US Diplomacy Towards LATAM and Caribbean

8/13/2019 US Diplomacy Towards LATAM and Caribbean

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No. 895Delivered July 27, 2005 August 23, 2005

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:www.heritage.org/research/latinamerica/hl895.cfm

Produced by the Douglas and Sarah AllisonCenter for Foreign Policy Studies

of theKathryn and Shelby Cullom DavisInstitute for International Studies

Published by The Heritage Foundation214 Massachusetts Avenue, NEWashington, DC 200024999(202) 546-4400 heritage.org

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflect-ing the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to

aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

Talking PointsU.S. peace and security depend on a stableneighborhood and more prosperous neigh-bors, yet Americas diplomatic engagementin Latin America has swung between com-prehensive and minimalist approaches.

Reagan-style strategic engagement requiresappointees dedicated to the Presidentsagenda and a willingness to deal withmany dimensions of a relationship.

Limited tactical engagement is more man-ageable but, lacking a guiding strategy, canlead to policy paralysis.

U.S. policy must be guided by a strategy topromote democracy, free economies basedon the rule of law, and security throughmore professional police and military capa-bilities. Bilateral relations should be com-prehensive and not focus on a single issue.

U.S. Diplomacy Toward Latin America:A Legacy of Uneven Engagement

Stephen Johnson

As the United States has become increasingly depen-dent on foreign oil and flooded by migrating popula-tions, troubles in Latin America take on greaterimportance. However, our engagement with this regionhas been uneventhat is, guided less by strategy thanby tactical response. Perhaps Latin America is not asimportant as trade partners in Europe and Asia, or theproblematic Middle East. But it is a close and populousneighbor, and one that teeters between stable self-suffi-ciency and chaotic menace. More significant, it is beingdrawn into the orbits of other global actors.

That doesnt mean we have to solve the regionsproblems. Its peoples and leaders should bear the bur-den of making their own choices, reaping the benefitsof good ones and learning from the bad. But the Unit-ed States can be more consistent in cultivating rela-tions that serve our own interests as well as those of our neighbors. To stave off future problems, the Unit-ed States should have a comprehensive plan of engagement, practice hands-on diplomacy, and nur-ture enduring partnerships.

Between Strategy and TacticsThe Monroe Doctrine and building the Panama

Canal were strategic decisions. Sending Marines toNicaragua and the Dominican Republic were tacticalresponses. In recent years, the best example of a stra-tegic agenda toward Latin America occurred duringthe Reagan Administration. Even so, it was focusedmainly on Central America and the Caribbean. Itsought to roll back Soviet advances in the hemisphere,


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establish stable democracies, and introduce eco-nomic reforms.

Reagans strategy had political, military, econom-ic, labor, diplomatic, and multilateral tracks. EvenCharles Wick, Director of the U.S. Information

Agency and presidential confidant, toured Central American posts to ensure that public diplomacyunits were explaining the administrations policy.Meanwhile, the Agency for International Develop-ment handed scholarships to needy Central Amer-ican students so they could attend college in theUnited States.

Because it took sides, President Reagans approachgenerated controversy. Some in Congress sympa-thized with the communist insurgents, a few withonce-friendly right-wing dictators, while most wereskeptical of the middle ground of promoting democ-racy in a region that had not known it.

Assuming the presidency in 1989, the elderGeorge Bush switched from offense to defense. Hepushed aside Reagans Central America policy assoon as elections took hold, in part to end partisanrancor, and in part because communism seemed tobe a fading threat with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, aid money fordemocracy programs was shifted from Latin Amer-ica to Eastern Europe, even though democracy inLatin America had barely developed beyond elec-tions. The White House proposed the Enterprisefor the Americas Initiative to refocus hemisphericrelations on less polemical trade issues. In thebackground, the White House quietly ramped upcounternarcotics assistance to Colombia in tacticalresponse to the growing power of narcotics cartels.Thus the first Bush Administration replaced com-prehensive strategy with an emphasis on trade andreaction to everything else.

