèmedans ces textes terministes par

rapport,

en

particulier,

celui

de la

Logique

de

Port-Royal

-

vient de

l'analyse

particulière

du

phénomène

de

l'anaphore

et des difficultés

posées par

la

règle

générale

adoptée

selon

laquelle

l'antécédent

et

le

26

Cf.

J.

Cl.

Pariente,

rammaire

ogique

t

onctuation,

tudesureXVI le

iècle,

niver-

sité eClermont

I, 1979,

p.

105-120.

'auteur

xplique

n

particulierue

e fait

ue

l'opposition

oit

iée la distinction

xplication/détermination

n

fait

ne

opposition

purement

ogique,

e

qui

explique

u'on

ne

a

trouve

as

dans a Grammairee Port-

Royalp. 108-109).'estpeut-êtrearce u'elle st iée, ans es extes édiévaux,

la

problématique

ssentiellement

ogique

e

a

restriction,

u'on

ne a trouve

as

dans

les

grammairesontemporaines,

u moins elles

ont

ous

disposons.

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relatif

d'identité)

ont

la

même

supposition27.

Cette

règle,

en

effet,

posée

pour

toute

anaphore,

nominale

et

pronominale,

s'applique

en

faitdifféremmentans les deux cas: c'est à proposd'un des problèmes

discutés iés à cette

règle,

celui des

antécédents

distribués,

u'est

avan-

cée

l'idée

d'une double

interprétation

ossible

qui

vaut

-

ici

aussi

-

pour

toute

proposition

ontenant

un

terme distribué28.

l nous a sem-

blé

qu'il

fallait rendre

compte,

en même

temps

que

de

la

présence

d'une telle

opposition

entre

deux

types

de

relatives,

de

la

manière dont

le

problème

se

posait

dans les textes

terministes.

Si

nous avons

insisté ur

le double

fonctionnement e la

proposition

relative,

ce n'est

pas simplement pour

montrer

que

les

médiévaux

sont,plusieurssiècles avant Port-Royal,les 4'inventeurs de celui-ci.

Ce

n'est

pas

non

plus pour

dire

qu'ils

avaient cette

distinctiondont

plusieurs

études récentes ont montré

l'inadéquation

pour

rendre

compte

du

fonctionnement

ffectif es

relativesdans

nos

langues29.

l

nous semble

plus

intéressant

de voir

que

cette

distinctionest

bien

d'origine

logique,

s'appliquant

sur

un

corpus

d'exemples

restreints,

t

inséré

de ce fait dans un cadre où il

s'agit

d'assigner

des

valeurs de

vérité aux

phrases

contenant des

relatives,

ce

qui implique

d'adopter

des

positions

tranchées: on

a

telle

ou telle

nference

partir

de

l'impli-

cite, l'antécédent est restreint u il ne l'est pas. Ce qui est étonnant

c'est le

bonheur avec

lequel

a

perduré,

usqu'à

nos

jours,

ce

type

de

distinction,

malgré

es difficultés

u'elle

suscite dans

l'analyse

linguis-

tique

de bon

nombre

d'exemples,

ainsi

que

les critères

permettant

e

l'établir,

dont certains

se

trouvent

déjà,

par

exemple,

dans le

passage

étudié

plus

haut de

la

Dialéctica

Monacensis.

Université

Paris 7

Département

e

Recherches

inguistiques

C.N.R.S. (U.A. 381)

27

Règle

mbiguë

ans a

formulation,

uisqu'elle eut

ouloirire

ue

'antécédent

et

e relatif

upposent

our

esmêmes

ndividusu

qu'ils

ntmêmemode

e

supposi-

tion.

28

Ceci

vaut

galement

our

'autres

ropositions,

ommees

exceptives

vec olum

tantumetc.

29Cf. nparticulier. leGoffic1979), ropositionselativesdentificationtmbiguïtéou

Pour

n

inir

vec

es eux

ypes

e

relatives

dans:DRLAV

21,

Universitée Paris

VIII,

pp.

135-145.

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Textes

ités

Ars

Emer.

I,

2: Ars

mmerana,

d.

par

L.

M. de

Rijk,

ogica

odernorum,

contribution

to he istoryf arlyerministogicvol. I, part ,Assen 967.ArsMel. II, 1:ArsMeliduna,bid, ol. I

part

.

Ars

Mel.:

Ars

Meliduna

ed.

complétéear

F.

Giusberti

1982),

Materials

or Study

n

Twelfthentury

cholasticism

Napoli:

TheArsMeliduna

n

implicit

ropositions

p.

77-85.

De

nplicationibus

ed.

par.

L.

M. de

Rijk

1966),

ome otesn

he

edieval

racte nso-

lubilibus,

ithhedition

f

tract

atingrom

hend

f

he 2th

entury

dans:

Vivarium

IV,

pp.

83-115.

Dial. Monac.

I,

2:

Dialécticaonacensised.

par

L. M. de

Rijk

1967)

ol.

I,

part

.

Fierville

d.,

Une

rammaire

atinenéditeuXlIIe

siècle

Paris 886.

Guillaume

de

Sherwood,

yncategoremata

ed.

O'Donnell,

Mediaeval

tudies, ,

pp.

46-93.

Lambert Auxerre, ogicaSummaamberti, ed.F. Alessio1971).

Log.

Cum it Nostra

I,

2:

Logica

umitnostraed.

par

L.

M. de

Rijk

1967),

ol

I,

part

.

Pierre

d'Espagne, ractatus,

d. L. M. de

Rijk 1972),

Assen.

Pierre

Helie,

Summa

uper

riscianumonstructionum

ed.

dans:

Cahiers e

'Institutu

Moyen ge

Grec

t

Latin,

7-28.

Robert

Blund,

umman rte

rammatica,ap.

derelativised.

parKneepkens

1977),

The

elatio

implex

n

the

rammaticalracts

f

he

ate 2th nd

arly

3th

entury

dans:

Vivarium

V,

1,

pp.

1-30.

RogerBaconXIV:

Summa

e

ophismatibus

t istinctionibused.

par

teele,

pera

acte-

nus nedita

ogeri

aconiOxford

937.

RogerBaconXV:

Summuleialecticesibid, ol

XV,

1940.

Summaerelativisanonymi),d.parKneepkens1977).

Sum.Met.

II,

1:

Summe

etenses,

d.

par

L. M. de

Rijk

1967),

vol.

I,

part

.

Tla:

TractatuseLocis

rgumentationum

ed.

par

Yukio wakuma

1981),

nstantiae.

Study

f

Twelfthentury

echnique

f

Argumentation

ithn Edition

f

Ms

Paris N

lat. 674

.

1-5.,

dans:Cahiers e

'Institut

e

Moyen

Age

Grec t Latin 8.

Iract.Anag:

I,

lractatus

nagnini,

d.

par

L. M. de

Rijk

1967),

vol.

I,

part

.

Tract,

de

Univ.Monac.

II,

2: Tractatus

e

univocationeonacensis

ibid.

Tract.de

Pr.Serm.

I,

2: Tractatuse

roprietatibus

ermonům,

bid.

Tractatus

mplicitarum

ed.

par

Giusberti

1982).

21

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Vivarium

XIV,

1

1986)

Walther

Burley's

De

exceptivis.

An

Edition

L.

M.

DE

RIJK

Here is

the

edition of

Walther

Burley's

early

tract

on

the

so-called

'exceptive

propositions.'

For some

information n

it,

see

the Introduc-

tion recedine myeditionofBurley'sDe exclusivis.n thisJournal,vol.

23

(1985),

pp.

23-54.

Contents

Chs

1-3

Introductio

4

Regula

la:

omnis

propositio

in

parte

vera et in

parte

falsa

potest

verifican

per

exceptionem

5-15

Dubitatio

16 Regula2a: exceptivaest preiacenti nstantia

17-23

Instantiae

24

Regula

За: si

tot

excipiuntur

quot supponuntur,

xcep-

tiva

est

impropria

25-34 Instantiae

35-69

De

suppositione

in

exceptiva

36-40 De

suppositione

ubiecti

41-61

De

suppositione

artis

xtracapte

42-45 De

primaopinione46-54 De secunda

pinione

55-62

De

tertia

pinione

63-69 De

suppositione

redicati

70-84 De

habitudine inter

exceptivam

et

exclusivam

70-77

An omnis

xclusiva

nferatxceptivam

t

econverso

78-82

An

exceptiva

nferatur

x

negativa

xponente

xclusive

83-84 An

exceptiva

nferatur

x

affirmativaxponente

xclusive

85-91

Utrum

exceptiva

possit

esse

falsa,

utraque

ex-

ponente existente vera

92-99

An post

exceptionem fiat

distributio

100-109

Quid

determinet

prepositio

cum

suo

casuali

22

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Sigla

L

=

codex ondinensis

British

Museum,

Royal

Ms.

12

F

XIX,

126va-

129vb)

Lc

=

manus

uae

correxit

В

=

codex

rugiensis

Bruges

Stadsbibliotheek,

od.

500,

85va-89rb)

Bc

=

manus

uae

correxit

Walter Burley

DE

EXCEPTIVIS

<Introductio)

a;

1

Circa

exceptivas

est

sciendum

quod

hec dictio

'

preter

aliquando

tenetur

xceptive,

aliquando

diminutive.

Quando

tenetur

exceptive,

tunc

dénotât instantiam

esse in suo

preiacente.

Ut si dicatur:

lnichil

preter

ortem urriť dénotât

ista

duo instare: 'nic

i curriť et

ť

Sortes

curriť

Sed

quando

tenetur

diminutive,

пес

attribuii

predicatum

parti

extracapte

пес removet

predicatum

a

parte

extracapta.

Ut

si

dicatur:

'decernreteruinqué untquinqué, non sequitur ex hoc quod quinqué

non sunt

quinqué.

Nec etiam

sequitur:

'

decern

reteruinqué

unt

uin-

qué;

igitur

ecernunt

uinqué

.

2 Sciendum

est

quod

differentia st

inter hanc dictionem

4

preter

quando

tenetur

xceptive

et

quando

tenetur

diminutive,

uia quando

tenetur

diminutive,

propositio

n

qua ponitur preter'

bene stat

cum

suo

preiacente.

Sicut

patet

in

exemplo:

ista duo stant bene simul:

'

decern

mmalia

unt

lba

9

et

'

decern

nimalia

reter

uo sunt lba'

,

quia

in-

tellects

huius

'

decernnimalia

reter

uo

unt

lba

9

est ste:

1

decernnimalia

remotisuobus unt lba'

que

est vera si octo sint alba. Sed

propositio

n

1

Circa.

dictio]

Hoc

signum

alterum

liquando]

B

teneturdd.B.

instan-

tiam]

oppositum

idest

epugnantiamuperscr.

ltamanus

n

L

dicatur]

dicitur

sic

aepius

dénotât]

denotatur

instare]

contradicere

extracapte]

ex-

trahere пес...

xtracapta]

от. В

пес... ecernunt

uinqué]

от. L

quinqué

sunt

uinqué]

quinqué

2

hanc

dictionem]

hoc

signum

exceptive]

exclusive

preter]

от.

L

suo]

L от. В

sicut...

xemplo]

unde

bene]

В

от. L

simul]

B

quod

dd.

В

decern]

duo

В

et]

LB

quod

add.

В

est]

LR

от.

В

decern

nimalia]

от.

В remotis] relictis duobus] B aliaĢpro nimalia)dd.В que] L et ista

В

hec

dictio

reter]

predicatum

?)

В

ut]

L

quando

В

uno]

L

una

В

op-

positum]

contradictoria

nam]

В

quia

L

omnis]

от. В

23

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qua ponitur

hec dictio

ť

preter

ut tenetur

xceptive,

non

stat

cum suo

preiacente.

Unde ista duo non

sunt

simul

vera:

4

omnis

homo urriť

t

'

omnis homopreter ortem urriť quia ex uno sequitur oppositum

alterius. Nam

sequitur:

ť

omnis

omo

reter

ortem urrit

igitur

ortes on

curriť

et

ultra:

'

igitur

onomnis omo urriť

3

Alia differentiast

quod

hec

dictio

preter

semper quando

tenetur

exceptive excipit partem

a toto in

quantitate

sive

partem

subiectivam

a terminocommuni. Sed

quando

tenetur

diminutive,

diminuii

a toto

universali

sive

integrali; semper

enim

dividit

[B

85vb]

partem

in-

tegralem

a

toto

integrali.

{Regula prima

4

De

hac

dictione

ť

preter quando

tenetur

exceptive,

dande sunt

regule.

Una

est

quod

omnis

propositio

in

parte

vera et

in

parte

falsa

potest

verificari

per

exceptionem;

excipiendo

illud

pro

quo

est

falsa.

Ut si hec sit falsa:

'

omnis

omo urriť

solum

pro

Sorte,

excepto

Sorte

erit

propositio

vera.

Ideo

hec est vera:

ťomnis omo reterortemurriť

(Dubitatio)

5

Contra

hanc

regulam contingit

dubitare an omnis

propositio

n

parte

vera

et

in

parte

falsa

possit

verificari.

Quod

non,

videtur.

Nam

hec est falsa:

ť

nullus homo st

homo lbus9 et non est falsa nisi

pro

homine

albo;

et tamen

excepto

homine

albo

non

erit vera. Нес enim

non

est

intelligibilis:

1

nullushomo

reter

ominem

lbumesthomo lbus'

quia pars extracapta non instai suo preiacenti. Nam ista duo non

repugnant:

'

nullushomo

st homo lbus et

'

homo lbus est homo lbus

3

quod]

L

quando

В

semper

uando]

L от. В

exceptive]

B

semper

dd.

В

excipit

artem]

xcipit

est

exceptio artis partem...

ermino]

partis

subiectivet a

termino

communi]

от.

В

sed]

LB hec

dictio

reter

dd.

L

diminuit]

excipit

sive]

vel

toto

dividit]

excipit

4

quando

enetur]

tenta

exceptive]

xceptiva

)L

diminutive

una]

LB

regula

dd. В

omnis]

от.

В

excipiendo...

alsa]

L

от. В

propositio]

от.

В

ideo

hec]

unde

sta

В от. В

est

vera]

R

от. В

5

hanc]£

stam

ic

saepius

in

parte

vera...

erificari]

etc. В

erit]

В est

L hec...ntelligibilis]hic nim st ntellectus hominem]от. В extracapta

excepta

suo]

L

nam]

В от.

L

non]

В

от.

L

repugnarent]

epugnant

B

prius

sequeretur]

equitur

B

alterum

equeretur]

equitur

B

aliquis]

от.

В

24

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Quia

si

repugnarent,

ex uno

sequeretur

oppositum

alterius;

et tunc

sequeretur:

'homo

lbus est

homo lbus

igitur

liquis

homo

sthomo

lbus*

ubi antecedens est necessariumet consequens contingens.

6 Item.

Supposito

quod

omnis

homo alius

a

Sorte

et

Platone

currat

et

quod

nec

Sortes пес

Plato

currat,

hec

tunc est

falsa: 'omnis

homo

preter

ortem

urriť et

non nisi

pro

Platone;

et

tarnen sto

excepto

non

erit

vera,

quia

non

potest

excipl.

7 Retento

casu

priori

hec

est falsa:

4

omnis

homo

urriť et non

nisi

pro

Sorte et

Platone. Et

tarnen

xcepto

Sorte et

Platone non

erit

vera.

Нес

enim est

falsa:

'

omnis

omo

reter

ortemt

Platonem

urriť

quia

ex

hac

sequitur

quod

omnis

homo alius

a

Sorte

et

Platone

currit

[L

126vb]. Sed hec est falsa, quia Sortes est alius a Sorte et Platone;

tamen hec

est

falsa:

'

Sortes on

urriť

8

Item.

Supposito quod

omnis

homo

alius

a

Sorte

excipiatur

ab

aliquo

actu

et

Sortes

non,

nec hec

tunc

est falsa:

'

omnis

omo

xcipitur'

et

nonnisi

pro

Sorte. Et

tamen

excepto

Sorte non erit vera.

Нес

enim

est

falsa

'

omnis

omo

reter

ortem

xcipitur'

uia

ex hac

sequitur quod

Sortes

non

excipitur.

Sed hec est

falsa,

quia

in

hac

propositione

ex-

cipitur.

9 Ad

oppositum. Si

propositio

sit

in

parte

vera

et

in

parte

falsa,

predicatumremovetur vere ab eo pro quo est falsa, et attribuitur

cuilibet

alii

inesse. Et

hoc

dénotât

exceptiva.

Igitur exceptiva

est vera.

10

Ad istam

dubitationem

dico

quod

regula

est bona.

Quod

patet

inductive,

quia

propositio

n

parte

vera et in

parte

falsa

aut

est afflr-

mativa

aut

negativa.

Si

affirmativa,

tunc

predicatum

vere inest

cuilibet

alii ab

eo

pro quo

est

falsa

et

vere removetur

b

isto

pro

quo

est

falsa;

et hoc

dénotât

affirmativa

xceptiva.

Si autem

illa

propositio

6

Platone]

a

Platone

sortesес

plato] plato

ес

ortes et

non]

et

amen

nonВ isto xcepto] exceptoiatone prius on] R от. В erit] estL

7 casu

priori]

eodem asuL

et

non]

В

sednon st

falsa

et tamen...

era]

В

non

otest

erifican

er

xceptionem

currit]

B

igitur

mnis

omo lius sorte

t

piatone

urritdd В

quia...

urrit]

R

от.

В

ex

hac]

L

от.

R

quod]

L

от. R

preter

ortemt

platonem

urrit

gitur

mnis omo

dd.В

piatone]

a

piatone

L

tamen...

urrit] igitur

ortes on

urrit

8

alius

sorte]

от.

L

excipiatur]

excipitur

actu]

от.

В

alius

sorte

dd.

L

tunc]

enim

tamen]

от.

L

erit]

est

L

sortes]

от. В

9

vere]

от.

В

attribuitur]

от. L

inesse]

inest

dénotât

xceptiva]

denotatur

er

xceptivam

10

ad.

dico]

dicendum

quod]

L

et

В

quia]

LB

aut lla dd.

В aut

st]

est

В

primům

ere]

от.

В

secundum

ere]

от.

В

dénotât]

denotatur

n

L

ter-

tiumere] от. В a quolibetlio]В от. L etvere... era]L от. В et ab ilio

removetur

ro

quo

est

falsa

R

igitur...

ro

quo]

LR

от. В

ista]

L est

R

propositio..

alio]

L

est

falsa

t

removetur

b ilio

pro

uo

non

stfalsa

25

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sit

negativa,

tunc

predicatum

vere

removetur

quolibet

alio ab ilio

pro

quo

est

falsa,

et

vere

attribuitur

lli

pro

quo

est vera.

Igitur

ista

propositio que significaipredicatuminesse illi pro quo propositioest

vera,

removetur

quolibet

alio.

Cuiusmodi est

exceptiva

negativa

in

qua

idem

excipitur.

11

Ad

primam

rationem

dicitur

quod

hec

est falsa:

ť

nullus

homo st

homo lbus' et hoc

non

nisi

pro

homine

albo

verum

est. Sed

ex

hoc non

sequitur

quod posset

verificari

xcepto

homine

albo;

sed

exceptis

stis

qui

sunt ¿libi erit

propositio

vera.

Unde si

aliqua

propositio

debeat

verificari

per exceptionem, oportet quod

singularia

per

se alicuius

communis

excipiantur.

Ideo cum homo

albus sit

per

accidens,

con-

tentum sub homine ab eo non potestexcipl.

12

Tu

dicis:

cum hec sit falsa:

ť

nullus omo

st

homo

lbus

pro aliquo

singulari

et

pro aliquo

vera,

potest

verificari

er

exceptionem.

Dico

quod

debet

verificari,

xcipiendo

illa

singularia

pro quibus

est

falsa

sub

disiunctione. Ideo debet sic verificari:

4

nullus

homo)

preter

ortem

vel

Platonem sthomo

lbus'

supposito quod

sit solum falsa

pro

Sorte

et

pro

Platone.

Et

si

pro pluribus

debet

verificari,

excipiendo

illa

singularia

sub disiunctione.

13

Tu

dicis: si verificetur

xcipiendo

singularia

sub

disiunctione,

adhuc est ista exceptiva falsa, quia hec est falsa: ťnullushomo reter

Sortem st homo

lbus'

et

hec similiter: nullushomo

reter

latonem st

homo lbus'

-

Dico

quod

non erit

disiunctiva

sed de

parte

disiuncta,

ita

quod

excipias

illud totum disiunctum:

Sortes el

Plato'

14 Ad

aliud

dico

quod

supposito quod

omnis

homo

alius

a

Sorte

vel a

Platone

currat et

quod

nec

Sortes пес

Plato

currat,

hec

tunc est

falsa:

1

omnis omo

reter

ortem

urriť

et solum

pro

Platone. Sed

ex

hoc

11 rationem]responsionem dicitur] dicendum hocnonnisi]ocnisiВ

nonnisi

sed]

В

quia

L

posset

erificari]

от. L

albo]

LB foret

ropositio

era

add.

L

istis]

от. В

erit]

ex

(

?pro

rit)

est

В si...

xceptionem]

semper

propositio

ebet

erificari

er xponentes

alicuius]

illius

excipiantur]

ex-

cipitur

contentum...

xcipi] oppositum

ub o ab eo

non

potest

ccipi

)B

12 homo

lbus]

albus

vera]

non

В

per

xceptionem]

от.

В

excipiendo]

L

per

xceptionemxcipiendo

est]

hec

st

В

vel]

etВ

solum]

от. В

et]

L

vel

В

et

si]

L

vel

i

В

singularia]

от.

В

13

si]

L

quod

si

В

verificetur]

verificatam

per xceptivam

dd.

В

singulari

sub

disiunctione]

solum

sortem]

B

sivenullus

reter latonem

dd.В et

hec...

lbus]

L от.

В

erit]

est

В

sed]

LB

erit dd.

L

disiuncta]

disiunctiva

В

excipias] excipitur plato]

B

velcichero

dd.LB

14 dico] от. В tunc] от. L omnis] nullus hoc]В hacL verumtamen]

В

tarnen

propositio

xceptiva]

xponens

?/>roxceptiva)

propositio

in

parte.

.parte]

от.

В

currit.

sorte]

R

от.

В

26

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non

sequitur quod

possit

verificari

er

exceptionem, quia

regula

est

intelligenda

de

propositione

non-exceptiva.

Verumtamen

ilia

pro-

positi exceptiva que est in parte vera et in parte falsa, potest

verificari

er exceptionem.

Ideo ista:

'

omnis

homo lius

a

Sorte urriť

verificatur ic

per exceptionem:

omnis omo

lius a Sorte

reter

latonem

curriť

15

Ad

aliud dico

quod

sicut

Magister

Abstractionum

icit

quod sup-

posto quod

omnis homo

alius a Sorte et

Platone

excipiatur

L 127га]

ab

aliquo

actu et

Sortes

non,

hec est falsa:

ť

omnis omo

xcipitur9

et hec

est falsa:

1

omnis omo

reter

ortem

xcipitur9

et hec similiter:

Sortes on

excipitur

'

sed non

sequitur:

'

Sortes

n

hac

excipitur;

ortes

gitur

xcipitur9

sed hec est falsa secundumquid et simpliciter.

{Regula

secunda

16

Alia

regula

est

ista

quod

exceptiva

est

preiacenti

instantia,

hocest

quod quelibet exceptiva

répugnât

suo

preiacenti.

(

Instantie

17 Sed contra

hanc

regulam

sunt

multe instantie.

Нес est vera:

laliquis

homo

non

vidět sinum9 et hec

similiter:

aliquis

homonon vidět

asinum

preter

urnellum9,

t

supposito

quod

Sortes videat

aliquem

asinum et

quod

Plato

non

videat

aliquem

asinum alium a Burnello

sed

solum

Burnellum,

hec

est vera:

ť

aliquis

homonon

videt

sinum

(quia

Sortes

non videt

asinum),

et

hec

similiter:

aliquis

homo

on

videt

sinum

preter

urnellum

(quia

Plato non videt asinum

preterBurnellum).18 Item. Ista duo stant simul: ťnichil

reter

ominem

В

86rb]

album

est

homo

lbus9

t

'

homo

lbusest

homo lbus9

quia supposito quod

nullus

homo

albus

sit,

utraque

istarum

est vera.

Нес

tunc est vera:

'

nichil st

homo

lbus9 et hec

similiter: nichil

reter

ominemlbum

sthomo lbus9

quia utraque

exponens

est vera.

15

quod

sicut]

sicut icit

dicit]

от. В

ab...

ctu]

L

от.

В

quod]

В

от.

L

ethec...

xcipitur]

от.

L

sequitur]

от. В

sortes]

от.

В

16

preiacenti]

preiacentis

suo]

L

от.

В

ut]

В от.

L

17 alium...olum] preter burnellum] burnello quia... sinum] от.

В

similiter]

B

quod

dd.

В

quia.

asinum]

от.

L

18

nichil...

lbus]

nullus omo st

lbus

27

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19 Ad

oppositum

est una

regula

in

exceptivis.

Dicendum

quod

regula

est bona

aliquando,

aliquando

non. Pro

quo

sciendum

est

quod

aliquando fit xceptioa subiecto, aliquando a predicato.

20

Si fiat

exceptio

a

subiecto

tune

exceptiva

non stat cum suo

preiacente, quia

si

fiat

exceptio

a

subiecto,

tunc

suum

preiacens

est

una

propositio

vera

in

qua

predicatum

attribuitur uilibet

contento

sub

subiecto

vel

removetur

quolibet

contento sub

subiecto.

Sed

si

predicatum

attribuitur uilibet vel

removetur

quolibet,

cum

illa non

stat

exceptiva,

quia

in

exceptiva

vel

predicatum

attribuitur

licui

contento sub subiecto

vel

removetur b

aliquo.

21

Si

autem fiat

exceptio

a

predicato,

aut subiectum

sumitur

universaliteraut particulariter.Si universaliter,talis exceptiva non

stat

cum suo

preiacente.

Nam

ista

duo non

stant

simul:

'

nullushomo

videi asinum

et

'

nullus homo

videi

asinum

preter

urnellurrìSi

autem

subiectum

sumatur

particulariter

t

fiat

exceptio

a

predicato,

tunc

cum tali

exceptiva

bene

stat suum

preiacens,

quia

cum

tam

in

excep-

tiva

quam

in

preiacente

stat

subiectum

particulariter, otest

subiec-

tum

in

exceptiva

stare

pro

uno et in

preiacente pro

alio.

Sicut

patet:

ista

duo

stant simul:

'

aliquis

homononvidet

sinum

et

1

aliquis

homo on

videt sinum

reter

urnellum' Sicut

et illa

stant simul:

'

Sortes onvidet

asinum et quod non videt asinum preterBurnellum.

22

Per

hoc

patet

ad

primam

rationem

quod

ista duo

stant simul:

'

aliquis

homo

non videt sinum

et

4

aliquis

homo

non

videt

sinum

preter

Burnellum*ex eo

quod

potest

fieri

xceptio

a

predicato

et

predicatum

sumatur

particulariter.

23 Ad

aliud dico

quod

ista

duo non

stant simul:

'

nichil

st homo

albus et

nichil

reter

ominem

lbum st

homo lbus .

Ad

probationem

dico

quod

supposito quod

nullus

homo sit

albus,

hec

est

falsa:

'

nichil st

homo lbus'

quia

etsi

homo albus

non

existât,

adhuc homo albus

est

aliquid

in intellectuvel

aliquid

rationis.

19

pro...

st] propteruod

ciendum

20

una]

В

от.

L

vera]

L

una

В

vel...

ubiecto]

от. L

sed]

В

от.

L

cum...

tat]

В tunc

lla

non stat

imul

um L

secundum

el]

В et

L

alicui]

cuilibet

от.

В

tertium

el]

В

et

L

aliquo]

В

quolibet

lioL

21

a]

L

ab

aliquo

В

sumitur]

stat

В

aut]

В

vel

L

universaliter]

BC

nifor-

miter

duo]

L

от. В

sumatur]

stat

cum]

от.

В

potest]

et

potest

et]

L

от. В

et...

sinum]

R

от.

В

sicut..

burnellum]

от.

В

22 rationem] regulam stant]R non tant non]В от. L ex eo... par-

ticulariter]

от. В

23

duo]

L

от.

В

homo...

xistât]

sive

atione

28

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Regula

tertia

24

Alia

regula

est ista:

si tot

excipiuntur

quot

supponuntur,

[L 127vb]

excep-

tiva est

impropria.

Ut

si

dicatur:

'

omnis

homo

reter

тпет

hominem

urriť

Et

ratio huius

regule

est

quia exceptio

est

extracaptio partis

a

toto.

Sed si

tot

exci-

piantur

quot

supponuntur,

tune

non

erit

extracaptiopartis

a

toto sed

magis

eiusdem

a

seipso.

(Instantie)

25

Contra

istam

regulam

arguitur

ic:

aliqua exceptiva

est

propria

ubi

plura

excipiuntur

quam

supponuntur. Igitur

a

multo fortiori

li-

qua exceptiva

erit

propria

ubi tot

excipiuntur quot supponuntur.

Assumptum patet,

quia

'

omnishomo

reter

ominem

lium

a

Sorte urriť

<est

una

exceptiva

propria)

et

tamen hic

plura

excipiuntur quam

supponuntur,

quia

omnes alii a

Sorte

excipiuntur

t

nihil

supponitur

nisi

Sortes,

et

plures

homines sunt alii

a

Sorte

quam

[В

86

va]

Sortes.

Igituretc.

26

Item.

Supposito quod

tantum sint

tres

homines albi

et tantum

duo

nigri

et

quod

omnes homines

albi currant et non

niger,

hec

est

vera:

'

nullus

homo

reter

ominemlbum curriť Et

plura

excipiuntur

quam

supponuntur,

quia

solum

nigri supponuntur

et

albi

excipiun-

tur,

et

plures

sunt

albi

quam nigri.

27

Item.

Supposito quod

Sortes

currat et Plato

non,

hec est

vera:

'

uterque

storum

reter

latonem urriť

et

tamen tot

excipiuntur quot

supponuntur,quia

Sortes

excipitur

et Plato

supponitur.

24

quot]

quod

ic

ersaepe

dicatur]

dicitur

omnem]

CB т.

L

et]

В

от.

L

quia...

xtracaptio]

от.

В

toto]

B

extracaptio

dd.B tunc...

artis]

non

erit

xcipitur

ars

Bf

т. В sed...

eipso]

BC

т.

В

25

contra...

upponentur]

т. В contra...

ic]

contra

stam

egulam

c

contrallud

arguitur

icL

aliqua]

lia LB

exceptiva]

от. В

prius bi]

Bc n

qua

L

a... ali-

qua]

L

multo

ortius

erit]

est

L

propria]

veraВ alterum

bi]

В

in

qua

L

assumptum...

uia]

В

ut

L

et]

В

от.

L

hic]

В

от.

L

quia...

xcipiuntur]

nam

hic

excipitur

lius sorte

nichil]

от. L

et]

L

sed

В

homines]

от.

L quam ortes] от. L

26 Item...

uam

nigri]

от. L

27

currat]

от.

В

non]

B

currant

dd.В

platonem]

Sortem

29

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28

Ad

oppositum est

regula

in

exceptivis.

Ad

hanc

dubitationem

dico

quod

hec

regula

bona est. Cuius

ratio est

quia

in

omni

exceptiva

propria excipiturpars a suo toto. Hoc enimpatet perdiffinitionemn

Exceptivis

uoniam

exceptio

est

extracaptio

artis

suo toto. ed

si tot ex-

cipiantur

quot

supponuntur,

non

excipitur pars

a suo toto.

Ut si

dicatur: lomnis

omo

reter

тпет hominem

urriť hic non

excipitur

pars

a suo toto.

Nam

omnis

omo on

est

pars

huius

quod

dico omnis omo.

29

Verumptamen

sciendum

quod

regula

habet

intelligi

ic: si

tot

excipiuntur uot

supponuntur

n

preiacente,

exceptiva

est

impropria.

Sed

non

sequitur:

Hot

xcipiunturuot

upponuntur

n

exceptiva;

gitur

x-

ceptiva

st

mpropria*

Unde

sic

habet

intelligi

ut dictum

est.

30 Per hoc patet responsioad primamrationem,quoniam hec est

propria:

'

omnishomo

reter

ominem

lium

a Sorte

urriť Nam hic

non

excipiuntur

tot

quot

supponuntur

in hac:

ť

omnis

homo urriť

quia

Sortes

non

excipitur.

Et

exponitur

ic:

ť

Sortes

urrit

t

nullushomo

lius

a

Sorte urriť

31 Ad aliud

dico

quod

in hac:

luterque

storum

reter

latonem

urriť

non

excipiuntur

tot

quot

supponuntur

in hac:

'

uterque

storum

urriť

Unde

etsi in

predictis

nstantiis

xcipiuntur

tot

quot

supponuntur

n

exceptiva,

tarnen

non

excipiuntur

ot

quot

supponuntur

n

preiacente.

Ideo non sequiturhas esse improprias.

32

Contra

istud

arguitur.

Ostenditur

quod aliqua

exceptiva

sit

propria

in

qua

tot

excipiuntur

quot

supponuntur

n

preiacente.

Quia

hec

est

propria:

4

nullus ol

preter

une olem sť et tarnenhic

tot

exci-

piuntur

quot

supponuntur

in

preiacente.

Nam

iste sol

excipitur

et

nullus alius

supponitur

n

preiacente.

33

Huic dicitur

quod

hec est

propria:

ť

nullus ol

preter

une olem

sť

et

hic

excipitur

iste

sol

et

nichil

aliud

supponitur

in

preiacente.

Verumptamen plura

in

preiacentesupponuntur

formaliter

uam

ex-

28

hec]

В

от.

L bona

st]

В

est

era

quia]

В

от.

L

in

exceptivis]exceptive

L

suo...

uo]

В от. L

dicatur]

dicitur

quod

dico]

от. В

29

excipiuntur]

excipiantur

unde...

t]

В

seddebet

ic

ntelligi

icut

30

responsio]

от. L

primam

ationem]primůmrgumentum

quia...

orte

currit]

от. В

31

dico]

от.

В

preter

latonem]

preter

ortem

ř

т. В

non...

urrit]

B

от.

В

istorum]

Bf

reterlatonem

dd.

32

arguitur]

argumentum

aliqua]

L alia

В

quia...

reiacente]

BCот.

В quia]Bfnam

33

dicitur]

dicendum

iste]

B

terminus

dd.

verumptamen...

xceptiva]

от. L

etsi]

si

L

solus]

от. L

inquantum]

quantum

30

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cipiuntur

n

exceptiva, quia

etsi non sint

plures

soles in

actu,

tamen

sol,

inquantum

est ex sua

forma,

est

communis

pluribus.

34 Tunc dicendum est breviterquod ad proprietatemexceptive

sufficit

uod

plura

formaliter

upponantur

quam

excipiuntur.

Et sic

est in hac:

'nullus ol

preter

B 86vb]

hune olem sť

(De

suppositione

n

exceptiva)

35

[L

127va]

Circa

suppositionem

terminorum

n

exceptiva

con-

tingit

dubitare.

Cum

igitur

sint

tria,

scilicet subiectum a

quo

fitex-

ceptio,

et

pars

extracapta,

et illud

respectu

cuius fit

xceptio,

de

sup-

positionibuseorumdicatursecundum ordinem.

(De

suppositione

ubiectï)

36

Sciendum

quod

subiectum

in

exceptiva

habet

duplicem sup-

positionem:

unam

respectu predicati,

aliam

respectu

exceptionis.

Sed

respectu predicati

subiectum

exceptive

stat

mobiliter,

ta

quod

con-

tingit

descendere

ad

quodlibet

contentum

sub

subiecto

aliud

a

parte

extracapta.

Unde

bene

sequitur:

'omnis

homo

reter

ortem

urrit;

gitur

PlatocurrittCicerourriť quia sequitur: lomnis omo reterortemurrit;

igitur

mnis

omo lius a Sorte urriť et ultra:

4

igitur

lato curritt

Cicero1

37

Verumptamen respectuexceptionis

tat

subiectum mmobiliter.

Unde

non

sequitur:

*

omnis

homo

reter

ortem

urrit;

gitur

lato

preter

Sortem urriť

Sed

non

stat immobiliter

bsolute,

sed solum

respectu

illorum

qui

non habent

rationem

totius

respectu partis

extracapte.

Unde

bene

sequitur:

nullum nimal

reter

ortemurrit

igitur

ullus

homo

preter

ortem

urriť

Sed

non

sequitur:

'

nullum nimal

reter

ortem

urrit;

igitur

ullus

sinus

preter

ortem

urriť

quia

asinus non

habet

rationem

totius

respectu

Sortis.

34

est

breviter]

stL

breviter

sufficit]

requiritur supponanturuam

x-

cipiuntur]

supponunturuam

excipiantur

supponuntur

uam

excipiuntur

В

sol]

LB от. В

35

terminorum]

termino

exceptiva]

exceptivis

contingit

ubitare]

от.

L

igitur]

от. L

scilicet]

cum

sit

L a...

exceptio

t]

В от.

L

illud]

L

predicatum

eorum]

om.L

36

aliam]

В

et aliam

L

sed]

L

si

В

exceptive]

exclusive

extracapta]

B

respectu

redicad

dd.

В

bene]

от.

В

quia...cichero]

от. В

37 verumptamen]sed L subiectum] от. L stat]L от. В qui] L que

В

non]

В от.

L

respectu]

от. L

totius]

от. L

sortis]

totius ormalitatis

(■%

31

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38

Verumptamen

videtur

quod

non

contingit

descendere

ad

partem

extracaptam

in

exceptiva.

Nam

sequitur:

'

omnishomo

reter

Sortentst nimal; giturortesst nimaV quod non essetnisi contingeret

descendere

ad

partem

extracaptam.

Probatio huius

consequentie:

nam

sequitur:

'

omnis omo

reter

ortem

st

nimal;

gitur

ortes

st

homo1

quia

ad

hoc

quod

aliquid excipitur

b

aliquo oportet

uod

sub eo

con-

tineatur.

gitur

sequitur:

omnis omo

reter

ortemst

nimal;

gitur

ortes

est

homo

Igitur

a

primo.

39

Huic

potest

dici

quod

aliquando contingit

descendere

ad

partem

extracaptam,

et hoc

quando

talis

exceptiva

includit

opposita.

Ut

hec:

'

omnis omo

reter

ortem

st

nimaV

ncludit

sta

duo,

quia

hec

ponit quod Sortes est homo et quod Sortesnon est homo.

40

Quod

patet

ic.

Omnis

omo

reter

ortemst nimal.

gitur

ortes

st

homo,

quia

ex

hoc

quod

Sortes

xcipitur

b homine

ex hoc

equitur

uod

Sortes

ithomo.

Similiter

equitur

uod

ortes on it

homo,

uia sequitur:

omnis

omo

reter

ortem

st

animal;

gitur

ortes

on st

nimal

igitur

orteson

st omo'

gitur

tc.

{De

suppositione

artis xtracapte

41 Circa

suppositionem

partis

extracapte

est

sciendum

quod

secundum

diversos

diversimode

supponit pars extracapta.

Nam

secundum

aliquos

supponit

confuseet

distributive;

ecundum

aliquos

particulariter,

t secundum

aliquos

aliquando

universaliter,

liquan-

do

particulariter.

{De

primaopinione

42

Circa

[В

87ra]

priorem

opinionem

est

sciendum

quod

dicentes

partem

extracaptam supponere

confuse

et distributive

hoc dicunt

propter

hanc rationem

quia

hec dictio

ť

preter

importâtnegationem

et

negatio quicquid confundit, onfundit onfuseet distributive. t ideo

38

verumptamen]

tarnen

nam]

В

quia

L

huius]

от.

В

sequitur]

от.

В sortesst

homo]

от.

В

ad]

exВ

от.

L

aliquid]

от.

L

oportet]

sequitur

В

contineatur]

continetur

igitur...

omo]

gitur

ortes st animal

Ř от.

В

igitur

primo]

quia

sortessthomo

39

potest

dici]

В

dicitur

ut

hec]

ut

hic L unde hec

includit

pposita

В includit...

onit]

ncluditsta

uo

L

quia

hec

ponit

40

quod... gitur

tc.]

В от.

L

41

sciendum]

B

in

exceptiva

dd.

В

secundum

iversos]

от. L

secundum]

et

secundum

aliquando...

articulariter]

supponit

niversaliter

42 priorem] primamL est] В от. L rationem] causamL prius

et...

istributive]

от.

L et

ideo]

В

ideo L

alterumt...

istributive]

от.

В ideo...

istributive]

от. L

unde]

et

L

omnis omo

urrit]

от.

В

32

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quia

in

exceptiva

exceptio přecedit

partem extracaptam

et

negative

quicquid negat negat

confuse

et

distributive,

deo

pars extracapta

supponitconfuse et distributive.Unde dicuntquod sequitur:

'

nullum

animal

reter

ominemurrit

igitur

mnis omo

urriť

43

Verumptamen

etsi

pars

extracapta

supponat

confuse et

distributive,

oc non est

respectu exceptionis

sed

respectu

predicati.

Unde non

sequitur:

'

nullum

nimal

preter

ominemurrit

igitur

ullum

animal

preter

ortem

urriť

sed

sequitur:

4

igitur

ortes

urriť

Unde

secundum

sic

dicentes

1

nullum nimal

preter

ominem

urriť

habet

sic

exponi:

1

nullum

L

127vb]

animai liud ab

homineurrit

tomnis

omo

ur-

riť

Et

ita

'omne nimal

preter

ominem

urriťhabet sic

exponi:

ť

omne

animal liudab homine urrit tnullushomo urriť

44

Contra istud

arguitur.

Ostenditur

quod pars

extracapta

non

stet confuse

et

distributive,

uia

si

sic,

posito quod

nichil

currat nisi

Sortes,

ista tunc est

vera:

'

nichil

reter

ominem

urriť

sed

posito quod

hec

ponit

hanc

'

omnis

omo

sť

hec est falsa.

[44a

Contrastam

pinioiiem

rguitur

ic.

Ostenditur

uod

pars xtracapta

non>

stet

onfusetdistributive

uia,

posito

uod

nichil urrat isi

ortes,

ec

sset alsa:

1

nullumnimal

reter

ominem

urriť

quia

hec

ponit uod

omnis omo urrit.

i

con-

cedatur

uod

hec

it

alsa,

sto asu

posito,

contra:

equitur:

nichil

reter

ortem

ur-

rit;giturichilreterominemurriťantecedensstverum;gituronsequens].

45

Huic

dicitur

ecundum hanc viam

quod

ab

inferiori

d

superius

cum dictione

exclusiva immediate addita non tenet

consequentia,

quia

tunc

sequeretur:

nullushomo

reter

ortem

urrit;

gitur

ullus

homo

preter

nimai urriť

Verumptamen

antecedens est

intelligibile

t

con-

sequens

non.

Consequens

est non

intelligibile oquod

non

excipitur

pars

a

suo

toto

sed totum a sua

parte.

De secunda

pinione

46 Alia opinio est quod pars extracapta in exceptiva stet par-

ticularités

Et sic dicentes concedunt

processum

ab

inferiori ad

43

verumptamen...

gitur]

от.

В

preter

ortem]

CB

от.

L

sed]

В от.

L secundumic

dicentes]

si dicetur habet ic

exponi]

exponitur

et]

L

igitur

t

В

44

Contra...st

falsa]

от. L

44a

Contra.

.consequens]

от.

В

<non>

upplevi

oll.

45

dicitur]

dicitur

uod

L

verumptamen]

ultimum

consequens...

n-

telligibile]

от. L

sua]

L

от.

В

46

opinio

st]

В

est

pinio

in...

tet]

supponit

processum]

quod

В

ad-

dita] Bnonvalet onsequentiadd.В adillud] d idВ illud quia. .animals]

от. В

secundum

artis

espectu]

espectuartis

tertium

artis

espectu]

respectu

partis

33

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superius

cum

dictione

exceptiva

immediate

addita.

Verumptamen

non

contingit

descendere ad

quodlibet superius

ad

partem extracap-

tam, sed solum ad illudquod habet rationempartis respectu ubiecti.

Verbi

gratia,

bene

sequitur:

4

nullum

nimal

preter

ortem

urrit;

gitur

nullum

nimal

preter

ominemurriť

quia

{

homo

habet rationem

partis

respectu

animalis.Sed

non

sequitur:

4

nullum

nimal

preter

ortem

urrit;

igitur

ullum nimal

preter

ubstantiamurriť

quia

substantia

on

habet

rationem

partis

respectu

animalis.

47 Contra

istam

opinionem arguitur.

Isto

dato,

ex veris

sequitur

falsum.

Supposito quod

omnis homo currit et

quod

nichil aliud ab

homine

currat,

tunc hec

est

vera:

'

nichil

reter

ominem

urriť

Si tamen

iste terminus 4homo stet particulariter,tunc sequitur: 4nichilpreter

hominem

urrit

igitur

ichil

reter

unchominem

urrit

el

lium*

Sed con-

sequens

est

falsum,

quia

est una

disiunctiva

cuius

quelibet pars

est

falsa.

48 Item. Нес est vera:

'

nullum

nimal

preter

ominemst rationale

.

Nisi

tamen

excipitur pro

quolibet

singulari,

hec

esset

falsa,

quia

si

non

[B

87rb]

excipiatur pro quolibet

sed

pro

aliquo

et

aliquo

non,

ideo cum

ad

quodlibet

contingat

descendere

quod

non

excipitur,

on-

tingit

descendere

ad

aliquem

hominem.

Et

tunc

sequeretur:

4

nullum

animalpreterominemstrationaleigitur liquishomo on strationalis'Et

hoc

est

sic

arguendum.

Si Sortes

non

excipiatur, igitur

contingit

descendere ad

Sortem,

quia

ad

quodlibet

aliud a

parte

extracapta

contingit

escendere.

Et tunc

sequitur:

4

nullum nimal

reter

ominemst

rationale

igitur

ortes on strationalis'

49 Preterea. Нес dictio

4

preter aliquam importât

negationem.

Igitur

cum

4

preterprécédât partem

extracaptam,

negatio

importata

47

arguitur]

arguo

icL

quod]

L

от.

В

tunc]

от.

В

currit]

от.

В

par-

ticulariter]

confuse

t

distributive

articulariter

f)B

vel

lium]

от. В

sed]

В

от.

L

secundum

st]

В от. L

tertium

st]

В

consequens

st

quelibet]

utraque

48

esset]

estВ

quia]

L

sed

В

excipiatur]

excipitur

aliquo

t

aliquo

non]

L

alio et

alio

В

ideo

um]

В

tamen

contingit]

ontingit

B

sequeretur]

se-

quitur

et

hoc]

hec

f)B

sie

rguendum]

contra

ristotilem non

xcipiatur

igitur]

excipitur

aliud...

xtracapta]

от.

В

descendere]

B

quod

non

ex-

cipitur

t ad

quodlibetuod

?pro liud]

parte

xcepta

ontingit

escenderedd.

В

nullum

nimal]

nichil

49

Preterea]

Item

aliquam]

liamВ

от.

L

preter]

dictio

précédât]

přecedit

extracaptam]

exceptam importata

er

hoc]

L in

hac dictione

В precedei]В přecedit extracaptam] exceptamВ sed] В sed si

L

precedens]

précédât

ilium]

от. L

stabit]

stat

L

distributive]

B

igitur

n

hacnullumnimal

reter

ominemurritdd.

В

34

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per

hoc

precedei

partem

extracaptam.

Sed

negatio

precedens

ter-

minům

communem ilium

confundit

onfuse et

distributive.

gitur

in

hac:

'

nullum nimalpreter ominemurriťstabit iste terminus

4

homo

confuse

et

distributive.

50

Sustinendo istam

[L

128ra]

opinionem

dicendum

est ad

primam

rationem

quod

in hac:

ť

nullum

nimal

reter

ominem

urriť ste

terminus

'

homo

duplicem

habet

acceptionem,

unam

respectu

predicati,

aliam

respectu

exceptionis.

Respectu

predicati

supponit

distributive. llud

patet

sic.

Sequitur:

'

nichil

reter

ominem

urrit;

gitur

homo

urriť et

ultra:

'

igitur

stehomo

urrit

el ste

urriť Et

sic

respectu

predicati

stat

distributive.

51 Sed respectuexceptionis tatconfusetantum,quia nec contingit

descendere

copulative

nec

disiunctive. Non

enim

sequitur:

nichil

reter

hominem

urrit;

gitur

ichil

reter

stum

hominem

urrit

et

istum)'

quia

supposito

quod

omnis

homo

currat

et

quod

nichil

aliud ab

homine

currat,

hec

est vera:

4

nichil

reter

ominem

urriť hec

tarnen

est falsa:

'

nichil

preter

stum

hominem

urriť. Et

sic non

contingit

descendere

copulative.

Nec

disiunctive,

uia

eadem

ratione,

predicto

casu

posito,

hec est

vera: 'nichil

reter

ominem

urriť

hec tarnen

falsa:

'

nichil

reter

istum

hominem

el istum curriť. Ex

quo

sequitur

quod

illud

nec

copulativenec disiunctivestat, sed quod statconfusetantum.

52

Per

hoc

potest

dici

ad

aliud

argumentum

sicut

ad

primum),

quod

non

sequitur:

'

nichil

reter

ominem

urrit

igitur

ichil

reter

stum

hominem

urriť

quia

pars

extracapta

non

stat

distributive

espectu

ex-

ceptionis

sed

respectu

predicati.

Ideo non

contingit

descendere

respectu exceptionis

sed

respectu

predicati.

50

istam]

primam

quod]

L

quia

В

acceptionem]

suppositionem

ex-

ceptionis]

B

respectu

xceptionis

upponit

onfuse

antum

el

distributive

uod

idem

st dd.

В

supponit]

B

confuset add.L

distributive]

B

respectu

xcep-

tionisonfuse

antum

dd.

illud.

sequitur]

sicut

atet

hominem]

sortem

L

alterum

urrit]

igitur primo

icut

atet

et

sic]

В от. L

stat] supponit

confuse

t

L

51

sed]

В

от. L

stat]

от.

L

et

stum]

от. В

supposito]

posito

homo]

В

от. В

hominem

urrit]

B

от. В

hic...

alsa]

В

currit]

B

est

falsa dd.

L

et...

opulative]

от.

L

quia]

L

от. В

eadam

ratione

redicto]

от. L

hec

est...

urrit]

от. L

hec

arnen

alsa]

hec

sset

alsa от. В

nichil.

currit]

R

от. В

vel

stum]

от. В ex

quo.

tantum]

от.

LB

52 Per... equitur] Etperhoc dprimumrgumentumот. В nichil.currit]

LB

от. В

currit]

B1

dicitur

uod

non

equitur

dd.

non

tat...

redicati]

stat

confuse

t

distributive

especturedicati

tnon

espectuxceptionis

35

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53

Ad

argumentum

dicitur

quod

hec est

vera:

'

nullum nimal

reter

hominem

strationale.

Et

quando

dicitur

quod

si non

quilibet

homo

ex-

cipitur, igitur contingitdescendere ad quemlibet hominem, dico

quod

non

sequitur.

Et

cum

dicitur

quod

contingit

descendere ad

quodlibet

aliud

a

parte

extracapta,

dico

quod

regula

sic

habet

intelligi:

contingit

escendere

ad

quodlibet

de

quo

non

dicitur

pars

extracapta.

Sed

pars

extracapta

in

proposito

В

87va]

dicitur

de

quolibet

homine.

Ideo

ad nullum hominem

contingit

escendere. Sed

regula

non

est sic

intelligendaquod

ad

quodlibet

contingat

descendere

quod

non

est ac-

tualiter

extracaptum,

sed ad

quodlibet

de

quo

non dicitur

extracap-

tum.

54 Ad aliud dico quod etsi hec dictio *preter1mportētnegationem

et

précédât partem extracaptam,

verumptamen

sua

negatio

non

přecedit partem

extracaptam.

Sicut

patet:

si

dicam:

t

contingit

d

utrumque

hominem currere

negatio

contingere

přecedit

subiectum

et

tamen sua

negatio

non

quia

tunc

sequeretur:

'

contingit

d

utrumque

hominem

urrere;

gitur ontingit

d

utrumque

ullum ominem

urrere.

De

tertia

pinione

55 Alia opinio est quod in exceptiva affirmativa ars extracapta

stat

confuse

et

distributive

sed

in

exceptiva

negativa

stat

par-

ticulariter.Unde dicunt

quod

ista:

4

nullum nimal

reter

ominemurriť

habet sic

exponi:

4

nullum

nimal

liud

ab homine

urritthomo

urriť sed

ista: lomne nimai

preter

ominemurriť

debet sic

exponi:

lomne

nimai

aliud ab homine

urrit

t nullus

homo

urriť

53

argumentum

icitur] primům

rgumentum

icendum

quod

si]

В

от.

L quilibet...gitur] quodlibet quemlibetominem]quodlibetuodnon x-

cipitur

et

cum]

tamen

a

parte]

BC т. В

dico]

В

dicendum

regula]

ista

В

dicitur]

predicatur

hominem]

istorum

quod]

В

от.

L

contingat

descendere]

от. L

actualiter]

accidentaliter

prius

xtracaptum]acceptum

( )B

alterum

xtracaptum]exceptum

54 aliud

dico]

В

argumentum

icendum

etsi]

В

si L

preter...

recedet]

m-

portēt

negationem

t

hec

dictio

preter

přecedit

В

preter

précédât

L

verumptamen...

xtracaptam]

от. L

patet]

В от. L

dicitur]

dicam

L

utrumlibet]

utrumque

igitur...

erum]

от. В

t

ontingit...

urrere

В

t

ontingit

d

utrumlibet

ominemurrere

gitur ontingit

d

utrumlibetominem

currereon st

verum trum

ontingererécédât

ubiectumum ua

negatione

on

quia

tune

equereturontingit

d utrumlibet

ominemurrere

gitur

ontingit

d

utrumlibetstumominemurrereL locusaldeorruptussse ideturnutroqueodice

55

est]

В

est sta

L

habet ic

exponi] exponitur

ic

В

animal]

quod

est dd.

L

debet ic

xponi]

exponitur

ic

В

36

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56

Ratio huius

opinionis

est

quia

in

exceptiva

affirmativa

egatio

importata

per

exceptionem

attin

it partem extracaptam.

Ut

patet,

quia in exceptivaaffirmativa redicatumnegatura parte extracapta.

Ideo

virtute

exceptionis>

negatio[nis] attingit

artem

extracaptam

et

stat

pars

extracapta

universaliter

espectu

predicati,

etsi

non

respectu

exceptionis.

In

[L 128rb]

exceptiva

negativa

negatio

importata per

exceptionem

non

attingitpartem

extracaptam, quia

predicatum

af-

firmatur

e

parte extracapta.

Ideo

virtute

negationis

non

stat

pars

ex-

tracapta

universaliternec

virtute licuius

alterius

posset

stare

sic.

57 Contra istam

opinionem.

Sicut

in

exclusione

importatur

negatio,

sic in

exceptione.

Si

igitur

pars

extracapta

staret confuse et

distributiven aliqua exceptiva ratione negationisincluse, inclusum

in

exclusiva

staretconfuseet

distributive atione

negationis

ncluse

in

exclusiva.

58

Dico

quod

in

exceptiva

affirmativa

ars

extracapta

stat univer-

saliter,

sed

in exclusiva

non

stat universaliter.

Cuius

ratio

est

quia

in

exceptiva

affirmativa

egatio

refertur d

partem

extracaptam

sed

in

exclusiva

negatio

non refertur d

inclusum. Ut

patet:

si

dicitur:

4

tan-

tumhomo

urriť

negatio importata

per

banc

dictionem

tantumrefer-

tur

ad

exclusa,

quia exponitur

sic:

4

homo urrit

t nichil

liud ab

homine

curriť

59

Contra.

Etsi in

exceptiva

affirmativa

egatio

refertur d

excep-

ta,

verumptamen

n exclusiva

negativa

negatio

non refertur

d

ex-

clusa

sed ad inclusum.

Ut

patet:

hec

'

tantum

omo

on urriť

xponitur

56

quia]

В

ista

uod

L

ut

patet]

c

от. LB

quia..

extracaptam]

BC т. В

af-

firmativa...

egatur]

c

negativa egetur

/

predicatum

extracaptam]

ex-

tracapta

respectu...

niversaliter]

от. В

nec]

L et

В

alicuius]

nullius

В

sic]

L

от.

В

57 inexclusione]er xclusionem inexceptione] inexceptione] per x-

ceptionem

importatur

ffirmatio

dd.В

si]

В

sic

L

staret]

stat

aliqua

x-

ceptiva]

lia

exceptiva

exclusiva fit dd.В

negationis

ncluse]

inclusionis

negationis

от.

В

eadem atione

dd.

inclusum.

.ratione]

B

от. LB

incluse]

L

от.

В

in

exclusiva]

от. L

58

Dico]

LB

hec add. В

exceptiva] exceptione

sed.

universaliter]

от.

L

cuius...

uia]

cuius atio

st

В

quia

L

exceptiva

ffirmativa]

nota

/) xceptiva

В

exclusiva]

B

negativa

dd.

inclusum]

subiectum

ut...

icitur]

ut i sic

dicam

exclusa]

xclusivamB

homo]

tantum omo

59

exceptiva

ffirmativa]

negativa

xceptiva

excepta]

xceptiva

)B

exclusa

L

verumptamen]

tarnen in

exclusiva]

inclusa

f)L

exclusa]

exclusivam

В

inclusum]

inclusa

patet]

B in

hac add.L

homo

non currit

t]

L

от.

