Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth

8/7/2019 Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth

1/23

Bond Law Review

| Issue 1Volume 22 Article 3

6-1-2010

Untangling the Constitutional LabyrinthRabindra Kr Pathak

This Article is brought to you by the Faculty of Law at ePublications@bond. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bond Law Review by an authorized

administrator of ePublications@bond. For more information, please contact Bond University's Repository Coordinator.

Recommended CitationPathak, Rabindra Kr (2010) "Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth," Bond Law Review: Vol. 22: Iss. 1, Article 3.Available at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blrhttp://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3http://epublications.bond.edu.au/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://epublications.bond.edu.au/http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr


2/23

Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth

Abstract

The tradition of analytical jurisprudence, from John Austin and Hans Kelsen onwards, highlights, in all its

complexity, the basic notion that constitutions constitute a higher law governing all forms of authoritativelegal enunciations and performances. In a sense, a constitution is an attempt by the society to limit itself toprotect the values it most cherishes. In fact, it is an attempt by the society to tie its own hand, to limit itsability to fall prey to weaknesses that might harm or undermine cherished values. In India, we the people,adopted and gave to ourselves a constitution which recognises certain basic fundamental rights of theindividuals under Part III. The underlying idea in entrenching certain basic and Fundamental Rights is to takethem out of the reach of transient political majorities.

Keywords

Constitutional fundamental rights

This article is available in Bond Law Review: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3


3/23


4/23

UNTANGLINGTHECONSTITUTIONALLABYRINTH

61

idea inentrenchingcertainbasicandFundamentalRights is to take themoutof the

reachoftransientpoliticalmajorities.Ithas,therefore,cametoberegardedasessential

thattheserightsbeentrenchedinsuchawaythattheymaynotbeviolated,tampered

or interfered with by an oppressive government. These rights put fetters upon thegovernmentalactions6thatare likely to infringeupon the fundamentalrightswhich

findapristineplaceinourconstitution.TheconstitutionalschemeusesArticle13as

thebulwarkagainstany infringementupon thefundamentalrights. Itgives teeth to

the fundamental rights by making them justiciable.7It arms the judiciary with the

powerof judicialreview8andmakesittheguardian,protectorandtheinterpreterof

thefundamentalrights.It,inessence,conferspoweraswellascastsanobligationon

thecourts todeclarea lawvoid if it is found tobe inconsistentwitha fundamental

right.9FramersoftheConstitutionofIndiatookgreatcareandcautioninweavingthe

delicatefabricofArticle13.And,itbecomesapparentwhenthelabyrinthineframing

ofthearticlerevealsthatthewordlaw(s)hasbeenusedtentimes,eachtimehavinga

newcolourdependingupon thecontext inwhich ithasbeenused.Themeaningof

law within the bounds of four clauses changes its colour with beauteous brevity.10

Amid the myriad constitutional provisions, it shows signs of a chameleon, a

constitutional chameleon! This paper, therefore, intends to bring to the fore the

6 ThegovernmentalactionimpliesthattheStateasbroadlydefinedunderArticle12cannot

takeanyactionthatthreatenstheexerciseoffundamentalrights.ThewordStateincludes

theGovernmentandParliamentofIndiaandtheGovernmentandtheLegislatureofeachof

theStatesandalllocalorotherauthoritieswithintheterritoryofIndiaorunderthecontrol

oftheGovernmentofIndia.7 See,MPJain,IndianConstitutionalLaw,827(2005).

8 ThispowerisexercisedbytheSupremeCourtunderArticle32andbytheHighCourts

underArticle226.9 Thefundamentalrightscannotbeinfringedeitherbyenactingalaworthrough

administrativeaction.10

BeginningwithClause(1),thewordlawreferstotheexistingorpreconstitutionallaws

whileClause(2)isconcernedwithpostconstitutionallawsmadebytheState(asdefined

underArticle12).ThelengthierClause(3)provideswhatwillbeincludedwithinthe

meaningoflawashasbeenusedintheprevioustwoclauses.Itmandatesthatthelaws

musthavetheforceoflaw,anexpressionthatrequireslookingbeyondtheboundsofArticle

13,andtherefore,thewordlawhasadifferentconnotationasusedintheaboveexpression.

Theimportoftheexpressionmayhavetobedeterminedjurisprudentiallylookingatthe

variousmeaningsoflawthathavebeengivenbythelegalscholarsandjurists.Thisaspect

oflawhasbeendiscussionindetailinthispaper.Besides,italsoprovidesthemeaningof

whatwouldamounttolawsinforce.Clause(4)providesthatthetermlawinArticle13

excludesanamendmenttotheconstitutionmadeunderArticle368.(See,ShankriPrasadv

UnionofIndia,AIR1951SC458;GolaknathvStateofPunjab,AIR1967SC1643;Kesavananda

BharativStateofKerala,AIR1973SC1461).

2

Bond Law Review, Vol. 22 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3

http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol22/iss1/3


5/23

(2010)22.1BONDLAWREVIEW

62

niceties and the nuances that inform the meaning of law under Article 13 of the

constitution.Andwhiledoingso,italsoaimstolookattheconsequent implications

that bear profound importance in understanding the import of constitutional

provisionsandtheirlimitations.11

II Meaningoflaw:ashortjurisprudentialdetour

Thesphereoflawissowidethatitpervadeseverywalkoflife.Itchangesitscolour

andcontourdependinguponthecontext.Whatconstituteslawhasinvigoratedmany

adebate.Legaland juristicmeaningsof lawhavedifferent connotationsdeveloped

overaperiodoftime.Sopersaysthatacitizensmainconcernistoknowtheprobable

consequencesofpastorcontemplatedaction.Forthatitisenoughtoknowthatlawis,

roughly, a set of directives issued or accepted by officialswho enforce the directiveswith

organizedsanctions.12However,whenwedelvedeepintovariouslegaltheories,weget

to see the lack of perspicuity that pervades the jurisprudential discourse. What

constituteamongthebehaviouralcodesbywhichgroupsorindividualsinsocietylive

hasbeendefinedby legalphilosophers in threedifferentways.Austindefined itas

thecommandofthesovereign.Hebelievedthatthematterofjurisprudenceispositive

law; law, simply and strictly so called,or law setby political superiors topolitical

inferiors. A careful reading of his theory reveals that he has not denied a role for

naturallaw,buthassidetrackedit.InsomesenseAustinislegalpluralist:hispositive

theoryoflawisatheoryoflawofonlyonesortoflaw:thecommandsofthepoliticalsuperiors

tothepoliticalinferiorsinanindependentpoliticalsociety.13Hewasawareoftheexistence