President Bill Clinton was also reactive but guidedless by a strategic formula. He fought hard in Con-

gress for approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which doubled trilateral tradein eight years and helped Mexico create enough new

jobs for its ballooning labor force to temper whatwould have been a deluge of migrants into the Unit-ed States. But elsewhere, improvisation led hisadministration down blind alleys. Budget cuts

prompted him to scale back Andean counternarcot-ics efforts and drastically reduce the size of the Officeof National Drug Control Policy. A pledge to helpousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide caused theadministration to invade Haiti in 1994.

Eventually, President Clinton had to reverse thosedecisions. When the United States decertifiedColombia as cooperating with counternarcoticsefforts and cut off security assistance, independentdrug traffickers forged alliances with communistrebels and paramilitary groups that expanded theirranks and power in the countryside. In 1998,Colombian President Andrs Pastrana made resump-tion of U.S. assistance his priority. The Clinton

Administration helped him shape what becameknown as Plan Colombia in 1999. The plan obligedthe United States to provide approximately $3 billion

in security assistance and development aid over sixyears while Colombia would contribute $4 billion of its own.

In Haiti, U.S. officials believed they could quicklyintervene and then hand the situation over to Unit-ed Nations peacekeepers to maintain order. In fact,the Clinton Administrations eagerness to ensurePresident Aristides personal success led him to mis-interpret U.S. actions as a license to subvert devel-opment efforts, politicize the police, and go back toold habits of unleashing violent mobs against his

opponentsa history the Clinton Administrationhad overlooked. Aristide broke numerous promisesto assistance donors and the Organization of Amer-ican States, causing political opponents and foreigndonors to distrust him. In 2000, President Clintonsuspended U.S. assistance.

Taking over in 2001, President George W. Bushpromised a more strategic approach encompassedby his theme Century of the Americas. Speaking toState Department personnel before his first tripabroad, to Mexico in 2001, he said the United Statesshould work closely with its neighbors to build awestern hemisphere of freedom and prosperity, ahemisphere bound together by shared ideas and freetrade from the Arctic to the Andes to Cape Horn.But occupied by the war on terrorism after 9/11, hetook two and a half years to assemble his Latin

America team and chose to build on Clinton-erapolicies rather than adopt a broad agenda.


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Even so, some good came from this fragmentedapproach. The Bush White House won bipartisanbacking for trade promotion authority, enabling itto conclude a free trade agreement with Chile in2003 and negotiate a similar pact with the Domin-ican Republic and five Central American states in2004 (DR-CAFTA). Congress approved initiativesto expand Colombian counternarcotics programsto include counterterrorism and strengtheningpublic institutions, as well as extending greatersecurity assistance to other Andean nations. Whenhis regime collapsed, Bush officials refused furthersupport to President Aristide, ushering in a freshstart in Haiti and ending a policy of supporting per-sonalities over institutions. Finally, the Bush

Administration has tied accountability to develop-ment aid by offering Millennium Challenge

Account grants to governments that have under-taken substantial democratic and free marketreforms.

Sadly, diplomatic pressure and programs to pur-sue political progress beyond elections havewaned. Rule of law and property rights are minorpriorities in U.S. assistance programs. As an indi-rect result, many Latin Americans are wonderingwhy democracy and limited market openings havenot made their governments any more accountableor their societies more prosperous.

As disturbing, vigorous public diplomacy pro-grams that provided news, speakers, book transla-tions, and thousands of academic and culturalexchanges at the beginning of the 1990s, were cut.The end of the Cold War prompted Congress andthree Presidents to reduce funding and, in 1999,merge the U.S. Information Agency into theDepartment of State. There, without leadership formuch of the Bush presidency, it has been unable torespond to the war on terrorism, much less reachout to publics in regions like Latin America.

Autopilot DiplomacyThe Reagan Administration may have handledbroad strategies and multiple policies well, but inone instance it lost control over personnel, whichresulted in the Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages scan-dal. Thus successive administrations have opted fornarrower agendas and have limited policymaking

authority to a smaller number of appointees. Thecurrent Bush Administration has placed career offi-cials in what would have been political positionssuch as naming Foreign Service officers to keyNational Security Council positions in WesternHemisphere affairs. Putting them in political posi-tions preserved continuity, but also ensured that lit-tle would happen to make news. Careeristsspecialize in implementing policy, not making it,which can break a 20-year career in a heartbeat if something goes wrong.