В homineurrit]homine secundumnclusum]inclusa tertiumnclusum]

inclusa

et

ideo]

В

ideo

L

quartum

nclusum]

inclusiva

stabit]

stat

L

et...

antum]

от.

L

non]

от.

В

37

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sic:

'

homo on

urritt

quodlibet

liud

ab homine

urriť

Igitur

n

exclusiva

negativa

staret subiectum

universaliter,

quia

negatio

přecedit

in-

clusum in exclusiva et referturd inclusum. Et ideo inclusum stabit

universaliter. Et

tunc

ista:

ť

tantum omo

non curriť

exponitur

sic:

'

quidlibet

liud

ab homine

urritt

nullushomo

urriť

60

Item. Si in

exceptiva

affirmaiva

pars

extracapta

staret

univer-

saliter:

supposito quod

omne animal

aliud ab

homine

moveatur

et

aliquis

homo moveatur et

aliquis

non,

tunc hec

esset falsa:

'omne

animal

preter

ominem

ovetur'

quia

ex

isto

videtur

sequi quod

nullus

homo

moveretur.

61

Ad

opinionem

dicendum.

Ad

primam

<rationem>,

quod

in

omni exclusiva negatio inclusa in exclusione refertur d alia ab in-

cluso,

tam in

exclusiva

affirmai

va

quam

in

negativa.

Unde

in

hac:

'

tantum

omo

urriť

negatio

inclusa

refertur

d

exclusa.

Unde

debet

sic

exponi:

ť

{homo

non

urritt

nichil

liud ab

homine

urriť Similiter

n

hac

'

tantum

omo

on

urriť

negatio

inclusa

refertur d exclusa

et)

tune

sic

exponitur:

4

homo

on urritt

nichil liud

ab

homine on

urriť et hec valet

hanc:

'

quodlibet

liud

ab

homine

urriť

Unde nisi

negatio

in

exclusione

referatur d

exclusa,

exclusiva non

haberet

aliquam

affirmativam

exponentem.

62 Ad aliam rationem dico quod hec est falsa: 'omne nimalpreter

hominem

ovetur'ilio

casu

posito.

{De

suppositione

redicati

63 De

suppositione

predicati

in

exceptiva

est

sciendum

quod

predicatum

in

exceptiva

aliquando

stat mobiliter et

aliquando

im-

60

si]

L от. В

moveatur]

movetur

moveatur]

movetur

aliquis]

B

homo dd. L tunc]L от. В isto]L opposito videaturequi]В sequeretur

L

homo

moveretur]

movetur

61

ad...

dicendum]

от.

В

ad

primam]

от. L

exclusiva]

exclusione

L

inclusa]

m. LB

in

exclusione]

exclusive

quam

in]

quam

L

quod

В

negativa]

B

negatur

dd. В

inclusa]

exclusive

exclusa]

exclusivam

В

unde...

xponi]

от. L

homo

urrit...d

exclusa

t] suppl.

т.

LB

tunc ic

exponitur]

от. L

in

exclusione]

exclusive

exclusa]

xclusivamB ex-

clusiva]

xclusa

от. В

aliquam]

aliamВ

62 Ad...

uod]

В

Ad

aliud

rgumentum

ico

uod

sto

asunonvalet

rgumentum

namL

ilio asu

posito]

от.

L

63

sciendum]

dicendum

aliquando

tat]

aut

upponit

aliquando]

aut

L

tunc]

от.

L

stat]

supponit

st

non]

R

non

В

et ta.

quia

non]

от.

В

песL non ontingit]есcontingitf irrationalesthomo] "hominemst rra-

tionaleL

sequitur.

.est

falsum]

BC

от. В

animal

rrationale]

f

hominem

L

cum...

st

vera]

qui

antecedensstverum

f

38

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 24, NOS. 1-2, 1986

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mobiliter,

quia

quedam

est

exceptiva

affirmativa,

et

quedam

negativa.

Si

exceptiva

sit

affirmativa,

unc

predicatum

stat confuse

et

distributivemmobilier, quia nec contingit escendereпес ascendere.

Non enim

sequitur:

ť

omne

nimal

reter

ominemst

non-homo;

gitur

mne

animal

preter

ominemst asinus'

quia

antecedens

est

verum et

conse-

quens

falsum.

Et

ita non

contingit

descendere.

Nec

ascendere,

quia

non

sequitur:

4

omne

nimal

preter

rrationale

st homo

igitur

mne

nimal

preter

nimal

irrationalest animal' cum antecedens

sit

verum

(quia

utraque

exponens

antecedentis

st

vera)

et

consequens

falsum

quia

ex

consequente sequitur

quod

animal

irrationalenon

est

animal).

64

Si autem fiat

exceptio

ab

aliquo

negato,

adhuc

supponit

predicatum L 128va] aliquando mobiliter t aliquando immobiliter,

quia

aut

fiet

xceptio

ab

aliquo

transcendente ut

ab

aliquo

speciali.

Si

autem fiat

exceptio

a

transcendente,

unc

predicatum

stat confuse

et

distributive,

uia sequitur:

'

nichil

preter

ominem

st

animai;

igitur

nichil

reter

ominem

st

asinus'

quia sequitur

4

nichil

reter

ominem

st

animai

igitur

antum omo

st animai'

et

ultra:

'

igitur

antum

omo

st

asinus

(ut

prius

visum

est);

et

ultra:

'

igitur

nichil

preter

ominem

st

asinus'

Igitur

a

primo.

65

Ideo,

si

fiat

exceptio

a

transcendente

n

exceptiva negativa,

contingitdescendere sub predicato. Si autem fiatexceptio ab aliquo

speciali,

tune non

contingit

descendere sub

predicato.

Quia

non

se-

quitur:

nullus

omo

reter

ortem

st

nimai;

gitur

ullushomo

reter

ortem

est

sinus'

quia

antecedens est

verum,

posito

possibili,

et

consequens

falsum. Antecedens est

possibile,

quia potest

esse

verum,

posito quod

nullus

homo sit nisi

Sortes.

Impossibilitas consequentis patet, quia

sequitur:

'

nullushomo

reter

ortem

st

sinus;

gitur

ortes st sinus'

66 Contra ista

arguitur.

Si

predicatum

stet confuse et distributive:

quando

fit

exceptio

a

transcendente

n

exceptiva

negativa,

tunc ex

64

supponit...

liquando] predicatum

ut

tat et

aliquando]

autL

quia]

L

от. В

fiet]

fit si...

unc]

si

primo

modo

quia]

В

nam

igitur

ichil..a

primo]

iste

erminus

nimal

upponit

onfuse

t

distributive

uia sequitur

i nichil

preter

ominem

st,

gitur

ichil

reter

ominemst sinus

65

Ideo]

L

от.

В

a В

ab

aliquo]

L

si

autem]

sed si L

contingit]

oportet

L

quia

non]

В non

enimL

verum...

ossibili]

possibile

falsum]

im-

possibile]

antecedensst

possibile]

от.

L

quia]

В

quia

antecedens im-

possibilitas.

patet]

В

consequens

st

impossibile

secundum

sinus]

L

animal

В tertium

sinus]

anus

)L

66 ista rguitur]от. L a] В ab aliquoL inexceptivaegativa] от. L sit

homo]

В

videat

ominem

hec]

В

tunc

L

hac]

В

hoc non

L

igitur]

от.

L

que]

В

quia

L

sub

hac]

В

ex

eo

L

39

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vero

sequitur

falsum. Nam

supposito

quod

nichil sit

homo

nisi

Sortes

et

quod

iste tantum videat

se,

hec est vera:

'

nichil

reter

ortem

idet

hominem'Sed ex hac sequitur: 'igitur ichil reterortem idět latonem

que

est

falsa,

quia

sub hac

sequitur

quod

Sortes

vidět Platonem.

67

Item.

Supposito

quod

quilibet

homo sit

niger,

hec

est

vera:

'

nichil

reter

ominem

igrum

st homo"

Sed

ex

hac

non

sequitur quod

nichil

preter

hominem

nigrum

est

[В

88ra]

homo

albus.

Consequens

est

impossibile,

quia

ex

consequente sequitur

quod

homo

niger

sit

homo albus.

68 Ad

istud dicendum

quod

si

fiat

exceptio

a

transcendente

n ex-

ceptiva

negativa, contingit

escendere

sub

predicato

ad

quodlibet per

se suppositumpredicatiet non ad suppositum per accidens. Nunc in

ista:

'

nichil

reter

ortem

idet ominem

li

ť

videns

ominemest

predicatum

et

'

videns stum

ominem

per

accidens continetur

ub isto. Et ideo

ista

consequentia

non

valet:

4

nichil

reter

ortem idet

hominem

igitur

ichil

preter

ortem

idet llum

hominemel lium'

69

Ad aliud dico

quod

homo

lbus

per

accidens

continetur sub

homine.

t

ideo

consequentia

facta non valet.

<DE

HABITUDINENTER

XCEPTIVAM

T

EXCLUSIVAM

An

omnis xclusiva

nférât

xceptivam,

t

econverso

70

Nunc circa

exceptivas

queratur

de habitudine inter

exceptivam

et

exclusivam,

an omnis

exclusiva

inferat

xceptivam,

et econverso.

Et

quod

non, videtur,

quia

non

sequitur:

4

tantum

omo urrit

igitur

nichil

reter

ominemurriť

quia aliquid sequitur

ad

consequens

quod

non

sequitur

ad

antecedens. Nam

sequitur:

nichil

reter

ominem

urrit;

igitur

ichil

reter

ortem urriť

Sed

non

sequitur:

ť

tantum omo

urrit

igitur

ichil

reter

ortem urriť

67

hec]

В

hec tunc hac

non]

L

parte

)B

nichil

reter.

.nigrum

st]

В

от.

L

consequens...equitur

uod]

В

от.

L

homo...

lbus]

sithomo

iger

68

dicendum

uod]

от. В

fiat]

fit

a]

Б

ab

aliquo

in

xceptiva

egativa]

В

от. В

quodlibet]

от.

L

suppositum]

subiectum

predicati]

от.

L

suppositumer

accidens]

per

accidens

d

suppositum

videt]

valet

В

hominemi... ortem

idet]

Bf т. В

hominem

i

videns

ominem]

asinum

videnssinum

hominem]

от. В

est

dd.

continetur]

contentum

isto]

vidente

subiecto

ideo]

В

от. L

valet]

tenet

hominem]

B vel asinum

В

vel

llum]

et stum asinum

dd.

В

69

ideo]

В

ista

facti]

от. L

valet]

tenet tc.

L

70 exceptivas] dictionesxceptivas queratur] queritur an] L nam

В

inferat]

inferí et

econverso] consequentis

sequitur

ichil]

nichile-

quitur

sed

non...

ortem

urrit]

от. В

40

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71 Item. Нес

est

una

exceptiva:

nullushomo

reter

ortem

urriť Sed

ex

hac

sequitur

non

aliqua

exclusiva.

Quia

non alia

quam

hec:

'

tantum

Sortes urriť Sed non sequitur:

'

nullushomo reterortemurrit;gitur

<

tantum Sortes urriť

72

Item.

Нес est una

exclusiva:

ť

tantum ortes on

urriť

Et tarnen

ista non

inferí

aliquam

exceptivam,

quia

aut

inferrethanc: 'nichil

preter

ortem

urriť

aut hanc:

'

nichil

preter

ortemnon

curriť

Non

primam, quia

aliquid sequitur

ad

hanc

quod

non

sequitur

ad ex-

clusivam;

nam

sequitur:

'

nichil

reter

ortem

urrit

igitur

ortes urriť

Sed

non

sequitur:

tantumortes on

urrit;

gitur

ortes

urriť

Nec

infert

secundam,

quia

valet hanc

[L

128vb]:

'

quidlibet

reter

ortem urriť

Sed non sequitur: ťtantum ortes oncurrit;gitur uidlibet reterortem

curriť

quia

tunc

sequitur

pari

ratione:

'

tantum

omo

nonest

non-homo;

igitur

uidlibet reter

ominemst

non-homo

;

ubi

antecedens

est verum et

consequens

falsum.

Falsitas

consequentis

patet,

quia sequitur:

'

quidlibet

reter

ominem

st

non-homo;

gitur

uidlibet reter

ominemst

asinus

.

73

Ad

oppositum

est

una

regula

in

exceptivis.

Ad hanc

regulam

dicendum

quod aliquando

tenet et

aliquando

non,

quia

aut

fit

xcep-

tio

a

transcendente ut a

speciali.

Si

primo

modo,

tunc

exclusiva af-

firmaiva infert xceptivamnegativam, et exclusiva negativa excep-

tivam

affirmativam.

sta enim

convertuntur: tantum

ortes urriť

et

1

nichil

reter

ortemurriť

et ista

convertuntur:

tantum ortes on

urriť

et

'

quidlibet

reter

ortem urriť

Et

ratio est

quia

exponentes

sunt

eedem.

74

Verumptamen

si fiat

exceptio

ab

aliquo speciali,

sive sit affir-

mativa

exceptiva

sive

negativa,

non

oportet quod

convertantur

um

71 Item...giturortesurrit] от. L aliqua] lia В

72

et

tarnen]

tarnen

ista]

L от. В

aliquam]

aliamВ

inferret]

infert

L

currit.

preter

ortem]

R

от.

В

primam]

hanc

nichil

reter

ortem

urrit

L

nam]

quia

В

tantum

ortes]

tantum

omo

igitur

ortes

urrit]

BC

т.

В

secundam]

istam

ichil

reter

ortem

on

urrit]

valet]

hecvalet

sednon... ortem

urrit]

от.

В

pari

atione]

per

adem

ationem

quidlibet]

В

quilibet

omo]

quilibet

c

non homo...

st]

В

от. L

asinus]

В

albus

per

predicta

73

dicendum]

dicitur

aut

fit]

fit

а]

В ab

aliquo

aut

]

aut b

aliquo

L

primo

modo]

В a

transcendente

exclusiva]

excepta

)B

exceptivam]

exclusivam

negativa]

affirmativanfert

affirmativam]

negativam

et

ista...

ortem

urrit]

от. L

eedem]

eadem

74 sit]L 'mВ convertantur]convertuntur cumaliquaexclusiva] от.

В

omnis...non

urrit]

от.

L

tantumortes

urrit

gitur

mnis

omo

reter

ortem

currit

homo]

°

semper]

tunc

impliciter

fiat

xceptio]

от.

L

tunc

41

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aliqua

exclusiva.

Unde

non

sequitur:

'

nullushomo

reter

ortem

urrit;

igitur

antum ortes

urriť пес

sequitur:

ť

omnis

homo

reter

ortem

urrit;

igiturtantumSortesnon curriť. Unde si fiat exceptio ab aliquo

transcendente,

В

88rb]

semper

exclusiva et

exceptiva

convertuntur;

sed

si fiat

exceptio

ab

aliquo speciali,

tunc

non

oportet,

nisi

velimus

circumloqui

exclusivam

sie:

1

tantum

oc

quod

estSortes

urriť

Sed

non

credo

quod

hoc

posset

convenientius

ignificare.

75

Ad

primum

argumentum

dico

quod

bene

sequitur:

4

tantum

Sortes

urrit;

gitur

ichil

reter

ominemurriť Sed

non

sequitur:

'nic i

preter

ominem

urrit;

gitur

ichil

reter

stum ominemurriť

eoquod

pars

extracapta

in

exceptiva

stat confuse tantum.

76 Ad aliud concediturquod huic: 'nullushomo reterortemurriť

non

correspondet aliqua

exceptiva, eoquod

fit

exceptio

ab

aliquo

speciali.

77

Ad

aliud dico

quod

hec:

'

tantum

ortes

on

curriť

correspondet

huic: 'nichil

preter

ortem

on

curriť

que

valet hanc:

4

quidlibet reter

Sortemurriť

Et dico

quod

bene

sequitur:

tantum omo

on

st

non-homo;

igitur uidlibet

reter

ominemst non-homo1Et

nego

hanc

consequen-

tiam:

'quidlibet reter

ominemst

non-homo;

gitur

uidlibet

reter

ominem

est

asinusy,

uia

in

exceptiva

affirmativa

redicatum

stat confuse et

distributive immobiliter, ita quod non contingit descendere пес

ascendere.

{An

exceptiva

nferatur

x

negativa xponente

xclusive

78

Circa

exceptivas

queratur

adhuc an

exceptiva

inferaturex

negativa

exponente

(exclusive);

et deinde

queretur

an inferatur

x

affirmativa

xponente

(exclusive).

non]

L

non

В

circumloqui]

tantum

oqui

L

exclusivam

ic]

В

aliquam

xclu-

sionem

ndehecnullus omo

reter

ortem

urritalet

uic

homo

ui

est]

hoc

quod

est

U

от. L

currit]

B

ita

quod

n

exclusiva

enotatur

uod

ortes urritt

quod

nullus liushomo urritdd.

convenientius

ignificare]

denotari

er

hanc

tantum omo

ui

est ortes

urrit

75

sequitur]

B

tantum omo

urrit

gitur

dd.

igitur...

urrit]

от. L

currit]

от. В in

exceptiva]

от.

L

76

aliud]

secundum

huic...

peciali]

от. L

huic]

ue

В

hec

Вс

aliqua]

lia

В

77 ad

aliuddico

quod]

В

от.

L

sortes]

homo non

currit]

BC

noncurrit

В

tantum...

ominemstnon

homo]

nichil

reter

ominemstnonhomo

gitur

tantumomo on stnonhomo nego...consequentiam]dico uodbene ) se-

quitur

ita

quod]

В

cum

78

queratur] queritur

queretur]

queratur

42

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79

Quod

inferatur

x

negativa

exponente

probatur.

Nam

sequitur:

4

nichil liud ab homine urrit

igitur

ichil

reter

ominem

urriť

Quod

sic

patet. Nam sequitur:

4

nichil liud ab homineurritigitur ullum urrensst

aliud

ab

homine9

Et

ultra:

4

igitur

ullum urrens

st

non-homo'

et

ultra:

4

igitur

ullum urrenson sthomo

<et

ultra):

4

igitur

mne urrenssthomo

;

et ultra:

1

igitur

antum omo

urrit

et

ultra:

4

igitur

ichil

reter

ominem

curriť

Igitur

a

primo.

80

Ad

oppositum.

Si

sic,

ex

possibili

sequitur

impossibile

aut

ex

necessario

contingens.

Nam

tunc

sequitur:

4

nichil

liud ab homine st

homo lbus

igitur

ichil

reter

ominemst

homo lbus*

Antecedens est

necessarium,

quia

suum

oppositum

est

impossibile.

Sed hec est con-

tingens:4nichil reterominemL 129ra] esthomo lbus' quia ex hac se-

quitur quod

aliquis

homo est homo

albus,

et hec est

contingens.

81

Item. Tunc

sequeretur

ex

opposito:

lnon

nichil

reter

ominemst

animai;

gitur

liquid

aliud ab homine st

animai . Et tune

a

propositione

habente

plures

causas

veritatis d unam

istam teneret

consequentia.

82 Dicendum

quod

non

sequitur

(exceptiva)

ex

negativa

ex-

ponente,

sed

requiruntur

due

exponentes.

Ad

primum

dico

quod

non

sequitur:

4

nullum urrensst

non-homo;

gitur

ullum

urrens

on

est

homo9

quia

antecedens est

propositio

negativa

et

consequens

affir-

mativa; tamen ex negativanon sequituraffirmativa; ec sequiturhec.

(An

exceptiva

nferatur

x

affirmativaxponente

xclusive

83

Circa

secundum

an

ex

affirmativa

xponente sequitur

excep-

tiva,

probo.

Nam

sequitur:

4

quidlibet

liud ab homine st

animai;

igitur

quidlibet reter

ominem

st

nimal9

Probatio huius

consequentie.

Nam

sequitur:

4

quidlibet

liud ab

homine st

animai;

igitur liquis

homononest

animal9 Sed

quicquid sequitur

ex

antecedente

et

consequente,

se-

79

igitur.

hominem

urrit]

от. L

sic

patet]

ostendituric L

homine]

B

non dd.В

<et

ultra)

uppl.

currit

t

ultra]

currit

80 ex

possibili]

от. L

aut

x]

LR

autВ

tunc]

от. L

quia]

L et

В

81

sequeretur]

sequetur

aliquid]

от.

L

a]

L

ex

Б

teneret

onsequentia]

est

fallacia

onsequentis

82

primum

ico]

В

argumentum

icendum

propositio

egativa]

от.

L

tamen...

ec]

В

от. L

83

circa...

n]

L

Contra

ecundam

robationem

uia

В

sequitur

xceptiva]

от.

L

probo]

от.

В

probatio.

consequentie]quod

ostendo

ic

L

nam

equitur]

L

от.

В

quodlibet]

quod

В

sed

quicquid...

liquis

omo on

st

nimal]

от.

В quia] L nam В sequitur] infertur namsequitur] nam L est non

animal]

non st nimal

igitur

primo...

on

st

nimal]

от. L

igitur

x]

L

secut

x В

opposito

equitur]

opposito

quidlibet.

.non

st

nimal]

от.

В

43

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quitur

ex antecedente

per

se. Cum

igitur sequitur:

1

quidlibet

liud

ab

homine

est

nimai

/

et

homo

on

st

nimai;

gitur uidlibetreter

ominem

st

аттаГ . Et similiter: quidlibetliudab hominest nimai; gituruidlibet

preter

ominemst nimai'

'

igitur

liquis

homo

on st

nimai'

quia

ex

op-

posite)

onsequentis sequitur

oppositum

antecedentis.

Nam

[В

88va]

sequitur:

ť

omnishomo

st

nimai;

gitur

mne on-animalst

non-homo'

Et

ultra:

*

igitur

on-homo

st

non-animal

et

ultra:

4

igitur

on-homo

onest

animai;

gitur

liud

ab

homine on

st

nimai'

Igitur

a

primo:

omnis omo

est

animai;

igitur

liud ab homine

on

est

animai'

Igitur

ex

opposito

se-

quitur

oppositum:

ť

quidlibet

liud ab hominest

nimai;

gitur

liquis

homo

non

st

nimai'

84 Ad oppositum. Exceptiva exponitur per duas exponentes.

Igitur

una non

sufficit.

Dicendum

quod exceptiva aliqua

potest

n-

ferri x

exponente

affirmativa,

i

fiat

exceptio

a

transcendente.

gitur

sequitur: quidlibet

liud

ab

homine

st nimai

igitur uidlibetreter

ominem

est

animai'

Verumptamen

si

fiat

exceptio

a

speciali,

tunc

numquam

exceptiva

infertur x affirmativa

xponente.

<Utrum

exceptiva possit esse

falsa,

utraque

exponente

existente

vera)

85 Alia dubitatio

est utrum

exceptiva

possit

esse falsa

utraque

ex-

ponente

existente vera.

Quod

sic,

videtur. Nam

supposito

quod

Sortes

videat

aliquem

asinum et

Burnellum

et

quod

nullus

alius homo

nec videat Burnellum nec

alium

asinum,

tunc hec

est vera:

'

aliquis

homononvidei

liquem

sinum lium a

Burnello

et

hec similiter:

aliquis

homonon

videtBurnellum' etsi

aliquis

homo videat Burnellum. Нес

tarnen

st falsa:

'

aliquis

homo

onvidet

sinum

reter

urnellum'

quia

hec

est una

particularis

cuius

quelibet singularis

est falsa.

86 Item.

Exceptiva potest

esse falsa et

utraque

exponens

vera.

Retento

<enim>

eodem

casu,

hec est falsa:

'

nullushomovidet

sinum

preter

urnellum' t

tamen

utraque

exponens

est vera.

Ista

enim

est

84

una]

В una

exponens aliqua]

L

affirmativa

a]

В

ab

aliquo verump-

tamen]

sed

L

alterum

]

В

ab

aliquo

L

numquam] unaqueque

85

possit]

potent

falsa]

BC

т.

В

aliquem

sinum..

aliquem

sinum]

R

от. В

aliquem.

.quod]

В

burnellumec

liquem

lium

sinum tL

homo]

от.

В

prius

ес]

В от.

L

tunc]

от.

В

aliquem]

от.

L

et

hec...

urnellum]

от.

В

etsi...

urnellum]

от.

L

hec

st

una...

st

falsa]

est

partialiter

alsa

86 exponens]В istarum ista... era] В от. L enim] tamen В quia

aliter.

burnellum]

от. L

quod.

sequitur]

от. В

<vera>]

uppl.

ullus omo

videt

sinum

reter

urnellumdd.

sed...

alsa]

от.

В

videat]

videt

44

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vera:

Ļ

nullus homo videt sinum alium

a

Burnello

t

aliquis

homo videt

Burnellum',

uia

aliter

hec

esset

falsa:

'

nullushomo

videt

sinum

preter

Burnellum1Quod hec est (falsa) probo: quia sequitur: 4gitur latonon

videt sinum

reter

urnellum1sed hec est

falsa,

quia

ex hac

sequitur

quod

Plato

non videat

Burnellum.

87

Verumptamen posito

casu

priori aliquis

homo

diceret

hanc esse

falsam:

1

nullus

homo

idet

sinum

lium

a

Burnello1Et

ideo

ponitur

ste

casus

quod

Sortes solum videat Burnellum

et

quod

nullus alius

videat

asinum.

Tunc

exponentes

sunt vere

et

exceptive expositum

falsum.

88 Ad oppositum.

Exponentes

antecedunt

[L

129rb]

ad ex-

positum.

Sed antecedens non

potest

esse verum sine

consequente.

Ideo exponentesnon possuntesse vere, exceptivaexistentefalsa.

89 Ad hanc dubitationemdicendum

quod

exponentes

non

possunt

esse

vere,

exceptiva

existente

falsa,

et

hoc

propter

rationem

in

op-

positum.

Ad

argumentum

dicendum

quod,

isto

casu

posito,

hec est

falsa:

ť

aliquis

homo

on

videt

sinum

reter

urnellum

Et

dicendum

quod

altera

exponens

est

falsa. Unde non

debet

sic

exponi:

'

aliquis

homo

on

videt sinum lium Burnello t

aliquis

homo

idet urnellum1sed

oportet

quod

in

utraque exponente

subiectum

supponat pro

eodem.

Et si ex-

ponentes

exponantur

pro

eodem,

una erit

falsa,

ut

satis

patet.

Unde

debet sic exponi: ťaliquishomo оп [В 88vb] videtsinum lium Burnello

et iste videtBurnellum

,

ita

quod

denotatur

quod

unus et

idem

non

videat asinum alium

a

Burnello et

quod

videat Burnellum.

90

Ad aliud dico

quod,

isto casu

posito,

hec est vera:

ť

nullushomo

videt sinum

reter

urnellum1

Sed

ex hac non

sequitur

quod

Plato non

videt asinum

preter

Burnellum,

quia

exceptio

in

predicato

impedit

descensum

in

subiecto.

91 Vel

potest

aliter

dici,

secundum

quod dicit1) quod,

isto casu

posito,

hec est

falsa:

'

nullushomovidet sinum

reter

urnellum

et una

87 homo

iceret]

videt

exceptive...

alsum] oppositum

erum

88

expositum]exponentem

sed]

L

etВ

sine]

sed

L

89

dicendum]

dico

L

non]

В

от.

L

propter]

patet

er

L

argumentum]

primům

rgumentum

et

dicendum]

dicendum

unde

non]

В

et

L

sed]

В

sed non L

utraque

xponente]

eadem

exceptiva

supponat]

supponit

В

exponanturro

odem] excipitur

)B

ut atis

atet]

от.

L

unde...

xponi]

LBC

т.

В

quod]

LR

от.

В

unus]

unum

quod]

В

от.

L

90

isto]

В

ultimo

sequitur]

от. В

asinum

preter

urnellum]

etc.

В

impedit]

от. В

91

aliter]

от. В

secundum

uod

dicit]

от. L

nullus]

CB

liquis

videt]

LCB on idet exponensit] exceptiostL Ideoetc.] от. В

Sc.

opponens;

ideos

upra

num.

7.

45

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exponens

erit falsa.

Unde sic

exponitur:

nullus

omo

idet

sinum lium

a Burnello t omnis

omo

idet

urnellum'

deo

etc.

<An

post

exceptionem fiat

distributio)

92

Potest

dubitare

an,

excepto

aliquo,

post

exceptionem

fiat

distributio

pro

eodem.

Quod

sic,

videtur,

quia

in

ista:

'

omnishomo

preter

ortem urriť fit

distributio

pro

Sorte,

quia

si

non,

Sortes non

posset excipl.

Igitur oportet quod

pro

Sorte

fiat

distributio.

93 Item. Si

solum

pro

aliis

a

Sorte

fieret

distributio,

unc esset

idem

dicere:

ť

omnis

homo

reter

ortem

urriť

t

i

omnis

omo lius a

Sorte

preter

ortem urriť

que

non

est

intelligibilis.

94 Ad

oppositum.

Si

sic,

quelibet

exceptiva

includerei

oppositum,

quia

ad

quodlibet

contingit

descendere

pro quo

fit

distributio. Si

igitur

in

hac:

1

omnishomo

preter

ortem

urriť

fieret

distributio

pro

Sorte,

tunc

sequeretur:

1

omnis

homo

preter

ortem

urrit;

gitur

ortes

curriť Et

similiter

equitur

quod

Sortes

non currit.

Igitur

ista

duo

sequerentur:

1

Sortes urriťet

'

Sortes

on

curriť

Et

eadem est ratio

de

qualibet

alia

exceptiva.

95 Ad hanc

dubitationem

dicendum

quod

post

exceptionem pro

parte extracaptanon fitdistributio, uia exceptio estpartis toto x

tracaptio.

ed

illud

quod

non est in

aliquo,

ab eo

non

excipitur.

deo

si

in

distributione

licuius

aliquid

supponatur,

illud non

excipitur.

96

Verumptamen

est sciendum

quod,

excepto

aliquo

a

subiecto

sumpto

pro

toto

n

quantitate,

llud

totum

n

quantitate

ad

duo

potest

92

Potest

ubitare]

Alia

est

dubitatio

post]

В

per

L

fiet]

potest

ieri

L

quod

sic

videtur]

videturnim

uod

sic

L

quia

si

non]

В

quod

nisifiat

distributio

ro

orte

posset]

B

ab

eodem

dd.

В

igitur...

istributio]

от. L

93

fieret]

iet fiat

tunc...

icere]

nichil sset

icere

homo]

B

alius

sortedd. etomnis...ortemurrit] от. L que]В quodL intelligibilis]in-

telligibile

94 includerei

ppositum]

includit

pposita

fieret]

fit

pro]

В

a L

tune]

В

sic

L

sequeretur]

sequetur

6

sequitur

similiter]

sic

L

quod]

L

от.

В

igitur.

.non

urrit]

от. L

alia]

В

от.

L

95

Ad hanc

dubitationem]

от. L

partis] extracaptio

artis

extracaptio]

extractio in

quantitate

sed illud

uod]

L

quod

В

non

est]

В est L

sup-

ponatur]

upponitursupponat

96

est]

В

от.

L

aliquo..

pro]

liquo

sumpto ro

В

aliquo

subiecto b

aliquo

L

exceptionem]exceptivam

exceptionem]

exceptiva

f)L dicendo]

dicto

L

homo]

BC т.

В

respectu

xceptionis]

от.

L

respectu

redicati

on]

В

от.

L si...

xceptionem]

cuiusratio

)B

semper

it]

ic

fit

semper

nim

В

pro

sorte] от. L Sortes] от. L semper] от. L proférât]proferatur hoc

proférât]

hoc

proferatur

pro

eo]

В от. L

distributio]

B

pro

Sorte

dd.

В

respectu...

on]

В et

non

espectu

redicati

46

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comparari:

vel ad

exceptionem

vel ad

predicatum.

Si

comparetur

ad

exceptionem,

semper

fit distributio

pro

^parte extracapta.

Ut sic

dicendo:

'

omnis homopreter ortem urriť respectu exceptionis fit

distributio

ro

Sorte,

respectu predicati

non. Si

respectu

predicati,

sic

fit distributio

pro

Sorte

quousque

Sortes

excipitur.

Ideo

si

aliquis

proférât

stam:

4

omnis

homo

reter

ortem urriť

semper

fitdistributio

pro

Sorte

quousque proférât

i

1

preter

ortem' Sed

postquam

hoc

pro-

férât,

tunc

excipitur

Sortes

et,

excepto

Sorte,

pro

eo non fit

distributio.

В

89ra]

Ideo

respectu

exceptionis

fit

distributio

ro parte

extracapta, respectu

predicati

non.

97

Ad

probationem

dico

quod

verum

est,

quia

in

exceptiva

ubi

il-

lud quod distribuitur n preiacente, (excipitur), non fitexceptio a

subiecto

exceptionis

sed

a

predicato

preiacentis.

Unde ex hoc

ipso

quod

illud

excipitur, pro

eo non fit distributio n

exceptiva

sed

in

preiacente.

98 Ad

[L

129va]

primam

rationem

dicendum

quod

non fit

distributio

espectu predicati pro

parte

extracapta.

99 Ad

aliud

dico

quod

etsi solum fiatdistributio

pro

aliis a

Sorte,

tamen

non

est idem

dicere:

'

omnis omo lius

a

Sorte

reter

ortem

urriť t

'

omnis omo

reter

ortem

urriť

quia requiritur uod

in

preiacente

ex-

ceptivefiatdistributio ro parte extracapta.Nunc inpreiacentehuius:

'

omnis

omo lius

a Sorte

reter

ortem

urriťnon

fit

distributio

ro

Sorte.

(Quid

determinet prepositio

cum suo

casuali)

100 Dubitatio

est

cuius

determinatio

sit

prepositio

cum suo

casuali:

an

subiecti

an

predicati. Quod

non

predicati,

videtur,

quia

si

sic,

pro

tot fieret

istributio n

exceptiva

pro

quot

in

preiacente,

quia

determinatio

redicati

non

immutai

distributionem

n

subiecto.

Igitur

sic dicendo: 'omnis omo

reter

ortemurriť

ro

totfieret istributio

ro

quot

in hac:

4

omnis omo urriť

97

quia]

quod

L от. В

exceptiva]

B ubi llud.

preiacente]

от.

В

<excipitur>]

suppl.

т.

LB

non

it...

reiacentis]

от.

L

unde]

verumtamen

illud]

dem

от.

L

non]

R от.

В

98 Ad...

xtracapta]

ositum

nte ит

97 nL deestn

В

99

aliis

]

L от. В

tamen]

от.

L

et...currit]

c

т. LB

quia

requiritur

uod]

Bc

uia

L от. В in

preiacente

xceptive]

B6

т.

В

ut dd. fiat.

currit]

R

от.

В non]Вnunc

100

non]

LB

sit

determinatiodd. L

fieret]

fietL

immutai]

mutât

L

dicendo]

dicto

fieret]

fit

currit]

B

velociterdd.

47

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101

Item.

Si

esset

determinatio

predicati

vel

compositionis,

tunc

sequeretur:

ť

nullushomo

urrit

igitur

ullus

homo

reter

ortem

urriť

quia

a predicatonegato absolute, vel a verbo negato absolute, ad verbum

negatum

cum

qualibet

determinatione

enet

consequentia.

Nam

se-

quitur:

'

nullus

omo

urrit

igitur

ullus

omo

elociter

urriť

Igitur

cum in

hac:

ť

nullushomo

urriť

negetur

predicatum

a

subiecto

absolute

et in

.

hac:

1

nullus

omo

reter

ortem

urriť

negetur

predicatum

subiecto

cum

tali

determinatione,

rit

consequentia

bona.

102

Ad

oppositum.

Videtur

quod

sit

determinatio

verbi,

quia

prepositio

cum

suo casuali

equivalet

adverbiali

determinationi.

Sed

adverbialis

determinatio

st determinatio

erbi.

Igitur

prepositio

um

suo casuali est determinatioverbi. Exemplum: idem est dicere Sortes

est

hic et

'

Sortes

st

n hoc

oco Sed sic

dicendo:

ť

Sortes st

n

hoc

oco ac-

cipitur prepositio

cum suo

casuali.

<Igitur>

equipollet

adverbiali

determinationi.

103 Ad

dubitationem

dicendum

quod

(prepositio

cum

suo

casuali)

equipollet

adverbiali

determinationi,

verumptamen

non

est

illi

semper

determinatum

nomen

impositum.

Unde hoc

quod

dico

'

preter

ortem

equipollet

adverbio,

illi tamen

non est nomen

im-

positum.

104 Sed pro rationibus est intelligendum uod aliquid est deter-

minatio

predicati

dupliciter:

vel

ita

quod

principaliter

determinai

predicatum

vel

actum,

vel

quod

determinet

ubiectum,

non

absolute

sed

in

comparatione

ad actum.

Primo modo

ilia

que

mere

sunt

adverbia,

determinant

verbum;

cuiusmodi

sunt bene9 'male1

'tarde9

'velociter9Secundo

modo

prepositiones

cum suis

casualibus

determi-

nant

compositionem.

Que equipollent

adverbiis

quibus

non sunt

nomina

imposita;

cuiusmodi est hoc

quod

dico

ť

preter

ortem9

101

sequeretur]

equitur

equitur

от.

В

a]

L

от. В

prius

absolute]

от.

L

subiecto

um]

sorte

um

bona]

В

от.

L

102

quia

prepositio...

asuali

st determinatio

erbi]

от. В

prepositio]

ro-

posino

verbi]

et

determinat

erbumdd.L

dicendo]

dicto

accipitur]

от.

L

adverbiali

eterminationi]

huic dverbio ic

103

dubitationem]

primam

ationem

equipollet]

equivalet

verump-

tamen]

tamen

illi

emper]

lli

impliciter

semper

determinatum]

от.

L

unde...

mpositum]

om.

L

illi]

llius

104

rationibus]

responsionibus

intelligendum]

incedendum

)B

est]

В

potest

sse

predicatum

el

ctum]

vel

ccidentaliter

quod

determinet]

от.

L mere]L vereВ adverbia] adverbialia cuiusmodi...elociter] от.

L

compositionem]

propositionem

que

equipollent]

is n L

que equipollet

( )B

quibus]

cuius hoc

uod

dico]

от.

В

sortem]

B

curritdd. B

48

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105

Et

breviter:

quedam

determinant actum

principaliter

et

quedam

determinant subiectum

in

comparatione

ad actum.

Unde

vera adverbia determinant ctum principaliter, ed reliqua que non

sunt

adverbia

sed

equipollent

adverbiis,

determinant subiectum

in

comparatione

ad actum.

Cuiusmodi

sunt

quedam prepositiones

cum

suis

casualibus,

ut

'

preter

B 89rb]

Sorterrí

L 129vb],

et

sic de

aliis.

106

Potest nunc

queri quid prepositio

cum suo

casuali determinei

vel

dictio

exceptiva

cum

parte

extracapta.

Et

dicendum

quod

deter-

minant subiectum n

comparatione

ad actum.

107

Ad

primům

argumentum

dico

quod

si

esset determinatio

predicati

absolute,

tunc

pro

tot fíeretdistributio

n

hac:

4

omnis

homo

preterortemurriťpro quot in hac:

'

omnis omo urriť Tarnen non est

determinatio

redicati

absolute

sed

in

comparatione

ad subiectum. Et

illud

quod

determinat subiectum in

comparatione

ad

actum,

idest

predicatum,

bene

potest

mmutare

subiectum.

108

Ad aliud dico

quod

non

sequitur:

ť

nullus omo

urrit

igitur

ullus

homo

reter

ortem urriť

109 Ad

probationem

dico

quod

a

verbo

negato

absolute

ad

verbum

negatum

cum

determinatione

(que

determinatio determinat

prin-

cipaliter

verbum)

tenet

consequentia.

Nunc li

'

preter

ortem non

determinat subiectum absolute sed determinat subiectum in com-

paratione

ad

actum.

Ideo non

oportet consequentiam

valere.

105 et

breviter]

breviter

pro

stonon

est

plus

nisi

quod

add.

L

quedam]

quod

В

vera]

Pan

ro

mere)

omnia

reliqua] aliqua

L

preterortem]

hic

preter

ortem

urrit

106

potest...

uid]

patet

nunc

qualiter patet

tunc

cum dicitur

uedam

est

L

determinet]

eterminat

от.

L

vel]

ut

LB

et

dicendum]

icendum

B

107

fieret]

fiet

tamen]

nunc

determinatio]

B

inhac dd. subiectum

et

llud...

dest]

от. В

predicatum]

preciacentem

bene]

non

В

108 non]L beneВ nunc i]sed i L nuncВ subiectumbsolute] actumb-solute

determinat]

от. L

Expliciunt...Burl']

от. В

Filosofiseli

nstituut

P.O. Box 9515

2300 RA

Leiden

The

Netherlands

Postscript

In

summing

p

the

ditionsf

Burley'sogical

works

Vivarium,

XIII

(1985), 3-4)

most

nfortunately

ailed o

mentionather

omuald

reen's

dition

ofDeobligationibus:he ogicalreatiseDeobligationibus':n ntroductionith ritical

Texts f

William

f

Sherwoodnd Walter

urley.

he

Franciscan

nstitute,

t.

Bonaventure,

.Y.

(forthcoming).

49

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Vivarium

XIV,

1

1986)

The

Oxford

Calculatores,

Quantification f

Qualities

and

Aristotle'sProhibition

f

Metabasis

STEVEN

J.

LIVESEY

When

Walter

de

Merton

founded

Merton

College

in

1264,

he

sought

to

provide

a

residence

hall

for

Arts

students

ntending

o

pro-

ceed to theFacultyofTheology at Oxford. Nevertheless,withtheex-

ception

of

Thomas

Bradwardine,

Merton scholars

from he

first alfof

the fourteenth

entury

have achieved

widespread

fame not for their

achievements

n

sacred

theology,

but

ratherfor

their

ontributions

n

the fieldsof natural

philosophy

nd mathematics. The

precise

nature

of

the

Mertonian achievement

s

a

topic

which has been discussed

at

great length

during

the

past seventy-five ears,1

and

a

subject

into

which this

paper

will

not

venture.

nstead,

its focus

will be Mertonian

methodology

and

in

particular

the

relationship

between

the Merto-

nians' workand a problemfirst iscussed by Aristotle n his Posterior

Analytics.

*

An

earlier ersion

f

his

aper

was

presented

t

theNineteenth

nternational

on-

gress

n

Medieval

tudies, ay

10-13,

984 t

Kalamazoo,

MI.

1

Regarding

he

nstitutional

evelopment

f

Merton

ollege,

ee

Hastings

ashdall,

The

Universities

f urope

ntheMiddle

ges

ed. F. M.

Powicke

ndA.

B.

Emden,

vols.,

Oxford

936,

vol.

3,

191-201. ne

can

scarcely

egin

o summarize

he

literaturen

theMertonian

ork.

ee

in

particular

hefive

olumes f

Anneliese

Maier' StudienurNaturphilosophieer pätscholastikRome 1949-1958;Marshall

Clagett,

he

cience

f

Mechanics

n

theMiddle

ges,

Madison,

Wise.

1959;

Curtis

Wilson,

William

eytesbury.

edieval

ogic

nd

he

ise

f

Mathematical

hysics

Madison,

Wise.

1956;

A.

G.

Molland,

heGeometrical

ackground

o heMerton

chool',

n:British

Journal

or

he

History

f

cience,

(1968),

108-125;

ndtwo xcellent

issertations,

James

A.

Weisheipl,

arly ourteenth-Centuryhysicsf

heMerton

chool

ith

pecial

Reference

o

Dumbletonnd

Heytesbury

Oxford

956,

nd Edith

D.

Sylla,

The

Oxford

Calculatorsnd he athematics

f

Motion,

320-1350

Physics

ndMeasurement

y

atitudes

Harvard

970.

ee

also

Sylla'

subsequent

rticles,

edieval

uantification

f

Qualities

the

Mertonchool'

in: Archive

or

History

f Exact

Sciences,

(1971),

9-39

nd

Medieval

oncepts

f

atitudes

f

ormsthe

xford

alculators

in:

Archives'histoire

oc-

trinalet

ittéraire

u

moyenge,

40

1973),

23-283.

ylla

ndother ecent

cholars

have rguedhat he ppellationMertonian"s ncorrectecause ourteenth-century

work

enerally

iscussed

s Mertonian

as n fact otrestrictedo Merton

ollege

masters.

n what

ollows,

have

used

he raditionalame

arge

ather

han tricte.

50

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While the Posterior

nalytics

s

a

whole

contains

Aristotle's

thoughts

on demonstrative

cience,

in

Book

I,

chapter

7

he

discusses a

par-

ticularaspect ofthe methodknownas metabasis,hat s, the transition

from

one

scientific

iscipline

to

another

n

the

process

of demonstra-

tion.

For a

variety

of

reasons,

both

ontological

and

methodological

n

nature,2

Aristotle

argues

that

science can be

organized

into

distinct

categories

or

disciplines

and

that t is

impermissible

o

prove

proposi-

tions

by

passing

from

ne such

genus

to

another

ovx

eariv

j

XXou

yevouç xexaßavTa

etÇat).

As is

oftenthe

case

in

the

Posterior

nalytics,

Aristotle

roduces

a

mathematical

example

to

reinforce

is

point:

it is

not

possible,

he

says,

toprove geometricalropositiony rithmetic... Where ifferentenera,.g.

arithmeticnd

geometry,

re

nvolved,

lthough

he asis f he

roof

ay

e

the

same,

t s

not

ossible

o

pply

he

rithmetical

emonstration

o he

ttributesf

extended

agnitudes,

nless

magnitudes

re

numbers.3

Nevertheless,

Aristotlewas

compelled

almost from the

beginning

to

modify

his

prohibition

somewhat,

for

in

chapter

7

and

again

in

chapters

9 and 13 he

admits

that

the

so-called

subalternating

and

subalternate sciences

astronomy,

music,

optics,

and the like

con-

stituted

small

group

of

exceptions

to

his

general

rule.4

When the Posteriornalyticsntered the Latin West in the middle

of

the twelfth

entury,5

Aristotle's

prohibition

of

metabasis

enerated

2

Aristotle's

ejection

f

metabasis

risesn

part

rom

is

riticism

f

he

ythagoreans

andPlatonists.

n

Metaphysics

II. 11

1036b8-21,

or

xample,

e

rejects

he

eduction

(avayaj^rj)

f ll

things

o

numbers,

ot

imply

ecause

e

feels

umbers

renot

he

proper

andidates,

ut

because

more

undamentally

e

opposes

he

eductionf

ll

things

o

one

genus.

More

xplicitly,

n

Metaphysics

V.

2

1004a4

nd1.9

992b19-933a7

he

rejectsny

notion

f Platonic

aster-scienceo which ll the

ther

ciences

re

reducible

ecause heres

no

genus

which

ncompasses

ll

things.

ethodologically,

Aristotleays hat he xistencef uch master-scienceouldmplyhat hefirst

principles

f he ciences eneath

t would ll be

proven y

themaster

cience,

nd

hence

ll

syllogisms

ould

y

eductionave he

ame

irst

rinciples.

ristotle

ejects

this

mphatically

n

Posterior

nalytics

.32

8a19.

inally,

he

bility

o ranscend

cien-

tific

enera

as

property

ristotle

ecognized

n

Platonic

ialectic,

nd

gainst

hich

he

developed

is

own

theory

f demonstration.

or

a

discussionf this

mportant

issue,

ee

below,

.

62.

3

Posterior

nalytics

.7

75a38-b6.

4

Posterior

nalytics

.7

75b15;

.13 78b35-79a17.

hat

Aristotleaw the

ubalternate

sciencess

a

relatively

onstricted

xception

s

suggested

y

his

emarksn

Post. n. .9

76a10 nd

76a23-25,

i

8è

xrj,

W

cbç

à

pfxovijcà

i'

àptGfjLrjTixfjç.

egarding

ristotle's

theory

f he

ubalternate

ciences,

ee Richard .

McKirahan,

r.,

Aristotle's

ubor-

dinateciences,n:BritishournalorheHistoryfScience, 1 1978),197-220.

5

Regarding

he atin

ransmission

f he

osterior

nalytics

seeCharles .

Haskins,

Mediaevalersions

f

he

osterior

nalytics

n:Studiesn

he

istory

f

Mediaevalcience

2nd

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significant

interest

among

scholars

studying

the

method

of

demonstrative

cience. The

opening

lines

of

chapter

7

became a fre-

quent lemma or iteralcommentaries, nd because they ikewisecon-

tained the most

explicit

account

of

Aristotle's

prohibition,

virtually

every

commentary

n

the

Analytics

iscussed

the nature

of

Aristotle's

remarks.

Similarly,

when

questionaries

became

the

popular

genre

of

commentary

ater

in

the

thirteenth

entury,

uch

queries

as

"Utrum

contingat

x

alio

genere

descendentem

n

aliud

genus

demonstrare?"

or

"Utrum

possibile

est

demonstratione

descendere

de

genere

in

genus?"

became standard

featuresof the

commentary

radition.6

The new directions n

natural

philosophy

taken

early

in the

four-

teenthcenturyrestedon, among other things,the quantificationof

qualities,

a

procedure

whose

ustification

modern

scholars

have found

problematic

for

a

variety

of

reasons,

including

the

disjunction

of

quantity

and

quality

in

the

categories7

and

the

tension

between

mathematical exactness

and

the

obvious

inexactness of

the

physical

world.8

But to

those scholars

working

within

he

university

radition

f

the Posterior

nalytics

Aristotle's

prohibition

of

metabasis

ould

con-

stitute still

another,

disciplinary

obstacle to

any

attempt

to

quantify

qualities

or

inject

mathematics nto

the domains of

natural

philosophy

or other sciences. It becomes, therefore, significant uestion to ask

how Mertonians

and their

ike-minded

Oxonians

undertaking

uch

a

procedure

could

also

reconcile their work with

Aristotle's

prohibition

of

metabasis.

Attempts

o understand

Mertonian

positions

on

the

prohibition

f

metabasis

re made

difficult

y

the

fact

that

taken as

a

group,

the Mer-

tonians

produced

virtually

no commentarieson

the

Posterior

nalytics.

edn.,Cambridge, ass. 1927, 23-241 nd more ecently,ristotelesatinusV.1-4

Analytica

osterioraed. L.

Minio

aluello

nd

B.

Dod,

Bruges-Paris

968,

x-lxxxiii.

Several

rticlesn

Minio-Paluello's

puscula

Amsterdam

972)

lso

bear

n

the

opic,

including

*

ignota

ersione

oerbekanaei econdi

nalitici

sata

a

S. Tomaso

pp.

155-163)

and acobus

eneticusrecusCanonist

nd

Translator

f

Aristotle

pp.

189-228).

0

Medieval cholars

oncerns

boutmetabasis

ay

othave

riginated

xclusively

n

logical

nvestigations.

obert

ilwardby,

or

xample,pends

ome

ive

olios fhis

commentary

n the

osterior

nalytics

iscussing

etabasis

nd

the

elatedssue

f

he

subalternate

ciences

Cambridge,

eterhouse

05,

fol.

42v-147r),

ut

omewhata-

ter,

n the e

ortu

cientiarumh.

16,

ection

6,

his

nterestn

metabasis

s

clearly

ied o

the

roblem

f

he

lassificationf he

ciences

nd he

elationship

etween

ne cien-

ce

and nother.

ee

De

ortucientiarum

ed.

Albert

.

Judy,

ondon

975,

2.

7 See,forxample,dithylla,MedievaluantificationfQualitiesnote above), .9.

A.

G.

Molland,

n

Examination

f

radwardine

Geometry

in:

Archiveor

istory

f

Exact

cience,

9

1978),

113-175t

131-138.

52

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Early

membersof the

college,

like

Thomas

Wilton and

John

Maudith

did

not write

one,

nor

did

Thomas Bradwardine.9

According

to

John

Bale, Robert Karew (or Cary), who was a fellow t Merton between

1326

and

1332,

produced

a

questionary

on

the

Analytics

n

1325,

a

work

that once was

in

the Oxford

University

Library

but seems

no

longer

extant.10

Various

other

commentaries

on the Posterior

nalytics

once

attributedto

early

Mertonians must also

be

treated as

ques-

tionable.

Bale

again

remains

the

only

reference o a

commentaryby

Thomas Sutton

d.

1311/15,

and

perhaps

a Fellow between

1263 and

1274).

11

A

Quaestiones

uper

ibros

osteriorum

reserved

n

Gonville

and

Caius

MS

512

is attributed

o Petrus de

Insula,

but

whether his

work

was producedbythe Petruswho was a fellow t Merton between1284

and

1307

or three

other

candidates

remains

uncertain.12 More

importantly

and

certainly,

the

generation

of the

1330s

and

40s

Heytesbury,

Dumbleton,

Swineshead,

and their lesser-known

colleagues

William

Sutton,

Richard

Billingham,

Simon

Bredon,

and

Thomas

Buckingham

left

no record of

having

written ommentaries

on the

work.13

If

we cast our net

somewhat

wider

and

compare

Oxford's

produc-

tion

with that

of

the

University

f

Paris in the second

half of the thir-

teenthcenturyand all of the fourteenth entury,we find a similar

situation.

John

Murdoch has noted

recently

that for

the

period

1200-1330,

commentaries on

the

Physicsproduced

at

Oxford

out-

numbered those

produced

at Paris

by

a

margin

of betterthan two to

one and

suggested

that this

may

be

partially

related

to the

peculiar

9

James

.

Weisheipl,epertorium

ertonense,

n: Mediaeval

tudies,

1

1969),

174-

224

t

177-182,

17-218,

22-224.

10

John

ale,

ndex

ritanniae

criptorum

ed. R. L.

Poole nd

Mary

Bateson,

xford

1902, 82.Concerningarew,eeA. B. Emden, Biographicalegisterf he niversity

of

Oxford

oA.D.

1500

3

vols.,

Oxford, 957-1959,

ol.

1,

366-367.

11

Bale,

55.

See also

Emden,

ol.

3,

1824-1825.

12

Concerning

he our

andidates,

ee

Charles .

Lohr,

Medieval

atin

ristotle

om-

mentaries

Authorsarcissus-

ichardusin:

Traditio,

8

1972),

81-396

t

362.

Concern-

ing

he ext t

fols.

7-87v,

ee

M. R.

James,

Descriptiveataloguef

he

anuscripts

n

the

ibrary

f

Gonvillend

aius

ollege

2

vols.,

ambridge,

907-1908,

ol.

2,

581-584,

where

he ext

s attributedo

Will(iam)

allinge

t

fol. 7and

Petrus e nsula t

fol.

81.

13

See

Weisheipl

note

above).

One should

ote,

owever,

hat

redon'

will

efers

to

"quaternos

eos e

grammatica

t

dialéctica;"

. M.

Powicke,

he

Medievalooks

of

Merton

ollege

Oxford

931,

4.

Bale

(note

0

above) 11]

referso

commentary

on ogic ssignedo Bredon'seuByridanus"hat esayshe saw n theMagdalen

Collegeibrary;

oole

inks his o

MS

88,

which

ontains

n

anonymousogical

om-

mentary

ssignedonjecturally

o Buridan.

53

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character of

Oxonian

calculatory

natural

philosophy.14 recisely

the

opposite

seems to be the

case for

commentaries on

the

Posterior

AnalyticswithParis outproducingOxfordby a factorof two to one.

This,

combined

with the dearth of

commentaries at Merton in

par-

ticular

is

in itself

n

interesting

tate of

affairs,

because the

Posterior

Analytics

ould

not have

been unknown

to

Oxford scholars

n

general

and Mertonians

in

particular.

On

the one

hand,

the

Analytics

as re-

quired

of

all

Arts students t

Oxford,

as

the

statutes

f the

University

clearly specify.15

And closer to the

College

itself,

he records

of the

Merton

Library

indicate that

the text of the

Posterior

nalytics

as

available

in

four

manuscripts

present

in

the

library

before

1325,

another added between 1325 and 1360, and several which are only

mentioned

n the electiones

r

lending

ists

of

1372 and

could

have

been

present

earlier in

the

century.16

n

addition,

the

ibrary

lso

acquired

commentaries

on the

Analytics

including

three

copies

of the commen-

taryby

Robert Grosseteste one of

which

entered the

ibraryperhaps

between

1325

and 1346

,

two

by

Thomas

Aquinas,

and

one

by

Simon of Faversham.17

And while

we do not know

the extent

o

which

14

John

.

Murdoch,

he

nalytic

haracter

f

ate

Medieval

earning:

atural

hilosophy

withoutaturein:ApproachesoNaturentheMiddle gesed. Lawrence . Roberts,

Binghamton,

Y

1982,

71-213t 197.

My

tatisticsave een erived

romtabula-

tion

f

ommentariesisted

n

Charles ohr'

Medievalatin

ristotleommentaries

in:

Traditio,

3(1967)313-413;4(1968)

149-245;

6(1970)

35-216;

7

1971)

51-351;

28(1972)

81-396;

9(1973)

3-197;

nd

0(1974)

119-144.

gainst

6

commentaries

on the

osterior

nalytics

roduced

t Paris

etween 250

nd

1400,

nefinds

nly

6

produced

t

Oxford.

15

tatuta

ntiqua

niversitatis

xoniensis,

d.

Strickland

ibson,

Oxford

931,

26:

"...quod

omnes ibros eteris

ogicae

d

minus is

audierint,

xceptis

ibris

oecii,

quos

emel ufficiatudiuisse

reteruartum

ibrum

opicorum

oecii,

uem

udiuis-

se

non

stringantur.

e

nova

utem

ogica

ibrum

riorům,

opicorum,

lenchorum,

bis,

ibrum

utem

osteriorum,

altem

na

vice urente

audiuisse.

..