of customs and moral prescriptions that played a vital and dominant role in

regulatingpeoplesconductandbehaviour.Naturallawtheorydealtwithquestionof

lawinwaythatwasdifferentfromthewaypositivistsdefinedlaw.Thosewhobelieve

in this theory say that law is theapplicationwithina stateorother communityof

rulesthatarederivedfromuniversalprinciplesofmoralityrootedinturninrevealed

religionorreasonorakindofethicalcommunalsensibility.14ToAquinas,lawisan

ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the

community.15BoththeseapproachestodefininglawfindculminationinHLAHarts

11 ReadingofArticle13,especiallythewaythewordlawhasbeenusedintheArticle,

remindedmeofwhatHohfeldsaidaboutthewordright.Itinspiredmetolookatthe

intricaciesthatunderliethebroadcontoursofArticle13.Ashasbeendiscussed,the

meaningoflawseemstobechangingitscolourandcontoureverytimeitappearsinanew

clausewithinthearticle.Ihavetriedtolookatvariousaspectsthatarerelevanttothe

understandingofmeaningoflawunderArticle13oftheConstitution.12

PhilipSoper,ATheoryofLaw,4(1984).13

See,NormanFCantor,ImaginingtheLaw,1(2000).14

See,Supranote11.15

Soperopcitat55.

3

Pathak: Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010


6/23


63

conceptoflaw.Hiselucidationoflawisacritiqueofthecommandtheoryasadvanced

by Bentham and Austin. His analysis is in fact a revised positivism which builds

upon the failure of classical positivism. However, it stands in its own right as a

distinctaccountofthejurisprudentialcharacterofpositivelaw.Throughhistheoryhetried to have a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between

law,coercion,andmorality,astypesofsocialphenomenon.HartobservesthatThemost general feature of law at all times and places is that its existence means that

certain kinds of human conduct are no longer optional, but in some sense

obligatory.16His theory of law comprises primary and secondary rules.17Primary

rules are duty imposing rules and the secondary rules are power conferring rules

which take careof threedrawbacks thatarenoticeable inaprelegal societywhich

possesses only primary rules. Thus he identifies the modern legal system as a

unionofwhathetermsasprimaryandsecondaryrules.Theideaofarulereplacesthe

conceptoftheordersofthesovereignasthecentralfocusoflegalpositivism.18He

describedlawastheunionofprimaryandsecondaryrules.Cotterrellobserves:19

Harts legal theory portrays lawasaselfregulating systemof rules. The rule of

recognitionandothersecondaryrulesareseenasgoverningtheentireprocess

of production, interpretation, enforcement, amendment and repeals of rules

within the legal system.Harts image of law is that of a system inwhich rules

govern powerholders; inwhich rules, rather that people, govern. What is, indeed,

impliedhere isanaspectofthedeeplyresonantpoliticalsymbolsoobviously

missing from Austins jurisprudence the symbol of the rule of law, a

governmentoflawsandnotofmen.(Emphasisadded).

16 See,HilaireMcCoubry&NigelDWhite,TextbookonJurisprudence,33(2002).

17 Tohimtheideaofobligationisatthecoreofrule.Arulehasaninternalaspect,i.epeople

useitasastandardbywhichtojudgeandcondemndeviations.Therulesofobligationare

distinguishablefromotherrulesinthattheyaresupportedbygreatsocialpressurebecause

theyarefelttobenecessarytomaintainsociety.See,RWMDias,Jurisprudence,351

356(1994).18

HLAHart,TheConceptofLaw,6(1961).Thekeywordsare,ofcourse,insomesenseand

Hartdeniesthattheclassicalpositivistmodeloflaw,asanimplicitlycoerciveexpressionof

politicalpower,sufficientlyaccountsforthecharacteroflawasanobligationimposing

socialphenomenon.Hartalsoarguesthatanequationofobligatorycharacteristicofpositive

lawwithmoralobligationisequallyinadequateandthusrejectsnaturalistictheoryonthe

groundthatitinsufficientlydistinguishestheparticularcharacteroflegalobligation.19

Cotterrell,ThePoliticsofJurisprudence:ACriticalIntroductiontoLegalPhilosophy,99(1989).

4




7/23


64

RMDworkinattackedpositivismusing HLAHartsversionasatarget.Hisnotion

of law differs from the one held by Hart as being a combination of primary and

secondaryrules.Hewrites:20

when lawyers reason or dispute about legal rights and obligations,

particularly in thosehardcaseswhenourproblemswith theseconceptsseem

most acute, they make use of standards that do not function as rules but

operate differently as principles, policies, and other sorts of standards.

Positivismisamodelofandforasystemofrules,anditscentralnotionofa

single fundamental test for law forcesus tomiss the important rolesof these

standardsthatarenotrules.

DavidPannicksaysaccordingtoDworkinLawisneithermerelytherightsandduties

createdbylegislation,customandprecedent;norislawmerelytheedictsofnatural

lawormorality.Rather, law is thebodyofrightsgivenexpression to in legislation,

custom and precedent, plus the political and moral rights that are implied by the

political theory that best explains and justifies the existing legislation, custom and

precedent.21

Article13:anoverviewandsomeobservations

Article 13 provides the meaning of law. However, this meaning does not extend

beyondPartIIIoftheConstitution.Itindetaillaysdownthescopeoflawandwhile

doingsomakesitclearthatunderwhatcircumstancesthepreconstitutionalaswellas

postconstitutionallawsshallbevalidorvoid.22Toputitsimply,theguidinglightisif

thelawsareinconsistentwithorinderogationofthefundamentalrights.

20 RMDworkin,TakingRightsSeriously,22(1977).

21 DavidPannick,ANoteonDworkinandPrecedent,43MLR3644(1980).

22 Article13.Lawsinconsistentwithorinderogationofthefundamentalrights.

(1)AlllawsinforceintheterritoryofIndiaimmediatelybeforethecommencementofthis

Constitution,insofarastheyareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthisPart,shall,tothe

extentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.

(2)TheStateshallnotmakeanylawwhichtakesawayorabridgestherightsconferredby

thisPartandanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,totheextentofthe

contravention,bevoid.

(3)Inthisarticle,unlessthecontextotherwiserequires,

(a) lawincludesanyOrdinance,order,byelaw,rule,regulation,notification,custom

orusagehavingintheterritoryofIndiatheforceoflaw;

(b)lawsinforceincludeslawspassedormadebyaLegislatureorothercompetent

authorityintheterritoryofIndiabeforethecommencementofthisConstitutionand

notpreviouslyrepealed,notwithstandingthatanysuchlaworanypartthereofmay

notbetheninoperationeitheratallorinparticularareas.

