UPyD | Freedom and democracy. basque terrorism, a political pathology

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FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

Basque terrorism, a political pathology in democratic Europe

Maite Pagazaurtundua UPyD - ALDE October 2014

Freedom and Democracy

!!!!!!!!!!! !!“The essence of fanaticism lies on the desire to force other

people to change”. !Amos Oz, How to Cure a Fanatic

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Contents !

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Introduction 4

On perceptions and beliefs in the Basque Country 9

Sketch of a political desease 15

40 years of terrorism: either think like me or shut up or die

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The State’s Response 31

The Role of Civil Society and the Victims of Terrorism 38

ETA’s defeat and the deceiving language 41

The challenge: freedom and democracy 48

Appendices 53

Bibliography 57

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Introduction

ETA announced a definitive halt to violence in 2011. No attacks

have been committed since, but the group has not been

dissolved and it remains – consciously or not – a potential

shadow of fear which has been prowling for over fifty years.

As a person who lived with a police escort for thirteen years due

to the direct threat of ETA, I can testify that it is a relief to be

able to have a coffee in a cafe window without having to be on

the alert, to be able to look at motorbikes and litter bins without

the fear of a bomb or simply to be able to have a daily routine.

Various friends and acquaintances in my area were murdered by

ETA, as was my own brother. Virtually all my friends and

colleagues were systematically persecuted, for refusing to be

forced into becoming Basque nationalists and for participating in

civic activism for freedom of thought and against the blackmail

and terror of ETA. The Citizens’ Initiative ‘¡Basta Ya!’ (Enough!),

which was created by a handful of Basque citizens, was awarded

the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in the year 2000 . 1

I ended up leaving the Basque Country with my husband and

our daughters in 2007 so that they would not suffer the

consequences of my chosen path, but I did this without

abandoning my total commitment to civil rights and the victims

of terrorism. The rest of my family - my brother’s widow, their

fatherless children, my other brother and our mother – left the

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Basque Country in 2012, selling everything they owned for a

pittance. They were forced to do so due to the political heirs of

ETA rising to power in the beautiful city where they had taken

refuge, Donostia-San Sebastián. This was after they had fled

from the place where we were raised, Hernani, the place where a

member of our family, Andoain, was killed. Both places were

controlled, both then and now, by the political arm of ETA. We

were morally unable to remain in the lands where we were born.

Politics must be conducted with all eyes on the future. This must

be the way of it. But it also requires us, as a society, to

acknowledge our wounds so that we can cure them in such a

way that they help us to be regenerated. The Basque situation

can teach us lessons about the way poisonous phenomena are

created and grow within societies; the phenomena of dominion,

of violent radicalisation, of collective cognitive distortion and of

the de-legitimisation of the Rule of Law. It can also teach us

about the processes of democratic response from the

community itself: because we can draw attention to the lack of

vengefulness of ETA’s victims, their effort to display their

absolute dignity and the merit of the citizens and intellectuals

who, going against the grain and paying dearly for it, took a

stand against terrorism and in favour of the Rule of Law.

I cannot and do not wish to conceal my subjectivity, nor the

empiricism with which I formulated the perspective from which

this is written. I prepared this sketch with humility because I have

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lived most of my life in a society threatened by a serious political

disease and I believe that I should share anything that may be of

use in these times when serious political diseases, both violent

and non-violent, are spreading inside and outside of the

European Union.

That which follows is a descriptive sketch of the paradigm of

social dominion and control conceived by a nationalist terrorist

organisation in the heart of Europe, in the richest part of Europe.

Before forging ahead, it is worth knowing that, since the arrival

of democracy in Spain and the formation of the decentralised

state in 1978, the Basque Autonomous Community has been

governed by non-violent Basque Nationalists, individually or in

coalitions, with the exception of 2009 to 2013.

I have to call attention to the fact that the terrorists threatened

and killed the representatives of the non-nationalist political

opposition.

It should be noted that this nationalist terrorism developed in a

territory that is wealthier than the Spanish average. And

therefore they cannot say that they were victimised socio-

economically.

It was the victims of Basque Nationalist terrorism who were

stigmatised in a large number of the communities of Basque and

Navarrese society, not their killers. These victims, however, did

not exact revenge.

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All the above, the processes of radicalisation and the recruitment

of pre-adolescents for violence over two generations can

provide interesting elements for analysis in other contexts of

community radicalisation and indoctrination. It can also provide

information about the ideological antibodies which, despite their

lateness and imperfections, arose in the heart of the Basque

Community and in Spain.

The terrorist organisation has been practically defeated by the

police but not by the politicians. Significant political and

institutional agents have managed to legalise the political heirs

of the terrorists, behind the backs of the majority of citizens. This

brings up the question of transparency and the limits of the

supposed “national interests” which governments apply to

democratic systems.

Even now, many victims of terrorism are demanding justice and

law, but once again, they are going against the grain. There is a

school of thought that seeks to establish a paradigm of

coexistence which is based on the idea that everyone suffered

equally, the killers and their victims. This premise hides the

political sense of the threats made to the non-nationalists. This

premise blurs lines in social perception of the serious crimes for

which terrorists who were tried and convicted are now serving

time. And it is in this setting that the political heirs of ETA claim

impunity.

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The Basque public powers are making a great effort to privatise

the political significance of the victims of ETA’s Basque

nationalist terrorism. I am a critic of this strategy because turning

away from the past and demanding social and political

responsibilities does not help the heirs of terrorism to simply

accept the law and the rule of law. I believe that they should

recognise the fact that we were hunted so that they could

change all Basque society and force it into becoming Basque

Nationalist. Accepting that fundamental matter does not

suppose their humiliation but rather it is an opportunity for them

to regenerate.

All these facts place us in front of a mirror of the universal history of infamies, both great and small.

! !!!!!! Maite Pagazaurtundua

Member of the European Parliament

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On perceptions and beliefs in the Basque Country For many centuries, the linguistic and cultural idiosyncrasies of

the Basques, settled in the centre of power of the Spanish

monarchy, were effectively used to highlight their absolute

Spanishness, in other words, their lack of any mixing of Jewish or

Arabic blood. This may seem like an aberration in our times but

it was highly relevant, socially speaking, in a nation which was

defining itself symbolically after the expulsion of the Spanish

Jews who did not convert to Catholicism in 1492 and after the

expulsion of the Spanish Muslims a few decades later. The

forced conversion to Catholicism of a large number of those in

these collectives generated suspicions and their descendents

were stigmatised for centuries. The purity of one’s blood was

therefore a significant factor in social ascension. It was like this

until the start of the 19th century.

The tumultuous 19th century in Spain progressed in between

various civil wars of dynastic origin, but there were also other

elements: the conflictive coming together of economic and

political liberalism, industrialisation and the reactions towards

the flow of people which was rapidly changing the socio-cultural

and geographical landscapes.

Basque Nationalism arose as a political movement at the end of

the 19th century, due to the belief that the territories in which

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Basque was spoken should form a different state to the Spanish

and French. The industrialisation of the Basque Country towards

the end of the 19th century attracted immigrants from all over

Spain and an organised workers’ movement was generated. The

brusque change in circumstances was watched anxiously by the

more traditional section of the Basque Community. It was against

this background that the Basque Nationalist movement emerged

with its traditional views on religion and its purist attitude

towards ethnicity. At the start, traditional nationalism defended a

community of Basques based on ethnic purity – the element of

proof of which was one’s surname, which could be used to check

one’s purity back to the generation of one’s grandparents.