Pragmatism and limited authority might seem likea useful combination in diplomacy but, surprisingly,they do not mix. Reactive diplomacy and improvisa-tion require hands-on direction from senior politicalleaders who often have little time to becomeinvolved. The Middle and Far East have taken most

of the attention of President Bushs policymakers.Because they are occupied in those regions, stasis hastaken over U.S. diplomacy in the Western Hemi-sphere. George W. Bushs first term was nearly overbefore a confirmed Assistant Secretary of State for

Western Hemisphere Affairs was in place.The current assistant secretary is thoughtful,

intelligent, and capable of conducting an array of initiatives toward the Americasthat is, if therewere broad guidelines and delegated authority tomake personnel decisions and oversee programs.

However, todays administration permits very littlediscretion at the assistant secretary level, whilemost personnel actions fall to the Foreign Servicesself-serving personnel system, which allows offic-ers to lobby for assignments, make deals, and optout of hardship postings with little consequence.

Missed OpportunitiesTactical decisions unguided by strategy have led

to conflicts over goals. Since 9/11, the United Stateswanted its hemispheric allies to participate in theglobal war on terrorism, which is hard for smallcountries like Costa Rica with limited financialresources. Washington could provide assistance tobuy scanning equipment to enhance port securityand offer intelligence training, except that CostaRica refuses to sign an Article 98 agreement.Named after a section of the Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court (ICC), such a pact


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exempts U.S. service personnel from jurisdictionunder the ICC. Americas reservations are justifi-able since the court is accountable to no one anduses legal procedures incompatible with U.S. law.

Yet Congress and the White House approved a lawthat would bar crucial security assistance if govern-ments refused to signa shot in the foot.

Short-term thinking has led to sudden impasses.In February 2004, mobs once loyal to Haitis presi-dent Aristide joined with thugs from previous gov-ernments, forcing him to resign. Rightly dissatisfiedwith Aristides despotic performance, the Bush

Administration chose not to intervene. HaitianSupreme Court Justice Boniface Alexandreassumed the presidency, and on March 13, formerUnited Nations official Gerard Latortue replaced

Aristides prime minister and named a new cabinet.

Some 3,300 peacekeepers arrived to help recon-struct Haitis tiny police force, collect weapons, andsecure humanitarian aid. Yet a year and a half later,Haitis interim authority lacks adequate supervisionand promised aid from donor nations. Haitians areonly marginally better off and hardly prepared toelect a new government.

Myopic insistence on coca crop eradicationtothe exclusion of help in dealing with growing polit-ical problemscontributed to the Bolivian govern-ments breakdown in 2003. Now populist agitators

are rolling back democratic governance and marketreforms achieved over the past decade. Absent anew approach, America may lose influence on cocaeradication and access to Bolivian natural gasexports. Similarly, containing drug trafficking andterrorism in Colombia are holdover issues thatdominate U.S. relations with Ecuador, despite itsequally pressing governance troubles. U.S. pro-grams to help political parties in addressing thesematters are inactive in both nations.

A tight inner circle seems to have shut out possi-ble sources of advice. President Bush chose tochannel U.S.Mexico relations through his friend-ship with Mexican president Vicente Fox, yetseemed puzzled on how to deal with him. Fox has

been thwarted in achieving important political andeconomic reforms by a divided congress and hisquirky first foreign secretary, who kept him silentafter September 11 and then inexplicably pushedhim to ask for U.S. concessions on Mexicanmigrants. Someone outside the inner circle mighthave recommended taking Fox aside to express dis-satistfaction with the foreign secretary, as well asoffer to address the Mexican congress to advocateapproval of Foxs promised economic reforms tocreate jobs at home.

Nowhere has Washington had more difficultythan in dealing with Venezuelas populist leaderHugo Chvez. In 2002, Chvez took advantage of apopular uprising against him to temporarily disap-pear from office, smoke out his enemies, and returnconsolidating his grip on power. The Bush Admin-

istration was embarrassed by statements thatappeared to accept Chvezs ersatz ouster. Seeking adignified exit, Secretary of State Colin Powellturned to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter andthe Organization of American States to broker a ref-erendum on Chvezs presidency. Although Chvezheld a recall vote, Carter accepted limits on moni-toring, declined to comment on the regimes mas-sive effort to pad voter lists, and hastily reported afree and fair result. The administration was forcedto accept a flawed assessment.