5




8/23


65

ThisclearlyputsadefinitelimitationonthewidelegislativepowersgivenbyArticle

246.ItiscertainlywithinthecompetencyoftheCourtto judgeanddeclarewhether

therehasbeenanycontraventionofthislimitation.

ThelegislativepoweroftheparliamentandtheStatelegislaturehasbeensubjectedto

twolimitations:

1. Thelawmustbewithinthelegislativecompetence;2. ThelawmustbesubjecttotheprovisionsoftheConstitutionandmustnot

takeawayorabridgetherightsconferredunderPartIII.

Boththeselimitationsbeingjustifiable,thecourtscandecideifeitherofthelimitations

hasbeen transgressedby the legislatureof theParliament.Thepowerderived from

Articles

245

and

246

to

make

law

has

to

be

exercised

keeping

in

view

the

limitations

delineated under Article 13 of the Constitution. This power is subject to the above

limitations.Infact,thisarticleequipsthecourtswiththepowerof judicialreviewby

making thePart III rights justiciable.23That iscourtshavebeenentrustedunder the

Indian constitution with the power to decide the question of justiciability24 as is

perspicuous from the provisions contained under Article 13. In order to keep the

executive/legislature within the limits assigned to their authority under the

constitution the interpretation of laws is the proper and peculiar province of the

judiciary.Constitutionisthewillofthepeople,whereasthestatutorylawsarethe

creationoflegislatorswhoaretheelectedrepresentativesofthepeople declaredintheconstitution thewillofthepeoplemustprevail.25Andthereforeifitisfoundthat

anorderpassedisviolativeoffundamentalrights,wasarbitraryanddiscriminatory,

(4)NothinginthisarticleshallapplytoanyamendmentofthisConstitutionmadeunder

article368.23

ExplainingtheimportofthetermjusticiableinthecontextofAmericanConstitution,

ChristopherNMayandAllanIdesobserve:Statedverybroadly,amatterisdeemed

justiciable,ieoneoverwhichanArticleIIIcourtmayexerciseauthorityifitpossessesa

sufficientnumberofthosecharacteristicshistoricallyassociatedwiththejudicialfunctionof

disputeresolutionChristopherNMayandAllanIdes,ConstitutionalLaw Powerand

Federalism,93(2004).24

AetnaLifeInsCovHaworth,300US227,240241(1937),whereitwasobservedthat[A]

justiciablecontroversyisthusdistinguishedfromadifferenceordisputeofahypotheticalor

abstractcharacter;fromthatishypotheticalormoot.Thetermjusticiabilityreferstoabody

ofjudiciallycreateddoctrinesthatdefineandlimitthecircumstancesunderwhichan

ArticleIIIfederalcourtmayexerciseitsconstitutionalauthority,includingitsauthorityto

engageinjudicialreview.25

AKGopalanvStateofMadras,AIR1950SC27(107).InthisrespecttheCourthassupremacy

overthelegislature.

6




9/23


66

hardshipwascausedtotheaffectedpersonsasaresultoftheorder,quashingisthe

normalrule,therebeingnogroundforcondoningthebreachoffundamentalrights.A

wellknownauthorityonIndianConstitutionobserves:26

Article 13 lays down that what would otherwise been implied, ie the

supremacy of the fundamental rights over any other law in case of

inconsistencybetween the two. It couldalsomean that theconstitutionmakers

intended to confine the application of fundamental rights towhat is stated in this

article.Thus, for example,preconstitutional laws shall be invalidonly to the

extenttheyfallwithin thecategoryoflaws inforce.Asuncodifiedpersonal

laws do not fall within that category, it could be argued that they were not

intended to become invalid on the ground of any inconsistency with the

fundamentalrights.(Emphasisadded.)

In giving to themselves the Constitution, the people have reserved the fundamental

freedomstothemselves.Article13merelyincorporatesthatreservation.Thearticleisnotthe

sourceofprotectionoffundamentalrights,buttheexpressionofreservation.27InAKGopalan

vStateofMadras,28theSupremeCourtobserved:

The inclusion ofArticle 13(1) and (2) in the constitution appears to be amatter of

abundantcaution.Even in theirabsence, ifanyof the fundamental rightswas

infringed by any legislative enactment, the Court has always the power to

declare the enactment to the extent it transgresses the limits, invalid. The

existenceofArticle13(1)and(2)intheConstitutionthereforeisnotmaterialfor

thedecisionofthequestionwhatfundamentalrightisgivenandtowhatextent

itispermittedtobeabridgedbytheConstitution.(Emphasisadded.)

Thereason,asDDBasuopines,isthattheveryadoptionofwrittenconstitutionwith

aBillofRightsandjudicialreviewimpliesthatCourtsshallhavethepowertostrike

downalawwhichcontravenesafundamentalrightorsomeotherlimitationimposed

bytheconstitution.29

IV Forceoflaw

Clause

3(a)

of

Article

13

gives

an

inclusive

definition

of

law

to

be

used

in

this

Article

andthereforethemeaningoflawgiven intheaboveclauseextendstoboththepre

and postconstitutional laws. It mandates such laws to have the force of law.

Interestingly, constitution is silent as to the meaning of this expression. The

26 MahendraPSingh,vNShuklasConstitutionofIndia,36(2008).

27 GolakNathvStateofPunjab,AIR1967SC1643.

28 (1950)SCR88,100.PerKania,CJ.

29 DDBasu,CommentaryontheConstitutionofIndia,689,Vol1(2007).

7




10/23


67

expression, therefore, requiresboth judicialaswellas jurisprudentialexploration to

understanditsmeaning.

NormanFCantorisoftheviewthatLawisthesystemofstateenforcedrulesbywhich

relatively large civil societiesandpolitical entitiesoperate.Thisprogrammed social

functioning isbackedbyapoliticallysovereignbody30Friedmanavoids anattempt

atdefinitionoflaw,andcomesoutwithhisconceptoflawwhenhesays:31

concept of law means a norm of conduct set for a given society and

accepted by it as bindingby an authority equipped with the power to lay

downnormsofadegreeofgeneralapplicationandtoenforcethembyavarietyof

sanctions.(Emphasisadded.)

Theelementofforcebackingthewordsoflawhasbeenconsistentelementinmostof

theattemptsthathavebeenmadetooutlinethecontentoflaw.Classicalpositivistlike

Kelsen who talks about the norms and normative order, also emphasises that law

requiressomekindofcoercion inordertosee that there isanobedienceof the law.

Lawisacoerciveorder.Hesays:32

It follows that a legal order may be characterised as a coercive order, even

thoughnotallitsformsstipulatecoerciveactslawistheprimarynormwhich

stipulatesthesanction.