Basque Nationalism arose out of a distressing sensation of

cultural loss and indeed, Basque language was waning both

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JOSU ORTUONDO IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT *

Josu Ortuondo, MEP of the PNV, in a speech in a plenary session of the EP in 1999:

“The Basque differentiating aspect” is based on various factors, amongst which are the historic and the “biological” factors. Euskadi

has suffered, throughout its history, “many defeats and massive immigration which has blurred it, causing a political conflict”.

* Fortunately this mixture of concepts is not seen nowadays in the traditional or classical nationalism. Available online at the EP minutes of the plenary session.


territorially and socially, in addition to being diglossic with few

written advancements or standardisation.

The workers’ and syndicate political movements which arose in

this same context, showed similar traits to Marxist, Leninist and

European Anarchist movements.

After the military uprising which led to the start of the Spanish

Civil War in the summer of 1936, the Basque Nationalists

decided to ally themselves with the Republicans, after a few

hesitations. Truthfully, the majority of Basque Nationalism did not

fit in with the radical, anti-Catholic and very often violent laicism

of a large number of their political allies on the Republican side.

In any case, the rapid fall of the entire Basque territory into the

hands of Franco’s troops – amongst whom were as many

Basques and Navarrese as on the Republican side – led the

leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party to the decision to

surrender all their troops. The negotiations that some

Nationalists held with the Italian fascists did not provide them

with protection, quite the opposite; socialists, anarchists and

nationalists shared jails and prisons both during the war and

after it.

The deeply Catholic nature of the Basque Nationalists among

those defeated, who were soon being released from prison,

mostly freed them from the added stigma suffered by the

atheists when they were released in the first few years of a

chauvinist and ultra-Catholic dictatorship.

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ETA’s Basque Nationalist fanaticism continued to rise in the

Basque Country throughout the sixties, through the actions of a

new generation of nationalists. It arose from a few young

persons of the incipient middle class, at the time of the timid

opening of the dictatorship. It was the time of a cultural

resurgence of the Basque language. It was the time of a

standardisation of the Basque language, under the tutorship of

the great linguist, Koldo Mitxelena. It was at the end of the

Franco era when the first Basque language schools appeared,

seeing as the Francoist government tolerated the creation of

cooperatives of parents driven by traditional nationalists –

although the founders were not all nationalists.

The new nationalists – those who flirted with or gave themselves

over to violent fanaticism – were generally the children of

traditional Basque Nationalists. They were not satisfied with their

parents, who had taught them the ideology at home but who

were undetectable in their social behaviour, having generally

adapted to the passivity of the Spanish during the dictatorship.

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A Basque-speaking Basque with a Basque surname, but who was

not a nationalist, was considered to be a non-Basque, anti-Basque

or a bad Basque, up until very recently. This simple slogan, along

with a fierce anti-Spain attitude, combined with a strategy of micro-

violence in the community, acted on the sociology and politics, from

the sixties virtually up to the present day.


After 1964, in its first national manifesto, ETA took a path which

soon led them to social control, to moral micro-violence and to

the elimination of plurality in the socio-political community. From

its beginnings, it attacked the possibility of real, ideological

pluralism. In fact, in this aspect it appears to be an inverted

mirror of the Laws of Franco’s Movimiento Nacional.

!“He who is not with the Basque People and the

Resistance is against the both of them (...). Those who

collaborate with the Basque Resistance are

‘abertzales’ – patriots, those who oppose it or boycott

it will be swept away”.

!First National Manifesto of ETA, 1964

After the death of the dictator, ETA became a powerful machine

for wiping out the freedom of the non-nationalists in the Basque

Country and Navarre and for weakening the symbolic Spanish

identity. Its relationship with traditional nationalism was very

often conflictive but, apart from certain exceptions, other Basque

Nationalists were not the targeted for murder. Their objective: to

reformat both citizens and society.

In France

ETA’s terrorist tactics varied between France and Spain. In France, people in public office were not targeted, policemen and soldiers were only killed in exceptional circumstances and

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the local communities were not terrorised by a network of informers. Many of those persecuted were not killed or forced into exile. !!

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Sketch of a political desease “Fanaticism is older than Islam, older than Christianity, older than Judaism. It is older than any State, government or political system. It is older than any ideology or creed in the world. Unfortunately, fanaticism is an ever-present component of human nature, an evil gene, if you will”.

Amos Oz, How to Cure a Fanatic !In the various forms of identity-based and political fanaticism we

can find signs of what some authors have called “replacement

religion” and and also the traits of a national-populist political 2 3 4

disease. The Basque situation fits this idea.

After the end of the sixties, Basque society went through an

extremely fast process of laicization, which coincided with the

process of transference and increasing devotion to fanatical

Basque nationalism.

Fanatical nationalism has the typical traits of national-populism.

It also has that of a calling for power, of all possible power.

Basque national-populism expanded into a single cultural ideal

of behaviour and belonging to a community, generating a

narrative mirage over the historic reality and imposing a low

tolerance of any type of political frustration which is inherent to

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democratic life and its disputes. This ideological construction

served as a psychological excuse for any citizens who were

perfectly integrated into their communities to stigmatise or

dehumanise their brothers and neighbours, without any feelings

of guilt or worry. In fact, these persecutors felt that they

themselves were the historical macro-victims.

Whether it is violent or not, any national-populist political

manifestation contains solvents against the great components of

the democratic system: pluralism and equality before the law.

These solvents even work against the very acceptance of the law.

The Basque situation is proof of this. Fanatical and violent

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BASQUE NATIONAL-POPULISM

1. Crude falsification of the community and its history.

2. Establishment of the community as a perfect historical victim.

3. Recognition of a single form of community that is considered natural and essential.

4. Only accepts a single discourse about the authentic national person.

5. Political language becomes ultra-sentimental.

If the above is added to the use of violence:

The aggressor appears to be the victim. The actual victim is stigmatised.


nationalism, better known as radical

nationalism, specialises in the

process of ideological re-education

and social exclusion.

Once ideological exclusion is in

place, any citizen who does not

accept the model is considered an

outsider. Citizens who oppose

nat ional -popul is t movements ,

e spec i a l l y movement s i n an

advanced phase, end up suffering moral violence and living in a

hostile atmosphere. Public opinion can become a notion which is

plagued with taboos. The intellectuals and journalists who dared

to lift the lid on these types of taboos in the nineties in the

Basque Country suffered all manner of abuse and injuries, but

their courage was essential to begin weakening ETA’s

pathological system.

These types of national-populist movements disregard the

current laws because their intense sentimentalism and their

feelings of victimisation lead them to the justification that the

triumph of their project is above the law. This can, in short, result

in an attack on the centre of gravity of the democratic system:

ideological freedom, pluralism and respect for the law. This

happened in the Basque Country and it had the expected

consequences.

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The history of the last 25 years of the B a s q u e C o u n t r y c a n n o t b e f u l l y understood unless we bear in mind a f a c t o r w h i c h permeates the entire period: fear


It must also be indicated that the influence of left wing

intellectual culture, prevailing in Europe at the time, and the

backward and violent views of some of the anti-colonial doctrine

were supplemented by self-perception components which

stayed with them throughout their history.

The pathological traits of Basque fanatical nationalism went

unheeded for many years because the presence of their vision of

the world was so intense in the media and on the streets that it

became habitual and normalised. In addition to securing a large

presence in the public and private media, they had and continue

to have their own, politically controlled media.

