Violation of Civil and Political Rights

8/3/2019 Violation of Civil and Political Rights

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G.R.No.86720September2,1994

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, vs. THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL

LUGATIMAN,andGERTRUDESGONZALES,Respondents.

PUNO,J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The constitutional protection of our people against unreasonable search andseizureisnotmerelyapleasingplatitude.Itvouchsafesourrighttoprivacyanddignityagainstundesirableintrusionscommittedbyanypublicofficerorprivateindividual. An infringement of this right justifies an award fordamages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnFebruary22,1983,petitionerMHPGarments,Inc.,wasawardedbytheBoyScouts of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official

Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their MemorandumAgreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to "undertake orcause tobeundertaken the prosecution in courtofall illegal sources ofscoutuniformsandotherscoutingsupplies."1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation received information thatprivate respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and GertrudesGonzalesweresellingBoyScoutsitemsandparaphernaliawithoutanyauthority.Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked toundertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the PhilippineConstabulary(PC).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnOctober25,1983,atabout10:30A.M.,petitionerdeGuzman,CaptainRenatoM.Peafiel,andtwo(2)otherconstabularymenoftheReactionForceBattalion,SikatunaVillage,Diliman,QuezonCitywenttothestoresofrespondentsattheMarikinaPublicMarket.Withoutanywarrant,theyseizedtheboyandgirlscoutspants,dresses,andsuitsondisplayatrespondents'stalls.Theseizurecausedacommotionandembarrassedprivaterespondents.Receiptswereissuedfortheseizeditems.TheitemswerethenturnedoverbyCaptainPeafieltopetitionercorporation for safekeeping.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against privaterespondents.2Duringitspendency,petitionerdeGuzmanexactedfromprivaterespondent Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSANDONE HUNDRED PESOS(P3,100.00)inorder tobedroppedfromthecomplaint.OnDecember6,1983,after a preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed thecomplaint against all the private respondents. On February 6, 1984, he alsoorderedthereturnoftheseizeditems.Theseizeditemswerenotimmediatelyreturned despite demands. 3Private respondents had to go personally topetitioners'placeofbusinesstorecovertheirgoods.Eventhen,notalltheseizeditems were returned. The other items returned were of inferior

quality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


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Privaterespondentsthen filedCivilCaseNo. 51144against the petitionersforsums ofmoneyand damages. 4In its Decisiondated January9,1987, the trialcourtruledfortheprivaterespondents,thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendants, ordering the latter jointly and severally: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

1.ToreturntheamountofP3,100.00toplaintiffMirasolLugatimanwithinterestat12% per annumfrom January12, 1984, the dateof the last receipt issued,untilfullypaid;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2.TopayplaintiffAgnesVillaCruzthesumofP2,000.00forthe26piecesofgirlscoutitemsnotreturned;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for and as moral damages and

P15,000.00forandasexemplarydamages;andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and litigationexpenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Costsagainstthedefendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtual lawlibrary

SOORDERED.

The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On January 18, 1989, its

FifthDivision,5

affirmedtheDecisionwithmodification,thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION;and, as modified, the dispositive portion thereof now reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents) andagainst defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter jointly and severally;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff (respondent) Mirasol

Lugatimanandcancelherapplicationfordistributor'slicense;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2.Topayplaintiff(respondent)AgnesVillaCruzthesumofP2,000.00fortheunreturned26piecesofgirlscoutsitemswithinterestat12%perannumfromJune 4, 1984 (date the complaint was filed) until it is fully paid; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

3.Topayplaintiffs(respondents)the amountofP10,000.00each,oratotalofP30,000.00, for and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a total ofP15,000.00,forandasexemplarydamages;andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and


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litigationexpenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Costsofthecaseaquoandtheinstantappealareassessedjointlyandseverallyagainst defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP Garments, Inc. and Larry deGuzman.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SOORDERED.

Inthispetitionforcertiorari,petitionerscontend:

FIRSTASSIGNMENTOFERROR

THE COURTOFAPPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTINGLIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TOTHE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECTMERCHANDISE.

SECONDASSIGNMENTOFERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MADE A FINDING THAT THEMANNERWITHWHICHTHECONFISCATIONOFPRIVATERESPONDENTSWASTORTIOUS BUT PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO DID NOTCOMMITTHEACTOFCONFISCATION.

THIRDASSIGNMENTOFERROR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND FOR THE PRIVATERESPONDENTSANDAGAINSTTHEPETITIONERS.

Weaffirm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ArticleIII,section2,oftheConstitutionprotectsourpeoplefromunreasonablesearchandseizure.Itprovides:

Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureforanypurposeshallbeinviolable,andnosearchwarrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafterexaminationunderoathoraffirmationofthecomplainantandthewitnesseshemayproduce,

andparticularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

Thisprovisionprotectsnotonlythosewhoappeartobeinnocentbutalsothosewhoappeartobeguiltybutareneverthelesstobepresumedinnocentuntilthecontrary is proved. 6In the case at bench, the seizurewasmade without anywarrant.UndertheRulesofCourt,7awarrantlesssearchcanonlybeundertakenunderthefollowingcircumstance:

Sec.12.Search incidenttoalawfularrest.-Aperson lawfullyarrestedmaybesearchedfordangerousweaponsoranythingwhichmaybeusedasproofofthe

commissionofanoffense,withoutasearchwarrant.


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Weholdthattheevidencedidnotjustifythewarrantlesssearchandseizureofprivate respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information thatprivaterespondentswereillegallysellingBoyScoutsitemsandparaphernaliainOctober 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidenceadducedbythe parties.PetitionerdeGuzman thenmadeasurveillanceof the

storesofprivaterespondents.TheyreportedtothePhilippineConstabularyandonOctober25,1983,theraidwasmadeonthestoresofprivaterespondentsandthe supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between thereceipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondentsshowstherewassufficienttimeforpetitionersandthePCraidingpartytoapplyforajudicialwarrant.Despitethesufficiencyoftime,theydidnotapplyforawarrantandseizedthegoodsofprivaterespondents.Indoingso,theytooktheriskofasuitfordamagesincasetheseizurewouldbeprovedtoviolatetherightofprivaterespondentsagainstunreasonablesearchandseizure.Inthecaseatbench,thesearchandseizurewereclearlyillegal.Therewasnoprobablecausefortheseizure.Probablecauseforasearchhasbeendefinedas"suchfactsandcircumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man tobelieve that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought inconnectionwiththeoffenseareintheplacesoughttobesearched." 8Thesefactsandcircumstanceswerenotinanywayshownbythepetitionerstojustifytheirwarrantless search and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, theProvincial Fiscal ofRizal dismissedtheircomplaintforunfair competition andlater ordered the return of the seized goods.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the

PhilippineConstabularythatconductedtheraidandtheirparticipationwasonlyto report the alleged illegal activity of privaterespondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have beenincludedinthecomplaintforviolationoftheprivaterespondents'constitutionalrights, still, the omission will not exculpatepetitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

InthecaseofLimvs.PoncedeLeon,9weruledfortherecoveryofdamagesforviolation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private

individual,thus:

Art.32.Anypublicofficeror employee,oranyprivateindividual,whodirectlyorindirectlyobstructs,defeats,violatesorinanymannerimpedesorimpairsanyofthefollowingrightsandlibertiesofanotherpersonshallbeliabletothelatterfordamages.

xxxxxxxxxchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(9) The rights tobesecure inone'sperson,house,papers, and effectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.



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The indemnity shall includemoraldamages.Exemplary damagesmay also beadjudged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogouscases:


(6)Illegalsearch;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1)Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and35.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Pursuanttotheforegoingprovisions,apersonwhoseconstitutionalrightshavebeen violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from thepublicofficeror employeeresponsibletherefor.Inaddition,exemplarydamages

mayalsobeawarded.


TheverynatureofArticle32isthatthewrongmaybecivilorcriminal.Itisnotnecessary therefore that thereshouldbemalice orbad faith. Tomake such arequisite would defeat themain purpose of Article 32which is the effectiveprotection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused theirpowersonthepretextofjustifiablemotivesorgoodfaithintheperformanceoftheirduties.Precisely,theobjectoftheArticleistoputanendtoofficialabusebypleaofthegoodfaith.IntheUnitedStatesthisremedyisinthenatureofatort.

(emphasissupplied)

In the subsequent case ofAberca vs. Ver, 10the Court En Banc explained theliabilityofpersonsindirectlyresponsible,viz:

[T]hedecisivefactorinthiscase,inourview,isthelanguageofArticle32.Thelawspeaksofanofficeroremployeeorperson"directlyorindirectly"responsiblefortheviolationoftheconstitutionalrightsandlibertiesofanother.Thus,itisnot the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer fordamagesunderArticle32;thepersonindirectlyresponsiblehasalsotoanswerforthedamagesorinjurycausedtotheaggrievedparty.


Whileitwouldcertainly betoonaivetoexpect thatviolatorsofhumanrightswould easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it shouldnonethelessbemadeclearinnouncertaintermsthatArticle32oftheCivilCodemakes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for thetransgressionjointtortfeasors.