The lawsmadeby the statehavealways thebackingof themachinery thatensures

that such laws are obeyed as can be seen in the myriad state made laws whichprescribethemeasuresthatcanbeinitiatedincaseofdisobedienceofthelaw.Thatis,

there isalways the forcethatgives life to the lawenactedormadeby thestate.This

force may be said to be the force of law, a force that makes sure that law has the

requisiteeffectivenessamongthoseforwhomitismade.Besidesthestatemadelaws

thereareothercategoriesofpractices thatfind theprotectionandrecognitionofthe

state. Thesemay include the customs andusage of people that form the lifeline of

societal existence. They are laws that precede the positive law. They are prevalent

among the people. They regulate the conduct of the individuals as they enjoy the

acceptance of people who generally regard them as binding their behaviour. And,

when such practices get the protective backing of the state, their enforceability

acquiresanewvigourandlife.

30 See,supranote12.

31 Friedman,LegalTheory,16(2004).

32 DavidSchiff,ModernPositivism:KelsensPureTheoryofLaw,inJamesPenneretal(ed),

JurisprudenceandLegalTheory,195196(2005).ToKelsen,Normisthemeaningofanactby

whichcertainbehavioriscommanded,permitted,orauthorised.Toputitsimply,itimplies

whatoneshoulddoormayorcando.

8




11/23


68

V Doctrineofseverability

The doctrine of severability is an important aspect of understanding the import of

Article13.Anyresorttothisdoctrinecanbehadwhenitbecomesapparentthatapart

ofanylawoffendstheconstitution.InthecontextofIndianConstitution,itisthepart

dealingwithfundamentalrightsthatisthedeterminingfactorastowhenalawwill

be subjected to the above doctrine. DD Basu says that doctrine of severability is

nothingbutthecommonlawruleofultraviresimportedintherealmofconstitutional

law.33Simplyput,thisdoctrinemeansthatifanyparticularprovisionofthestatuteis

unconstitutionalandthatprovisionisindependentoforseverablefromtherest,only

theoffendingprovisionwillbedeclaredinvalidbytheCourtandifitisnotseparable,

thewholeofthestatuteshallfail.34However,inPoindextervGreenhow,35theAmerican

Supreme Court held that the doctrine cannot be applied to substitute for the law

intendedbytheLegislatureonetheymayneverbeenwilling,byitself,toenact.

Indianconstitution

UndertheIndianconstitution,Clauses(1)and(2)twoprovidefortheapplicationof

theabovedoctrine.Boththeclausesdealwiththecontraventionoffundamentalrights

ascontainedinthePartIII.Thetwoclausesprovide:

1 AlllawsinforceintheterritoryofIndiaimmediatelybeforethecommencementofthisConstitution,insofarastheyareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthis

Part,shall,totheextentofsuchinconsistency,bevoid.

2 TheStateshallnotmakeanylaw,whichtakesawayorabridgestherightsconferredbythisPartandanylawmadeincontraventionofthisclauseshall,to

theextentofthecontravention,bevoid.

Thedoctrinesimplyimpliesthatwhereonlyapartoftheoffendinglawisinconsistent

withorcontravenesthefundamentalrights,itisthatpartonlythatshallbedeclaredto

bevoid,andnottheentirelaw.Andthevoidnessiscircumscribedbytheexpressions

to the extent of the contravention and to the extent of such inconsistency. That is, the

applicationof thedoctrineseparates the invalidpartof the law from thevalidpart.

The resultant implication is that thevalidpartof the lawcontinues tobe lawwhile

33 DDBasu,HumanRightsinConstitutionalLaw,217(1994).Alsosee,FieldingvThomas,(1896)

AC600;GreatWSaddleryvR,(1921)2AC91.34

PollockvFarmersLoan&TrustCo,(1895)158US635;LynchvUS,(1933)292US571.InElPaso

RCovGutierrez,(1909)215US,87,itwasheldthatiftheCourtfindsthatanoffending

portionofthestatutetobeseverable,itwillbethedutyoftheCourttodeclareonlythe

offendingpartinvalidandmaintaintherestofthestatute.35

(1885)114US270.

9




12/23


69

thatpartofitwhichoffendstheconstitutionceasestohavethecontentoflaw.Itno

longerremainsalaw.HMSeervaiobserves:36

When a law is impugned as violating constitutional limitations, it may be

possibletosavethelawbyapplyingtheprincipleofseverability.Therearetwo

types of severability the provision violating the Constitutional limitations

maybedistinctandseverable,andtheCourtwouldupholdtherestoftheAct

by severing such distinct provisions and declaring them void. But the

impugnedlawmaybeoneandinseverable;sothatnospecificprovisionofthe

Act could be declared to void. In such circumstances, the doctrine of

severabilityinapplicationorenforcementwouldapply.

When the provisions of the impugned law are so interwoven that they are not

severable, then the entire law, say the Act, is ultra vires. The Privy Council in re

InitiativeandReferendumActs,observed:37

AparticularsectionofanActmaynotbeanisolatedandindependentclause,

andmayformpartofoneconnectedindissolubleschemefortheattainmentof

adefiniteobject;inwhichcaseitwouldhavetobeconsideredasaninseparable

partofthewhole.Alawwhichisultraviresinpartonlymaytherebybecome

ultra vires in the whole, if the object of the Act cannot at all be attained by

excludingthebadpart.

InAKGopalanvStateofMadras,38s14ofthePreventionDetentionAct1950wasdeclared

to

be

ultra

vires

by

the

Supreme

Court.

The

Court

observed

that

the

impugned

Act

minusthisSectioncanremainunaffected.Theomissionofthissectionwillnotchange

thenatureofthestructureofthelegislation.Therefore,thedecisionthatSection14is

ultraviresdoesnotaffectthevalidityoftherestoftheAct.However,thecourthasno

jurisdiction to redraft the legislation. The court cannot sever one single provision

whichcoversvalidaswellas invalidsubjects inordertosavesomeportionof it.In

RMDCvUnionofIndia39thePrizeCompetitionAct1955waschallengedontheground

of violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners as secured under Article

19(1)(g)thecourtheldthattheprovisionoftheActwereseverable.Itobserved,ashas

beenpreviouslydiscussed,thatwhenastatutewasinpartvoid,itwouldbeenforcedas regards the rest, if that was severable from what was invalid.40Separability is a

questionof substance,notof form.Hence,while the substance is tobedetermined

36 HMSeervai,ConstitutionalLawofIndia,421(1991).

37 AIR1919PC145.

38 (1950)SCJ174.

39 (1957)SCR930.

