Rotation

Even as the 1st larine Division hecame more heav­ily engaged along the Jamestown Line, replace­ment~ had to be absorhed, not only for the grow­

ing number of killed and .;\'ounded, but also for tho~e

whose tours of duty in Korea were ending, In the springof L952, for example, the di\'ision tran~rerred e!'e,;\'here133 officers and 6,2HO enlisted Marines, while adding )06officers and ,3'59 men. The greater number of replace­ments kept the di\ ision slightly ab()\ e auth rizedstrength.

t this time, a normal tour of dut), in Korea encom­passed about] 0 and one-half months. Inf~lI1try lieutenantsand cal rains arri\'ed in such large numbers, how vcr, thata si:x-month tour became common for these ofTicer~,

although tho~e in other grades and specialtie' might con­tinue to serve from nine (0 m'eh'e months. The turnoveramong officer~, plus reassignmenL<; within the di\'ision,had mi.: ed result~. Although changing a<;signmem' e\'l~ry

thre to fi\'e months reduced the eITeeti\'ene,. of the di\ i­• ion, the policy broadened the e perience of officers.individually and a~ a group. In the summer of 1952, how-

e\'cr, the division cho~e efficiency (weI' experience andreduced the frequency of reassignments among its offi­cer~,

Replaccmcnt drafts did not al\\'a '<; fill existing \'acan­cies, Indeed, for a time in 19)2 the 11th J\larines had toretrain infantry ofncer~ for artillel) dut), ~loreO\'er, skill ddrivers and gunn 'r~ for the ~1-'16 tan\.. prc)\'ed ~carce untilthe training program.<; at Camp Pendleton, California,could he expand 'd.

. imilar problem~ affected the] <;t ~Iarine Aircraft \X'ing\\ here tour of duty LJ\'eraged six to nine Illonth~ for piloL<;and 10 to 12 month~ for non-flier~. ~ in the di\'ision, rota­tion between Kore~l and the United State~ and rea~sign­

ment within the wing affected efficiency. The turnO\'er inpilots got the hlame for a ~eries of accid 'nb on the e~coJt

carrier BataalJ. e\'en though the ne\\ arrivals had requal­ified to tly from a carrier. ,\loreO\'er, the \\ ing'~ ;\lal1ne Air

ontrol Group 2 operated a formal cour<;e to train forwardair controller~, and recently arrhed pilot~ \\ith ru. t) <;kill<;underwent inf rmal refre<;her training. ~ -arcity of air­craft mechanic~ and electronics technician~ per~i~ted.

\) 'jXlrlmeOl uf D '!en'l' PhOIO (tS\IC> /\ l-n-C,2

494

place had to guard against attack atany time and patrol aggressivelyby night. Another explanation ofthe lagging program of bunkerconstruction blamed the trainingreceived by the Marines, wholearned to emphasize the attack atthe expense, perhaps, of defensivepreparations. Whatever the rea-sons, Marine bunkers, as well asthose manned by American sol-diers, did not measure up to thestandards of the Chinese, who pro-vided as much as 35 feet of over-

Jamestown Lineand its Combat Outposts,

Summer 1952

head cover for frontline positions,which usually were linked by tun-nels rather than trenches.

The fighting along the James-town Line grew even deadlier.Shortly after midnight on 9 August,the Chinese seized Siberia (Hill58A), the site of a squad-size out-post, and also probed the positionsof the 1st Marines. Siberia lay mid-way between the Marine main lineof resistance and the line ofChinese outposts. The enemy'spossession of Siberia would pro-

495

vide observation posts to adjustartillery and mortar fire against thenearest segment of the JamestownLine. As a result, Colonel Walter F.Layer's 1st Marines, on the right ofthe division's line, counterattackedat once, using the same unit,Company E, 2d Battalion, that haddispatched the squad driven fromSiberia. Chinese artillery and mor-tar fire, directed from Hills 110 and120, stopped the counterattackshort of its objective.

The Marines called for air strikesand additional artillery fire beforerenewing the counterattack onSiberia. At 0650, four GrummanF9F jets from the 1st MarineAircraft Wing struck, droppingnapalm and 500-pound bombs.Shortly before 1000, Air Force F-80jets dropped 1,000-pounders, anda platoon from Company A, 1stBattalion, the regimental reserve ofthe 1st Marines, immediatelystormed the hill, with the supportof a platoon from the 2d Battalion'sCompany E. The Chinese again cutloose with mortars and artillery butcould not stop the assault, whichseized the crest. The supportingplatoon from Company E joined inorganizing the defense of therecaptured outpost, which cameunder a deadly torrent of accuratefire that forced the Marines to seekthe protection of the reverse slope,nearer their main line of resistance,where they held out until mid-afternoon before falling back. Theenemy's artillery and mortars hadfired an estimated 5,000 rounds,wounding or killing perhaps three-fourths of the Marines who hadattacked Siberia on the morning of9 August.

While Companies E and A reor-ganized, the task of recapturingSiberia fell to Company C, com-manded by Captain Casimir C.

Ksycewski, who attacked with twoplatoons starting uphill at 0116. Afirefight erupted, lasting four

The Center of the

() Outposts in right battalion Sector

0 500 1000 1500Yardsl I'

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164331

Col Walter F Layer, a veteran of thebattles for Saian, Tinian, andOkinawa, assumed command of the1st Marines in July. He would laterserve as the senior advisor to theKorean Marine Corps.

hours, but the Marines gained thecrest and held it until dawn, whendriven from Siberia by a Chinesecounterattack.

The losses suffered by the 1stMarines, 17 killed and 243 wound-ed within 30 hours, convincedColonel Layer that his regimentcould not hold Siberia if Hill 122,nicknamed Bunker Hill, remainedin Chinese hands. He and his staffplanned a sudden thrust at BunkerHill, possession of which wouldenable his command to dominateSiberia and observe movementbeyond the Chinese outpost line.

Fight for Bunker Hill

To disguise the true objective,Lieutenant Colonel Roy J. Battertonattacked Siberia at dusk on 11August with one company from his2d Battalion. The 1st TankBattalion supported the maneuverwith four M-46 tanks (M-26 tankwith a new engine and transmis-sion), each mounting a 90mm gun

and an 18-inch searchlight fittedwith shutter to highlight a target ina brief burst of illumination, andfour M-4A3E8 tanks, each carryingboth a flamethrower and a 105mmhowitzer. While the 90mmweapons hammered Hill 110, theflame-throwing tanks climbedSiberia, using bursts of flame tolight their way while demoralizingthe defenders, and gained the crestbefore doubling back towardMarine lines. As the flame-throw-ing M-4s withdrew, the M-46sopened fire on both Siberia andHill 110, illuminating targets withfive-second bursts of light fromtheir shuttered searchlights, andCaptain George W. Campbell's

Company D overran Siberia, hold.-ing the crest until midnight whenthe diversionary attack ended.

The Bunker Hill assault force,Company B, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines—commanded by CaptainSereno S. Scranton, Jr., and underthe operational control of Batter-ton's 2d Battalion—reached thecrest by 2230 and began drivingthe enemy from the slope nearestthe division's main line of resis-tance. The defenders recoveredfrom their initial surprise, but thebypassed pockets of Chinese sol-diers, though they tried to resist,could not check the Marineadvance. In the wake of the assaultforce, other Marines and members

Marines crouch in a trench during the fighting for Siberia and other nearby hills.The struggle was fierce; some Chinese refused to yield and Jbught to their death.Most briefly held their defensive positions before retiring.