[N]either can it be said that only those shown tohave participated "directly"shouldbeheldliable.Article32oftheCivilCodeencompasseswithintheambit


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ofitsprovisionsthosedirectly,aswellasindirectly,responsibleforitsviolations.(emphasissupplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent courtcorrectly granted damages to private respondents. Petitionerswere indirectly

involvedintransgressingtherightofprivaterespondentsagainstunreasonablesearchandseizure.Firstly,theyinstigatedtheraidpursuanttotheircovenantintheMemorandumAgreementtoundertaketheprosecutionincourtofallillegalsourcesofscoutingsupplies.11Ascorrectlyobservedbyrespondentcourt:

Indeed, the acts committed by the PCsoldiersofunlawfully seizing appellees'(respondents') merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint for unfaircompetitionagainstappellees(respondents)werefortheprotectionandbenefitofappellant(petitioner)corporation.Suchbeingthecase,it is,thus,reasonablyfairtoinferfromthoseactsthat itwasuponappellant(petitioner)corporation'sinstancethat the PCsoldiersconducted the raidand effectedthe illegal seizure.

Thesecircumstancesshouldanswerthetrialcourt'squery-posedinitsdecisionnowunderconsideration-astowhythePCsoldiersimmediatelyturnedovertheseized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation. 12 chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Theraidwasconductedwiththeactiveparticipationoftheiremployee.LarrydeGuzmandidnotliftafingertostoptheseizureoftheboyandgirlscoutsitems.Bystandingbyandapparentlyassentingthereto,hewasliabletothesameextentas the officers themselves. 13So with the petitioner corporation which evenreceivedforsafekeepingthegoodsunreasonablyseizedbythePCraidingteamand de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite thedismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Secondly,LetterofInstructionNo.1299waspreciselycraftedonMarch9,1983tosafeguardnotonlytheprivilegeoffranchiseholderofscoutingitemsbutalsothecitizen'sconstitutionalrights,towit:

TITLE: APPREHENSION OF UNAUTHORIZED MANUFACTURERS ANDDISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT PARAPHERNALIA AND IMPOUNDING OF SAIDPARAPHERNALIA.

ABSTRACT:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Directs all law enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, toapprehend immediately unauthorizedmanufacturersanddistributors of Scoutparaphernalia, upon proper application by the Boy Scouts of the Philippinesand/orGirlScoutsofthePhilippinesforwarrantofarrestand/orsearchwarrant

withajudge,orsuchotherresponsibleofficerasmaybeauthorizedbylaw;andtoimpound the said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in court or otherappropriate administrative body. Orders the immediate and strict compliancewiththeInstructions.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Undertheaboveprovisionandasaforediscussed,petitionersmiserablyfailedto


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report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of thePhilippinesfortheproperapplicationofawarrant.Privaterespondents'rightsareimmutableandcannotbesacrificedtotransientneeds.15Petitionersdidnothave the unbridled license tocausethe seizureofrespondents' goodswithoutanywarrant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Andthirdly,ifpetitionersdidnothaveahandintheraid,theyshouldhavefiledathird-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any otherrelief, 16in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money withDamages.Again,theydidnot.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Wehaveconsistentlyruledthatmoraldamagesarenotawardedtopenalizethedefendantbuttocompensatetheplaintifffortheinjurieshemayhavesuffered.17Conformablywithourrulingin Limvs.PoncedeLeon,op.cit.,moraldamagescanbeawardedinthecaseatbench.Therecanbenodoubtthatpetitionersmust

have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelingsdue thetortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals ofembarrassment andhumiliationduring theseizure of theirmerchandiseweresupportedbytheirtestimonies.RespondentCruzdeclared:

Ifeltverynervous.Iwascryingtoloss(sic)mygoodsandcapitalbecauseIamdoingbusinesswithborrowedmoneyonly,therewascommotioncreatedbytheraidingteamandtheyevensteppedonsomeofthepantsanddressesondisplayfor sale. All passersby stopped to watch and stared at me with accusingexpressions.Iwastremblingandterriblyashamed,sir. 18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RespondentLugatimantestified:

Ifeltverynervous.IwascryingandIwasverymuchashamedbecausemanypeoplehavebeenwatchingthePCsoldiershaulingmyitems,andmany/I(sic)heardsay "nakaw palaangmga iyan" forwhich I amclaimingP25,000.00 fordamages.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WhilerespondentGonzalezstatedthus:

Idonot likethewaytheraidwasconductedbytheteamsirbecauseit lookedlike that what I have been selling were stolen items that they should beconfiscatedbyuniformedsoldiers.Manypeoplewerearoundandthemoretheconfiscationwasmadeinascandalousmanner;everyclothes,T-shirts,pantsanddresseseventhosenotwrappeddroppedtotheground.Iwasterriblyshamedinthepresenceofmarketgoersthatmorning.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Needlestostate,thewantonnessofthewrongfulseizurejustifiestheawardofexemplarydamages.21Itwillalsoserveasasternremindertoallandsundrythattheconstitutionalprotectionagainstunreasonablesearchandseizureisavirilerealityandnotamereburstofrhetoric.Theallencompassingprotectionextends

against intrusionsdirectlydonebothbygovernmentand indirectlybyprivateentities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


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INVIEWWHEREOF,theappealeddecisionisAFFIRMEDWITHMODIFICATION.We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%) interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWOTHOUSANDPESOS(P2,000.00)fortheunreturnedtwenty-six(26)piecesofgirlscoutsitemsandaTWELVEPERCENT(12%)interest,inlieuofSIXPERCENT(6%),onthesaidamountuponfinalityofthisDecisionuntilthepaymentthereof.

22Costs against petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,Padilla,Regalado,andMendoza,JJ.,concur.

G.R.No.104513August4,1993

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABORRELATIONS COMMISSION AND GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF

WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES(GLOWHRAIN), SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CHAPTER, ROGELIO M.

SOLUTA,ELMERC.LABOG,JOSELITOA.SANTOS,FLORENTNOP.MATILLA,

EDNAB.DACANAY,HENRYM.BABAY,RAYANTONIOE.ROSAURA,DENNIS

C. COSICO, VICENTE M. DELOSA, IRENE V. RAGAY, APOLONIO BONDOC,

QUINTOS B. BARRA, ALFREDO S. BAUTISTA, RICHARD T. GALIGO, JOHN

DOESANDJANEDOES,Respondents.

NOCON,J.:

MaytheFirstDivisionoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)order

thereinstatementofemployeesdismissedforleadingand/orparticipatinginanillegalstrike,inaninjunctioncase 1whichisseparateanddistinctfromtheillegalcase2againstthemandwhichispendingappeal?chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this instant petition for certiorariand prohibition, the answer to the mainissuestatedabovedetermineswhetherornotthepublicrespondent-NLRCactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretioninissuingsuchanorder.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petitioner Silahis International Hotel Inc. is the employer of privaterespondent employees. Respondent-Union Genuine Labor Organization ofWorkers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN)-SilahisInternational Hotel Chapter, is the exclusive bargaining representative of therank-and-fileemployeesinthecompany.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Theantecedentfactsareasfollows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On November 16, 1990, respondent-Union filed a notice of strike againstpetitioner-SilahisHotelforunfairlaborpractices:violationofCBA,dismissalofunionofficers/members,masstermination/illegallockout,andunionbusting.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the sameday, private respondents staged a strike, picketing and allegedly


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obstructing the ingress to and egress from the hotel. 5 chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On November 28, 1990, the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumedjurisdiction and issued an order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for

consolidationwith an earlier case and for all striking employees to return towork.6Accordingly,onNovember29,1990,theemployeesendedthestrikeandreturntowork.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnFebruary1,1991,petitionerSilahisHotelfiledacomplaintforillegalstrike(NLRC NCR Case No. 02-00717-91) against respondent-Union, fourteen (14)namedemployeesrepresentingtheunionofficersandJohnDoesandJaneDoesrepresentingalltheotheremployeeswhojoinedthestrike.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

InadecisiondatedFebruary12,1992,LaborArbiterCornelioL.Linsanganfound

private respondents guilty of illegal strike and declared the union officers tohavelostandforfeitedtheiremployment.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnFebruary14,1992,thedaytheprivaterespondentslearnedofthedecision,petitioner-Silahis Hotel barred them from entering the hotel and terminatedtheirservices.Respondent-Unionandprivaterespondent-employees filed theirappeal onFebruary19,1992,wellwithin the ten-dayperiod for perfectionofappealprovidedbylaw.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

And on February 27, 1992, herein private respondents filed a Very UrgentPetition10fortheissuanceofawritofpreliminarymandatoryinjunctionunder