40 Alsosee,PunjabProvincevDaulat,(1942)FCR1;ChintamanRaovStateofMadhyaPradesh,

(1950)SCR759;StateofBombayvFNBalsara,(1951)SCR682.StateofBiharvKameshwar

Prasad,AIR1952SCR889;HarakcahandvUnionofIndiaAIR1970SC1453at1468.

10




13/23


70

from theprovisionsof the statute asawhole, itwillalsobe legitimate to take into

accountthehistoryofthelegislationanditsobject,apartfromitsenactingprovisions,

title,andpreamble.41

VI Doctrineofeclipse

The above doctrine is important as regards the validation of void laws. Certain

existinglawssometimesmaygeteclipsedbyreasonoftheirclashwiththeexerciseof

fundamental rights contained under Part III of the Constitution. There are certain

pertinentquestionsinthiscontextlikewhetherthedoctrineofeclipseappliesonlyto

thepreconstitutionallawsortothepostconstitutionallawsalso,whetherthelawsin

forcebeforethecommencementoftheconstitutionbecomevoidabinitioorvoidintoto

if theyare inconsistentwitha fundamental right.Andalsowhatabout thepersons

whoserightsitdoesnotaffect:doesthevoidnessofthelawdependupontheperson

whosefundamentalrightsitcontravenes?TheguidinglightcanbetracedtoArticle13

whichprovides interaliathat All laws in force in the territoryofIndia immediately

beforethecommencementofthisConstitution,insofarastheyareinconsistentwith

the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. The

voidnessofsuch law is limited to theextentof inconsistencywith theprovisionsof

Part III of the Constitution. The voidness of law under Clause (1) does not imply

voidness ab initio. InKeshavanMadhavMenonvStateofBombay42the effectofArticle

13(1)wasinquestionbeforetheCourt.TheCourthadtodecidetheimportofArticle

13 in thiscase.Thebroad issue in thiscasewaswhetheraprosecutioncommenced

before the commencement of the Constitution, could be continued after the

Constitutioncame intoforce if theconcernedActbecamevoidgiventhat itviolated

Article19(1)(a)and(2)oftheConstitution.DasJobservedthattheprosecutioncould

be continued because the provisions of the constitution were not retrospective

providedtheywereexplicitlysodeclared.

It is axiomatic from the provisions of the constitution that it has no retrospective

effect.PartIIIoftheconstitutionisprospective.43Andthatbeingso,theexistinglaws

can

become,

and

can

be

rendered,

void

from

the

date

of

the

commencement

of

the

constitution. An existing law becomes inoperative only from the date of the

commencement of the constitution. The very fact that it is inconsistent with the

fundamentalrightsdoesnotmakeitadeadlaw.Asfarasthedeterminationofrights

andobligationincurredbeforecommencementoftheconstitutionisconcerned,sucha

41 RMDCvUnionofIndia,(1957)SCR930.Alsosee,KihotoHollohanvZachilhu,AIR1993SC

412.42

AIR1951SC128.Alsosee,BehramKhurshidPesikakavStateofBombay,AIR1955SC123.43

InPannalalBinjrajvUnionofIndia,(1957)SCR233,itwasheldthatArticle13has

retrospectiveeffect.

11




14/23


71

law isagood law. InBhikajiNarayanvStateofMadhyaPradesh,44theSupremeCourt

formulatedthedoctrineofeclipsethus:

Thetruepositionisthattheimpugnedlawbecame,asitwere,eclipsed,forthe

time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First

Amendment)Act,1951wastoremovetheshadowandtomaketheimpugnedAct

freefromallblemishorinfirmity

Therefore,thedoctrineimpliesthattheshadowcastbythefundamentalrightcanbe

removedbyasubsequentamendmenttotheconstitution,andonceitissodone,the

lawinitssuspendedoreclipsedstateistherebyrevived.Itgetsrevived,freedfromall

blemishesand infirmity.Thatis,thepreconstitutional lawscontinuetobe lawthough

in an eclipsed state. They are inoperative laws whose revival in post constitutional

period

is

contingent

upon

a

subsequent

amendment

that

would

remove

the

shadow.

In

KeshavanMadhavaMenon,45Mahajan,CJobservedthat:

thepartofthesectionofanexistinglawwhichisunconstitutionalisnotlaw,

andisnullandvoid.Fordeterminingtherightsandobligationsofcitizensthe

partdeclaredvoidshouldbenotionallytakentobeobliteratedfromthesection

for all intents and purposes, though for the determination of the rights and

obligationsincurredpriorto26January1950,andalsoforthedeterminationof

rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the

constitution.

HMSeervaicomments:46

It isdifficult tounderstandwhat ismeantbynotionallyobliterated from

the section. it is submitted that there is no scope for an unconstitutional

provision being notionally obliterated. The theory of eclipseis quite

inconsistentwithanyobliteration,actualornotional.

Meaningoflaw:pre andpostconstitutionallawtangle

Rivalopinionsaboundas to theapplicationofdoctrineofeclipse topre andpost

constitutional

law.

The

implications

of

different

opinions

are

profound

and

have

a

far

reachingimpactonthenatureoflawasprovidedunderArticle13oftheConstitution.

It is the general view that doctrine of eclipse applies only to the preconstitutional

laws,andnottothepostconstitutionallaws.InDeepChandvStateofUP,47theCourt

held:

44 AIR1955SC781.

45 Supranote41.

46 Supranote4at411.

47 AIR1959SC648.

12




15/23


72

...[T]hedoctrineofeclipsecanbe invokedonly in thecaseof lawvalidwhen

made,butashadowiscastonitbysuperveningconstitutionalinconsistency.

InMahendralalJainivState,48theCourtobserved:

The doctrine of eclipse will apply to preConstitutional laws which are

governed byArticle 13(1)andwouldnotapply topostConstitutional lawswhich

aregovernedbyArticle13(2).UnlikealawgovernedbyArticle13(1)whichwas

validwhenmade,thelawmade incontraventionoftheprohibitioncontained

inArticle13(2)isastillbornlaweitherwhollyorpartiallydependinguponthe

extentofthecontravention.Suchlawisdeadfromthebeginningandtherecan

benoquestionof its revivalunder thedoctrineof eclipse [which]cannot

conferpoweronthestatetoenactalawinbreachofArticle13(2)whichwould

be theeffectof theapplicationof thedoctrineofeclipsetopostconstitutional

laws.

However, interestingly in Bhikaji 49 in which the Supreme Court enunciated the

doctrine of eclipse, Das ACJ made the following observation that tells a different

story:

Alllaws,existingorfuture,whichareinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofPartIII

orourConstitution,are,bytheexpressprovisionofarticle13,renderedvoidto

the extent of such inconsistency. Such laws were not dead for all purposes.