Whose Responsibility?Latin America is predominantly rural, Catholic,

and poor. Ireland is also rural and Catholic, but nolonger poor, nor a net people exporter. 1 By mostindices, including The Heritage Foundations Indexof Economic Freedom, Ireland is now an economicpowerhouse. Its democratic and recent economicchoices have made the difference.

Despite average poverty rates running about 50percent, Latin America has felt too little pressure toreform. Foreign assistance and loans make it easyto get by without change. Outside actors, such asChina, are willing to trade and deal with corruptgovernments that maintain control over markets.

1. Irelands GDP per capita is now 122 percent of the European Unions average, its economy having grown 80 percent duringthe last decade. See Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, Mary Anastasia OGrady, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington,D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2005), p. 225, at www.heritage.org/index.


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Chinas state-owned companies need raw materialsto feed expanding production quotas. Althoughselling commodities to China may fill governmentcoffers, it will not boost industrial growth to liftLatin Americas workers out of poverty.

For all its faults, U.S. diplomacy has had notablesuccess. Just 25 years ago, military dictatorshipsoutnumbered civilian-elected governments by twoto one. Today, all Latin American countries exceptCuba and Haiti hold competitive elections andhave adopted some market-oriented reforms. Pret-ty much on its own, Chile has even become a first-world leader in trade and market liberalization.

With help, Colombia is back from the brink of acollapsing state.

Where U.S. diplomacy has failed, officials mayhave underestimated the extent to which somesocieties and their ruling elites are unwilling part-ners. The signs are at our borders. Each year, aboutone million illegal migrants come from Latin Amer-ica to create wealth in the United States, largelybecause they cannot do so at home. Desiring a bet-ter future, they leave behind some of the worldsworst public schools and bizarre laws that preventthem from going into business.

Doing What It TakesExcept for Mexico, the United States probably

could survive without Latin American markets,which account for less than 6 percent of U.S. tradewith the world. American refiners can buy oil fromother suppliers besides Venezuela, which providesroughly 7 percent of U.S. consumption. 2 But U.S.peace and security depend on a stable neighbor-

hood and on more prosperous neighbors. Alarm-ingly, as Latin Americas population has expandedfrom 503.1 million inhabitants in 1999 to 534.2million in 2003, its aggregate economy declinedslightly from $1.8 trillion in to $1.7 trillion. 3 Near-ly 44 percent of the regions citizens live below the$2-per-day poverty line. Such factors affect theUnited States in lost potential trade, states that tee-ter on the edge of instability, and migrants who ille-gally enter the U.S. seeking safety and economicopportunity. 4

Except for Europe and some Asian countriessuch as India, Japan, and the Philippines, no regionshould be as favorably disposed toward democracyand open economies as Latin America. Latin Amer-ican leaders have generally aspired to Western-styledemocracy and markets, exemplified by numerous

constitutions and laws that mirror the U.S. system. Yet individual rights, free choice, and equal oppor-tunity clash with older traditions of imposed ruleand corporatist segregation of economic classesand ethnic groups. Without adequate support forreforms that go beyond elections and free trade, theregions democratic progress could slide.

To ward off future problems, the United Statesmust:

Implement a more comprehensive strategy.This strategy should be based on three pillars:to promote stability through more democraticgovernance, to help open economies throughthe rule of law and the establishment of pro-business policies, and to improve security bystrengthening police and military capabilities.

All diplomacy, foreign assistance, and public

2. Mexico is Americas second-largest trade partner behind Canada, with $220.2 billion in merchandise trade in 2002. Brazilranked 15th with $26.8 billion. In 2002, most bilateral trade between Latin American countries and the United Statesranged between $3 billion and $9 billion. See U.S. International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and TradeDataWeb, at dataweb.usitc.gov (August 29, 2003).

3. Although the population of Latin America and the Caribbean has increased from 503.1 billion to 534.2 billion from 1999to 2003, gross national income has declined from $1.8 trillion to $1.7 trillion, according the World Bank, Latin America& Caribbean Data Profile, at www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html (March 5, 2005).