Art.218(e)oftheLaborCode,notintheillegalstrikecasethenonappeal,11butas NLRC NCR IC No. 00-0235-92. In that petition, respondents (petitionerstherein) allege that petitioner-Silahis Hotel terminated the employment ofrespondents on February 14, 1992 even before the illegal strike decision12becamefinalandexecutoryandthatmostoftheemployeesterminatedwerenotunionofficersnorprovedtobeparticipantsinthestrike.Theterminationofrespondents'employmentwouldcausegraveorirreparableinjurywhichcanbecorrected by the writ of preliminary mandatoryinjunction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ThefirstdivisionoftheNLRCissued,inaMinuteResolution,anorderinfavorofrespondentsdatedMarch11,1992,thedispositivepartofwhichreads:

Wherefore,weighing the relativepositionof the parties vis-a-vis the equitablereliefsavailable,weherebyrulesubject.topetitioners'postingofabondofFiftyThousand(P50,000.00)Pesos toanswer forwhatever liability the respondentmay suffer should it appear that they are not entitled to the reliefs herebygranted,directingtherespondentcompany:(1)toreinstateeitherphysicallyoronpayroll,atrespondent'soption,toreinstate(sic)RogelioM.Soluta,JoselitoASantos, Florentino P. Matilla, Edna B. Dacanay, Dennis C. Cosico, Alfredo S.BautistaandRichardT.Galigo;and(2)toreinstate,withfullbackwages,allthe

otherpetitionerstotheirpositionsheldasofFebruary14,1992.LaborArbiterAdolfoC.Babianois herebydirectedtohearthe incidentof temporaryand/or


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permanent injunction, and to submit a report and recommendation thereonwithin ten (10) days from the conclusion of thehearing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This Order shall be effective for a period of only twenty (20) days from

petitioners'submissionoftherequiredbond.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnMarch16,1992,petitioner-SilahisHotelfiledaMotionforReconsiderationofthe Order above, but the same was not and has not been actedupon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner-Silahis Hotel assails this Order and on March 25, 1992, filed theinstant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporaryrestraining order.Thefollowingday,we issued a temporary restraining ordercontinuing until further orders from the Court, enjoining the NLRC fromenforcingtheOrderdatedMarch11,1992inNLRCNCRCaseNo.00-0235-92

and from further proceeding with aforesaid case. 14 chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Petitionercontendsthat:

THERESPONDENTNLRCACTEDWITHOUTORINEXCESSOFJURISDICTIONORWITHGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINORDERINGTHEREINSTATEMENTOFPRIVATERESPONDENTS,CONSIDERINGTHAT:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A. The questioned Order illegally confers a relief on private respondents, inviolation ofpetitioners right todue process. Injunction is not the appropriate

remedy to order the reinstatement of privaterespondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

B.The questionedOrderoperatesasanadjudication on themerits ofprivaterespondents'appealfromtheLaborArbiter'sdecision,whichraisestheissueastothescopeofthedeclaration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

C.Respondents,beknowinglyfilingtheinjunctioncaseduringthependencyofthe appeal in the illegal strike case are guilty of forum-shopping.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

D.ThequestionedorderwasissuedinclearandpalpableviolationofArt.218oftheLaborCode.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The resolutionof the instantpetitiondepends onwhetherpublic respondent-NLRCcanvalidlyentertainthe"VeryUrgentPetition"16filedbyrespondentsandissue the Order 17reinstating the respondents, assailed bypetitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Theappealfromthedecisionofthelaborarbiterintheillegalstrikecase(NLRCNCR Case No. 02-00717-91) was pending when respondents filed its "Very

Urgent Petition" as NLRC IC No. 00-0235-92.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


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Petitionerclaimsthatfilingthe"VeryUrgentPetition"asanotherinjunctioncaseandnotwiththeappealedcaseis"forum-shopping"andcannotbedoneforsuchpracticehas, longbeencondemned as"contrary tothe interestof justice."18Itfurther argues that the issue of respondents' employment status and/ordismissal is pending in the appealed strike case and that respondents were

dismissedpreciselybecauseofsaidillegalstrikeconductedbythem.Hence,they(respondents)cannotseekrelieffromtheeffectsofthedismissalinanentirelynewsuitthe(injunctioncase).19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, private respondents contend that they are not guilty offorum-shopping because the issues involved in the appealed case and theinjunctioncaseare different.Theyclaimthat the issuesinthe appealedillegalstrikecasearewhetherthefindingofillegalstrikeandthedeclarationthattheunion officers have lost and forfeited their employment are correct. And theissue in the injunction case, which arose the decision of the labor arbiter, iswhetherthisdecisioncanbeexecutedorimplementedbythepetitionerevenifthesamewasnotfinalandexecutory.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The labor arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the respondentswas illegal.After receiving notice of a favorable decision, petitioner-hotel dismissed therespondent-employeesforhavingparticipatedinthisillegalstrike.Respondentsthen filed its appeal from this decision. And within the same month, therespondents filed their petition for injunction as a new injunctioncase.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Itisnotverydifficulttoseethattheissuesinthesetwocasesareinterrelated.Becauseofthisrelevantconnection,thereliefprayedforbytherespondents, i.e.,injunction restraining the petitioner from dismissing them, could have beenproperlygrantedordeniedinthecaseonappeal.Therewasinfactnoreasonforthe respondents to file a new injunction case before the sameagency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Bydoing this, they effectively soughtanother forum togrant them relief. TheCourt cannot but proscribe this as a species of forumshopping.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

InVillanuevav.Adre,21wesaidthat:

There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in oneforum,apartyseeksafavorableopinion(otherthanbyappealor certiorari)inanother.Theprincipleappliesnotonlywithrespect tosuits filedin the courtsbut also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while anadministrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeatadministrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrativerulingandafavorablecourtruling.22

AndinGabrielv.CourtofAppeals, 23weadded that "filingofmultiplepetitionsconstitutesabuseof the court'sprocesses and improperconduct that tendsto

impede,obstructanddegradetheadministrationofjusticeandwillbepunishedascontemptofcourt."24


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We have consistently ruled that a party should not be allowed to pursuesimultaneousremediesintwodifferentforums.Althoughmostofthecasesandhaveruleduponregardingforumshoppinginvolvedpetitionsinthecourtsandadministrative agencies, 25the rule prohibiting it applies equally to multiplepetitionsinthesametribunaloragency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles

virtuallawlibrary

Byfiling,anotherpetitioninvolvingthesameessentialfactsandcircumstancesin the same agency, as in this case where respondents filed their appeal andinjunctioncaseseparately in theNLRC, respondents approached twodifferentforainordertoincreasetheirchancesobtainingafavorabledecisionoraction.This practice cannot be tolerated and should becondemned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Publicrespondent-NLRCerredwhenitentertainedtheseparateinjunctioncasefiled by respondents. Moreover, it should have consolidated the petition for

injunction with the case already on appeal, for the fact of appeal and theattendantcircumstanceswerestatedinthepetitionandevenacknowledgedinthequestionedResolutionoftheNLRC.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Whilewefindtheactiontakenbytherespondentswasill-suitedhowever,thisdoes not mean that the petitioner-hotel's act of dismissing respondent-employeesbeforethedecisionofthelaborarbiterbecamefinalandexecutoryshouldbesanctioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Despite our proscription against forum shopping, the respondents should beallowedtohaverecoursetotheprocessesoflawandtoseekrelieffromtheirdismissalasthisallowancewillbetterservetheendsofjustice.Theproprietyofthe hotel's act of dismissing the respondents and the resulting consequencesmay still bepassed upon, in conjunctionwith the appealedcase after filing aproper petition therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

However, the culpability of respondent's counsel, who are charged with theknowledge of the law andwith the duty of assisting in the administration ofjustice, is clearly manifest. Because of the cunning practice they employed,respondents' lawyers, Attys. Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. and A.E. Dacanay are

herebywarned and admonished tobemore circumspect in theirprofessionalconcerns otherwise a penalty more severe shall befall them for similaracts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Theother issuesraisedbypetitionernolongerbearany significance aftertheresolutionofthemainproblemabove.Nofurtherdiscussionregardingthemwillthereforebemade.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and theruling of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby setaside. The temporary restraining order dated March 26, 1992 is made

permanent.Nocosts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


13/36

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,C.J.,Padilla,RegaladoandPuno,JJ.,concur.

LIWAYWAYVINZONS-CHATO,G.R.No.141309

Petitioner,Present:

-versus-Ynares-Santiago,J.(Chairperson),

cralawAustria-Martinez,

Chico-Nazario,and

Nachura,JJ.

FORTUNETOBACCO

CORPORATION,Promulgated:

Respondent.

cralawJune19,2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

PetitionerassailstheMay7,1999Decision[1]oftheCourtofAppealsinCA-

G.R.SPNo.47167,whichaffirmedtheSeptember29,1997Order[2]ofthe

RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofMarikina,Branch272, inCivilCaseNo. 97-

341-MK, denying petitioners motion to dismiss.The complaint filed by

respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its

constitutional rights arising from petitioners issuance of Revenue

MemorandumCircularNo. 37-93 (RMC37-93),which the Courtdeclared

invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of

Appeals.[3]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an

entityengagedinthemanufactureofdifferentbrandsofcigarettes,among

whichareChampion,Hope,andMorecigarettes.