Si autem e o-

phismatibusublice onresponderint,mnesibros redictosurenteaudisse, oc

adiecto,

uod

bis

audierint

ibrum

osteriorum."

oncerning

he

medieval

urricu-

lum

t

Oxford,

ee

James

.

Weisheipl,

urriculum

f

he

aculty

f

Arts

t

Oxford

n

he

Early

ourteenth

entury

in:

Mediaeval

tudies,

6

1964),

43-185.

ne

should,

owe-

ver,

e cautiousn

giving

oo

much

eight

o

university

tatutess a reflection

f

ctu-

al

curricular

ractice,

s Mordicai

eingold

as

recentiy

mphasized

orate ixteenth-

and

early eventeenth-century

nglish

niversities;

ee

his

cience,

niversitiesand

o-

ciety

n

England

1580-1640

Ph.D.

dissertation,

xford

981).

16

For

hose

n

the

ibrary

efore

325,

ee

Powicke,

he

Medieval

ooks

note

3

bove)

no.

32,48,62,

nd

63;

between

325

nd

1360,

o.

104;

ndfor

hose

ncluded

mong

the

lectio

f

1372

nos.

393-402),

o.

393,

397,

nd

401

pecifically

ncludehe

ogica

nova.

17Grosseteste'sommentarys ncludednPowickeo.207 =Merton ollegeMS

280),

which nteredhe

ibrary

erhaps

etween325 nd

1345,

o. 515

=

Merton

MS

289),

cquired

efore

385,

nd

no.

518

=

Merton

S

292),

lso

cquired

efore

54

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these

were

read

in

the first

half

of

the

century,

the first

ending

list

available

-

dating

from

1372

18

indicates that

both the texts and

the

commentaries n thePosteriornalytics ere popular in thesecondhalf

of the

fourteenth

entury.

n

view of

the

factthat

the Posterior

nalytics

generated ncreasing

numbers of

commentaries

lsewhere n

the

four-

teenth

entury,

t

seems rather dd

that

the

Mertonians ofthe first

alf

of the

century

hould

have leftno

commentary

ecord

of the text.

The

exception

to this

observation

is

Walter

Burley,

who

was

a

fellow at

Merton

by

1305,

but who

spent

much

of his career

on the

Continent,

first t

Paris and

then at

Avignon.19Burley

seems

to

have

composed

not

one,

but

perhaps

three

commentaries on

the Posterior

Analytics20 Nevertheless, Burley like Aristotle generally argues

disciplinary

utonomy

among

the

sciences.

Paraphrasing

Aristotle,

he

notes that

arithmetic

nd

geometry

have

some

common

principles

such as the

axiom

that

equals

subtracted

from

quals

yield equals,

yet

diverse

sciences such

as

arithmetic

nd

geometry

o

not have the

same

subject genus

or

the

same

principles

of

the

subject

genus,

and

therefore

transference rom

ne

genus

to another s

impossible.21

ut

Burley,

again

like

Aristotle,

also

suggests

that

there is

a

legitimate

means

of

descending

from

one

genus

into

another on

certain

occa-

sions, and he divides these ntotwo cases. On the one hand, one may

1385.

Aquinas'

ommentary

s

containedn

no. 126

=

MertonMS

296) acquired

before

360

nd

also

n no. 357

=

Merton

MS

277)

acquired

efore

385.

Faver-

sham's

ommentary

s

containedn

no.

518.The

availability

f

Grosseteste'sorks

interesting,

onsidering

is

discussion

f

partial

ubordination

f

the ciences hich

seems

o have

tood

ehind

ckham's

dea

discussed

elow,

p.

57-58.

18

See

the ext

n

Powicke,

p.

60-63.

19

Concerningurley's

areer,

eeC.

Martin,

Walter

urley,

n:

Oxford

tudies

resented

toDaniel

allus

Oxford

964,

94-230.

20

Weisheipl,epertoriumnote above) ttributedhreeommentariesohim, n-

cluding

ne

iteral

ommentary,

second

bbreviatedersion

rinted

n

the

Venice,

1514

ditionf

Grosseteste's

ommentary,

nd

questionary

n the

osterior

nalytics

in

Gonville

nd

Caius

668*7645.

21

Expositio

uper

ibros

uos

osteriorum

London,

ambeth

alace

MS

70,

fol.154va:

"...ita enim

stuna

dignitas

ommunis

eometrie

t

arismeticei ab

aequalibus

e-

qualia

demas t cetera.

ed

diversecientie

on

habent

dem

enus

ubiectum

ec

eandem

assionemeneris

ubiecti t

arismetica

t

geometria,

t

deonon

onvenit

descendere

geometria

n

arismeticam

uia

nonhabent

dem

enus

ubiectum.

on

enim

abent

dem

enus

ubiectum

isi

magnitudines

tnumeris

ssentdem."

The

last

phrase,

araphrased

rom

ristotle,

ccupied

he

ttention

fmedieval

ommen-

tators

eginning

ith

rosseteste;

ather

han

aking

he

hrase

n

the ense f

con-

traryofacttatement,sAristotleikelyad ntendedt,mostommentatorsought

to

explain

ow

magnitudes

ight

e

numbers,

nd

proposed theory

f

magnitudo

numeratand

non-numerata.

urley,

owever,

oesnot

laboraten this

material.

55

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transfer

demonstration

when

the

subject

genus

of one

simply

con-

stitutes

species

of the

other;

this s

trivially

rue,

says Burley,

because

the same science that examines triangles also examines isosceles

triangles.

On

the

other

hand,

demonstrations

may

be

transferred

when

the

genera

are

the

same

"in

a

certain

way"

(

quodammodo

.

This

occurs,

according

to

Burley, among

the subalternate

sciences

when,

for

example,

a

proof

nvolving

a line is used

to

prove

a

property

n-

volving

visual

lines.22

Burley'

analysis

of

metabasis

in

other

words,

is

congruent

with

that

of

Aristotle,

nd

hence

he

is of ittle

help

in

deter-

mining

a Mertonian

response

to

the

problem

of

metabasis

nd

the

techniques

of

the

next

generation

of work.

Despite this setback, thereare several aspects of Mertonian or at

least

early

fourteenth-century

xonian

work

which

suggest

responses

to the

problem

of

metabasis.

he

first

oncerns

the

subalternating

nd

subalternate

ciences

or

scientiae

ediae

s

they

were

known

n the Mid-

dle

Ages.

As

we

have

seen

already,

Aristotle

imself

ecognized

excep-

tions

to

his

prohibition

f metabasis

the

sciences

of

astronomy,

ptics,

music

and the

like

prove

their

propositions

by

recourse

to

principles

taken

from

the

higher

sciences

of

arithmetic

nd

geometry.

Based

upon

his discussion

in the

first ook

of

the

Analytics

Aristotle

eems

to

have consideredthisa rather narrowexceptionto the generalrule of

disciplinary

utonomy,23

et

there

s

evidence that

would

suggest

that

at

least

by

the

opening

years

of

the

fourteenth

entury,

medieval

scholars

were

beginning

to

adopt

a more

liberal

version

of this

rule.

And

while

he

is

neither

lone

nor the

first

n this

movement,

should

like to illustrate

briefly

he

lengths

to

which

this

shift

was taken

by

a

non-Mertonian

whose

logical

and

philosophical

orientation

was

fre-

quently

adopted

by

later

Mertonians,

William

of Ockham.24

22Expositiofol.154va: ...potest uperiusescenderen inferioraupliciter:no

modo

er

differentiam

ssentialem

ue

constat

peciem,

lio

modo

er

differentiam

existentiam.

..

Si

fiat

escensus

er

differentiam

ssentialem,

unc

it

escensus

n

idem

enus

impliciter,

am

adem

cientia

abet

onsiderare

e

superiori

tde suo

per

e

nferiori.

adem

nim

cientia

ue

onsidérât

e

triangulo

onsidérât

e

ysoceli.

Si

autem

iat

escensus

er

ifferentiam

xistentiam,

une on

fit escensus

n dem

genus

impliciter,

ed

in idem

genus

quodammodo

t

si

per probata

e

linea

descendenda

d

probandum

e aliade

inea isuali.

unc

fit escensus

n

dem

enus

quodammodo,

am

cientia

ubai

ernans

t

cientia

ubalternata

unt

dem

uodam-

modo.

sto

duplici

modo

onvenit

escendere

genere

n

genus

t

descendendo

n

idem

enus

impliciter

t

descendendo

n

dem

enus

uodammodo."

23

See

the

eferences

n note

above.

24ThefollowingccountfOckham positionnmetabasiss discussed oreullyn

my

William

f

Ockham,

he

ubaltérnate

ciences,

nd

Aristotle's

heoryf

metabasis,

orth-

coming

n

British

ournal

or

he

History

f

Science.

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In the

prologue

to

his

Or

inatio,

which

Ockham

completed

before

he

leftfor

Avignon

in

1324,

Ockham

discusses

the

nature

of science and

in particular,theways bywhich one science interactswith another.25

Ockham

argues

that

scientia

may

be taken

in

two

different

enses. On

the

one

hand,

it

may

refer

o

a

single proposition egregated

from ll

others nd hence

autonomous.

But,

says

Ockham,

this s

generally

not

what

we mean

when we

speak

of

cientia

nor

s

it

what

Aristotle

ad

in-

tended

when he

discussed

the sciences

in the

Posterior

nalytics

r

the

librinaturales.

ather,

scientias

usually

taken to mean a collection

of

propositions

whose

unity

derives

not

from

single

subject,

but

from

the orderwhich

bringstogether

hese

propositions.

Under

this

concep-

tion ofscience,Ockham suggests hata proposition eparatedfrom ts

order

may

well

apply

to several

other ciences. And

most

mportantly,

this idea of

science

leads

him in

turn

to

suggest

that

some sciences

overlap

and that

Aristotle's

prohibition

of metabasis

pplied

only

to

scientia

when taken

in

the first ense: that

is,

the

autonomy

of

single

propositions.

However,

says

Ockham,

when

the

subject

of

one science

is

contained

under the

subject

of

another,

t

is

entirely ermissible

for

one science to

demonstrate

he conclusions

of

another.

How

does

this

happen?

Clearly,

Ockham

recognized

that

Aristotle

had excluded

only

the traditional ubalternate ciences fromhis prohibition f metabasis

because

at this

point,

he

expands

upon

Aristotle's

position:

If t s

said

hat he

hilosopher

xcludes

nly

he

ubalternatend

ubalternating

sciences,

..

ithas obe

said hat

y

his e

ntendedo

xclude,

ut idnot o so

explicitly,

ertaintherciences hichre subalternated

n

other

ays.26

Now,

in

Part

III of

his

Summa

Logicae

Ockham elaborates on

the

several

ways

by

which sciences

are

subalternated,

drawing

upon

and

making

more

explicit

a

notion of

partial

subordinationthat had been

discussed as early as Robert Grossetestea centurybefore.One need

not

suppose

that he

higher

mathematical

cience is

completely

xtend-

ed

to the subalternate

ciences;

rather,

nly

part

of t

may

extend to

all

or even

part

of the

inferior ciences. More

important

till,

Ockham

argues

that

there

s

both

a broad and strict ense of subalternation.

Strictly peaking,

sciences

such as

optics,

astronomy,

music,

and the

like

are

subalternated

to

arithmetic

or

geometry according

to the

criteriathat Aristotlehad

suggested.

But

Ockham

also

suggests

that

25Scriptumn ibrumrimumententiarumrdinatioPrologue,.l.; ed. Gedeon ài and

Stephen

rown,

pera

heologica

vol.

1,

St.

Bonaventure,

.Y.

1967,

-15.

26

Ordinatio

Prologue,

.l.;

OTh

1.14,

16-20.

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there s a

broad

sense

according

to

which

sciences

not

normally

een as

subalternating

an be

considered

n

that

capacity.

In

spite

of

the fact

thatAristotlehad statedexplicitly hatmedicine and geometry re not

subalternate

sciences,

Ockham

suggests

that

broadly speaking they

are,

and

likewise,

one

may

also

consider

ogic

or

metaphysics

nd

the

special

sciences in

this same

broad

subalternating elationship.27

What is clear from

his s that

Ockham

has altered

Aristotle's

pro-

hibition

of metabasis rom

wo sides.

On

the

one

hand,

by

restricting

the

prohibition

o

only

those

sciences

that

are

completely

distinct

n

subject

and

properties

that

is,

Ockham's

idea

of

science as

a

single

proposition

Ockham

has

removed much of the

force hatthe

original

theorypossessed. And on the otherhand, by greatly xpanding the

number

of

sciences that

may

be

considered

subalternating

and

subalternate,

Ockham

escapes

the

injunction

of

metabasis

n

most

cases.

If

a science

cannot

qualify

as

subalternate

under Aristotle's

strict

definition,

t

may

well

qualify

under

Ockham'

s more

liberal

rules.

Some ten

years

after

Ockham's

original

discussion,

Thomas

Bradwardine takes

up

the

problem

of

metabasis

mplicitly

when

he con-

siders the

generic

ncompatibility

f

mathematics nd

physics

n

part

4

ofhis second chapterto the TractatuseproportionibusChapter 2 as a

whole

deals with what

Bradwardine

calls "four

erroneous

positions"

regarding

he

relationship

etween

velocity

nd the

powers

that

cause

motion.

Already

he

has

argued against

three:

that

velocity

s

propor-

tional to the

difference etween

motive and

resistive

power,

that

it

follows he

proportion

etween

thatdifference

nd the

resistive

ower,

and

that

t

corresponds

o the

proportion

etween

motive

and resistive

power.28

All of

these,

Bradwardine

notes,

are

similar

nasmuch as

they

assume that there is a

mathematical

relationship

between

velocity,

motive

power,

and resistive

power.

But in the fourth rroneous

posi-

tion,

Bradwardine

considersthe

objection

thatnatural

philosophy

nd

mathematics

are

generically

different nd

that therefore

here

is no

mathematical

relationship

etween

motive

and resistive

owers.

Brad-

27

Summa

ogicae

II,

ii,

ch.

20-21;

ed.

GedeonGài and

Stephen

rown,

Opera

philosophica

vol.

1,

St.

Bonaventure,

.Y.

1974),

37-542,

sp.

539-541. ckhams

by

no means

nique

n

his deas

bout

artial

ubalternation;

s

I

have

uggested

n

my

rticle n Ockham's

heory

f

metabasis

Burley

nd otherseem o be

drinking

fromhe ame

tream.

28Thomasf radwardinehisTractatuse roportionibusits ignificanceorheevelopmentf

mathematical

hysics

ed. and trans.

H. Lamar

Crosby,

r.,

Madison,

Wise.

1955,

86-105.

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wardine

s

reply

centerson a

distinction

f

two senses of

proportion:

n

a strict

ense,

proportion

refers

only

to

quantities

and

therefore s

restrictedto scientificgenera that deal with quantity. In a more

general

sense,

however,

proportion

s found

n

all

things

which

admit

of

being

equal,

greater

r

less, similar,

or

arger

and

smaller. And

this,

says

Bradwardine,

is the

sense

in

which he

uses

proportion

n the

present

context.29

With

varying degrees

of

success,

Bradwardine

challenges

his

fourth

pponent,

suggesting

hat he has conflated hese

two

senses of

proportion.

But when

the dust

clears,

we find

hat Brad-

wardine'

conviction bout the

applicability

of

proportion

o

the

topic

of

motion

rests on

his observations

about the

subalternate

and

subalternating ciences:

"...if

there ere o

proportion

etween

owers

ecause

hey

renot

uantities

(of

he

ame

enus)," ays

Bradwardine,

by

the ame

osition,

here ould e

no

proportion

etween

ones. nd hen

he ntirecience fharmonics

ould e

destroyed."30

Simple

pragmatism

n the one

hand and

I

would

suggest

n

expanded

view

of subalternation as

we

have

seen

in

Ockham

-

on the

other

seem to

have

exerted

an

influence n Bradwardine' view of

metabasis.

If

Bradwardine'

extensive discussion of the

issue indicates

that he

was concerned about the legitimacyof applying such proportions,

scholars of the

succeeding generation

eem to

have

merely

ssumed it

at the

outset.

Many

of

them had

learned of Bradwardine' work

not

from

the

original

Tractatus de

proportionibus

but rather from

abridgements

f

the work. And it

s

interesting

nd

perhaps

indicative

of the concerns of the new

generation

hat

one somewhat

popular

ver-

sion the so-called Tractatus revis

roportionum

glosses

over the

argu-

ment of

chapter

2,

part

4,

and

instead moves

on to

part

5

Bradwar-

dine'

s own

function to

deduce several

conclusions that

follow from

it.31 In the same

way,

near the

beginning

of his

Regule

solvendi

29

Tractatus

6,

ines

-10;

08-110,

ines

81-516.

30

Tractatus

06,

ines

45-447;my

ranslation.

31

am

currently

nvestigating

he

isseminationfBradwardine's

aterial

hrough

the

gency

f

hese

bridged

ditions.

ost resimilar

o theTractatusrevis

ropor-

tionum

abbreviatusx

ibroe

roportionibus

Vienna

515,

eproducedy

Clagett

n

cience

of

Mechanicsn

he

iddle

ges

Madison,

Wise.

959;

he

rgument

f

art

I,

chapter

hasbeen

educedo

"Quarta pinio onit

uod

velocitas otus

on

equatur

ropor-

tionem,

uia

nulla st

roportio

nter

otentiam

t

resistentiam.

ed

omnia

rgumenta

pro

lia

opinione

olum

rocedunt

e

proportioneroprie

icta. deocontraarn on

arguo d praesens."p. 490).The version oundnVienna,Österreichischea-

tionalbibliothek

784,

ol.

3

-236v,

s

evenmore rief

fol. 36r"v):Quarta

pinio

est

uod

velocitas otuum

on

debet ttendi

enes liquam roportionem.

imiliter

59

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sophismata,

William

Heytesbury

remarks that

he will

assume

in the

course

of his

work

that

"any

finite

atitude is a certain

quantity."32

And at thebeginningoftreatiseXIV oftheLiber alculationum,ichard

Swineshead

points

out that

his

treatment f

ocal

motion will

proceed

under

the

assumption

that

motion

is measured

according

to

geometrical

proportion.33

f

the

application

of

proportion

and

the

legitimacy

of

quantification

rested

originally

n an

expanded

version

of

subalternation,

t

would

seem

that

the

ssues

and

assumptions

of the

generation

of the 30s

and

40s

had shifted

way

frommetabasis

nd

in-

stead

concentrated n

what have come to be called

calculatory

echni-

ques.

In spite of this shift n emphasis, there would seem to be at least

two

aspects

of Mertonian science

which both

facilitatedthe use

of

mathematics

n

natural

philosophy

and relieved concerns about

the

appropriate

use of

one

science

in

the

domain of another. Each

treads

upon

the

development

in

ideas about

the

subalternation

of the

sciences. When

Aristotle

rohibited

he

use

of

metabasis

n

the

sciences,

he

made it clear that

he

was

not

concerned

with

the

transference

f

general principles

nd

axioms

from ne

science

to

another,

but

rather

with what he

considered

the

misapplication

of

principles

that are

specific to one science. From Grosseteste onward, virtuallyevery

medieval

commentator

on the

Posterior

nalytics

ad noted that

the

principle "Equals

taken

from

equals yield

equals"

is common

to

several

sciences,

but the

principle "Equal

magnitudes

taken

from

equal

magnitudes yield

equal magnitudes"

is

specific

o

geometry

nd

cannot be transferred

o another

cience.34

t

is

the

atter,

more

specific

principle

that

is

constrained

by

the

prohibition

f

metabasis.

One

of the most

striking

eaturesof

fourteenth-centuryalculatory

science

is the extentto

which

ogic

enters the

topics

under discussion.

This is

perhaps

nowheremore

apparent

than in

Heytesbury' Regule.

According

to

its

prologue,

the

Regule

was intended

as a

guide

for

first-

talisnon tat."Still

notherersion

Cambridge,

onville

nd Caius

182/215,

p.

1

19-131),lthough

ore

omplete

nother

ectionsf

he

reatise,

mitshis

ortion

f

the ext

ntirely.

32

Hentisberie ensu

omposito

tdiviso

Regule

olvendi

ophismata

..,

Venice

494,

ol.

40va:

Quelibet

atitudoinitast

uedam uantitas."

33

Liber

alculationum,

enice

520,

ol. 3va:

...quedam

regule

e motu

ocali

up-

ponendomotumttendiroportionemeometricam."

34

Robert

rosseteste,

ommentariusnPosteriorum

nalyticorum

ibros

ed.

Pietro

ossi,

Florence

981,

37.

60

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year

students

n

logic.35

What

precisely

s the

relationship

of

logic

to

the

mathematical

or

physical

topics

under

discussion?

Over the

past

thirty ears,scholarshave recognizeda two-fold, eciprocating ie.On

the one

hand,

according

to Curtis

Wilson,

while mathematical and

physical principles

re used

in

Heytesbury'

text,

they

re

brought

to

bear on

logical

or

semantic

problems

such

as

the

problem

of

denomination;

that

s,

under what conditionscan a

subject

be said to

be such-and-such?

If

Brownie

the

donkey

begins

to move and in-

creases

her

speed,

at what

degree

of

velocitymay

we

say

she runs?

Or

if

Socrates

is

lifting

weights

and reaches

the limits

of

his

strength,

s

there

a maximum

weight

which he can

lift,

or a minimum

weight

which he cannot lift?36While problems such as these admit of

mathematical

or

physical

solutions,

and

indeed

Heytesbury

uses

both

in his

discussions,

he

marshals these

techniques

in the solution of

a

logical

or semantic

problem.

More

recently,

however,

John

Murdoch

has noted that the

reciprocal

relationship

s

also

true

of Mertonian and more

generally,

fourteenth-century

ork.

By

using

what

Murdoch

calls

'

'analytical

languages/'

fourteenth-century

cholars transferred

roblems

in

the

object

anguage

to

ones

that

were

analyzed

in a

metalanguage;

that

s,

rather than an analysis of problemsthe objects of which are things,

those

problems

were translated

n

such a

way

that

the

objects

became

propositions,

nd

by

suitable

reductions,

operations

on terms

or

prop-

ositions

gave

solutions or

in

the case

of

sophismatadistinguished

be-

tween

proper

and

improper procedures

first n

the

metalanguage

and then

by

reversal

n the

object

language.37

35

Repuleol.

V.

36

Regule

ol. 3rff.

141r"v.ee also

Curtis

Wilson

note

above)

1-25

nd

his

William

Heytesburyin:Dictionaryf cientificiographyNewYork 972, ol.6,376-380.37

This

aspect

f

fourteenth-century

cience as been

emphasizedy

Murdoch

n

several f

his

more ecent

rticles,

ut ee

n

particular

he

Analytic

haracter

f

ate

Medieval

earningnote

4

above),

The

evelopmentf

Critical

emper

New

Approaches

and

Modes

f

nalysis

n

ourteenth-Centuryhilosophy

Scienceand

heology

n:Medievalnd

Renaissancetudiesed.

Siegfried

Wenzel,

Chapel

Hill,

NC

1978,

51-79,

and

Mathematicsnd

ophisms

n

ateMedievalatural

hilosophy

in:Les

enres

ittérairesans

es

sources

héologiques

t

hilosophiques

édiévales

Définition,ritique

t

xploitation.

ctes u col-

loque

nternationale Louvain-la-Neuve

5-27

mai

1981,

Louvain-la-Neuve

982,

85-100.Murdoch otes hatwhile

ourteenth-century

cholars

sed

ogic,

t

would e

misleading

o

suggest

hat

hey

re

simply

oing

ogic; they

re

doing

hysics

r

natural

hilosophy

utwith

ecidedlyogical,

metalinguistic,

ools"

Analytic

haracter

p. 196). ee alsoEdithylla's iscussionf his ssuen TheOxfordalculatorsin: The

Cambridgeistoryf

ater

edieval

hilosophy

ed.

Norman

retzmann,

nthony

en-

ny,

nd

Jan

Pinborg,

ambridge,

982,

40-563

t 546-547.

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This

relationship

between

logic

and

the Mertonian

work is

not,

I

would

suggest,

an

insignificant

ne,

for n

his

discussion of

metabasis,

Aristotlehad singledout dialecticas a peculiarscience n thesense that

unlike the

special

sciences

those

of

mathematics and

natural

philosophy

dialectic has

no

specific

domain or

subject

matter on

which

it

operates.

This

feature of dialectic

lay

at the foundation

of

Aristotle's

prohibition

f metabasis

for unlike

Plato,

Aristotle

was

far

less

convinced

about the

certainty

f

dialectical

method n

all

areas

of

science,

and it was

against

Plato's universal

dialectic that

Aristotle

developed

his

theory

f

demonstration.

Dialectic could

proceed

from

knowledge

based

on belief

or

opinions;

demonstration

by

contrast

rested only on necessary principles. Dialectic must be prepared to

argue

a

conclusion

from the indeterminate

response

to

a

question;

demonstration

may

respond

to

questions,

but

they

must

be

questions

that admit

only

one

answer.

Dialectic

ranges

over all

fields;

demonstration,

ound

by

the

prohibition

f metabasisis restricted

o

a

single

subject

genus.38

One

means of

avoiding

this

prohibition,

as

I have

already

sug-

gested,

is to

change

the

nature

of the

subject

genus

or

expand

the

allowable

exceptions,

both

of

which

can

be seen

in

Ockham.

But

another, perhaps less obvious solution is to draw upon Aristotle's

distinction between

dialectic and demonstration.

While Aristotle

clearly

favored

demonstration

s the method

of

the

sciences,

he did

not

dispose

completely

f the

dialectical method. Instead

he reserved

t to

the

Topics

where

it served as

a

method

for

discoveringarguments.39

38

Concerning

he ltimateases f

dialectic,

ee

Topics

.1

100al -2 100b22-23

nd

Posterior

nalytics

.19 81b19-21.

n

Topics

III.

1 1

5b8- Aristotle

ompares

he

method

f

he

ialecticianith hat

f

he

demonstrative)hilosopher.

sfor

he

ub-

ject genera

f

dialectic,

ristotle

otes n

Sophistical

efutations

I

17244-17 hat

"...the art f xaminationsnotknowledgef nydefiniteubject,nd ttherefore

followshat

tdealswith

very

ubject;

or

ll

the rts

mploy

lso certain

ommon

principles."

ristotle

epeats

his n Posterior

nalytics

.

1

77a26-35,

nd n Onthe

Generation

f

Animals

I.

8

747b27-30,

e

says

hat ialectical

roof

s

more

niversal

"the

furtheremoved

t

is

from

he

pecial

nd

proper

rinciples."

ikewise,

n

Rhetoric

.1,

1.2,

and

1.4,

Aristotle

tates

hat

hetoric,

ike

dialectic,

as no

special

genus

for

ts

subject

matter.

ompare

his

haracterization

ith

Aristotle'se-

quirements

or

emonstration

Posterior

nalytics

.7

75a38ff.),

hichnclude

he

p-

plication

f n essential

ttribute

o

some

genus

nd the

pecification

f

the

genus

itself.

39

Concerning

ristotlend he

Topics

seeWalter e

Pater,

es

Topiques

'Aristote

t

a

dialectique

latonicienne

La

méthodologie

e

a

définitionFribourg

965,

nd

Aristotlen

Dialectic.he opics.roceedingsf he hirdymposiumristotelicum,d. G. E. L. Owen,

Oxford

968,

sp.

he rticles

y

De Pater nd

Düring;

nd

J.

D.

G.

Evans,

ristotle's

Conceptf

ialectic

Cambridge

977.

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Now

the fate of this

topical

method has

been much-discussed

by

scholars

over the

past

generation.40

n the

sixth

entury,

Boethius

held

much thesame viewofdialectic as a methodofdiscovering rguments

and made

the

method more

precise

in

his De

topicis

ijferentiis.

ut

beginning

in the eleventh

century

and

continuing through

the thir-

teenth

century,

we find

a

deviation

from

the traditional

Aristotelian

notion of

topics.

There is

a

growing

sense

that

all

syllogisms

are

dependent upon

topics

and

that

topical

arguments

as well as

demonstrative

nes

are

necessary.

The

result of this shift

s

first

hat

topics

become a method not as much for

discovering

as

confirming

arguments,

and second

and

for

our

purposes

more

important

a

gradual blurringof the distinctionbetween dialectic and demonstra-

tion.41

The

significance

of this

development

for the

parallel problem

of

metabasiss

considerable.

The

revaluation of

dialectic,

particularly

n

the new forms f scholastic

ogic

like the

consequentiae

brings

with

t

the

recognition

hat

dialectic,

and

to

some

extent

demonstration,

may

be

freefrom

Aristotle's

remarks

about metabasis.

When

coupled

with the

broad

sense

of

subalternationwe

have seen

in

Ockham,

this

special

property

f

ogic

becomes

a

significant

ne

forMertonian science. It

is

perhaps even more suggestivewhen we observe that n the thirdpart

of

the Summa

ogicae

Ockham had

suggested

that

one science

may

in

certain cases be both

subalternating

nd subalternate

with

respect

to

different

arts

of another science.42

n

other

words,

logic

as

a

science

in its own

right

can

both come to the

aid

of and be

aided

by

mathematics and natural

philosophy.

If

logic

is

subalternated

and

subalternating

to both

mathematics and natural

philosophy,

both

sciences

may

be

applied side-by-side

without

strictly peaking

resort-

ing

to metabasis.

ogic

thus becomes a

bridge

between mathematics

and

physics.

Closely

related to this

bridge

s another

aspect

of Mertonian science

that bears

upon

quantification

and

metabasis. t has often been re-

40

Eleanor

tump,

opics

Their

evelopment

nd

Absorption

nto

onsequences

in:

The

Cambridgeistoryf

ater

edieval

hilosophy

273-299

nd

Dialectic

in:

The even

iberal

Artsn he

iddle

ges,

d. DavidL.

Wagner,

loomington,

nd.

1983,

25-146.

41

See,

for

xample,

ckham's iscussiont

Summa

ogicae

II, i,

ch.

1;

OPh

.360 nd

III, ii,

ch.

9;

OPh

.521

nd

Eileen erene's

iscussion

n

Demonstrativecience

in: The

Cambridgeistoryf ater edievalhilosophy496-517 t514.

42

Summa

ogicae

II, ii,

ch.

20-21;

Ph

.537-542.ee also he

iscussion

n

my

rticle

citedn

note

4

above.

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marked that Mertonian science is an

analysis

of

problems

ecundum

m-

aginationem.

he

problems Heytesbury

onsiders,

the solutionshe

pro-

poses, and theobjectionsto his positionthathe refutes re more ikely

than not

framed

according

to

imagination;

empirical

considerations

and

actual

physical

measurements are

absent from his

work.43

Likewise,

when Swineshead

discusses

the

case

of a

very

thinrod

pass-

ing

down a shaft

to the

center

of the

earth

and

asks whether

t will

reach the center of the

universe,

his

problem

is framed

ecundum

m-

aginationem.

4

It matters ittle o

Swineshead that

this

problem may

be

unverifiableor that the situation

may

be

actually

impossible.

It is

a

problem

framed secundum

maginationem

whose

purpose

is

to

test

the

boundary conditionsof a theoryunder consideration,not determine

how

things

actually

behave in

reality.

Several

years ago,

A.

G.

Molland drew attention

o

the fact that

by

the

early

fourteenth en-

tury, imaginatio

was

closely

associated with

mathematics. Thomas

Aquinas

perceived

mathematics

s a

science which

receives ts

subject

matter

through

the

imagination,

while

physics

does so

through

the

senses.

Henry

of Ghent

likewise

suggested

that

those whose

im-

aginative

faculties

were

well-developed

made the best

mathemati-

cians,

the

worst

metaphysicians,

nd

inept

natural

philosophers.

And

when Thomas Bradwardine discusses themathematicalproperties f

relationships

between

nfinite

lasses

in

the

De causa

Dei he

does so

per

imaginationem

45Given this

relationship

between the medieval

concep-

tion of

imaginatio

nd the

mathematical

disciplines,

are we

led once

43

CurtisWilson

note

above)

4-25, 48-149,

nd

174

n. 65.

44

Liber

alculationum

note

3

above)

ol.

5v-37r.

he

text as lso

been dited

y

M.

A.

Hoskin nd A.

G.

Molland,

winesheadn

Falling

odiesAn

Examplef

ourteenth-

Century

hysics

n:

British

ournal

or he

History

f

cience,

1966),

50-182.

n

the

same opic,ee lsoMolland, ichardwinesheadndContinuouslyaryinguantitiesin:

Actes

uXIIe

congrès

nternational

'histoirees

ciences

4

(Paris 968),

27-130.

45

Molland

note

above)

113-114.

homas

quinas,

xpositiouper

ibrumoethiie

Trinitate

.

5,

a.

3

resp.;

Expositio

n XII libros

etaphysicorum

II,

lect.

10,

nn.

1494-1496.

enry

f

Ghent,

uodlibeta

Paris

518, I,

q.

9;

fol. 6r.

radwardine,

e

causa

eil,

ch.

1,

coroll.

ars

0;

ed.

Henry

avile,

ondon

618,

21-124.

oncern-

ing

hemedieval

heory

f

he

magination,

eeM. W.

Bundy,

he

heory

fmagination

inClassical

nd

Medieval

hought

Urbana,

11.

927. he

faculty

f he

magination

nd

its

mportance

ormedieval

erceptions

f

Aristotle's

rohibition

f

metabasisas

not

generally

een

ecognized.

s

the

aculty

hat

mediatedetweenense ndreason

irst

by

recreating

mages

eceived

riginally

hrough

he

enses nd

hen

ombining

hem

toform ew

omplexes,maginatio

tself

as

kind f

psychological

etabasisrtransi-

tionbetween issimilarealms. hishasbeensuggestedecentlyor hecaseof

Galilean cience

y

Lorraine

.

Daston,

n: Galilean

nalogiesImagination

t

he

ounds

f

Sense

in:

sis,

75

1984),

02-310.

64

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again

to the middle sciences as the vehicle for

eluding

Aristotle's

pro-

hibition

of metabasis

Unfortunately,

he

evidence

on

this score

is

somewhat mixed. As John Murdoch and Edith Sylla have noted,46

works

involving

calculationes

n

early

manuscripts

were not

grouped

with mathematical exts ike the Elements

but

instead with treatises

n

logic

or natural

philosophy.

This,

of

course,

would

seem

to

be

quite

understandable,

given

the

ogical

component

of the

work

and the

fact,

as

Murdoch

and

Sylla

emphasize,

that medievais often

ended to blur

the distinctionbetween mathematics and

logic,

moving

freely

from

one to another.

Furthermore,

nd

perhaps

more

fundamentally,

we

should

remember

that the

Arts

Faculty

at

Oxford

or

any

other

medieval universityhad no provisionforstudyingcalculationespart

from

the

traditional curriculum of

logic,

mathematics,

natural

philosophy,

ethics,

and

metaphysics.

When such

curricula are

specified,

mathematicalwork

centered

around

such texts s the

works

of

Boethius,

Euclid's

Elements and

Jordanus

de

Nemore's

Arithmetical1

nd

while

Bradwardine's

theory

f

ratios has its

roots

n

the

Elements

48

it

seems

clear from

the

manuscript

evidence

that

medievais did

not

consider the

mathematics

of

the

calculatores

on-

gruent

with that

required

in

the

arts

faculties.

Hence

it should

not

be

surprising hat calculationeshould be grouped by defaultamong the

logical

or

natural

philosophical

works.

It

is

perhaps

more

surprising

hat treatises

dealing

with the

atitude

of formswere

grouped

n

codices with

textsof

more traditional

cientiae

mediae

nly

beginning

n

the fifteenth

entury.49

here

are,

however,

some

suggestions

lready

in

the

fourteenth

entury

that this

concep-

tion

was

beginning

to

change.

Given the link

between

calculatory

tradition nd

imaginario,

ne

should note that

as

early

as the

beginning

of the

fourteenth

entury,

Peter

Auriol whose

work on

the

nature

of

science seems to have influenced Ockham's ideas on the same sub-

ject

characterizes the

scientiaemediae

s those

disciplines

in

which

46

John

. Murdochnd

Edith

.

Sylla,

he

cience

f

Motion,

n:

Sciencen he

iddle

Ages

ed.

David

C.

Lindberg,

hicago

978,

06-264

t

247-248.

My

own

ursory

review

f

he

manuscripts

f

Heytesbury's

egule

ndSwineshead'siber

alculationum

would

uggest

hat

uite

ftenhese exts

ere

rouped

ith

thersf

he

ame

enre.

47

James

.

Weisheipl,

he

Curriculum

note

5

above)

sp.

170-176. ee

also

Edith

Sylla's

emarks

n

The

Oxford

alculators

note

7

above) sp.

542-544.

48A.G. Molland, n xaminationf radwardine'seometryin:ArchiveorHistoryf

Exact

ciences,

9

1978),

113-175

nd

Sylla note

7

above)

53-554.

49

Murdoch

nd

Sylla

note

6

above)

63 n.

137.

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sense

and

imaginado

re

joined.50

Similarly, Henry

of

Langenstein

already

in the

1380s includes treatises on

the

latitude

of formsnot

among the scientiaeermocinalesr thedisciplinesofnaturalphilosophy

in his arbor

cientiarum

but instead

among

the

scientiaemediae.bi

What

this

may suggest,

n other

words,

is

the

genesis

of a

wider

conception

of

the

middle sciences that

becomes

incorporated fully only

in

fifteenth-century

exts and

codices.

Historians of

science

have

long pointed

to the

scientiaemediae

s the

mechanism

for

effecting

mathematical

physics

out

of

Aristotelian

natural

philosophy.

Olaf

Pedersen,

for

example,

sees

the

creation of

the concept of scientiaemediae by Aquinas as "un chemin du

quadrivium

à

la

physique.

52

And

more

recently,

ean

Gagné

has

ex-

50

Peter

Auriol,

criptumuper rimum

ententiarum

ed.

Eligius

M.

Buytaert.

t.

Bonaventure,

Y

1952,

rologue,.

5,

a.

2,

no.

49

p.

300).

Concerning

he elation-

ship

between

uriol nd

Ockham,

ee Paul

Vincent

pade,

The

Unity

f

Science

According

o

Peter

uriol.n:

Franciscan

tudies,

2

1972),

03-217.

51

Henry

f

Langenstein,xpositio

rologi

ibliae

MS

Vienna,

Österreichischea-

tionalbibliothek,

VP

3900,

fol.

54ra*va.

he

text

s

quoted

ully

y

Nicholas

.

Steneck,

Late

Medievalrbor

cientiarum,

n:

Speculum

50

1975),

45-269t

250-251.

Steneckas lsonoted hat enryrgues gainstisciplinaryutonomylsewherenhis

works;

eeSciencendCreationntheMiddle

ges'. enryf

angensteind.

1397)

n

Genesis

Notre

ame

1976,

45

nd

191

n.

24.

Henry's

osition,

ccording

o

Steneck,

bears he

unfortunate

onsequence

.. that

he

tudy

f

nature asno

rules hat

re

specifically

nd

exclusively

pplicable

o

it

alone"

(p.

145),

and he

therefore

distinguishesenry's

cience

nd medieval

cience

more

generally

rom

modern

science.n the

eneral

ense,

f

ourse,

hiss

true;

ut

een

gainst

he

ackground

f

Aristotle's

rohibition

f

metabasis

Henry's

tatements,

ike

hose f

ther ourteenth-

century

cholars

uggested

n

this

paper,

onstituten

important

urdle oward

modern

ethodology.

Earliernthis

aper,

we

uggested

hat

radwardine's

rgument

n

chapter

I,

part

4

of

heTractatus

estedn

part

n thenature

fmusic.

radwardine's

rgument

s

likewise irrorednFranciscuseFerraria'suestioe roportionibusotuum,d. Mar-

shall

lagett

n

Science

f

Mechanics

note

1

above)

t 501.

The same

rgument

eems

to

have

ppealed

o

Oresme

n

his

iscussionf

ntensionnd

remission;

eehis

Quaes-

tiones

upereometriam

uclidised.

Marshall

algett

n Nicole

resmend he

Medieval

Geometry

f

Qualities

ndMotions

Madison,

Wise.

1968,

.

11

(pp.

546-547).

he

culmination

f

this

ink

etween

he ntermediate

cience f

music nd

calculatory

techniques

ay

be found

n

the

nonymousuestiones

usicef

Paris,

BN

lat.

7373

studied

y ohn

Murdoch

Music

ndNatural

hilosophy:

ithertonnoticed

uestiones

y

Blasius

f

arma(?)f

n:

Manuscripta,

0

1976),

119-136].

urdoch

uggests

hat

he

text

eflectshe

nterestsf

he

University

fPavia

p. 126),

nd f

his s

the

ase,

t

would lsoreflect

ate

fourteenth-century

iews bout he

ies etween

scientiaedia

such s

music nd henew

alculatoryechniques,

ince

lasius

aught

here etween

1379 nd1382, etween389 nd1399 ndagain etween403 nd1407.

52

Olaf

Pedersen,

u

quadrivium

la

physique

in:Artes

iberaleson

er ntiken

ildung

ur

Wissenschaft

es

Mittelalters,

d.

Josef

och,

Leiden

959,

07-123

t

123.

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amined

the

development

of

the more

traditional cientiaemediae show-

ing

that

among

the Arabic

and later

Latin

commentators,

these

in-

termediate ciences moved away frombeing tied to eitherphysicsor

mathematics

or

as Aristotle

had

specified,

from

being

"the

more

physical parts

of mathematics'

-

to

become

a

tertium

uid truly

n-

termediate

between

the two

disciplines.53

What

has not

generally

been

recognized

s

that

ater in the Middle

Ages,

not

only

was

the

position

of

the scientiae

mediae

eginning

to

change,

but

more

fundamentally,

the

criteria

by

which

a

discipline

could

be

considered subalternate or

subalternating

were

changing

as

well.

Sciences

could

be

seen as

par-

tially

ubalternated

n

such

a

way

that different

arts

could

depend

on

distinctsuperior sciences fortheirprinciples. More importantstill,

many

more sciences

could

qualify

for

this

relationship,

and

the

new

techniques

of

the

fourteenth

entury

were

eventually

ncorporated

n

the

body

of the sciences under this

relationship.

And

with

this

change,

medievais

were

able to

modify

Aristotle's

prohibition

f

metabasis

hat

had

precluded

cross-disciplinary

work

in

the sciences.

Somewhat

more

generally,

this

shift

n

the nature

of the

subalter-

nate sciences and the

attendant

revision of Aristotle's

theory

of

metabasis

mphasizes

an

important

spect

of scientific

hange

in

the

Middle Ages. By and large, historians have adopted the view that

while

medievais modified

ancient and in

particular

Aristote-

lian

theories of natural

philosophy,

they

did not

usually

challenge

the basic

assumptions

or

the

core elements54

f

Aristotelian science.

Bradwardine

or

Buridan,

for

xample,

may

have

adjusted

the

descrip-

tion of

motion or the

causes of

projectile

motion,

but

they

left

un-

disturbed the idea

that

every

mobile

requires

a

mover.

Similarly,

medieval scholars

beginning

with

Grosseteste

gave

more

precision

to

the distinction

between

propter

uid

and

quia

science,

but

underlying

thisworkremained theconviction hatscientias a causal

enterprise.55

53

JeanGagné,

u

quadrivium

ux cientiaeediaein:

Arts

ibérauxt

hilosophie

u

moyen

âge.

Actes u IVe

congrès

nternationale

philosophie

édiévale,

ontreal-Paris

1969,

75-986.

54

Larry

audan,

rogress

nd

ts roblems

Berkeley

977,

5ff.

"

Anneliese

aier,

Ergebnisse

er

patscholastischenaturphilosophie

in:

Ausgehendes

MittelalterRome

1964-1977,

ol.

1

425-457;

ames

.

Weisheipl,

he

rinciple

пте

quod

moveturb

alio

moveturn

Medieval

hysics

in:

Isis,

56

(1965),

26-45;

Grosseteste's

osition

n

scientia

ropter

uid

nd

quia

s

discussed

y

А.

С.

Crombie,

Robertrossetestend he riginsfExperimentalcienceOxford953, sp.ch.5; later

medievaliscussions

f he

heory

re

reviewed

y

ohn

erman

andall,

he chool

f

Padua

nd he

mergencef

Modern

cience

Padua 1961

67

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In the modification

f the

prohibition

of metabasis

however,

we

have

what

would

seem to be a shift in

one of the

core

elements

of

Aristotelian science, for the prohibitionof metabasis eflected fun-

damental

aspects

of

Aristotle's

ontological

and

methodological

posi-

tions. Yet

even

in this

respect,

when

medievais shifted

he

boundaries

of the

sciences,

they

did so under

the

wings

of Aristotle:

Ockham,

as

we have

seen,

suggests

that

if

subalternation s

possible

in

cases not

prescribed by

Aristotle,

t

is not

because he has deviated from

the

Philosopher's position,

but rather

because

he

has made

explicit

what

was

implicit

n

Aristotle's

deas. And

somewhat ater n

the

fourteenth

century,

when

Albert of

Saxony

asks

why

Aristotle

would

bother

pro-

hibitingmetabasis hen so many sciences are related,his answer s that

Aristotle

had

never

intended to

apply

the

prohibition

o the subalter-

nate

sciences

(which

Albert,

like

Ockham,

now considers

more

numerous),

but rather

nly

to those

sciences

that

are

clearly

distinct.56

If, however,

fourteenth-century

cholars

reconciledto

their atisfac-

tion

theirown

modification f metabasis

ith Aristotle's

position,

their

solution

was

not

unanimously

held or

at least

permanent.

Looking

back

from he

early

sixteenth

entury,

Pietro

Pomponazzi complained

that Swineshead

and

the rest of the

English

calculators

had

put

too

much mathematicsand geometry ntonatural philosophy.According

to

him,

such sciences

are

illegal

innovationsbetween mathematics

nd

physics.57

Likewise,

later

in

the

sixteenth

century,

Francesco

Buonamici,

who was one of

Galileo's

teachers at

Pisa,

expresses

his

exasperation

at

"many

of

these

(Latins)

who

leap

from

physics

to

mathematics."58

And

as

Henry

Guerlac

has

recently

oted,

as

late

as

56

Albert f

Saxony,

uaestionesuper

ibros

osteriorumVenice

497,

ol.

D[b:

'Sed

diceret

liquis

x

quo

sunt

lures

cilicet

modi

uibus

onvenitescendere

e

una

scientian aliam,quareAristotelesluries icit non convenit emonstrantem

descenderee

genere

n

genus?

espondetur

uod

hocnon

icit icut

rius

icebatur

et

etiam on

descendere

onvenit

tc.,

o

modo

uo passio

robata

e

aliquo

ubiecto

in

scientia

ubalternata

tiam

robaretur

e subiecto

ubalternante

..

quando

unt

duo

ubiecta iversarum

cientiarum,

t

uni llorum

nest

liquapassio er

e et lteri

illorum

nest

lla

passio

er

ccidens,

une

on onvenitieri

escensum

e

genere

n

genus,

lio

modo

quod

passio

demonstrata

e subiecto

ui

inest

per

se et

demonstraretur

e

subiecto

ui

nest

er

ccidens.

ropter

oc

quod plerumque

t

turpes

unt

assiones

ue

insunt

er

ccidens

lli

inee,

eometra

on

probat

uod

linea ecta it

inearum

ulcherrima.

."

57

De

intensionet emissione

ormarum

c de

arvitate

t

magnitudine

Venice

525,

ol.

va,

gva-vbee aļso

Curtis

Wilson,

omponazzi'

Criticism

f

Calculator

in:

Isis,

44

1953)

355-362t 357 nd360.

58

Francesco

uonamici,

e motu

ibri

,

Florence

591,

25. At

p.

528,

Buonamici

considershe

roblem

f

whether

roportions

hat

perate

nmathematicsre

pplied

68

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the

end of

the seventeenth

century,

the

early

French

reviews of

Newton's

Principia

focused

their

attention on

among

other

things the fact that while this new work may have been a

mathematical

one,

it was

clearly

not natural

philosophy.59

he

prob-

lem of

metabasisnd

the

dea of

disciplinary

oundaries on

which t was

founded

did not

evaporate

in the Middle

Ages.

Rather,

metabasisnd

its

avoidance was still

s

much

an

issue in

the

seventeenth

entury

s it

had

been in the

fourteenth.

Norman,

Oklahoma

Universityf

Oklahoma

Departmentf

the

History f

Science

legitimately

othe aseof

hings

n

matterthe ame

oncern

radwardine

ismisses

in

his Traciatus

hapter

I,

part

4.

Concerning

uonamici's

reatment,

ee

Christopher

ewis,

TheMertonraditionndKinematicsn

Late ixteenth-nd

Early

Seventeenth-

entury

taly,

adua

1980,

27-169.

59

Henry

Guerlac,

ewton

nthe

ontinent

Ithaca,

NY

1981,

50-51. t

is

perhaps

notablehat he

eviewer

n

the

ournal

es

çavans

1688) egarded

he

rincipia

s

a

work n the

mixedmathematicalraditionf

mechanics ather han

natural

philosophy.

69

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Vivarium

XIV,

1

1986)

Buridan,

Albert

f Saxony

and

Oresme,

nd a

Fourteenth-century

ollec-

tion

of

Quaestiones

n the

Physics

nd on

De

Generatione

t

Corruptione.

J.

M. M. H.

THIJSSEN

A

substantial

part

of

John

Buridan' s works

can be

found

in Italian

libraries.

The studies

of A.

Maier

for

xample,

show

that the

Vatican

library s particularlymportantnot onlywithregardstoBuridanica,

but

also with

respect

to

many

othertexts hat must

be of

great

nterest

to students

of

14th-century

atural

philosophy).2

Then there

is

G.

Federici-

Vescovini,

who,

in

two

of

her

articles,

has

discussed

a

number

of mss. from talian

libraries,

all

containing

Buridan

texts.3

This

paper

intends

to be still

another

contribution

o

investigations

already

made.

Especially

the

ms.

Cesena,

В.

Malatestiana S.

VIII.

5

is

of

particular

nterest

o us

here.

This

manuscript

contains

Questiones

n

the

Physica

nd on De

genera-

tionetcorruptioneand claimsJohnBuridan (1300-after1358) explicitly

as its author.

One

might

think that

this attribution

f

authorship

s

therefore

eyond

discussion.

This is

not

quite

true,

however,

as

we

shall

see.

The

Questiones

n

the

Physics

In the detailed

description

of

the

ms.

Cesena,

В. Malatestiana

S.

VIII. 5

in

the

Catalogo

i

manoscritti

ilosofici

elle iblioteche

taliane

D.

Fiori

takes the

authorship

as

stated

in

the

manuscript

for

granted.4

1

The research

orthis

paper

was

made

possible y

financial

upport

f

the

Netherlands

rganisation

or

ure

cientific

esearch

Z.W.O.).

I

wouldike o

xpress

y

hanks

oH.

H.

Thijssen

or

endering

he ranslation

rom

the

utch,

nd

oProf.

. A.

G.

BraakhuisndProf.

. Hubien or heir

ncourage-

ment.

wish o

expressmy

gratitude

o

the taffsf he

University

ibrary

f

Basel

and

the

General cientific

ibrary

fErfurtor

heir

ind

eception

nd

ooperation.

2

Maier

1949-1958).

3

Federici-escovini

1960);

1976).

4

This

description

an

be foundn

Leonardi

1982),

48-151. rior o

his he

ms.has

beendiscussed

y

Federici-

escovini

1976),

31-34

nd also n

1979),

22

n.4

en

(1983), 0n.14.She oo cceptswithouturtheriscussionBuridan'authorshipf

the

Questiones

n the

Physics.

n

ff. ra-3vb e find he abula

uestionum

fthe

Physica.

. 3vb:"

Expliciunt

abule ubricarum

uestionum

ecundum

ohannem

70

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Ch. Lohr on the other

hand shows

more

caution,

although

he

too con-

siders

the

Physics

as a

work

of

Buridan,

but then in the

category

"uncertainwhichredaction";5 and indeed the incipits well as theex-

plicit

differ

rom

hose of

the well known

redactions

of

Buridan'

s

Ques-

tiones

n the

Physics.6

A

remark,

made

by

the

copyist

himself,

lso

gives

the

impression

that we are not

dealing

here

with

one of

Buridan's "well known"

Questiones-

ollections. On f.

r

the text

in

the same

writing

s

the

rest)

reads as

follows:

"Questiones

iste

sunt Parisius

disputate

per

reveren-

dům

doctorem

magistrům

ohannem

Bridam,

et sunt

sue

questiones

moderne

que

omnibus

aliis

quas

unquam

fecerit

prestant.

Deo

gratias."

7

The remark questiones odernecould be an indicationthat

the attribution

o

Buridan was

new to

the

copyist,

itherbecause

they

really

are another version of Buridan'

s of which he

did not

know,

or

because

they

re not

Buridan's at all.

In

the

atter

case,

of

course,

the

attributionmust be false. And

indeed

here

we are

dealing

with a

false

attribution,

ince

these

Questiones

re in

fact from

Albert of

Saxony

(d. 1390),

which

s evident not

only

from he

ncipit

nd

the

explicit

nd

the titels

f

the

questiones

but also from

he

text

tself.From the

follow-

ing

transcription

f

a

passage

the

reader

can

judge

for

himself.

The

last questio f the Book VIII, which is question 13, reads as follows:

Bridam

uper

ibro hisicorum.men."

On f. ra

he ext

egins:

He

sunt

uestiones

super

ibro

hisicorum

arisius

isputate

er

everendůmoctorem

agistrům

ohan-

nem

ridam,

t

unt

ste

rimi

ibri

2."

Thetext hen uns o

f.

74rb. he

colophon

(in

the

ame

handwriting

s the

ext) oes:

Expliciunt

uestiones

uper

cto ibris

Phisicorum

arisius

isputate er

reverendůmoctorem

magistrům

ohannem

Bridamt finite

ueruntcribi

er

me

Bartholomeum

e

Madiis,

ie sabati ecundo

mensis

prilis

373.

Deo

gratias

men."

my

wn

ranscription).

5 Lohr1970),169.6

The

ncipit

oes

s

follows:

Queritur

irca

rimum

hisicorumtrumns

mobile

sit

ubiectum

roprium

n cientia

aturaliotali. t

per

cientiamaturalemotalem

intelligo

habitům

congregatum

x

habitudinibus mnibus

conclusionum

demonstratarum

n ibris

aturalibus..."

he

explicit:

...et

si

accidens

ualis

it:

utrum

uantitas

el

qualitas.

t

si

qualitas,

trum

e

prima

pecie

el

tertia. oc

enim

onsiderare

st

lterius

egotii,

cilicet

etaphysici."

my

wn

ranscription)

7

This s

a

correctionfFederici-Vescovini's

ranscription

1976),

1. She

proposed

the

ollowing,

n

my

pinion

ess

meaningful,

eading:Questiones

ste unt arisius

disputate

er

reverendům

octorem

agistrům

ohannem ridam t sunt ue

ques-

tionesn ordine

uestionibus

liis

uas

unquam

ecerit."

Neitheran

Fiori'

transcription

n

Leonardi

1982),

149be

called orrect:

Ques-

tionesste unt arisiiisputateer everendůmoctoremagistrůmohannemrin-

danum t unt

uestiones

edecine

ue

omnibusliis

uas

unquam

ecerint

restant.

Deo

gratias

men."

71

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Consequenter

ueritur

quo

moveatur

roiectumost eparationem

ius

prohiciente.

stam

ubitationemristoteles

ractat

irca

inem uius

ctavi.

Circa

quam

unt

iverse

piniones,uarum rima

st

quod

movetur

prohi-

ciente. t hoc sta pinio ult icostendere.am biliomoveturroiectumui

imponitur

roiectio;

ed sic st

uod

lia

mponiturrohicienti.

Alia

st

pinio

uam

pro

nunc

eputo

eriorem,

t

st

uod

proiciensmprimit

proiecto

uamdam

irtutem otivam

ue

est

quedam ualitas ue

innata st

manere isi

fiat

mpedimentum

liunde

d

eandem ifferentiam

ositionis

d

quam proiciens

rohicit.

t

secundumstam

pinionemossunt

eddi

ause

quarundamxperientiarum.

rimo

uia

apis rohicitur

emotius

uam

pluma.

Breviteruius

ausa st sta

uia

ex

quo

apis

habet

lus

e

materiat st

magis

densus

luma,

lusrecipit

e ista

virtute

otiva t diutius arn etinet

uam

pluma.

Queres it alis irtuson pectatd naturalemed dmetaphysicam,cilicet

utrum

alis es it ubstantia

el

ccidens,

t

i

accidens,

ualiter

it:

trum

uan-

titas el

ualitas.

t si

qualitas,

trume

prima pecie

el

ertia. oc enim on-

siderare

st ltioris

egotii,

cilicet

etaphysici.

This

passage

from

Cesena,

S.

VIII.

5,

f.73r-74v s

almost

verbatim

the same as

the

transcription

f Albertus'

text

by

Maier,

who used the

1504 Venice

edition in

her

analysis

of

Albert's

impetus-theory.8

Besides,

a

comparison

between

these

(and

other

passages)

and

cor-

responding

ones of other mss. can lead

to

no other

conclusion

than

that the Questionesuperocio librisPhysicorumn the Cesena ms. В.

Malatestiana S.

VIII. 5

have

been

incorrectly

ttributed o

Buridan.9

The

Questiones

n

De

generatione

t

corruptione

In

Ch. Lohr'

s

report

t

says,

that the Cesena ms.

В.