TheyexistedforthepurposeofpreConstitutionrightsandliabilitiesandthey

remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against noncitizens. It is

only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or a moribund

condition.

Itisclearlyinferablethattheabovedictumdidnotmakeanydistinctionbetweenpre

andpostConstitutionallaws.HMSeervaihascommentedthat Itisclearthatthese

observationsarenotrestrictedtoArt13(1),whichdealswiththepreConstitutional

laws, but also to Art 13(2), which deals with postConstitutional laws, because the

CourtdidnotrestitsdecisiononthedistinctionmadeinAmericandecisionsbetween

preConstitution and postConstitution laws.50The following submission ofSeervai

sounds

convincing:

48 AIR1963SC1019.

49 Supranote43.

50 Seervaiopcitat413.DasACJinBhikajiobservedthatTheAmericanauthoritiesreferonly

topostconstitutionallawswhichwereinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofthe

constitution.TheAmericanauthorities,therefore,cannotfullyapplytopreconstitutional

lawswhichwewereperfectlyvalidbeforetheConstitution.itmustbeheldthatthese

AmericanauthoritiescanhavenoapplicationtoourConstitution.

13




16/23


73

[T]he theory of eclipse is based on the premise that a law which violates

fundamental rights is not a nullity or void ab initio, but remains

unenforceable(that is, in a moribund condition); and secondly, it implicitly

recognizesthedistinctionbetweenalawvoidforlegislativecompetenceanda

lawvoidforviolatingfundamentalrights.

DD Basu is of the view that as far as postconstitutional laws are concerned, the

doctrineofeclipseisnotapplicable.51ThesameviewisalsosharedbyMPJain.52

Be thatas itmay, in theStateofGujaratvShriAmbicaMills,53though thedoctrineof

eclipsewasnotanissue,theCourtthroughitsdecisionmadeitclearthatthedoctrine

applies to both the preconstitutional as well as postconstitutional laws. Mathew J

observedthatanystatementthatalawwhichtakesawayorabridgesfundamental

rights conferred under Part III is stillborn or null or void requires qualification in

certainsituations.Althoughthegeneralruleisthatastatutedeclaredunconstitutional

isvoidatalltimesandthatitsinvaliditymustberecognisedandacknowledgedforall

purposes and is no law and nullity, this neither universal nor absolutely true, and

therearemanyexceptionstoit.54Itissubmittedthattheviewwhichholdsthatvoid

underArticle13(2) canonlybevoidagainstpersonswhose fundamental rightsare

takenawayorabridgedbylaw,seemsreasonableandconvincing.Thelawmightbe

stillbornsofarasthepersons,entitiesordenominationswhosefundamentalrights

aretakenawayorabridgedbutthereisnoreasonwhythelawshouldbevoidorstill

bornasagainst thosewhohaveno such rights.55Mathew J inAmbicaMillsmakesa

validpointwhenhereasons:56

[T]herealreasonwhyit(preconstitutionallaw)remainsoperativeasagainst

noncitizens is that it is void only to the extent of its inconsistency with the

rightsconferredunderArticle19andthatitsvoidnessis,therefore,confinedto

citizens, as, exhypothesi, the law became inconsistent with their fundamental

rightsalone.Ifthatbeso,weseenoreasonwhyapostconstitutionallawwhichtakes

awayorabridgestherightsconferredbyArticle19shouldnotbeoperativeinregardto

thenoncitizensasitvoidonlytotheextentofthecontraventionoftherightsconferred

oncitizens,namely,thoseunderArticle19.

The voidness of preConstitution and postConstitution laws to the extent of

contravention of fundamental rights, proclaimed by Article 13(1) and 13(2) of the

constitution has generated much judicial controversy and confusion. One question

51 DDBasu,CommentaryontheConstitutionofIndia,Vol1,692(2007).

52 Supranote6.

53 AIR1974SC1300.

54 Ibid.

55 CfJainopcitat849.

56 Ibid.Para43.

14




17/23


74

pertains to the scope of voidness of such laws. Despite the rather lavish use of

expressions such as stillborn, law void ab initio, nonest, obliteration from the

statutebookandrepeal, ithasbeenacknowledgedby theCourt, inaalong line

decisions,thatthevoidnessarisingoutofviolationofrightsconferreduponcitizensdoes not entail voidness for all purposes. Such lawmay apply in full force to non

citizens.57As to the question of deciding the voidness of law, ie when does a law

becomevoid,weneedtomakeadistinctionbetweenvoidnessandunenforceability.

Doesalawwhichisunconstitutionalonthegroundoflackoflegislativecompetence,

standonthesamefootingasthelawwhichisviolativeofconstitutionalprohibitions?

JusticeVenkataramaIyermadeadistinctionbetweenalawmadewithoutlegislative

competenceandalawwhichviolatedconstitutionallimitationsonlegislativepower.

The former would be absolutely null and void and non est; the latter was simply

unenforceable.Theunenforceabilityarisesoutof the fact that it iseclipsedby the

provisionsoffundamentalrights.When the longshadowofeclipse isremoved,this

type of law will be automatically revived from the date of removal, and even

retrospectively,ifitweretobesoprovided.Ontheotherhand,alawvoidforlackof

legislativecompetencedoesnotsoreviveuponprovisionofsuchcompetence;ithas

tobereenacted.58Seervaiobserves:59

[T]here is a clear distinction between lack of power and disregarding a

restrictiononpowerasregardsapartofthesubjectmatterofthatpowerand

the most important result of this distinction is that a legislature having a

legislative power can legislate conditionally on the limitation on its power

beingremoved,whereasa legislaturenotpossessing legislativepowercannot

legislateatall.

VII Article13andjudicialdecisions

InAshokKumarGuptavUnionofIndia,60SupremeCourtobserved that Judgmentor

order isnota legislativeActwhich isvoidunderArticle13(2)buta judicialtoolby

whichtheeffectofjudgmentwasgiven.Itfurtherelaborated:

It

is

true

that

Art.

13(1)

deals

with

pre

Constitutional

law

and

if

it

is

inconsistentwithfundamentalrights,itbecomesvoidfrom26.01.1950andif

a postConstitutional governed by Art.13 (2) violates fundamental rights, it

becomesvoidfromitsinception.Eithercasedealswithstatutelawandnotthelaw

declared by thisCourtunderArticle 141 and directions / ordersunderArticle 142.

(Emphasisadded).

57 UpendraBaxi,KKMathewonDemocracy,Equality,andFreedom,XXXV(1978).

58 IbidatXXXVI.

59 Seervaiopcitat421.

60 (1997)5SCC201at248.