OnJune10,1993,thelegislatureenactedRepublicActNo.7654(RA7654),

whichtookeffect on July 3,1993.Prior to its effectivity,cigarettebrands


14/36

Champion,Hope,andMorewereconsideredlocalbrands subjected toan

advaloremtaxattherateof20-45%.However,onJuly1,1993,ortwodays

before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying

Champion, Hope, and More as locallymanufactured cigarettes bearing a

foreignbrandsubject to the55%advalorem tax.[4]RMC37-93 ineffect

subjected Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA

7654,specifically,toSec.142,[5](c)(1)onlocallymanufacturedcigarettes

whicharecurrentlyclassifiedandtaxedat55%,andwhichimposesanad

valoremtaxof55%providedthattheminimumtaxshallnotbelessthan

FivePesos(P5.00)perpack.[6]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnJuly2,1993,atabout5:50p.m.,BIRDeputyCommissionerVictor

A.Deoferio,Jr.sent viatelefaxacopyofRMC37-93toFortuneTobaccobut

itwasaddressedtonooneinparticular.OnJuly15,1993,FortuneTobacco

received,byordinarymail,acertifiedxeroxcopyofRMC37-93.OnJuly20,

1993,respondentfiledamotionforreconsiderationrequestingtherecall

ofRMC37-93,butwasdenied ina letterdatedJuly30,1993.[7]Thesame

letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to

P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded

payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.[8]On August 3, 1993,

respondentfiledapetitionforreviewwiththeCourtofTaxAppeals(CTA),

which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the

implementationofRMC37-93.[9]InitsdecisiondatedAugust10,1994,the

CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and

furtherenjoinedpetitionerfromcollectingthedeficiency taxassessment

issuedpursuanttoRMCNo.37-93.ThisrulingwasaffirmedbytheCourtof

Appeals, and finally by this Court inCommissionerof InternalRevenuev.

CourtofAppeals .[10]Itwasheld,amongothers,thatRMC37-93,hasfallen

shortoftherequirementsforavalidadministrativeissuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint[11] for


15/36

damagesagainstpetitionerinherprivatecapacity.Respondentcontended

that thelattershould beheld liable for damagesunderArticle 32ofthe

Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its

constitutionalrightagainstdeprivationofpropertywithoutdueprocessof

lawandtherighttoequalprotectionofthelaws.

Petitioner filedamotion todismiss[12] contending that: (1) respondent

hasno causeof action against her because she issued RMC37-93 in the

performance of her official function and within the scope of her

authority.SheclaimedthatsheactedmerelyasanagentoftheRepublicand

therefore the latter istheone responsibleforheracts; (2)thecomplaint

statesnocauseofactionforlackofallegationofmaliceorbadfaith;and(3)

the certification against forum shopping was signed by respondents

counselinviolationoftherulethatitistheplaintiffortheprincipalparty

whoshouldsignthesame.

OnSeptember29,1997,theRTCdeniedpetitionersmotiontodismiss

holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to

prematurelydecidethemeritsofthecasewithoutallowingthepartiesto

presentevidence.Itfurtherheldthatthedefectinthecertificationagainst

forum shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate

secretarys certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification

againstforumshopping.Thedispositiveportionthereof,states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway

Vinzons-Chatoandthemotiontostrikeoutandexpunge

from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by

plaintiffFortuneTobaccoCorporationarebothdeniedon

the grounds aforecited.The defendant is ordered to file

her answer to the complaintwithin ten (10) days from

receiptofthisOrder.

SOORDERED.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


16/36

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for

certiorariunderRule65.However,samewasdismissedonthegroundthat

underArticle32oftheCivilCode,liabilitymayariseevenifthedefendant

didnot actwithmaliceorbad faith.Theappellate courtratiocinated that

Section38,BookIoftheAdministrativeCodeisthegenerallawonthecivil

liabilityofpublicofficerswhileArticle32oftheCivilCodeisthespeciallaw

thatgovernstheinstantcase.Consequently,maliceorbadfaithneednotbe

allegedinthecomplaintfordamages.ItalsosustainedtherulingoftheRTC

thatthedefectofthecertificationagainstforumshoppingwascuredbythe

submission of the corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to its

counseltoexecutethesame.

cralaw

Undaunted,petitionerfiledthe instantrecoursecontendingthatthesuitis

groundedonheractsdoneintheperformanceofherfunctionsasapublic

officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which

should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when

thereisaclearshowingofbadfaith,malice,orgrossnegligence.Shefurther

averredthattheCivilCode,specifically,Article32whichallowsrecoveryof

damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the

liability ofpublicofficers;whileSection38, Book I oftheAdministrative

Codeisa special lawonthe superiorpublicofficersliability,suchthat,if

thecomplaint,asintheinstantcase,doesnotallegebadfaith,malice,or

gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of

action.As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping, she

urgedtheCourttostrictlyconstruetherulesandtodismissthecomplaint.

Conversely,respondentarguedthatSection38whichtreatsingeneralthe

public officersacts fromwhichcivil liabilitymay arise, isa general law;

whileArticle32whichdealsspecificallywiththepublicofficersviolationof

constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine

whetherthecomplaintstatesacauseofactionornot.CitingthecaseofLim


17/36

v.PoncedeLeon,[14]respondentallegedthatunderArticle32oftheCivil

Code,itisenoughthattherewasaviolationoftheconstitutionalrightsof

theplaintiffanditisnotrequiredthatsaidpublicofficershouldhaveacted

withmaliceorinbadfaith.Hence,itconcludedthatevengrantingthatthe

complaint failed to allegebad faith or malice, themotion to dismiss for

failuretostateacauseofactionshouldbedeniedinasmuchasbadfaithor

malicearenotnecessarytoholdpetitionerliable.

Theissuesforresolutionareasfollows:

(1)cralawMay apublic officerbevalidly sued inhis/herprivate capacity for acts done in connection with the

dischargeofthefunctionsofhis/heroffice?

(2)cralawWhichasbetween Article 32of theCivil Code

andSection38,BookIoftheAdministrativeCodeshould

govern in determining whether the instant complaint

statesacauseofaction?

(3)cralawShouldthecomplaintbedismissedforfailureto

comply with the rule on certification against forum

shopping?

(4)cralawMaypetitionerbeheldliablefordamages?

cralaw

Onthefirstissue,thegeneralruleisthatapublicofficerisnotliablefor

damageswhicha personmay sufferarisingfromthejustperformanceof

hisofficialdutiesandwithinthescopeofhisassignedtasks.[15]Anofficer

whoactswithinhisauthoritytoadministertheaffairsoftheofficewhich

he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to

another,asitwouldvirtuallybeachargeagainsttheRepublic,whichisnot

amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its

consent.[16]However,apublicofficerisbylawnotimmunefromdamages

inhis/herpersonalcapacityforactsdoneinbadfaithwhich,beingoutside

the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of

immunityforofficialactions.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


18/36

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil

liabilitymayarisewherethereisbadfaith,malice,orgrossnegligenceon

the part of a superior public officer.And, under Section 39 of the same

Book,civilliabilitymayarisewherethesubordinatepublicofficersactis

characterizedbywillfulnessornegligence.Thus

Sec.38.LiabilityofSuperiorOfficers.(1)Apublicofficer

shallnotbecivillyliableforactsdoneintheperformance

ofhisofficialduties,unlessthereisaclearshowingofbad

faith,maliceorgrossnegligence.

xxxx

Section 39.Liability of Subordinate Officers. No

subordinateofficeroremployeeshallbecivillyliablefor

actsdonebyhimingoodfaithintheperformanceofhis

duties.However,heshallbeliableforwillfulornegligent

acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals,

public policy and good customs even if he acts under

ordersorinstructionsofhissuperior.

Inaddition,theCourtheldinCojuangco,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,[18]thata

publicofficerwhodirectlyorindirectlyviolatestheconstitutionalrightsof

another,maybevalidlysuedfordamagesunderArticle32oftheCivilCode

evenifhisactswerenotsotaintedwithmaliceorbadfaith.

Thus,theruleinthisjurisdictionisthatapublicofficermaybevalidlysued

inhis/herprivatecapacityforactsdoneinthecourseoftheperformance

of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with

malice,badfaith,ornegligence;or(2)wherethepublicofficerviolateda

constitutionalrightoftheplaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent

statedacauseofactionandthatthedecisiveprovisionthereonisArticle32

oftheCivilCode.