The crimes committed by ETA were amnestied in 1977 and 1978

and this even included murders committed mere days earlier.

But the intimidation and persuasion tactics used by the world of

ETA were accentuated with the arrival of democracy in Spain.

Micro-social intimidation, the networks of informants and the

random killings in small towns in a small territory became a

major instrument of social control in the years of the democratic

transition. This is without forgetting their use of their feelings of

victimisation and their powers of persuasion.

The biggest expert on ETA explained it thusly in 2003:

“The history of the last 25 years of the Basque Country cannot be fully understood unless we bear in mind a factor which permeates the entire period: fear. A sizable section of the population, possibly the majority, lived in fear in those times, a

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fear which could be more or less intense depending on the period. This feeling, denied and hidden most of the time, often conditioned the behaviour of the people. It profoundly altered basic social values and distorted public life.

The climate of fear was needed by the terrorist organisation so that it could embed itself so deeply into society. This terrorist organisation, which was prepared to do anything to impose its will, had the ability to silence, literally and not metaphorically, its adversaries, critics, those hostile to the regime and, if necessary, even their own members. It was a terrorist organisation which became a real power, under no-one’s control and with no limits other than its totalitarian will.

The second necessity was the existence of an extensive network of civilians who were sympathetic to the terrorists, a network which was essential for taking ETA’s threats to all corners of society, for personally pointing an accusing finger at each citizen, citizens who knew that the finger was on the same hand that gripped a gun. This civilian network, to give it a name, was very decisive in the spreading of fear, even more so than ETA itself. Crime prevails by itself as an intimidation factor but its effects are multiplied if there are people who sympathise with the criminals, with the one standing before a university professor telling him that he may be next, with the one openly branding a councillor as an enemy of Euskal Herria, with the one reminding a pacifist that they know where he lives, with the one screaming at a businessman that the best boss is a hanged boss and with the one blaming a journalist for the prolongation of the conflict. This legal network puts names and surnames on the threats and it acts as an ecclesiastical power for ETA. Often, a political atmosphere is created as it is required to justify a crime which will come later.

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Furthermore, the fear is needed to produce a cowed society, the effect, on the one hand, of the intimidation and the cause, in time, being future cowardice. The fear of many businessmen financed ETA, helping it to increase its capacity for terror.”

Florencio Domínguez, Las Raíces del Miedo (The Roots of Fear), p 17

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!The pro-violence youth, a goldmine of active terrorists, shared a strict dress-code, rock bands with appropriately ideological lyrics, social clubs and slogans. It must be said that their social environments are still abundantly decorated with signs and posters because the nationalist world allied with ETA still runs continuous and permanent campaigns.


40 years of terrorism: either think lime me or shut up or die The ETA terrorist organisation thought of itself, from its first

Assembly in 1962, as a Basque Revolutionary Movement for

National Liberation. And at that point it testified that its

objectives would be independence and socialism.

Given the political nature of the objective, they made it clear

from the beginning that “the most powerful weapon which will

bring victory to the fighters of the Revolutionary War is the

civilian population, the fact that the people are on our side” . 5

General Franco died on the 20th of November 1975. On the 22nd of November, Juan Carlos I de Borbón was proclaimed king before the Courts. The young monarch led the arrival of democracy. The Law for Political Reform, which was approved by the Francoist Courts and ratified by the Spanish people in a referendum, repealed the Francoist political regime. The first democratic elections were held on the 15th of July 1977.

But by this time, ETA had perfected its system of harassment.

The communiqués made after the murders pressured those not

affiliated with Basque Nationalism into leaving the Basque

Country. After the arrival of democracy, the social world of ETA

formed a sort of paral lel society and it colonised

neighbourhoods and towns, influencing social contexts.

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They specified the citizens to be stigmatised, their pretext being

in all cases: having links to the State law enforcement agencies.

This made the majority cautious as they did not want to suffer

what the people and families of these agencies suffered. This

stigmatisation also included the boys and girls of the specified

families. A victim would be “pointed out” and became

considered as an antisocial element which had to be eliminated

or ignored. The usual phrase to dissociate oneself with a

potential victim was “algo habrá hecho - they must have done

something”.

Internal ETA documents show that, with their fatal attacks, ETA

wished to cause a repression of the State in those years and

therefore legitimise itself in the face of public opinion. This

perverse dynamic was called internally: “action-repression-

action”.

The Spanish Democratic Constitution was approved on the 6th of

December 1978. One year and a few months previously, on the

15th of October 1977, the Amnesty Law was enacted to directly

benefit ETA prisoners. As a consequence of this historical

circumstance, more than 66 ETA murder cases were consigned

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“WHOEVER IS NOT LIKE US SHOULD GET OUT”

After each murder, the terrorists would issue a press communiqué. “Whoever is not like us should get out”, “...until their total physical

elimination or permanent expulsion from the Basque territory” – these were common expressions in the communiqués


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DURING THE DICTATORSHIP

The first violent acts occurred in December of 1959, with the placement of bombs in Vitoria, Bilbao and Santander. The first fatal attack occurred in 1960, when a 22-month-old baby named Begoña Urroz Ibarrola was caught in a fire bomb placed by the group in San Sebastián. The first (deliberate) murder took place in 1968, after the group decided to incorporate assassinations into its strategy. The victim was a Civil Guard who stopped two terrorists at a roadblock.

The first fatality was in 1960. The first (deliberate) killing was in 1968

Total fatalities: 45

DURING THE TRANSITION

Tras la muerte de Franco se inicia en España un proceso de transición a la democracia, que culmina en 1978 con la aprobación en referéndum de la Constitución. ETA incrementó la actividad terrorista. Ignoró la senda de la legalidad y la democracia. No quiso aprovechar la oportunidad de la amnistía de diciembre de 1977, que hizo que salieran de las cárceles españolas todos los miembros de ETA en prisión. Buscaba desestabilizar la Transición.


DURING THE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD

In the stage of democracy which Spain has been in since the approval of the Constitution of 1978, ETA has killed 724 people. ETA’s activity was most intense during the first years after the approval of the Constitution. These years are known in Spain as “los años de plomo - the years of lead”. The eighties also saw a lot of terrorist activity but the number of fatal attacks was seen to decrease in the nineties, thanks to effective police strategy. The regions worst hit by the terrorist murders were, along with the Basque Country, Madrid and Catalonia.


Source: Vidas Rotas


to legal obscurity and dozens were deemed

to be mere negligent conduct . 6

From the point of view of the history of their

beliefs and perceptions, it has to be

highlighted that in the seventies and eighties, ETA truly believed

that it was going to manage to subordinate the state.

They tried to influence the moderate nationalists, the continuers of the first Basque Nationalist traditions, by arguing that only their methods were different, not their political objectives*. It was as if they believed they were the vanguard of all of Basque society, which only included Basque Nationalists. It was as if they thought that the greatest expression of being a Basque Nationalist was their own, which included a systematic strategy of threatening non-nationalists or any representations of democratic legality or of the institutional powers of the Spanish

State.

In 1988, democratic political forces isolated the political arm of

ETA through the Ajuria-Enea Pact . Frustrated by the 7

circumstances, after 1995 ETA sought to circumvent the situation

by increasing the harassment of non-nationalist politicians to

near unbearable levels. Elsewhere, it built bridges with union

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* A certain part of that political tradition, Eusko Alkartasuna, ended up being used by the radical nationalist left to be legalized.

40% of ETA’s assassinations remain unsolved


and civil agents in linguistic, cultural and ideological matters, all

of which were very dear to all Basque Nationalists.