Department of Defense I'hoto (USMG) Ai65i4

496

most of the casualties.

of the Korean Service Corps man-handled sandbags, wire, and shov-els up the hill to help Company Borganize the defenses of the objec-tive against the counterattack thatwas certain to come.

Chinese mortars and artilleryharassed the Marines on BunkerHill until dawn on 12 August, butthe counterattack did not comeuntil mid-afternoon, after Com-pany B passed under the opera-tional control of 3d Battalion, 1stMarines. The defense of BunkerHill became the responsibility ofthe battalion commander,Lieutenant Colonel Gerard T.

Armitage, whose Marines faced ademanding test. The volume andaccuracy of the shelling increasedat about 1500, a barrage that lastedan hour and forced the Marines toseek the protection from direct fireafforded by the reverse slope.Company I, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, commanded by CaptainHoward J. Connolly, reinforcedScranton's embattled Company B

in time to help break up an attackby some 350 Chinese and hold thesouthern slope of Bunker Hill.

While the battle raged onBunker Hill, General Selden

moved his reserves closer to thefighting. Company I, 3d Battalion,7th Marines, took the place ofConnolly's company on the mainline of resistance, and by the endof the day, all of the 3d Battalion,7th Marines, had come under theoperational control of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marines. Seldenattached the 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, to Layer's command tostrengthen the reserve of the 1stMarines. Meanwhile, Layer movedtwo provisional platoons from hisreserve, the 1st Battalion, to rein-force the 3d Battalion, and the 3dBattalion's reconnaissance platoonestablished an outpost on Hill 124,linking Bunker Hill with the mainline of resistance. This shuffling ofunits proved necessary becausethe 1st Marine Division was sothinly spread over an extendedfront. During the realignment, sup-porting weapons, ranging frommachine guns through mortars andartillery to rocket batteries, pre-pared to box in the Marines hold-ing the near slope of Bunker Hill,hammer the Chinese at the crest

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A165106

Navy Corpsmen administer blood plasma to a Marine wounded in the fight forSiberia. Intense enemy mortar and artillery fire during the seesaw battle caused

Marines take a much-needed break on the reverse slope of the main line of resis-tance during a lull in the fight for Siberia.

Department of Defense Photo (U5MC) A165132

497

and beyond, protect the flanks,and harass movement on theroutes enemy reinforcementswould have to use.

As daylight faded into dusk on12 August, the Marines defendingthe reverse slope of Bunker Hillstruggled to improve their hurried-ly prepared fortifications, for theChinese preferred to counterattackunder cover of darkness. For-tunately, the comparatively gentleincline of the reverse slope of theridge that culminated in BunkerHill reduced the amount of deadspace that could not be covered bygrazing fire from the Marine posi-tion. Moreover, weapons on theJamestown Line could fire directlyonto the crest, when the expectedattack began. By 2000, all the sup-porting weapons had registered tohelp the two companies hold theposition.

Just as the Marines had attackedSiberia on the evening of 11

August to divert attention fromBunker Hill, the Chinese sought toconceal the timing of their

inevitable counterthrust. Shortlybefore midnight on the night of 12August, the enemy probed thedivision's sector at three points.While one Chinese patrol wasstumbling into an ambush set byKorean Marines, another harried aMarine outpost east of Bunker Hill.The third and strongest blow, how-ever, landed after midnight atStromboli, a Marine outpost on Hill48A at the far right of the sectorheld by Layer's regiment, near theboundary with the 5th Marines.

In conjunction with the attackon Stromboli, launched in the earlyhours of August 13, the Chinese hitCompany F on the right of the lineheld by the 1st Marines. TheChinese failed to crack theJamestown defenses, but theyinflicted so many casualties atStromboli that reinforcements hadto be sent. The reinforcing unit, asquad from Company F, cameunder mortar and machine gun firefrom the Chinese probingCompany F's defenses and had toreturn to the main line of resis-

498

tance. Pressure against Stromboliand its defenders continued untilthe commander of Company F,Captain Clarence G. Moody, Jr.,sent a stronger force that fought itsway to the outpost, breaking theChinese encirclement. The 5thMarines moved one company intoa blocking position behind theJamestown Line near Stromboli incase the fighting again flared atthat outpost.

Some 4,500 yards to the south-west, the Chinese attempted toseize Bunker Hill. At about 0100on the morning of 13 August, sav-age Chinese artillery and mortarfire persuaded Captain Connolly ofCompany I to request box-me-infires, which the 11th Marines pro-vided immediately. Enemy in-fantry, supported by machine gunfire, advanced behind burstingshells, but the Marines fought backwith every weapon they couldbring to bear—artillery, mortars,tank guns, rockets, rifles, and auto-matic weapons. After almost fourhours, the violence abated as theenemy relaxed his pressure onBunker Hill.

Company G, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, under Captain William M.Vanzuyen, joined Connolly's menbefore the Chinese broke off theaction and withdrew behind ascreen of artillery and mortar fire.Except for a determined few,whom the Marines killed, theenemy abandoned Bunker Hill.Colonel Layer took advantage ofthe lull to send Company H, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, to relievethe Marines holding the hill. Heafterward withdrew all the otherelements of the 7th Marines thathad reinforced his regiment, hutnot until a patrol from Company Ihad reconnoitered the far slope ofthe hill.

In keeping with their usual tac-tics, the Chinese tried to divertattention from Bunker Hill before

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164530

On the night of 11-12 August, the 1st Tank Battalion made effective use of the18-inch searchlight mounted on its M-46 tanks by temporarily blinding theenemy with dazzling beams of light. Behind the "cloak of darkness, "elements ofthe 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, were able to overrun Siberia.

taff ergeant William E. huck,Jr.

Born in 19_6 in Cumberland, Maryland, he enli'ted in the Marine Corp~ in1947. 'erving as a machine gun squad leader with ompany G, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, he was killed near Panmunjom on 3 July 1952. Hi.'>

JVledal of Ilonor aW:.Ird bore a citation which reads, in pan:

'\ hen his platoon \\'a~ subje ted to a deva~tating barrage of en 'my small-arms,grenade, artillery, and mortar fire during an assault again 't strongly fortified hillpositions \\'ell forward to the main line of resistance, taff Sergeant <'huck,although painfully wounded, refused medical attention and continued to leadhi~ machine-gun ~quad in the attack. Pnhesitatingly a. suming command of arille squad when the leader became a casualty, he 'killfully organized the twosquads into an aua king force and led two more daring assaults upon the hos­tile po itions. '\ ounded a second time, he steadfastly refused e\'acuation andremained in the foremo't position under hea\')' fire until assured that all dead and wounded were e\'ac­uated. !I Ie was] mortally wounded by an enemy snip I' bullet "'hile voluntarily as~i~ting in the remO\ alof the last ca~ualty.

fter the war, enlisted quarters at Marine Corps Ba e. Quantico. Virginia, wen: named in his honor.