Ageneralstatuteisonewhichembracesa classofsubjectsorplacesand


19/36

does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class.A

specialstatute,asthetermisgenerallyunderstood,isonewhichrelatesto

particularpersonsorthingsofaclassortoaparticularportionorsection

ofthestateonly.[19]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A general lawandaspecial lawon the samesubjectarestatutes inpari

materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if

possible,withaviewtogivingeffecttoboth.Theruleisthatwherethere

are twoacts,oneofwhichisspecialandparticularandtheothergeneral

which,ifstandingalone,wouldincludethesamematterandthusconflict

with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the

legislativeintentmoreclearlythanthatofageneralstatuteandmustnot

betakenasintendedtoaffectthemoreparticularandspecificprovisions

oftheearlieract,unlessitisabsolutelynecessarysotoconstrueitinorder

togiveitswordsanymeaningatall.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thecircumstancethatthespeciallawispassedbeforeorafterthegeneral

actdoesnotchangetheprinciple.Wherethespeciallawislater,itwillbe

regardedasanexceptionto,oraqualificationof,thepriorgeneralact;and

where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as

remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by

necessaryimplication.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus,inCityofManilav.Teotico,[22]theCourtheldthatArticle2189ofthe

CivilCodewhichholdsprovinces,cities,andmunicipalitiescivillyliablefor

death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other

publicworks, isa specialprovision and should prevail over Section4 of

RepublicActNo.409,theCharterofManila,indeterminingtheliabilityfor

defectivestreetconditions.UndersaidCharter,thecityshallnotbeheldfor

damagesorinjuriesarisingfromthefailureofthelocalofficialstoenforce

the provisionofthecharter, law,orordinance,or fromnegligencewhile


20/36

enforcingorattemptingtoenforcethesame.AsexplainedbytheCourt:

Manila maintains that the former provision should

prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a

special law, intended exclusively for the City ofManila,whereastheCivilCodeisagenerallaw,applicabletothe

entirePhilippines.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code,

and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its

territorialapplicationisconcerned,RepublicActNo.409

isa special law and theCivilCodea general legislation;

but,asregardsthesubjectmatteroftheprovisionsabove

quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a

generalruleregulatingtheliabilityoftheCityofManila

fordamagesorinjurytopersonsorpropertyarisingfromthefailureofcityofficerstoenforcetheprovisionsofsaid

Actoranyotherlaworordinance,orfromnegligenceof

thecityMayor,Municipal Board, orotherofficerswhile

enforcingorattemptingtoenforcesaidprovisions.Upon

theotherhand,Article2189oftheCivilCodeconstitutes

a particular prescription making provinces, cities and

municipalities. . . liable fordamages for thedeathof,or

injury sufferedby, any person by reason specifically of

thedefective condition of roads, streets,bridges,public

buildings,andotherpublicworksundertheircontrolor

supervision. In other words, said section 4 refers to

liabilityarisingfromnegligence,ingeneral,regardlessof

theobjectthereof,whereasArticle2189governsliability

due todefective streets, inparticular.Sincethepresent

action isbasedupontheallegeddefectiveconditionofa

road,saidArticle2189isdecisivethereon.[23]

In the case ofBagatsingv.Ramirez,[24] the issuewaswhich law should

govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, aspecial act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their

publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a

generallaw,whichdealsinparticularwithordinanceslevyingorimposing

taxes, fees or other charges, and which demands publication only after

approval.InholdingthatitistheTaxCodewhichshouldprevail,theCourt

elucidatedthat:

ThereisnoquestionthattheRevisedCharteroftheCity


21/36

ofManilaisaspecialactsinceitrelatesonlytotheCityof

Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law

because it applies universally to all local governments.

Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule

affecting the entire community and special law as one

relatingtoparticularpersonsorthingsofaclass.Andtherule commonly said is that a prior special law is not

ordinarilyrepealedbyasubsequentgenerallaw.Thefact

that one is special and the other general creates a

presumption that the special is to be considered as

remaining anexception ofthe general,one asageneral

law of the land, the other as the law of a particular

case.However,therulereadilyyieldstoasituationwhere

the special statute refers to a subject in general,which

thegeneral statute treats inparticular.Th[is] exactly is

thecircumstanceobtaininginthecaseatbar.Section17

of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of

ordinance ingeneral, i.e., irrespectiveofthenature and

scopethereof,whereas,Section43oftheLocalTaxCode

relates toordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or

other charges in particular. In regard, therefore, to

ordinancesingeneral,theRevisedCharteroftheCityof

Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force

loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of

ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other

chargesinparticular.There,theLocalTaxCodecontrols.

Here,asalways, ageneral provisionmust giveway toaparticularprovision.Specialprovisiongoverns.

Letusexaminetheprovisionsinvolvedinthecaseatbar.Article32ofthe

CivilCodeprovides:

ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or any private

individual,who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,

violates,orinanymannerimpedesorimpairsanyofthe

following rightsand libertiesofanotherperson shallbeliabletothelatterfordamages:

xxxx

(6)cralawThe right against deprivation of property

withoutdueprocessoflaw;

xxxx

(8)cralawTherighttotheequalprotectionofthelaws;


22/36

xxxx

TherationaleforitsenactmentwasexplainedbyDeanBocobooftheCode

Commission,asfollows:

DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights,

Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so

amendedastomakeapublicofficialliableforviolationof

another persons constitutional rights only if the public

official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code

Commissionopposesthissuggestionforthesereasons:

The very nature of Article 32 is that thewrongmaybe

civilorcriminal.Itisnotnecessarythereforethatthere

shouldbemalice orbad faith.TomakesucharequisitewoulddefeatthemainpurposeofArticle32whichisthe

effectiveprotectionofindividualrights.Publicofficialsin

the past have abused their powers on the pretext of

justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of

theirduties.Precisely,theobjectoftheArticleistoputan

end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the

UnitedStatesthisremedyisinthenatureofatort.

Mr.Chairman,thisarticleisfirmlyoneofthefundamental

articles introduced in the New Civil Code to implementdemocracy.Thereisnorealdemocracyifapublicofficial

is abusing and we made the article so strong and so

comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual

rightsevenifdoneingoodfaith,thatofficialisliable.Asa

matter of fact, we know that there are very few public

officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual

rightsofthecitizens.Inmostcases,theabuseisjustified

onapleaofdesiretoenforcethelawtocomplywithones

duty.And so, ifwe should limitthe scopeof thisarticle,

that would practically nullify the object of the article.

Precisely,theopeningobjectofthearticleistoputanendtoabuseswhicharejustifiedbyapleaofgoodfaith,which

is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual

rights.[25]

TheCodeCommissiondeemeditnecessarytoholdnotonlypublicofficers

but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights

enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code.It is not necessary that the

defendant under thisArticle should have actedwithmalice orbad faith,


23/36

otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective

protection of individual rights.It suffices that there is a violation of the

constitutionalrightoftheplaintiff.[26]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law.[27]A tort is a

wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or

omissionofanactbyone,withoutright,wherebyanotherreceivessome

injury,directlyorindirectly,inperson,property,orreputation.[28]There

arecasesinwhichithasbeenstatedthatcivilliabilityintortisdetermined

bytheconductandnotbythementalstateofthetortfeasor,andthereare

circumstancesunderwhichthemotiveofthedefendanthasbeenrendered

immaterial.Thereasonsometimesgivenfortheruleisthatotherwise,the

mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would

determinewhethertheactwaswrongful.[29]Presenceofgoodmotive,or

rather,theabsenceofanevilmotive,doesnotrenderlawfulanactwhichis

otherwiseaninvasionofanotherslegalright;thatis,liabilityintortisnot

precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil

intent.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct

causeofaction inthenature oftort for violationofconstitutionalrights,

irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.[31]This is a

fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the

Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then

President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this

constitutionalprotectiononcivilliberties.

InAbercav.Ver,[32]itwasheldthatwiththeenactmentofArticle32,the

principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution

acquiresaddedmeaningandassumesalargerdimension.Nolongermaya

superiorofficial relaxhis vigilance orabdicatehis duty to supervisehis


24/36

subordinates,secureinthethoughtthathedoesnothavetoanswerforthe

transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally

protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that

propelledpeoplepowerinFebruary1986wasthewidelyheldperception

that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually

responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.While itwould

certainlybetoonaivetoexpectthatviolatorsofhumanrightswouldeasily

bedeterredbytheprospectoffacingdamagesuits,itshouldnonetheless

bemadeclearinnouncertaintermsthatArticle32oftheCivilCodemakes

the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the

transgression,jointtortfeasors.

Ontheotherhand,Sections38and39,BookIoftheAdministrativeCode,

laiddowntheruleonthecivilliabilityofsuperiorandsubordinatepublic

officersforactsdoneintheperformanceoftheirduties.Forbothsuperior

and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and

negligencearevitalelementsthatwillmakethemliablefordamages.Note

that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of

government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e.,acts done in the

performanceofofficial duties,without specifying theaction oromission

thatmaygiverisetoacivilsuitagainsttheofficialconcerned.

Contrarily,Article32ofthe CivilCode specifies inclearand unequivocal

terms a particular specie of an act that may give rise to an action for

damagesagainstapublicofficer,andthatis,atortforimpairmentofrights

and liberties.Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals

specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers.All

otheractionableactsofpublicofficersaregovernedbySections38and39

oftheAdministrativeCode.WhiletheCivilCode,specifically,theChapteron

Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a

special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and


25/36

allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be

committed by public officers.Compared thus with Section 38 of the

Administrative Code,whichbroadlydealswithcivil liabilityarising from

errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the

specificprovisionwhichmustbeappliedintheinstantcasepreciselyfiled

toseekdamagesforviolationofconstitutionalrights.