The late eighties and the nineties also saw an awakening of

citizens against ETA. This was done timidly and intermittently,

but it had an effect on the political class.

Throughout this time, ETA demanded negotiations with the

government, whilst making it responsible for the attacks through

its unwillingness to yield to their demands.

For decades, their sense of victimisation and sentimentality

aroused fanaticism in many youths, even in children. On various

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THE POLITICIAN PERSECUTION STRATEGY

Barne Buletina (internal bulletin) number 67, July 1993

“Because even though we hit the txakurras (police), the drug dealers and people like that, they do not see their lives as being in danger, whilst we do see that danger and we have principals. (…) I believe it’s time for them to see us endanger that which we all love the most, life. Because the day that a guy from the PSOE, the PP or the PNV goes to the funeral of one txakurra (policeman - despective) or one hundred and his mouth fills with words of condemnation and crocodile tears, he does not see any danger in his personal situation and he accepts these types of ekintzas (actions) because they are all banded together against our rights as a People. But on the day that he goes to funeral of a party colleague, when he returns home perhaps he will think that it is time to find solutions or perhaps it is his turn to be in the place of the other (feet first in a pine box)”.


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CHILDREN

24 children were murdered by ETA. Others were left seriously mutilated. ETA harassed many of their families intensely. The lives of hundreds of children were miraculously saved from attacks which aimed to kill them in their own beds or cribs. In their homes.

11th of December 1987: three members of ETA detonated a car-bomb near the main gate of the Civil Guard Barracks in Zaragoza. The 40 families who lived in the barracks – members of the Civil Guard along with their wives and children – were asleep. 11 people died, 6 of them children.

16th of December 1987: ETA declared that “the blame for said incident” was on the chiefs of the Civil Guard, on “the current State powers“, and on “the social-democratic directors of the latter” for not taking part in a “Political Negotiation”.

15th of April 1991: ETA placed a limpet bomb on the car of a police officer and it exploded when he was just getting ready to get into the vehicle to take his four children to school. The daily routine of the officer was known by the group. One of the officer’s daughters was killed in the bombing and his other three children were injured, one of them seriously.

24th of April 1991: ETA assured that “the one ultimately responsible for what happened was Police Officer Villamudria, because he used his family as a shield”.

7th of November 1991: a bomb exploded when an officer of the Civil Guard was taking his two-year-old twins to the swimming pool. The members of ETA knew that he travelled to and from work by train and that he only used his personal car with his family. The bomb killed one baby instantly and it injured the other.

21st November 1991: ETA stated in its communiqué that “both the Civil Guard and his companions in the armed forces used their families as shields”.

Source: Vidas Rotas and ETA statements


occasions, the State law enforcement agencies were able to

confiscate the control and recruitment protocols for youth

groups and they also put a stop to the youth leisure camps

which were used for the recruitment of susceptible young

individuals.

Various components and organisations of this violent world

sought new methods other than violence and made their

presence felt throughout society. They supplemented ETA’s

violence and threats with strategic street violence, carried out by

violent young activists who set alight buses, cars, houses, cash

machines and businesses. They also used threatening graffiti and

put pressure on all unsympathetic councillors. The harassment

was especially harmful to non-nationalists and on occasion it

even escalated to murder. Although they did not go quite as far,

they also threatened nationalist councillors and local leaders

when they were deemed troublesome, due to their charisma or

their frankness with regard to terrorist violence, or when there

was a strategic interest in the area.

Some councillors left their jobs. Non-nationalist parties had even

more problems than before in filling their electoral lists and

some local corporations removed all the names from the

electoral lists of one of the non-nationalist parties.

Acting this way and expressing a sincere desire for peace was an

exercise in profoundly psychological blackmail over Basque

society and over the politicians who endured the greatest threat.

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A MONTH IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY!

4th of February 2002 !The PP denounces the distribution of pamphlets containing information about two councillors, Zumárraga and Urretxu. They leave a rucksack with a note in front of the home of a PP councillor in Vitoria. 8th of February 2002 !The only PP council member in Elorrio hands in his resignation. 10th of February 2002 !Various youths disguised with sheets attack the PNV mayor of Azpeitia.!14th of February 2002 !Ibarretxe summons the parties and institutions to address the safety of councillors. 17th of February 2002 !A 75-year-old member of the PSE-EE who left the Basque Country attends a service held in Ermua in support of those threatened. The councillor left Mallabia, a Biscay town governed by the PNV, a year and a half ago, after a warning from someone affiliated with the violent factions. The person said “Leave. We can’t control them”. 18th of February 2002 !The PSOE asks for jail sentences for the intimidation of councillors. 21st of February 2002 !

The only council member of the PP in Ondarroa was insulted and assaulted upon leaving the last Town Council Meeting, usually held at the start of the month. 22nd of February 2002 !Two pistols seized by the Nafarroa cell of ETA were used to assassinate the UPN councillor Tomás Caballero and a Sub- Lieutenant of the Army, Francisco Casanova. 23rd of February 2002 !Threatening graffiti is sprayed next to Maite Pagazaurtundua’s house, the socialist councillor of Urnieta. 26th of February 2002 !The Zumárraga Town Council starts the proceedings to establish an intermediary. 28th of February 2002 !ETA attempts to assassinate Esther Cabezudo, the socialist councillor of Portugalete. The bomb, placed in a shopping trolley, contained 30 kilos of dynamite. The councilwoman and her bodyguard were only slightly injured. The PSE-EE spokesman of Llodio resigns “because the situation has become unbearable”. An artefact explodes at José Ángel Encina’s house in Lasarte, a PP councillor who lives in Donostia. He states that he will continue to fight for “the ability to not require a bodyguard”.

Source: ¡Basta Ya!


After 1995 and for more than a decade, living with a bodyguard

became commonplace for all non-nationalist politicians. Some

nationalist politicians were also under guard. It was even

obligatory for the most humble non-nationalist councillors, civil

activists, businessmen, university professors who were becoming

a consciousness of rebellion against ETA and also for committed

journalists. Resisting the strategic call for socialisation was

complicated and uncomfortable, but it was incredibly weakening

to ETA.

�30

KALE BORROKA

Kale borroka (meaning “street fighting” in English) refers to the urban guerrilla actions carried out by militants or sympathisers of the Basque left-wing nationalist movement and the terrorist group ETA, the majority of whom were youths. What differentiates it from simple acts of vandalism is that they include attacks on political party headquarters or on the property of elected persons who do not share their ideology. It also includes throwing stones or Molotov cocktails in order to destroy street furniture and even the burning down of entire buildings. The most dramatic case was when a toy car, which was loaded with the gunpowder used in this ‘street fighting’, blinded a 17-month-old baby and killed his grandmother, after various altercations between violent youths and the police on the 20th of August 2001. The grandmother thought it was a toy that had been thrown away. It exploded.

Kale borroka activity is on the decline. Its critical point was in the middle of the nineties. In 2014 there have been a few incidents of this type and they were criticised by the current leaders of Bildu and Sortu. The police believe that it is perpetrated by a sector which is critical of the disarmament process.


The State’s Response During the first years of democracy, the State institutions and law

enforcement agencies had to adapt to profound social and legal

changes, as well as to the codes of good practice in matters of

human rights of similar bodies in other European democracies.

The State law enforcement agencies gradually increased their

effectiveness until they became an internationally esteemed

force. The truth is that the young Spanish democracy had to earn

international respect before being able to act effectively against

the branch of ETA which was hiding outside of Spain.