Ho pital Corpsman John E. Kilmer

.Nati\.e of 11ighland Park, Illinois, 22-year-old Kilmer enli~ted in the a\')

from Texa~ in I -I. He wa~ as. igned to duty with 3d Battalion, 7th1arines, in Korea and wa' killed on 13 ugust 1952. Jli~ l\ledal of Honor

citation reads, in part:

With his company engaged in defending a vitally important hill position, wellfcmvard of the main line of I' si~tance, during an assault by large concentrationsof hostile troops. II Kilmer repeatedly braved intense enemy mOl1ar, artillery,and sniper fire to move from one position to another, adminbtering aid to thewounded and expt:diting their evacuati n. Painfully \vounded himself when~truck by mortar fragment, while moving to the aid of a ca~ualty, he per, ist­ed in his efforts and in hed his way to the side of the 'tricken larine througha hail of enem shells falling around him. ndaunted by the d 'va~tating hos­tile fire, he skillfully administered first aid to his comrade and, as another mounting barrage of enemy!'ire shauered the immediate area, unhesitatingly shielded the wounded man with his body.

Born in Detroit. Michigan, in 1930, he was inducted into the i\tarine Corpsin 1951. For his br3\'ery in Korea on 17 Augu t 1952, \\ hill' ~er\'ing "'ith

ompan F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, he wa' awarded a Medal of Iionorwith a citation which reads, in part:

Robert E. SimanekPrivate First CIa

While accompanying a patrol en route to 0' 'upy a combat outpost fon ard offriendly lines, Private Class imanek e 'hibited a high degree of courage ancl res­olute spirit of self-sacrifice in protecting the live' of his fellow Marines. Withhis unit ambushed by an intense concentration of enemy mortar and 'mall-armsfire, and uffering hea\'y casualties, he \Ya' forced to . eek cover with theremaining member~of the patrol in the near-by trench line. Determined to sa\'ehis comrade, \vhen a ho tile gr nade \Va~ hurled into their midst, he unhe 'i-tatingly threw himself on the deadly missile, ab~orbing the ~haltering \'iolence 1J.·p.1I1111<·nt "I Ddl'I1,,<' I'h,.. , II "I< I ""-'f)of the exploding charge in his own body and shielding hi fello\\ l\larines from seriou~ injury or death.

Ill' miraculou~ly ~urvi ed the explosion and \Va retired on disability in 19':;3. -Captain John C. hapin,1 R (Ret)

499

attacking again. Mortars andartillery shelled Combat Outpost 2,overlooking the Panmunjom corri-dor on the left of the sector heldby the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,and also harassed the main line ofresistance nearby. The mainChinese thrust, directed as expect-ed against Bunker Hill, began atabout 2100 on the night of August13. While shells still exploded onCombat Outpost 2, the enemyintensified his bombardment ofBunker Hill, which had beenunder sporadic fire throughout theafternoon. Chinese troops hitCompany H, commanded byCaptain John G. Demas, attackingsimultaneously near the center ofthe position and on the right flank.(His was the only element of the3d Battalion, 7th Marines, not yetpulled back to the JamestownLine.) High explosive shells boxedin the Marines, and illuminatingrounds helped them isolate andkill the few Chinese who had pen-etrated the position.

The Chinese battalion thatattacked Bunker Hill on the nightof August 13 again tested theMarine defenses at 0225 on the fol-

lowing morning. Before this unit'ssecond attack, a Chinese machinegun on Siberia began firing ontoBunker Hill. Marine M-46s stabbedSiberia with brief shafts of illumi-nation from their searchlights andsilenced the weapon with 90mm

fire, thus revealing the position ofthe tanks and enabling Chineseartillery fire to wound a crewmanof one of them. The enemy mayhave initiated this flurry of action,which lasted only about four min-utes, to protect the recovery of hissoldiers wounded or killed in theearlier fighting rather than to chal-lenge the hill's defenses.

The 1st Marines responded tothe fighting of 13 and 14 August byreinforcing both Bunker Hill andthe nearest segment of theJamestown Line, the so-calledSiberia Sector, in anticipation offurther Chinese attacks. As part ofthe preparation, Captain Demas,whose Company H, 7th Marines,still held Bunker Hill, patrolled theslopes where the enemy hadlaunched several attacks hut foundno Chinese, a situation that rapidlychanged. At 0118 on 15 August, adeluge of hostile artillery beganpummeling the Marine position,while Chinese infantry jabbed atthe defenses. Once again, Marine-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A161025

Two Marine machine gunners wait for another Chinese onslaught after beatingback an attack that seemed to last for hours.

X Hill 120

..—x

58AX Hill 123

C)XHrIIYOkH

Hill 122 P—(Bunker Hill) r

4

XHIIII24

I

/ ttt

/ tipX Hill 229 The 2l LEGENDCapture of Bunker Hill, —

9-11 August 1952 0 OutpostX Hill designationF Flame tank route

Yards0 500 1000 ——s. Route to, diversionary attack

I Tank firing position

500

The struggle for Bunker Hill costthe Marines 48 killed, 313 serious-ly wounded, and hundreds of oth-

supporting weapons laid downfinal protective fires that preventedthis latest attack from gainingmomentum. Fate then intervenedwhen the crew of an M-46 tanktriggered the shutter of its search-light and illuminated a force ofChinese massing in a draw. Beforethese soldiers could launch theirassault, fire from tanks, artillery,and mortars tore into the group,killing or wounding many andscattering the survivors.

Even though Marine-supportingweapons had deflected thisplanned thrust, the Chineseregrouped, called in additionalsupporting fire, and plungedahead. The bombardment by mor-tars and artillery attained a volumeof 100 rounds per minute beforeending at about 0400, when theenemy realized that he could notoverwhelm Bunker Hill and calledoff his attack, at least for the pre-sent. When the threat abated,Demas withdrew his company tothe main line of resistance, leavingthe defense of Bunker Hill toCaptain Scranton's Company B.

The quiet lasted only until lateafternoon. At 1640, the Chineseattacked during a thunderstorm,avoiding the use of mortars orartillery, presumably to achievesurprise, hut once again the attackfailed. The Chinese refused, how-ever, to abandon their attempts toseize Bunker Hill. At 0040, 16August, a Chinese battalionattacked behind mortar andartillery fire, penetrating to thecrest of the hill. Captain Scranton,whose Company B held the hill,called for reinforcements, and aplatoon from Company I, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, arrived asthis assault was ending. Theenemy again probed the hill withfire but did not press the attack.Before Company C, 1st Battalion,1st Marines, relieved Scranton'sunit, it came under artillery firethree more times.

The succession of Marine com-panies that took over Bunker Hillhad to repel seven attacks beforethe end of August, but only one,on the night of 25-26 August,threatened to overrun the outpost.

501

ers who suffered minor wounds.The number of known Chinesedead exceeded 400 and total casu-alties may have numbered 3,200.The month ended with Bunker Hillin Marine hands.

The capture of Bunker Hill byColonel Layer's Marines and itssubsequent defense relied on thedeadly use of supporting arms,ranging from the tanks that hadspearheaded the diversion againstSiberia, through mortars andartillery, to aircraft. The search-light-carrying M-46s, for example,helped illuminate Chinese troopsmassing to counterattack the hilland opened fire on them. Marineand Air Force fighter-bombers hitthe enemy on Siberia, helped seizeand hold Bunker Hill, and ham-mered the approaches toStromboli, where F4Us dropped1,000-pound bombs and napalm.Marine MPQ-14 radar directednighttime strikes against Chineseartillery positions. In addition,Marine artillery played a criticalrole, especially the box-me-in firesplanned for emergencies. The 11thMarines fired 10,652 shells in the24 hours ending at 1800 on 13August, a volume not exceededuntil the final months of the war in1953. Although supplies of explo-sive shells proved adequate at thistime, illuminating rounds tended tobe in short supply.