Malatestiana

also

contains

a

text

of Buridan'

s

Questiones

uper

ibris

e

generatione

t

orrup-

tione10

G. Federici-

Vescovini,

on the

other

hand,

mentions that

the

Cesena ms.

only

contains

a

tabula

uestionum

f

this

work,

but not

the

text tself.11

esides,

the

ms. has a

very

nteresting

ntroduction,

o

the

effect hat t places De generationetcorruptioneithinthe framework f

8

Maier

1968),

60-263.

hese

ranscribed

ragmentsorrespond

ith

Maier' line

1-7,

4-92,

nd

110-end

n

that rder.

9

For

his

urpose

have onsulted

he

ollowing

ss.:

Bologna,

ollegio

i

Spagne

ms.

160;

Brugge,

penbare

tadsbibliotheek

77;

Venezia,

ibi.Naz. Marc.VI

218

(= 3022).

Pattin

1978),

14

gives

description

f

he

Bruges

ms.,

whichhows

hat

inc.

nd

expl.

re dentical

ith

hose

f

urCesena

ms.

We

may

herefore

dd

the

ms.

Cesena,

. Malatestiana.

VIII.

5

ff. ra-74rb

oLohr's ist

(1967),

50)

f

Ques-

tionesn thePhysics yAlbertfSaxony.

10

Lohr

1970),

171.

11

Federici-Vescovini

1976),

1.

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Aristotle's ibri

naturales.

ederici-

Vescovini' s

findings

have

been con-

firmed

by

D.

Fiori.12

Here

also both authors

take the ms.

attribution

forgranted.

This causes

a

problem,

however,

since a

comparison

between the

titles

f the

questions

of

the Cesena ms. table

of contents

nd the titles

of another ms.

of Buridan'

s

Questiones

(e.g.

Basel,

Universitätsbibliothek

. V.

2,

ff.

64r-86r,

or

Munich,

Clm.

19551,

ff.

106r-125v)13

hows

that

there

are

many

differences.Not

only

the

sequence

of the

titles

differsn the Italian

ms.,

but also

many

questiones

have

no

equivalent

in

the

other mss.

(and

vice

versa).

The

introduc-

tion

is also

missing,

at

least

in the

mss.

Basel,

Universitätsbibliothek

F.V.2; Berlin, SB lat. fol. 387 and Munich, Clm. 19551,14whereas

certainother

mss. of

Buridan's

Questions

on

De

gen.

et corr. do

have

the

Introduction.15

Thus

we findboth a

similarity

with

regards

to

the

Introduction

nd

discrepancies

with

regards

to titles nd

text.

It seems to me therefore

that

the attribution

f

this text to

Buridan

remains

questionable.

For

establishing

he

authorship

t

would be

necessary

to

identify

thermss.

containing

he text

which

once

belonged

to the Cesena

ms. In

order

to

faciliate his

task,

will

present

here

the tabula

uestionum

which

has

up

till now remainedunpublished:

(f.4v:

"Нес est tabula

questionum

ibri

De

generatione

t

corruptione

disputatarum

arisius

er

everendůmoctorem

agistrům

ohannem ridam

et

sunt

umero

9

ta,

uod

questiones

rimi

unt

5;

secundi

ero

4".

Tabula

questionumrimi

ibri e

generatione.

1 Prima

uestio

stutrum

oces

ignificent

dem

e existentet non

x-

istente.

in

carta

9).

6

2.

Utrum

ebus

cibilibus

oruptis

ossit

manere

cientiam

e

eis.

in

car-

ta

89).

3.

Utrum

e

generabilibus

t

coruptibilibusossit

sse

cientia.

in

carta

90).

4.

Utrum niversale

it

per

e

generabile

t

coruptibile.in

carta

1).

5.

Utrummobile d

formamit ubiectum

uius

ibri,

in

carta

1).

12

f.Leonardi

1982),

148-151.

13

These

re

womss.

f

Buridan's

uestiones

e

en.

t

orrmentioned

y

Lohr

1970),

171.

The

following

ss. anbe added oLohr's

urvey:

iege,

U

346C,

f. 3-94

cf.

Pattin

1978),

103),

Munich,

lm.

4376,

ff.

25-150

cf.

Markowski

1981),70).

14

Maier

1952),

120has been

my

eferenceith

egards

o

theBerlin

ms.

15

As Maier

1952),

20

ndicates,

his

s

the

ase

for

oth

mss. f

Erfurt,

.

Ampl.

.

325and F. 357.Thesameholds rue orWien,O.N.B. 5453.

16

The

foliating

in

carta...)

has beendone

by

the wner fthe

ms.

Cesena. will

come ack o this

ater.

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6.

Utrum

eneratio

t

oruptio

int

assiones

ntium

aturalium.

in

arta

92).

7.

Utrumsta

itbona

onsequentia:

i

possibile

st

generari,

mpossibile

est a alterari.incarta 3).

8.

Utrum mne

orpus

it

divisibile

uper

mne

unctum,

in

carta

3).

9.

Utrum itdare

generationem

impliciter

atam,

in

carta

4).

10.

Utrum

emper eneratio

nius it

coruptio

lteriust

econverso,

in

carta

5).

11.

Utrum

materiait

ausa

peipetuitatis

enerationis

t

coruptionis.

in

carta

5).

12. Utrum

eneratio

ifférât

b alteratione.

in

carta

6).

13.

Utrum

n

generatione

impliciter

icta iat

esolutio

sque

d materiam

primam,

in

carta

6).

14.

Utrum

liqua

orma

ccidentalisaneat

adem

n

generato

t

orupto.

(in

carta

7).

15. Utrumarefactioitproprieugmentatio.incarta 8).

16.

Utrum

orpus

um

dvenit ibus

ugeatur

el

cibus,

el

materia

el

aliud,

in

carta

9).

17.

Utrum

n

augmentatione

iventium

artes

ecundum ateriam

luant

et refluant,

in

carta

00).

18. Utrum

ualibet

ars

ucti it ucta.

in

carta

01).

19.

Utrum

ugmentatio

it

per

e

motus,

in

carta

02).

20.

Utrum

mnis ctio t

passio

iant

er

ontactum

gentis

d

passum.in

carta

02).

21.

Utrumimile

atiatur

simili,

el

dissimile

dissimili,

in

carta

03).

22.

Utrum

gnis

it

ontrarius

que. in

carta

03).

23. Utrum

orme

lementorum

uscipiant agis

t

minus,

in

carta

04).24. Utrum ormelementorumaneantnmixto,incarta 05).

25. Utrum

mixtio

it

possibilis.

in

carta

06).

Tabula

questionum

ecundi

ibri e

generatione

t

coruptione.

1

Utrumint

antum

uattuor

rime

ualitatesangibiles.

in

carta

07).

2.

Utrum

qua

sit

primo

rigida,

in

carta

08).

3.

Utrum

aliditas

aturalis

gnis

t

aeris

int

iusdem

peciei.

in

carta

109).

4.

Utrum

rimarum

ualitatum

angibilium

ue sint

active,

cilicet

calidumt

frigidum;

ue

passive,

cilicet

umidumt iccum.

in

carta

109).

5.

Utrum mnia

lementa

int d in

icemmmediate

ransmutabilia.

in

carta

10).

6.

Utrum

lementa

abentia

imbolum

acilius

d

nvicem

ransmutentur.

(in

carta

11).

7.

Utrum

e

necessitate

equatur,

i

sunt nfinita

lementa,

uod

unt

n-

finite

ontrarietates.

in

carta

12).

8.

Utrum mnia

omparabilia

ommunicent

n

eademvel n

consimili

materia,

in

carta

12).

9.

Utrum mniamixta

ue

sunt irca ocum

medium,

int

omposita

x

omnibus

implicibus

orporibus.

in

carta

13).

10.

Utrum

n

natura

it

possibile

eperiri

ixtum

impliciteremperatum.

(incarta 14).

11. Utrum

alidum,

rigidum,

umidum

t

iccumint

rincipia

ctivan

generationibus

ixtorum.

in

carta

14).

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12. Utrum

n

rebus

erpetua

it

generado

t

coruptio.

in

carta

15).

13.

Utrum,

i celum

essaret

motu,

liqua

generado

t

coruptio

ssent.

(in

carta

16).

14. Utrumoruptumossitevertidemnnumeron stisnferioribus.incarta

16).

Save for few

exceptions

the titles

of

these

questiones

re

verbatim

he

same as

those

of

a

survey

f an

anonymous

ollection

of

Questions

on

De

gen.

et

corr.

in

the ms.

Vat.

lat. 3097

which was

published by

A.

Maier.17

A

comparison

between

the

Cesena

ms.

and

the

Vatican ms.

leads to the

following

bservations:

The

questiones

-10 inci. of Book I

run

parallel

in

both mss.

Questiones

1

and 13

have no

equivalent

in

Vat. lat.

3097.

Questio

8

("Utrum

corpus

vivens nutriatur

uamdiu

vivitet non augeaturquamdiu vivit") of theVat. lat. ismissing n the

Cesena ms. The

following

uestiones

re

practically

dentical

again;

so

the

Cesena ms. has one

question

more

than

the

Vatican

ms.18 The

titles n Book

II

are

the same

in

both

mss.

They

also

have

the

same

pro-

emium.

A. Maier

is

of

the

opinion

that

the

anonymous questiones

f

the ms.

Vat.

lat.

3097

are

Nicole

Oresme's

(d. 1382)

commentary

n De

gen.

et corr. that

was

considered ost.19Her

first

rgument

s

the

matter

of

style.

She

thinks

she

recognizes

"der

lebendige, temperamentvolle,

manchmal brillanteStil" ofOresme.20

The second

argument

s the

fact

that Albert

of

Saxony

and

Marsilius

of

nghen

base their

Questiones

n

De

gen.

et corr.

upon

Buridan's

(in

the

redaction known

to

Maier)

and

on

the

above

mentioned

anonymous

commentary

of

Vat.

lat.

3097. It is a well

known

fact,

however,

that

at

other

occasions Albert

of

Saxony

as well

as

Marsilius

of

Inghen

repeatedly

base

theirown

commentarieson

Aristotle

upon

Buridan's and

Oresme's

commentaries.

So

for Maier it is

obvious

therefore

o

assume

that

they

have done the

same with

regards

to

the

Questiones

n

De

gen.

et corr. From

which she draws

the conclusion

17

f.Maier

1955),

35-536.

18

As a resultf

hese

ifferenceshe

rder

f

uestiones

as

been

hanged

omewhat.

Vat. at.3097

.

11

orresponds

ith

.

12

of he

esena

ms.;

.

12-q.

4;

q.

13-17n-

ci. with

.

1

-q.

ind.;

q.18

hasno

quivalent

s

we

have

lready

een;

.

19-24ncl.

correspond

ith

.

10-25

ncl.

19

Maier

1952),

23;

1955),

36.

20

Maier

1952),

23-124.

n

pp.

1

8-134

ne

anfind discussionf few

ommen-

taries nDe gen. t orr. nd heir ss.Note hatMaier idnot nowhe esenams.

B. Malatestiana

.VIII. 5 at

the

ime. ohr

1972),

123has

taken ver

Maier's

t-

tributionfVat. at.

3097 o

Oresme.

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that

the

anonymous

collection must

be from

Oresme.21

The under-

lying implicit

assumption

here

is,

that the

anonymous

text

of the

Vatican ms. is not he same as the redaction of Buridan's text hatwas

used

by

Maier.

It

is

true,

Maier

has

established the fact that

the

anonymous

Questiones

f the

Vatican

ms. differ

from

Buridan's,

ai

though

n

some cases

the titlesare

identificai.22 he

too

found

that

the

anonymous

commentary

howed "eine

gewisse

Abhängigkeit

von

Buridan'

on the

one

hand,

but

on

the other

hand also

"eine starke

Selbständigkeit

des

Denkens

und eine

Art der

Darstellung,

die

weit

über

den

Durchschnitt steht und auf

einem Verfasser von hohen

Niveau

schliessen ässt".23

Maier' s discussion of the contents of the Questions on De gen. et

corr.

of the

Vat. lat. ms.

3097 makes it

sufficiently

lear,

that

this text

must

definitely

e

placed

against

the intellectual

background

of the

14th

century

Parisian

"school".

One

may

question,

however,

her

at-

tribution of these

anonymous

Questiones

o

Oresme;

even

more

so,

since

after

Maier' s

publication

another

ms. has

been

discovered,

con-

taining

a text

of

Questiones

n De

gen.

et corr. and

which

explicitly

names Oresme

as its

author:

Firenze,

В.

Naz.,

Conv.

Sop.

H. IX.

1628,

ff.

-76v.24 This

is

not

the same

text as

the

one

in

the

Vatican ms.25

In

my opinion

we

should

consider the

possibility

hat

in Vat. lat.

3097

we have another edaction

of Buridan's

Questiones

n

De

gen.

et

corr. This

hypothesis

ould be corroboratedwith the

following

bser-

vations:

1

In the first

place

we

have the

explicit

attribution of the

anonymous

Questions

of the Cesena

ms.,

a

ms.

not known to Miss

Maier:

(f.4r)

"Incipit

ordo

istius libri De

generatione

ad alios

libros

naturales secundum

magistrům

ohannem Bridam".

Then

follows he

preface: "Prima pars scientie naturalis tractat de entibus

21

f.

Maier

1952),

124.

22

Maier

1952),

21

п.

71,

and

122

hasbasedher

omparison

n

themss.

rfurt,

.

357 and

Berlin,

at. fol.

387 of

Buridan's

uestiones.

he mss.

Basel,

F.V.2

and

Munich,

lm.

19551,

which

have

consulted,

onfirmhe orrectness

f Maier's

observations.

23

Maier

1952),

123.

¿

Menut

19bo),

o

. thisms.

has

lready

een eferredo

nKnsteller

1Уоэ),

oó

Unfortunately

he

ncipit

hichMenut

ives

'

Primo

ueritur

trume ente

mobile

ad

formamit aec cientia

amquam

e

subiecto")

snot rom

irenze,

.

Naz.

Conv.

Sop.H.IX 1628, ut romat. at.2185Hedidnot oticehat hemss. istedyhim

and attributedo

Oresme,

ontain

ifferentommentaries

n

De

gen.

t

corr.

25

n

the

Appendixpresent

survey

f he

itles f

Oresme

questions.

76

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naturalibus..."

It

concludes

with the

significant

remark

(f.4va):

"Hunc ordinem

ibri De

generatione

ad

alios

hie

scripsi

propter

duo:

Primo, quia utilisest ad evidentiam omnium que dicentur; secundo,

quia

ipsum

Iohannes

Bridam

ponit

n

expositione

ibri

De

generatione

cuius

libri

questiones

secundum eundem

Iohannem

infradicentur

vel

ponentur.

Quarum

questionum

est

sequens

tabula

per

rubricas

pro-

tensa.

Amen."

Then

the

tabula

of

questions

follows

with

the

above

mentioned

incipit,

stating again

that we are

dealing

here

with

Buridan' s

Questiones

isputate.

he

survey

of titles concludes

with

the

following xplicit

f

4vb)

Explicit

abula

questionum

disputatarum

super

duobus

libris

De

generatione

et

corruptione.

Amen."

The

Preface of this ms. is identicalwith the one ofVat. lat. 3097, and the

titles

of

the

questions

are

nearly

identical.

Besides,

the

same Preface

appears

in some mss.

of

De

gen.

et corr.

of which Buridan's

authorship

has never been doubted.26

The

assumption

that Vat. lat.

3097

con-

tains

a

second redaction

of

Buridan's

Questiones

n De

gen.

et

corr.

is

not

basically

being

refuted

y

any

of

Maier'

s

arguments

n

favour

of

Oresme's

authorship.

On

the

contrary,

her remarksto

the effect

hat

the

commentary

of

Vat.

lat.

3097

shows

a

certain

dependency

on

Buridan'

s

could

be

seen

as

a

corroborationof this

hypothesis.

2. The ms. Vat. lat. 2185, mentioned by A. Maier, contains on

ff.40ra-61rb

anonymous

uestiones

n

De

gen.

et

corr.27At the end of

the first ook of

this

collection

wo

questions

from

Buridan'

s

commen-

tary

and his

Introduction

have been inserted:

(f.50ra)

"Expliciunt

questiones

primi

De

generatione

secundum

ilium,

sed

ponuntur

alie

due

disputate per

Iohannem Bridam cum

quodam

suo

prohemio."

And

indeed,

then follows the

Prologue

and the

questiones

utrum

voces

significent

dem

re

existente

t non

existente",

and "utrum de

generalibus

et

corruptibilibuspossit

esse scientia". These are the

questions

1 and 3 ofthems.

Cesena,

В. Malatestiana S.VIII. 5 and the

ms.

Vat.

lat. 3097.

Thus

in

Vat. lat.

2185

we

have another

explicit

t-

tribution o

Buridan.

26

Namely

n the

bovementioned ss.

Erfurt,

.

Ampl.

.

325

and

F. 357.

With

regards

o his

oint

havenot een ble o

onsulthemss.

raha,

Metr.

Kap.

1286,

ff. 9v-lllr

nd

Wien,

.N.B.

5453,

f.

0r-48v,

hich

ccording

oLohr

1970),

71

alsocontain uridan

s text. esides ne

must

ear n

mind hat here

s

always

he

theoretical

ossibility

hat n

Introductionas been

ransmitted

eparately

romhe

text,ndhasbeen nsertedomewherelse ta later ate.

27

Maier

1952),

120-121.

n

elaborate

nalysis

fVat. at.

2185

has

been

given y

Maier

1961),

91-201.

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A. Maier stated that both titles

also

occur

in

the

only

redaction

of

Buridan'

s

De

gen.

et

corr. she

knew,

namely

in

questiones

and

1

respectively, utthatthetext fthesetwoquestionesiffersorm he one

of Vat.

lat.

2

185.

28

This

discrepancy

ould

well be

explained

by

the ex-

istenceof a second redaction

of

Buridan's De

gen.

et

corr.

n

such case

the

questions

1

and

3 of Book I

including

the

Prologue

would

then be

the ones found in Vat. lat.

2185.

3 In

connection with these two

arguments

would like to draw the

attention o a remarkable tem

with

regards

to Vat. lat.

2185.

There

appears

to

be considerable difference

etween the rest

of

the

text

of

Book

I

in Vat. lat.

2185

and Book

I in

Vat. lat. 3097.

Compare

the

titlesforexample. Book II on the other hand runs almostexactlythe

same as

Book

II

of the Vat. lat. 3097. For Maier this was even the

reason

for

calling

Vat. lat. 2185

a

"

Ziemlich

eingreifende

Umarbeitung".29

On the other hand one could also

say by

way

of

argument,

hathere we

are

dealing

with

two different

exts.

One

could

speculate

on

the

question

as to whetherVat.

lat.

2185

-

besides

the

questionesxplicitly

ttributedto

Buridan

perhaps

contains

another

commentary

n

De

gen.

et

corr.

A

real conclusion on

the

authorship

of

the

Questiones

f

Cesena,

В.

Malatestiana S. VIII. 5

(in

itsentirety resented n Vat. lat. 3097) can

only

be arrived at after

a

painstaking

text-comparison

between

Buridan's

Questiones

nd the so called

other edaction thereof

n Vat.

lat. 3097.

30

Also

the text of the

ms.

Firenze,

В.

Naz.,

Con.

Sop.

H.IX.

1628

must then be drawn into

this

nvestigation.

All

I

want

to do here

is

simply

ndicate that the

Questions

on

De

gen.

et corr.

of the

ms. B. Malatestiana

which are

explicitly

ttributed

to

Buridan,

are not identical

to

those

known to

us

through

Maier' s

publications.

The

way things

stand at

the

moment

an

attribution f

these

Questiones

o

Oresme

is also

questionable.

The least we can

say

is,

28

Maier

1952),

21,

namely

.

71:

"...Übrigens

ei

bemerkt,

assdie

beiden

ues-

tionen

n

der

Durchführung

iemlichbweichenonden

entsprechenden

n

den

hs.

Erfurt. 357

undBerlin

at.

2

387." Both

mss. ontain uridan's

uestions

n

De

gen.

t corr.

n

the

nly

edaction

hat

wasknownt

the ime.

29

cf.

Maier

1952),

122-123

here

he

pointed

ut

the

discrepancies

etweenoth

mss.with

egards

o

Book

.

30

Prof.H.

A. G. Braakhuisnd are

studying

he irstwo

uestions

f

Book

in

Vat. lat.

3097

"utrum

oces

ignificent

dem

e

existente

t

non

existente"nd

"utrum ebus cibilibusorruptisossitmanere cientiam e eis") and their

equivalent

n Vat. at.

2185

nd n Buridan's

ommentary.erhaps

his

tudy

ill

solve he

uestion

f

uthorship.

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that

the

possibility

f

another

edaction of Buridan' s

Questions

cannot

simply

be

ruled

out.31

Another interesting spect of the ms. Cesena, В. Malatestiana

S.

VIII. 5 are the annotations

n

the

margin by

a

one time

owner

of the

ms.

(end

14th-beginning

5th

century).

At the end of the tabula

ues-

tionum

f

the

Physics

he

makes the

remark

f.3vb):

"Nota

quod

habeo

etiam

questiones super

libro Phisicorum

secundum

alios doctores.'

Among

the authors

he

then mentions s also

Blasius of

Parma:

"Item,

habeo

questiones

secundum

Blasium

librorum

Phisicorum

in

libro

uno

per

se,

in

quo

etiam sunt conclusiones

super

libris

Phisicorum

secundum

Blasium

ipsum."

G.

Federici-Vescovini has

been

able

to

identifyhiscodex, which contains the Conclusioness well as theQues-

tiones

n

the

Physics

of

Blasius

of

Parma:

Vat. lat.

2

159.

32

It

is

in-

teresting

o see that this codex Vat.

lat.

2159

refers o the Cesena

ms.

(f.227vb):

"Item,

habeo eas

(seil,

the

Questions

on the

Physics)

secun-

dum Bridam

in libro

in

quo

sunt etiam

questiones

de

generatione

secundum Bridam.'

Federici- escovini has not mentioned the fact that

there

are more

mss.

with

nnotations

by

thisowner

n

existence: for

xample

Vat. lat.

2185

With

regards

to the

anonymous Questions

on De

gen.

et corr.

this same owner remarks: (f.40v) "Habeo etiam istas questiones

secundum Marsilius de

Hingen...,

Item,

habeo

ipsas

secundum

Bridam

in

uno

libro,

in

quo

sunt

etiam

questiones super

libro

Phisicorum secundum

ipsum

Bridam.33"

This

seems to be

a

clear

reference

o

our

Cesena

ms.,

which

ndeed also contains

Questions

on

the

Physics

that are

being

attributed o

Buridan,

as we

have

seen.

The

owner who

made

these

annotations was in

all

probability

a

certain

Bernardus

a

Campanea

of

Verona,

a

medicus

34From referencesmade

by

the owner of these mss. we

may

conclude

that the text f Buridan' s

(?)

De

gen.

et corr. nthe ms. Cesena, В. Malatestiana S.VIII. 5 must

have been lost

at

a later date. As

possible

evidence

of

this

may

also

be

seen the

tabula

uestionum

f thisms. After

very

questio

we find

in

the

owner's

own

handwriting-

nformation

s

to the foliumon

which each

31

For hat

mattert s not

nusual or

uridan omake

more han ne

commentary

on one nd

the amework

fAristotle.

or

xamples

ee Lohr

1972),

163-182.

32

Federici-Vescovini

1976).

32.

33Thorndike1952),83 gives his eferencenlynan Englishranslation,aier

(1955),

121 ranscribes

nly

art

f he

passage

eferring

o Buridan.

34

cf.

Federici-Vescovini

1976),

2

and

Maier

1961),

110.

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questio

egins

(in carta...)

These

folia,

however,

are

missing

in

the

codex

(ff.

9- 11

).

35

In his 'catalogue' the ownerof thesemss. has withoutdoubt taken

for

granted

the

attributions

made in

the mss.36

Hopefully

have

made

clear

that

n

the case

of the

ms.

Cesena,

В.

Malatestiana

S.

VIII. 5

this

was

not

quite

correct.

Summary

By

way

of

conclusion

we

may

add

the

following

hree

tems to

A.

Maier's

and G. Federici-

Vescovini'

s

investigations:

1.

The

Questionesuper

libris

Physicorum

n the

ms.

Cesena,

В.

Malatestiana

S.

VIII. 5

have

been

incorrectly

attributed

to

John

Buridan.

Their real

author is

Albert

of

Saxony.

2.

The ms.

Cesena,

В.

Malatestiana

S. VIII.

5

ff.4ra-4vb contains

the

Prologue

and

the

tabula

uestionum

f

the

Questions

on

De

gen.

et

corr.,

whereas the ms.

Vat.

lat. 3097

ff. 103ra-146rb

has

the

complete

text.

This

Prologue

and the

questions

1

and

3 can also

be

found

in

Vat. lat.

2185

ff.

50ra-50vb.

This text

certainly

annot

be considered

as

another

copy

of

Buridan'

s well

known

Questions

on

De

gen.

et

corr. Neither is it certainthat Nicole Oresme is theirauthor, as A.

Maier

seems to

believe.

There

are

indications

pointing

n

the

direction

of a redaction other

han

the one

known,

of Buridan'

s

Questions.

In

any

case

this

possibility

annot

be

ruled

out

by

the material

that

has

been

presented

here.

3.

The ms.

Cesena,

В. Malatestiana

S. VIII.

5 has at

one time

had

the same

owner

as

the

codices

Vat. lat.

2159,

2160,

2185

and

3066,

and the codices

Cesena,

В. Malatestiana

S. VII.

5

and

S. VIII.

2.

This

owner

was in

all

probability

Bernardus

a

Campanea

of

Verona,

a

physician.

35

Besides here

re wo

moremss.

n

Cesena,

В. Malatestiana

und ith imilar

n-

notations

y

the wner. ince

n

these

mss.

he ameworks

rereferred

o

s

in

the

already

mentioned

at.

mss.,

ne

could

afely

ssume hat

we are

dealing

ith

he

same

wner

ere.Grabmann

1928),

105-106

as

drawn

he

ttentiono

these

mss.

(S.VII.5

and

S.VIII.

2).

36

Perhaps

his lso

explains

hy

he wner

as

added o the itle

'Questiones

e

generacione

t

corruptione

ristotilis

artim

ecundum ridanum"

he

following

remark

n Vat. at.

2185;

scilicet

uper

ecundo

ibro t

n

fine

rimi

ibri unt ue

questiones

ecundum

psum

ridanum".

cf.

Maier

1961),

97).

The owner

imself

hasprobablyeen he imilarityetweenhe nonymousookI inVat. at.2185 nd

the ame

Book n

B. Malatestiana

.

VIII.

5,

which as

also

ms.

n

his

possession,

andwhich as ttributed

o Buridan

here.

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APPENDIX

List f

uestions

f

he

ommentary

nDe

gen.

t orr. ttributedoNicole

resme,

accordingothems.Firenze, . Naz.Conv.Sop.H.IX 1628.

Book

.

1.

Utrum

ossit

videnter concludi

(?)

aliquam

enerationem

sse.

2. Utrum

eneratio

it lteratio.

3.

Utrumi

generatio

rit

npossibilis,

lteratio

rit

npossibilis.

4.

Utrum

ormelementorum

uscipiunt

agis

t

minus,

ive ntendantur

t

remit-

tantur.

5. Utrum ormelementorum

aneantn

mixto,

t icet sta

uestio

it

upra

extum

sequentem,

amen

olo

psam

eterminare

ropteruestionem

equentem.

6. Utrum mnis

eneratio

nius

it

orruptio

lteriust econverso.

7.

Utrum

n

generatione

implici

it

resolutio

d

materiam

rimam.

8.

Utrum

liqua ualitas

maneat

adem

n

generato

uam

prius

uit

n

corrupto.

9. Utrumato liquogenerabili,osset quolibetluriumgentiumenerari.

10.

Utrum ato

liquo

enerabili,

llud

ossit

n

plurium

nstantium

uolibetenerari.

11.

Utrum

n omni lterationeiat

eactio.

12.

Utrum

ugmentatio

it

generatio.

13. Utrum

ugmentum

aneat

dem

n

principio

ugmentationis

aturalis

t

n

fine

ipsius,

t similitere

diminutione.

14.

Utrum

uelibet ars

ucti it ucta.

15.

Utrum

ugmentatio

iat ecundum

artes

ormales

t non ecundum ateriales.

16.

Utrum

ugmentatio

itmotus

ontinuus.

17.

Utrum mnis

ctio

t

passio

iant

er

ontactum,

ta

quod

agens

emper

an

at

passum.

18. Utrumimile

ossitgere

n sibi

imile

utetiam

ati

simili,

ut tiam

emperfiat dissimili.

19. Utrum

mixtio

it

possibilis.

20. Utrum

ndivisibile

ossit

lterari.

21. Utrum

mnismixtio

it

naturalis.

Book

I

(f.45r.)

1.

Utrumantum

int

uattuor

ualitatesrime,

cilicet

aliditas,

ri

idi

as,

iccitast

humiditas.

2. Utrum

uattuorualitatumrimarum

ue unt

ctive,

cilicet

alidumt

frigidum,

et

due

passive,

cilicet

iccum

t

humidum,

tmore ristotelisontractum

onitur

ro

abstracto.

3. Utrumint

uattuor

lementa

tnon

lura.

ropter

avillationes

ntelligendum

st

in

specie

tnon

n

numero,

cilicet

ic:

utrumint

uattuorpecies

ignificantes

m-

nia

elementa,

uia quantum

d numerumon stdeterminatum.

4.

Utrum

aliditas

gnis

t

caliditas

eris

int

iusdem ationist eodemmodode

humiditate

que

t eris t imilitere

frigiditate

que

et

frigiditate

erret um oc e

siccitate

gnis

t

terre,

uia

eadem stdifficultas.

5.

Utrum

uodlibet

lementorumabeat namde

primis ualitatibus

agis

rin-

cipaliteruam

liam t o modo

uo ponit

ristoteles,

cilicet

uod

errast

magis

ic-

ca

quam

frigida

t

aqua

primo

rigida

t aer

primo

umidust

gnis

rimo

alidus.

6.

Utrum

it

liquod urum

implex

lementům.

7.

Utrum

mnia lementaint d invicem

ransmutabilia,

ta

uod

uodlibet

ossit

n

quodlibetransmutari.

8.

Utrum

lementaabentia

ymbolům

acilius

t

citius ransmutentur.

9.

Utrum

x

duobus lementis

ossit

ertium

enerari.

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10.

Utrum

ielementassent

nfinita,

nfinitessentontrarietates

t tiam

n

uolibet

elemento

ssent

nfinite

ualitates.

11.

Utrum

uodlibet

mixtumirca

medium

ocum it

compositum

x

omnibus

simplicibus.

12.

Utrum

ualitates

rime

int

rincipia

ctivan

generatione

ixtix elementis.

13.

Utrum

ossit

sse

aliquod

mixtum

emperatum

x

elementis,

el

qualitatibus

eorum.

14.

Utrum

eneratio

it

perpetua.

15.

Utrum

uodlibet

orruptibile

abeat

eterminatam

eriodum

ue

durationis.

explicitf.

7vb)'...

t ic

st inisecundi

ibri

e

generatione

t

corruptione

eo

gratias

amen. damine mni

acto

er

ivitatem.

colophon

Explicit

iber

e

generatione

t

corruptioneicolaj

rem.

Nijmegen

Philosophischnstituut . U.

List

of

citedworks.

Federici

escovini,

.

(1960),

u alcuni

anoscritti

i Buridanoin: Rivista ritica

i

Storia

ella

Filosofia,

5,

413-427.

,

(1976),

¿4

ropos

e a

diffusion

es euvres

e

Jean

uridan

n talie u

XI

Ve iècle

u

XVIe iècle

in:

The

ogic f ohn

uridan

ed.

J. Pinborg,

1-47.

openhagen.

,

(1979),

Astrologia

scienzia.

irenze.

,

(1983),

Arti"

filosofia

el

ecolo

IV. Firenze.

Grabmann, . (1928).MittelalterlicheateinischeristotelesübersetzungenndAristoteles-kommentaren

Handschriftenpanischer

ibliotheken.ünchen.

Korolec,

.

B.

(1977),

Kepertonum

ommentanorum

ean

evi

n

Aristotelem

atinorum

uae

in

Bibliotheca

lim niverstatis

ragensis

unctatni nihovna

SR

vocata

sservantur

Wroclaw.

Leonardi,

.

(ed)

1982),

Catalogo

i

manoscritti

ilosofici

elle iblioteche

taliane.oi.

4.

Firenze.

Lohr,

С.

H.

(1970),

Medievalatin

ristotle

ommentaries.uthors

acobus-oh. uff,

n:

Traditio, 6,

135-216.

,

(1972),

Medieval

atin ristotleommentaries.

ddendat

Corrigenda

in: Bulletin

e

S. .

E.M.

P.,

14,

116-126.

Maier,

A.

(1952),

Ander

Grenze

on

cholastik

nd

aturwissenschaft.

oma.

, (1955),Verscholleneristoteleskommentarees 4.Jahrhunderts,n: AutourAristote.

Receuil

'études

e

philosophie

nciennet médiévale

ffert

monseigneur

.

Mansion,

15-541. ouvain.

,

1961),

Codices

aticaniatini.

odices

118-2192

,

recensuit

. Maier.

n Biblio-

theca

aticana.

Markowski,

.

(1981),

Buridanica

uae

n codibus

anu

criptis

ibliothecarum

ona-

censiumsservantur.

roclaw.

Pattin,

.

(1978),

Repertorium

ommentariorum

edii evi

nAristotelematinorum

uae

n

bibliothecis

elgicis

sservantur.euven.

Thorndike,

.

(1953),

A

highlypecialized

edieval

ibrary,

n:

Scriptorum,

,

81-88.

82

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Vivarium

XIV,

1

(1986)

Books

Received

Sant

Agostino,

a

vera

eligione.

cura

i

A.

Lamacchia,raduzione,

ntroduzione,

n-

notazionei

Pasquale

orro,

driatica

Editrice,

Bari

1986,

03

p.

Christianity

nd

aganism

350-750.

he

Conversion

f

Western

urope.

dited

y

J.

N.

Hillgarth,evised dition, niversityf Pennsylvaniaress,Philadelphia

1986,

XVII &

213

p.

ISBN

0

8122

7993X &

0 8122 1213

4

(pbk)

William

hester

Jordan,

romervitudeo reedom.

anumissionn

he

énonais

n

he

Thirteenth

entury

University

f Pennsylvania

ress,

Philadelphia

986,

VIII

&

149

p.

ISBN 0

8122

8006

7

Manuscripts

f

the

ibner

ollectionn

the

ibner

ibrary

f

the

Historyf

Science

nd

Technology

f

theSmithsoniannstitutionibraries

Smithsoniannstitution

Libraries,

Washington,

.C.

1985,

XIII &

145

p.

ISBN 0

88135

025

7

Johnf

Holland,

our racts

f ogicSuppositions,

allacie

Obligationes,nsolubilia).

irst

Critical dition

romhe

Manuscripts

ith

n

Introduction

nd

ndices,

y

E.

P.

Bos,

ngenium

ublishers,

ijmegen

985,

XLVII

& 192

p.

ISBN

90 70419

11

4

ProclusThe latonicheology.nSixBooksVol. I: Books -III. Translatedromhe

Greek

y

Thomas

aylor.

With

Preface

y

R.

Baine

Harris,

elene

Books,

Kew

Gardens,

.Y.

1985

Repr.

r.

Taylor,

ondon

816,

SBN 0 9609866

9

(pb;)

TheRuodlieb.

dited

with ranslation

nd notes

by

C.

W.

Grocock,

olchazy-

CarducciPublishers

Aris

&

Phillips,

Chicago/Warminster

985,

35

p.

John

Wyclif

ractatuseUniversalibus.

ext

dited

y

.

J.

Mueller,

larendon

ress,

Oxford

985

Repr.1986),

XCIII

&

403

p.

ISBN

0 19 824680

John

Wyclif

n

Universais

Tractatus

e

Universalibus).

ext ranslated

y

A.

Kenny,

with

n

ntroduction

y

P.

V.

Spade,

Clarendon

ress,

Oxford

985,

I

& 184

p.

ISBN 0

19

824681

Versus.Quaderniistudiemiotici38/39maggio-dicembre984). emioticaedievalea curadi U. Eco. - Contents: . Eco, R. Lambertini,. Marmo,A.

Tabarroni,

n

Animal

anguage

n he

Medieval

lassification

f igns

R.

Pellerey,

Tommaso

'Aquino

semioticaaturale

processo

noseologico

A.

Tabarroni,

egno

mentale

teoria

ella

appresentazione

n

OckhamR.

Lambertini,

'origine

la meta.

Percorsi

ell'interpretazioneontemporanea

eimodisti

C.

Marmo,

Guglielmo

i

Ockham

e

il

significato

elle

roposizioni

M.

Colmegna,

nunciazioniirca

l

modo. er

na

grammatica

ella

ogica

elle odalità

segnalazioni

recensioni;

nglish

ummaries

of

talian

Articles.

Mediaevalemantics

nd

Metaphysics.

tudies

edicated

o L. M. de

Rijk,

Ph.D.

on the

Occasion f

His

60th

irthday.

dited

y

E. P.

Bos,

ngeniumublishers

985,

XXIX

&

350

p.

ISBN

90 70419

10 6

-

Contents:

.

Jacobi,

iskussionenber

unpersönlicheussagennPeter baelardsommentaru Perihermeneias;. P.

Henry,

Abelard'

Mereological

erminology,

.

H.

Kneepkens,

Omnis

homo

resurgeť

: A Note n he

arly

estriction

heory

nd 2th

entury

rammar:

H. A.

83

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G.

Braakhuis,

ilwardby

ersusacon

The

ontribution

o

he

iscussion

n

Uniuocal

Signification

f eings

nd

Non-Beingsound

n

Sophism

ttributedoRobert

ilward-

by;

J.

Jolivet, ogique

atharela scission

e

l'universel

J.

A.

Aertsen,

er

wissenschaftstheoretischerter ottesbeweisender umma heologiaees homason

Aquin'

.

Vos,

On he

hilosophy

f

he

oung

uns

cotus.

omeemanticalnd

ogical

Aspects

A.

Maierù,

propos

e

a doctrine

e

a

supposition

t

héologie

rinitaire

uXlVe

siècle

N. Kretzmann

ndEleonore

tump,

he

nonymous

e arte

bligatoria

n

Merton

ollege

S

306 Ria vander

Lecq John

uridann

ntentionality'

. P.

Bos,

Peter

f

Mantua's reatise

e veritatet

falsitate,

iveDe

taliter

t

qualiter;

.

Nuchelmans,

tanislaus

f

naim

d. 1414)

on Truthnd

alsity.

84

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Vivarium

XIV,

2

(1986)

PeterAbelard,' Semantics

nd

His

Doctrine

of

Being*)

L. M. DE RIJ

1

PreliminarySignificatio

n

Abelard

Abelard starts

[GL

Per.

335,

32

ff.]

from a

rather broad

sense of

'

significative according

to

which

every

word

(

vox

=

'articulate

sound')

is

significative

f

the

presence

of a

speaker

('prolator').

Of

course, like his

contemporaries

what he is

really

nterestedn is those

words which

are

significative

f

something

which the

speaker

intends

to

express concerning

the domain

of

whatever

exists.

In

the

wake

of

Aristotle

De

int.

3,

16b20)

a word's

significative

unction

s said to

consist n

producing

an

idea in the

hearer's mind

which

bears on some

entity.

Gl.Pred.

136,29ff.;

Gl.Per.

339,20-340,6;

D

112,30ff.)

Signi-

ficative words were

commonly supposed

to have

acquired

their

significations hrough

what was

considered to be the historical

factof

ť

imposition' (impositio, nstitutio,nventici)

s

performed by

some

impositor

r

inventorominumome

time

in

the

past (such

as Adam

in

Paradise;

Gen.

2:

19-20).

The

concept

of

'institution'

hints at the

(Ancients'

and)

Medievais'

awareness

of

the

fact that some social

agreement

was

required

for there

to

be a

'universe

of discourse'

[Gl.Por.

19,15;

Gl.Pred

112,37ff.;

112,46].

*)

This

paper

s meant s

a continuation

f the eries On

Ancientnd

Mediaeval

SemanticsndMetaphysics'ublishednthis ournalrom 977-82. orbibliographical

reasons he

riginaleneral

itle asbeen

dropped

ndthe tudies

ill e continued

under

eparate

itles. ome

other

apers

n

the

ame

ubject

avebeen

published

elsewhere:

Die

Wirkung

er

neuplatonischen

emantik

uf

das

mittelalterliche

Denken

ber

as

Sein",

nMiscellanea

ediaevalia3

1981),

19-35;

"Boèce

ogicien

et

philosophe:

es

positions

émantiques

t a

métaphysique

e

'être",

nAtti

i

Con-

gresso

nternazionale

i studi oezianiPavia ottobre

980),

Roma

1981,

141-56:

"Abailard's emantic iews n

the

Light

fLater

Developments",

n

Englishogic

and emanticsromhe

nd

of he welfth

entury

o

the ime f

William

fOckham

and

Burleigh.

cts f he th

uropean ymposium

n Mediaeval

ogic,

Nijmegen

1981,

-58:

"Semantics

n

Richard

illingham

nd

Johannes

enator",

n

English

Logic

n

taly

nthe 4th nd

5th enturies.

cts f

the

5th

European ymposium

n

Mediaeval ogic ndSemantics,apoli 982, 7-83; "Did Parmenideseject he

Sensible

World?",

n

Graceful

eason.

ssays

n

Ancient

nd Medieval

hilosophy

presented

o

Joseph

wensCSSR

... etc. oronto

983,

9-53.

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For

Abelard,

'significai

o'

has

two

different

spects.

Of

course,

tokens

are

used

to refer

o

'things',

i.e. all

kind of

entitieswhich are

(putatively)

nhabitantsof the

outside

world. As a

matterof

fact,

our

speech

is

mainly

focussed

upon

'real

things',

rather than

'figments'.

{Gl.

Per.

315,29-30).

However,

the

same

tokens are used to

convey

ideas

(or

entities

qua

conceived

of;

intellectus).

n

Gl.Pred.

112,29-113,

3

Abelard

is

most

explicit

about this distinction nd sets out to

make

it clear

that

the main aim

of

any imposition

or use)

of

significative

words is to

produce

some

notion. For their

emantic

function,

ccord-

ingly,

the 'intellectus'

conveyed

by

them is most vital.

Unlike some of his

contemporaries,

Abelard

wishes

to follow the

grammarians n also assigningsome signification o conjunctionsand

prepositions D.

119,30-120,

20;

cf. Gl.Per.

338,2

Iff.

to the

extent

that theirs

is

mainly

what was later labelled as a

syncategorematic

function;

that

is,

they

do

not have

a

meaning

of their

own, but,

together

with

categorematic

words,

contribute

to the

meaning

of

the

phrase

involved.

Sometimes

Abelard even seems

to

be aware of

their

operational

character

[Gl.

Per.

336,27ff.

D.

118,14-25].

Nonetheless,

the noun and the

verb are the

significative

words

par

excellence.

n

this

account,

Abelard

remindshis

readers

[D.

121,

28ff.]

of the factthat Aristotlediscussed onlynouns and verbs. Nouns and

verbs

are

indeed

per

e

significative,

.e.

meaningfulby

themselves,

o

the

extent that even

in

complete

isolation

as

single

exical

items,

one

could

say)

they

convey

some definite

onception

or idea.

This

is com-

mon

doctrine with the Medievais.

However,

the

contradistinction

between

nouns

and

verbs vs

prepositions, conjunctions

and

interjec-

tions is

differently

iewed

by

them. Some

people

are

of the

opinion,

Abelard

says,

that the atter

re also

meaningful

ven

quite

apart

from

any

context,

although

when

they

are taken as

lexical

items,

there s

somethinguncertain and vague about theirmeaning, butwhen con-

nected

with

properly

significative

words,

they

come to

have a

full-

fledged

meaning

as

parts

of the

meaningfulphrases

involved,

as

e.g.

the

preposition

de'

('out

of',

or

'about')

in

the

phrase

'de

hornině'

(Gl.

Per.

337,12ff.; ZU19,7ff.;

cf. Mews

[1985]: 4).

Abelard's

objection

to

this view is

especially

interesting

n

that

it

raises the

question

of

the

criteria for

distinguishing

nouns

and

verbs

from

prepositions,

conjunctions

etc.

He

points

out

that as for

nouns

and

verbs,

it

may

also be maintained that

they

do

not have

their

deter-

minatemeaninguntil some further eterminationhas been

given.

He

instances

[Gl.

Per.

338,

3ff.]

homo'

('man'),

and

'diligo'

('I

love')

as

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opposed

to

phrases

having

a richer

meaning

such

as

'homo albus'

('white man')

and

'diligo

Ricardum'

('I

love

Richard').

For

that

reason, he prefers o assign

them a

propersignification

f their

own,

which

they ctually

convey

only

when

they

re used

in

connection

with

nouns

and

verbs. Thus their

signification

ather s

'co-signification'.

However,

his ideas

about

co-signification

f

syncategorematic

words

still

were rather

vague,

due

to his

seemingly

too

'thing-like'

concep-

tion of their semantic or

syntactic

function

s well as his

failure

in

recognizing

mere

operators

or

functors

cf.

Gl.Per.

338,21-339,

4).

The

phenomenon

of

co-signification

plays

an

important

role

in

Abelard's

thought,

for

that

matter.

So it

is at the basis of

the notion

oftemporalconnotationand of confusionof sememes' whichmay be

considered

the

key

notions of

his semantics

see

below,

pp.

88-9).

Since

nouns

and

verbs are the

principal conveyers

of

meaning

we

have to

start

with these

'parts

of

speech'

('partes

orationis').

2

Nomen

verbum,

ratio

The best

way

to elucidate Abelard's view on nouns and

verbs

is to

present

his

discussion

of the

criteria

for

distinguishing

etween them.

FollowingPriscian nst.grammII 18, p. 55, 8-9; XVII 14, p. 116, 26-

7 et

l.),

grammarians

used to

distinguish

he

different

arts

of

speech

according

to their diverse

meanings.

Along

these

lines,

the

verb

was

defined

as a

word which

is

mainly

(principalitersignificative

f

an

action

or a

'being-acted-upon'

(' passio

),

that s to

say

that

verbs

such

as

'sedere'

('to

be

seated')

and 'vivere'

('to

be

alive')

and even

the

so-

called 'substantive verb'

('esse';

'to

be')

are

said to

signify

n action

or a

being-acted-upon

[Gl.

Per.

346, Iff.;

D.

130,

6ff.].

This

mainly

grammatical

view

is

rejected

by

Abelard

in

spite

of its

adherents'

attempts o maintain tby assumingan equivocal use ofverbssuch as

'sedere',

of which

they

claim

that t sometimesmeans

the action

of

sit-

ting,

n its

verbal function

in

vi verbi

that

s,

and at other

times

stands

for the state of

being

seated and thus

acts,

in

fact,

as

a

noun

{in

vi

nominis)

ather han a verb. When

applied

to the substantiveverb

this

way

out

induces the adherentsto

make

'esse'

equivocal

as well

in

that,

as

a

verb,

it

may

equivocally

stand

for

all

kinds

of

actions

expressed

by

other

verbs

and,

as

a

noun,

for the existence

or 'being given')

of

any

thing

whatsoever

ncluding

all

kinds

of

accidental

beings (such

as

qualities

and

quantities).

Of

course,

such a

repeated refuge

nto the

domain of

equivocity

is

bound

to

provoke

Abelard's

disapproval.

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In

point

of fact Abelarďs solution sets about to

more

fully

mploy

the 'verbal

vs nominal' distinction ntroduced

by

his

opponents,

in

that he

applies

it

to the basic

level of sememes as well.

For

each and

every

sememe,

e.g.

the sememe common to 'white'

('albus,

um'),

'whiteness'

(albedo)

or 'be-

white'

('albere7),

you may

form a noun

(whether

substantival or

adjectival)

or

a

verb.

Therefore,

Abelard

argues,

the

criterion f exical

meaning

for

distinguishing

etween the

noun and the

verb

is

unsound.

And it is

at the

same time

against

authority,

Abelard

warns us

(Gl.

Per.

346,28-9),

since

it

is Aristotle

himself

who

put

forward

De

int.

2, 16al9; 3,

16b6-9)

the

proper

criterion

n

saying

that

nouns

and verbs

differ

n that the atter addi-

tionally ignifyime', and theformer o not,and explainingthe verb's

distinctive

by

the

words:

"a

verb

additionally signifies omething's

obtaining

ow.

To

begin

with

the basic featureswhich

the

noun and

verb

have in

common,

Abelard's

explicit

remark

(Gl.

Per.

346,25-8)

should be

recalled to the effect

hat

"just

as

some

nouns

signify

hings

n their

substantialness'

res

n essentia

;

see

below,

pp.

110-1),

while

others

ig-

nify

hem after

ome

adjacent

property,

o

verbs

do

as well."

All this

amounts

to

asserting

that the

noun

as well

as the

verb have the dual

functionof naming and determining cf. Kretzmann 494).

1

Indeed,

nouns

such

as

'lion'

or 'brave' both

name and determine

a

thing

n

that

using

such nouns the

'thing'

involved

is introduced into the

universe

of

discourse as

e.g.

a

'lion-thing'

or 'brave

thing'

or 'brave

lion-thing'.

Of

course,

the function f

determining

omes more

to

the

fore

in

the case of

adjectival

determiners uch as

'brave',

or 'red'.

Well,

Abelard

roughly

views

verbs

along

the

same

lines,

and he does

this

also

in

the

wake of Aristotle

De

int.

3,

16Ы9-20)

who

regarded

verbs

merely

as a

peculiar

kind of common names.

For

Abelard

also,

the naming-determiningunction s performedby a verb belongs to

its

principal signification2 cf.

Gl.Per.

357,1-3;

D.

123,15-22;

131,

26ff.).

Hereby

it

should

be

noticed,

however,

that the

main

function

of the verb is to determine

rather

than to

name. Our author

says

in

this

connection that

by

the

second

part

of his definition

De

int.

3,

16b7]

Aristotle ntends

to make clear that

verbs have

mainly

been

1

I

prefer

retzmann'sabel

determining'

othat f

descriptive'

hich have sed

elsewhere

so

De

Rijk 19861, assim).

2

A noun's rverb's rincipalignificationsthemeaningt hasby tselfs a con-

veyer

f sememe.

f

course,

emporalo-signification

s

part

f ts

meaning

hen

it

s

actually

sed

as

a finite

erb).

Cf.

Kretzmann

1986],

95,

п. 33.

88

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invented

for

predication',

whereas

nouns ratherhave

the function

f

stating

ubjects (Gl.

Per.

352,

4-6;

see

also

below).

To

be

sure,

every

noun

may

be

transformed

nto

a

verb

by simply adding

a

tense

indicator.

Abelard

extensively

discusses

the

'

consignificatioemporis ('co-

signification

f

time',

whether

present,

preterite

r

future

ime).

His

remark Gl.Per

348,

28ff.

359, 36;

D

138, llff;

see

below)

to the effect

that

in

cases

where no verb have been invented

in

order

to

convey

some

sememe

in

a

verbal

manner,

one

may

have recourse to

forging

a

stand-in

by

combining

a

noun

(substantival

or

adjectival

or a

nominal

participle)

with a

finite orm

of

to

be',

fits n with the same

line of thought.So there is no semanticdifference,Abelard argues,

between

'sedere'

and

'sedentem esse'

or

'sedisse'

and 'sedentem

fuisse';

indeed the

circumscriptions

ave the same

meaning

and

the

same

temporal

co-signification

s

the one-word verbs have. Abelard

is

glad enough

to

quote

Aristotle's

authority

gain,

where the latter

remarks

De

int.

12,21b9-10)

thatthere s no

difference

etween

saying

that

a

man

walks' and

saying

that a man is

walking'.

It should be

noted

already

that

for

Abelard' s

semantics of the

statement-making

utterance,

this

periphrastic

device

will

prove

to

be of

utmost

mpor-

tance (see below, 103).

Since

the

temporal

connotation

in

the

great commentary

on

Perihermeneias

Gl.Per.

36,

25ff.)

s said to be

the

main semantic distinc-

tive between the

noun and

the

verb,

it is the

more

interesting

o con-

sider the

two-sided

position

of

participles.

Abelard remarks

Gl.Per.

346,

32-4)

that

a

part

of

speech

such as

'amans'

('loving')

is either

a

noun

or a

participle

designating

one and

the

same action in

either

function. t is

only,

he

says,

the

temporal

connotationwhich allows us

to

set the two

functions

part

and

to

determine this word as either

a

noun or a verb.

However

important

he connotation

of

time

may

be

in

his

Dialéctica

not

only

as

a

distinctive

f the

verb

but

in its

own

right

s

well,

our

author most

significantly

oes

so

far

as

to

bluntly reject

Aristotle's

view that

verbs differ

romnouns

in

having

a

co-signification

f

time,

since

we

may assign

such

a

co-signification

o nouns

as

well. Indeed

nouns,

too could

be

considered

as

assigning

their

main

signification

o

the substrates

nvolved in accordance

with

the time

of the

utterance:

D. 122, 2-7: icut nimcurro' el currens'ursumirca ersonamamquam

ei

presentialiter

nherentem

emonstrat,

ta 'album'

circa

substantiam

albedinem

amquam

resentialiter

nherentem

eterminai;

on nim

lbum isi

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ex

presenti

lbedine

icitur. nde

t tantum

albi' nomen

icere idetur

uan-

tum

quod

presentialiter

lbedine

st

nformatum',

icut

t

currens'

n

quodam

presentialiter

ursum

articipai.

Forust s run'or running'esignateunningnconnectionith persons

presently

nhering

n

him,

ust

so 'white'

etermines

hiteness

n

connection

with substances

presentlynhering;

ndeed,

t s

called

white

thing

'3

only

ecause f

he

resent

hiteness.

ence

hename white

thing

'

seems

tomean

ust

s

much s thatwhich

s

presently

nformed

y

whiteness',

ust

s

'running'

n

somebody

resentlyartakes

n

running'.

Similarly

substantive

nouns have

present

time

connotation:

D.

122,

29-31:Sicut

nim curriť antum

uantum

est currens'

icit,

ta

'homo' antundem

uantum

<quod

est>

animal ationale

ortale'.4

Forust s runs'means he ame s isrunning',o man' stantamounto that

which

s,

n the

present

ime,

mortal

nimal ndowed ith

eason'.

Some

lines further n our

author

again

indicates

the

present

time

co-signification

of

both substantival

and substantivated

adjectival

nouns:

D.

123,

11-5:

Sicut

enim album'ex

presenti

lbedine atum

st,

ta etiam

'homo'

ex

presenti

ubstantianimalis ationalis

ortalis;

t

quem

hominem

dicis,

am animal ationale

mortale

psum

stendis;

t tantundem

hominis'

vocabulum onat

quantum

quod'

[quidem

MS]

presentialiter

st

animal

rationale

ortale".

Just

s

album'

'the

white

hing')

s

assigned

o

omething

ecause

f ome

res-

ent

whiteness,

o

'homo'

'man')

too s

assigned

o

something

ecause

fthe

material

resence

f a mortal

nimal

ndowed

ith

eason.

And ndeed he

linguistic

ool

man'

s

equivalent

o

the

hrase

that

which,

n

the

resent

ime,

is

a mortalnimal

ndowed

ith eason'.

For

the

present

time

connotation,

see

also

D.

116,

25-6

and

137,

3-6.

So it

may

be

said,

in

Abelard'

s

view,

that f t

s a substantival

noun

a name

determines

thing

s

subsisting

r

(if

it

is an

adjectival

noun)

as inhering n somethingelse at some ime r other'aliquando').5

3

Unlike atin

and

Greek) nglish

diom

equires

hatGuthrie

alls tiresome

makeweights'Historyf

Greek

hilosophy

404,

n.

1),

uch s

things',

entities',

fac-

tors' nd so

on

whereGreek nd

Latin

and

Dutch

nd

German)

ave

only

he

equivalents

f the

white'

to

eukon,

album

).

See

also De

Rijk

1986],

4.1,

n. 13.

4

Tweedale

1976: 88]

s

right

n

thinking

hat he ext s handed

own eeds

men-

dation,

ut

his

uppletion

f

only

heverb

est'

is

idiomaticallyrong.

f. alsoD.

123,

14-5

uoted

n thenext ote.

5

For

the

general

uestion

f whether

belard's otion f

essentia'

'material

presence')ncludesctual xistencenthe utside orld,eeDe Rijk 1981b],9-32.

For

he onnected

roblem

f

Actuality'

s

Facticity',

eeDe

Rijk 1981a]

8-30

nd

[1981b],

8-40.

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Jacobi

is

right

n

pointing

out

[1986:

1

53f.

]

that

a noun such as

'album' does

not

mean 'white' in

the

sense of a

dictionary entry

('albus'). Its neutrum lreadyhintsat itsbeing used in some context.

So

it rather means

'something

white'

or

'a

(the)

white

<thing>'.6

The same

goes

for

a

noun

such as 'homo'

which,

when it

is

actually

used,

is,

by

the same

token,

actually

attributed o

somebody

existent

or

supposed

to be

existent,

speaking

more

precisely).

Therefore,

for

Abelard,

a

noun

also

has

temporal

connotation,

so to

speak,

within

ts

semantic

value,

which

comes to be an actual

denotation

of

temporality

whenever

the

word

is

actually

used in

some context.

There is

an

interesting

ontroversy

between

modern

scholars on

what exactly is meant by the noun's temporal co-signification.

Tweedale

(1982:

146)

is of the

opinion

that

the noun used

in

predicate

position

"has in

isolation

my

italics)

a

tense of its

own

(generally

the

present)

and

this can

conflictwith

the tense

of

the

copula".