�31

GAL!

The Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (GAL from the Spanish) were ‘parapolice’ groups which participated in what became known as“dirty war” against the ETA criminal organisation and its associates. They were active between 1983 and 1987 and they committed 23 murders. During the legal proceedings against the organisation – the heads of the groups never testified in any court – it was proven that they were financed by high level members of the Ministry of the Interior. The attacks by GAL were not only perpetrated against ETA terrorists but also against those affiliated with the group and against citizens with no known political affiliations, as these were sometimes confused with criminals in the terrorist group and at other times accused of colluding with ETA. The dirty war undermined the fight against terrorism, it gave wings to the false theory of a conflict between the two sides and it ended up being a burden, in view of public opinion, to some of the organisations who were working legally against terrorism.


International collaboration also greatly weakened the

operational and violent side of ETA.

The zero tolerance policy against ETA terrorism was not always

understood by all the Basque democratic political agents. For

almost twenty years, many democrats believed that ETA was

invincible and that giving in or negotiating was inevitable.

In the nineties for example, the nationalist democratic leaders

did not agree with the extradition of ETA operatives to Spain.

The illegalisation of Batasuna *

The illegalisation of the political side of ETA was also polemic but after a certain amount of time, there was no doubt that it was a pertinent step, from a democratic point of view, and very efficient in the weakening of a totalitarian and fanatical strategy as a whole. La colaboración internacional también debilitó a la parte operativa y violenta de ETA extraordinariamente.

Since 2002, Spain has been able to legally pursue parties which seek “to deteriorate or destroy the system of freedoms or to make impossible or eliminate the democratic system”, including those which “give express or tacit political support to terrorism, legitimise terrorist actions to obtain political gains outside of

�32

* Different political parties of the same entourage have been: Herri Batasuna, Batasuna, Euskal Herritarrok. After been illegalised they used PCTV y ANV. Since 2012 they have used Bildu and Sortu.


pacific and democratic discourse, and/or exonerate or minimise its significance”.

In fact, Spanish law ordered the suspension of activities and the dissolution of the ETA’s political groups and satellite organisations, i.e. its entire political framework. These decisions were confirmed in all Spanish courts of law and also in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in 2009.

The ECHR backed the dissolution of the two political parties linked to ETA as there was a “pressing social need” and because the action was “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”, especially in the preservation of public safety, the defence of order and the protection of rights and freedoms. The sentence affirmed that Batasuna and Herri Batasuna acted as instruments of the terrorist tactics of ETA. Along with this, it was mentioned that the creation of the various subsequent political parties was done with prior knowledge of their illegal nature and that the

�33

THE ANTI-TERRORIST PACT

The Anti-terrorist Pact was an agreement signed by the PP and the PSOE in December of 2000, after having been proposed by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The main objective of the pact was to declare that anti-terrorist policy was State policy, removed from political confrontations that had electoral objectives. It also represented the unity of democrats in the face of ETA totalitarianism and it was a way of differentiating against speeches that were ambiguous towards terrorism. When Zapatero’s Government decided to initiate a negotiation process with ETA, the pact became, de facto, no more than a piece of paper which propagated a use of deceitful language.


refusal to condemn the violence would be understood as an attitude of tacit support of terrorism.

After the illegalisation in 2003, the political facet of ETA created local electoral platforms to avoid the actions of justice. Some of them managed to circumvent the law and so their feuds were kept alive under their social and political dominion. They also managed to do the same thing in other elections, using all manner of ruses.

With the illegalisation of their political frameworks, the

strategists among ETA’s supporters realised that from now on

they would not be able to profit from their perverse game, both

inside and outside of any institutions. They continue to give the

impression that they are attempting to save the underlying

political strategy, altering their tactics and abandoning the

violence which is becoming increasingly costly in terms of

Basque and Spanish public opinion.

Zapatero and the attempt to end ETA violence through dialogue

On the 22nd of March 2006, ETA announced a permanent ceasefire. The government acted opaquely. Some of the things it hid have been subsequently discovered, impeding the expression of the opinion of the people, as adults with full rights to criticism and to speech in large social debates.

The PSOE began this strategy without the support of the PP and this was one of the great errors in its mandate.

�34


In 2013, Teo Uriarte wrote with great insight:

“That negotiation in 2006 was called a process because whenever anyone approaches the world of ETA, they return with some new concept, as false as the group itself but initially striking. It was later declared an “historic process” but in the language of the Basques, although it may appear very important, it is nothing other than normal because any political matter is historic for the Basques. There is no doubt that calling it a “process” gave it, from a propaganda point of view, a validation which it would not have obtained if the term “negotiation” was used, seeing as there had already been many failed negotiations in the past. Furthermore, the word “process” avoided falling into the realm of previous meetings which were highly restricted to so-called technical matters about the world of ETA, such as the prisoners, the penitentiary measures and the return of those who fled abroad, in exchange for peace. Now the word “process” must indicate something much more ambitious, political reforms included. In other words, it should indicate a profound and legitimising political change with those who endured the terrorism, including praise for the efforts they made to end the conflict.

The Government called it a “Peace Process” as if we had to resolve a long term war and not just a few terrorist attacks, in a prone attitude, demonstrated in the words to resolve the violent activity of ETA, putting forward too much compromise and will. ETA and Batasuna called it a “Democratic process”, snatching a

�35


win seeing as they were setting up something more complete: a procedure to achieve real democracy, still false, and in doing so slipping their most dear demands - self-determination and territoriality - into this pseudo-democratic impulse. At first glance, the inaugurated process went much further than previous negotiations, the majority of which failed. I believe it was something much more profound, with constituent nuances which were added to other constitutional mutations, as was the case with the new Catalonian Statute.

However, both concepts were false. The real or democratic peace process should start with the Constitution of 1978, which is what was in crisis.

Eduardo "Teo" Uriarte, Tiempo de canallas. La democracia ante el fin de ETA (A time of scoundrels.

Democracy before the end of ETA), 2013.

Ed Ikusager *

The Government’s negotiations with ETA ended after the bombing of

Madrid Airport Terminal 4 on the 30th of December 2006, an event

which killed two Ecuadorian workers. The government lied to the

people when it said it would not maintain contact or continue

negotiating.

�36

* In the mid 1960s he joined ETA, for what he was deteined and condemned to death in the Proceso de Burgos (Burgos Process). He spent eight years in prison. After the amnesty, he collaborated in the creation of a nationalist social democrat party. Years after he joined the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party).


This period deserves a monographic dossier in order to analyse the

State’s transparency and whether the Government strictly or vaguely

followed the spirits and contents of the Spanish legal system. !

!!!!

�37

THE LEGALISATION OF SORTU After a somewhat opaque process, about which not many facts are known, the Constitutional Court (whose members are elected by the political groups who are represented in Congress) legalised Sortu as a political party on the 20th of June 2012, contravening the previous decision by the Supreme Court, which believed that said party should be illegal as it was a reincarnation of Batasuna. Red lines were established in the sentence and it was said that if they were not crossed it would lead to the process of the legalisation of Sortu: 1. Violence: comparing terrorist violence with the legitimate

coercion that a Rule of Law reserves for law enforcement. 2. Victims: attempting to equate the suffering inflicted on the

victims of terrorism to the sentences of those convicted. 3. Blackmail: legitimising terrorist acts as a means to achieve

political objectives or using blackmail. 4. Perpetrators: praising the perpetrators of terrorist acts as

“victims” or “heroes”, especially by institutions. 5. Legality: inciting the breaking of laws with the objective of

achieving political goals.