15




18/23


75

Article141providesthatthelawdeclaredbytheSupremeCourtshallbebindingon

allcourtswithintheterritoryofIndia.Theexpressionlawdeclarediswiderthanthe

law foundormadeand implies the law creating roleof theCourtand itbecomes

bindingontheState.OnArticle142,thecourthasobservedthatthepowerexistsasaseparateandindependentbasisofjurisdiction,apartfromthestatutes.61Thisplenary

jurisdiction is, thus residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as

necessary whenever is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the

observanceofthedueprocessoflaw,todocompletejusticebetweentheparties,while

administering justice according to law. 62 The power conferred by Article 142 is

curative innatureandcomplementary to thosepowersspecificallyconferredon the

Courts by the statutes. Article 142 is conceived tomeet situations which cannot be

effectivelyandappropriatelytackledbytheexistingprovisionslaw.Itisnotablethat

thoughthe judiciary isanorganoftheStateliketheexecutiveandthelegislature,it

has not been included within the meaning of state as provided under Article 12.

Shouldthisbeconstruedasmeaningthatjudiciarywasnotintendedtobeincludedin

theconceptofstate?Thisquestionassumesimportanceinthatthe actionsofanyof

the bodies comprised within the term state as defined in Article 12 can be

challengedbeforethecourtsonthegroundofviolatingFundamentalRights.

Itistakentobeasettledpositionthatwhileexercisingitsnonjudicialfunctions,the

courts fallwithin themeaningofstateandwhileperforming judicial functions they

wouldnotbeincludedwithinthemeaningofstateasdefinedunderArticle12ofthe

Constitution. That is, the rule makingpower would be within the sweep of the

expressionState,butnottheperformanceofjudicialfunction.Ithasbeenarguedthat

in theexerciseof judicial functionscourtsarerequired todetermine thescopeof

fundamental rightsvisvisa legislativeor executive action.Unless theirpower to

perform that function isexcludedor restrictedby the constitutionoranyother law

theyarecompetent tomakerightsorwrong law.Awrongdetermination insucha

casedoesnotconstituteabreachofanyfundamentalrightbythecourt.Itisgenuine

mistakewhichitiscompetentto,thoughitmustnot,make.63

HMSeervaivehementlyarguesthatjudiciaryisincludedwithinthemeaningofState

asprovidedunderArticle12:64

Article 12 which defines the State for the purpose of Part III, does not

expressly exclude the judiciary, and though Article 12 does not expressly

includethejudiciary,itissubmittedthatthejudiciary,withthelegislatureand

61 MPSingh,NShuklasConstitutionofIndia,454458(2003).

62 Supranote6at267.

63 Supranote60at27.

64 Supranote4at393.

16




19/23


76

the executive, is included in theordinarymeaningofaStateasoneof the

threegreatdepartmentsofaState;andfurther,thattheordinarymeaningisnot

outside the inclusive definition of the State given in Article 12. This

conclusionissupportedbyArt.13whichdeclaresthatanylaw,rule,regulation

andthelike,whichviolatesfundamentalrights,void.ThejudiciaryinIndiahas

the rulemakingpowerand if itwerenottheState for thepurposeofPart

IIIrulesmadebythecourtscouldnotbeimpugnedasviolatingfundamental

rights.

SinceArticle13ofourConstitution,declaringunconstitutional legislativeacts tobe

void, has been inserted only by way of abundant caution, there is nothing in the

Constitution to exclude from thepurviewofArticle12orArticle 32or226 judicial

proceedingsortoassertthatajudicialproceedingwhichisviolativeofaconstitutional

guarantee

would

not

be

void

so

as

to

subject

it

to

a

collateral

attack

in

remedial

proceedingswhichareequallyguaranteedby theconstitution. It is tobenoted that

the definitionof law inArticle 13 includes a custom orusage and any customor

usage which contravenes a fundamental right would be void, under Article 13(1).

Againstthisbackdrop,ifwesupposethataninferiorcourtenforces,byitsdecision,a

customwhichhasbecomevoidbyreasonofcontraventionofafundamentalright.If

anappeal lies fromsuchadecision, theappellateCourtwouldnodoubtcorrect the

decisiononthemerits,ifthepointisproperlyplacedbeforeit.Whathappensifthere

isnorightofappeal,andthematterisbroughtbeforetheSupremeCourtoraHigh

Court

under

its

extraordinary

jurisdiction

under

Article

32

or

226?

Would

the

Court

refuse reliefon theground that itwouldnot interferewithanerror in thedecision

unless the error is apparent on the face of the record; or should the guardians of

FundamentalRights,performitsdutybyreversingthedecisionwhichhasbecomea

nullityowingtoitsbeingfoundedonavoidlaw?

Inviewoftheforegoingdiscussion,anyconclusionmayseeminconclusive.Still,the

views that support thepropositions that judiciary shouldbewithin themeaningof

StateasgivenunderArticle12appearsconvincingthoughsuchastandmayleadto

multiplicityofproceedingsbyraisingthesameissuefirstinappealandtheninwrit

proceedings.

VIII Personallaws

In India thereareseveralpersonal lawswhicharebyand largenonstatutory.They

arenotinacodifiedform.And,religionhasastronginfluenceupontheselaws.The

fact that these have a historical existence that precedes the inception of the

constitution,theyarelikelytocomeinconflictwiththefundamentalrightsprovided

undertheconstitution,whichisaproductofmoderntimes.

Certain featuresof these lawshavebeen challengedbefore thecourtsmanya time.Thecourtshaveadoptedanequivocalapproach.Theapproachofthecourthasbeen:

17




20/23


77

toholdthatpersonallawsnotcompatiblewithfundamentalrights;

todenythatpersonallawsfallwithinthesweepofArticle13,andtherefore,these

lawscannotbechallengedonthegroundofviolatingfundamentalrights.

Gajendragadkar,JinStateofBombayvNarasuAppuMali65observed:

[T]heframersoftheConstitutionwantedtoleavethepersonal lawsoutside

theambitofPart IIIof theConstitution (viz,Fundamentalrights).Theymust

have been aware that these personal laws needed to be reformed in many

materialparticularsandinfacttheywantedtoabolishthesedifferentpersonal

lawsandtoevolveonecommoncode.Yettheydidnotwishthattheprovisions

of personal laws should be challenged by reason of the Fundamental

Rightsandso theydidnot intend to include thesepersonal lawswithin the

definition

of

the

expression

laws

in

force.