He

refers

to

the

well-known

example

'this

old

man

was

a

boy'

('

hic

senex

uit

puer')

which will

be

necessarily

false

if we

treat

boy'

as

retaining

ts

signification

f

present

ime,

for

hen

the sentence s

equivalent

to

this

old man was one

of

those

who

are

presently oys'

(¿fuit

nusde haben-

tibus

presentialiter

ueritiam3).1

he

remedy

consists,

Abelard

says,

in

treating he copula plus predicatenoun as one singleconstruct 'una

dictio')

having

the

tense of

the

copula,8

to the

extent

that the

original

proposition

s to be

understood

as: 'this old man

is one

of those who

were

boys'.

Jacobi objects

(1986:

164,

n.

44)

to

the above

view that our

textual

evidence

does not

allow

us to

understand

Abelard

"as

associating

a

tense

with

the

isolated

noun

my

italics)

generally

the

present"

and

argues

that to

assume

that in

such

cases

as

meant

by

Tweedale

the

noun must

change

its

meaning

when

it comes after

copula

in the

past

or future ense would be in conflictwith thewordingofthe

passages

involved.

Nor

is it

clear,

Jacobi

goes

on,

how a

noun

in

isolation

is

to

convey

a

time

co-signification

n

top

of its main

meaning.

Finally

he

refers o

Gl.Per.

349,

31-3

where he

thinks

hat

"Abelard

speaks

out

against

the

very theory

which

Tweedale

attributes o

him". He

also

adduces

Gl.Per.

349,33-350,

5.

As a

matter of

fact,

at

349,22-36

we

read:

6

For

this

makeweight',

ee

above,p. 90,

n. 3.

7 See Tweedale 1982],146; cf. also PeterAbelard,Gl. er.348,28-349,17;.

138,5-140,22.

8

See

Gl.

er.

48,28ff.

esp.

349,19-350,39);

.

139,12-140,22

nd

249,11-35.

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Quippe

<sicut

homo'>

[Geyer

nly

upplies sicut>'

tantum omen st

vivorumt

cadaver'

mortuorum,

t

4puer'

orum

ui

in

praesenti

ueritiam

habent,

icet

empus

onnotet.

uodsi

uis

dicat

homo'

nomen sse

hominum

aequaliteram raesentiumuamfuturorumuampraeteritorum,amprofecto'mortuum't homo'

pposita

on unt icut itAristoteles.t sicut ere icitur

'<hoc>

cadaver

uit

omo',

t

ita

etiam

ere

potest

ici

hoc cadaver st

homo';

ui

cum

psum

adaver

it,

tiam

num st orum

uae

ab

'hornině'

nominantur;

tverum

st adaver sse d

quod

stvelfuit

el

rit

omo.

i

quis

autem dicat

'homo'

per

adiunctionem

fuit'

transiré

n

significationem

preteritorumuia

verbum diunctum

empus raeteritum

ignificai,

on

videtur

atio,

uia

cum

dico

homo

mbulaviť t ambulans mbulaviť

el

'amans st

vel

eriťvel

fuit')

maturus'

vel

amatus'),

on stnecesse

ropter

tempora

erborum

ppositorumignificationem

liorumommutari.

It s

quite

nderstandableince

just

as

'man'>

is

only

name

tanding

or

living eingsnd corpse' or eadones, nthe ameway boy'too < standsfor> thosewho n the

resent

imeave

boyhood,

lthough

tdoesnot ndicate

time.

or f

omebody

ays

hat

man' s

a

noun

tanding

qually

or

resent

nd

past

ndfuture

en,

well hen e

must

ccept9

he

isappearance

f

he

pposi-

tion etween

dead'

and

man',

which

ristotlelaims

here

o

be, And,

<on

that

upposition

,

as

truly

s

it s said

< this

corpse

as

man',

tcan

lso

be

truly

aid this

orpse

s

a

man';

since

e

s that

ery

orpse,

t

s

alsooneof

those

hings

hich

re

nominated

y

man',

and

it

is true < still

n

that

supposition

that

corpse

s

thatwhich

s,

or

was,

rwill

e,

a man.

However,

if

omebody

ays

hat

man',

through

he ddition

f

was',

is transferredo

signifying

ast

human

eings

n

consequence

f

thefact

hat he

verb

dded

signifies

he

ast

ime,

hereeems o

be

no

reason

for

that>

forwhen

say

'a manwalked' nd a walkingman> walked' r a lovers or willbe' or

'was')

going

o

ove'

or

onewhohasbeen

oved'),

t s

not

ompulsory

hat he

signification

f

the ther

erms

e

changed

ecause

fthe

enses

dded.

Matters seem

to be rather

omplicated,

indeed.

In

erroneously

ak-

ing

the MS

reading

rõ

(

=

ratio)

for recto

Geyer

gives

the

conjecture

rectum

presumably

not

knowing

what

to do with

the

reading

rõ which

he

does mention

n

his

apparatus

riticus)

cobi

failedto

grasp

the

point

of

Abelard'

s

argument.

In

fact,

in

this

passage

our

author does

not

reject

the view

that

an

isolated noun has

temporal

co-signification,

e

onlyrebukes the assumptionthatwhen a noun takes over a preterite

co-

ignification

rom he

past

tense fuiť it

is

ust

because verb of the

preterite

ense s

added,

since,

on that

ssumption

we

are

bound

to have

difficulties

with

expressions

as

'homo

ambulaviť,

(ťa

man

walked')

where we find

nothing

of the

sort.

Well,

that

s

why

Abelard

proposes

an alternative

olution,

i.e. to take the

copula plus

the

predicated

oun

as

one

single

dictio.

Besides,

I

have the

impression

that

by

'the noun in isolation'

Tweedale does not

mean the noun

merely

as a

dictionaryentry,

but

9

For

this

endering

f am

rojecto,

ee De

Rijk 1985b],

.2.

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rather,

the

noun

actually

used

in a

sentence

but

momentarily

aken

apart

from

hat

specific

entential

ontext.10

inally

there s a context

in which Abelard really

makes the

impression

of

assuming

that

because of

its

proper

invention a noun has

present

time co-

signification.

So

in

his discussion with

his

Master

(William

of

Champeaux?)

he deals

with

phrases

such

as

'homo mortuus'

('dead

man')

by

arguing

on the

(clearly

accepted)

assumption

that 'man'

may

retain its

proper

invention because of its

signifying

n

actually

existent

human

being.11

The conclusion

may

be drawn

now

that

Abelard

is

really

of the

opinion

that

when

actually

used in some

speech

context a noun

is

prone to retain the present time co-significationdue to its 'proper

invention'.

However,

one should bear

in

mind that

by 'present

time'

the

time

is meant

in

which the utterance is made. That is

precisely

why taking

a

noun

'in

isolation'

does not

amount

to

viewing

t

merely

as

a lexical

entry.

Returning

now to

our

author's search for a

proper

criterion for

distinguishing

etween the noun and

verb,

we

have to

notice,

first,

that Abelard looks for the distinctive

feature

of the verb

in

quite

anotherdirection.

Again,

he refers o

Aristotle,

who

in

defining

t

(De

int.3, 16b6-7) had notonlypaid attention o the verb's temporalcon-

notation.

ndeed,

he

says:

"A

verb is what

additionally

s

significative

of time

[..]

land

t s a

signofthings

s

12

said

of

omething

lse'

where

the

latter

is

explained

in

terms

of

'additionally

signifying

omething

as

obtaining

ow It

is

true,

n

Gl.Per.

this function eceived

quite

a lot

of

attention

but

it

is still

abelled a verb's 'additional

property'

'sup-

posita

proprietas';

Gl.Per.

357,17)

which comes

on

top

of its

proper

distinctive,

viz.

its

temporal

connotation.

In the Dialéctica

however,

10

One

might

e reminded

f he seof he

hrase

erminus

er

e

umptus

n

upposition

theories,

here

t

imilarly

eans

propositional

erm aken

y

tself or

moment

ratherhan

ust

lexicaltem. ee

De

Rijk

1971],

3-80

nd

1985a],

85-8.

orthat

matter,

hemodern otion f noun s a lexical

ntry'

s

not

uite

he ame

s the

Ancientnd Medieval

otion f noun akenn ts

proper

nvention'.ee also

what

will

ater

e remarkedbout

present

ime'

s 'the time f the

utterance';

elow

pp.

97-8.

11

D.

116,25-6:

i vero homo'

propriam

nventionem

ervet

x

presentia

nimalis

rationalis

ortalis,

rit

uidem

ppositio"However,

f

man' retainsts

proper

inventionecause

fthe ctual

resence

f mortalnimal

ndowed

ith

eason,

there

ill

urely

e an

opposition";

iz. that

etween

man' and

corpse').

12 nmy pinion,s so oftennGreekandLatin) heparticipleonstructions to

be

understood

n

dominant

se,

othe xtenthat n this ase t

means,

ot

ust

things

which re

said'

but

rather

things

s

being

aid'.

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a verb's

predicative

or

copulative

function is the real focus of

Abelard' s

attention.

Our

author is most

explicit

on

this

score. The

predicative-copulative

function s said to

be an essential

part

of the

concept

of the

verb

('

ad verborum

omprehensionerrí

D.

129,24-6).

3

On

the

redicative-copulative

unction

f

theverb

What

exactly

s to

be understood

by

the

predicative-copulative

unc-

tion

of the verb? It

may

be

stated,

at the

outset,

that

copulative'

or

'connecting

a

predicate

to a

subject'

is,

as

such,

a

syntactic

tool,

whereas

'predication'

or

'assigning

some

(essential

or

accidental)

property oa substrate' s, as such, of a semanticnature,sincea noun

when

predicated

still

performs

ts function

f

determining.

When con-

sidering

a

verb

actually predicated

it

may

be

said

that

for one

thing

it

performs

he

assignment

of

its sememe to some

subject

and more-

over,

it

literally

couples'

a

predicate

noun

with

another noun

put

in

subject position.

As

may

be

expected,

at this

point,

the

syntactic

evel

is not

clearly

set

apart

from

the semantic

one

by

Abelard

but,

nonetheless,

he seems to

have had

some idea about their

diversity.

E.g.

at

GLPred.

124,32-3,

he

says

that when

we assert whiteness s

an

accident' ('albedo est accidens') we are not assigning ('attribuere')

something

o

whiteness,

but rather

oupling

'copulare')

it with

sub-

ject.

Of

course,

it is Abelard' s

view

of

universais

that

prevents

him,

in

such

cases,

from

ssuming

that we are

dealing

with

real

attribution

('predication'

in the semantic

sense,

we

might say).

In L.N. P.

534,

17-21

a

division

of

predicari'

is

made from

the same

point

of

view:

"To

be

predicated

is said

in a

twofold

manner,

viz

meaning

either

'being conjoined'

.... or

'being

truly

onjoined'

('coniungi

veraciter').

And in

the latter ense

the

term enters

the definition f universal'

as

a result of which 'chimaera' and other nouns of that sort are

excluded". In

Abelard'

s

discussion

about the

copulative

verb

'is'

('est')

it is

precisely

the

chimaera and its

imaginary

companions

that

prove

to be the

main

spoil-sports

n

the

numerous efforts o

gain

a

clear

insight

nto the nature

of

the

propositional

is': see

below,

p.

120.

However this

may

be,

the

predicative

function

ssigned

to

every

verb

in Aristotle's

definition s

explained

by

Abelard

as the

ob

of

coupling predicate

with a

subject

('officium

copulandi

predicatum

subiecto';

D.

129,23).

In

the

Dialectica)

the

predicative-copulative

function s no longer taken as merelya featureof the verb, as is the

case in

Gl.

Per. but rather

s the riterion

for

singling

out verbs

from

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other

significative

words,

particularly

nouns.

So Abelard

explicitly

states

D

.

129,

25-6)

that

although

"a

verb can be

pronounced

ust

by

itself,

without

oupling anything,

till

t

s

always copulative

as

regards

its

invention"

(or

'original

imposition').

At the same

time,

the

tem-

poral

connotationhas been

given

a

second

rank in

so

far

as that

con-

notation s

conveyed by

a

verb is

ust

a concomitantof

the

special

way

in

which it

designates

the inherence of some

property

n a

subject,

a

way

indeed that

should

be

distinguished

rom

he

way

in

which

a

noun

signifies,

not

a

thing's

inherence

in

another

one,

but

rather

some

4

thing'

as

inhering

n

something

else

[Z). 123,15-25].

The

predicative-copulative

functionhas

still another

aspect

most

importantto Abelard. What distinguishesverbs fromotherwords,

nouns

in

particular,

is most

significantly

hat

they

effect he com-

pleteness

of sense

('sensus

perfectio')

which s the

haracteristic f full-

fledged

sentences

'orationes

perfectae')

as

contradistinguished

rom

incompletephrases

'

orationes

imperfectae').

n

order to

get

this func-

tion

which

may

be

termed he verb's

function

s a

'statement-maker')

in

the

right

perspective

we

have

to

begin

with

considering

perfect'

and

'imperfect

ense'.

The theme of

perfect

ense'

and

its

natural

counterpart

imperfect

sense' as applied to thoughts nd their xpressions plays an important

role in the

doctrine of the

statement-making

tterance. It

may

be

traced back13 o Plato's

Sophist

262c

where

it

is

said that mere

strings

of

onomata

nouns)

or rhêmata

attributive xpressions

ncluding verbs)

do not

yet

make

up

a

logos

('statement-making

utterance).14

Some

relatively

omplete

and

self-contained

peech

unit s

required

for here

to

be a

statement,

n

expression,

that

is,

which

'tells

something'

or

'makes a

point'

instead of

ust 'naming'

or

'determining' things

and

only

bringing

them

up

for

discussion.

(See

De

Rijk,

[1986], 309ff.).

At D. 148,19ff.Abelard divides the 'orationes' into perfectand

imperfect

nes.

By

the

former e

understandswhat Priscian calls 'con-

structiones'

nst.gramm

II, 108,16ff.

nd

XVII,

cap.

3],

which

are

defined as

speech

units

orderly composed

and

conveying

a

'perfect'

('complete')

sense,

e.g.

'a man

runs'

('homo curriť).

Imperfect

ora-

tiones' are

those,

Abelard

says,

which in

spite

of a

'competens

13

See

Nuchelmans

19731,

5-7

nd his ndex

f

Topics

.v.

Completeness.

14Forthatmatter,nPlato logos snot f hewell-knownS is P' form. ee for

an

all-over

nterpretation

f the

whole

assage

bout

ogos

261C-264B),

e

Rijk

[1986],

3.13

nd

15.2-15.4.

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dispositio'

('suitable

disposition')

of

its

parts yet

still

convey

an

incomplete

sense,

e.g.

'running

man'

('homo

currens').

The suitable

disposition

s

interesting

n

as

far

as it is

mentioned

as

early

as in

Plato's

Sophist

s the

basic

requirement

for here o be a

logos

(such

as our

'running

man' or

'white

man').

However,

such a suitable

disposition

is

a

necessary

condition but not

a

sufficient

ne in

order

to

have a real assertionor statement.When

hearing

an

oratio

mperfecta

the hearer's mind is not

yet 'acquiesced'

and waits for some more

information,

n

order to obtain

a

complete

sense

(or

real

assertion).15

Now

without he

verb,

Abelard

says,

no

'perfectio

ensus' is

possible.

Speaking

about the

phrase 'running

man'

('homo

currens')

Abelard

remarks that it does not convey a real assertion. He explains:

D.

148,

4-30:

Competens

nim

st

ubstantivitadiectivi

onstructio,

um d

eundem

asum,

d idem

enus

t

eundem

umerum

opulantur,

ed

nondum

in eis

completa

st sensus

erfectio.

dhuc nim

premissa

ratione

rolata

suspensus

udientisnimus

liquid mplius

udire

esideratt d

perfectionem

sensus

erveniat,

eluti esť

aut

aliquod

liud

ompetens

erbum.

reter

er-

bum

namque

ulla st

ensus

erfectio.

Indeed,

here

s a

suitableonstruction

f

substantival

nd n

adjectival

oun,

when the

two

partsmaking

t

up>

are

coupled

n

the

ame

ase,

he ame

genre

nd the ame

number,

ut

<then>

a

completeness

f

ense as not

yet

been

brought

bout

n

them. orwhen

he foresaid

hrase

as been

uttered,

the earer'smind ssuspendednd till esiresohear omethingore norder

to rrivet a

completeness

f

ense,

uch

s <the verb> 4s' or

nother

uitable

verb.

Forwithout verb heres no

completeness

f ense.

Making

an

expression

an

oratio

erfecta

mounts

to

pronouncing

something's

nherence

n

something

lse,

and

that,

Abelard

says,

is the

special

function f

verbs.

This

'pronouncing'

is characterizedas

pro-

ducing

a

complete

thought by

way

of

the

connection of

A

with

В

('perfectum

...

secundum

copulationem

alterius ad alterum

generai

intellectum;

D.

149,2-3).

However,

the

connection'

meant here

is of

a

special

nature, and not

ust

a connectionof two

concepts

n a har-

monious

way,

which,

as was

objected

against

Abelard

by

his

opponents,

certainly

oes

produce

some idea in

the hearer's

mind

and

also

supplies

information,

o a certain extent at

least.

For

instance,

when

one

uses the

expression

the white

man',

('homo

albus')

apply-

ing

to,

say,

Mr.

Johnson,

obviously

the

hearer is

supplied

with some

15

As

a

linguistic

nit lato's

ogos

oesnot

yet onveyperfect

ense'

since

t

may

be used nthe o-callednomazeinevel).n order hereobea realstatement''asser-

tion')

he

ogos

eeds

obe

expressed

n the

egein

evel. ee Nuchelmans

1973],

4-

5,

and

De

Rijk 1986],

94ff.

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information. ndeed

some idea

(man

plus

whiteness)

s

conveyed

and,

besides,

the inherence

of

whiteness n the man

is

expressed.

So

much

for

Abelard's

(supposed) opponents .

D

.

149,6-11). However,

Abelard

strongly

rejects

this

view of

'copulation'.

If

there is to be

a

perfect

oratio he

replies,

t s not

enough

thatwhiteness

s

determined s

adja-

cent to

man,

we

may

have also to

say

t inheres n him.

Well,

this

can

only

be

performed

by

a verb.

Unlike

a

participle

a verb not

only

signifies

n action or

a

being- cted-upon,

inhering

n

something,

t also

tells

s

that t

actually

nheres

n

it. That

is

why

this

way

of

expressing

is

called

the 'indicative

mood' Thus

the verb as

expressing

an

actual

assertion

s the main

constituent f a

'complete

sentence'. Abelard

even

goes so far as to include the othermodiof the verb (imperative and

optative)

as

expressing

mental states

other than

the

intention

of as-

serting

omething

of

something

else. He

says:

D.

149,20-7:

erfectio

taque

ensusmaxime

endere

inoscitur

n

verbis,

quibus

solis

alicuius d

aliquid

nherentiaecundum

arios ffectusnimi

demonstratur;

reter uam quidem

nherentiam

rationis

erfectio

on

sub-

sistit. um

enim ico: veni d me' vel utinam eniresd

me',

quodammodo

inherentiameniendid

me

propono

ecundumussummeum

el desiderium

meum,

n eo scilicet

uod

ubeo

lli

ut

venire i

cohereat,

el

desidero,

dest

t

ipse

veniat.

nde t

sepe

n

consequentiis

erba

ptativi

odi

im

nuntiativi

tenent.

So

it s

recognized

hat

he

ompleteness

f ense

mainly epends

n

verbs,

y

which lone nherence

f

omething

n

something

lse s

designated

n

accord-

ance

with

ifferent

ental

tates;

ithouthis

nherence,

hen,

o

completeness

of ense omes nto

xistence.orwhen

say:

come o me ' or if

you

would

come

o

me ',

n a

way pronounce

he nherence

f

coming

o me' in the

frameworkf

my

rder

r

my

desire,

amely

n

so far s

I

order hat

coming'

should

nheren

him,

r

that,

espectively,

have

desire,

iz.

that e

come.

That s

why

n

nferences,

erbs f he

ptative

ode ften

ct as verbs

f

he

indicative

ode.

It

should

be noticed thatAbelard

presumably speaks

about the verb

on two differentevels. When contrasting t with the noun, his main

concern

seems to be the level of

naming' (or

onomazein

evel),16

rather

than

the

verb's

function

f

pronouncing something.

So in

D.

123,

15-

25

it

was

argued (see

above,

p.

95)

that the noun as well as the verb

signifies

some

(substantial

or

accidental)

forms as

presentlynhering

although

the

former'smode

of

signifying

iffers rom hat of the atter

in

that the

verb

signifies

hat

inherence

as

such,

not

only

some form

as

inhering.

owever,

it is

patently

clear that

in

contrasting

he

noun

and the

verb

in

this

way,

Abelard must

have

been

thinking

f the

noun

16

Forthis

istinction,

ee Nuchelmans

1973],

oc. it.

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and

verb in their

merely

semantic

function

f

naming

and

determin-

ing.

On

the other

hand,

in his discussion

of the oratio

erfecta,

t is

precisely

the verb's

special capability

of

accomplishing

statement-

making

utterances

that

is in the focus of Abelard's attention. We

should

be mindful

f

him

frequently eferring

o the

verb as a tool for

pronouncing

omething.

This assertive

force of the verb

is

expressly

brought

forward

n

opposing

'

determining

he inherenceof whiteness n

man'

to

explicitly

elling

hat it

actually

inheres in

him

(see

D.

149,

12-3).

It

may

be

gathered

from all our

evidence

that,

in a final

analysis,

Abelard finds

he

proper

distinction

etween the noun

and verb on

the

'level ofpronouncing' (/égrái-level),o such an extent, ndeed, thatthe

latter

oncerns,

not the utterance

omposed

of

the noun

plus

finite

erb

as such

but the

statement-making

tterance as

actually

ronounced

17

So the

most

appropriate

distinction etween the

noun and

verb has

everything

o do

with Abelard'

s view of sentencehood.

4

The Noun and

Verb

n Abelard.

A

Survey

Before

embarking

on

a discussion

of Abelard'

s

views on

sentential

predication

and the

role of

the

copula,

it

seems

useful to

summarize

our

author's

basic views on

the noun

and

verb.

(1)

'Nomen'

(noun,

name)

is

defined

in

the Aristotelian-Boethian

tradition)

as

'a

spoken

sound

having

a

signification

y

convention,

without

the

notion

of

time,

of which

no

parts

are

meaningful

in

separation'

(.

D

.

121,28-9;

cf.

129,4-5

and GL

Per.

334,18ff.).

It should

be borne

in mind

that ike

the Ancients

the Medievais

too,

were in the

constant

habit of

not

sharply distinguishing

between

a

noun's

(or

verb's or any other significativeexpression's) significateand the

'thing' (whether

substantial

or

accidental)

signified

n

the

outside

world.18

(2)

Verbum

('verb')

is defined

Z).

129,11-3)

as:

'a

spoken

sound,

having

a

signification

by

convention,

which,

in

its finite

forms,

s

17

Cf.

De

Rijk

1986],

93ff.,

heret s

argued

hat

or

lato,

he ifference

etween

logos

nd

ogos

irêmenos

s most ital.

18

For this

phenomenon,

ee

e.g.

De

Rijk [1986],

ndexs.v.

Name. For

Peter

Abelard,eee.g.Gl.Pred.26,35-127,13;. 564,6-9nd llthe assagesnwhich e

explains

he

ignificatio

erumvs.intellectuum

.

The distinction

lways

oncerns

he

opposition

f

es

ignificata

o

ntellectus

ignificans

emrather

han

he ntellectus

s

such.

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designative

of the

present

time,

of which no

parts

have

meaning

in

separation'

(3)

As

a

logician

Abelard

is

quite explicit throughout

his works

about the semantic difference etween

categorematic

words

(nouns

and

verbs)

and

syncategorematic

ones

(prepositions,

conjunctions

etc.).

As to

the

differences etween the noun

and verb his

opinions

are

less

stable,

it seems. So much

seems to be

certain,

on the

semantic

level

Abelard

recognizes

a

close

affinity

etween the

noun and verb

as,

in his

opinion,

they

re

ust

various tools to

convey

identical sememes

[so e.g.

'cursus'

('course')

and 'currere'

(ťto run')],

whereas

theyonly

differ

y

the different

ays

in which

they onvey

the

common sememe

('modus significandi').

(4)

Both

nouns and verbs have the

ob

of

naming

and

determining,

whereby

he

difference etween

naming'

and

'determining'

s

only

of

a

syntactic

nature,

it seems.

On the level

of

naming

and

determining

{onomazein-

evel),

the noun

and verb

convey,

each in their own

ways

(nominally

or

verbally,

respectively),

some

semantic content

('sememe').

By

this,

they

constitute some

'idea'

('conceptio',

'con-

ceptus',

'intellectus')

in

somebody's

mind

(the

speaker's

or

the

hearer's that

s),

but stillwithout

conveying

any complete

thought

or

sense.

(5)

Contrariwise,

on the

level

of

'statement-making' egein

evel)

the

(finite)

verb

when

ctually

sed

9

comes

to be

really

'statement-

making',

to the extent

ndeed that

it

performs

his

ob together

with

some

noun(s)

but

nonetheless

being

itself he

statement-maker,

rop-

erly

speaking.

5

Sentencehood

Connectionnd

Predication

5.1 SomePreliminaryemarks nNaming ndPredication

A

preliminary

remark

on

the

phenomenon

of

predication

as

opposed

to

that of

naming,

first.

The

label,

'predication'

is

nowadays

commonly

used to

stand for

the

sentential

assignment

of

some

(substantial

or

accidental)

form

by

means of

the

well-known

S is

P'

construct.

As far

as Ancient

and

Medieval

texts are

concerned

the

verb dicere

de'

(or

Greek

legein

eri'

to

say

of or

about')

is

usually

con-

sidered a

linguistic

expression

entirely

quivalent

to

'praedicare

de'

19

For

his

ondition,

ee

Kretzmann

1986],

95,

n.

33;

cf.De

Rijk

1986],

5.23;

15.32 nd 16.4.and

below,

.

101.

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(Greek

katêgorein

.

gen.;

to

predicate

of).

As I have

argued

elsewere,20

this seems

to

be the

result

of an

optical

error.

t is often

upposed

that

where nouns have

only

the function f

naming

or

determininghey

ct

as

real

predicates

in a

(putative)

4S is P' scheme. To confine

myself

to

a

famous

example

of

this fallacious

use: when

Plato claims that the

Transcendent Form of

Beauty ('Beautifulness')

is

primarily

ntitled

o

bear

the name

'beautiful',

most of

his commentators

re

of the

opinion

(and

extremely

worried

about

this

fact')

that Plato should

admit

such

tricky

entences as

'Beauty

is beautiful' and

'Largeness

is

large'.21

A related

commentatorial

pecularity

s

to

explain

'naming'

in terms

of

'predication'.

E.g. Jacobi

[1986:

154]

equals

the

assignment

of

names to what he calls 'implicit predication', in whichx is givensome

name,/,

but the

F-ness

"is

not asserted

expressly".22

The

temporal

connotation of nouns

(discussed,

above,

p.

89)

is viewed

by

Jacobi

in

a

similar framework:

The

temporal

significance

does not

belong

to

the

significatio

f

a word

but

to a

specific

function.

When one refers

o

something

by

means of

a

noun,

one does

predicate.

The

temporal

co-

signification

s the result

of the

implicit

or

explicit predication".

Jacobi

is even

of

the

opinion

that

"If

Abelard'

s

line of

thought

were

to

be followed

to

its ultimate

consequences,

one can

imagine

him

givingup thedifference etween nounsand verbsaltogether nd con-

tinuing

to observe

only

the functional

ifference etween

subject posi-

tion and

predicate position.

But this

[starting

rom

predication

as the

foundation

f

ogic,

De

R.

]

would have

meant

turning

he

whole struc-

ture

of

logic upside

down."

{ibid.).

I

am afraid

that to

explain 'naming'

as an

'implicit

predication'

(and

thereby

o

understand

it in

terms

of

sentencehood)

amounts to

confusing

semantics

proper

and

syntax.

Even when

one,

quite

reasonably,

it

would

seem,

should

assign

priority

o

sentence-making

overnaming and any otherpre- entential emanticactivity) here re

still

good

reasons

to

set

naming

theoretically

uite

apart

from

predica-

tion

and

sentence-making.

Otherwise,

there

is the risk of

playing

20

De

Rijk

1980],

6

ff. nd

1986],

ndex

s.v.

Name.

21

See

De

Rijk

1986],

16ff.orPlato uch entencesere

quivalent

o

Beauty ar-

ticipates

n

Beauty'

r

Beauty

s

beauty-like'

nd should

imply

e

rejected

s

basically

ncorrect

r

ncongruent.

22

Cf.

Jacobi,

bid "the noun

erves o

name

as

something

o

which

definite

substantialr accidental

orm

forexample,

he

quality whiteness')

s to be

ascribed";a predicationies tthe aseof nynaming"; when his se ofnouns

toname s made

xplicit,

t s revealed

obe

predication";

when ne

referso ome-

thing

y

means

f

noun,

ne

does

predicate".

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down

the

name's denotative

function,

very

time

it is

used

incorrectly

in

a

true

proposition.

When

e.g.

you

are in the

possession

of

a

genuine

Rembrandt

by

inheritance and

say:

"I've

got

this rubbish in

my

possession

without

paying

a

nickel

for

t",

not

even the most brilliant

art

expert

can claim that

your

assertion s

false,

in

spite

of

his

feeling

deeply

shocked

by your

false

qualification

of

the

subject.

However,

more

importantly

f

course,

nothing

of the

sort s

found

n Abelard' s

expositions

on

nouns and verbs. There is no reason

whatsoever to

assume

any

inclination on

his

part

to start from

predication

as

the

foundationof

logic

and, thus,

4

'turning

the whole

structure

f tradi-

tional

(Aristotelian-Boethian)

ogic upside

down".

5.2

Predication

s a Semantic roblem:

inguistics

Semantics

Abelard's favourite

xamples

of

predication

are

'Socrates est albus'

('Socrates

is

white')

and

'Socrates

legit'

('Socrates

reads').

Predication

may

be described as a

'relationship

of some sort'

(cf.

Kretzmann

1982:493).

As

always

this

relationship

s determined

by

the nature

of

its relata For

Ancient and Medieval

thought,

from the

logico-

grammatial

point

of view

the

relata re

the

subject

(term)

and the

predicate term); ontologically peaking they re thesubstrate or sub-

ject

'thing')

and the

attribute

or

property

r

characteristic)

which is

either

a

substantial

essential)

or an

accidental form

of

being.

The

logico-grammatical nalysis

examines

predication qua

operation,

the

conjunction

or

coupling,

that

is,

of a

subject

term

5)

and

predicate

term

P)

by

means of

a

copula

(i.e.

a

verb

with

copulative

function).

So it is "concerned with how what is said

in

predication

gets

said"

(Kretzmann

1982:

493,

n.23)

and, thus,

deals

with the

linguistic

apparatus

of

predication

the

'container' of the

predicational

expres-

sion so to speak). On the otherhand, theontologicalanalysisfocusses

upon

the

relationship

between

the form

predicated

which

is

signified

by

P)

and the

thing

signified

by

S

,

in

which

the form s

supposed

to

inhere.

So this

analysis

is

"concerned with what

s

said

in

predication"

(Kretzmann,

ibid.)

and, thus,

deals with the

'content' of the

expres-

sion

involved.

Defining23

emantics as

the

study

of

the relations

between

the

signs

23

With

. W. Morris

See Lyons

977:

115].

Thisbroad

efinitionill

urely

o

for hepurposef interpretingncient nd Medieval hinkers.eterAbelard's

thought

n

the core

f

ogic

nd

grammar

an

only

e

understood

fone s aware

of he lose

elationship

etweenialecticnd

grammar

nhisworks. ee

esp.Jolivet

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and

the

objects

to

which

the

signs

are

applicable implies

that

its

ob

is

to focus

upon

what

I

have

labelled the

logico-

rammatical

analysis

and

the

ontological analysis simultaneously.

As for the

phenomenon

of

predication,

this

amounts to

studying

the

interference f

the

con-

tainer' and its

content'

when

compared

with the

speaker's

intention.

Abelard was

fully

ware of a tension

existing

between the content

of

a

speech

act and the

speaker's

intention,

in

that the

logico-

grammatical

device has its

proper

features which

are not

per

se

applicable

to

each

and

every

ontological

situation,

let alone their

agreement

with

a

speaker's

actual

intention.

See

e.g.

D.

127,20-128,

21; 136,22-36

(cf.

Kretzmann,

507);

140,23-9

(cf.

Kretzmann,

510).

Basically, the problem of predication as it worriesAbelard equally

comes down to the

antagonistic

tension

between

its

linguistic

apparatus (conjunction;

'

copulatio

)

and the

speaker's

intention,24

.e.

the

predication

proper

as intended

by

the user of the

inguistic

device.

So

it seems to

be of

the

utmost

mportance

to

Abelard'

s

interpreter

o

keep

noticing

that

the entire discussion

of

predication

is,

in

a

final

analysis,

one

protracted ttempt25

o overcome

the

antagonism

of the

'connection

vs

predication'

issue

in

meticulously

examining

and,

through

different

manoeuvres,

delimitating

both

functions.

Hereby one should carefully xamine what, in theMedieval view,

the

precise

bearing

of

the

inguistic

pparatus

upon

the semantic out-

come

is.

What

I

am

trying

o

say

is this.

Often

the

inguistic

ituation

is not

simply

mirrored

n

the semantic domain

along

the

lines the

linguistic

urface tructure

may

make us

think.For

example,

the

plain

[1969],

8-62.

The latter as

pointed

ut

1981: 175-95]

hat

eter

Abelard ever

detached

imself

ompletely

romhe

platonist

ontological)

raditionanded own

by

the

Latin

grammarians.

ee

also

Mews

1985],

n.66.

24

As for he peaker'sntention,sentenceor proposition',n theMedievalenseof

propositio'eferring,

ot o a

propositional

ontentut o a

propositional

ign,

whether

ritten

r

poken

r

mental)

may

e

explained

ither

ntensionally

r

xten-

sionally.

n

Peter belard

as

in

many

ther

Medieval

uthors)

oth

xplanations

re

found. o 'Socrates

s white' s

interpreted

s: 'Socrates

s

a

being

nformed

y

whiteness'

so e.g.

D.

131,36-8),

hereas

Socrates

s

one

of

hosewho

re'

See

e.g.

D.

135,

).

However,

ny

onsiderationf lass

membership

r lass nclusion

s well

as

any

discussion

f

n

inherence

s.

dentity

heory

f

predication

as

ittle

earing

on the

proper

tems fPeter

belard's

emanticiscussions.

specially

odern

alk

(started

y

Ernest

oody

nd aken

pby

many

thers,

ncluding

he

resent

uthor)

about

nherences

dentityredication

an better

e

stopped.

f.

De

Rijk

1981a],

2.5

and

Mews

1985b],

.37. For

a

simultaneousccurrence

f

the

wo onsidera-

tions,eeD. 332,9-20 nd De Rijk 1981a], 5.25

On Kretzmann'

assumption

f

different

heories

f

predication

n

Abelard,

ee

below,

.

124.

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occurrence,

on the

linguistic

evel,

of

three-piece

as

opposed

to two-

piece) predication

with

Abelard is not

sufficient eason to ascribe to

him a similar

tripartition

us

bipartition)

of

the

proposition

when it

comes to

its

semantic

anatomy.

So,

when

Abelard,

following

Aristotle

(De

int.

12,

21b9),

substitutes n

expression

such as 'homo

ambulai'

('A

man

walks')

for

homo est ambulans'

('A

man is

walking'),

with-

out

any

change

of

meaning,

his

interpreter

s

not

entitled

to take

Abelard's choice

of

the

linguistic pparatus,

'homo est

ambulans' for

an

argument

n

favourof

semantic

tripartition

o

semantic

bipartition.

To

put

it

schematically,

rom he

semantic

point

of

view,

Abelard

may

take

a

linguisticthree-piece predication

to stand for a

copulation

of

just two sememes:

12

12

I

n

1

1

1

J

'homo

est-ambulans':

('A)

man

is-walking'.

It should

be

noticed

against

Kretzmann,

passim)

that

Abelard

in

fact

always

maintained the

semantic

bipartition,

fromwhatever

inguistic

device

(two-piece

or

three-piece)

he

started.

This

may

seem the

more

remarkable o us since

the

semantic

tripartition

as

equally

traditional

as its

linguistic

ounterpart,

the

three-piece

predication.26

5.3.

On

Dating

the

Logical

Works

f

Abelard

Constant Mews has

recently

ublished

1986)

a

thorough

nvestiga-

tion

of the

sequence

of

Abelard's various

writings

on

logic

and

theology.

n

my

view

most

of

ts

results,

however

tentative

hey

might

be

,

should

be

accepted.

Obviously

he is

right

n

rejecting

any

idea

that Abelard had

rewritten he Dialéctica

everal

times

(which,

as the

editor

of this

work

took over

from

d'Olwer)

and also his

claim that

thework dates back from bout 1119 insteadof the thirties eems to

rest

upon

firm

vidence. For

that

matterMews

comes to the

following

chronology

for the

extant

works

on

logic:

-

1102-08:

the so-called

'literal'

glosses

called

editiones

n

our

MSS:

Editto

super

Porphyrium

Ed.Por.)'

Editio

super

Praedicamenta ristotelis

(

Ed. Pr

d.

'

Editio

super

Periermenias

ristotelis

Ed.

Per.);

Editio

super

De

26

The

rules f

conversion

nd

syllogistic

nference

amely

made

the

three-piece

analysisheogician'savouritend o t s nterestingo eethat nthis coreswell

Abelard efends

he

emantic

ipartition

s the

more ruitfullnd ven

ndispensable

analysis.

ee

D.

139,12-140,22;

f.

Tweedale

1982:146]

nd

below,

.

122.

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divisionibus

oethii

Ed.

Div.);

all

edited

by

Mario

dal Pra

(Florence

2

1969)

-

1109-16:

Sententieecundum

magistum

etrum(?

,

edited

by

Minio-

Paluello

(Rome

1958)

-

c.

1117-21: Dialéctica

eforethe

so-called

Logica

ngredientibus

Glosse

super

Porphyrium

Gl.

Por.);

Glosse

super

Predicamenta

Gl.

Pr

d. Glosse

super

eriermenias

GL Per.),

all

edited

by

Geyr

(1919-27)

and

Glose

uper

Topica

Gl.

Top.)

edited

by

Dal Pra as

part

of the

Logica

Ingredientibus

(Florence

21969);

see

below,

p.

113,

n.46)

and the

Glosse

uper

Por-

phyrium

ecundum

ocales edited

by

Ottaviano,

Florence

1933).

-

1120-24(?)

Tractatus de

intellectibus

ed.

Cousin

1859)

and

the

Glossule

superPorphyrium

dited

by Geyer

under the

title

Logica

Nostrorum

etitioni

Münster

1933).

For our

purpose

the

relativedates

of Dialéctica

Gl.Per.

and Gl.

Top.

are

of

importance.

Mews locates

the

Dialéctica before

the

Gl.

Per.

The

following rguments

are

adduced to

support

this view:

(1)

'

'Whereas in the

Dialéctica

Abelard

acknowledges

that voces

ignify

as

well as

things,

n

the

gloss

he asserts

that

voces n

themselves

do

not have

any

meaning,

unless

they

were

instituted or this

pur-

pose'' (Mews, 82).

I am

afraid that

Mews fails to

see that in the

Dialéctica too Abelard

considers the

speaker's

intention

as the

main

cause

of

signification.

This is best seen

where

our author

deals with

the

question

of the

relation

between

imposition

and

signification:

D.

114,

6-11:

Si

tamen

significare'

roprie

с

secundumectamt

propriam

eius diffinitionem

ssignamus,

on

alias res

significare

icemus

isi

que per

vocem

oncipiuntur.

ndeBoetium

upra

ixisse

meminimus:

vocis n

pro-

prias

ignificationes

ivisio it

tc.

proprie

amque

unt lle

rerum

ignifica-

tiones

ue

determinaten

sententia

ocis enentur.

However,fwe take tosignify'roperlyndaccordingtspropernd correct

definition,

e

will

ay

hat

hey

the

ouns]

o not

ignify

hings

therhan

hose

whichre

onceived

f

y

he

word.

encewe

re

reminded

bove hat oethius

said,

the

divisionf

word s

nto ts

proper

meanings

tc.";

for

hosemean-

ings

f

hings

re

proper

hichre

determinately

ontained

n

what

s

meant

y

theword.

The term

determinated'

does not

only

refer

o the

intentionof

the

primus

nventor

ut

also

to

that of

any

user of the

word

in

some

context,

as

may

be

clear

from

what

Abelard

says

about

the use

of

equivocal

terms. ndeed, they re said to have just one meaning. Well, this can

only

be

asserted of an

equivocal

noun when

used n

some ontext:

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D.

114,

11-5:

tsi nim

ox

quivoca

luribus

mposita

it,

lura

amen

roprie

significare

on

icitur;

uiaequivocumamquam

lura

on

ignificat

uibus

x

eadem

ausa st

mposita,

nam

e omnibus

antumenensubstantiam.axe

tamen imiumepe uctoritasdomnemmpositionemsignificationis'omen

extendit.

For

lthough

n

equivocal

ord

asbeen

mposed

o

plurality

f<

different

things,et

t s not aid o

ignify

hat

luralityroperly,

ince

tdoesnot

ignify

those

hings

owhichthas

been

mposed

y

the

ame

ause,

ua

plurality,

s

ithas

nly

ne ut f ll ts

meanings.

owever,

he uthors

oo

oosely

xtended

the se of

henoun

signification'

o the

whole

ange

f

mposition.

Furthermore

ll

passages

where the

hearer's

mind is

mentioned

may

be

referred

o

(e.g.

D.

69,27-31).

See

also

below,

(2).

(2) " Absent from heDialéctica s thediscussionofthemeaning of

'man'

when

used

to

mean

that

word.

Abelard

insisted n

the

gloss

that

such a

vox

signified

only

through

a

process

of

translatio,

ot

through

any

intrinsic

property

of

the

word.

This

concept

of

transference

f

meaning,

not

discussed

in

the

Dialéctica

has an

important

place

in

the

glosses

on

the

Categories

nd

Periermeneias

s

well as in

every

version

of

the

Theologia"

Mews,

82-3,

and

n.43).

Mews

first

tatement s

not

correct,

am

afraid.

There

is

a

discus-

sion in D

.

166,

16ff.

f

the

autonymous

use

of

homo'

in

sentences

uch

as 'homo estnomen'. There Abelard

explains

thatthe

subject

and the

predicate

terms

always

have

to

signify

he same

thing

'in

eadem re

conveniunt

tque

hoc

modo

consignificanť).

To

be

sure,

in

the

Dialéc-

tica he

process

as

such

is

not

discussed nor

is

the

abel

'translatio'

used

for

it.

Mews

is

quite

right

in

remarking

83)

that in

the GL

Top.

Abelard

quite

explicitly

laims

(305,1-4)

that a vox

does not

signify

unless a

listenercan

grasp

the

sense

of its

imposition.

However,

the

point

Abelard

sets

out to

make

here is

that an

actual

ignification

nly

comes about

when

there

s

somebody

to

hear

the

vox.

Well,

this

com-

pletely

agrees

with all

earlier

discussions

on the

subject,

in

which

signification

s

always

related

to a

hearer's

mind

(e.g.

as

early

as in

the

Gl.Per.

76,12-9).

One

should be

mindful

that when

speaking

of

'the

hearer's

mind'

Abelard

(like

his

contemporaries)

s

thinking

f

any

dialogical

situation,

rather

han the

occurrence

of a

word as a

lex-

icographical

entry.

(3)

Mews

rightly

tates

83)

that

in

the

Dialéctica

Abelard

"asserts

that

conjunctions

and

prepositions

had

to

have a

meaning

in

themselves ftheywere to be distinguishedfrom etters nd syllables,

although

their

ignificance

was

uncertain".

He refers

o D.

I,

118-120

and

contrasts

his

with

Gl.Per.

337-340

where

Abelard

"formulates as

105

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a criterion f

meaning

that word

must

form n

intellection

ntellectus

in

the

mind".

I

am

afraid,

Mews fails to see

that in the

Dialéctica

he

author

quite rightly) pposed conjunctions

tc. o

meaningless)

etters

and

syllables

and

assigns

the former he

functionof

'determining

o

some

extent'

quodammodo

éterminent)

he

proper

nouns

they

re

added

to.

Well,

that does not

imply

ascribing

them

any

real

signification

withouthose nouns. Our author

most

explicitly

akes the

part

of those

(dialecticians)

who

deny

any meaning

to

conjunctions

tc.

t is

true,

n

the

GLPer.

it is

explicitly

sserted that

they

do

not

properly

form an

intellection

(4)

As to

the different

meanings

of

'homo curriť

and 'homo cur-

rens' Mews remarks that "In the gloss he asserts thatboth phrases

have

an

identical

meaning

because one

creates

the same

intellection

as

the other.

Although

commenting

in

the

Dialécticathat

the same

phrase

might

be

used

according

to

different

tates

of

mind,

he

does

not

mention

the

idea

formulated n the

gloss

that different

ype

of

phrase

could form

he

same

intellection".

Mews contrasts

D.

II,

148,17-152,

26

with Gl.Per.

373,1-33.

As one can

easily

see,

it s

overdoing

t

some-

what to

speak

here,

with

Mews,

of

"a

(similar)

contrast

n his

discus-

sions of a

phrase".

From the doctrinal

point

of

view

both

expositions

perfectly gree.

(5)

Next,

Mews

refers to

the

discussions in

D.

and

Gl.

Per. on

account

of the

analysis

of

the

substantive

verb.

At

first

lance

he

seems

to

be

right

n

arguing

that

the

suggestion

advanced in the

Dialéctica

only

at

the end

of

the discussion

(see

below,

p.

121)

to the effect hat

'is-a-poeť

should be

taken

as

equivalent

to a

single

verb

pro

uno

verbo),

is

found n

the Gl.

Per.

349ff.)

without

such a

tentative

etting.

How-

ever,

it

should

be

noticed

first,

hat

the

pro

uno

verbo'

(or

Чп

vi unius

verbi

el dictionis

)

device

which

admittedly

s

the

very

nucleus of

the

Dialécticasuggestion, is not found in the special discussion of the

substantiveverb

as such in

Gl.Per. 359ff.but in

an

earlier

discussion

of

the

temporal

co-signification

f

verbs.

Secondly,

that

device

is even

remarkably

absent27 in the

discussion of

the

substantive

verb,

remarkably

o such an

extent

ndeed,

that

sentences uch as

'chimaera

est

chimaera' are

interpreted

by

transferring

he

'est'

into a

nun-

27

Mews'

reference

1985a:

85,

n.59]

to

Gl.

er.

360,

25-7

must e a

mistake,

s

nothing

hatsoeveran

be

foundf he

pro

unoverbo' evicenthat

assage.

More-

over,Mews'discussionf copulatingf ssentia"84and87)andhisview f he

entire iscussionf he ubstantive

erb

s not

ntirely

ight,

am

afraid;

ee

below

pp.

113-4.

106

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cupative

'vocatur',

which is an

extremely

weak

proposal

(see

Kretz-

mann

[1982],

502-3).

In the Gl.

Top.

the substantive

verb

problem

is

not solved

by

means of the

'

pro

uno verbo

device,

either.

(6)

Mews

is of the

opinion

(86)

that "the one

passage

which

Geyer

cited

as evidence

that the

argument

of the Dialéctica

was 'more

developed5

than that of the

gloss"

is

not conclusive.

Geyer

referred o

D.

I

136,19-26

and

II

169,4-24

where Abelard

discusses

a

position

that

he

used

to

hold

in

defence

of the

opinions

of his

Master,

William of

Champeaux,

about

figurative

onstructions

namely

that

n those

con-

structions here was a sense of the

phrase

which was

quite

different

from he

significations

f

its

separate

parts)

and took

this as

referring

to what Abelard wrote n Gl.Per.480,22-37. However, in my opinion

Mews is

wrong

n

rejecting 86-7) Geyer's argument

and in

changing

the

proper

ssue of

the

passages

involved;

indeed,

propositions

uch

as

'Homer

is

a

poet'

are

meant

here,

rather

han

phrases

'word strings')

such

as

'dead man'

('homo

mortuus'),

as Mews seems to assume.

(7)

Finally,

Mews

may

find

some

support

for

his thesis

by

con-

trasting

Abelard' s

view

of

maxima

ropositio

n Gl.

Top.

238,35-239,6

with the one

held

in

the

Dialéctica

III

309,25-310,19).

In

the

latter

passage

Abelard follows he view

held

by

William

of

Champeaux

that

(in Mews wording)"the meaning ofa maxim lay in themultitudeof

hypothetical onsequences

which

it

implied."

In the

Gl.

Top.,

how-

ever,

Abelard

explicitly

rejects

(239,

Iff.)

any interpretation

f

the

maxim as in

inference

cheme.

The

conclusion which we can

draw from ll

this s

obviously

not the

one

drawn

by

Mews

(88)

that

the "the

series

of

Glosse

n

Porphyry,

Aristotle

nd

Boethius

{Logica

Ingredientibus)

resent

more

developed

ideas than those of

the Dialéctica nd

so

are more

likely

to be

a

later

(Mews'

earlier s a

misprint)

rather than

an earlier

(Mews

later s a

misprint) omposition". I believe it makes more sense to assign both

works

following

Mews)

to

roughly

the

same

period

rather

than

try

o

separate

them

chronologically.

Sometimes

the

Logica

Ingredientibus

seems

to be

'more

developed'

than the Dialéctica sometimes

things

re

the

other

way

round.

Besides,

the

author's

different

ntentions

may

have been

of some

importance,

since

the

Logica Ingredientibus

as

originated

from

choolteaching

whereas the

Dialécticawas

written

fter

a

request

had

been

made

by

Abelard'

s

brother

Dagobert,

presumably

for

instructing

he latter's sons.

Incidentally,

Mews

suggests

(76-7)

that the Gl.

Top

do not

necessarily

form

part

of the

Logica

Ingredien-

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tibus,

o thatthis

ast

argument our

number

7)

may

not bear

upon

the

date of

the latter work either before or after

the Dialéctica.

5.4

Abelard,'

Tackling f

theProblem

f

Predication

n

GLPer.

In Abelard' s

view

to solve the

problem

of

predication

always

meant

to

recognize

first he basical

antagonism

between

the

inguistic

device

for

onnection and semantic

predication

as intended

by

a

speaker

and,

accordingly,

to conceive

of a

harmonious

account

of the

two

opera-

tions.

This

enterprise

naturallyrequired

a meticulous examination

of

the

proper

tool

for

coupling

viz. the

copulative

verb

(whether

or not

occurringas the substantiveverb 'in thirdposition' tertiumdiacens).

So

the substantive

verb

'esse',

4

to

be')

inevitably

omes

up

for

discus-

sion

as

well.

All

personal

verbs,

Abelard

says, {Gl.

Per.

359,

23ff.)

re able

to

cou-

ple

themselves,

no matter

what

their

ignification,

ince

they perform

the

act of

coupling

and

by

the

same token

predicating

their semantic

content

the

so-called 'res

verbi';

see

below,

p.

119).

This is clarified

by

the

well-known

Aristotelian

analysis

mentioned

before:

Gl.

er.

59,23-8:

t sciendum

uod

personalia

erba

uae praedicariossunt,

cuiuscumqueignificationisint, mnia e copulare ossunt. t si dicatur

'Socrates

st',

Socrates

egit',

esse' et

'legere'

per seipsapraedicantur

t

geminatimunguntur,

uia

vim

praedicati

abent t

copulantis,

t simul t

praedicentur

t

seipsa opulent.

ic enim

icitur

curriť

uasi

dicereturest

currens'.

It s essential

oknow

hat

ll

personal

erbs,

o matter hat heir

ignification,

which an serve s

predicates

an

couple

hemselves.

or

example,

f

one

says

'Socrates

s',

Socrates

eads',

be' and

read' re

predicated

ithout

here

eing

any

mediumnd < indeed

they erform

dual

function,

or

hey

ave

he

force oth f

a

predicate

nd of

a

copulant

o that

hey

imultaneously

re

predicated

nd

couple

hemselves

s well.Forto

say

curriť

'runs')

s tanta-

mount osayingestcurrens''is running'r is a running thing').

It seems

useful to

remark

that the

linguistic

copulare'

and

the

semantic

praedicare'

are mentioned

n

one

breath,

which should lead

us

to

take their

subjects

('be'

and

'read')

in a

dual

manner,

to mean

namely

both the

verbs as

linguistic

ools

and their

emantic

contents.28

Abelard

continues, then,

by saying {ibid.,

28-30)

that

there

are

only

two verbs that

can

couple

utterances

different

rom

themselves,

the

28For the interwovennessf the twoitems, ee above,pp. 101-3. Cf. also

Kretzmann'

remarkn Abelard'

casualnessr

ambivalence

oward

hedistinction

between

inguistic

nd

extralinguistic

ntities

1982:

96,

n.37].

108

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substantive nd the

nuncupative,

and

he instances he is Socrates'

and

'he

is-named29 ocrates'.

In the next ines he

goes

on to discuss

(360, 3ff.)

the

peculiar

nature

of the substantive nd

nuncupative

verb.30

The substantiveverb is not

so much

interesting

n

that

it

is

displayed

both s an

ordinary

verb

in

two-piece predication

('Socrates

is')

where it occurs

as

'adjacent

in

second

position' ('secundum adiacens')

and as the

copula

in three-

piece predication

where

it occurs

as

'adjacent

in third

position';

'ter-

tium

adiacens')

as

well as

being

a

spoil-sport

n

the atter ase.

Indeed,

when

acting

as

the

copula

it

truly performs

he

activity

of

coupling

intended

by

the

speaker,

but,

at the

same

time,

it does a

job

which is

flatly ontrary o the ntention fthe framer nd utterer f theproposi-

tion.

It is this

défaut

e

qualité

which bothers

Abelard. What

precisely

is that

troublesome

activity?

No

more and no

less than

retaining

ts

proper

invention

and

thus

conveying

the notion

of 'essentia' on

top

of the

specific

notion of the

predicate

noun. Let Abelard

be

his own

mouthpiece:

Gl.

er.

60,

13-22:

ubstantivum

ero,

uod

non onvenit

x

appellatione

ed

ex

psa

rei

ssentia,

mnibus

raedicatisoniungi

otest,

arn cilicet ominibus

quam

pronominibus

el

participiis

ive tiam

rationibus.

t

cum n essentia

quaelibetignificet,umquam

i

copulatio

ssentiae

eest,

uia ubiqueperipsum roponiturliquidliud sse, tiam uando diectivisdiungitur,eluti

cum icituriste st lbus'.

Nam icet

uantum

d intentionem

acientis

roposi-

tionemola lbedo

opulatur,

nde

psa

ola

praedicariotest,

ex vi

tarnen

substantivi

erbi

psum

ubiectum31lbum ssentialiterocrati

oniungitur;

quare32pse

Socrates sse

ponitur

i

substantivi

erbi,

uia significationem

essentiaeenet.

The

substantive

erb, owever,

hichs not uitable

for

thing

33

n

virtue

of

ts

names uton thebasis f

ts

very

ssentia

can be

conjoined

ith ll sorts

of

predicates,

ot

merely

ith

ames,

ut

lso with

ronouns,

articiples,

r

evenword

trings.

nd

because t

signifies

nything

hatsoevern essentiathe

29

n

English

is-named's a

two- ords

xpression,

n

Latin

as

in

German

nd

Dutch)

one-word

xpression

'nuncupatur';

heiss',

heet').

30

Abelard'discussions

f

he

uncupative

erbs

'nuncupari',

nominari',

vocari',

and

appellari';

f.

Priscian,

nst.gramm.414,19)

re

foundn Gl. er.

59,28-360,

12and

D.

134.3-27. hev nlv lav secondary

ole n his reatmentf

predication.

31

The correction

ipsum

subiectum

instead

of

'substantivum')

lbum'

is

paleographicallyasy

nd s

supported

y

the

parallel

assage

n the

uper opica

Glossae

see

below,

.

115.

32

think,

heMS

readinguia

hould e corrected

nto

uare

this

ind f

cribalrror

is often

ound:

c

nstead f

q<.

33

Viz. allkinds f

hings

hichrereferred

o

by

ll

sorts f

nouns,

djectival

ouns,

pronouns,articiplesnd ven hrasesuch s homo lbus'; ee Gl. er. 60,6-9) s

opposed

o the

nuncupative

erbwhich efits

hingsnly

n

the

basis f

heir

eing

named

y

a

proper

ame;

ee

bid.,

-12.

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coupling

f

ssentias never

bsent rom

t;

for n all

cases,

t s

by

means f hat

<essentia> hat ne

pronounces

hat ne

thing

s

something

lse,

ven

when

t

goes

with

djectives,

s

when ne

says

he

s white'. or

lthough

s

far s the

intentionftheframerf thepropositions concerned,hitenesslone s

coupled

nd o t lone an be

predicated,

evertheless,

s a

consequence

f he

force

f he ubstantive

erb,

hewhiteubstratetselfs

conjoined

ith ocrates

in

themanner

f

n

essentia.

herefore,

n virtuef he orce f he ubstantive

verb ocrates imselfs

presented

s

being,

ecause

t

retains

he

ignification

of ssentia.

Of

course,

it

should

be

asked now what the

precise

meaning

of

'essentia' is.