The Role of Civil Society and the Victims of Terrorism 1981 saw the creation of the first self-help association to help other families and it was founded by three valiant women: Ana María Vidal Abarca, Sonsoles Álvarez de Toledo and Isabel O’Shea. It was the embryo of the Association of the Victims of Terrorism (AVT).

There is a long and uncomfortable path from the first self-help associations or the first bands of pacifists to the emergence of civic movements with real social relevance.

The Gesto por la Paz (A Gesture for Peace) Association became widespread all over the Basque Country and in 1993 it won the Prince of Asturias Award. From San Sebastián, the ¡Basta ya! Citizens’ Initiative, with unheard of impertinence, stood up to ETA and the taboos which tormented a large section of Basque society with fear (it won the Sajarov prize in 2000). COVITE, the Collective of the Victims of Terrorism, came about in 1998, overcoming the terrible fear of simply being noticed, right in the heart of where the political disease of violent nationalism was nesting.

Some journalists faced up to the fearful environment and started to label murders as murders. University professors started to write in the regional press, arguing and encouraging other citizens to do the same. Pacific activist movements which went against the grain were threatened by the world of ETA and their colleagues. ETA tried to neutralise them by creating false movements and did not hesitate to murder some of the more outspoken activists of Basta Ya.

None of those in Gesto por la Paz were killed but they were also threatened in the towns where social control was more overwhelming.

�38


Among other threats, the business of a humble pacifist was burnt to the ground.

In any case, it from was Basque society that the seed of resistance and the denouncement of ETA terrorism sprouted.

The intensification of the harassment in the so-called “socialisation of suffering strategy” also awoke a lethargic part of the Basque conscience. This awakening came to a head, in the Basque Country and also in the rest of Spain, in July 1997 when ETA kidnapped and put a time limit on the life of a young PP councillor, Miguel Ángel Blanco.

Victims

At this point it needs to be said that the victims of ETA did not educate their children in vengeance, despite the stigmatisation, despite the dual victimisation that many of them must have suffered. There was no violent reaction from them for over fifty years. And after the last years of the nineties, this powerful sense of human dignity became the key in the visibility of the victims.

Indeed, the victims had to walk a long path from stigmatisation to visibility, from dehumanisation to humanisation. And when this happened, it raised the stakes amongst their own ranks when it came to killing.

It should be noted that many of the survivors of attacks and the families of those who were murdered left the Basque Country, unable to withstand local environments which were often more favourable to the killers than to the victims.

!

�39


Hearts of ice

It was not easy to participate in politics in the threatened parties – the Socialist Party and the People’s Party. For many years, the governing nationalism was not perceived as close to the majority of those harassed and by the victims . 8

In fact, former Basque president Juan José Ibarretxe, in 2006 during a remembrance of the anniversary of the brutal attack in the Hipercor shopping center in Barcelona, said sorry for «the 9

distance that victims have felt sometimes from the authorities» and «loneliness with which they have had to deal with the pain due to losing those who they love» . 10

�40


ETA’s defeat and the traps of language

– 'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’ – ‘The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ –‘The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master — that's all.'

Lewis Carol, Alice Through the Looking Glass

“Those who are considered terrorists today, may not be so tomorrow. It depends on who wins the political battle”. (2007)

Pernando Barrena, Batasuna

“We are not willing to reject or review any of that. We defend what we were and what we are, what we have done and what we do. It couldn’t be any other way.” (2013)

“What we have to fight is the view that we should concede that our path has been an enormous mistake, that they were right and that we should integrate ourselves into the democratic game which we rejected 35 years ago”. (2013)

Hasier Arraiz, Batasuna

Defeating ETA with the police does not mean that its strategic

project is defeated.

�41


“Go back to your own country. Our people on the streets, yours

in a hole”. In December of 2013, this was how various groups

affiliated with the radical nationalist world received a group of

people from the Association of the Victims of Terrorism who

intended to march through five of the towns worst hit by ETA.

Such moral spitefulness can only thrive where relativism makes

itself at home.

On the 28th of December 2013, the collective of ETA prisoners

(EPPK) insisted that “what brought us to prison was the fight for

the political and social freedom of our people”. And therefore

now “is the time for political responsibility. For everyone”.

Other party members, as we will see, are less brutish and use

euphemistic language or the creation of cognitive contexts

designed to neutralise the blame. As the crime is undeniable,

their strategy consists of continuing to impose their interpretive

framework. In this respect, they allege that the political nature of

the crime is an attenuating circumstance, rather than, as it

actually is, an aggravating circumstance.

The distorting language of this ‘gloss over’ strategy has recently

lead some ex-convicts to attend services for the victims of

terrorism to say that they regret having humiliated those who

suffered through terrorism, “although” (or “but”) they put it

down to the tensions of “the conflict”.

�42


“Not memory. Memories”, said one intellectual affiliated with

the radical Basque nationalist world. That is why they have opted

for a “summing up of stories” to allow the construction of “a

process of peace and of democratic coexistence for our

people” . 11

“If, through action or omission, they continue to deny the real implications of the crimes of ETA, and the responsibilities that derive from them, the murders will end up seeming a bit more understandable and nationalist terrorism will seem less culpable” . 12

It is no surprise, therefore, that the leader of Sortu affirms that

“our debates must be political, about political content; ethics

must be left to each his own” . This involves ignoring the fact 13

that ultimate political values, such as equality, liberty and justice,

are also moral values; that dignity, which sits on the frontispiece

of our constitutions, is a moral concept; and that from them are

derived all the fundamental rights, whose foundations could be

nothing other than moral as well. It is more than evident that

whoever wishes to categorically separate politics from morality is

doing nothing more than seeking an excuse for not having to

explain their own political stance: if something is good or bad,

just or unjust, it is a matter of each person’s own morality. All of

this permits them, on the one hand, to save the value of the

political project (by simply renouncing violence). And on the

other, to wish to neutralise their responsibility by alluding to the

fact that it took place among other violent acts concerning

�43


French and Spanish repression, as if terrorism was the same as

subjection to the rule of legally limited justice.

Their unflinching premise of victimisation and national-populist

organicism is condensed into the magic words: “the conflict”.

“The conflict” served as a pretext for the persecution and

harassment of Basque non-nationalists and it now serves to

neutralise their responsibility for their violent acts. Because “the

Basque people” – considered organically and essentially – as a

whole, “have been and continue to be the victims of Spain and

France”.

When all persons (despite their actions), all ideas (despite their

quality) and all projects (despite their consequences) deserve the

same respect and are given the same value, a false tolerance is

produced through a wish to be universal: to tolerate everything,

without establishing thresholds, is to stand up for a tolerance

which destroys itself.

Moral relativism, the comparison of state violence with terrorist

acts and the equal value of all political projects are all elements

which inevitably lead to the diminishing of the evils committed

(extortion of the State, political assassinations to impose a

discriminating project) in the subjective suffering of each.

As José María Ruiz Soroa explains, it reduces the victims to 14

their empirical dimension (pain, subjective suffering) and forgets

�44


the normative dimension of “victim” (that which symbolises the legal right which is stolen and that stipulated in the Penal Code).

This privatisation of pain seems to demand a privatisation of the

reparations and apologies. Psychological therapy and obtaining

an apology from the murderer is the best that can be hoped for.