The Marines of 1952 were fight-ing a war of unceasing attrition fardifferent from the succession ofbloody campaigns, interspersedwith time for incorporatingreplacements into units withdrawnfrom combat, that had character-ized the war against Japan. Menand equipment had to be absorbedduring sustained fighting toreplace not only combat losses,but also administrative attrition

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164539

Tired Marines of Company J 2d Battalion, 1st Marines unwind during a pausein the fighting on Bunker Hill. Tank, artillery, air, and ground Marines partici-pating in the battle gave up one outpost but took another, one that added strengthnot only to the outpost defense but also to the main line.

Casualties and Courageous Hospital Corpsmen

The fighting at Bunker Hill would have been evendeadlier for the Marines had it not been for theirprotective equipment and the excellent medical

treatment available from battlefield first-aid stations tohospital ships off the coast. According to regimental sur-geons, 17 wounded Marines would certainly have diedhad they not been wearing the new armored vest.Moreover, the steel helmet used in World War II hadagain proved its worth in deflecting or stopping shellfragments or nearly spent bullets. The heavy vest,though it undeniably saved lives, proved an enervatingburden in the heat and humidity of the Korean summerand contributed to dehydration and heat exhaustion,hut the advantage of increased safety—along withimproved morale—more than outweighed the disadvan-tages.

The uniformly sloping terrain of Bunker Hill causedthe Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the Marines to set uptheir forward aid stations on the reverse slope, over-looked by the Jamestown Line, to obtain protectionfrom flat trajectory fire and direct observation by theenemy. Wounded Marines being evacuated from the aidstations for further treatment ran the risk of mortar andartillery fire. A shortage of tracked armored personnelcarriers, which would have provided a measure of pro-tection from hostile fire and a less jolting ride than ordi-

naiy trucks, increased both the danger and the discom-fort. Moreover, the stretcher rapidly became a preciousitem, since so many of the limited supply were beingused for the time-consuming trip to surgical facilitiessome distance to the rear.

The 1st Medical Battalion had three collecting andclearing companies, two of which supported units com-mitted on the division's main line of resistance while thethird supported units on the Kimpo Peninsula. Locatedabout six miles behind the line was the division hospi-tal, a 200-bed facility staffed and equipped to providedefinitive care for all types of cases. Serious cases orcases requiring specialized care were evacuated by heli-copter, ambulance, hospital train, rail bus, or plane to ahospital ship at Inchon, Army Mobile Surgical Hospitals,or to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

The Surgeon General of the Navy, Rear AdmiralHerbert L. Pugh, evaluated the medical support that heobserved during the Bunker Hill fighting. He declaredthat medical treatment had been successful for a varietyof reasons: the armored vest and steel helmet, of course;skilled Navy surgeons with access to a reliable supply ofblood for transfusions; evacuation by helicopter to sur-gical facilities ashore or, if necessary, to hospital ships;and the courageous effort of Navy Hospital Corpsmenserving alongside the Marines.

502

Courtesy oF Frank 0. Praytor, USMC

caused by a fixed period of enlist­ment and a definite tour of duty inKorea. To help man his combatbattalions, General Selden on 12August directed rear-area units toprovide replacements for the 1stMarines; within two days, some

200 men, most of them volunteers,joined the regiment's infantry units.The Commandant of the MarineCorps, General Lemuel C.Shepherd, Jr., approved flying 500infantry replacements to Korea.Lieutenant General Franklin A.

Change of Command

Hart, in command of the FleetMarine Force, Pacific, requested adelay to make sure he couldassemble the necessary air trans­port; he could, and on 21 Augustthe replacements arrived in Korea.The Commandant also approved

On 29 ugust 19,)2, Major General John T. :elden,shown on the left in the accompanying photo­graph, r >Iinquished command of the 1st Marine

Division. His tenure as commanding g neral. whichb gan in JanualY 1952, earned him the U.S. Army'sDistingui. h d ,ervice Medal for conducting '·succes. fuloperati ns against the enemy." During World War Il, hehad comman Ie I the 5th Marines on ew Britain andserved a hief of 'taff, 1 't Marine Division, in the con­quest of Peleliu in the Palau 1 land. After leaving Korea,h served n the staff of the Command l' in hief, U. , .Forces, Europe, until 1953 when he as 'um d commandof Marine Corps Ba e, amp Pendl t n, California, from, hich post he retire I in 1955. General elden died in] 96 and was buried with full militalY honors inArlington ational Cemetery.

Born at Richmond, Virginia, in 1893, elden enlistedin the Marine Corps in 1915 and was commissioned asecond lieutenant in Jul 1918. Inst ad of being ent toFrance, he received orders to convoy duty in US,1htl7lillp,lon. B >tween the World Wars, he served in Haitiand China and at various posts in the nited tates. Hattended the Senior Officer, 'Cour at Marine Barracks,Quanti 0, Virginia, joined the 1st Brigad , which formedth nucleus of the 1st Marine Division, and parti ipatedin maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When warcame, he served in a variety of a'signments in the Pacificbefore joining the 1st Marine Division in time for the'Jew Britain campaign.

Command of the 1 t Marine Division in Korea passedto Maj l' General Edwin A. Pollock, a native f Georgiawho graduated from The Citadel, uth arolina's mili­tary college, in 1921. He promptly reSigned his commis­sion in the Army Reserv and on 1 July acc pted anappointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine CorpsRc 'Ct'\' . His early career included sel'\'ic in theDominican Republic and icaragua, on board ship, andwith various installations and unit in the United tates.

Promoted to lieutenant olon I in April 1942. he com­manded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Guadalcanal,\Vh re on the night of 20-21 August, he earned the avyCro for his inspired leadership in repulsing a Japan seattack at the T naru River. He becam a colonel in

ovember 1943 and aftetward saw a tion on ew Britainand at Two Jima.

Following the war he served at Marine orps. choolsand Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, and atHeadquarters Marine Corp. s a major general, he to kover the 2d Marine Division at amp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, I efore being rea Signed to Korea, where hesucceeded General elden in ' mmand of the bt MarineDivision. General Pollock led the division in Korea fromAugust 1952 until June 1953, in the final week' of thewar.

After Korea, General Polio k returned to Quantico asdirector of the Marine Corp Education enter, and thenwas assigned as c mmander Marine orp RecruitDepot, Parris Island, outh Carolina, before coming hackto Quantico a Commandant of Marine Corp' _chools. In1956, h was appointed C mmanding General, FleetMarine Force, Pacific, followed by a tour as CommandingGeneral, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, from which po t heretir d in 1959. General Pollock s rv d in everal capac­ities on The itadel's Board of Visitors before his death

in 1982.

503

Selden's request to increase by 500men each of the next two sched-uled replacement drafts.

Fighting Elsewhere on the

Outpost Line

As the month of August woreon, any lull in the action aroundBunker Hill usually coincided witha surge in the fighting elsewhere,usually on the right of the mainline of resistance, the segment heldby the 5th Marines, commandedafter 16 August by Colonel EustaceR. Smoak. On 6 August, whileColonel Culhane still commandedthe regiment, the Chinese beganchipping away at the outpost linein front of the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, which consisted ofOutposts Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.

Because the battalion mannedthe outposts only in daylight, theChinese simply occupied Elmer,farthest to the southwest, afterdusk on 6 August and employedartillery fire to seal off theapproaches and prevent theMarines from returning after day-break. The Chinese took overOutpost Hilda on the night of 11August, driving back the Marinessent to reoccupy it the following

morning. The same basic tacticsenabled the enemy to take overOutpost Irene on the 17th. Duringan unsuccessful attempt to regainthe third of the outposts, PrivateFirst Class Robert E. Simanek savedthe lives of other Marines by divingonto a Chinese hand grenade,absorbing the explosion with hisbody, suffering severe though notfatal wounds, and earning theMedal of Honor.