Wherever,

as

in

our

context,

essentia'

is

opposed

to

'adiacentia',

it

cannot

possibly

stand

for

essence',

and

must be used

to mean 'what is of a

non-adjacent

nature'

or

'what is a

selfcontained

unity'. Therefore,the primarynotion of 'essentia' must be that of

subsistence or rather 'substantialness'.

Elsewhere the

opposition

'secundum

substantiam secundum adiacentiam3

s

found.34

o

Kretz-

mann

seems to

be rather

lose

to

the truth

n

taking

essentia'

for"no

more than

existence,

or

independent,

substantial

existence."35

Returning

now

to Abelard'

s

exposition

of

the behaviour of the

substantive

verb,

we

see

him

depicting

what its

performing

ne

ob

too

many

amounts to:

Gl. er.

60,23-34:

uo

itaque oniunguntur

ocrati

er

albus'

albumGeyer]praedicatum,lbedo scilicetn adiacentia t album, dest psum ffectum

albedine,

n

essentia;

ola tamen

lbedo

raedicatur,

uia

sola

coniungi

nten-

34

D.

595,

36-8.For

ubstantiandessentiased

ndiscriminately,

ee

D.

84, 1-2; 7,

27;

91,8; 194,

;

408,

33-4;

25,

12ff. or

he efinitionf

substantia',

ee

D.

331,

15-6

'substantiam

icimus

em

er

e

existentem');

f.

94,9;

and

334,

25:

res

per

se

existens,

dest ullo

gens

ubiecto'.

his hould e

parallelled

ith

rammatical

oc-

trine,

.g.

Peter

elias,

n

Priscianum

inorem

59,28-61,73

d.

Toison,

who

xplicitly

describes

substantia' s

a

self-contained

ntity nifying

ll its substantial

nd

accidentalormsnd

treats

he

ubstantive

erb romhis

oint

f

view

p.

61,75-62,

29;esp.61,76-9: edñeque stdicendumuod ignificaiocuniversale,ubstantiam

neque

hanc el

llam

ubstantiam,

eddicitur

ignificare

em

t substantem

ormis,

idest

ésignât

em t

ibiunit ormast ntere.

"One

should

ot

ssert, owever,

that t

viz.

he ubstantive

erb]

ignifies

he

niversal,

ubstancenor

hatt

ignifies

this

r that

ubstance;

t is rather

aid to

signify

thing

s

underlyingorms,

.e. it

designates thing

nasmuch

s it

unites

orms

ith tself

nd

also

mutually").

ee

also

Kneepkensforthcoming),

66.

35

Kretzmann

1982],

97;

cf.

498,

п. 43.

Incidentally,

substantialness'

oesnot

as such

mply

eal xistence

n

this)

utside

orld,

s it

may

efer,

n Abelard

oo,

o

just

Particularizaron'

or Actuality')

s

opposed

o

Facticity'.

ee

De

Rijk

1981a],

29-32

nd

38-40.

A

similar

pposition

s found

n

many

ther uthors.

.g.

Duns

Scotus,

n

Arisi.

eriherm.

.2,

586a: "nomen

ignificai

nivoce

em,

e

manente

el

existenteel non xistente.dquodsciendumuodhocnomen,Sortes' ignificai

Sortem

ecundum

uod

est

n

ctu,

on amen

ortemxistere

"

Cf.

d.

In

Arisi.

nal.

Post.

I,

q.4,

n.2:

"

'ens' nomen on

ignificai

em t

tempore

ensuratam".

110

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ditur.

on nim

uicquid oniungiturraedicatur,

ed d solum

uod

proposi-

tione

oniungi

ntenditur.

ui

enim

propositionem

acitSocrates

st

lbus',

solum

solam eyer]

lbedinemnesse ocrati

stendit.t

si

haberet

erbum

er

quodpossetimpliciteralbum' opulareocratita uodnil ubiectittingeret,

profecto

ic

faceret.ed

quia

non

stverbum

er uod

d

fiat,

enit

d

substan-

tivum;

uod

uia

essentiae

antum

ignificationem

abet,

on

otestpsum ro-

ferri

ine

oniunctionessentiae.n

essentia

ero

on

otest

erealbum'

ocrati

copulari,

t

scilicet

icatur

Socrates st

lbedo'.

And

so two

things'

re

conjoined

ith

ocrates

y

means f

the

predicate,

'white',

iz.

whiteness

n

adjacence

nd

a white

thing>',

i.e.

the

hing

tself

whichs

affected

y

the

whiteness,

n termsf

ubstantialness,evertheless,

t

is

whiteness

lone

hats

predicated

for

t

lone

s what

s

ntended

o

be

conjoined.

For

not

verything

hat

s

conjoined

s

predicated,

ut

nly

hatwhich

y

means

of

he

roposition

s

ntended

o

be

conjoined.

ndeed,

whoever

rameshe

ropo-

sition,

Socratess white'

nly36

eclareshatwhitenesss n Socrates. nd

fhe

had verb ymeans fwhich ecould ouplewhiteness37ith ocratesirectly

so that

he

wouldnottouch

nything

f

the ubstrate38of

whiteness

,

he

surely

ould

o

so.

However,

ecause heres

no

verb

vailable

y

means

f

which

hat ould e

done,

eends

p

with he

ubstantive

erb,

which,

s

ithas

only

he

ignification

f

substantialness',

annot e uttered ithout

he

onjunc-

tion

f ubstantialness.

ut

s

regards

ubstantialness,

white'39annot e

truly

coupled

with

ocrates,

o

the xtent

amely

hat ne

were o

say

Socrates

s

whiteness'.

The result

s

somewhat

astonishing,

ndeed:

whiteness,

which

s the

only

thing

the

speaker

intends

to

predicate

is

coupled

only

'adjacently', whereas the supposititious child, the substrate of

whiteness,

obtains the honour of

being 'essentially'

predicated.40

One

36

olam lbedinem

eyer

solum lbedinem

S.

37

The

reading

lbedinem

instead

f

lbum)

s

supportedy

he

arallel

assage

n

Super

Topica

lossae

see

De

Rijk

1981b],

5,

n.

29 andbelow

.

116.

Cf.

Kretzmann's

ro-

posal

1982],

99.

38

Abelard

means o

say

hat f he

whole emanticrea

of album'

i.e.

'

that hich

is

affected

y

whiteness')

he

framer f

the

proposition

ishes

nly

o

include

'whiteness',

ot

he

that

which',

n his

ctof

predicating.

his

nterpretationesp.

the

reading

ubiectinstead

f

substantivi,

hich,

ncidentally,

oncerns

frequent

scribe'srror)sstronglyupportedy he arallelassagenSuperopica lossaesee

below,

.

115.

39

At

first

lance

Kretzmann's

1982:

499]

correctionlbedo

or

lbum an

be

reasonablyrgued

or,

nd

may

e

supported

y

the

arallel assage

n

Super opica

Glossae:

ee

below,

.

116 ndDe

Rijk

1981b],

5,

n.29.

Howevert s

unnecessary

and,

fter

loser

nspection,

ven

eems

o

miss

subtlety

n

Abelard's ords. ne

has

to

notice, irst,

hat he

phrase

n

essentiaeros

put

n first

osition

as

some

emphasis.

esides,

Abelard eems

o

say

that s

regards

he substantialness

n

'album',

white'

annot

ruly

e

conjoined

ith

Socrates', ince, hen,

aying

'Socrates

s

white'

would e tantamounto

saying

he

lumsy

Socratess hisown

whiteness'.am

afraid hat

Kretzmann'siscussion

p. 501)

s

not

ntirely

o

the

point, specially

is

assertionhat"At this

critical

uncture

he

theory

eems

confused".

40

For n

extensiveiscussion

f

he

whole

assage,

ee De

Rijk

1981a],

2-5 nd

38-40.

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also

holds

ood

or

the

white

thing

is

Socrates'. o

wonder,

f

when

lways

retaining

he

ame

ignification,viz.

oncerning

he

whitenessnd ts

ubstrate)

<the word> 'white' s sometimes

redicated

n one

predication

nd

at

other

timescts s the ubject. ence t s correctlyaid an accidentspredicated'butnotanaccidentsthe

ubject'

ince,

swas aid < before

,

a noun

ignify-

ing

n accident

s

predicated

n virtue

f

ts

ignifying

n

accident ut cts

s

subject

n

virtue f ts

ignifying

he ubstrate.

Finally,

the

conjunction

of

non-existents

such

as

chimaera)

comes

up

for

a short

discussion.

Abelard

knows

of no

better

way

out than to

declare

that

in

such cases 'est'

equals

'vocatur'

(4s

called'),

e.g.

in

'chimaera

est chimaera'.45

It

seems

to

be

useful

to

discuss, now,

the

parallel

passage

found

in

Abelard's Super Topica Glossae.

5.5

The

Present

nterpretation

onfirmedy Super

Topica

Glossae

The

logical

commentaries on

Porphyry,

the

Categories

nd

Perihermeneias,

dited

by

Bernhard

Geyer

entitled

Logica Ingredientibus

were

followed

by

Glosses on

Boethius' De

topicis

ifferentiis

Mario dal

Pra

has

convincingly

hown46 hat

these

glosses

were

part

of the

Logica

Ingredientibus

nd were

written

fter he texts edited

by Geyer.

These

glossescontainan interesting iscussion ofpredicationwhichprovides

a most

clarifying

parallel

to

the

one

found

in the Glossae

super

PerihermeneiasI

shall

give

the

vital

passages

in

full.47

When

discussing

271, 12ff.)

Boethius,

De

top.

diff.

,

1177 D

7ff.,

Abelard

gives

an

extensive

treatment

of

the so-called

quaestio

praedicativa

e.g.

'utrum

nix

est

alba'

=

'whether snow

is

white'),

which

entirely

ocusses

upon

the

notion of

predication.

To

this

end

he

makes

a

distinction

between

'inherence of

essentia

and

inherence of

adjacence' (271, 19-21).

The former s instanced

by

'whether snow is

whiteness', the latterby 'whether snow is white'. He mentions his

master William

(of Champeaux?)

and the atter'

adherentswho

used

to

say

that as to sentences such as 'Socrates

est albus'

('Socrates

is

white'),

there is

a

grammarian's interpretation

nderstanding

t as

45

Geyer'

eaque

at

GL er.

61,

16)

should ead a

quae.

orthe

present

iscussion,

see

Kretzmann

19821,

02-3.

46

[1969],

ntroduzione

XXI-XXXIX,

where

eadduces ome

onclusive

rguments

against

my

ssumption

1967:

73;

183-6;

03-5 nd

1970:

XII]

to

he

ffecthat hese

glosses

were

art

fthe

ntroductiones

arvulorum,

lso edited

y

dal

Pra;

see

above,

p. 104.

47

Fol.

176

rb-vb

=

ed. dal Pra

271,13-276,39).

quote

he

MS,

as

the ditionon-

tains

ome

misreadings.

113

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'Socrates est

ipsum

album,

idest

ipsum

quod

albedine est

affectum

('Socrates

is

the

white <

thing

itself,

.e.

precisely

that which

is

affected

ywhiteness'),

which s

the

resultof the

grammarians

ttend-

ing

only

to the intransitive onstruction48fthe

subject

and

predicate

noun:

Gl.

op.

72,12-21:

t hii

antum

opulationem

ssentie

undamentilbedinisd

Socratemttendunt.

uippe

album'

quod

secundum

olam

nominationem49

intransitive

opulatur

ocrati,

olum

fundamentum

ominando

ignificat,

albedinemero

eterminando

irca

undamentum,

on

nominando.50nde

lli

qui

vim ntransitionisttendunt

n

constructione,

axime

d coniunctionem

nominatorum

espiciunt

ecundum

uam

intransitio

it,

t sit

grammaticus

sensus

uod

ubiectumlbedinisssentialiterohereat

ocrati,

cilicet

uod pse

Socratesst

psum uod

albedine

st ffectum.

And they ttend nlyto thecoupling f theessence f the foundation

[

=

substrate]

f he

whiteness

o

Socrates.

s

s

clear,

ndeed,

white',

hat,

s

regards

henomination

nly,

s

ntransitively

oupled

o

Socrates,

ignifies

he

sole foundation

y

naming

it

,

whereas it

signifies

the

whiteness

y

determining

t s

being

n the

oundation,

ithout

aming

t. Hence

hose

who

attend

o

he

orcef he ntransitiveonstruction

ainly

egard

he

onjunction

of

he

hings

amed

y

which he

ntransitiveonstruction

s

performed,

o that

the

grammatical

ense

s that he

ubstrate

f

he

whiteness,

n the

manner

f

substantialness,

nheresn

Socrates,hat,

amely,

ocrates

imselfs

ust

that

which

s

affected

y

thewhiteness.

The (false) sentence Socrates est albedo' ('Socrates is

whiteness')

is

explained

by

the

grammarians

n

a similar

way.

That

is,

there s a

similar

essential

coupling,

in

this case

of whiteness to Socrates

{ibid.

272,

21-31).

The

dialecticians,

however,

(still

in

the

view of

Master

William)

take

both

cases as

predication

and, therefore,

as an

'inherence of

adjacence'

and 'inherence of

essence',

respectively,

ak-

ing

'inherentia'

in

a

larger

sense both

ranging

over the inherence of

an essential

nature

and that of an

accidental characteristic.

Thus,

everyproposition

has

a

dual

sense,

one dialectical

focussing

on

the

inherenceofP in S

,

the other

grammatical

which concernsessential

coupling

{ibid.

272,31-273,3).

48

An

ntransitive

onstruction,

r

oupling,

asdefined

after

he

rammarians,

.g.

Priscian

nst.gramm.

I

8, 552,

26-7

nd

11,555,

13)

as

a

coupling

n

which

here

is

no

transition

rom

ne

hing

'subject')

o

nother

'object');

.g.

D.

166,

16-9: f.

Gl.

er.

61,15-7

nd

362,39-363,

. For

parallel

iews

n

grammatical

iscussions

about

henature

nd

function

f est'

the

onjunction

f essentiae'

.a.),

seeMews

[1986],

ff.,

sp.

n.27-8,

where

e also refers

o

papers y

Hunt,

Fredborg

nd

Kneepkens.49 Nominado' r

appellatio'

s the signification'f

particular.

f.

above,

.

86.

50

.e. it

does

not

ignify

he

particular

hiteness

nhering

n Socrates.

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So

much for

Master

William's view

of

predication.

Abelard

rejects

any

distinctionbetween

a

dialectical and a

grammatical

sense

and is

even

of the

opinion

that n

spite

of

their

diverse

formulasthe

dialecti-

cian

and the

grammarian

have

quite

the same

thing

in

view.

{ibid.

273,37-274,13).

To

his

mind,

every predicative

proposition

contains

and

asserts

('continet

et

poniť)

a

certain mode

of

inherence. He

explains:

Gl.

op.

274,14-23:

eluti

ec:

Socrates sthomo'

determinate

determinare

MS)

monstrat

ominem ssentialiter

nesse

Socrati,

dest Socratem

sse

hominem;

t

sta

uoque

propositio:

Socrates

st lbus'

determinatam

deter-

minativa

S)

inherentiam

roponit,

cilicet

sive

MS)

quantum

d

essentiam

albedinis

animalis S):

quippe

t

albedinem

n

adiacentia

opulat

antum

t

subiectumn essentia. uippeubi Socrates icitur sse ipsum ubiectum

albedinis

animalis

S),

simul

stenditur

pse

lbedine diacenter

adiacentie

MS)

affici.

t duo

Socrati

opulari

copulare

S)

videnturs

lbedo

uidem

n

adiacentia,

ubiectumlbedinis

animal

MS)

in

essentia.

E.g.

this ne:

Socratess

a

man'

declares

yway

f

determinationhatmans

in

Socrates

n

the

mannerf

ubstantialness,

.e.

that

ocrates

s-a-man'

nd

this

proposition

qually:

Socratess

white'

ronounces

determinate

nherence,

iz.

in

view f he

ubstantialnessf

whiteness:

or,

learly,

t

couples

he

whiteness

in

adjacence

nly

nd

the

ubstrate

ubstantially.

f

course,

here

ocrates

s

said o be the

ery

ubstrate

f

the

whiteness,

e s

simultaneously

eclared o

be

adjacently

ffected

y

he

whiteness.

nd t eems hat

wo

hings

re

oupled

toSocrates,iz. thewhitenessdjacently,nd the ubstratefthewhiteness

substantially.

As in

his

Perihermeneias

ommentary

Abelard now

introduces

the

notion

of

speaker's

intention':

only

whiteness s

predicated,

although

it

s

not the

only

thing oupled,

because

'white', too,

is

coupled.

How-

ever

one

should

not

call 'the

thing

predicated'

that

thing

which is

coupled

to

the

subject,

but

solely

the one

which

the

(framer

of

the)

proposition

ntends

to

couple.

Our

author

repeats

his

complaint

about

the

absence of

a

properlycopulative

verb:

Gl.

Top.

74,28-39:

icut

album',

hoc

nomen,

e

Socrate

nuntiatum

axime

in

significationem

lbedinis

oniungende

ubiecto

onitur,

uia

s

qui

proposi-

tionem

roferì,

antum

lbum nesse

ocrati t

formam

stendere

ntendit.

t,

si

verbum

aberet

uod

posset opulare

lbedinem

antum

ocrati,

umquam

ad

subiectum

lbedinis

eniret.ed

quoniam

olum

ubstantivum

subiectum

MS]

verbum

et

nuncupativum,uando

in

substantivum

subiectum

S]

resolvitur)

liquas

res

coniungereer

predicationem

onstat,

ubstantivum

[subiectum

S]quia

omnia n

ssentia

ignificai,

ine

oniunctione

ssentie

ro-

ferri on

potest.

portet

bique liqua

ssentialiter

er

ubstantivum

subiec-

tum

MS]

verbum

opulari.

E.g.the ounwhite'whennunciatedf ocratessmainlysed osignifyhe

conjunction

f

he

whiteness

ith

he

ubject,

ecausewhoever

roffers

propo-

sition

nly

ntendso

declare hat

whites n

Socratess hisform.

nd

fhe

had

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a verb hat ould

ouple

ust

the

whiteness

o

Socrates,

e would ever

ay

finger

n the

ubstratef thewhiteness.

ut,

since t

is

plain

hat

nly

he

substantive

erb

and

the

nuncupative

hen t s resolved

nto he

ubstantive)

conjoinertainthings'hroughredication,he ubstantiveerb annot epro-ferred ithouthe

onjunction

f ubstantialnessecause t

ignifies

verything

in

ubstantialness.

So> it

s

nevitable,

hat,

n

ll

cases,

hrough

he

ubstan-

tive erb

ome

hings

re

coupled

n

the

manner f

ubstantialness.

Finally

Abelard sketches

what

goes

on

semantically

s a result f

the

inadequacy

of the

copulative

verb,

which

really

does

its

ob,

but

not

without

doing something

lse which is

not called

for,

viz. to

substan-

tially couple

the

whiteness

or

some other

form)

as well:

Gl.

Top.

74,39-275,7:

tvero lbedo nessentia ere

opulari

on

otest.

nde

cumsuppliedy he cribe]dfundamentumpsius enimusuodnon n ssen-tia substantivi

subiecti

S]

verbi

opulamus,

lbedinisimul

similiter

S'

adiacentiam

uam

intendimus

ndicamus,

um videlicet

roponimuspsum

Socratem

sse

psum

ubiectumlbedinis

animal

S'.

Et icet uo

copulentur,

fundamentumcilicet

n

essentia

t

albedo

n

adiacentia,

ola

albedo

amen

predicari

icitur,

uia

sola

opulari

ntenditur

intenduntS'

et

propter

opula-

tionemius antum

ropositio

it;

t

predicatum

ocabulum axime

n

ignifica-

tionem

ius

subiecto

opulatur,

uia

tantum d

subiectionemlbedinis

ostendendam

ubiecto

oniungitur.

However,

hitenessannot

ruly

e

coupled

n themanner f ubstantialness.

Therefore,

hen

we

arrive t

the

oundation

f

hat

hich

e do not

ouple

n

the

manner

f

ubstantialness

xpressedy

the

ubstantive

erb, y

the

ame

token edesignatehe djacence e ntendto

designate

,viz.whenwepro-

nounce hat

ocrates imself

s

the

ery

ubstratef hewhiteness.

nd

lthough

two <

'things'

are

coupled,

iz the

foundation

n

substantialnessnd the

whiteness

n

adjacence,

evertheless

nly

hewhitenesss said o

be

predicated,

since hat lone s

intended

o be

coupled

nd t

s

only

n

view

f

ts

oupling

that he

roposition

s

framed;

nd

the

redicated

erm51s

mainly

oupled

ith

the

ubject

n

order o

signify

t

i.e. whiteness],

ince

t

s

conjoined

ith he

subject

nly

or

esignating

he ubstrate

fthewhiteness.

So,

again

we

see Abelard

proposing

to

split up

the semantic field

of

'album' into

ts two

strata,

viz. the

characteristic' nd its

foundation'

or 'substrate'.

5.5

The

Discussion

f

Predication

n the

Dialéctica

In the

Dialéctica Abelard is still

primarily

oncerned with

the wor-

risome

contrast

between

conjunction

and

predication

which,

from

he

operational point

of

view,

amounts to

the conflict

between

the

linguistic

apparatus

of the

proposition

and the

speaker's

intention.

The

outcome

of

the

longish

treatment f the

problem

as

reported

n

51

Viz.

thewordwhite'

'album').

Abelard lludes

o the

ual emantic

unction

f

such

words,

o

refer,

amely,

oth

o a

characteristicnd ts ubstrate.

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the

Logica

ngredientibus

both

in

Gl.

Per.

and

in

Gl.

Top.)

was,

roughly

speaking,

that the

framer

f

a

proposition

ntends

only

to

predicate

a

form

nd

actually

does

so,

but

not

without,

besides

adjacentlycoupl-

ing

that

form,

lso

conjoining

ts substrate

n

terms

of

substantialness.

When

taking

up

that

discussion

in

the

Dialéctica

(at

129,2

ff.)

Abelard

begins

by

rejecting

the view of those

who

reduce

predication

to the

adjacent

oupling only,

thus

ignoring

the natural

(and quite

inevitable)

conjunction

in

terms

of

substantialness.

So

they

claimed

that

n

'Peter is

white'

whiteness lone is attributed o Peter as

some-

thing djacent,

since

that s the

only

thing

the

framer f that

proposi-

tion

intends to

do

(

D .

131,26-33).

Abelard

replies

that,

quite

to the

contrary, hepredicationwhich concerns the substratef the whiteness

which is

named

by

the

predicate

noun

'albus',

pertains

to the true

sense

of

the

proposition

as

well as the

proper

function

f the

substan-

tive verb

rather than

to

the

predication

concerning

the

adjacence

f

whiteness

which

is

only

connoted

by

the

predicate

noun.

In

fact,

he

argues:

D.

131,36-132,6:

um enim

liquem

icimus sse

lbum,

ocest

roponimus

ipsum

sse

liquem

x his

que

albedine

nformantur,

ecundum

opulationem

essentiellud

uod

esse

dicitur

roprie er

est'

verbum

redicatur,

ocest

es

albedinenformata.ed

quoniam

er

albi' nomen

psum

ttribuitur

esignaturquod ei ex adiacentelbedinempositumst,ex ipsa quoquepropositione

inherentiadiacentislbedinisnnuitur.lia

taque redicatio

ssentie

ue

n eo

est

uod

hoc

llud

sse

icitur,

roprie

x

verbis

ropositionisxprimitur;

liavero

que

est

diacentie

ttributio,

uodammodo

nnuitur.

For

when

we

ay

hat

omebody

s

white

i.e.

whenwe

pronounce

hat e s one

of

hose

things'

hat re nformed

y

whiteness),

hen,

egarding

he

oupling

of

ubstantialness,

t

s that hich

2

s said

o

be thats

properly

redicatedy

he

verb

is',

namely

he

thing

nformed

y

thewhiteness.

owever,

ince

he

expression

thename white'

f

ll names53s

attributed"

s used

o

show hat

it s

imposed

n

that

hing

n

view

f

the

djacent

hiteness,

he nherencef

the

djacent

hiteness

s also

mplied

y

the

proposition

tself.

herefore,

he

predicationf ubstantialnesshichonsistsn ayingthiss thaťbAsthatwhich

is

properlyxpressed

y

the

words f

a

proposition,

hereas he

predication

whichs the

ttribution

f

djacence

s

somehow

mplied.

There

is

something

remarkable

about

Abelard's

rejection

of

the

opponents'

view

inasmuch

as

it

nicely

suits

his own intention o rule

52

n

my

view llud

uod

s

the

predicate

oun n llud

uod

sse

icitur

ather

han

ts

subject

as

Kretzmann

akes t

[1982]:

03).

Cf. the

phrase

hoc

llud sse'.

53

Albi omen

psum

'precisely

he

ame white'. belard

means o

ay

hat

lthough

the

ubstratenvolveds the

main

emantic

ngredient

fthe

ememe,

hename

y

means fwhicht s named s alsoof omemportance.

Abelard ntends o

point

out thatthe

proposition

rimarily

oncerns

hings

themselves

atherhan

heir

roperties.

117

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out the

unwanted role

of the

copulative

verb.

However,

as we

can see

from the

last

quotation,

Abelard

sticks to the

Log.Ingred

view,

and

even

gives

essential

conjunction'

a

clear

priority

o

4

adjacent predica-tion'.

Quite

naturally

our author

goes

on to

attempt

o take

away

the

bad

consequences

of the dominant

position

of the

essential

conjunc-

tion'.

His

move is

quite

ingenious. Taking up

an idea

prompted

earlier

in

the

Glossae

up.

Periherm

55 he

sets out to

empty

the

very

notion

of

substantialness'

'essentia')

in

stripping

t

of

any

thing-like'

content.

In

fact,

est'

developes

into

an

open spot

which

stands itself

only

for

there-being-

n-x

or

y'

Abelard

explains

this

aspect

of the

copulative

use

of

the substantiveverb

as

its

secondary

sense,

which s

opposed to theprimarysense it has when it is used as a full-fledged

verb of

existence.

He embeds

the

novel view

in

a

general

consideration

of the

verb

used

in

a

statement-making

tterance:56

D.

134,28-135,1:

on st utem

llud

retermittendumuod

verba

n enuntia-

tionibus

osita

modo

proprie,

odo

per

accidens

redican

icuntur.

roprie

autem

redicantur

oc

modo:

Petrus

st',

Petrus

urriť;

ic

nim

emina

i

funguntur,

umnon

olum

opulandi

fficium

enent,

ed

etiam ei

predicate

significationem

abent.

er

accidens

utem t non

proprie redicari

icitur,

cum

psum

redicato

d eiustantum

opulationem

pponitur,

ta: Petrus

st

homo'.

Neque

nim ic

nterpositum

uoque

rem

redicatam

ontinet

quippe

iam

homo'

uperflueupponeretur),

edtantum

uod

ubiungitur

redicatum

copulat.Nec i am liquid reterominemn pso sset ttributum,neodem

loco

hominem'

opularet

ubiunctum.

Now

that

must

ot

be

overlooked

hat erbs sed

n

statements

re said to be

predicated

roperly

n

some ccasions

nd

secondarily57

n

others.

hey

re

predicatedroperly

n

this

way:

Peter

s',

'Peterruns'.For

here

hey

re

engaged

n

double orce

nthat

hey

o

not

nly

erform

he unction

f

oupl-

ing,

but lso bearthe

ignification

f he

thing'

redicated.

owever,

t

the

verb

is']

is

said

o

be

predicated

econdarily

nd not

roperly

hen t s added

to the

redicate

erm or he ole

purpose

f

oupling

t,

s in Peter s a

man'.

For

in this

case

the

interposed

erb

does

not also contain

he

'thing'

55

When

ommenting358, 1-19)

pon

Aristotle'sssertion

at

De

interpr.

6b23-4;

see

Arist.Latinus

d

loc.):

by

itself

is'

is

nothing".

f.

Gl. er.

49,16-350,39.

56

am

afraid hatKretzmann

s

wrong

n

thinking

1982:504]

that t this

oint

Abelardeaves he

roject

f

unified

heoryovering

oth

he is' secundumdiacens

and

ertiumdiacens.e seems o

gnore

n this

core

hat ll

verbs

may

e used ither

properly

primarily)

r

improperly

secondarily);

.g.

'ridet'

'laughs')

n Petrus

rideť

'Peter aughs')

nd

pratum

idet'

'the

meadow

s in

bloom').

57

When

he

oppositionproprie'

s

per

accidens' s

used,

per

accidens'

quals

'improprie'

see

134,

32-3],

r secundario'r

transsumptive'

r

diminutive'

nd

the

ike,

nd tands

or

word

eing

sed

n diminished

ense,

.e. when

nly

ome

of he onstitutiveotionsf tspropermeaningre nvolved.eeesp.Gl. er. 62,

4-9where

per

ccidens's

glossed:

idest

ecundooco'andthe

quivalents

f

pro-

prie'

re

principaliter'

nd

primo

oco'.

118

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predicated

then, ndeed,

man' would

e

supplied

uperfluously

insteadt

only

ouples

he

redicate

ubjoined.

nd

f

omething

ther

hanman'

would

be

attributed

s

containednthe

erb 'is'

>

,

itwould ot

imultaneously

ou-

plethe ubjoinedman'.

Of

course,

the crux

ies in the

meaning

of

res

predicata'.

Well,

by

the

'thing

predicated'

one

has to

understand,

it

seems,

what

is tradi-

tionally

alled

the

pragma

r 'res verbi'.58

n the

grammatical

radition

the 'res verbi' is

also

called

'substantia verbi'.

In

L.N. P.

532,

34,

Abelard

apparently

also uses that

term so

common with the

grammarians.59

ee

e.g.

Peter

Helias,

Summa n Priscianumminorem

61,75-62,29

(ad

XVII,

35)

and

65,40-67,95

(erf

XVII,

37-8).

Helias

is all the more nteresting,incehe describes the substantia erbif esse'

as "to

signify

a

thing'

as

underlying

forms nd

as 'unitive

of

all

kind

of

forms"

(61, 75ff.).60

In

the

next lines

Abelard refers to Aristotle's use

of

the

label,

'accidental

predication'

in De

interpr.

1, 21a25-6,

where 'Homer is

something

ay,

a

poet'

is

instanced

and the

predication

of is' is called

accidental,

since

here it does not

have its full

sense;

"for

it is

because

he is a

poet,

not

n his

own

right,

hat

the

is' is

predicated

of

Homer".

I

cannot see

why

Kretzmann calls

this

development

astonishing

[1982: 505]: the substantiveverb still signifies essentia' but after

closer

inspection

and

adapting

the

empty

(or

variable)

'is' from

Aristotle,

Abelard comes

to the

insight

hat

he has to

refine he

notion

of

'substantialness'.

Indeed,

the substantive

verb

when it

is used

as

copula:

D.

135,4-8:

..

predicato

pponitur

d

ipsum

antum

opulandum

ec

pro

subiectae

predicanda

onitur,

ed

uttantum

opulet

d

quod

predicatur.

um

autem

roprie

icitur,

em tiam

redicatam

ontinet

tque aliquam

erum

existentiumndeterminate

ttribuit,

elut

um

dicitur

Petrus

st',

hocest:

Petrus st liquade existentibusebus.

58

See

e.g.

Nuchelmans

19731,

7-50.

59

Cf.

Gl. er.

54,

1-3

where

he

es

ua

of

currere's

saidto be currens'

'the

a)

running

thing>);

see

alsoD.

120,

18-20

nd

133,

5-7.

60

See

Petrus

elias,

umman

Priscianum

inorem

ad

XVII, 35,

p.

61-62

d.

Toison);

Et

quia

hocvocabulum

esse'

ignificat

ubstantiam

t ibi nit

ormas,

nde st

uod

potest

ormas

opulare

ei

ubiecte.

t

ita substantivum

subiectum

oison] otest

copulare

liud

predicatum

xtra e

rei

subiecte,

um

nullum liud

verbum

isi

vocativumoc

possit

acere.

ullum nim

liud

vocabulum

pro erbum?]ignificatrem tunitivastformarumntere. [ ]. Cumergoesse'substantiamignificet

ut

unitiva ormarum

ibi

st,

deo

potest

omen

uod

ex forma

atum st

opulare

subiecto.

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... is

not

dded o

the

redicate

or he ole

purpose

f

oupling

t;

t s not

sed

for

redicating61

n

underlying

thing',

ut

nly

n

order o

conjoin

hat

which

is

predicated.

hen,

n

the

ther and t s

used

properly,

t

containslso

the

thing redicatednddeterminatelyttributesneof the hingshat xist, swhen ne

says

Peters', that

s,

Peter s one ofthe

hings

hat xist.

It

should be noticed

and objected

to

Kretzmann'

s too

strict istinc-

tions between

several

Abelardian

'

theories'

that

quite

the same

view

of the

copula

is

already

found at

362,32-4

in the

Glossae

super

Perihermeneias

Gl. er.

62,

32-4:

Unde

nterpositum

ertium

il

ignificationis

n

se

tenet

uod

intellectus

opulet

ed tantum em

redicati

uppositi.

Hencewhen

is'

is

nterposed

s a third

lementt

has

nothing

f

signification

in twhichhentellectould ouple ut nlyhething'f he redicatedded.

So

when

speaking

of

an

'indeterminate

attribution'

Abelard

establishes his view

of 'is' as

an

empty

container.

Whenever

4s'

couples

non-existent ntities

as

in 'a chimera

is

conceivable')

it

does

not even have

any

signification

f

substantialness

t

all

and

just

serves

as a

copula,

Abelard

argues:

D.

135,18-23:

t vero

ueritur,

um est'

verbum

uperius

ictumit

nde62

quaslibet

ssentias

opulareuod

omnes res>

in

essentia

ignificat,

uomodo

ilia

potest opulare uorum ignificationem

on

ontinet,

eluti

<non>

ens'

aut opinabile', uod propriecceptumolanon-existentia,t nobis lacuit,

nominat;

ut

uomodo

onstructionis

roprietas

ervari

oterit,

isi

ntransitive

ipsum

uoque

his

que copulai

oniungatur?

However,

heres

a

question.

ince he

erb is'

was aid

bove o

couple

ny

kinds f

ssentiaehatoever

or

hat

ery

eason hat t

ignifies

ll

things

n the

manner f

ubstantialness,

ow, hen,

an t

couple

hings

he

ignification

f

whicht doesnot ontainuch s

a

'non

being'

r

what s

ust

conceivable',

which,

roperly

sed,

n our

view,

esignates

on-existents

lone;

r

how an

the

pecial

haracterf he

onstruction

e

preserved

nlesst

=

the erb

is']

is also

ntransitively

onjoined

ith

he

hings

t

couples?

Indeed, when being mindful of what he has continouslyclaimed

about the substantive

verb as

naturally

signifying

substantialness'

Abelard cannot

escape

admitting

chimaeras

or

dead

persons

like

Homer

to

the

scene.

He starts

with

recalling

earlier

attempts

o solve

the

problem,

among

which

the one

given by

his

Master and

his own

61

n

renderingpredicating/or

n

underlying

eality"

retzmanneems

o

gnore

the

erundivum

onstruction

ro

e

redicanda

obe

equal

othe

unusual)

erundium

construction

ro redicando

em.

62 ndeMS, Englishhencewronglyhangednto ntern myedition;inde ..

quod'

=

'for he

very

eason

..

that',

cf.English

hence ..

because').

The same

constructions found

t D.

138,9.

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earlier

argument

n

defence

of

t.

First,

he

renews the

rejection

of some

people's63

claim that n

'Homerus est

poeta'

('Homer

is a

poet')

'est'

is

used

to refer

o non-existents.But

in

that

case,

Abelard

asks,

what

kind of

being

is involved?64

Therefore,

he now returns

o the former

view of his Master "that the

predication

was

improper,

not

because

of the verb but

because

of the

figurative

nd

improper

way

of

express-

ing

performed

y

the

grammatical

construction aken as a whole"

(

D .

135,29-31),

which

makes the

composite

expression

have a

sense dif-

ferent rom

hose of the

separate

words. So

'Homer is a

poet'

is

a

true

sentenceonce

'to-be-a-poeť

is taken

for

one

construction

n

which

the

word

'poet',

to some

extent,

also refers

o the

poem

still extant

(

D .

135,32-136,13, where at 135,33 signijicatorumhould be read sin-

gularum).

Next,

Abelard recalls

an

objection

and the answer

he

used

to

give

in

defence of his Master's

view. The

objection

runs: if

Homer is

a

poet'

is

an

improper

ocution one

may

ask whom the

sentence

s

speak-

ing

about.

If

about

Homer,

the assertion

s

false,

since

Homer

is

dead;

if

about

his

poem,

there s no

reason to

deny

its existence or to con-

sider the

construction n

improper

one.

(D.

136,

14-8).

The

support

Abelard

used to

give

his Master

earlier consisted

in

profiling

the

'entire-construction' iew in greaterdetail:

D.

136,22-6:

t

vero um

totius onstructionis

ententia

ensatur

c simul65

verba

n

sensu lterius

nuntiationis

onfunduntur,

on am

singularum

ic-

tionum

ignificado

ttendenda

st,

sed tota

magis

orationis ententia

intelligenda;

tque

n

eo

impropria

icitur

rationis onstructio

uod

eius

sententiax

significatione

artium

on

venit.

However,

hen

he

meaning

f

he ntire

rammatical

onstructions

pondered

and

thewords

re

mixed

ogether

n

the ense

f he

lternate66

ssertion,

hen

it s no

onger

he

ignification

f

he

eparate

ords hat hould e attended

o;

rather,

hewhole

meaning

f the

xpression

hould e

understood.nd the

grammaticalonstructionf he xpressionscalledmpropernthattsmeaning

doesnot

omefrom he

ignification

f ts

parts.

ee

also

D

169,4-24.

63

The

quidem

f

the

dition

135, 34)

is

a

misprint

or

uidam.

64

Kretzmanns

definitely

rong

n

reading

is or a

in

135,

7:

Sed

quid

rgo

sse

ea

negat?'),

s the

Latin eads

iterally:

them

o

be

what,

e

denies',

wherethem'

(ea)

s

subject

ccusativuso

the nfinitive

sse.

cf.

nglish:

I

take

im o

be such-and-

such').

See alsoD.

136,

16-7: cur

esseet

psumnot, psi) enegetur".

65

imul

'together'

to

be

takenwith

onfunduntur)

atherhan at

the ame

ime'

(Kretzmann).

66The equivalentssertions meantwhichmore ccuratelyxpresses hat he

speaker

means o

say,

uch

s

'fama

Homēri

er

poesim

psius

maneť

alternates

'Homerus st

poeta';

ee D.

136,

2.

121

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Some

lines further

n,

the sentence

'a

chimaera is

conceivable' is

interpreted long

the

same

lines.

Abelard himself eels

nspired,now, by

the

way

he

(and

his

Master,to some

extent)

tackledthe

problem

of

predication

and he undertakes

a

fresh

move in

defending,

this time

along

the

very

same

lines of the

'entire-construction'

iew,

an

improper

use of 'is'

for

all

its

occur-

rences as a

copula.

Along

the same

lines, indeed,

since

he

goes

on to

exploit

a

concomitantfeature

of the

improper

use'

explanation

of the

chimaera

case;

viz. to take 'is'

together

with the

predicated

noun

as

a

single redicate

such as in

'to-be-a-man',

to-be-a-chimera'

Now,

the

existential

mport

is associated

with the

noun

predicated:

D. 136,37-137,6:tveromichi mnis lia verbi redicadoer ccidenstque

impropria

idetur

uando psum

...]

tertiumdiacens

nterponitur,

umnon

«em

..

]

predicatam

ontineat

ed olius

opule

fficium

abeat,

t

nea

quoque

qua

diciturPetrus

st

homo el lbus'.

Nec

quidem uantum

d

eius

nterpreta-

tionem

ertinet

x eo

quod

dicitur

Petrus st

homo'

nferri

otest:

Petrus

st',

sed

fortasse

uantum

d

predicationem

hominis',

uod

existentis

eitantum

nomen st.

"But

every

uch

predication

f

the

verb eems

o me to be

secondary

nd

improper,

henever

t s

third

djacent...].

For

...]

itdoesnot ontain

he

hing

predicated

nd

only

has the

function

f

the

opula,

lso

e.g.

here: Peter

s a

man',

r Peter

s

white'.

nd

he nference

romPeter

s a man'

to

Peter s'

doesnot ertaino henterpretationviz. ny utativexistentialmport]f he

verb

ut,

erhaps,

othe

predication

f man'

which

s

thename f n existent

entity

nly. Cf.

D.

122,22ff.,

uoted

bove

2.3).

A

final

objection

is made about

the

label

'improper

use'.

Our

author

argues

that t is

not

so

pejorative

as it

may

sound,

once one

has

accepted

his

suggestion

to take

the 'is'

plus predicate

as one

single

sememe:

D.

138,5-17:

t vero

quomodo

ocutio

ropria

icetur

bi

predicatio

erbi

impropria

ueritecearn

n

qua

inventum

st

ignificationem

enuerit?

eque

enimnventumuitnofficioolius opulationiserum imul...] insignifica-

tione

xistentium;

uod

etiam

...]

inde

quelibet

uibuslibetopulare

otest

quod

omnibus

hominibus

S,

nominibus

d)67

ecundum ssentiam

uam

impositum

st.

Sed

cur ad eorum

uoque

nherentiam

onitur

ue

non unt

atque

in

ipso

non

continentur?nde

michi,

i

profiteri

udeam,

llud

rationabiliusideturtrationiufficerealeamus

t cilicet

...]

cum

icitur

est

67

Kretzmann

eems

o

be

right

n

rejecting y eading

in

my

ditionf he ialéc-

tica)

nominibusince nominibus

mpositum

st' is rather wkward.t should e

recalled

see apparatus

riticusd

loc.)

that

he

MS readshominibushich ften

s

mistakenn MSSfornominibuse.g. Gl. er. 47,12)as well s for mnibusKretz-

mann's

onjecture

ebuss

paleographically

nattractive.

ne

should

ather

hange

impositum

nto

nterpositum

r

otherwiseead

mnibus

nstead

f

hominibus,

think.

122

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homo'vel

est

opinabile'

el est

album',

ro

uno

verboesse

hominem'68el

'essealbum' el esse

opinabile'

ntelligamus.

Buthow

s one to call a locution

roper

n which he

predication

f heverb s

impropernd< the erb doesnot etainhe ignificationnview fwhichtwasinvented?or t = to

be]

was

nventedot

n

view

f he

unctionf

oupling

alonebut

simultaneously

...] signifying

xistents;

t can

couple

nything

o

anything

hatsoever

ust

because thasbeen

mposed

o all of

hemn view f

their

ubstantialness.

ut

why

s tused or

expressing

the

nherencef lso

those

hings

hat

renot nd

that re

not containedn it s

signification

?

Therefore,

f

may

enture

o declaret

openly:

n order o

be able to

satisfy

reasont seems o

me more

easonable,

hat

...]

when

ne

says

is a man'or

'is

conceivable'r

is white'we

understandtas one

erb:

to-be-a-man'r

to-

be-white'

r

to-be-thinkable'.

6

Conclusion

Upon

surveying

Abelard' s

investigations

about

sentencehood it

may

be

stated that it

certainly

developed

gradually

and,

as a

result,

so

to

speak,

of

our

author's

continuously

crutinizing

he

recalcitrant

problems

concerning

the

ways

in

which,

in

our

linguistic

behaviour,

we

deal with

the vital

problem

of

being.

First,

Abelard

makes us

recognize

the

peculiar

nature of

the

substantiveverb

4

to be'

('esse'), peculiar

indeed,

since

it is the

onlyverb that s

capable

of

conjoining

but,

at thesame

time,

when

serving,

thus,

as

a

device for

predication,

conveys,

due to its

proper

nvention,

the

notion of

substantialness'

'essentia').

As

was said

before

above,

p.

109),

Abelard' s

entire

discussion

of

the

problem

is

ostensibly

on-

cerned

with

mastering

he

antagonism

between

coupling

and

predica-

tion.

First,

he

considers the

vicissitudes

the

predicate

noun

cannot

escape

undergoing

as

the

very

result of

this

antagonism

and

finds a

remedy

in

splittingup

the

different trata

present

in

nouns

such as

'album' ('the or a white <thing>'). In thisendeavour, thechimaera

and the

like

(the

'non-existents')

turn

out to

be

a

real

spoil-sports.

In the Dialéctica

then,

Abelard

maintains,

a

a

whole,

his

previous

position

which

is

found

in

two

parts

of

the

Logica

Ingredientibus

viz.

the

Perihermeneias

ommentary

nd

the one

on

Boethius De

topicis

if-

ferentiis

,

but

sets on

to refine

t

n

that

he

gives

the

coupling

f

substan-

tialness'

a

predominant

position

over and

against

the

predication

f

a

(substantial

or

accidental)

form.

However,

he

aptly

combines this

68Of ourse, retzmann'shangingheMSreadingessehominem'ntoessehomo'

is a serious

mistake

gainst

atin

diomwhich

trictly

equires

n accusative

the

o-

called

subject-accusative')

n

such

phrases.

123

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move

(quite

unavoidably,

it

may

seem)

with

a

subtle

emptying

f

the

notion of

essentia'

('substantialness'),

with

the

result

that,

fromnow

on,

'est'

(4s')

has

developed

into

a

mere container

meaning

'undeter-

mined

substantialness')

for 're-al'

('thing-like')

content

or sememe)

conveyed by

a

predicate

noun

(which

also

may

be a

participle

of

an

ordinary

verb).

An additional result s

that,

on this

nterpretation,

he

existential

mport

eems

to come from

he

predicate

noun,

so that

our

chimaera is

no

longer

a

spoil-sport.

Finally,

the

empty-container

iew

of the

copula

is

completed

by

Abelard' s

suggestion

o take the is'

plus

the

predicate

noun

as

merely

one

linguistic

construct.

Kretzmann

[1986:

493 and

passim]

takes

the

stages

in which

Abelard

developed

his view of

predication

forthreedifferent

heories,

the first

f which

occurs

in an

original

version

and

a

revision,

while

the

third

is no

more than

a

suggestion.

He even views

them in a

chronological

order

(the

'

Ingredientibus

heory',

the

'

DialécticaRevi-

sion'

thereof,

he

'

Dialéctica

Theory'

and

the Dialéctica

Suggestion').

Jacobi

seems to

be

quite right

in

rejecting

[1986: 171]

any

chronological rrangement

f

thatkind. He

is of the

opinion

that

"the

array

of

different heories

n Abelard' s work

s

not to

be

explained

in

chronological

terms"

{ibid.).

To

my

mind,

one

should

not

even

speak

of "different heories" on this score. Our texts rathershow a con-

tinuous

discussion

in

which

Abelard himself

s

making proposals

and

attempting

ertain

solutions

to the

questions

raised, and,

quite

in

line

with his

undertaking,

he himself

s

always

the

main

objector.

One should

notice,

in

this

connection,

that

what Kretzmann

calls

the

Ingredientibusheory'

is

foundon

about one

page

of the

Log.Ingred.

(360,13-361,20)

and the

'

Dialéctica

Revision'

plus

the

'

Dialéctica

Theory'

plus

the

'

Dialéctica

Suggestion'

occur

in less

than 10

(suc-

cessive) pages

of the

Dialéctica

so

that

one

might

think f

temporal

dif-

ferences,f ny, betweenthe atter hreeof ust a fewdays, so to speak.

Besides,

Kretzmann failed

to see

that

each

new

move

mainly

consisted

in an alternate evaluation

of some

element taken

from

former

iews.

More

importantly,

Kretzmann did not

regard

it

as a

special

difficulty

to his view

that

both the

notion of

coupling

as

expanded

in

the

Dialéc-

tica

'

"is"

merely

onjoins')

and

the

Dialéctica

uggestion

take

'to-be-

a-man'

as

just

one

dictio)

are

explicitly

found

in

the

Log.

Ingre-

dientibus69

69

See above,p. 92. Kretzmannuggests509,n. 62) that he ocationf some

similar

assage

nthe

og.Ingred.

4could aise urther

uestions

bout he

hronology

of

Abelard's

ritings

r

about

hehistorical

evelopment

fhis

hought".

owever,

124

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I

think,

one had better

regard

the

whole

discussion

of

predication

in

Abelard

as

exclusively

focussing

upon

the

problems

generated by

the relations

between

'predication'

and

'copulation'.70

Its outcome

can indeed ratherbe viewed as the result

of

Abelard' s own

procedure

of

'tried

nd

error'.71

However this

may

be,

Abelard'

s

achievements

in

semantics are

astonishingly

reat

and even remained

unparallelled

for centuries.

Filosofisch

nstituut,

P.O.

Box

9515,

Leiden

he seems ocome loser

o

the ruthn

thinking

hat it s most

aturally

nterpreted

as

an

earlier

xpression

f desideratum

hose

mportance

ecame learer o him

after e had

seen he

problems

eneratedy

his

heories

fthe

ubstantiveerb

s

the

copula"

ibid.),

n

spite

f his

speaking

f theories'where abels uch as

'theoretical oves' r tentative

iews'

would

do

far

better,

t

might

eem.

For

remarkable

arallel

evelopments

n

ccount

f

Abelard'

theory

f

predication

nhis

theological

nd other

orks,

ee Mews

1985]

nd

19861,

assim.

70

Cf.

Kretzmann,

03.To

my

mind,

ny

hoice etween

wo-piece

nd

three-piece

predicationent,

s

such, evond belard's ocus f nterest.ee also bove, . 103.

'

'

(

>

71Asforhat, retzmannidwell ee 506), hat belard idnot fferositiveup-

port

or he

Dialéctica

heory'

nd, nstead,

aised

ome

ecisive

ounterarguments

himself.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A.

Abbreviations:

exts

f

Medieval uthors

Abelard

.

=

Petrus

baelardus

ialéctica.

irst

omplete

dition f theParisian

Manuscript,

ith n Introduction

y

L.

M.

de

Rijk,

Ph.

D.

Assen

970

-

Ed.

Cat.,

Ed.

Per.,

d.

or.,

d.

Div.,

Gl.

Top.

=

Scritti

i

logica:

NTRODUC-

TIONESDIALECTICAE:Editio

uper

orphyrium

Glossae

n

Categorias

Editio

super

ristoteleme

interpretatione

De divisionibus.

LOGICA

INGREDIEN-

TIBUS:

Super opica

lossaediti a

Mariodel

Pra,

Firenze

969

- Gl. at.,Gl. er.,Gl. or.= Bernard eyer. eter baelardshilosophischechriften,

I

Die

Logica

ngredientibus

n B.G.Ph.T.M.A.

Band

XXI,

1

Heft

-3

Münster

1919-27

-

L.N.P.

=

Id. Ibid.

I

Die

Logica

Nostrorum

etitioni

ociorum.ie

Glossen

u Por-

phyrius,

n

B.G.Ph.T.M.A.Band

XXI,

Heft

Petrus

elias,

n

Prise,

minoremThe

umma

f

etrus

elias

n

Priscianusinord.

James

E.

Toison,

with

n

introduction

y

Margaret

ibson.

Part

I,

in

CIMAGL,

27

Copenhagen

978

rnscianus:

nst.gramm.

rrisciani

rammatici

aesariensis

nstitutionum

rammaticarum

libri VIII ex recensione

artini

ertziiGrammaticiatini

x.

rec.

H.

Keilii

I,

III),

Lipsiae

855-59.

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В.

Abbreviations:

econdary

iterature

Jacobi

.

[1980]

Diskussionenber

rädikationstheorie

nden

ogischenchriften

es etrus

Abcelardus.ersuchiner

bersicht,

n:Petrusbœlardus

1079-142).

Person,

erknd

Wirkung,d. R. Thomas nTriererheologischetudien,d38,Trier 980,

165-179

-

[1981]=

Die Semantik

prachlicher

usdrücke,

usdrucksfolgen

nd

Aussagen

n

Abaelards

ommentaru Peri

ermeneias,

n:

Medioevo

(1981),

41-89

-

[1983]

Abelardnd

rege:

he

emantics

f

Words

nd

roposition,

n:Atti elCon-

vegno

nternazionale

i storia

ella

ogica.

an

Gimigniano

-8 decembre 982.

Bologna

983

-

[1986]

Peter

belard'

Investigations

ntohe

eaning

nd unctions

f

he

peech

sign

Est',

n: The

ogic f

eing.

istoricaltudies

dited

y

imoKnuuttila

nd

Jaako

Hintikka.

ynthese

istorical

ibrary,

ol.

28

Dordrechttc.

986

Jolivet,

.

[1969]

Arts u

angage

t

héologie

hez

bélard,

n: Etudes e

philosophie

médiévale7,Paris1969-

[1981]

Non-réalismet

latonisme

hez

bélard,

n: Abélardt on

emps.

ctes

du

colloque

nternational

rganisé

l'occasion

u 9e

centenaire

e

a naissance

de Pierre bélard

14-19

mai

1979),

d.

J. JolivetParis

1981),

75-195

Kneepkens,

. H.

[forthcoming]

Het udicium

onstructionis.

et eerstukande con-

structsn de tweede

elft an

de 12de

euw

Kretzmann,

.

[1982]

The ulmination

f

he

ld

ogic

nPeter

belard,

n:

Renaissance

andRenewal

n he

welfthentury

dited

y

Robert

. Bensonnd

Giles

onstable

with

arol

D. Lanham

xford

982

reprint985)

Lyons,

. [1977]

Semantics,

vols.

Cambridge

niv.Press.

Cambridge

tc.

977

(reprint

978)

Mews,

C.J.

[1985]

On

Dating

heWorks

f

eter

belard,

n: Archives'histoireoc-

trinalet ittéraireumoyen ge,Année 985 Paris1986), 3-134-

[

1

86]

ť

'Aspects

f

he volutionf eter belards

Thought

n

Significa-

tion nd

Predication",

n Actes

u

eptièmeymposium

uropéen

e

ogique

édiévale

(Poitiers

7-22

uin

1985):

Gilbert

ePoitiers

t

es

ontemporains.

aris 986

forth-

coming)

Nuchelrhans,

.

[197.3]

1heories

j

the

roposition.

ncientnd Medieval

oncep-

tions f

the

Bearers f

Truth

nd

Falsity.

msterdam973

Dal

Pra,

M.

[1969]

Introduzione,

n: Pietro

belardo,

critti

i

ogica,

irenze

1969,

XI-XXXIX

De

Rijk,

.

M.

[1967]

Logica

modernorum

I 1: The

Origin

nd

Early evelopment

ofthe

Theory

f

Supposition,

ssen 967.

-

[1970]

Introduction

o

Petrus

Abaelardus, ialéctica,

nd.

revised

dition

Assen 970, X-CII

-

[1970b]

Die

Bedeutungslehre

nder

ogik

es 3.

Jahrhunderts

ndhr

Gegenstück

in

der

metaphysischenpekulation,

n:

Miscellanea

ediaevalia,

(1970),

1-22

-

[1980]

The emantical

mpact

f

Abailard'solutiono he roblem

f

Universals,

in: Petrus

baelardus

1079-1142),

erson,

Werk

nd

Wirkungrsg

onRudolf

Thomas,

rierer

heologische

tudien

nd38 Trier

980,

39-51

-

[1981a]

Die

Wirkung

er

euplatonischen

emantik

uf

asmittelalterlicheenken

über as

Sein,

n:

Sprache

nd rkenntnismMittelalter

Miscellanea

ediaevalia)

Bnd

13,

1

Berlin tc.

1981),

19-35

-

[1981b]=

Abailard'semanticiewsn the

ight f

Later

evelopments,

n:

Englishogic

nd

emantics,

rom

he nd

of

the

welfth

entury

o

the

ime f

Ockham nd

Burleigh.

cts f the4th

European ymposium

n Mediaeval

Logic ndSemantics981,1-58

126

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-

[1985a]

La

philosophie

u

moyenge,

raduit u néerlandais

..

par

P.

Swig-

gers,

eyde

985

-

[1985b]

Martin

.

Tweedale

nAbailard.

ome

Criticismsf

Fascinating

Venture,n: VIVARIUM 23 1985),81-97-

[1986]

Plato's

Sophist.

A

Philosophical

ommentary.

oninklijke

Nederlandse

kademiean

Wetenschappen,

erhandelingen

fd. etterkunde.

Nieuwe

eeks 33Amsterdamtc.

1986)

Tweedale,

M. M.

[1976]=

Abailardn Universals.

ordrecht

981

-

[1982]

Abelardnd

he

ulmination

f

he

ld

ogic

in: The

ambridge

istory

of

ater edieval

hilosophy

romhe

Rediscovery

fAristotle

o he

isintegration

of Scholasticism100-1600

eds.

Norman

retzmann,

nthony

enny, an

Pinborg;

ssociate ditor leonore

tump).Cambridge

niv.

Press

1982,

143-57

127

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Vivarium

XIV,

2

(1986)

The Aristotelian

octrine

of

theMean

andJohn ofSalisbury's Concept f Liberty

CARY

J.

NEDERMAN

One tenet of conventional

wisdom

among

historians

of

medieval

moral

and

political philosophy

holds

that

the

dawn of

the thirteenth

century

marked the

beginning

of a

new

direction n

the

trajectory

f

social ideas. An intellectual reorientation is said to have been

necessitated

by

the

reintroduction nto the

West of

the

body

of Aristo-

tle's

writings

on

ethics and

politics.

It

is thus

commonplace

for

scholars to declare that Western

social

theory

underwent

concep-

tual revolution'

during

the

period

from

1200

(when fragments

f the

Nicomacheanthics ame

into

circulation)

until

1250

(by

which

date

the

whole

Politics eems to

have been

translated).