Howeveritcanbearguedthat Afterthecommencementoftheconstitution,several

ActshavebeenpassedbytheParliamentandtheStateLegislaturesmodifyingseveral

aspectsofthesepersonallaws.Primafacie,itisdifficulttoarguethatthesestatutesdo

notfallwithinthescopeofArt.13(3)(a).66Theobviousreasonbehindthestandtaken

by thecourtsmaybe that thecourtshaveadopted thepolicyofnon interference in

thatthesemattersconcernthesusceptibilitiesofthepeopletowhomtheselawsapply.

Article(1)(a)providesthatlawsinforceinclude:

lawspassedormadebyaLegislature

orothercompetentauthority.

Thisisaninclusivedefinition.Thatis,itdoesnotexcludeotherformsoflaws.Therefore,

itshouldalsoincludepersonallaws.

IX Custom

The three main sources of Hindu Dharma or law are the Sruti, the Smriti and the

Custom.InCollectorofMaduravMoottooRamalinga67itwasstressedbythecourtthat:

UndertheHindusystemoflaw,clearproofofusagewilloutweighthewrittentextof

law. Ithasbeen repeatedlystated thatacustommaybe inderogationof smriti law

andwhereproved toexistmay supersede that law.The tenacityof family customs

evenunderthestrainofmigrationhasbeenrepeatedlyrecognizedindecisionsofthe

65 AIR1952Bom84.Alsosee,DanielLatifivUnionofIndia,AIR2001SC3958;AhmedabadWomen

ActionGroupvUnionofIndia,AIR1997SC3614.66

Jainopcitat846.67

See,YouthWelfareFederationRepByItsChairman,K.JPrasadvUnionOfIndia,1996(4)ALT

1138.

18




21/23


22/23


79

prevailing public opinion of the community in the place where the custom

prevails?IthasbeensaidthattheJudgeshouldnotconsulthisownstandards

orpredilectionsbut thoseof thedominantopinionat thegivenmoment,and

that in arriving at the decisions the Judge should consider the social

consequences of the custom especially in the light of the factual evidence

availableastoitsprobableconsequencestheJudgeshouldnotfollowmerely

themassopinionwhenitisclearlyinerror,butonthecontraryheshoulddirect

it,notbylayingdownhisownpersonalandisolatedconceptionsbutbyresting

upontheopinionofthehealthyelementsofthepopulation,whoseguardiansof

anancient tradition,whichhasproved itselfandwhich serves to inspirenot

only those of a conservative spirit but also those who desire in a loyal and

disinterestedspirit tomakeradicalalterations to theorganizationsofexisting

society.Thus,thejudgeisnotboundtoheedeventotheclearlyheldopinionof

the greater majority of the community if he is satisfied that that opinion is

abhorrenttorightthinkingpeople.

X Amendments:aretheylaw?

ThequestionwhetheranamendmenttotheconstitutionmadeunderArticle368hasa

historywhich canwellbedescribedasa rollercoaster ride. Judicialdecisionshave

varied, so have the opinions. To begin with, in Shankri Prasad vUnion of India,73

SupremeCourtadoptedaliteralinterpretationoftheconstitution,andobservedthat

anamendmentunderArticle368wasenactedintheexerciseofitsconstituentpower

while

the

term

law

used

under

Article

13

referred

to

the

exercise

of

ordinary

legislativepowerconferredontheParliamentbyprovisionsoftheConstitutionother

than Article 368. Therefore, it was held that Article 13(2) does not affect the

amendmentsmadeunderArticle368.74InSajjanSinghvStateofRajasthan,75thesame

questionthatwasraisedinShankriPrasadwasagainraisedbeforetheCourt,andthe

majorityreiteratedtheconclusionofShankriPrasad.However,inL.C.GolaknathvState

ofPunjab76themajority(6:5)heldthatanamendmentmadeunderArticle368isalaw,

andissubjecttoArticle13.Thus,theearliertwocases,ShankriPrasadandSajjanSingh,

wereoverruled.TheConstitution(TwentyFourthAmendment)Act,1971insertedthe

Clause

(4)

which

provided

that

Nothing

in

this

article

shall

apply

to

any

amendment

of this Constitution made under article 368. The Supreme Court in Kesavananda

Bharati v State of Kerala 77 upheld the Constitutionality of the above amendment.

73 AIR1951SC458.

74 Thecourtwasoftheviewthatthewordlawshouldbetakentorefertorulesofregulations

madeintheexerciseofordinarylegislativepower.75

AIR1965SC845.76

AIR1967SC1643.77

AIR1973SC1461.

20




23/23


Therefore it is settled that law under Article 13 excludes an amendment of the

ConstitutionmadeunderArticle368.

XI Inlieuofaconclusion

TheforegoingdiscussionanddeliberationrevealthattheframersofourConstitution

tookgreatcareandcautiontoconstructthestructureofArticle13,thoughitwasonce

declaredtobeanactofabundantcaution.Article13givesteethtothefundamental

rights, and empowers the courts to protect the fundamental rights from any

unconstitutionalonslaught.Theframingofthearticlesuggeststhatitwasintendedto

broadenthescopeofprotectionof thefundamentalrightsby incorporatingboththe

preConstitutional and postConstitutional laws. They also laid down other

requirements that make them worthy of being called a law. However,

notwithstanding the effort so made, confusions and controversies abound as is

apparentfromthejudicialdecisionsthathaveinterpretedtheimportandimportance

ofArticle13.Certainexpressionsused inthearticlehaveamplescopeofgenerating

invigorated controversies, and they did generate such controversies. Personal laws

presentoneaspectofArticle13thatshowshowtheinterpretationshavevaried,and

so have the opinions. There are cogent arguments that contend that personal laws

should be included within the meaning of law under Article 13. The courts have

adoptedanequivocalapproachashasbeendiscussed.However,whenonesees the

approachof the court in respectof the customs,onewondersas to the reason that

compelled the courts to adopt a different approach as regard the personal laws.

Besides,giventhefactthatthedefinitionoflawunderArticle13isaninclusiveone,it

canbearguedthatotherformsoflawthatarenotexplicitlynotgiventhereinmaybe

readaslaw.

Anamendmentmade to theconstitutionunderArticle368showsanotheraspectof

Article 13 that generated a debate as whether they are law within the meaning of

givenintheArticle.Bethatasitmay,thereisnodenyingthefactthattheuseofthe

termlawunderArticle13showsitschameleoniccharacter.Itcanbeseenaschanging

its

colour

with

the

variations

of

context.

Despite

the

shortcomings

that

give

rise

to

misgivings in theunderstandingof its import,Article13showshowbeautifully the

framingofthearticlehasbeendone,takingnoteofalltheseemingimplicationsthat

mayimpedeanyefforttoeffectuatethegoalsoffundamentalrightsunderPartIII.


Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth

Documents

Transcript of Untangling the Constitutional Labyrinth