Heavy rains comparable to thedownpour of late July turned roadsinto swamps throughout theMarine sector, swept away a bridgeover the Imjin River, and forcedthe closing of a ferry. Bunkersremained largely unaffected byflooding, but the deluge interferedwith both air support and combaton the ground. Since the rain fellalike on the U.N. and Chineseforces, activity halted temporarilywhen nine inches fell between 23and 25 August.

Bunker Hill and Outpost Bruce

The Chinese greeted the newdivision commander, MajorGeneral Edwin A. Pollock, byexerting new pressure against theBunker Hill complex, now held by

504

Captain Stanley T. Moak'sCompany E, 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, attached temporarily tothe regiment's 3d Battalion. On thenight of 4 September, Chinese gun-ners began shelling the outpostand probing its right flank, hutsmall arms fire forced the enemy topull back.

The resulting lull lasted onlyuntil 0100 on 5 September, whenChinese mortars and artilleryresumed firing, concentrating OflHill 122, Bunker Hill. Apparentlyconfident that the barrage hadneutralized the defenses, theattackers ignored cover and con-cealment and moved boldly intoan unexpected hail of fire thatdrove them hack. After regrouping,the enemy attacked once again,this time making use of everyirregularity in the ground andemploying the entire spectrum ofweapons from hand grenades toartillery. This latest effort wentbadly awry when a force trying tooutflank Bunker Hill lost its wayand drew fire from Marines on themain line of resistance. The attack-ers tried to correct their mistakeonly to come under fire from theirfellow Chinese who had penetrat-ed the extreme right of BunkerHill's defenses and may have mis-taken their comrades for counterat-tacking Marines. Amid the confu-sion, Moak's company surged for-ward and drove the enemy fromthe outpost. The Marines ofCompany E suffered 12 killed and40 wounded in routing a Chinesebattalion while killing an estimated335 of the enemy.

Yet another diversionary attackon Outpost Stromboli coincidedwith the thrust against Bunker Hill.The Marines defending Strombolisustained no casualties in breakingup an attack by an enemy platoonsupported by machine guns.

The 2d and 3d Battalions ofColonel Smoak's 5th Marines

The Right of the 1St Marine Division's Line,September 1952

Private First Class Alford 1. McLaughlin

A2 -y ar-old native of Lec(l", Alabama, he listed in the Marine Corps in 19 '5.Awarded a Purple Heart Medal in August 19~2, his heroislll again was rec­ognized during the struggle on Bunker Hill on the night of 4-5 eptember

1952, while selving as a machine gunner with Company T, 3d Baualion, 5th Marines.IIi cirati n read', in part:

When hostile fores attacked in battalion strength during the night, he maintaineda constant flow of devastating fire upon the enemy alternating employing twoIllachine guns, a carbine and hand grenades. Although painfully wounded, hebravely fired the machine guns from the hip until hi hand' hecame blistered bythe extreme heat from the weapons and, placing the guns on the ground to allowthem to cool, continued to defend the position with his carbine and grenades.• tanding up in full view, he shouted words of encouragement to his comrades llcp.lrtmmt ul Ddm.e Ph"", 11 \\1e> \ 1'>"1>(,· \

above the din of battle and, thr ughout a 'eries of fanatical enemy auacks, sprayed the surrounding areawith deadly fire accounting for an estimated one hundred and fifty enemy dead and fifty wounded.

Hemarbbly, he survived this hattie, made a continuing career in the Marine Corps, and eventually retired in

1977 as a master sergeant.

Ho pita! Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold

Born in Staten Island, ew York, in 1931, he enlisted in the avy and wasassigned in 1951 to the Marine Corps wh 're he bore the deSignation of "med­ical fi Id technician." In Korea, while serving with 3d Battalion, 5dl Marine,

h was I illed on 5 'eptember 1952. His Medal of Honor citation read', in pan:

Benfold resolutely moved from position to position in the face of intense hostilefire, treating the wounded and lending words of encouragement. Leaving the pro­tection of his shelLered position to treat the wounded, " hen the platoon area inwhich he was working was anacked from both dle front and rear, he mm'ed for­ward to an exposed ridge line where he observed two Marines in a large crater.

s h· approached the twe men to determine their condition, ~111 enemy soldierthrew [WO grenades into the crater while two other enemy charged the pOSition.Picking up a grenade in each hand, HC3c Benfold leaped OLit of dle cracer andhurled himself against the onrushing ho tile soldiers, pushing the grenades against

their 'hesL'i and killing both the attackers.

'.In- \1l'dllUlt.' IIhO«1 (.ollc..''t.llon

In ]991, the avy named a guided missile destroyer, • Benfold (DDG 65), in hi. honor.

-Captain John hapin, US ICR (Ret)

fought to defend their outpost line-from Allen in the west, throughBruce, Clarence, Donald, FeliX,and Gary, to Jill in the east­against a succession of attacks thatbegan in the early hours of 5September. At Outpost Bruce­manned by Company I, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, underCaptain Edward Y. Holt, Jr.-acompany of attacking infantry fol­lowed up a savage barrage. PrivateFirst Class Alford L. McLaughlin

killed or wounded an estimated200 Chinese, vlctlms of themachine guns, carbine, andgrenades that he used at varioustimes during the fight, and sur­vived to receive the Medal ofHonor. Private First Class FernandoL. Garcia, also earned the nation'shighest award for heroism; thoughalready wounded, he threw him­self of a Chinese grenade, sacrific­ing his life to save his platoonsergeant. Hospitalman Third Class

505

Edward C. Benfold saw twowounded Marines in a shell holeon Outpost Bruce; as he preparedto attend to them, a pair ofgrenades thrown by two onrushingChinese soldiers fell inside thecrater. Benfold picked up onegrenade in each hand, scrambledfrom the hole, and pressed agrenade against each of the twosoldiers. The explosions killedboth the Chinese, as Benfold sacri­ficed himself to save the two

Private First Class Fernando 1. Garcia

Bom in 1929 in tuado, Puelto Rico. and inducted into the 1arine Corp~ in19')1, he \\'a killed at utpo~t Bruce in the Bunker Hill area on 5 ept 'mber1952 while . erving a~ a member of Company I. 3d Banalion. -th Marine~. The

fu' t Puerto Rican to be award >d a Medal of llonor. hi citation reads. in part:

hile participating in the def, nse of a combat outpost located more than one milefem: ard of the main lin of resi tance, during a savage night atwck by a fanaticalenemy force employing grenade . mortars, and artillery, Pri,·ate Fir~t CIa s Gar ia.although 'uffering painf-ul " ounc~, moved through the intense hall of ho~tile fireto a supply poinr to secure more hand grenade. Qui k [0 act when a hostilegrenade landed nearby, endangering the life of another Jaline. as well a~ hi~

own, he unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice hims If and immediately threw hi. bodyupon the deadly missil , receiving the full impact of the explosion.

The enemy then oven'an his position and his body was not recovered. In hi~ honor. a camp at Vieques inPu Ito Rico and a d stroyer escort, 55 Garcia (DE 10'10), were named aft r him.