ThecomplaintintheinstantcasewasbroughtunderArticle32oftheCivil

Code.Consideringthatbadfaithandmalicearenotnecessaryinanaction

basedonArticle32oftheCivilCode,thefailuretospecificallyallege the

samewillnotamounttofailuretostateacauseofaction.Thecourtsbelow

thereforecorrectlydeniedthemotiontodismissonthegroundoffailureto

state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a

violationofaconstitutionalrightoftheplaintiff.

Anenttheissueonnon-compliancewiththeruleagainstforumshopping,

the subsequent submission of the secretarys certificate authorizing the

counseltosignandexecutethecertificationagainstforumshoppingcured

thedefectofrespondentscomplaint.Besides,themeritsoftheinstantcase

justifytheliberalapplicationoftherules.[33]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecision

oftheCourtofAppealsdatedMay7,1999whichaffirmedtheOrderofthe

RegionalTrialCourtofMarikina,Branch272,denyingpetitionersmotion

to dismiss, is AFFIRMED.The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of

Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the

proceedingsinCivilCaseNo.97-341-MKwithdispatch.

Withcosts.

SOORDERED.


26/36

CONSUELOYNARES-SANTIAGO

AssociateJustice

[G.R.No.141309,December23,2008]

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA,J.:

Itisafundamentalprincipleinthelawofpublicofficersthatadutyowingtothe

publicingeneralcannotgiverisetoaliabilityinfavorofparticularindividuals.[1]

The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only

when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to himself as an

individualisalsoinvolved,andthathehassufferedaspecialandpeculiarinjury

byreasonofitsimproperperformanceornon-performance.[2]

Bythistoken,theCourtreconsidersitsJune19,2007Decision[3]inthiscase.

Asculledfromthesaiddecision,thefacts,inbrief,areasfollows:

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654),

which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands

`Champion,""Hope,"and"More"wereconsideredlocalbrandssubjectedtoanad

valoremtaxattherateof20-45%.However,onJuly1,1993,ortwodaysbefore

RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion,"

"Hope,"and"More"aslocallymanufacturedcigarettesbearingaforeignbrand

subjecttothe55%advaloremtax.RMC37-93ineffectsubjected"Hope,""More,"

and"Champion"cigarettestotheprovisionsofRA7654,specifically,toSec.142,

(c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and

taxedat55%,andwhichimposesan advaloremtaxof"55%providedthatthe

minimumtaxshallnotbelessthanFivePesos(P5.00)perpack."

OnJuly2,1993,atabout5:50p.m.,BIRDeputyCommissionerVictorA.Deoferio,

Jr.sentviatelefaxacopyofRMC37-93toFortuneTobaccobutitwasaddressed

tonooneinparticular.OnJuly15,1993,FortuneTobaccoreceived,byordinary

mail,acertifiedxeroxcopyofRMC37-93.OnJuly20,1993,respondentfileda

motionforreconsiderationrequestingtherecallofRMC37-93,butwasdeniedin

aletterdatedJuly30,1993.Thesameletterassessedrespondentfor advalorem


27/36

taxdeficiencyamountingtoP9,598,334.00(computedonthebasisofRMC37-

93)anddemandedpaymentwithin10daysfromreceiptthereof.OnAugust3,

1993,respondentfiledapetitionforreviewwiththeCourtofTaxAppeals(CTA),

which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the

implementationofRMC37-93.InitsdecisiondatedAugust10,1994,theCTAruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further

enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued

pursuanttoRMCNo.37-93.ThisrulingwasaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,

andfinallybythisCourtinCommissionerofInternalRevenuev.CourtofAppeals .

Itwasheld,amongothers,thatRMC37-93,hasfallenshortoftherequirements

foravalidadministrativeissuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages

againstpetitionerinherprivatecapacity.Respondentcontendedthatthelatter

shouldbeheldliablefordamagesunderArticle32oftheCivilCodeconsidering

that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against

deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal

protectionofthelaws.

Petitionerfiledamotiontodismisscontendingthat:(1)respondenthasnocause

ofactionagainstherbecauseshe issuedRMC37-93intheperformanceofher

officialfunctionandwithinthescopeofherauthority.Sheclaimedthatsheacted

merelyasanagentoftheRepublicandthereforethelatteristheoneresponsible

forheracts;(2)thecomplaintstatesnocauseofactionforlackofallegationofmaliceorbadfaith;and(3)thecertificationagainstforumshoppingwassigned

by respondent's counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the

principalpartywhoshouldsignthesame.

OnSeptember29,1997,theRTCdeniedpetitioner'smotiontodismissholding

thattoruleontheallegationsofpetitionerwouldbetoprematurelydecidethe

merits of the casewithout allowingthe parties topresent evidence. It further

held that the defect in the certification against forum shoppingwas cured by

respondent'ssubmissionofthecorporatesecretary'scertificateauthorizingitscounseltoexecutethecertificationagainstforumshopping.xxxx

xxxx

ThecasewaselevatedtotheCourtofAppealsviaapetitionforcertiorariunder

Rule65.However,samewasdismissedontheground thatunderArticle32of

theCivilCode,liabilitymayariseevenifthedefendantdidnotactwithmaliceor

bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the

Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officerswhileArticle32oftheCivilCodeisthespeciallawthatgovernstheinstantcase.


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Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for

damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the

certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the

corporate secretary's certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the

same.[4]

[Citationsandunderscoringomitted.]IntheaforesaidJune19,2007Decision,weaffirmedthedispositionoftheCourt

ofAppeals(CA)anddirectedthetrialcourttocontinuewiththeproceedingsin

CivilCaseNo.97-341-MK.[5]

Petitioner,onJuly20,2007,subsequentlymovedforthereconsiderationofthe

saiddecision.[6] Afterrespondent filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14,

2008Resolution,[7]deniedwithfinalitypetitioner'smotionforreconsideration.

Undaunted,petitionerfiled,onApril29,2008herMotiontoRefer[thecase]to

the Honorable Court En Banc.[8] She contends that the petition raises a legal

question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier decision

rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will

adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in

departmentsoragencieswithrule-makingandquasi-judicialpowers.Withthe

saiddecision,theCommissionerofInternalRevenuewillhavereasontohesitate

or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the due process

safeguards inSection 228of the National Internal RevenueCode.[9] Petitioner

hencemovesforthereconsiderationoftheJune19,2007Decision.[10]

InitsJune25,2008Resolution,[11]theCourtreferredthecasetothe EnBanc.

Respondentconsequentlymovedforthereconsiderationofthisresolution.

Wenowresolvebothmotions.

Therearetwokindsofdutiesexercisedbypublicofficers:the"dutyowingtothe

public collectively" (the body politic), and the "duty owing to particular

individuals,thus:

1.OfDutiestothePublic.-Thefirstoftheseclassesembracesthoseofficerswhosedutyisowingprimarilytothepubliccollectively---tothebodypolitic---

andnottoanyparticularindividual;whoactforthepublicatlarge,andwhoare

ordinarilypaidoutofthepublictreasury.

Theofficerswhosedutiesfallwhollyorpartiallywithinthisclassarenumerous

andthedistinctionwillbereadilyrecognized.Thus,thegovernorowesadutyto

the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent

officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of the

legislature do not receive his approval, but these, andmany others of a likenature, are dutieswhichheowes to the publicat largeand noone individual


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couldsinglehimselfoutandassertthattheyweredutiesowingtohimalone.So,

membersofthelegislatureoweadutytothepublictopassonlywiseandproper

laws,butnoonepersoncouldpretendthatthedutywasowingtohimselfrather

thantoanother.Highwaycommissionersoweadutythattheywillbegoverned

onlybyconsiderationsofthepublicgoodindecidingupontheopeningorclosingofhighways,butitisnotadutytoanyparticularindividualofthecommunity.

These illustrationsmight be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are

sufficienttodefinethegeneraldoctrine.

2.OfDutiestoIndividuals.-Thesecondclassabovereferredtoincludesthose

who,whiletheyowetothepublicthegeneraldutyofaproperadministrationof

their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a

particularindividualtodosomeactforhiminanofficialcapacity,underaspecial

andparticularobligationtohimasanindividual.Theyserveindividualschiefly

andusually receive theircompensation fromfeespaidbyeachindividualwho

employsthem.

Asherifforconstableinservingcivilprocessforaprivatesuitor,arecorderof

deeds in recording thedeed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in

enteringupaprivatejudgment,anotarypublicinprotestingnegotiablepaper,

aninspector ofelections inpassingupon the qualificationsofanelector,each

owesageneraldutyofofficialgoodconducttothepublic,butheisalsoundera

special duty to the particular individual concerned which gives the latter apeculiarinterestinhisdueperformance.[12]

Indeterminingwhetherapublicofficerisliableforanimproperperformanceor

non-performanceofaduty,itmustfirstbedeterminedwhichofthetwoclasses

of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs,

"[t]heliabilityofapublicofficertoanindividualorthepublicisbaseduponand

isco-extensivewithhisduty totheindividualorthepublic.Iftotheoneorthe

otherheowesnoduty,tothatonehecanincurnoliability."[13]

Stated differently, when what is involved is a "duty owing to the public ingeneral", an individual cannot have a causeof action for damagesagainst the

publicofficer,eventhoughhemayhavebeeninjuredbytheactionorinactionof

theofficer.Insuchacase,thereisdamagetotheindividualbutnowrongtohim.