The subjective elements would absorb the moral, legal and

political elements. As Sandrine Lefranc wrote in “Un tribunal des

larmes” (A tribunal of tears):

“The invitation extended to the victim is to universalise their pain, to identify with other victims and even with the aggressors. It is not about an in-depth description of political and social belongings, nor about weighing up the acts and their motivations. It is appeasement derived from the therapy of what is being addressed. The victim is therefore defined in universal moral terms and taken care of by psychological means” . 15

Thus arise the civil channels which try to help but are, in certain cases, disputable. Psychological therapy and the apology which can be offered by the aggressor must never terminate the moral, political and legal responsibility, not in the case of the assassin and above all, not in that of the group. The problem cannot be reduced to a rearrangement of the interpersonal relationship. Even the Basque government works to depoliticize the victims and to start anew in a society in which 26% of Basque youths support the use of violence to protect a political project . 16

�45


Closing this chapter without assuming responsibility for the past,

alleging that the memories of each individual are mutually

incommensurable (and that the only ethical level ground is

suffering) supposes the ability to relapse tomorrow.

The citizens’ obligation is to remind the Government that the democratic imperative requires the application of the current laws and to never be content with a simple apology. Pernando Barrena, the leader of radical nationalism, points out, however, that demanding an apology from the aggressors constitutes “a pointless attempt at additional humiliation” . 17

Pressured intermittently by the public powers and permanently by the victims’ collectives, the collective of ETA prisoners showed, in December 2013, a “willingness to analyse the responsibility of each of us, within an agreed process which fulfils the appropriate conditions and guarantees” . Those 18

responsible for so much terror always make demands.

This sketch aims to establish the value of the Rule of Law in the

face of the end of the terrorism we have suffered. But there is no

way of doing this if the law is not obeyed and if we do not

resolve the more than forty percent of ETA killings which

continue to know no truth or justice. A society which is damaged

in terms of its moral fibre needs the regeneration of this

damaged fibre but also, a society which is damaged because the

sense of the law and of the play of democratic plurality has

disintegrated due to fear, needs to escape from any temptation

�46


of impunity. Society needs the law to function and be respected

and to repair the freedom of non-nationalist thought, which was

so damaged.

!

�47


The challenge: Democracy and Liberty The victims of ETA’s terrorism should remind us that democracy

was founded on the political equality of all citizens and that, as a

synonym of self-government, their function is to ensure the

political freedom of all. Citizens are, as Rousseau warns: “free if

they subject themselves to the laws which they themselves have

enacted”.

Secondly, and staying with Rousseau, this needs the people to

not confuse “common will” or aggregated interests or the

simple majority rule with “general will”.

It is necessary for the Law to channel this participation in order

to avoid the majority crushing the minority, seeing as the portion

of reason that the latter may have will allow them, based on the

public defence of their ideas, to become the majority of

tomorrow. Therefore, there is no democratic participation

without respect for fundamental rights, without tolerance,

without political pluralism and without the division of powers,

etc. This is especially pertinent to the Basque Country after the

situation of political harassment described herein.

In short, there is no democratic participation if there is no

institutionalised Rule of Law in liberal constitutions.

�48


Well, this is what advanced stage national-populism refuses to

accept. These political diseases do not hold the individual as a

moral unit but instead they constantly appeal to the undefined

entity: “the people”. They defend political theology: before

politics (which actually refers to public deliberation or

parliamentary procedure) there is the political, a prior category -

pre-democratic and essentialist.

The political is based on power and it determines the “conflict”,

something which is not (nor does it wish to be) democratically

resolvable. This power should not be subject to law (Kelsen) but

rather the law should be subject to the victorious power

(Schmitt).

Thus, the political is a dangerous struggle for power which, once

attained, does not look out for the minorities who disagree with

it, but instead treats them like enemies.

These political ideas are hidden behind the appeal for the

existence of a secular “conflict”. This is how they avoid justifying

their stance. This is why they speak of “progressing towards

peace” as if there was a war between the two sides. This sustains

and encourages the discourse which gives rise to the status of

“the people”, supported by history as a step towards

independence.

�49


It is clear that when this type discourse

about the political sinks its claws into a

citizen, that citizen will refuse to support

due procedure and the Rule of Law.

If Schmitt’s ideas are absorbed by the

population and people believe that

democracy consists of imposing the will

of the majority on the minority, without

any other limitations, the Rule of Law will de facto cease to exist.

This is why advanced stage national-populism seeks to attract

people to its imaginary, bucolic civil religion, to later take

advantage of its majority and impose its objective by force.

And from there it is small step to car bombs and indiscriminate

machine gun fire with the obvious intention of terrorising the

population into surrendering and then embracing the

secessionist cause, through exhaustion or fear. The ceasefire

tactic also pointed towards social conscience, constantly

presenting itself as the part willing to “start a sincere dialogue”

for “peace” and then blaming the current government for each

death after it did not wish to engage in “dialogue”.

There are ways to avoid anyone using the freedom offered by the Rule of Law in this way and to preserve a real and effective range of liberties. One can, as Germany did in its day, delve into the concept of militant democracy, a term coined by K.

�50

"We defend what we were and what we are, what we have done and what we do"

Hasier Arraiz, Nov 2013


Loewenstein . This endeavours to appeal to a firm face of 19

democracy which obliges the State to neutralise the initiatives of those who do not accept the democratic rules of the game.

Because “to force tolerance to the extreme of admitting fanaticism equates to favouring the victory of intolerance” . 20

However, not even militant democracy can stop the expression of certain ideas, however dangerous they may be, nor does prohibiting their expression stop the problem.

We are therefore left with complying with and enforcing the law

and encouraging a democratic and liberal political culture

among the citizens. Without this, democracy cannot stand. The

assumption that democracy is a fragile regime, with feet of clay

and a dependence on the vigour of its citizens, is essential for

understanding that the multiple types of discriminations which,

to varying degrees, promote political populisms must be

eradicated from social consciousness.

Today, the party descended from Herri Batasuna (whose

hierarchically enforced links to ETA were proven in court and

which refused to discredit the history of the group), with the

same leaders as decades ago, quietly governs San Sebastián

(34% of the votes) and has obtained a support figure of 20% in

provinces such as Álava and Vitoria.

Therefore, the victimisation cannot be a private matter if the

reason for the death was public. Restoring the dignity of the

victims cannot be understood without strengthening our

�51


democracy, without an idea of political identity structured by the

principles of “equality”, “liberty”, “justice” and “political

pluralism”, with regard to current law.

The dignity of the victims will not be restored whilst it is not

considered a priority to condemn those responsible for a

strategy of systematic persecution of their fellow citizens and to

make them assume the weight of their responsibility. The

community mourning cannot be concluded positively if the

intention is to build the political future of the Basque Country on

the blood of those persecuted, those threatened and those who

fled, as if nothing happened, as if democratic logic was not

corrupted, as if fear did not condition people’s consciences.

It is as if seeking the lowest common denominator in suffering

was a good start and not a smoke screen for not having to look

at an uncomfortable part of the past.

!!

�52


Appendices 1. On the Basque Country, Navarre and French Basque Country

�53

AREA AND POPULATION

The Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, with an area of 7,234 square kilometres, has a population of 2.2 million inhabitants. The Chartered Community of Navarre has around 650 thousand inhabitants who are spread over an area of 10,391 square kilometres. The French territory with a French Basque-speaking community which is claimed by the Basque left-wing nationalists has an area of 2,900 square kilometres and an approximate population of 300,000 people.