-Captain John . Chapin. U:M R (Ret)

The 1st Marine Division commander, MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, left, welcomesthe United Nations commander, Gen Mark W Clark, USA, to the division's area.Gen Clark had succeeded Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, who took over as SupremeAllied Commander, Europe, from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A167677

wounded Marines, earning aposthumous Medal of Honor.

When dawn broke on 5September, Holt's Company I stillclung to Outpost Bruce, eventhough only two bunkers, both Onthe slope nearest the JamestownLine, survived destruction by mOr-

tar and artillery shells. The com­mander of the 3d Battalion,Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T.Jensen, Jr., rushed reinforcements,construction and other supplies,and ammunition to the batteredoutpost despite harassing firedirected at the trails leading there.

Marine and Air Force pilots tried tosuppress the hostile gunners with10 air strikes that dropped napalmas well as high explosive.

On the morning of 6 September,the defenders of Outpost Brucebeat off another attack, finally call­ing for box-me-in fires that tem­porarily put an end to infantlyassaults. At dusk, however, theChinese again bombarded the out­post, this time for an hour, beforeattacking with infantry whiledirecting long-range fire at neigh­boring Outpost Allen to the south­west. The Marines defendingOutpost Bruce survived to under­go further attack on the earlymorning of 7 September. TwoChinese companies tried to envel­op the hilltop, using demolitions inan attempt to destroy any bunkersnot yet shattered by the latestshelling.

For a total of 51 hours, theenemy besieged Outpost Brucebefore breaking off the action bysunrise On the 7th. At Bruce, thesite of the deadliest fighting in thissector, the Marines suffered 19killed and 38 wounded, 20 morethan the combined casualties sus­tained defending all the other out­posts manned by the 2d and 3d

506

killed and wounded at OutpostBruce may have totaled 400.

Pressure on Korean Marines

At the left of the line held by the1st Marine Division, the frontage ofthe Korean Marine Corps veeredsouthward, roughly paralleling theSachon River as it flowed towardthe Imjin. The Korean Marines hadestablished a series of combat out-posts on the broken groundbetween the Sachon and the

Jamestown Line. On the evening of5 September, while the outpostsmanned by the 5th Marines wereundergoing attack, Chinese ar-tillery and mortars began poundingOutpost 37, a bombardment thatsoon included Outpost 36 to thesouthwest and an observation poston Hill 155 on the main line ofresistance, roughly 1,000 yardsfrom the boundary with the 1stMarines.

Chinese infantry, who hadcrossed the Sachon near Outposts36 and 37, attacked both of them.

507

Two assaults on Outpost 37, whichbegan at 1910, may have been adiversion, for at the same time theenemy launched the first of threeattacks on Outpost 36. The finaleffort, supported by fire from tanksand artillery, overran the hill, butthe Chinese had lost too manymen and too much equipment—atleast 33 bodies littered the hillalong with a hundred abandonedgrenades and numerous automaticweapons—forcing the enemy towithdraw the survivors. TheKorean Marines suffered 16 killedor wounded from the platoon atOutpost 36 and another four casu-alties in the platoon defendingOutpost 37.

Clashes involving the outpostsof the Korean Marine Corps con-tinued. The South Koreans dis-patched tank-infantry probes andset up ambushes. At first, theChinese responded to this activitywith mortars and artillery, firing adaily average of 339 roundsbetween 12 and 19 September,about one-third of the total direct-ed against Outpost 36. An attackby infantry followed.

Before sunrise on the 19th,Chinese troops again infiltratedacross the Sachon, as they had twoweeks earlier. They hid in cavesand ravines until evening, whenthey advanced on Outposts 36,their principal objective, and 37,along with Outposts 33 and 31 tothe south. A savage barrage ofmore than 400 rounds tore up thedefenses rebuilt after the 5

September attack and enabled theChinese to overwhelm Outpost 36.Shortly after midnight, a SouthKorean counterattack seized a

lodgment on the hill, but theChinese retaliated immediately,driving off, killing, or capturingthose who had regained the out-post.

With the coming of daylight,Marine aircraft joined in battering

Combat Outposts of theSouth Korean Marines,

September 19520 500 1000

Yards' I

Battalions, 5th Marines. Chinese

National Aichives Photo (USMG) 127-N-A165912

MajGen Edwin A. Pollock centei accompanied by Col Kim Gunfire Liaison Company concerning Marine air supportSuk Bum, commanding officer of the 1st Korean Marine for Korean Marine operations.Co'ps Regiment, talks with members of the lstAir and Naval

enemy-held Outpost 36. Air strikessucceeded in hitting the far side ofthe hill, destroying mortars andkilling troops massing in defiladeto exploit the earlier success. Twoplatoons of Korean Marines—sup-ported by fire from tanks, mortars,and artillery—followed up thedeadly air attacks and regainedOutpost 36, killing or wounding anestimated 150 of the enemy.

Further Action Along the Line

In late September, while fightingraged around Outpost 36 in thesector held by the Korean Marines,the Chinese attacked the combatoutposts manned by ColonelLayer's 1st Marines, especially Hill122 (Bunker Hill) and Hill 124 atthe southwestern tip of the sameridge line. The enemy struck first atHill 124, attacking by flare-lightfrom four directions but failing to

dislodge the squad dug in there,even though most of the Marinessuffered at least minor wounds.

The entire ridge from Hill 124 toHill 122 remained under recurringattack for the remainder ofSeptember, especially Bunker Hillitself, where the enemy clung toadvance positions as close as 30yards to Marine trenches. TheChinese frequently probed BunkerHill's defenses by night, and theMarines took advantage of dark-ness to raid enemy positions, usingportable flamethrowers and demo-litions to destroy bunkers whilefire from tanks and artillery dis-couraged counterattacks.

Tests earlier in the year hadproved the theory that transporthelicopters could resupply a battal-ion manning the main line of resis-tance. The next step was to deter-mine if rotary wing aircraft couldaccomplish the logistical support

508

of an entire frontline regiment. Forthe five-day period, 22-26 Septem-ber, Marine Helicopter TransportSquadron 161 successfully sup-plied the 7th Marines with ammu-nition, gasoline, rations, and madea daily mail run. All hut valuablecargo, such as mail, was carriedexternally in slings or wire baskets.

As October began, the Chinesesaluted the new month with heav-ier shelling, the prelude to a seriesof attacks on outposts all acrossthe division front from the KoreanMarine Corps on the left, past the1st Marines and Bunker Hill, to thefar right, where the 7th Marines,commanded by Colonel Thomas C.Moore, Jr., had taken over from the5th Marines, now in reserve. Tomake communications moresecure, Colonel Moore's regimentredesignated Outposts Allen,Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Gary,and Jill, replacing proper names, in

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A165528

Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., center, Commandant of the Marine Corps, looks atenemy positions while touring frontline Marine positions. LtCol Anthony ICap uto, left, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, briefs theCommandant on the situation.

alphabetical order, with the ran-domly arranged names of cities:Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin,Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.

On the left, Chinese loudspeak-ers announced on the night of 1October that artillery would levelthe outpost on Hill 86, overlookingthe Sachon River, and warned thedefenders to flee. When the SouthKorean Marines remained in place,a comparatively light barrage of145 rounds exploded on the hilland its approaches, too few to dis-lodge the defenders. On the fol-lowing evening at 1830, theChinese resumed firing, this timefrom the high ground beyond Hill36, and extended the bombard-ment to all the outposts withinrange. The Korean Marines dis-patched a platoon of tanks tosilence the enemy's direct-fireweapons, hut the unit returnedwithout locating the source of theenemy fire. After the tanks pulledhack, Chinese artillery fire intensi-fied, battering all the outposts untilone red and one green flare burst

the three, resisted gallantly, forcingthe Chinese to double the size ofthe assault force in order to over-run the position. On 3 October, theKorean Marines launched twocounterattacks. The second ofthese recaptured the crest and heldit until Chinese artillery and mortarfire forced a withdrawal. By lateafternoon on 5 October, theKorean Marines twice regained theoutpost, only to be hurled backeach time, and finally had to calloff the counterattacks, leaving thehill in enemy hands.