These five

decades are

taken to be a

watershed

n

the

development

of

European

philosophy.1

In

turn,

two

conclusions

are

ordinarily

rawn from

he

postulate

of an

Aristotelian revolution in the early thirteenth entury: first,after

about

1200,

and

certainly

by

1250,

the

foundations

of

ethical

and

political

thinking

n

Latin

Christendomwere

wholly

nd

irredeemably

Aristotelian;

and

second,

it

is

senseless to look

for the influence of

Aristotle's

deas

on moral and social

treatises

omposed prior

to

1200.

Although

these

canons of

nterpretation

ave

become

paradigmatic,

they

are

by

no

means

engraved

in

stone.

On the one

hand,

it

may

be

demonstratedthat even

the

most

Aristotelianof

thirteenth nd four-

teenth

century

authors were

often ess

indebted to

Aristotle

than to

other classical and medieval sources. Aristotle,once recovered, n no

way supplanted,

but

instead

supplemented,

the other

uthorities

pon

which the

Middle

Ages depended.2

On the other

hand,

Aristotle's

social ideas were not

entirely

unknown

to,

and

uninfluential

with,

1

It

would,

f

ourse,

e a massive

ndertaking

o document

ll of

he uthors

ho

have

dopted

his

iew. or

representativeampling,

ee: Walter

llman,

Medieval

Political

hought

Harmondsworth,

iddlesex

975,

p.

159;

Quentin

kinner,

he

Foundations

f

Modernolitical

hought

2

vols.,

ambridge

978, ,

pp.

50-1;

nd

Brian

R. Nelson,WesternoliticalhoughtEnglewoodliffs, J1982, . 89.

2

I

intend

o

stablish

hisn

forthcoming

eries f

nvestigations

nto he nfluencef

Aristotlen medieval

olitical

heory

fter

250.

128

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Latin

philosophers

prior

to

the thirteenth

entury.

Indeed,

earlier

research

has

already

shown

that one

of

the

most

prominent

twelfth

century

reatises

on moral and

politicalmatters,John

of

Salisbury's

Policraticus is

unmistakably

imbued with Aristotelian

doctrines.3

John's

access to these doctrines

indicates

the

existence of

an

'

underground

tradition

f

Aristotelian

hought

bout man in

society

running

throughout

the

Middle

Ages prior

to the

recovery

and

transmission

f Aristotle's

Ethics nd Politics4

Admittedly,

knowledge

of the structure

f

the Aristotelian

rgument

was

fragmentary

ntilthe

thirteenth

entury.

But Aristotle id

exert a

philosophically

nteresting

influence over

earlier

moral and

political concepts

in the medieval

West.

The

mere

presence

of Aristotelian

terminology

nd ideas

in

texts

completed

before

1200

does

not,

it is

true,

prove

their

mportance

to

medieval

philosophizing.

Rather,

what is

required

is

an

analysis

of

how Aristotelian

principles

were

assimilated and

integrated

into

significant

aspects

of medieval

philosophical

discourse.

With this

broader

issue

in

mind,

the

present

paper

will

argue

that a

key

element

of

Aristotle'smoral

thought,

his

definition

f

virtue s a

mean,

was not

only

known

to and used

by John

of

Salisbury

in

the Policraticusbut

also was the indispensiblebasis for the doctrine of individual and

political

iberty spoused

by John.5

Defense

of

this claim necessitates

the

investigation

of three

matters:

first,

he

range

of

sources

from

which

John

may

have

drawn the idea of

virtue

as a

mean; second,

John's

application

of the

concept

of the mean

within

the

Policraticus

and

third,

he conclusions

about

liberty

eached

in

the

Policraticuss a

result

of

John's

notion

of

the mean.

By focussing

our attention

on

John

of

Salisbury,

we shall discover

how,

in

at least one

instance,

the

3

Cary

J.

Nederman nd

J.

Brückmann,

ristotelianismn

John f

Salisbury's

Policraticus,

n:

Journal

f

he

History

f

Philosphy,

1

1983),

pp.

203-29.

4

For

similar

rgument

bout he

work f

Henry

racton,

ee

Cary

J.

Nederman,

Bractonn

Kingship

evisited

in:

History

fPolitical

houeht, (1984),pp.

61-77.

5

For

he ake f

broader,

on-specialist

udience,

eferences

o

the

olicraticusill

be drawnfrom he

existing

ranslations

with

occasional

modifications).

he

political

ections

f

he olicraticusavebeen

ranslated

y

John

ickinson

nder

the itle he tatesman'sook

New

York

1927);

the

courtly

hapters

ave

been

renderednto

nglish y

J.

B. Pike s Frivolities

f

Courtiersnd

ootprintsf

hilosophers

(Minneapolis938).

Both

ranslationsrebased

n the xcellent

909

ritical

dition

of

the

Policraticus

lately

eprinted)

roduced

y

C. C.

J.

Webb

Frankfurt

.M.,

Unveränderterachdruck,965), vols.; itations ill lsobegiveno hemarginal

numbers

n

Webb'sedition.

n future

eferences,

he

criticalditionwillbe ab-

breviated

s

P,

The

tatesmans

Book

s

S,

and

the rivolities

f

Courtiers

s F.

129

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4

'underground

Aristotle

provided

the

foundations

for n

innovative

contribution

o the moral

and

political

philosophy

of

the Middle

Ages.

I

It would

be a

difficult nd

perhaps

futile ask to

identify

ll of

the

documents from which

John

of

Salisbury

could

have

extracted

the

equation

of

virtue with a mean

between

excess

and

deficiency.

Elements

of

this doctrine

pervaded

the

Roman

and Christian

tradi-

tions,

and

were often

expressed by poets

and

theologians

as

well as

philosophers.6

But

while moderation or

the

mean as

a

general princi-

ple was commonlyadvocated by pre-medieval authors,Johnwould

have

known

comparatively

few

works which

provided

a

thorough

r-

ticulation

of the

concept.

In

particular,

here

ppear

to

be two

possible

sources for more detailed Aristotelian ccount

of

virtue:

first,

risto-

tle

himself,

ome

of

whose treatiseson

logic

and

language

survived

n

Latin to the

mid-twelfth

entury;

and

second,

the

writings

f

Cicero,

who

occasionally

reported

nd

even

accepted

Aristotle's

moral

ideas.

It

may

be that other

potential

uthorities

such

as

Boethius)

have

been

overlooked.

But

it is sufficient for the

present argument

to

demonstrate hat ome extsfamiliar oJohncontainedthesubstanceof

Aristotle's doctrineof the

mean.

In

preparation

for

n examination

of

the

sources to

which

John

had

direct

access, however,

we

ought

first o

survey

the

salient

features f

Aristotle's

classic and

complete

definition

f virtue n the Nicomachean

Ethics.

Aristotle

laims that the virtuous soul is

possessed

only by

the

person

who has learnt

all

the

virtues n

their

roper

measure. oodness

in

human action

is thus

defined as

hitting

he mark

(or

mean)

between

excess

and

deficiency;

vil occurs

when

the

agent's

behaviour is either

too much to too little . For instance, it is equally bad to be

foolhardy

s to be timid

when

the virtue

sought

is

courage.

Aristotle

teaches

that

whereas

the vices either fall short

of

or

exceed

what is

right

n

feelings

nd

actions,

virtue

scertains

and

adopts

the

mean.

7

This

suggests

that

we

ought

not

simply

to

contrast

good

and

evil,

vir-

tue

and vice.

Instead,

the

good

and

the

virtuous

must

be

juxtaposed

to

6

For

xample,ohn

imself

ites erence nd

Horace n

moderation

t

P

398a-bF

p.

25);

andwe

find ven

t.

Augustine

dvocating

moderate

ifestyle

nDe iberor-

bitroBook ,sec.48.7

Aristotle,

icomachean

thicsI. vi.

6, 1107a;

H. Rackham

ranslation,

nd

ed.,

Cambridge,

ass

1934.

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two forms

f

vice,

excess

and

deficiency,

oth of

which

are

in

turncon-

trary

o one

another.8

t

is

noteworthy

hat,

on this

account,

to hit

the

mean is to

be

moderate

n

one's

moral

conduct,

but

that

moderation

as

opposed

to

temperence

or

self-control)

as no

standing separate

from

the

specific

virtues.

Good

or virtuous

action consists in

following

middle

path

between

opposite

wrongs.

Therefore,

moderation

or

the

mean is

characteristic

f all the

virtueswithout

ver

being

construed

s

a

virtue

n

itself.

Various

logical

and

linguistic

omplexities

arise

from he structure

of ethical

propositions. Consequently,

Aristotle's

works on

language

and

syllogistic

ogic

often ddress

moral

ascriptions

nd,

by

extention,

concepts.Some ofthesewritings, nowncollectively nder the abel of

the

Organon

were

available

during

the

Middle

Ages

even

prior

to

the

massive

influx

of

Aristotelian

exts that commenced at the

end of

the

twelfth

entury.

For

example,

the

Categories

ad been translated nto

Latin

by

Boethius and

was

read

widely

by early

medieval

men,

in-

cluding

John

of

Salisbury; similarly,

the

Topics

the

transmissional

history

f

which is

a bit

more

confused,9

was

known

already

to

John

when

he

composed

the

Metalogicon

n

the

ate 1150s.10 n

each

of

these

works,

Aristotlehad

expressly

referred

o the

doctrine of the

mean

both as one way ofunderstanding he term good and as an impor-

tant

exception

to

general

rules

about

the

use of contraries.As

a

result,

the

Topics

nd

Categories

ontain several

passages

which

present

he

no-

tion of the mean in

a

manner

parallel

to the Nicomacheanthics.

The

Topics

declares,

for

nstance,

that

the word

good

is

applicable

to

that which is

moderate;

for

that which is moderate is

also

called

good. 11

Aristotle ater

expands

on

this remarkwith the

explanation

that

defect and

excess

are

in the same

genus

for both are in

the

genus

of

evil

whereas what is

moderate,

which

is

intermediatebe-

tweenthem, s not nthegenusofevil, but thatofgood. 12Essentially

the same

argument

s

also

found

n the

Categories

What is

contrary

o

a

bad

thing

s

sometimes

good

but

sometimesbad. For

excess,

which s

itself

ad,

is

contrary

o

deficiency,

which

s

bad;

yet

the mean is

con-

8

See

ibid.,

I

viii.

1108b.

9

This

s

dealt

with,

t

east n

part, y

Eleonore

tump,

oethius

s

De

topicisijferen-

tis

Ithaca,

NY

1978,

p.

159-236.

10

As

John

imselfells s at

Metalogicon

ook

,

Chapter

(trans.

.

D.

McGarry

(Berkeley955),

.

172).

11Aristotle,opics . 5, 07al -13;E. S. Forster ranslationCambridge, ass.

1960).

12

Ibid.,

V.

3,

123b27-30.

131

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trary

to both and it is

good. 13

According

to

both the

Topics

and

Categories

then,

moral

goodness may

be

found in

moderation

understood

as a mean

between excess and

deficiency.Attaining

o

vir-

tue consists in measured

action,

and

by

extension vice

may

equally

well

arise out

of

either an absence or a

surplus

of

virtue.

There

is no

doubt

that

classical authors

n the

centuries

fter

Aristo-

tle both knew and recounted the doctrineof the

mean. The most

pro-

minent

of

these

thinkers

writing

n the Latin

language

was

Cicero,

many

of whose works

were

retained

and

disseminated

by

the

in-

telligensia

of both

late

Roman and

medieval Christendom.

Cicero's

application

of

Aristotle'snotion

of

the mean was

not,

t

must

be

admit-

ted, thorough-goingor consistent. In his mature moral thought,

represented

by

De

officiis

Cicero

generally

adopts

the

tenets

of

the

Stoic ethical

system.

Nevertheless,

he does on

occasion

refer o the

doctrine

of

the

mean...

approved

by

the

Peripatetics,

namely,

that

happy

mean which ies

between

excess

and defect.

14

Moreover,

De

officiis

eaches that n

dress and

in

generousity

the rule of

the

golden

mean

is

best.

15

This view accords with Cicero's

claim

that

modera-

tion in

all

things

is embraced

by

the

concept

of

decorumthat

is,

the

quality

which

pertains

to

every

act of moral

rectitude.16 ut

the

very

essence of decorum De officiis eclares, is the Cardinal Virtue of

Temperence.17

In other

words,

moderation

really

forms

a

part

of

substantive

virtue n De

officiis

ather han

a

structural haracteristic f

all

the virtues.

Cicero

is truerto Aristotle's doctrineof the mean in

a

youthful ssay

on

rhetoric,

De inventione

which

was,

like De

officiis

widely

read

throughout

he

Middle

Ages.

In De inventioneas in

the

Organon

the

concern

is not

with

ethics

per

se but with

the

linguistic

nature

of moral

ascriptions. Specifically,

Cicero

objects

to the conven-

tional

paring

of one virtue with its

opposite

vice,

e.g., courage

with

cowardice. Instead, Cicero maintains that the standard virtues

(justice,

courage

and the

rest)

are

contrary

oth to their

ustomary

p-

posites

injustice,

cowardice,

etc.)

and to

another et of

qualities

which

are

composed

of virtue taken to excess.

De

inventione

nsists hat each

virtue

will

be found

to have

a

vice

bordering upon

it,

either one to

which

a definitename has become

attached,

as

temerity

hich borders

13

Aristotle,

ategories

1,

14a2-6;

.

L. Ackrillranslation

Oxford

963).

14

Cicero,

e

officiis,

.89;

W.

Miller ranslation

Cambridge,

ass.

1913).

15

Ibid.,11.59; f.1.130 nd 11.66.16

Ibid.,

1.93-4.

17

Ibid.,

1. 00.

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on

courage

... or one

without

ny

definitename. All of

these as well as

the

opposites

of

good

qualities

will be

classed

among things

to be

avoided. 18 Cicero's

analysis

thus

captures

what was

crucial to

Aristotle's

riginal

account of the

mean: that t s no

better o

display

a

surplus

of virtue than

a

surfeit.

Missing

the mark in

either the direc-

tion of

defect

or

of excess is bound to

lead the individual

into vice.

II

We

can now see that

John

of

Salisbury possessed

an

ample

number

of

authorities n which to base an

Aristotelian

conception

of

the vir-

tues as a mean between excess and deficiency.We should not be sur-

prised,

then,

to

discover

reverberations

f this doctrine

hroughout

he

text of the Policraticus.

ohn certainly

had

a

good

historical

reason for

including

Aristotle's

doctrine of the mean.

The Policraticus as com-

posed,

after

ll,

as

a

critique

of

many

of the

practices

associated

with

the

courtly

conduct of the

twelfth

century

feudal

aristocracy

in

England

and on the

Continent.

John's primary

concern is to il-

luminate the vices of

noblemen

and rulers

n

order

to

instruct hem

n

the forms f

behaviour

becoming

men of status and

power.19

To im-

pose upon such magnates a monastic or ascetic regimenwould be,

however,

unrealistic

and

ultimately

self-defeating.

The

feudal

aristocracy,

as

John

knew

well,

was

properly composed

of

war-like

men of

action who would never

heed

seriously

he

bookish virtuesnor-

mally

advocated

by contempletive

hurchmen.

Since the Policraticuss

intended to be a

practical

guidebook,

John

is

willing

to

allow that if

moderation s

displayed,

I

do not

udge

it

unbecoming...

to dwell at

times

upon

the

pleasures

of the

senses;

as

has

often

been

said,

nothing

is

unseemly

except

that which

s

beyond

measure...

Modestly pursued

for purposes of recreation, they are excused under the license of

leisure.

20

In this

way,

John

orients he

values he

upholds

towards the

actual

conditions under

which

knights

and

princes

lived. The

Policraticus

eeks to

temper

the

behaviour of

warriors,

not

to

suppress

all the

amusements of

court.

18

Cicero,

e

nventione

11.65;

H.

M.

Hubbell

ranslation

Cambridge,

ass.

1949).

19

The

range

f

John's

ourtly

oncerns

s

addressed

yCaryJ.

Nedermannd N.

Elaine

awson,

he

rivolities

f

ourtiers

ollowhe

ootprintsf

Women

Misogyny

nd he

CrisisfVirilitynJohnf alisbury'solicraticus,n: C. Levin tal.,eds.,Medievalnd

Renaissance

omen,

etroit

Forthcoming).

20

F,

p.

373;

P

761b-c,

61d.

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The audience

to

which

John

addresses

himself

thereby

helps

to

determine

his

conception

of virtue. For

throughout

he Policraticus

John

maintains

that if

any

action

4

'exceeds the

mean,

it is a fault.

Every

virtue is marked

by

its own

boundaries,

and consists in the

mean.

If

one

exceed

this,

one is off

the

road,

not on

it. 21 It

is

a

characteristic

f

genuine

moral

goodness,

John

teaches,

to be neither

excessive

nor

deficient,

but

rather to follow

a

middle

course

between

opposite

evils.

Bad

men,

accordingly,

'withdraw

from he mean

be-

tween

vices,

which s the

fieldof

virtue.

22

Employing

the

metaphor

of

the eft nd

right

hands,

the

Policraticusbserves that

to

incline to

the

right ignifies

o insist oo

enthusiastically

pon

the

virtues hemselves.

To incline to the right s to exceed the bounds ofmoderationin the

works of

virtue,

the

essence to

which

is moderation.

For

truly

ll en-

thusiasm

is the

foe of salvation

and

all excess is

a

fault:

nothing

s

worse

than the

mmoderate

practice

of

good

works. 23

While this

view

may

seem

strange

for

an

orthodox

twelfth-century

hurchman,

it

reveals the

extent

to which

John's

concerns

about the condition

of the

feudal

nobility

result

in his

presentation

of

a

fundamentally

Aristotelian

ccount of virtue.

It

is

in

the

nature

of all

virtues,

John

says,

that

they may

be attained

only

when

pursued

within definite

limits. Moderation or the mean indicates the manner in which the

boundaries

defining

virtuous

action

are to be constructed.

John

seeks

particularly

o

establish

the

harm which

may

result

from he

zealous

exercise

of virtue.

For

instance,

the individual

who,

in

the name

of

justice,

shows

mercy

to someone

whose actions

warrant

punishment

has committed

s

grave

an

injustice

as

if

punishment

had

been

meted

out

unfairly.

Perhaps

referring

irectly

o

Aristotle,24

ohn

comments

that

the

philosopher

warns

us to

avoid

excess;

for

f a man

depart

from this caution

and

moderation,

he

will in his

lack of

caution

foresakethepath of virtueitself...What can then be of any profit f

justice

herself,

the

queen

of the

virtues,

is hurtful

n

excess? 25

Overstepping

the

bounds of

goodness

in the

name of

goodness

itself

will

be

as

repugnant

as

the utter

bsence

of moral

propriety.

Modera-

tion

pertains

to

the essential

structure

f

virtue,

n the

sense

that

any

21

F, p. 157;

P

480d.

22

F,

p.

374;

P

762c.

23

S,

p.

43;

P

731c-d.

24NedermanndBrückmann,ristotelianismnJohnf alisburyPolicraticus,p.

215-6.

25

S

p.

43;

P

731d.

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action

is virtuous

f

and

only

if t

participates

n

and

is

guided by

the

measure or

mean.

But

how

can one know

what

the

virtuous mean is

in

any specific

case

requiring

a

moral decision?

In the

Nicomachean thics

Aristotle

had

held that he

mean is

always

relativeo the

agent.26

o far

s can

be

discovered, however,

this

position

is not

reproduced

anywhere

n

the

Organon

r in the

Aristotelian-influenced

hinkers vailable

to

John.

Nevertheless,

the solution

proposed

in

the Policraticus oes not differ

greatly

romAristotle's

own.

'

'Discretion with

regard

to

time,

place,

amount,

person

and

cause,'

'

John

states,

'readily

draws

the

proper

distinction

between

virtuous

and vicious

action; indeed,

circumstan-

tial discretion is the origin and source of moderationin its widest

sense

without

which

no

duty

is

properly performed. 27

n

deciding

how

to

conduct

himself,

ach

individual

must determine all relevant

circumstantial onsiderations nd choose the course

of

action which s

appropriately

moderate within

ts context.

According

to

John,

most

actions

cannot be

judged apart

from heir

circumstances.

To cite but

one

case,

it

is

clearly

vicious to take

a

human

life;

yet

as

a

form of

punishment,

or as

the outcome of

a

justly

fought

battle,

it

may

be

vicious not o take

a life.

n

John's

view,

there

would

seem to be a few

moral absolutes in therealmofhuman conduct. His circumstantialist

doctrine eads to

a

form f

ndividualism,28

lthough

not,

of

course,

to

complete

relativism,

nsofar as

one is still

subject

to the

ultimate

assessment of divine

udgement.

Another

onsequence

of the claim

that

all virtue s

characteristically

governed by

moderation

is that

various actions which

John

first

p-

pears

to

condemn

as

morally reprehensible

he

eventually

allows to be

morally acceptable

in

the

proper

measure. After

a

lengthy

and

scathing

critique

of

hunting

a

favourite

pastime

of the

Anglo-

Norman aristocracy John ostensivelyreverseshimself: The activi-

ty,

however,

is

laudable

when

moderation

is shown

and

hunting

is

pursued

with

udgement

and,

when

possible,

with

profit. 29

The

seeming

contradictionbetween

John's

obvious distaste for

hunting

and his

later

acceptance

of it

may

be

explained

precisely

by

his view

26

See

Aristotle,

icomacheanthics

II.

viii,

1109a.

27

F,

p.

373;

/>761d-762a.

28

A viewwhich asbeen

roposed

y

Kate

Langdon

orhan,

hendividual

n

he

ody

Politic:he oliticalhoughtf ohnf alisburypresentedo he 984 nnualmeetingf

the

American

olitical

cience

ssociation,

ashington,

.C.

29

F,

p.

25;

P

398a.

135

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that the virtuous

mean

arises out

of

circumstantial

eterminations.

n

this

instance,

the relaxation afforded

by

hunting

to the

warrior

aristocracymay

render

it a

proper

formof

behaviour

at times. The

Policraticus

nalyzes

courtly

music in an

analogous

fashion.

Although

John

recognized

that the

morals

of

courtiers

and

knights

re

threat-

ened

by

contemporary

musical

lyrics

nd

styles,

he

stops

short

of the

condemnation

of music

altogether.

While

objecting

to those avacious

and

wanton tones which exceed the

mean,

the Policraticus

lso

declares that

if

singing

be

kept

within

moderate

limits,

t

freesthe

mind from

are,

banishes

worry

bout

things

emporal,

nd

by impar-

ting oy

and

peace

and

by inspiring deep

love

for

God draws souls to

association with theangels.,,3°As theexamples ofhunting nd music

illustrate,

John's

central

goal

is

to

promote

that

moderation without

which

a

good

life s

impossible. 31

Such

moderation

requires

that

vir-

tue

and vice

be

judged

on

the

basis of the ndividual

agent's

chosen

ac-

tion

in a

particular

set of

circumstances.

What

may

at

one

place

and

time be

correct

for

one

person may

at

another

place

and

time be im-

proper

for nother

person

or

even forthe same

person).

The overar-

ching

moral lesson of the

Policraticus

s that

virtue tems

from

perform-

ing

the

right

act

in

the

right

situation,

which constitutes

the

very

essence of moderation.

If

the

Policraticuss

addressed

generally

towards

the

medieval

court

aristocracy,

then its more definite

target

is the

prince

and

his im-

mediate circle of advisors. We should not be

surprised,

hen,

that

John

applies

this conclusions

about

virtue

as a

mean to the

specific

ondi-

tions and

problems confronting

eudal rulers

(primarily

kings,

but

also,

by

extension,

other

independent

magnates).

Fundamental

to

John's

approach

is the claim that the

political qualities

of the com-

munity

re

inextricably

inked

to the moral

qualities

of ts

royal

head.

Hence, theprinceof virtuousmoral character ssuresthestabilitynd

cohesion of

the

polity;

a

vicious

prince

will

destroy

the

body

politic.

But insofar s

virtue

has

already

been defined as

a mean

between

ex-

cess

and

deficiency,

ohn

must maintain that the

actions

of the

good

prince

will

themselvesbe moderate.

Indeed,

the Policraticusdvocates

exactly

the view

that

the

moderate

ruler

engenders

peace

and

security

among

his

people:

With how much

care

should the

prince

moderate

his

acts,

now

with

the

strictness

f

ustice,

and now with

the

leniency

30F

p.

32

translationltered);

402d-403a.

31

F,

p.

161;

P

482c.

136

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of

mercy,

to the end that he

may

make his

subjects

all

be of one

mind

in one

house,

and thus

as it were out

of

discordant

dispositionsbring

to

pass

one

great perfectharmony

in

the service

and

in

the works of

charity. 32

We

ought

not to

infer,however,

thatthe ruler s tobe the

absolute arbiter f the morals of his

subjects.

Rather,

the

prince

should

instruct

mainly by

his

own

example,

adopting

that

4

'tranquil

modera-

tion

of mind so valued

in

the

magistrates

f

antiquity.33

While never

overlooking

r

encouraging

moral erroron the

part

of

subjects,John's

monarch would not

actively

punish

those evils

within

he

polity

which

do not

endanger

public

order or

religious

orthodoxy.

On

the

one

hand,

John

insists

that the measure

of the affection

with which

[t]he

[prince]should embracehis subjects ike brethrenn the arms of chari-

ty

must

be

kept

in the

bounds

of

moderation, 34

lest

he

commit

the

vice

implied by

excessive

kindness.

Still,

on

the other

hand,

the

Policraticus

rotests

gainst

the ruler who is

too

ready

to

faulthis sub-

jects,

and take

revenge

on

them for

their

faults. 35

Both

routes

are

of

great

harm to

the

body

politic,

John

says, although

he would

prefer

o

err on the side of

royal

tolerance.36While the

king

should

rapidly

up-

press

those

flagrant outrages

which

it is not

permissable

to

tolerateor

which cannot

be

tolerated

n

good

conscience,

he should

also show patience towards whatever faultsof subjects which can

honorably

be tolerated. 37

Special

princely

virtue,

the

art

of

statesmanship,

consists

in the

moderate

use of

divinely

granted

authority.

The

virtuous

prince

will

aim

fora mean between

two

con-

trary

uses of

political power:

excessive

charity

and intolerance.

By

conceiving

of

the

moral character of the monarch

within

the

terms

of

virtue

defined

as

a

mean,

John

has built his

political

theory upon

essentially

Aristotelian oundations.

n

the

case of the

prince,

as for

ll

other

men,

whosoever

follows

he moderate

course,

by carefully

eter-

miningthe circumstancesin which action is to be performed,may

properly

be admired for his virtue.

Ill

Our

analysis

of

John

of

Salisbury's application

of the

Aristotelian

doctrine

f the mean has so far

demonstrated hat

virtuousmoderation

32

p.

39;

P 530b.

33

pp.

40, 41;

P 530d.

34

p.

37;

P

529a.

35 p. 43;P 531d.36

S,

p.

44;

P

532a.

37

p.

265;

P

629b.

137

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must

be counted

among

the

key

themes

of the Policraticus. ut

John,

having

established

that moral

goodness

consists

in the

mean,

addi-

tionally

nfers rom

his

precept

set of

corollaryprinciples.Specifical-

ly, John's acceptance

of thedoctrineof the mean leads him to

adopt

two

claims about

liberty

one of a

moral

character,

he other

political:

1)

Each

individual

agent

must

be at

liberty

to make

his own cir-

cumstantial

determinations

egarding

he

mean in

a

particular

on-

texto

and

2)

The

prince

has

a

responsibility

o ensure each

subject's liberty

by

steering

political

course between

icense

and

slavery,

o thata

vir-

tuous

community

ntails the

continued

liberty

of

the virtuous

n-

dividuals within thatcommunity.

Both of these

principles

of

liberty

are

dependent

upon John's

ac-

count

of

virtue as

moderation.

For

John

acknowledges

an intrinsic

connection between

virtue and

liberty:

'Virtue

cannot

be

fully

at-

tained

without

iberty,

nd the absence

of

iberty

roves

that virtue

n

its full

perfection

s

wanting.

Therefore

a man is

free n

proportion

o

the measure of his virtues. 38

Liberty

and virtue

are in

principle

n-

separable.

He

who is most

virtuous s most free nd the

freestman en-

joys

the

greatest

virtue.

ButwhydoesJohn positthis ntimate nd inexorableconnectionbe-

tween

liberty

and

virtue? The

answer,

it

seems,

is that

John

understands

iberty

o be

the

ability

o

make

circumstantial

etermina-

tions

regarding

the

proper

course

of conduct

(the

mean)

in

any

situa-

tion.

Hence,

liberty

s

required

for

the individual

to

discover

the

moderate,

and

therefore

irtuous,

route and to

act in accordance

with

it.

Liberty

to

do

as one

pleases

is

ustified

f

moderation

controls

he

act,

the Policraticus

ays,

The circumstances

that

regulate

all

freedomfrom estraint

re

dependent upon

a

preceeding

consideration

ofplace, time, ndividualand cause. 39 Libertyconsists n theforma-

tion

of

sound,

rational

udgements

by

the

individual

agent

about

the

most

appropriate

route

to

virtue:

Liberty

means

judging

everything

freely

n accordance

with one's

individual

udgement. 40

Virtue

is a

set

of

general

postulates

which

through

liberty

are translated

into

specific

precepts

of

action

applicable

as circumstances

warrant.

Liber-

ty

is

not,

however,

quite

co-extensive

with

right

reason,

insofar as

John

questions

the

value

of

liberty

f it is

not

permitted

hose

who

38S, p. 323;P 705d.39

F,

p.

28;

P 400a.

40

p.

323;

P 705c.

138

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desire to ruin themselves

by luxury. 41

If

liberty

s

necessary

forvir-

tue,

then

there

must remain

the

possibility

hat t

will

be used

wrongly,

for

vice.

Indeed,

the occasional use of

iberty

orvicious

acts does

not

constitute for

John

sufficient

grounds

for the denial

of

liberty

altogether.

Without a measure of

iberty,

we have no

hope

of achiev-

ing

virtue;

for his

reason,

vice must

sometimes

be

tolerated.

Full

and

true

iberty

demands

that the

individual serve

virtue

and

perform

ts

duties.42But

the

suppression

of

iberty

n

the name of

eradicating

vice

will

only

result n

the simultaneous eradication

of virtue.

Consequently,

the

conception

of

liberty

in

the Policraticus tself

resembles

nothing

so

much

as a mean between the excess of

license

and the defect fslavery. By license ismeantunlimitedfreedomwhich

does not

concern tself

with

circumstantial

eterminations;

by slavery,

the

inability

o

make

any

circumstantial

determinationswhatsoever.

Both license and

slavery

lead to

vice,

in

John's

view,

because

both

constitute enials of

that

iberty

which

s a

requisite

of virtuous

ction.

The

man who

acts on the basis of

icense

stands

opposed

to true iber-

ty,

since he

aspires

to a

kind of fictitious

iberty,

vainly

imagining

that he can live withoutfear

and do with

mpunity

whatsoever

pleases

him;

and somehow

be

straightaway

ike

unto

God, not,

however,

that

he desires to imitate the divine goodness, but rather seeks to incline

God to

favour

his

wickedness

by

granting

him

immunity

rom

punish-

ment forhis evil

deeds. 43 License

is

a

sort

of

self-deification

y

which

man

confuses he

pursuit

of

arbitrary

esires with

his

divinely

granted

freedom.

The man of

license seeks to make

God's

will

conformwith

his

own,

thereby

endering

virtuous

whatever has been

chosen.

John

is adament in

his

condemnation

of

such license:

4

'When

under the

pretext

f

iberty

ashness

unleashes the violence of

ts

spirit,

t

proper-

ly

incurs

reproach,

although,

as a

thing

more

pleasing

in the

ears of

thevulgarthanconvincingto themind of the wise man, itoftenfinds

in the

indulgence

of

others

the

safety

which it does not

owe to its own

prudence. 44

But if

icense

by

its excessive character can

lead

only

to

vice,

then no better

nd

can

be achieved

by

the

utter bolition of iber-

ty through

the

introduction

of

slavery. John

alternately

describes

slavery

s the

image

of

death 45

and as the

yoke

of vice. 46

Virtue

41

F,

p.

342;

P

741c.

42

F,

p.

365;

P 756c.

43

p.

282;

P 675c.

44 p. 324;P 706c.

45

p.

282;

P

675c.

46

F,

p.

365;

P

765c.

139

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can

only

be

voluntary,

the

result of

choice

in

accordance

with

right;

any

action

which

is

involuntary,

lavish,

can therefore

y

definition

never be

virtuous.

ndeed,

the Policraticus

uggests

more than

once

that

because virtue can never be achieved without

iberty,

men of

good

character should be

willing

to

give

all

they

have,

even their

wn

lives,

in

order to

ť

'strike ff

he

heavy

and hateful

yoke

of

slavery.

47

Even if

the slave

behaves

in all external

ways

correctly,

he can never attain

virtue,

for

he has

not

exercised

the

power

of

his

will,

that

s,

the

iberty

of

making

one's own

circumstantial

udgements.

On

John's

account,

then,

those

'

'things

which

are done or

spoken freely

constitute

mean between the

faultof

timidity

n

the one

hand

and of

rashness

on theother, 48between themoralattitudes risingoutofslavery nd

out of license.

The

slavish and the

licentious

men

are

equally lacking

in

liberty,

although

for

quite opposite

reasons:

from

icense,

no

ra-

tional,

moderate

and

thus

valid choice can be

made;

under

slavery

there

exists

no choice

at

all.

It is

precisely

because

of

the

precarious

balance

required

for

iberty

that

John

is

so fearful f

the

prince

who seeks

to enforcemorals coer-

cively

over his

subjects.

John acknowledges

that

in

order

to

preserve

liberty

nd out of

regard

for

t,

t has

always

been

permissible

for free

man to speak to personsconcerningtheirvices. 49 Patient correction

is

the

duty

of the

good

man. But

correspondingly,

he

iberty

f others

must be

respected

n

word

and in

deed,

at

least

so

long

as another's

freedomdoes

not involve the

casting

away

of virtue.

For

since each

virtue

shines

by

its own

proper ight,

the

meritof

tolerance s

resplen-

dam

with a

very pecial

glory. 50

t

pertainsespecially

to

the

prince

to

ensure

the

liberty

of

those

over whom

he

reigns.

Indeed,

John's

famous

distinction etween the

prince

and the

tyrant

urnson

his doc-

trine

of

liberty.

By

definition,

the

prince fights

orthe

laws

and

the

liberty fthepeople: the tyrant hinksnothingdone unless he brings

the laws to

nought

and reduces the

people

to

slavery. 51

Since

John

elsewhere

tells

us that

good

laws were introduced for

the

sake of

liberty, 52

we

may

surmise that

the true

king's

efforts

re

directed

en-

tirely

owards

the

preservation

of each

subject's

individual

freedom.

47

Sy

.

323;

P

705c.

A

similar

pinion

s

expressed

t

S

p.

282;

P

765c.

48

S

p.

324;

P 706b.

49

p. 331;

P

710b.

505,p. 324;P 706b.51

S

p.

335;

P 777d.

32

S,

p.

323;

P 705d.

140

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Nor does

John

eave

any

doubt about

what the

protection

f

iberty

n-

volves: So

long

as

they

have

peace

and

practice

ustice

and

abstain

from

falsehood

and

perjury,'

members

of the

body politic enjoy

liberty

nd

peace

in such fullness hat there

s

nought

that

can in

the

least

degree

disturb

their

repose. 53

The

intimacy

which obtains be-

tween a

body politic

and

its

royal

head

depends upon

the maintenance

of

a

proper

moral and

political

order. This

order s the

special

respon-

sibility

f

the

prince

and

his

government.

The

right rdering

f

society

secures

iberty

nd

liberty rocures

the virtueof ndividuals and

of the

whole

community.

Disorder,

by

contrast,

stems

from immoderate

government

nd

results n the loss

of

liberty

n

one of two

manners:

through ule based on license and through yranny.Anymonarch cor-

rupted

by

license

will

nvariably

uccomb

to

evil,

since his

government

does

not

know

its own

just

measure,

nor

will

it

repress

its in-

temperence

before

it

has fallen

into the last

extremity

f

baseness

through

overindulgence

in license. 54

Simultaneously,

those sub-

jected

to such licentious

rule either will become

corrupt

themselves

from ack of moral

guidance

and

example

or will rebel

against

public

immorality.55

n

both

cases,

the

consequence

is an absence of

peace

and

justice

withinthe

community,

hence

the denial

of

iberty.

Yet the

tyrant aresno better,forhe toodisturbspoliticalorderbydemanding

slavish obedience

fromhis

subjects.

Those

over

whom

a

tyrant

ules

should

never make a

virtueout of their

ituation;

to do

so is to

confuse

the semblance

of

liberty'

with real

and

pure

liberty.

56

In

response

to

their

enslavement, rather,

men should

seek

to correct he

tyrant, hey

should

pray

to God for his

removal,

and

they may

even

act as God's

representative

n such

removal.57

Tyranny

destroys

iber-

ty

nd thusvirtue

ust

as

surely

s does

licentious

government.Only

in

moderation s

the

authority

f the

prince

used

rightly

nd

legitimately.

In effect,heprince s not free ifhe is toretain the name ofprince)to

forcehis

subjects

to surrender heir

iberty

even

in

the

name of

vir-

tue. The

distinguishing

mark of

any

vicious

government

will be a

populace deprived

of its own

appropriate iberty

nd led instead into

either icence or

slavery.

53

S,

p.

54;

P

536b-c.

54

p.

222;

P

610b.

55

S

pp.

222-3;

6 lOb-d.

56

F,

p.

184;

P

496d.

57John's iews bout yrannyavebeen horoughlyreatedyRichard ouse nd

Mary

Rouse,

ohn f

alisbury

nd he octrine

fTyrannicide,

n:

Speculum,

2

1967),

pp.

693-709.

141

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In a

sense,

the

indispensible political

esson of the Policraticuss

that

individual

liberty provides

the

limiting

condition

defining

good

and

valid

government.

The

virtuous

prince

knows when to

suppress

the

flagrant

vices of his

subjects

without

denying

to them

the

liberty

o

make

their

own moral

determinations.That

John

comes

to this con-

clusion of the

basis of a

concept

of

iberty

nformed

y

the doctrineof

virtue s a

mean

indicates

the

philosophical mportance

f Aristotelian

ideas

in

the Policraticus.

t

is true

that

John,

in

constructing

political

analysis

directly

relevant

to

the

problems

of

twelfth

entury

feudal

society,

has added a

new

dimension to the

Western

conception

of

liberty.

Unlike the

ancient

Greeks,

John

teaches

that

liberty

an be

maintained withoutnecessarilydevolving nto icense.58 n contrast o

the

Church

Fathers,

John

claims

that

iberty

s not

merely

he submis-

sion of one's own

will

to

God,

but

implies

a

process

of

genuine

in-

dividual

judgement

and choice.59

John

thereby

creates

a

notion

of

liberty

which

points

the

way

towards modern

principles

of freedom.60

Yet,

all the

same,

the idea of

ibertyproposed

in the

Policraticusas at

its root the Aristoteliandoctrine

of the mean:

the

qualitites John

at-

tributes o

liberty epend

upon

his

logically

prior

definition

f virtue

n

terms of moderation.

Although

John

laboured without

direct

knowledgeof eitherthe Ethicsor the Politics the moral and political

concepts

of the Policraticus

we

a

profound

debt to

Aristotle.This and

similar

debts must

be not

only acknowledged

but

analyzed

if

we

are to

assess the full extent

of the

underground

tradition

of Aristotelian

philosophy present

during

the Middle

Ages.61

Christchurch,

New

Zealand

Universityf

Canterbury

58This

may

econtrasted,or

xample,

ith lato's

bjections

o

iberty

n

Republic

VIII,

561b-563end

Laws

III,

699a-701e.

59

Cf.

St.

Augustine,

e liberorbitrioBook

I,

sec. 37.

60

This s not o

reject

he

bservationf

Hans

Liebeschütz,

edievalumanism

n he

Life

nd

Writings

f

ohn

f

alisburyLondon

950)

hat

ohn's

otion

of

iberty

s a

medieval

ne,

nd that

iberty

or immeans

hat achdistinct

phere

hould e

al-

lowed

o

enjoy

ts

pecial

ights

ndisturbed

p. 54).

t s

by

no

means bsurd o

ay

that he

eculiarly

edieval

onception

f

iberty,rising

romhe

rivatized

urisdic-

tion

ypical

f

feudal

ociety,

as

a

necessary

ondition

or

he

emergence

fthe

modern

otion

f

iberty.

n

many

ways, ohn's

ristotelian

onception

f

iberty

s

compatible

ith

hehistoricaldea offeudal

iberty.

61This ssaywascomposed ith he upportf heMactaggartesearchellowship

programme

t

the

University

f

Alberta. n bbreviated

ersionf he

resent

aper

was

presented

o

theMedieval nd Renaissance uild f

he ame

University.

142

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Vivarium

XIV,

2

(1986)

REVIEW ARTICLE

Transzendental

ersus

Kategorial

Die

Zwiespältigkeit

on

Thomas

Philosophie?

Eine

kritische tudie

JAN

A.

AERTSEN

I

1982

erschien eine

umfangreiche

Arbeit

-

555

eng

bedruckte Sei-

ten

-

von Wilfried Kühn mit dem

Titel

Das

Prinzipienproblem

n der

Philosophiees ThomasvonAquin. Um welches Problem gehtes hier?

Die

Problemstellung

kann

knapp

mit

einer

Formulierung

zusammen-

gefasst

werden,

die der Autor

selbst

im

Vorwort

gebraucht:

4

'Die

Konkurrenz der

Transzendentalien und

Kategorien

um die

Stellung

von

Prinzipien

(XXIX).

Wesentlich

deutlicher st mit dieser Kurz-

formel

die Problematik

allerdings

noch nicht

geworden.

Es bleibt

nämlich

unklar,

wie

hier

von

einem

Spannungsverhältnis

die

Rede

sein

kann. Transcendentia

werden

ja

von

Thomas als

Bestim-

mungen charakterisiert,

die in allen

Kategorien herumgehen

(

circumeunt

und

darum in

jedem

Prädikament

anzutreffen ind .2

Deshalb müssen

wir

erst

dem

nachgehen,

wie

der

Verfasser das

The-

ma

problematisiert.

(1)

Im

ersten Teil seiner

Studie

( Selbständigkeit

als

Begriff

om

Prinzip:

Die

Substanz ,

35-179)

will Kühn

zeigen,

dass

Aristoteles

auf die

Prinzipienfrage

mit dem

Begriff

Substanz

antwortetund

diese Antwort

ugleich

eine

deutlich

gegen

Piaton

gerichtete

olemi-

sche

Spitze

enthält.

Die Kategorienlehre,worin die Substanz ihre Prinzipienfunktion

gewinnt,

ntwickeltAristoteles us seiner

Analyse

des

Urteils,

in wel-

chem

etwas von etwas

ausgesagt

wird.

Dass die Substanz

die

grundle-

gende Kategorie

ist,

ist

jedoch

nicht

sosehr das

Resultat

dieser

Analyse;

vielmehr

st für diese

das

Prinzip

der

Substantialität

be-

reits

vorausgesetzt.

Im

aristotelischen

Verständnis von

Sprache

1

Verlag

B. R.

Grüner,

msterdam,

982

Bochumer

tudien

ur

Philosophie,

Bd.

1).

2 Depotentia,7: ... circuitmne enus; evirtutibusn ommuni.un.,2 ad 8: ...

in

transcendentibus,

uae

circumeunt

mne

ns;

n

Ethic.,

ec.

6,81:

Bonům utem

sicut t

ens,

um

onvertaturum

o,

inveniturn

quolibet

raedicamento.

143

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werden nämlich die

Satzzusammenhänge

aufgelöst

und dem

Subjekt-

nomen

eine klare

Prioritätvor

dem

Verb

eingeräumt

und

zwar,

weil

das

Subjekt

etwas

Selbständiges

bezeichnet und das

Selbständige

Prio-

ritätvor dem auf anderes

Bezogenes

hat. SubstantialitätmSinne von

selbständigem,

von

anderem

unabhängigem

Bestehen st von vornhe-

rein als der

erste

Sinn von

Sein

gedacht

(51).

Für die

Auffassung,

Selbständigkeit

ei das Kriterium

für Prinzi-

pien,

beruft

Aristoteles

ich

auf

Piaton.

Nach

Kühns Urteil

edoch

zu

Unrecht. Piaton

habe die

Ideen

gerade

nicht

als

unabhängige

Prinzi-

pien

gedacht.

Vor

allem

im

Sophistes

abe

der

späte

Piaton mit seiner

Konzeption

der

fünf

grössten

Genera

(Sein, Bewegung,

Ruhe,

das

Selbe und das Andere) seine Ideenlehre korrigiert.Er macht diese

apriorische Grundbestimmungen

nicht zu

Prinzipien

im Sinn

selb-

ständiger

Früherer,

sondern

begreift

ie

in

ihrer

synthetischen

unk-

tion

für

besondere

Sachbestimmungen.

Sie sind

Transzendentalien,

d.h.

Reflexionsbestimmungen,

nter

denen

Gegenstände überhaupt

gedacht

werden.

Die

Prinzipienfrage

kann

deshalb von

Kühn

auf

die

Alternative u-

gespitzt

werden:

'Reflexionsbestimmungen

Transzendentalien)

oder

Substanzen?

(siehe

164

ff.).

Aristoteles'

ntention

st,

die

konkreten

Einzelseienden anstellevon Reflexionsbegriffenls Prinzipienauszu-

weisen

vgl. 345)

und

die

Transzendentalien,

die Piaton

als

Prinzipien

etabliert

hatte,

4

'aufzuheben .

In

Metaphysica

führt r

den Nach-

weis,

dass die

ersten

Genera,

auf die

Bestimmungen

4

'Sein und

Einheit

reduziert,

keine

Prinzipien

sein können.

Sie

sind

die

allge-

meinsten

Prädikate,

aber bezeichnen

nichts

Selbständiges.

Die Prio-

rität

unmittelbarer

Sachbestimmungen

vor

der

Reflexion

auf ihre

transzendentallogischenBedingungen

konstituiert

die

aristotelische

Fragestellung

(176).

In diesem ersten Teil wird deutlich,dass das Prinzipienproblem,

welches der

Verf.

anvisiert,

ich aus

Aristoteles'

Aufhebung pätpla-

tonischer

Prinzipien

zum

Kategorienschema

ergibt.

Dies

ist

der

Hintergrund,

vor

welchem

er Thomas'

Haltung

den

Transzendenta-

lien

gegenüber,

wie wir sehen

werden,

als ambivalent

betrachtet.

(2)

Aber bevor

er

sich Thomas

zuwendet,

setzt

Kühn seine

Analyse

der

aristotelischen

ntwort

uf die

Prinzipienfrage

ort.

m

ersten

Teil

kommt

er

zu dem

Ergebnis,

dass das Theorem

der

Prinzipienfunktion

der Substanz

weder

aus

Aristoteles'

Analyse

des Urteils

noch

aus sei-

nerAuseinandersetzungmitPiaton resultiert.m zweitenTeil ( Be-

gründung

des

Prinzips

'Substanz'

aus

der

Begrenzung

des

144

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wissenschaftlichen

iskurses ,

183-325)

will Kühn

zeigen,

dass

diese

These aus der aristotelischen

Wissenstheorie

begründet

werden kann.

Aristoteles

egreift

en

wissenschaftlichen iskurs als eine endliche

Reihe der

Begründungen.

Die

Unmöglichkeit

eines unendlichen

Re-

gresses mpliziert,

ass die demonstrative

Wissenschaft

on

Prämissen

ausgehen

muss,

die

keiner

weiteren

Begründung

oder

logischen

Ver-

mittlung

mehr

fähig

sind. Aristotelesunterscheidet

wei

Typen

sol-

cher

Wissensbedingungen,

d.h.

'

'Prinzipien ,

deren

Differenz n

den

Analytica

osteriora

edoch

nicht

entsprechend

gewürdigt

wird.

Zunächst

gibt

es

Prinzipien,

die

wie das

Widerspruchsprinzip

Be-

dingungen

eglicher

Erkenntnis

sind. Sie können als

apriorische

Prinzipien charakterisiertwerden, denn diese allgemeinen Erkennt-

nisprinzipien

rkennt

man

gerade

so

wie

die

platonischen

Transzen-

dentalien durch Reflexion auf

die

logische

Form des

vernünftigen

Denkens. Es handelt

sich um eine

Erkenntnis,

die

man im

kantischen

Verstände

(KRV

All

ff.)

transzendental nennen kann

(233).

Daneben

kennt Aristoteles

spezielle Prinzipien

der

verschiedenen

Wissenschaften,

nämlich

die

Wesensbestimmungen

von Substanzen

durch

Definitionen. Mit

bezug

auf diese

besonderen Prämissen reali-

siert

Aristoteles ie

Unmittelbarkeit

uch

an

der

Erkenntnisweise,

n-

soferndie Einsicht n solche Prämissen aufWahrnehmungals einem

unmittelbaren

Bewusstsein beruhen soll. Sie

bringt

die

Priorität

der

Substanz

als

Inbegriff

iner an

vorfindbaren

Dingen

orientierten r-

fahrung

zur

Geltung.

Die

Notwendigkeit

einer

Begrenzung

im

Be-

weisverfahrenwird

in

der sinnlichen

Erfahrung

von der unmittelbar

gegebenen

Substanz

realisiert,

die dadurch

den

Rang

eines

Prinzips

erhält. Die

Einsetzung

der Substanz

zum

Prinzip

schlechthin

ann,

so

konkludiert

Kühn,

als ein

Ergebnis

wissenstheoretischer

rgumente

betrachtet

werden. Sie

ist mit

einer

Minimalisierung

des

reflexiven

Moment im Wissensprozessverbunden.

(3)

Im dritten

Teil,

sicherlich

der

interessanteste,

ehandelt

Kühn

verschiedene

Ansätze,

die

den

Prinzipiencharakter

er

Substanz,

des

selbständigen

Früheren,

relativieren

'

'Alternative

Ansätze

in

der

Prinzipientheorie ,

329-524).

Erst

in

diesem

letzten

Teil

kommt

hauptsächlich

Thomas zu

Wort,

denn

in

dessen

Philosophie

befinden

sich

Elemente,

die

nach dem Urteil des

Verf. eine Revision der aristo-

telischen

Prinzipienkonzeption

rmöglichen.

Dazu

gehören

vor allem

die

Transzendentalien,

die

Vernunftbestimmungeneglichen

Ge-

genstands .

Ihre

Ausarbeitung

ist bei Thomas

viel deutlicher als bei

Aristoteles,

obgleich

Kühn dem

sofort

die

Bemerkung

hinzusetzt,

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Thomas

bringe

die fundamentale

Funktion der

Transzendentalien

m

ganzen

seiner

Philosophie

nicht

entsprechend

ur

Geltung.

Der Sache nach knüpftThomas' Reflexionan Piatons Konzeption

der

grössten

Genera'

'

an,

die

den historischen

Hintergrund

des

Transzendentalienthemasdarstellt

416).

Die

Analyse

der Transzen-

dentalien

geht

nicht

mehr von einem unmittelbaren

Bewusstsein

und

einem

unmittelbar

Gegebenen

aus,

sondern von

den

Urteilsformen,

Affirmation

nd

Negation,

und betrachtet

die

apriorische

Struktur

der diskursiven

Vernunft ls

Prinzip

allen

Wissens.

Einen ersten alternativen

Ansatz sieht Kühn

in der

transzendenta-

len

Bestimmung

Wahrsein

(343 ff.).

Diese

wird

in De veritate

,1,

wo Thomas die verschiedenen transcendentia'ableitet,als die Bezo-

genheit

uf

Erkenntnis,

uf das erkennende

Bewusstsein,

verstanden.

Dieser Vernunftcharakter

kann dem Verfasser

ufolge

auch an den

anderen transzendentalen

Bestimmungen nachgewiesen

werden,

ob-

gleich

Thomas diesen

Zusammenhang

nicht

gesehen

hat. Die Konse-

quenz,

die sich

aus dem

Begriff

er

Transzendentalien als

a

priori

gewisser

Bestimmungen

beliebiger

Objekte

ergibt,

könnte

nur

sein,

dass die

Annahme eines

einfachen

Gegebenseins

der Realität

über-

wunden

wird.

Das Wahrheitsbewusstsein

macht die Wirklichkeit u

einem- abhängigen- ExtremderErkenntnisbeziehung.Abergera-

de diese

Konsequenz

zieht Thomas

nicht;

so leer

bleibt bei ihm der

Vernunftbezug

alles Seienden

unter

dem Titel

des

transzendentalen

Wahrseins

(350).

Es ist hm

an einem

Prinzip

gelegen,

das

die Unab-

hängigkeit

der

Realität von

der

Erkenntnisbeziehung

u

verbürgen

verspricht.

Als solches

fungiert

die

Materie .

Sie wird

gleichsam

zum Garanten

der

im

Sein der

natürlichen

Einstellung

pointierten

Objektivität

der

Kategorien,

während die Transzendentalien auf eine

blosse

begriffliche

truktur

estringiert

leiben.

Einen weiterenalternativenAnsatz zum aristotelischen rinzipien-

begriff

ieht

Kühn

in

Thomas' vernunfttheoretischem

urchdenken

des

Begriffs

Seiendes . Thomas nennt

Seiendes

das

Ersterkann-

te.

Damit

gibt

er zwar

-

gemäss

dem Ansetzen

bei

einem

unmittelbar

Gegebenen

-

für die

intellektuelle

Anschauung

einen

intelligibelen

Gegenstand

an,

aber man

kann diese Rede

auch

als einen

nicht-

intendierten

Verweis

auf die

sprachliche

Vernunftform

ller

Erkennt-

nisgegenstände

verstehen

437).

Man

kann

seine

Reflexion

in

dem

Sinne

lesen,

dass sie

nicht osehr

von einem

Gegenstandhandelt,

son-

dern

von dem

Inbegriff

ller

Urteilsmöglichkeiten.

Wenn Thomas in

De veritate

,1

weiter

sagt,

dass

jede

beliebige

Natur' wesentlich

ein

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Seiendes

ist,

heisst

das,

dass

die

Bestimmung

Seiendes'

nicht

sepa-

rat,

sondern

n

ihrer

bedingenden

Funktion für alle

anderen

Bestim-

mungen gedachtwerden muss. Thomas macht die Verselbständigung

des

Prinzips

gegenüber

dem

durch

es

Bedingten gerade

anhand einer

reinen

Vernunftbedingung priori

faktisch

ückgängig

426).

Eine

Legitimation

zu

dieser

vernunfttheoretischen

eutung

des

Seinsbegriffs

ieht

Kühn in

der

auffallenden

Neueinschätzung

des Ne-

gativen

bei

Thomas. In seinem

Kommentar

zu

Boethius'

De

Trinitate

(Q.4, Art.l)

entwickelt homas die

These,

die

Negation

sei

in ihrer

Entgegensetzung uje

einer Affirmation

rinzip

aller

Distinktionund

Verschiedenheit.3

Die

Einbeziehung

der

Negation

in diesen

Entwurf

bedeutet nach Thomas' Begriff on der Negation, dass eine Unter-

scheidung

von

Seienden

und deshalb

auch die

Distinktheit

dieses

einzelnen

Seienden

nur

unterder

Bedingung

eines reinen

Verstandes-

seienden ens

rationis)möglich

st.

Thomas fasstdie

Unterschiedenheit

beliebiger

Seiender von

einander nicht

mehr

als

einen

gegebenen

Sachverhalt

auf,

sondern

als

eine Konstruktionder

Vernunft,

ls Re-

sultat einer Reihe von

Gedankenschritten,

deren

Form

durch die

Transzendentalien a

priori

('Sein-Nichtsein',

'Geschiedenheit-

Einheit')

bestimmt st.

Mindestens de

facto wird

so das

traditionell

aristotelischeAufnehmendes natürlichenRealitätsbewusstseinskriti-

siert.

Zugleich

wird

diese

Interpretation,

worin

die

Transzendentalien

als

4

'Resultate

logischer

Tätigkeit

erscheinen,

wiederum von

Tho-

mas

selbst

relativiert,

ndem er

die

Bestimmung

Seiendes'

allem

Ne-

gativen

-

unter dem

Terminus

'Nichtseiendes'

-

entgegensetzt

nd

so

zu einer

Bezeichnung

für

reine

Positivität

macht.

(4)

Das Fazit

von

Kühns

Studie ist deshalb

die

Zwiespältigkeit

von Thomas'

Philosophie

(375),

die

Zwiespältigkeit

seiner Prinzi-

pienkonzeption

522):

Einerseits

treibtThomas

die Reflexion

auf

die

Transzendentalienweiter,weist

gegen

die

antiplatonische

Absichtder

aristotelischen

Kategorienlehre

deren

bedingende

Funktion für

die

Denkbarkeit von

Gegenständen

nach

und

restituiert o ihren

Prinzi-

piencharakter.

Aber

gerade,

weil

Thomas die

logische

Struktur,

die

Seiendes

überhaupt

bestimmen

oll,

weiter

ausarbeitet,

ergibt

ich für

ihn

die

Notwendigkeit,

agegen

den

Prinzipiencharakter

er

Katego-

3

In

Boethu

e

trinitate

,1:

Prima

luralitatis

el

divisionisatio ive

principium

st

ex

negatione

t

ffirmatione,

t

alis rdo

riginis

luralitatis

ntelligatur,

uod

primo

sintntelligendans tnon ns, xquibuspsaprima ivisa onstituuntur,сperhoc

plura.

nde icut

ost

ns,

n

quantum

st

ndivisum,

tatimnvenitur

num,

ta

post

divisionemntis t non

ntis

tatim

nvenitur

luralitasriorům

implicium.