In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his

interesttohisprejudice;buttheofficerowesnodutytohimasanindividual.[14]

Theremedyinthiscaseisnotjudicialbutpolitical.[15]

The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a

particular or special injury on account of the public officer's improperperformanceornon-performanceofhispublicduty.Anindividualcanneverbe


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sufferedtosueforaninjurywhich,technically,isonetothepubliconly;hemust

showawrongwhichhespeciallysuffers,anddamagealonedoesnotconstitutea

wrong.[16]Acontraryprecept(thatanindividual,intheabsenceofaspecialand

peculiarinjury,canstillinstituteanactionagainstapublicofficeronaccountof

an improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the publicgenerally)willleadtoadelugeofsuits,forifonemanmighthaveanaction,all

men mighthave the like--the complaining individual has no better right than

anybodyelse.[17]Ifsuchwerethecase,noonewillserveapublicoffice.Thus,the

rulerestatedisthatanindividualcannothaveaparticularactionagainstapublic

officerwithoutaparticularinjury,oraparticularright, whichare the grounds

uponwhichallactionsarefounded.[18]

JuxtaposedwithArticle32[19]oftheCivilCode,theprinciplemaynowtranslate

into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for

damagesonaccountofanactoromissionthatviolatesaconstitutionalrightonly

ifitresultsinaparticularwrongorinjurytotheformer. Thisisconsistentwith

thisCourt'spronouncementinitsJune19,2007Decision(subjectofpetitioner's

motionforreconsideration)thatArticle32,infact,allowsadamagesuitfor"tort

forimpairmentofrightsandliberties."[20]

It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for

damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such

injuries resultedfroma breach ofdutywhich the defendant owed the plaintiff,

meaning a concurrenceof injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the

personcausingit.Indeed,centraltoanawardoftortdamagesisthepremisethat

anindividualwas injured incontemplationof law.[21]Thus,inLimv.Poncede

Leon,[22] we granted the petitioner's claim for damages because he, in fact,

suffered the loss of his motor launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[23] we upheld the right of petitioner to the

recoveryofdamagesastherewasaninjurysustainedbyhimonaccountofthe

illegalwithholdingofhishorseraceprizewinnings.

Intheinstantcase,whatisinvolvedisapublicofficer'sdutyowingtothepublicingeneral.Thepetitioner,as the thenCommissioner oftheBureauofInternal

Revenue, isbeingtakento task for RevenueMemorandumCircular(RMC)No.

37-93which she issued without the requisitenotice, hearing and publication,

and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,[24] we

declared as having "fallen short of a valid and effective administrative

issuance."[25]Apublicofficer,suchasthepetitioner,vestedwithquasi-legislative

orrule-makingpower,owesadutytothepublictopromulgateruleswhichare

compliantwiththerequirementsofvalidadministrativeregulations.Butitisa

dutyowednottotherespondentalone,buttotheentirebodypoliticwhowouldbeaffected,directlyorindirectly,bytheadministrativerule.


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Furthermore,asdiscussedabove,tohaveacauseofactionfordamagesagainst

the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered aparticular or special

injuryon account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A

careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that noparticularinjuryisallegedtohavebeensustainedbytherespondent.Thephrase

"financial and business difficulties"[26] mentioned in the complaint is a vague

notion,ambiguousinconcept,andcannottranslateintoa"particularinjury."In

contrast, the factsof the caseeloquentlydemonstrate that the petitioner took

nothingfromtherespondent,asthelatterdidnotpayasinglecentavoonthetax

assessmentleviedbytheformerbyvirtueofRMC37-93.

Withno"particularinjury"allegedinthecomplaint,thereis,therefore,nodelict

orwrongfulactoromissionattributabletothepetitionerthatwouldviolatethe

primaryrightsoftherespondent.Withoutsuchdelictortortiousactoromission,

thecomplaintthenfailstostateacauseofaction,becauseacauseofactionisthe

actoromissionbywhichapartyviolatesarightofanother.[27]

Acauseofactionexistsifthefollowingelementsarepresent:(1)arightinfavor

oftheplaintiffbywhatevermeansandunderwhateverlawitarisesoriscreated;

(2)anobligationonthepartofthenameddefendanttorespectornottoviolate

suchright;and(3)anactoromissiononthepartofsuchdefendantviolativeof

therightoftheplaintifforconstitutingabreachoftheobligationofdefendantto

plaintiffforwhichthelattermaymaintainanactionforrecoveryofdamages.[28]

Theremedyofapartywheneverthecomplaintdoesnotallegeacauseofaction

istosetupthisdefenseinamotiontodismiss,orintheanswer.Amotionto

dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the complaint

hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. However, the

hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well-

pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The admission

does not extend to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover

allegationsoffactthefalsityofwhichissubjecttojudicialnotice."[29]

Thecomplaintmayalsobedismissedfor lackofcauseofactionifit isobvious

from the complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any

relief.[30]

TheJune19,2007Decisionandthedissentherein reiteratesthatunderArticle

32oftheCivilCode,theliabilityofthepublicofficermayaccrueevenifhe/she

actedingoodfaith,aslongasthereisaviolationofconstitutionalrights,citing

Cojuangco,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,[31]

wherewesaid:Undertheaforecitedarticle,itisnotnecessarythatthepublicofficeractedwith


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maliceorbadfaith.Tobeliable,itisenoughthattherewasaviolationofthe

constitutionalrightsofpetitioners,evenonthepretextofjustifiablemotivesor

goodfaithintheperformanceofduties.[32]

Thecomplaintinthiscasedoesnotimputebadfaithonthepetitioner.Without

any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondent's complaint(specifically,paragraph2.02thereof)fordamagesunderArticle32oftheCivil

CodewouldbepremisedonthefindingsofthisCourtinCommissionerofInternal

Revenuev.CourtofAppeals(CIRv.CA), [33]whereweruledthatRMCNo.37-93,

issuedbypetitionerin her capacityas Commissioner ofInternalRevenue, had

"fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance."This is a logical

inference.WithoutthedecisioninCIRv.CA,thebareallegationsinthecomplaint

thatrespondent'srightstodueprocessoflawandtoequalprotectionofthelaws

wereviolatedbythepetitioner'sadministrativeissuancewouldbeconclusions

oflaw,hencenothypotheticallyadmittedbypetitionerinhermotiontodismiss.

ButinCIRv.CA,thisCourtdidnotdeclareRMC37-93unconstitutional;certainly

not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the laws

perspective.Ondueprocess,themajority,afterdeterminingthatRMC37-93was

alegislativerule,citedanearlierRevenueMemorandumCircular(RMCNo.10-

86)requiringpriornoticebeforeRMC'scouldbecome"operative."However,this

Courtdidnotmakeanexpressfindingofviolationoftherighttodueprocessof

law.Onthe aspect ofequalprotection,CIRv.CAsaid: "Notinsignificantly,RMC

37-93mighthavelikewiseinfringedonuniformityoftaxation;"a statement that

does not amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation ofrespondent's constitutional right.Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional

infringementbyRMC37-93onthenon-uniformityoftaxprovisions,thenature

oftheconstitutionaltransgressionfallsunderSection28,ArticleVI--notSection

1,ArticleIII--oftheConstitution.

ThisCourt'sownsummationin CIRv.CA:"Alltaken,theCourtisconvincedthat

the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective

administrativeissuance,"doesnotlenditselftoaninterpretationthattheRMCis

unconstitutional. Thus,thecomplaint's relianceonCIRv.CA--whichiscitedin,andacopyofwhichisannexedto,thecomplaint--assuggestiveofaviolationof

dueprocessandequalprotection,mustfail.

Accordingly,fromtheforegoingdiscussion,itisobviousthatparagraph2.02of

respondent'scomplaintlosestheneededcrutchtosustainavalidcauseofaction

againstthepetitioner,forwhatisleftoftheparagraphismerelytheallegation

that only respondent's "Champion", "Hope" and "More" cigarettes were

reclassified.

If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of


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respondent's cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be

paragraph2.01,whichreads:

2.01.OnoraboutJuly1,1993,defendantissuedRevenueMemorandumCircular

No.37-93(hereinafterreferred toasRMCNo.37-93)reclassifyingspecifically

"Champion", "Hope" and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing aforeignbrand.Acopyoftheaforesaid circularis attachedheretoandmadean

integral part hereof as ANNEX "A". The issuance of a circular and its

implementationresulted inthe"deprivationofproperty"ofplaintiff.Theywere

done withoutdueprocess of lawand in violation of the rightof plaintiff to the

equalprotectionofthelaws.(Italicssupplied.)