To the south, the Chinese alsostormed Outpost 36 on 2 October.The defenders hurled back twonighttime attacks, but the cumula-tive casualties and damage to thefortifications forced the KoreanMarines to withdraw. The enemyimmediately occupied the hill andheld it.

The most vulnerable of thethree, Outpost 86, lay farthest fromthe main line of resistance andclosest to the Sachon River. On the

in the night sky. At that signal, theguns fell silent, and infantryattacked Outposts 36, 37, and 86.

Outpost 37, the northernmost of

During Operation Haylift in late September, Sikorsky HRS-2 helicopters of HMR-161 lift cargo from the istAirDelivery Platoon area to the sector occupied by the7th Marines. The cargo net slung under the helicopter greatly increased its 4ftcapability.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A166041

509

trip to the division's lines.

night of 2 October, a Chineseassault overran the outpost, forcingthe Korean Marines to find cover atthe foot of the hill and regroup. Atmid-morning on the 3d, artillerybarrages and air strikes poundedthe enemy at Outpost 86, scatter-ing the Chinese there and enablinga South Korean counterattack toregain the objective. The KoreanMarines dug in, but on 6 Octoberthe Chinese again prevailed, hold-ing the outpost until a SouthKorean counterattack in the earlyhours of the 7th forced them downthe slope. At about dawn on thatsame morning, the enemy mount-ed yet another counterattack,advancing behind a deadly artillerybarrage, seizing and holdingOutpost 86, and ending this flurryof action on the outpost line infront of the Korean Marine Corps.

Focus on 7th Marines

Although October passed ratherquietly for the 1st Marines—except

for recurring probes, patrols, andambushes in the vicinity of BunkerHill—violent clashes erupted alongthe line held by the 7th Marines.The enemy began stubborn efforts,which persisted into 1953, to gaincontrol of some or all of the ninecombat outposts that ColonelMoore's regiment manned on the

high ground to its front.The 7th Marines took over seven

outposts when it relieved the 5thMarines, renaming them, fioiu leftto right, Carson, Reno, Vegas,Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.At the point—later known as theHook—where the frontline veeredsouthward toward the boundarywith the British CommonwealthDivision—the 7th Marines set upOutpost Warsaw. A second newoutpost, Verdun, guarded theboundary between the Marine andCommonwealth divisions. An aver-age of 450 yards separated four ofthese outposts—Detroit, Frisco,Seattle, and Warsaw—which occu-pied hills lower than those on theleft of the regimental line andtherefore were more easily isolatedand attacked.

As they did so often, theChinese began with a diversionarythrust, jabbing at Detroit beforethrowing knockout blows—artillery and mortar fire precedingan infantry attack—at Seattle andWarsaw. An enemy company over-whelmed the reinforced platoonon Warsaw on 2 October, hut theMarines fought stubbornly beforefalling back. Private Jack W. Kelsopicked up a grenade thrown into a

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166198

Replacements step ashore at "Charlie Pier." Brought from transports by landingcraft, the Marines would broad waiting trains for the four-and-one-half-hour

LEGEND, Combat outpost (COP).

COP and date withdrawn,

————1/7 boundary established 5 OCtober.Companies A and B or, line. /3/7 inreserve after 5 October

510

Private Jack W Kelso

B rn in 1934 in Madera, California, he enli. ted in the Marine orr· in 1951.In Korea, he was awarded a Silver tar medal for heroism in Augu t 1952.As a riOeman with Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed on

2 ctober 1952 near. okchon. Jlis Medal of Iionor itation reads, in part:

When both the platoon commander and the platoon ergeanr b came casu­alties during the defense of a vital outpost against a numelically superiorenemy force attacking at night under cover of intense small-arms, grenade andmortar fire, Private Kelso bravely exposed himself to the hail of enemy fire ina determined effort to reorganize the unit and to repel the onrushing anack­ers. Forced to seek cover along with four other Marines, in a near-by bunker~ hich immediately ame under alta k, he unhesitatingly picked up an enemygrenade whi h landed in the shelter, rushed out into the open and hurled it back at the enemy.

Ithough painfully wounded when the grenade exploded as it left his hand, and again forced to seekthe protection of the bunker when the hostile fire be ame more intensified, Private Kel 0 refused toremain in his position of comparative safety and moved out into the fire-swept area to return the enemyfire, thereby permitting the pinned-down Marines in the bunker to escape.

Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins

Born in 1925 in Seneca, ,outh Carolina, he enli ted in the larine Corps in1950. While ser ing a a platoon gUide for Company 1, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, he gave his life on 7 October 1952. His Tedal of llonor citation

reads, in part:

With his platoon a. signed the mission or re-wking an outpost which hadbeen 0 errun by the enemy earlier in th night, Staff ergeant Watkins skillfullyled his unit in the a sault up the designated hill. Although painfully \: oundedwhen a well-entr nehed hostile force at the crest of the hill engaged the pla­to n with intense 'mall-arms and grenade fire. gallantly ontinued to lead hismen. Obtaining an automatic riOe from one of the wounded men, he assistedin pinning clown an en 'my machine gun holding up the as ault.

When an enemy grenade landed among Staff ergeant Watkins and severaloth r Marines while they were moving forward through a trench on the hillcre't, h immediately pu hed his companions aside, placed him elf in positionto shield them and picked up the deadly mis'ile in an attempt to throw it outside the trench. Mortallywounded when the grenade exploded in his hand, taff ergeant Watkins, by hi' great personal valor inth> face of almost certain death, . aved the live of several of his comrades.

-Captain John hapin, MCR (Ret)

bunker that he and four otherMarines from Company I, 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, were man­ning. Kelso threw the live grenadeat the advancing Chinese, but itexploded immediately after leavinghis hand. Although badly wound­ed, Kelso tried to cover the with­drawal of the other four, firing atthe attackers until he suffered fatalwounds. Kelso earned a posthu­mous Medal of Honor, but heroism

alone could not prevail; numerical­ly superior forces captured bothWarsaw and Seattle.

The Marines counterattackedimmediately. Captain John H.Thomas, in command of CompanyI, sent one platoon againstWarsaw, but the enemy had tem­porarily withdrawn. The lull con­tinued until 0145 on the morningof 4 October, when a Chinese pla­toon attacked only to be beaten

511

back by the Marines holdingWarsaw.

Meanwhile, Captain Thomasmounted a counterattack againstSeattle early on the morning of 3October, sending out two squadsfrom the company's position onthe main line of resistance. DespiteChinese artillery fire, the Marinesreached the objective, but Seattleproved too strongly held andThomas broke off the counterat-

-tack. As dusk settled over the bat­tleground' Marine aircraft andartillery put down a smoke screenbehind which the counterattackresumed, but the Chinese succeed-

ed in contammg the two squadsshort of the crest. To regainmomentum, another squad-thisone from Company A, 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, which had

come under the operational con­trol of the 3d Battalion-reinforcedthe other two, but the Chineseclinging to Seattle inflicted casual­ties that sapped the strength of the

econd Lieutenant Sherrod E. kinner, Jr.