POLITICAL AUTONOMY

The Basque Country and Navarre are two of the regions with the most political autonomy in Spain and in Europe. They have their own Autonomous Statutes and their own police force, education systems and tax systems, among other things.

Within the Spanish model of Autonomous Communities, which in itself supposes a high level of decentralisation, the Basque Country and Navarre have greater autonomy, due to the so-called Charter Regime. This historic status, recognised in the Spanish Constitution, grants these two Communities certain specific characteristics in their tax regimes. These factors have clearly favoured the Basque Country and Navarre over other regions in Spain.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION

The GDP per capita rose from 89.6% of the European average in 1990, to117.1% in 2002, to 125.6% in 2005 and then to 137% in 2008.

The Basque Country had a GDP per capita of 129.7% in 2008 and in 2012 this percentage rose to 132.5%. The unemployment rate, although high (16.1% in the second quarter of 2014), is notably lower than the Spanish average (24.5%).


2. Assassinations by year

YEAR VICTIMS YEAR VICTIMS

1960 1 1986 42

1961 0 1987 52

1962 0 1988 19

1963 0 1989 18

1964 0 1990 25

1965 0 1991 45

1966 0 1992 26

1967 0 1993 14

1968 2 1994 13

1969 1 1995 18

1970 0 1996 5

1971 0 1997 13

1972 1 1998 6

1973 6 1999 0

1974 19 2000 23

1975 16 2001 15

1976 18 2002 5

1977 11 2003 3

1978 68 2004 0

1979 80 2005 0

1980 98 2006 2

�54


!!!3. Assassinations by type of attack

4. Assassinations by type of explosive

1981 32 2007 2

1982 40 2008 4

1983 41 2009 3

1984 33 2010 1

1985 37

TOTAL 858

TYPE OF ATTACK VICTIMS

Explosives 307

Shooting 545

Others 5

TOTAL 858

TYPE OF EXPLOSIVE VICTIMS

Molotov concktail 2

Grenades 3

Explosive letter 13

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Source: Vidas Rotas

Source: Vidas Rotas


!!!!!!!!

Bomb under the victim’s car 41

Bomb car 158

Other bombs 90

TOTAL 307

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Source: Vidas Rotas


Bibliography ALONSO, Martín (2012). El lugar de la memoria. La huella del mal como pedagogía democrática. Bilbao. Bakeaz

ALONSO, Martín (2004). Universales del odio. Creencias, emociones y violencia. Bilbao. Bakeaz.

ALONSO, Martín y PARDO, María, (2010) Una ética para el debate. Cuadernos Bakeaz 100, Bilbao, p 5

ALONSO, Rogelio; DOMINGUEZ IRIBARREN, Florencio; GARCÍA REY, Marcos. (2010). Vidas Rotas. Historia de los hombres, mujeres y niños víctimas de ETA. Madrid. Espasa.

ARREGI, Joseba (2014) Materiales para una narrativa de las víctimas. La historia del terror de ETA. Manuscrito

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CALDERÍN, Juanfer F. (2014) Agujeros del Sistema, Bilbao, Ikusager

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Special thanks to Joseba Arregi for letting us access to the manuscript of his “Materiales para una narrativa de las víctimas. La Historia del terror de ETA”. Special thanks to Juanfer F. Calderín for letting us access the manuscript of his book “Agujeros del sistema”.


CASQUETE, Jesús (2009). En el nombre de Euskal Herría. La religión política del nacionalismo radical. Bilbao. Tecnos

COVITE (2013) La verdad que cura. Manuscrito

DOMINGUEZ IRIBARREN, Florencio (2003). Las raíces del miedo: Euskadi, una sociedad atemorizada. Madrid. Editorial Aguilar.

DOMINGUEZ IRIBARREN, Florencio (2002). Dentro de ETA. La vida diaria de los terroristas. Madrid. Editorial Barquillo.

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GONZÁLEZ, Santiago (2011) Lágrimas socialdemócratas. La Esfera de los Libros

GONZÁLEZ, Santiago (2004) Palabra de vasco: la parla imprecisa del soberanismo. Espasa

GORRIARÁN, Carlos Martinez (2008). Movimientos cívicos. De la calle al Parlamento. Madrid. Ediciones Turpial.

MARINA, Jose Antonio (2006). Anatomía del miedo. Un tratado sobre la valentía. Barcelona. Anagrama.

MATE, Reyes (2008). Justicia de las víctimas. Terrorismo, memoria, reconciliación. Barcelona. Anthropos.

OZ, Amos (2002). How to cure a fanatic.

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PAGAZAURTUNDÚA RUIZ, Maite (2004). Los Pagaza: historia de una familia vasca. Madrid. Temas de hoy.

RIVERA, Antonio; CARNICERO HERREROS, Carlos (eds.) (2010). Violencia política: historia, memorias y víctimas. Madrid. Maia ediciones.

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ULAYAR MUNDIÑANO, Salvador (2013). Morir para contarlo. Madrid. Sahats.

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VARIOS (2010). Democracia, nacionalismo y terrorismo en el País Vasco. Madrid. Ciudadanía y libertad.

VARIOS (2012). Las víctimas del terrorismo en el discurso político. Madrid. Dilex.

!!!!!!

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References

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Sakharov price 2000: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/1

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CALDERIN, Juanfer F (2014) Agujeros del sistema, Bilbao, Ikusager, p 206

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2013/01/12/actualidad/1358018722_673896.html

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ABC: http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-20-06-2006/abc/Nacional/ibarretxe-pide-perdon-a-las-victimas-en-el-19-aniversario-de-hipercor_1422089764415.html#

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historia del terror de ETA. Manuscrito

Rogelio Alonso, ABC, 5/04/201412

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http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-20-06-2006/abc/Nacional/ibarretxe-pide-perdon-a-las-victimas-en-el-19-aniversario-de-hipercor_1422089764415.html#

http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/01/12/actualidad/1358018722_673896.html

Arraiz: 'Nuestro debate es político, la ética hay que dejarla para cada cual’, in EL 13

MUNDO: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/30/paisvasco/1364640073.html

Ruiz Soroa, Privatizar las víctimas, in El País, 11/11/2013: http://elpais.com/14

elpais/2013/11/06/opinion/1383765931_387157.html

Sandrine Lefranc, “Un tribunal des larmes”, La Vie des idées, 08/10/2013: 15

http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Un-tribunal-des-larmes.htlm

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defender sus ideas políticas o religiosas, in El Correo: http://www.elcorreo.com/bizkaia/sociedad/201408/16/cada-cuatro-jovenes-vascos-20140816134650.html

Sortu dice que exigir a los presos de ETA que pidan perdón es “un intento 17

baldío de humillación”, in El Correo: http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/20140320/mas-actualidad/politica/sortu-dice-exigir-presos-201403201101.html

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ALONSO, Martín y PARDO, María, (2010) Una ética para el debate. 19

Cuadernos Bakeaz 100, Bilbao, p 5

Ibid.20


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http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/30/paisvasco/1364640073.html

http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Un-tribunal-des-larmes.htlm

http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/11/06/opinion/1383765931_387157.html

http://www.elcorreo.com/vizcaya/20140320/mas-actualidad/politica/sortu-dice-exigir-presos-201403201101.html

http://www.elcorreo.com/bizkaia/sociedad/201408/16/cada-cuatro-jovenes-vascos-20140816134650.html

http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2013/12/28/52beea8222601d317e8b456e.html

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UPyD | Freedom and democracy. basque terrorism, a political pathology

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