But,asintimatedabove,thebareallegations,"donewithoutdueprocessoflaw"

and"inviolationoftherightofplaintifftotheequalprotectionofthelaws"are

conclusionsoflaw.Theyarenothypotheticallyadmittedinpetitioner'smotion

todismissand,forpurposesofthemotiontodismiss,arenotdeemedasfacts.

InFluorDaniel,Inc.Philippinesv.EB.Villarosa&PartnersCo.,Ltd.,[34]thisCourt

declared that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as

constitutingacauseofactioniswhetherornot,admittingthefactsalleged,the

courtcouldrenderavalidverdictinaccordancewiththeprayerofthecomplaint.

Intheinstantcase,sincewhatremainsofthecomplaintwhichishypothetically

admitted,isonlytheallegationonthereclassificationofrespondent'scigarettes,

therewillnotbeenoughfactsforthecourttorenderavalidjudgmentaccording

totheprayerinthecomplaint.

Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code

premisedonviolationofdueprocess,itmaybenecessarytoharmonizetheCivil

Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those

related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the

provisionsof theNationalInternalRevenueCode,asamended,and of the law

creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample remedies to

aggrievedtaxpayers;remedieswhich,infact,wereavailedofbytherespondent--

withoutevenhavingtopaytheassessmentunderprotest--asrecountedbythis

CourtinCIRv.CA,viz.:Ina letter,dated19 July1993, addressed to the appellate divisionof theBIR,

FortuneTobaccorequestedforareview,reconsiderationandrecallofRMC37-

93.Therequestwasdeniedon29July1993.Thefollowingday,oron30July

1993,theCIRassessedFortuneTobaccoforadvaloremtaxdeficiencyamounting

toP9,598,334.00.

On03August1993,FortuneTobaccofiledapetitionforreviewwiththeCTA.[35]

Theavailabilityof theremediesagainst theassailedadministrativeaction, the

opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies,contradicttherespondent'sclaimofdueprocessinfringement.


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At this point, a brief examinationof relevantAmerican jurisprudencemay be

instructive.

42U.S. Code1983, aprovision incorporated into the CivilRights Act of1871,presentsaparalleltoourownArticle32oftheCivilCode,asitstates:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

usage,oranyStateorTerritory,subjects,orcausestobesubjected,anycitizenof

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivationofanyrights,privilegesorimmunitiessecuredbytheConstitution

andlaws,shallbeliabletothepartyinjuredinanactionatlaw,suitinequityor

otherproperproceedingforredress.

Thisprovisionhasbeenemployedasthebasisoftortsuitsbymanypetitioners

intending towin liability casesagainst governmentofficialswhen they violate

theconstitutionalrightsofcitizens.

Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Investigation,[36]hasemergedastheleadingcaseonthevictim'sentitlementto

recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and

unconstitutionalabusesofadministrativepower.Inthiscase,federalnarcotics

officersbrokeintoBivens'homeat6:30a.m.withoutasearchwarrantandinthe

absenceofprobablecause.TheagentshandcuffedBivens,searchedhispremises,

employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a

visual strip search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed,interrogatedandbookedhim.WhenBivenswasbroughtbeforeaUnitedStates

Commissioner, however, charges against himwere dismissed. On the issue of

whether violationof the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agentacting under

colorofauthoritygivesrisetoacauseofactionfordamagesconsequentuponhis

constitutionalconduct," the U.S. SupremeCourt held thatBivens is entitledto

recoverdamagesforinjurieshesufferedasaresultoftheagents'violationofthe

FourthAmendment.

AnumberofsubsequentdecisionshaveupheldBivens.Forinstance,inScheuerv.Rhodes,[37]aliabilitysuitformoneydamageswasallowedagainstOhioGovernor

James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three students who had been

killedbyOhioNationalGuardtroopsatKentStateUniversityastheyprotested

againstU.S.involvementinVietnam.InWoodv.Strickland,[38]localschoolboard

memberswere sued by high school students who argued that they had been

deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from

schoolforhavingspikedapunchbowlataschoolfunctionwithoutthebenefitof

afullhearing.InButzv.Economou,[39]Economou,whoseregistrationprivilegeas

a commodities futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, bySecretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the


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suspensionwas aimedat "chilling" his freedomof expression right under the

FirstAmendment.Anumberofothercases[40]withvirtuallythesameconclusion

followed.

However, it isextremely dubiouswhether aBivensaction against governmenttaxofficialsandemployeesmayprosper,ifweconsiderthepronouncementof

theU.S.SupremeCourtinSchweikerv.Chilicky,[41]thataBivensremedywillnot

be allowedwhen other "meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of

personssituatedas (is theplaintiff)"areavailable.Ithasalsobeenheldthata

Bivensactionisnotappropriateinthecivilservicesystem [42]orinthemilitary

justicesystem.[43]

InFrankVennesv.AnUnknownNumberofUnidentifiedAgentsoftheUnitedStates

ofAmerica,[44]petitionerVennesinstitutedaBivensactionagainstagentsofthe

InternalRevenueService(IRS)whoallegedthathe(Vennes)owed$250,000in

tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes' business,

forcedatotalassetsale,andputVennesoutofbusiness,wheninfactheowed

notadime.TheU.S.CourtofAppeals,EighthCircuit,ruled:

The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayer's

remediesundertheInternalRevenueCodeprecludesuchaBivensaction.Vennes

citestousnocontraryauthority,andwehavefoundnone.ThoughtheSupreme

Courthasnotaddressedthisprecisequestion,ithasstronglysuggestedthatthe

districtcourtcorrectlyappliedBivens:

WhenthedesignofaGovernmentprogramsuggeststhatCongresshasprovidedwhat it considers adequate remedialmechanisms for constitutional violations

thatmayoccurinthecourseofitsadministration,wehavenotcreatedadditional

Bivensremedies.

xxxx

Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers who

challengeoverzealoustaxassessmentandcollectionactivities.Ataxpayermay

challenge a jeopardyassessmentbothadministrativelyandjudicially, andmay

sue the government for a tax refund, and have authorized taxpayer actionsagainst the United States to recover limited damages resulting from specific

types of misconduct by IRS employees. These carefully crafted legislative

remediesconfirmthat,inthepoliticallysensitiverealmoftaxation,Congress's

refusal to permit unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has not been

inadvertent.Thus,thedistrictcourtcorrectlydismissedVennes'sBivensclaims

againstIRSagentsfortheirtaxassessmentandcollectionactivities.

InstillanotherBivensaction,institutedbyataxpayeragainstIRSemployeesfor

allegedviolationofdueprocessrightsconcerningataxdispute,theU.S.District

CourtofMinnesotasaid:In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial and


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otherwise,forcorrectingandredressingwrongfulactstakenbyIRSemployees

in connectionwith any collection activities.Although theseprovisions donot

provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for wrongful acts of IRS

personnel, the rights establishedunder the Code illustrate that it providesall

sorts of rights against the overzealous officialdom, including, mostfundamentally,therighttosuethegovernmentforarefundifforcedtooverpay

taxes,anditwouldmakethecollectionoftaxeschaoticifataxpayercouldbypass

theremediesprovidedbyCongresssimplybybringingadamagesuitagainstIRS

employees.[45]

Americanjurisprudenceobviouslyvalidatesthecontentionofthepetitioner.

Finally,we inviteattention toSection227,RepublicActNo.8424 (TaxReform

Actof1997),whichprovides:

Section 227. Satisfaction of JudgmentRecovered Againstany InternalRevenue

Officer. -When an action is brought against any Internal Revenue officer to

recoverdamagesbyreasonofanyactdoneintheperformanceofofficialduty,

andtheCommissionerisnotifiedofsuchactionintimetomakedefenseagainst

the same, through the Solicitor General, any judgment, damages or costs

recoveredinsuchactionshallbesatisfiedbytheCommissioner,uponapproval

oftheSecretaryofFinance,orifthesamebepaidbythepersonsuedshallbe

repaidorreimbursedtohim.

Nosuchjudgment,damagesorcostsshallbepaidorreimbursed inbehalfof a

personwhohasactednegligentlyorinbadfaith,orwithwillfuloppression.Becausetherespondent'scomplaintdoesnotimputenegligenceorbadfaithto

thepetitioner,anymoneyjudgmentbythetrialcourtagainstherwillhavetobe

assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the

natureofasuitagainsttheState.[46]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioner's motion for

reconsiderationoftheJune19,2007DecisionandDENYrespondent'smotionfor

reconsiderationoftheJune25,2008Resolution.CivilCaseNo.CV-97-341-MK,

pendingwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofMarikinaCity,isDISMISSED.

SOORDERED.

Puno, C.J.,Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Tinga,

Chico-Nazario,Velasco,Jr.,Reyes,Leonardo-DeCastro,andBrion,JJ.,concur.

Ynares-Santiago,J.,seedissentingopinion.Corona,J.,onleave.

Violation of Civil and Political Rights

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