Bom in 1929 in I lartford , Conne 'ticul. he \\'as appointed a se ond lieutenant inthe brine orps R ' rye 19')2 and then rd 'red to active dut)'. He died hero­ically at 'The I look" on 26 tober 1952 while serving as an artillery forward

obs 'rv 'r of UattcIY F, 2d Battalion, lltll Marine. The citation for his Medal of Honoraward rea ll", in part:

Skinner in a determined effort to hold hi p ition, inunediately organized anddirected t.he surviving personnel in the defen 'e of the outpost, continuing Lo calldown nrc n the enemy by m ~ans of radio alon' until this equipmem becamedamaged I yond repair. Undaunted by the intense hostile ban'age and th rapid- lll·p.IOl11enl "Ilk""",,· PhOlO IC'\IU ':\tIl'!'»!

Iy do!>ing attackers, he rwice I ft the protection of hi!> I unker in order to direct accurate machin ~-gun nrc andLO replenish the depleted supply of ammunition and grenade!>. Although painfully wounded on each (xca-sion, he t adfai>tly refu 'ed m dical aid until the rest of the men received tr atment.

!> tile ground atta k reached it') c1iI11LL'(, he gallamly directed the fmal defens • until the meager supply I'anUllLlI1ition was e 'hausted and the position overrun. DLlling the tllree hours thal the outpost was occupiedb tile enemy, several grenade were tllrown into the bunker which !>erved a protection for, econd Lieutenant:kinner and hi!> remaining cOlTlJ'"dd " Realizing that there \"as no ch:J.nce for other tllan passhe resistance, hedirected hi' men to feign deatl1 e\'cn though the hostile troops entered tile bunker and searched their per­sons. L<ner, when an enemy grenade W:J.S thrown between him and two other sUlyivOl " he imm 'diat 'Iy thre\\himself on the dead] mi' iJe in an effort to prot 'ct the others, absorbing me fuJI force of the explosion andsacrificing his liJe for hi!> co/mad '.

In 199], ,kinner Hall at Quantico. Virginia, was dedicated in his honor.

Second lieutenant George H. O'Brien,Jr.

Bam in FaIt Wonh Texas, in 1 26, he enlisted in the Maline orp Reserve in19-19. Ordered to active duty in ] 9'5], he entered Officer andidate chool andwas commissioned in 19'52. As a rifle platoon leader \vith ompany H, 3d

Battalion, 7th Marin '!>, in tht: battle ~ r the Hook on 27 ctober 1952, he was awar l­ed a ledal of Hon r with a Citation, which re-dds, in part:

'Brien leap'd from his u'ench when tile attack signal wa: given and, 'houringfor his m n r 1'0110\\ raced aero' an e 'po d saddl ' and up tile enemy-held hillthrough a \'utual hail of deadly ~mall-arms, artillery and mortar fire. Altl10ugh shotrhrough dle arm and thrown r() the ground by hostile automatic-weapons fu' ash, neared the weU-entrenched enemy po'ition, he bl"J\ely regained hi feet. w~l\edhis men onward and continued to !>pearhead rhe a...,sault, pau 'ing only long enough I":p,lftm<'''' ,I Iklen'" 1'1... It '\It I \1'1"'>1<

to go t th aid of a wound,d ;\1arine. En untelmg rhe enemy at close range, he proceeded to hurl handgrenade into the bunkers and, utilizing his arhine to best advantage Ul a age hand-to-hand combat. 'uc­ce'ded in killing at least tllree I' the enemy.

Struck down b the concu 'sian of grenades on three occa ions during rhe subsequent action, he stC'ddfastlyrefused to be e acuated for medical trearmenr and continu d to lead his platoon in the a".. aulr for a pericx.I ofn 'arly four hours r peatedl en 'ouraging his men and maintaining superb direction of the unit.

II ' r 'ceived a second Purple Heart Medal in Janu~\IY 1953, and aft 'r the war, he joined the Res 'rves and wa ' pro-moted to major. -Captain John lupin, U, MCR (Ret)

512

candy, cameras, and toilet articles.

counterattack. While the Marinesregrouped for another assault, the11th Marines pounded the outpostwith artillery fire. At 2225 on 3October, the Marines againstormed the objective, hut Chineseartillery prevailed, and Seattleremained in Chinese hands.

The loss of Outpost Seattle, therecapture of Warsaw, and a suc-cessful defense of Frisco against aChinese probe on the night of 5October did not mark the end ofthe effort to seize the outpostsmanned by the 7th Marines, butonly a pause. The regiment's casu-alties—13 killed and 88 woundedby 3 October when the Marinessuspended the attempt to retakeSeattle—caused the 7th Marines toshuffle units. The 3d Battalion,commanded until 13 October byLieutenant Colonel Gerald F.

Russell, had suffered most of thecasualties. As a result, whileRussell's battalion reduced itsfrontage, the 1st Battalion, under

Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki,moved from the regimental reserveto take over the right-hand portionof the Jamestown Line. Dulacki'sMarines manned the main line ofresistance from roughly 500 yardssouthwest of the Hook to theboundary shared with theCommonwealth Division, includ-ing Outposts Warsaw and Verdun.Colonel Moore thus placed allthree battalions on line, LieutenantColonel Anthony Caputo's 2dBattalion on the left, Russell's 3dBattalion in the center, and nowDulacki's 1st Battalion on the right.

The 7th Marines completed itsrealignment just in time to meet aseries of carefully planned andaggressively executed Chineseattacks delivered on 6 and 7October against five combat out-posts and two points on the mainline of resistance. The Marinesstruck first, however, when a rein-forced platoon from Company C,1st Battalion, attacked toward

513

Outpost Seattle at 0600 on 6October. Mortar and artillery fireforced the platoon to take coverand regroup, even as the Chinesewere reinforcing the outpost theynow held. The attack resumed at0900. Despite infantry reinforce-ments, air strikes, and artillery, theMarines could not crack Seattle'sdefenses and broke off the attackat about 1100, after losing 12 killedand 44 wounded. The attackersestimated that they had killed orwounded 71 Chinese.

On the evening of the 6th, theChinese took the initiative, by mid-night firing some 4,400 artilleryand mortar rounds against the out-post line and two points on themain line of resistance. On the leftof Colonel Moore's line, the enemyprobed Outposts Carson and Reno,and on the right he stormedWarsaw, forcing the defenders tocall for box-me-in fire that severedthe telephone wire linking the out-post with the Jamestown Line. Thefirst message from Warsaw whencontact was restored requestedmore artillery fire, which by 2055helped break the back of theChinese assault, forcing the enemyto fall back.

The most determined attacks onthe night of 6 October and earlyhours of the 7th hit OutpostsDetroit and Frisco in the center ofthe regimental front. To divertattention from these objectives,each one manned by two squads,the Chinese probed two points onthe main line of resistance that hadalready been subjected to artilleryand mortar bombardment. At 1940on the night of the 6th, an attack-ing company that had gained afoothold in the main trench onDetroit fell back after deadly firestopped the enemy short of thebunkers. Two hours later, theChinese again seized a segment oftrench on Detroit and tried toexploit the lodgment. The Marines

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A165717

Ri/lemen of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines take a breakfromfrontline duty longenough to buy "luxuries" from the regimental Post Exchange truck. The trucktoured the frontline twice a month oJfrring Marines a chance to buy such items