147

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rien

deutlich

zu

markieren.Er

schwächt

gleichzeitig

ie Transzenden-

talien

zu blossen

Gedankenbestimmungen,,

ab

(379),

er

ordnet sie

als nur gedankliche Differenzierungen es Seienden dessen realen in-

haltlichen

Bestimmungen

unter,

die unter die aristotelischen

Kate-

gorien

zu subsumieren sind und deshalb die

Substanz

zum

Prinzip

haben

(siehe

v.a.

XXIX).

II

(1)

Aus der

vorangegangenen

Darlegung

des

Gedankengangs,

wie

knapp

auch

immer,

tritt

eutlich

hervor,

dass

Kühns Studie

kritische

Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung

ein

will. Der

Anfangssatz

seines

Buches ist in dieser Hinsicht

vielsagend:

Thomas von

Aquin galt

lange

als

systematischer

enker und

sein Werk als

in sich

kohärente

philosophisch-

heologische

Theorie .

Genau dieses Bild

bedarf dem

Verf.

zufolge

einer

gründlichen

Revision.

Er will

nachweisen,

dass

Thomas'

Philosophie

sich

in

den

Grundlagen

als uneinheitlichund

nicht

harmonisierbar rweist.

mmer wieder

signalisiert

r fundamen-

tale

Widersprüchlichkeiten.

o

wird auf

S. 457 darauf

hingewiesen,

dass

Thomas

mit seiner

Analyse

von

Unterschiedenheit

sich dem

Einwand aussetzt, der sonst von ihm vorgetragenenPhilosophie

grundsätzlich

u

widersprechen .

Kühns

kritischerAnsatz

stützt

sich stark

auf die

Arbeiten von

K.

Flasch,

namentlichdessen

Die

Metaphysik

esEinenbeiNikolaus

on

Kues.

Problemgeschichtlichetellung

nd

systematische

edeutungLeiden

1973).

Der erste

Teil davon enthält

eine

weitgespannte

Exposition

der Pro-

blemlage,

deren zentraler Punkt die

kritisch-historische

ufhellung

der

Beziehung

des Aristoteles

u Piaton ist. Diese

Beziehung

wird als

Zurückdrängung

der

transzendentallogischen

Motive Piatons

gekenn-

zeichnet (109 ff.). Kühns Studie kann als Ausarbeitungdieser Per-

spektive

n

bezug

auf Thomas betrachtet

werden.

Die

Philosophie

des

Doctor

Angelicus

ist

im

Laufe

der

Jahr-

hunderte

wohl

mehr als andere

Denksysteme

sanktioniert'

worden.

Eine kritische

Durchleuchtung

seines

Denkens ist darum nur zu

begrüssen;4

etztlich

wird sie Thomas als Denker mehr

gerecht.

Aber

im Hinblick auf

die

vorliegende

Kritik an Thomas

erheben sich doch

4

Solch

inekritische

ewertung

st

n

den

etzten

ahrzehnten

eniger

ngebräuch-

lich lsderAutor nsglaubenmachen ill.Vgl.L. B. Puntel Analogiend eschicht-

lichkeit:

Philosophiegeschichtlich-kritischer

ersuchber

as

Grundproblem

er

Metaphysik

Freiburg/Basel/Wien,

969.

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ernsthafte

edenken,

die vor

allem

die

Beziehung

von

Systematik

nd

Geschichte

n

der

Problemstellung

und

-analyse

betreffen.

eide Mo-

mente sind untrennbar:

Philosophiegeschichtsschreibungst,

um

einen Ausdruck von Gilson

zu

gebrauchen,

immer

mehr

als

nur

4

'mentale

Archäologie .

Die

Analyse

eines

Denkers der

Vergangen-

heit

kann

nie

lediglich

rein historisch

ein,

schon aus

dem

Grunde,

weil sie

stets

eine

philosophische

Reflexion

erfordert.

Die

Beziehung

zwischen

dem historischen

nd dem

systematischem

Moment

variiert

je

nach Art der

Forschung.

Manchmal ist der

systematische

Ansatz

vorherrschend

man

kann aus einer

modernen

Problemstellung

her-

aus

die Geschichte

befragen,

.B.

untersuchen,

ob die mittelalterliche

Philosophie die konstitutiveFunktion des menschlichen Denkens

kennt.5Gerade

in einer

Arbeit,

die die innere

nkonsistenz

n Thomas'

Denken

aufzeigen

will,

ist es

jedoch

ein hermeneutisches

Erfordernis

die

systematische

tellungnahme

n

den

Dienst des historischen

Ver-

stehens zu

stellen.

Es muss darum

gehen,

die Intentionen von

Tho-

mas*

Denken

freizulegen.

In

dieser

Hinsicht

versagt

diese

Studie.

Ihr Aufbau

ist

im

Wesen

a-historisch.

Der Autor

versucht

eine rationale

Rekonstruktion

on

Grundkonzeptionen

(XXVI),

wobei es

allerdings

fraglich

st,

ob

darin die Hauptperson der Studie wirklichnoch zu Wort kommt, a

zu Wort

kommen

kann. Auffallenderweisewird

in

diesem

Buch nir-

gends

die

Frage gestellt,

wie

Thomas selbst ie

Begriffe

Substantiali-

tät und

Prinzip

versteht,

obwohl sich hierzu

in

seinem

Werk

interessante

arlegungen

befinden.6

Dadurch auch wirktKühns

kriti-

sche

Problemstellung

konstruiert ,

und

man

fragt

ich,

ob

es hier

wirklich

noch

um

ein

Problem

bei

Thomas

geht.

Die Gekünsteltheit

tritt or

allem

zutage

bei der

Erörterung

ines anderen

zentralen

Be-

griffs

ieser

Studie,

nämlich

dem

der 'transcendentia'.

Hier werden

wohl Texte von Thomas diskutiert, ber sie werden so gelesen, dass

der

vom

Verf.

selbst

gebrauchte

Ausdruck

spekulative

Deutung

(XXXVIII)

eine nicht unzutreffende

Bezeichnung

ist.

Im Verlauf

5

Vgl.

denAufsatz

onK.

Flasch Kennt iemittelalterliche

hilosophie

ie

kon-

stitutiveunktiones

menschlichen

enkens?,

n:

Kantstudien3

(1972),

182-206.

6

Kennzeichnend

st,

dass

m

LiteraturverzeichnisehrWerke berPiaton nd

Aristoteles

ngeführt

erdenls

überThomas. o

gut

wiealle

Abhandlungen,

ie

nach em

.

Weltkrieg

ichtige

euerungen

m

Thomas-Studium

ingeleitet

aben,

bleiben

ngenannt.

gnoriert

erden.B. die verschiedenen

rbeitenber

die Be-

deutungerplatonischenraditionnThomas'Denken, iedie vonC. Fabro nd

L.-B.

Geiger

ber

ie

Partizipation,

in

Thema,

as

vonKühnwohl m

Zusammen-

hang

mit

lato,

ber

nicht ei Thomas ur

Sprache ebracht

ird.

149

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dieses

Aufsatzes

werden wir

auf

einige Aspekte

der

Darstellung

ein-

gehen,

die unsere

methodologischen

und inhaltlichenBedenken ver-

deutlichen

werden.

(2)

Das

Prinzipienproblem

bei

Thomas,

das

Kühn

ins

Auge

fasst,

besteht

n

dem

Gegensatz

von

dessen

Konzeption

der

Transzendenta-

lien

und der

Kategorienlehre.

Nun

steht

transzendental

im

scholas-

tischen

Sinne

in

der

Tat

gegenüber

kategorial.

Aber

es ist

wichtig

u

sehen,

wie

diese

Opposition

begriffen

ird. Dies wird

von Thomas in

dem

klassischen Text

von De veritate

,1

herausgearbeitet.

Seiendes ist das

Ersterkannte.

Dies

beinhaltet,

dass alle anderen

Be-

griffe

urch

Hinzufügung

zu

Seiendes

entstehen. Aber

wie ist

dies

möglich? In jedem Fall nicht in der Weise, wie ein Differenz inem

Genus

hinzugefügt

wird.

ť

'Seiendes ist kein

Genus

(vgl.

Aristoteles,

Metaphysica

,

c.8);

ausserhalb des

Seienden

gibt

es

nichts.

Andere Be-

griffe

önnen dem

Seienden allein in

dem

Sinne

etwas

hinzufügen,

dass

sie von

ihm

eine

Seinsweise

{modus)

usdrücken,

die durch den

Namen

Seiendes noch nicht

ausgedrückt

wird. Die

Explizierung

dessen,

was

im

Seienden

enthalten

st,

kann auf

zweierlei Weise

ge-

schehen.

Was zum

Ausdruck

gebracht

wird,

kann

zunächst eine

spe-

zielle

Seinsweise sein. Seiendes

wird dann

kontrahiert

und

eingeengt.Dies geschiehtn den Kategorien; sie stellendie erstenVer-

besonderungen

des Seienden

dar.

Aber

das,

was

ausgedrückt

wird,

kann

auch einen

allgemeinen

Modus

betreffen,

er

jedem

Seienden

folgt

modus

eneralis onsequens

mne

ns).

Dann

wird etwas

expliziert,

das Seiendem als

solchem

zukommt,

das

damit

konvertibel

ist.

Diese Termini nennt Thomas

anderswo

(u.a.

in De

veritate

1,4)

auch

transcendentia.

Aus diesem Text

geht

deutlich

hervor,

dass der

Gegensatz

von

transzendentalund

kategorial

bei

Thomas

auf dem

Unterschied

von

allgemeinerund besonderer Seinsweise beruht. Wie wird dieserGe-

gensatz

nun

in

Kühns

Studie verarbeitet?

Charakteristisch afür

sind

drei

Schritte.

Erstens

Transzendental

wird hier

ausschliesslich

m

logischen

in-

ne

aufgefasst.

Transzendentalien werden

konsequent

als Vernunft-

bestimmungen

eglichen Gegenstandes

bezeichnet,

als

a

priori

gewisse Bestimmungen beliebiger

Objekte .

Damit wird

eine be-

stimmteerkenntnistheoretischeosition

eingenommen,

die offenbar

für o

selbstverständlich rachtet

wird,

dass dieser Schritt

weder erläu-

tert noch begründetwird. Verallgemeinerndwird behauptet, dass

die

transzendentale

Einsicht in

Vernunftbestimmungen

das

Ziel

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der

philosophischen

Reflexion als

Prinzipienforschung

ausmache

(234).

Aufgrund

dieses Standortes

gebraucht

der

Verf.

den Ausdruck

'

'transzendental

nur in der kantischen

Bedeutung;

dieser bezieht

sich also auf die

Analyse

der

Konstitutionder

Objektwelt

durch

den

menschlichenGeist.7

Damit ist ndessen eine

Entscheidung

gefallen,

die

in

einer

Analyse,

welche sich

mit Thomas' Denken

befasst,

von

vornherein inen

Ge-

gensatz

hineinträgt.

Kant

stellt

nämlich

in

der

Kritik er einen

ernunft

(par.

12,

В

114)

seine

eigene Konzeption

der

Transzendentalphilo-

sophie

der

Alten

gegenüber.

Darin

wurden die

Transzendentalien

falsch

gedolmetscht

als

Prädikate

der

Dinge ;

sie

sind

jedoch

nichts anderes als logische Erfordernisseund Kriterien aller Er-

kenntnis

der

Dinge

überhaupt .

Indem

der Verf.

transzendental

in

dieser

Bedeutung

fixiert,

weiss er

mit den

'transcendentia' im

mit-

telalterlichen

ontologischen

inn

eigentlich

nichts

anzufangen.

Mit

seiner

Textlesung

bezweckt

er,

ene

als

logische

Momente der Reali-

tät

zu rekonstruieren

vgl. 463);

Seiendes

ist

eine

reine

Vernunft-

bedingung

a

priori .

Es wäre

jedoch

historisch

angemessener

und

auch

philosophisch

fruchtbarer

ewesen,

Thomas'

Denken über die

'transcendentia'

ls

eigenständige

Form innerhalbder transzendental-

philosophischenTradition anzuerkennen. Einen ersten Ansatz dazu

hat

N.

Hinske

geliefert Verschiedenheit

und

Einheit der

transzen-

dentalen

Philosophien ,

in: Archiv

ür

Begriffseschickte

4

(1970),

41-68).

Zweitens

Weil

transzendental

im

kantischen Sinne

gegenüber

empirisch

steht und dieser

Gegensatz

mit der

(nicht-kantischen)

Distinktion

transzendental/kategorial

dentifiziert

wird,

wird diese

Unterscheidung

n

der

vorliegenden

Studie mit einer Reihe

weiterer

Gegensätze

befrachtet.

Es

geht

um die Reflexion auf

die

logischen

Voraussetzungender Erkenntnisversus unmittelbareGegenstandser-

kenntnis,

um

Wissensbedingungen

versus

objektive

Seinsprinzipien,

um

apriorische

Bedingungen

versus natürliches

Realitätsbewusstsein,

um das

Prinzip

der Relationalität versus Substantialitätdes

Prinzips.

DrittensAlle

obengenannten

Oppositionen

verankert

Kühn

histo-

risch

n

dem

Gegensatz

zwischen Piaton

und

Aristoteles.Dem Plato-

nismus der

Transzendentalien

(176)

steht

die aristotelische

Präferenz für unmittelbare

Sachbestimmungen

gegenüber.

7

Angeregt

on

K.

Flasch

Die

Metaphysik

es

inen eiNikolauson

ues

103,

Anm.

1.

151

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Aufgrund

dieser drei Schritte st

die

ursprüngliche,

mittelalterliche

Bedeutung

des

Gegensatzes transzendental/kategorial

n diesem

Buch

so

transformiert,

ass Thomas'

Transzendentalienanalyse

einen

'

'al-

ternativenCharakter

erhält und

der Thomismus als ein sich

selbst

relativierender

Aristotelismus

(521

ff.)

präsentiert

werden

kann.

(3)

Kühns

transzendentallogische

nterpretation

on Piaton stützt

sich vor allem

auf

die

Lehre von

den

grössten

Genera

im

Sophistes.

Uber diesen

Dialog

ist

n

den letzten

Jahren

viel

geschrieben

worden.

Hier

ist nicht

der

Ort,

und

für

unseren Zweck

ist es auch nicht not-

wendig,

auf die mit diesem Werk

verbundenen Probleme

einzugehen.

Wir

begnügen

uns mit zwei

Anmerkungen.

Zunächst konstatieren

wir, dass eine transzendentallogische eutung keineswegscommunis

opinio

ist.

So

schreibt z.B. W.

Beierwaltes:

Die

'megista

gene'

...

scheinen mir aber auch nicht

auf

reine

Begriffe

eduzierbar

zu

sein.

Es sind vielmehr die

jedem

Seienden und

jeder

Idee

zukommenden,

ontologischen

und

deshalb

auch

logisch

ausdrückbaren

Strukturen .8

Besonders instruktiv

st in dieser

Hinsicht auch ein auf

dem sechsten

Symposium

ristotelicum

ehaltenes

Referat von E.

de

Strijker

über das

Verhältnis

zwischen Piatons

Sophistes

nd Aristoteles'

Metaphysica

,

nebst

der sich

daran

anschliessenden Diskussion.

Daraus ist

zu erse-

hen, wie unterschiedlich iese Beziehung eingeschätztwird.9

Wichtiger

st

edoch

noch ein zweiter

Punkt. Dass Thomas sich

ei-

nes

transzendentallogischen

Anspruchs

von

Piatons Position bewusst

gewesen

sei,

wie der

Verf.

suggeriert,

st

völlig

unakzeptabel ( Tho-

mas musste

sich

des

impliziten

Anspruchs

des Transzendentalienbe-

griffs,

ine

Theorie

der

Wissensprinzipien

zu

enthalten,

durchaus

bewusst

sein,

weil

er die

aristotelischeKritik

..

kommentierend

er-

folgt

hat ,

415).

Hier rächt sich

erneut der

a-historischeAnsatz von

Kühns

Arbeit.

Weder

Thomas' Kommentare noch seine selbständi-

gen Schriften nthalten inen Hinweis darauf,dass er die philosophi-

sche

Beziehung

zwischen

Piaton

und Aristoteles ls den von

Kühn

rekonstruierten

egensatz

von

transzendentallogischem

ersus kate-

gorialem

Denken durchschaut

hat.

In

der

Konsequenz

dieses Schemas

erscheint

Aristotelesbei

Kühn

in

erster Linie

als

Repräsentant

der

Substanzontologie,

der

Philoso-

8

W.

Beierwaltes

''Nicht-Sein

sť'

Identität

nd

Differenz

ls

Elemente

latoni-

scher

ialektik,

n:

dentitätnd

ifferenz

Frankfurt

.

Main,

1980,

-23

hier:

9).

9 Notes ur es relationsntrea problématiqueuSophisteePlaton t celle e la

Métaphysique

'Aristote,

n: P.

Aubenqueed.)

-

Etudesur a

Métaphysique

'Aristote

Paris,

979,

9-64

Diskussion:

5-67).

152

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phie

von

dem

empirisch

Dinghaften.

Aber

wie

aristotelisch

st dieser

Aristotelismus?

0

Die

Darlegungen

des

Verfassers sind

ziemlich ein-

seitig

auf

das

Verhältnis

von konkreter ubstanz

zu

Akzidenz

gerich-

tet. Gerade

bei Thomas

(z.B.

De

potentia

,1)

hätte er nachlesen

können,

dass

das

Prinzip

der Substantialitätbei Aristoteles

vieldeuti-

ger

ist

-

der

Aquinat

führt

uch die

philosophischen

Gründe

dafür

an.

Philosophus ponit

substantiam

dupliciter

dici. Dicitur enim uno

modo substantia

psum

subiectumltimum

.

Alio modo dicitur

orma

vel natura ubiecti .

Das Kennzeichen

von Substanz

im

ersten

Sinne

ist

die Subsistenz

( quasi

per

se

et non

in

alio

existens ).

Substanz

in

der letzteren

Bedeutung,

von Thomas auch 'essentia'

genannt,

ist

etwas Nicht-Subsistierendes,ber nichtsdestowenigeras ontologisch

Frühere,

weil

aus

ihr die

' 4

determinado

essendi

hervorgeht.

An

dem

Form-Prinzip,

mit dem damit verbundenen

Begriff

on

Akt ,

kann

man nicht

vorübergehen,

wenn

man

Aristoteles' Position

im Verhält-

nis zu

Piaton,

aber auch in

Beziehung

mit

Thomas,

bestimmen will.

Die

primäre,

formale

Bedeutung

von Substantialität

1

relativiert

noch in anderer Hinsicht

das Aristotelesbild es

Verf.,

in dessen Mit-

telpunkt

nämlich die These

steht,

Aristoteles

habe den von ihm in Me-

taph.

V,

1

(1013

a

17

ff.)

bestimmten Relationscharakter

von

Prinzipien ( das Erste zu sein, von dem her etwas ist, entsteht der

erkannt

wird )

gerade

in sein

Gegenteil

verkehrt

82/3),

weil Aristote-

les

die

Selbständigkeit

zum

Kriterium

für

Prinzipien

erhoben habe

( Substantialität

des

Prinzips ).

Dass dieses

Bild

undifferenziert

st,

wird

noch durch einen Text

bestätigt,

er Kühn

(297)

zufolge

die

Rol-

le

des

empirischen

Moments

bei

Aristoteles

llustriert,

ämlich

Physica

B,

l.12 Nun definiert

ristoteles ort Natur'

als eine

arche

von

Bewe-

gung

und

Ruhe),

aber er

betont,

dass

sie

kein

selbständigerGegen-

stand ist.

Wie

Thomas

in

seinem

Kommentar

bemerkt,

hat

das

(selbständige)konkreteNaturding rationem principiati , die Natur

jedoch

rationem

principii

{In

llPhys.,

lect.

2,152).

Für

Thomas

gilt

10

Vgl.

F.

Inciarte

Wie

ristotelischst

er

Aristotelismus,

n:

Theologie

nd hilo-

sophie

4

1979),

4-107

Zu

K.

Flasch

Die

Metaphysik

esEinen

eiNikolaus

on

Kues).

11

F.

Inciarte

o.e.,

103:

Weder

n

den

Substanzbüchernoch n

De

anima

at

die

aristotelische

ubstanz

rimär

inghaften

harakter .

12

Kühn

ielt

uf

ie

Bemerkung

es

Aristoteles,

it

er

rdie

Frage

ür

berflüssig

erklärt,

b es

so

etwaswie

Naturdinge

irklich

ebe.

Der Text

agt

twas

nderes

aus. Nicht ieFrage ältAristotelesür berflüssig,ondernenBeweis afür,ass

es

dieNatur

ibt.

er

Verf. at

manchmal

elbst as

Bedürfnis,

ein

Aristotelesbild

zu

modifizieren

vgl.

XXXV).

153

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noch,

dass er

die

eigentliche

Bedeutung

von

principium

im

Begriff

'

'Ursprung

( origo

sieht

und nicht

m

Begriff

Priorität'

(vgl.

Summa

theologiae, 33,1

und

ad

3).

(4)

Die mittelalterliche ehre der

Transzendentien hat sich

im 13.

Jahrhunderts

entwickelt

im

Zusammenhang

mit der

Aristoteles-

Rezeption.

Denn sachlich

knüpft

ie Scholastik

an

Metaphysica

V,

с

2

an,

wo Aristoteles

usführt,

das

Eine

sei eine

mit

Seiendem koex-

tensive

Eigenschaft.

Kühn

konstatiert

urecht,

dass Thomas weiter ls

Aristoteles

gegangen

ist. Die

Frage

ist:

Warum? Welche

Motive ha-

ben im

weiteren Ausbau der

Transzendentalienlehre eine Rolle

ge-

spielt?

Ein erstes Motiv ist von onto-logischerArt; Transzendentien

drücken,

wie

wir

sahen,

Weisen von Sein aus. Dieses Motiv wird

be-

reits

n

Thomas' Kommentar zu

Metaphysica

V,

2

sichtbar,

wo er

die

Konvertibilität

des Seienden und

des Einen

entfaltet,

ber

zugleich

ein weiteres transzendentales Attribut

introduziert,

nämlich 'res'

( Ding ).

Diese

Bestimmung

unterscheidet

ich insofernvon sei-

end ,

als res die Washeit

oder

das Wesen des

Seienden

ausdrückt,

während

der

Name

ens

dem Seinsakt entnommen st

n

IVMetaphys.,

lect.

2,553).

Die neue transzendentaleBestimmtheit

rücktdie

Tatsa-

che aus, dass die Struktur es Seienden selbstbei Thomas komplizier-

ter

als bei Aristoteles

geworden

ist,

nämlich

dreifach:

'subiectum-essentia-esse'.

Diese

Triplizität

fasstThomas

in der These

zusammen:

Hic homo non est sua humanitas nee

suum esse .

Kennzeichen

von

'subiectum' ist die

Subsistenz,

von

'essentia'

das

Wassein,

von 'esse' die Aktualität.13

Diese

komplizierte

einsstrukturmacht

bereits

deutlich,

wie

unbe-

gründet

Kühns

Auffassung

st,

Bestehen

mache auch

bei

Thomas

den

eigentlichen

Sinn

von

Sein aus

(111/2).

Bei der

Behandlung

der

transzendentalenBestimmung bonum' ist das entscheidendeArgu-

ment des

Aquinaten

fürdie Konvertibilität des

Seienden

und

des

Guten ,

dass das Sein die actualitas

on einem

jeden Ding

ist

(5.

th.

13

Ein

prechendes

eispiel

ür ieDreifachheitesSeienden

st

umma

ontraentiles

IV,

11: In creaturaliud st ssentiat

esse,

t

n

quibusdam

st

tiam liud

uod

subsistit

n ua essentiat

ejus

ssentiaive

natura;

am

hic

homo

on st ua huma-

nitas

ес

suum

sse,

edDeusest

ua

essentia

t uum

sse.

Et,

quamvis

aec

nDeo

unum int

erissime,

amen

n

Deo

est

uidquid

ertinet

d

rationem

el

ubsisten-

tiae

vel

essentiae

el

psius

sse;

convenit

nim i non sse n

aliis,

n

quantum

st

subsistens,ssequid, nquantumst ssentiaetesse nactu, ationepsius sse.

Vgl.

zu

dieser reifachheit

uch

J.

A.

Aertsen

Naturan

Creatura.e

denkweg

an

Thomas

an

Aquino

,

Amsterdam

982,130;

175;

376/7.

154

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I,

5,1).

Es ist

merkwürdig,

ass

der Verf.

nicht

bemerkt,

dass

sich die-

ses

neue

Seinsverständnis

uch

auf Thomas' Substanzdefinition

us-

wirkt. Ens

per se,

so Thomas

in

De

potentia

,3

ad

4,

ist nicht die

Definitionvon Substanz. Insoferndie Substanz als

genus generalissi-

mům in einer definitorischen

estimmung

fassbar

st,

muss diese

lau-

ten: Substantia

est cuius

quidditati

debetur esse non

in

aliquo .

Darum ist

die Substanzdefinition

nicht auf Gott anwendbar

( Et

sie

non

conveniet

definido substantiae

Deo ).14

Damit

gelangen

wir zu einem

anderen,

theologisch

gearteten,

Mo-

tiv

im

Ausbau

der

Transzendentalienlehre,

nämlich die Reflexion

über die

göttlichen

Namen. Es

ist

kein

Zufall,

dass

die

transzendenta-

len Seinseigenschaften ei Thomas hauptsächlichan den Stellen der

Summa

heologiae

iskutiert

werden,

wo er die

göttlichen

Attributebe-

handelt.

In

dieser

Reflexion taucht

nämlich die

Frage

auf,

wie der

Transzendente,

der

alle

Kategorien übersteigt,

ich

zu dem Transzen-

dentalen,

das sich durch alle

Kategorien

erstreckt,

erhält. In

diesem

Zusammenhang gebraucht

Thomas

ein anderes

Prädikationsmodell

als das

aristotelische,

ämlich das

platonische

von

per

s entiam nd

per

partieipationemsiehe

z.B. S.th.

I,

6,4

und

Quodl.

I,

2,1)

und

entwickelt

er

einen

Begriff

on

Ursprünglichkeit,

er

das

Seiende

als Seiendes

betrifft,.h. eine transzendentaleKausalität (vgl. S.th. I, 44,2). Die

aristotelischen

Kategorien

erhalten den Status

einer divisio ntis reati

{In

I

Sent.

8,4,2

ad

1).

In

noch anderer

Hinsicht

st

das

theologische

Moment

in

der Trans-

zendentalienlehre

nstruktiv,

eil

es nämlich

deutlich

macht,

dass die-

se Lehre

bei

Thomas eine andere Tendenz

hat

als bei

Kant.

Das

Anliegen

dieses Denkens ist nicht

eine

Begrenzung

der Vernunft

durch die Vernunft.Die

besondere

Beziehung

des

Menschen zum er-

sten

Seinsprinzip

wird

von Thomas

gerade

auf

die transzendentale

Offenheit es menschlichenGeistes gegründet S.th. II-II, 2,3: Na-

tura autem

rationalis,

nquantum cognoscit

universalem

boni

et entis

rationem,

habet

immediatum

ordinem

ad universale essendi

princi-

pium ).

Das

menschliche Denken

ist

nicht

auf

das

Kategoriale

beschränkt,

ondern

besitzt eine

Offenheit

für

alles,

was

ist.

Damit

ist die

Verbindung hergestellt

mit einem

letzten Motiv

in

Thomas'

Transzendentalienlehre,

welches

in

De veritate

,1

im

Vor-

dergrund

teht.

n

diesem Text wird eine

'resolutio' zum

Anfang

des

14

Vgl.

E.

Gilson

Quasi

definitio

ubstantiae,

n:

St. Thomas

quinas

ommemorati-

ve tudies

,

Toronto, 974,

111-129.

155

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menschlichen

Denkens,

zu den

ersten Denkinhalten

durchgeführt.

Diesem Moment widmet Kühn

aufgrund

seiner

Transzendentalien-

auffassung

exklusiv seine Aufmerksamkeit.Aber

seine

Deutung

des

Vernunftcharakters der 'transcendentia' bei Thomas ruft nhalt-

liche

Bedenken

hervor. Zum Schluss

hierzu.

(5)

'Transcendentia'

fügen

Seiendem etwas hinzu. Diese

Hin-

zufügung,

so

betont Thomas

in

De

veniate

1,1,1

betrifft

icht

eine

'

'bestimmte Weise

von

Sein

(<

eterminatusodus

ssendi

,

denn

dann

würden sie

ja

'

'Seiende beschränken

und ihren transzendentalen

Charakter verlieren. Transcendentia'

fügen

etwas

hinzu

secundum

a-

tionem antum. o

fügt

beispielsweise

das

Eine an Seiendes die

Negation hinzu.

Daraus

konkludiert er

Verfasser,

dass

Transzendentalien

nur

ra-

tionale

Bestimmungen

seien. Die

Konsequenz

ist

dann,

dass

die

Transzendentalien,

seiner Ansicht

nach,

bei

Thomas

eine

eigentüm-

liche

Stellung

bekommen: sie sind

notwendige

Elemente

edes

Seien-

den als

solchen

und

zugleich

blosse

Gedankenbestimmungen

(175).

Dies

führt

leichzeitig

u einem

Spannungsverhältnis

wischen

trans-

zendentalen und

kategorialen

Prinzipien.

Thomas

bestimmtnämlich

das Verhältnisdes transzendentalen inen zum

kategorialen

Einen

als

das des Früheren zum Späteren {In V Metaph. lect. 8,875: Et ideo

unum

non omnino

aequivoce

diciturde eo

quod

convertitur um

ente,

et

de

eo

quod

est

principium

numeri,

sed

secundum

prius

et

poste-

rius).

Das

Verhältnis

Früher-Später

macht

in

dem

vorliegenden

Fall

die transzendentale

Bestimmung

..

zu

einer

notwendigenBedingung

für

die

kategoriale,

also

eine

'nur rationale'

Bestimmung

um

Prinzip

für

eine

unmittelbare

Sachbestimmung.

Diese

Formulierung

soll das

Dilemma

anzeigen,

in

dem sich Thomas'

Denken

über

Prinzipien

be-

wegt

(379).

Mir scheint

edoch,

hier werde

ein falsches

Dilemma

gezeichnet,weil die Semantik der transzendentalenTermini missver-

standen ist.

Ausdruck

der Transzendentalität

st

die Konvertibilität.Das

Eine,

das Wahre und das

Gute

sind mit

Seiendem

und

untereinander

um-

kehrbar. Aber diese Konvertibilität

resultiert

nicht

in

tautologische

Sätzen,

ist kein leeres Gerede

( nugatio

.15

Transzendentien

bezeich-

nen realiter

dasselbe,

sind

qua 'suppositum'

identisch,

aber

Synony-

me sind sie nicht.

Sie differieren

ua Begriff,

gemäss

dem

'modus

15

De

veritate

,1

ad

1

(sed

contra);

1,1.

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signifìcandi'.16

n

Kühns

Betrachtung

wird

dieser

etzte

Aspekt

verab-

solutiert. Die

logische

Bedeutung

wird vom

ontologischen

Sinn

iso-

liert.

So konkludiert

r,

dass

die Transzendentalien

auf eine

blosse

begriffliche

truktur

restringiert

leiben . Dies

liegt

in der Konse-

quenz

seines

Ausgangspunktes.

Aber von

einer solchen

Restriktion,

von

einer Reduktion

auf bloss

gedachte

Momente'

'

findet

ich bei

Thomas

keine

Spur,

wie sich

aus

seinen

Darlegungen

über das

Ei-

ne

zeigt.

Das

Eine,

das

mit dem Seienden

konvertibel

st,

st

quod-

dam

metaphysicum

(

Summa

heologiae

,

11,3

ad

2),

denn

das Eine

bedeutet nicht

ediglich

die

Ungeteiltheit,

ondern

das

Wesen des Sei-

enden

mit dieser

(Ungeteiltheit) .17

TranszendentienexplizierenPerfektionen, ie in Seiendem als sol-

chem enthalten

sind

U

ngeteiltheit (

ť

eines

)

,

Intelligibilität

( wahr )

und

Begehrenswürdigkeit

gut ).

Diese

Explikation

erfor-

dert

Gedankenschritte,

die

in De

potentia

,7

beschrieben

werden

(

Primum nim

quod

in

intellectum

adit,

est

ens;

secundum

ero est

negatio

entis;

ex

his

autem duobus

sequitur

tertio

ntellectusdivisio-

nis...;

quarto

utem

sequitur

in

intellectu

atio

unius,

prout

scilicet n-

telligitur

oc ens

non esse

in se

divisum ).

Für Thomas sind

edoch

Transzendentien

weder

mit diesen

Gedankenschritten

dentisch

noch

eine Konstruktionder Vernunft . Transzendentienbezeichnen die

durch

diese

Schritte

xplizierten llgemeinen

Seinsweisen;

darum

sind

wohl

'ens' und 'unum'

transzendentale

Begriffe,

ber nicht

negatio'

und

'divisio'.

Es

gibt

dann

auch

keine Konkurrenz

zwischen

nur

begrifflichen)

ranszendentalen

und

kategorialen

Prinzipien.

Unsere

Schlussbeurteilung

muss lauten:

Kühns Thomas-Kritik

ist

nicht

gelungen,

weil

sie

ihr

Ziel verfehlt.

16

De

potentia

,7

ad

13:

Unum t

ens onvertuntur

ecundum

upposita;

ed

arnen

unumddit ecundumationem,rivationemivisionis;tpropterocnon unty-

nonyma,uia

synonyma

unt

uae significant

dem ecundumationem

amdem.

17

De

potentia

,7:

.. non

quodsignified

psam

ndivisionem

antum,

ed

substan-

tiam iuscum

psa.

157

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Vivarium

XIV,

2

(1986)

Review

Egbert

. Bos.

Marsilius

f nghen

Treatises

n

the

roperties

f

Terms.

First

ritical

Edition

f

he

Suppositions',

Ampliations',

Appellations',

Restrictions'

nd

Aliena-

tions'

with

ntroduction,

ranslation,otes,

nd

Appendices.

ynthese

istorical

Library,

2.

Dordrecht,

oston,

ancaster:

.

Reidel

Publishingompany,

1983. x + 274pp.

By

producing

his ditionnd

translation

f

group

f

Marsilius

f

nghen

s

logical

treatises,

. P. Bos has

rendered

signal

ervice

o

the

history

f

ogic

n

the ater

middle

ges.

The

period

rom 350

o

1500,

during

hich

Marsilius's orks

ere

produced

nd

read,

hasbeen

much

eglected.

ew

riginal

exts

re

vailable,

ther

than

n

facsimileditionsf

arly rinted

aterial,

nd

he ecent

ambridgeistoryf

Later edieval

hilosophydespite

ts

heavy

oncentration

n

ogic,

ells

s

virtually

nothing

fthe

years

fter 350.

n

order

o

overcomehis

eglect,

t

s essential

o

have

good

ccess

o

the

extbook

iterature;

or t

s

only y

nalyzing

his hat ne

can

come

to

understandhe

types

f

ogical heory

hich

were

presented,

ow

theories

eveloped

nd

changed,

ndwhat

art

heir

tudy layed

n

the

niversitycurriculum.

The

group

f exts hich

os

has hosen

o

dit s

argely

oncerned

ith

roblems

of

reference.

he

issues iscussed

ange

rom hereferencef concrete

ouns

n

standard

ategorical

ropositions

o

the

variations

ntroduced

y

the

presence

f

relational

erms,

emporal

odifiers,

nd

ntentional

erbs.Marsilius'siscussion

s

clear,

organized,

nd

occasionally

nnovative.

or

instance,

e

disagreed

ith

Buridan

ver

he

losely

inked

uestions

f

whether

eference

ould e extended

o

cover

maginarybjects,

n

ddition

o

past,

resent

ndfuture

bjects;

ndwhether

words uch

s

'chimera',

hich

urport

o

pick

ut

mpossible

bjects,

an have

referent.

owever,

t

must

e

noted

hat

hese

octrinal

ifferences

o

not

play

large

ole

n

Marsilius's

resentation;

or

s theremuch

mphasis

n

sophisms

nd

counter-examplesf he ort oundnPaulofVenice's ogica agna.Marsilius'sextsare

preeminentlyeaching

exts,

irected,

twould

eem,

owardhe

younger

tudent

(cf.

p.

63).

In

his

study

f

Marsilius,

os does

not

purport

o

present

a

complete

nd

thorough

iscussion

f

his

teachings,

or o

ocate hem

roperly

n

the

history

f

philosophy"

p.

17).

Even

with

espect

o

the

properties

f

terms,

he

ubject

m-

mediately

t

issue,

Bos's

analysis

f doctrinal attersnd

their

evelopment

s

piecemeal,

nd

presentednly ncidentally

n

the

ody

f he

notes

o

the

ext.

os's

approach

may isappoint

he

eader,

ut

t s

easy

o

understandnd

o

ustify

iven

the

nature

f

what ehas

done.On

the

ne

hand,

Bos's im

s

to

present

s

with

he

essentialawmaterial

or full

tudy

fdoctrinal

evelopments.

n the ther

and,

thebook

s

already

ong

nd

tightlyacked

ven

without

uch

study,

or n t

we

1

The

Cambridge

istoryf

ater

edieval

hilosophy

edited

y

Norman

retzmann,

Anthony

enny

nd

JanPinborg, ambridge,

ew

York

tc. 1982.

158

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find n ntroductionhich reats

f

Marsilius'sife nd

works;

n exhaustive

isting

of

all

the

manuscripts;thorough

iscussionf theeditorial

rinciples

dopted;

lengthy

otes;

our

ppendices,ncluding

ne which

ives

n overview

f

thedif-

ferencesetweenuridanndMarsilius;ndseveralndices.While he

eneral

utlinesfBos's

presentation

re

perfectlyatisfactory,

herere

someminor

oints

hich eed omment.shall

egin

with

few

catteredemarks.

First,

n

hisdiscussion

f

Marsiliust

Paris,

Bos does

not

mention

illiam

user,

under

whom

Marsilius

ncepted

n

1362,

and from hom

Marsilius

rew

much f

the

materialnhis reatise

n

obligations.

econd,

he o-called

agennaw

ommen-

tary

as

n

fact irst

ublished

n

Basel,

n

1 87

3

Third,

here

s

no

ndication

n

the

text

fwhich

ectionsave een iscussed

n

the

ootnotes,

hough

uch n ndication

would

ave

een f

great elp

o he eader.

ourth,

shworth977

cited

n

p.

192)

does

not

ppear

n

the

bibliography.inally,

henote

n

p.

245

referring

o

p.

240.12)

s

misleading.

Disiunctive*

n

this

ontext

urely

efers

ot

o

the octrine

f

ampliation,

ut

to

thefact hat

n

4

'Sorteswill un" the

future

ime

icked

ut

s

eitheromorrowrthenext ay rthe ay fterhat,nd oon,whereasn 'Sortes

will un

omorrow"

here s a restriction

hich

ules ut

any

uch

disjunction

f

future

imes.

A

point

which trikes e as ess

minor

as

to

do

with

os's

handling

f

he

erms

'

Logica

modernaand

Parva

ogicalia'

He

claims hat he

ogica

odernambraced

oth

treatises

n

the

roperties

f

erms

nd

he hree

reatises

n

consequences,

nsolubles

and

obligations;

nd he

supports

his laim

by

a

reference

o

an

early

-

1962

)

remark

y

De

Rijk

p. 44).

However,

e

gnores

ilbert's iscussionf he

ssue,

n

which ilbert

hows hat

n

fact he

elevant

ifteenth-century

sage

f he

hrase

as

to

pick

ut

ust

the hree

reatises

n

consequences,

nsolublesnd

obligations.4

os

also

dentifies

he

o-called

arvaogicalia

s

embracing

oth

roups

f

reatises,

nd n

support

e cites

very-poorly

ootnoted

assage y

Boehner

p.

3,

p.

46).

Again,

Gilbertoints utthat he ource uoted, heCologneCopulataractatuumarvorum

logicalium

f

1493,

makes n

explicit

istinction

n

its

subtitle

etween

he

parva

logicalia

nd

he hree

ther

reatises;5

nd

he

ame

s true

f

he

494,

496 nd

1498

editions

f

his

work

hat have

onsulted.

t

is also

relevanto note

hat

he

1463

statutesf

Freiburg

m

Breisgau

eem

o

make

distinctionetweenhe

arva

ogicalia

and the

onsequences

hen

hey

write hat he

books o be

read nclude:

Parva

Logicalia

magistři

Marsilii,

cilicet

upposiciones,

mpliaciones,

ppellaciones,

restricciones,

t

lienaciones,

imilitert

mbas

artes

onsequenciarum

iusdem."6

This

referenceo

the

Freiburg

tatutes

uggests

nother

nteresting

ssue

o

which

Bos

might

ave

paid

more

ttention,

amely

he

ctual

mportance

f

Marsilius's

work

s measured

y

tsuse

n

thefifteenth

entury. part

rom

he

vidence

ro-

vided

by

the

arge

number

f

manuscripts

hich

urvive,

here

s some

readilyavailable videncef Marsilius'slace ntheuniversityurriculum,hich an be

2

See C. H.

Kneepkens,

he

Mysterious

user

gain:

William

user

f

Heusdennd he

Obligationes

ract

b

rogatum,

n:

English

ogic

n

taly

n he 4th nd

5th

enturies

edited

y

A.

Maierù,

Napoli

1982,

.

152.

3

The

full itle s

Commentum

ovum

n

primum

t

quartum

ractatusetri

ispani

um

commento

arvorum

ogicalium

arsilii.

copy

s

to

be

found

n

theBodleian

ibrary,

Oxford.

4

N. W.

Gilbert,

ckham

WycliJ

nd he Via

Moderna*in:

Miscellanea

ediaevalia.

Antiqui

ndModerniedited

by

A.

Zimmermann,

erlin,

New

York

1974,

pp.

111-115.

5 Gilbert,p. cit.,pp. 112-113.

6

H.

Ott

nd

J.

M.

Fletcher,

he

Mediaevaltatutes

f

he

acultyf

Arts

f

he

niversity

of reiburg

m

Breisgau

Notre

ame,

ndiana

964,

.

40.

159

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summarized

riefly

s follows.

e

wasread t Cracow

n

the

irst

ixty

ears

f

he

fifteenth

entury;7

cult f

Marsilius asrevivedt

Heidelberg

t the nd

f he

if-

teenth

entury;8

e wasused

t

Erfurt,

udging

y

references

n the

tatutes

f

1412

andthe dditionsf1449;9nd there revarious eferencesohim nthe cts f he

faculty

f rts tVienna.10o be

specific,

heresonereferenceohis

nsolubles,

nd

there

re

wo

eferencesohis

uppositions,

our

o

his

onsequences,

nd

nine

o

his

obligations.

e wasforbiddent

Cologne;11

e wasforbidden

t

Louvain

n 1

27

12

and

he wascondemnedt

Paris

n

1474.

3

On the

ther

and,

fter

is

obligations

had

been

published

t

Paris

n

1489,

4

e

was

used

xtensively

y

such

uthorss

Thomas

ricot,

ohnMajor

nd

Domingo

e Soto. t s alsoworth

oting

hatater

in

the

ixteenth

entury

he talian

Aristotelian

gostino

ifo

requently

ited is

commentary

n

the

rior

nalytics.15

uch etails ould

sefully

ave een dded o

Bos's

introduction,

ithout

nvolving

im n

the

detailed

nalysis

f

doctrinal

developments

hat

e,

probably

ightly,

ished

o

avoid.

I

shall

onclude

ypointing

ut

that os

hasbeen

xtremelyoorly

erved

n

his

work yhis ditorsndpublishers.irst,hereeems obe anextraordinarilyarge

numberf

ypographical

rrors,

hough

ith

he

xception

f

body'

or

boy'

on

p.

1

1

,4

from

ottom,

one f hem

s

ikely

o

misleadhe

eader.16here

lso eems

o

7

S.

Wlodek,

ViaModernat Via

Antiqua

dansa

métaphysique

l'universitéeCracovie

auXV sièclevues travers

e

problème

e a

forme

ubstantielle

in:Miscellaneaediaevalia

,

p.

494.

8

A.

L.

Gabriel,

Via

Antiqua

and ViaModerna

and he

igration

f

aris tudentsnd

MastersotheGerman

niversities

n

the

ifteenthentury

in: Miscellanea

ediaevalia

,

p.

463.

9

Gabriel,

p.

cit.,

pp.

467-468.

10

P. Uiblein,Acta acultatisrtium niversitatisindobonensis385-1416, raz,

Vienna,

ologne

968,

assim.

11

Gilbert,

p.

cit.,

p.

91;

Gabriel,

p.

cit.,

pp.

465-466.

12

Gilbert,

p.

cit.,

p.

91.

13

Gabriel,

p.

cit.,

p.

446.

14

The workwas attributedo

Peter

f

Ailly:

Tractatus

e arte

bligandi.

ditus

magistro

etroeAlliacoacre

heologie

octori

Parisius

489).

However,

have

ompared

itwith

rakow

ibl.

ag

2602

fols.

0r-101v

see

Bos

p.

23,

XII)

and

t

s the ame

work.

15

Nifo eferredo

Marsilius

s

Inguenus.

ee

Agostino

ifo,

uper

ibrosriorům

Aristotelis

Venetiis 554)

passim.

16

Here s the

ist

f

typographical

rrors hat

noticed:

4,4

f.b.

published'

or

'publisher';0,8f.b.on'foran'; 33,3f.b.claissical'orclassical'; 0,8 II' forI';

54,21

sit2'

or

si';

77,8

if' for

it'; 81,20

if' for

it'; 89,5

f.b. is' for

it';

93,22

'causes'for cases'

and

the ower

art

f

the

ast ine

on

this

age

s

improperly

printed

n

my

opy);

7,1

is' for

it';

101,11

significated'

or

significates';

03,19

'wih'for

with';106,6

spponiť

or

supponiť;

21,5

may'

for

my';

121,14

has'

for

was'; 127,6

man'

hould

ot

e

talicized;27,2

.b.

particples'

or

participles';

139,

ast ine bus'

for

but'; 152,10

here

hould e

no

modal

perator;

54,32

'significada'

or

significantia';

55,10

.b. known'

or

know'; 58,22

rem'

hould

be

rationem'; 65,10

.b.

dissilaba'

or

dissillaba';

68,13

exponic'

or

exponi';

169,3

toltalem'or

totalem';

78

title)

Appeliationes'

or

Appellationes';

84,20

'inforo' or

infero'; 00,7

is' for

it';

201

2

and8 f.b. Burdian' or

Buridan'; 04,9

f.b.,

distinuish'or

distinguish';

05,22

as'

for

and'; 205,30

principle'

or

prin-

cipal'; 208,3f.b. corrolaries'or corrollaries';10,9f.b. virute' orvirtute';

218,22

then'

or

than';225,17

signficatio'

or

signification

27,23

thought'

or

'though'; 50,2

nd3 f.b. Chirst' or

hrist'; 52,22

Chirsť

or

Christ';

56,2

.b.

160

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be

a

phrasemissing

rom heLatin

n

p.

234,14,

or he

phrase

theterm

man

s

alienated"

ppears

n

the

nglishp.

235,13)

without

ny

ndication

hat

t

was

dd-

ed

by

he

ranslator.

econd,

nd

more

eriously,

he

ext

as

not

een

arefully

ead

forense.While os'sEnglishsexcellent,e snot native nglishpeaker,nd n-

evitably

herere

places

where is ranslations

stilted,

rdifficulto

follow,

rwhere

it

imply

oes

not

eem

o

apture

he

meaning

f he atin. shall onsider

ust

hose

cases

n

which

he

meaning

s obscured.17

On

p.

64.35

homo

non

urriť s

translated

s

'No man

runs',when,

iven

hat

Marsiliuss

talking

bout

articular

nd ndefinite

ropositions,

t

hould

e Some

man

s

not

running.'

n

p.

76,7-9,

heLatin ext

peaks

irstfuniversal

ropos-

itionsnd

hen f ffirmative

ropositions,

ut

n

the

nglish

ext

he wo

re

fudged

together

n

the

phrase

predicate

f

a universalffirmative

roposition'.

n

p.

82,11-12

he Latin

Unum

storum

erminorum

onitur

ntecedens

t

alterum

relativum'

s

translated

s "Sometimes

ne

of

hese

ermss used

s an

antecedent

and

totherimess

a

relative",

hen

learly

wo

ermsre

being

eferred

o,

ne n

antecedentnd theother relative. n p. 82,17 nonoportetecsupponere's

translateds 'these

elativeso

not

have

upposition'

hen he

reading

hould e

'these

elatives o

not

have

to

have

supposition'.

n

p.

84,11

per

positionem

subiecti's translated

s

when

he

ubject

s

placed

irst' hen

he

ense

f he

hrase

is that he xistence

f he

ubject

s

posited.

n

p.

92,27

hec sset

oncedenda'

s

translateds ithadbeen

onceded'

ather

han s

this

hould

e

conceded'. n

p.

92,9

confuse

t distributive'

s translateds confused

eterminate'.

n

p.

122,3-4

'creans

otest

on

sse

deus' s translated

s a

creating

hing

annot

e God'

rather

than s

it

s

possible

or

creating

hing

ot o

be

God'.

On

p.

128,10-12,

he atin

gives

wo

lternatives:

rationem

ecundum

uam

fuit d

significandum,

eu

ra-

'La' for

Le'; 257,1

Ebbessen'

or

Ebbesen'; 57,3

Karď

for

Karl'; 257,9

f.b.

'aujourdjui'

or

aujourd'hui';

59,17

Bekerley'

or

Berkeley';

59,13

.b.,

of'

for

'by';

263

singificatio'

or

significatio'.

17

The

other erbali

nfelicitiesnd

difficulties

noticed

were s follows:

9,19

'transcribed

o

hardly'

s

not

nglish;

6,

The econd

ext

ine

10,

pro

pluribus

ndif-

ferenter's

translated

s

in

many

nstances

ndifferently'

hen

t

hould

e as stand-

ing

or

many

nstances';

.

37,

The

hird extlines

-5:

he ranslation

f

descensus

esto

uod

upponeret

ropluribus'

s a descent

o the ffect

hat

t

has

upposition

for

more

nstances'

s

obscure;

7,13-14

in

the

erm

here

s

descent'

s

puzzling;

60,8

et

sic

de

singulis

erpropositionem

opulativam'

s translated

s 'and

so

on,

through

he

opulative

roposition'

hen

t

hould

e and so

on

for

ll

the

ingulars

bymeans f copulativeroposition';1 the ast ine xhibitserywkwardyntax;

70,17

he

ranslation

f

in

quos

ransitctus' s

puzzling;

2,19-20

he ranslation

f

'et alium

ctum

ignificai

ransiré

n

sortem'

s and

signifies

nother

ct

transiting

to

Sortes's

puzzling,

hen

t

eems

hatwhat

s

being poken

f s

an act

qualifying

the

referent

fthe

erm

n

some

way;

80,10

singulatim'

s

translated

s

'graduad'

when his oes

not

roduce

grammatically

orrect

nglish

entence,

ndwhen

he

sense

s

one-by-one';

9,8

f.b.

n

the

phrase

there

s

nothing

eft

ut

han

o',

the

word

out' must

e

omitted;5,35

he se

of would ave'

n

if t

would

ave'

s

n-

correct;41,12-13

in

a

proposition

hat id

not

ccord

o'

s

clumsy

nglish;

47,13

'This

s

well

ossible'

s

not

English;

57,19-20,

There s

no

question

egarding

o

which's

not

orrect

nglish;

91,5

that

n

which' hould

e

that

nto

which';

92,2

'prefersranslating'

s

not

English;

95,10

it

s

a self-

eference'

s

not

English;

08,

note or 8,16Is by orrelarlalienameant...' snotEnglish;09,9inthree otes's

not

nglish;

09,15

.b. On

what

s

the

earing

f his tatement

f

Marsiliushere?'

is

very

lumsy.

161

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tionemecundum

uam

ua

significataignificai

However,

he

first

lternative

s

suppressed

n

the

ranslation,

hichmakes

o

mention

f

mposition.

Despite

hese ritical

emarks,

warmly

ecommendos's

volume

o

llhistorians

of ogic; nd lookforwardagerlyohispromisedurtherolumen whichMar-silius's reatisesn

consequences,

bligations

nd nsolublesretobe edited.

University

f

Waterloo,

aterloo,

anada

E.J.

Ash

orth

162

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Vivarium

XIV,

2

(1986)

CIVÍCÍMA

ComiténternationaluVocabulaireesnstitutionstde a Communication

Intellectuellesu

Moyenge

Le Comiténternational

u

Vocabulairees nstitutionst de la

Communication

Intellectuelles

u

Moyen

Age CIVÍCÍMA)

a été créé orsd'un

workshop'

ur

e

thème

e a

Terminologie

e a vie

ntellectuelle

u

moyen

ge ,

qui

s'est enu

ux

Pays-Bas,

es

20

et 21

septembre

985.

Le

CIVÍCÍMA nevise

u'unepartie

u

vocabulairee a

vie

ntellectuelle,

savoir

lespoints e convergenceesdiversesisciplines,onpas leur ontenu,mais e

système

u travailntellectuel.

LesmembresuCIVÍCÍMA

présents

ux

Pays-Bas

e

sont

mis

'accordur e

pro-

gramme

e

travail

ue

nos

présentons

ci,

out n

précisant

ue

e schéma e e

veut

i

définitif

i

exhaustif:

l

s'agit

d'un

programme

uvertmentionnant

implement

es

premiers

errainse

recherche

ue

nousnous

proposons

'aborder.

L'objectif

rincipal

st

a

publication

'études

nterdisciplinaires

ur

es différents

élémentsu

programme,ui

devrontien

ntendutre

ifférenciés

éographique-

ment t

chronologiquement.

es

études

ourront

tre

ubliées

u

non,

elon

es

vues

des

uteurs,

tsous a forme

ui

eur

araîtra

a

plus ndiquée:

ivres,rticles,

icro-

fiches,

tc.

De

plus,

ous vons

dopté

a

suggestion

e constituern

fichierentralisé

es er-

mes yantraituxterrainséterminés,établirelon esnormesniformestsou-

mis la limite

hronologique

e

1520. e

traitementes

fiches

nformatiséese

fera

l'Université

e

Astonn

Birmingham,

e fichierraditionnelura

peu-être

a

place

u

bureau

u Comité u

Cange

Paris.

Le

CIVÍCÍMA

étant ne

nitiative

éerlandaise,

a

présidence

n

a

été onfiéeu

professeur

. M.

de

Rijk,

e

'Université

e

Leyde,

t

e secrétariat

Olga Weijers,

du

Lexique

u atin

médiévales

Pays-Bas.

es

différents

ays

e

'Europe

cciden-

tale,

insi

ue

es

Etats-Unis

t

e

Canada,

ont

eprésentésar

des membres.our

coordonner

t

pour

timuler

es recherches

nvisagées,

e Comité

l'intentione se

réunir

ériodiquement.

Nousdemandons tous

es

chercheurse nous

mettreu

courant 'éventuelles

recherches

nalogues

n cours u

prévues.

Secrétariatu

CIVÍCÍMA:

Olga

Weijers

Bibliothèque

oyale

Prins

Willem lexanderhof

2595

BE Den

Haag, Pays-Bas

Programme

e

ravail

1.

Vocabulaire

esécoles

institutions,

nseignants,

lèves,

méthodes).

-

IX-XIe siècles.

'école

de

type

arolingien.

-

Xlle

siècle.

- XlII-XIVe sièclesécoles rbainest studia esmendiants).

2.

Vocabulaireesuniversités

institutions,ersonnes,

éthodes

'enseignement).

-

XlIIe

siècle.

'espace

uropéenaraît

onserverne

ertaine

nité

ui permet

uneétude 'ensemble.

163

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-

XlV-XVe

iècles,

ù les

diversités

égionales

u nationalesevront

tre

rises

de

compteFrance, ngleterre,

talie,

mpire,

éninsule

bérique).

Ad

1

et2: Dans e domaine

e

'enseignement,

l

faudraraiter

es ermeson-

cernantesméthodes'enseignement,n aissante côté e vocabulaireech-

niquepropre

uxdiverses

isciplines.

Sur e terrain

nstitutionnel,

l faudra

ncorporer

es

aspects

ocioculturels,

comme

ar xemple

e vocabulaireelatifla viedes étudiants

notamment

dans es

collèges).

3. Vocabulaireu

livre tde

l'écriture.

-

le

livre

fabrication,

omposition,

dition,

irculation).

-

autres

ormese documents

crits

chartes,

ablettes,

iches).

-

écriture

matériaux,

tyles

'écriture,

opistes).

-

le

texte t sa tradition

copie,

aute,

orrection).

-

les

bibliothèques

t es

archives

cadre

matériel,lassement,

atalogues).

4. Vocabulaire

es

méthodes,

nstrumentst

produits

u travail

ntellectuel.

- alphabétisation,nnotation,raduction,nformation,ommunication.

-

concordances,

ables,

lossaires,

ncyclopédies.

-

traités,

ommentaires,ommes,

ompendia,

tc.

5. Les

appellations

es

disciplines

t de eurs

tudiants.

-

disciplines

t sciences.

-

personnes

'y

consacrant

artista,

ecretista,

hysicus,tc.).

Réalisations.

ad

2: Une

étude

'Olga Weijers

ur a

Terminologie

es niversitésuXlIIe iècle

araîtra

en 1986 ans

a collectionu

Lessico

ntellettuale

uropeo.