4. According to the National Intelligence Councils new study, Mapping the Global Future, ineffective governance and the back-wardness of ruling elites could decrease Latin Americas influence in world affairs and bar many of its countries from partici-pating in the global economy. See National Intelligence Council, Report of the National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project,Mapping the Global Future (Washington, D.C.: December 2004), p. 78, at www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s3.html#page78 (March 3, 2005).


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outreach programs should be judged by thesegoals. While participation in multilateral insti-tutions may enhance agreement on broadhemispheric agendas, it should not substitutefor bilateral engagement. Summitry has pro-duced hundreds of obligations that weigh onthe hemispheres governments. Few are eversatisfied because leaders cannot follow up andpromote them all when they return to localcapitals.

Practice consistent diplomacy. Each U.S.administration must decide how much it cando. The government cannot take on so manytasks that it loses control of some of them. Norshould it limit engagement to certain objec-tives despite evidence that other problemsmust be solved. Appointments to positions in

the National Security Council and cabinetagencies with foreign affairs responsibilitiesshould be made considering who would bestpromote the Presidents policies. If the admin-istration desires continuity, career officialsshould be guided by a comprehensive strategyto avoid paralysis. If Reagan-style, proactiveengagement is desired, political appointeesshould have enough authority and supervisoryinterest to achieve it. Above all, assistant secre-taries and subordinate advisers should be bet-ter integrated into the policymaking process.

Nurture enduring partnerships. NAFTA (withMexico) and bilateral trade relations (withChile) are building a basis for common experi-ence and economic success. The Bush Admin-istration has acted strategically to enhancecounternarcotics assistance to Colombia toinclude counterterrorism and help strengthenpublic institutions. Stovepiped counter-drugaid ignored deeper problems that have pro-duced the countrys crime and terrorism prob-lems. Todays more comprehensive approach,coupled with a willing partner in the Uribegovernment, has weakened rural bandits,strengthened the economy, and laid the foun-dation for a new justice system that should beable to process Colombias criminal terrorists.More countries besides Colombia need thiskind of relationship.

Congress can help by crafting legislation that doesnot promote conflict between policies. For example,

Washington might withhold development aidnotsecurity assistanceas a lever to promote Article 98agreements and yet help erstwhile allies strengthentheir counterterrorism capabilities. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 should beamended to permit judicious training and assistanceto foreign law enforcement agencies to ensureinteroperability with U.S. counterparts. Congressshould exercise oversight of security programs suchas counter-drug assistance to prevent waste andhuman rights abuse, but refrain from excessiverestraints that turn U.S. Embassy program sectionsinto micro-managers that relieve host countries of their responsibility for running initiatives.

Both the White House and Congress should help

repair Americas faltering public diplomacy capa-bilities. The State Departments Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs should havepersonnel and budgetary authority to carry outprograms, instead of acting in the current advisorycapacity. Declining foreign broadcasting efforts like

Voice of America service to Latin America shouldbe revitalized to offer programs that discuss how tomaximize political and economic reforms as well asoffer balanced news. This is particularly importantas Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez inaugurateshis satellite television channel, Telesur, to dissemi-nate anti-U.S. propaganda throughout South

America and the Caribbean.

ConclusionThe United States and its hemispheric neighbors

face new challenges on the horizon. In placeswhere shallow democratic reforms and market lib-eralization have served to paper over autocraticpractices and statist economies, publics are losingfaith in pluralism and free markets. Latin Americaspopulation continues to grow without a healthy

increase in jobs. Cuban dictator Fidel Castro issending ideologue teachers and doctors to Belize,Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Vene-zuela. Venezuelas Hugo Chvez has become hisnew sponsor, making up for lost Soviet-era subsi-dies. Moreover, Chvez is spreading petroleumprofits around Latin America to advance populist,


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leftist parties and has aided terrorist groups such asColombias guerrillas. China is making deals withany government it can to obtain raw materials andestablish its influence in the hemisphere.

Sustained U.S. commitment is essential to assure

Latin Americas stability and continued peaceful,democratic developmentall very much in ournational interest. In a nutshell, the ships in ourdiplomatic armada need rust-proofing, a clear

course, and courageous captains to weather thestorms ahead.

Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and

Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studiesat The Heritage Foundation. This lecture is based on tes-timony before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemi-sphere of the House International Relations Committee.

US Diplomacy Towards LATAM and Caribbean

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