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Matrimonial Rights and Obligations

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FamilyLawVolume2:Marriage,Divorce,andMatrimonialLitigationFlaviaAgnes

Printpublicationdate:2012PrintISBN-13:9780198072201PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072201.001.0001

MatrimonialRightsandObligations

FlaviaAgnes

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072201.003.0002

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterestimatesthemovementwithinfamilylawsfromthesacramentalpremisesof‘loveandhonour’,‘obedienceandsubservience’,and‘dutiesandobligations’,tomodernframesof‘rightsandentitlements’.Thevariousnuancesandtheordealofaccessingjusticearedealt.Itthencoverstherighttomatrimonialproperty.Therighttoresideinthematrimonialhomeandtherighttoafinancialsettlementattheterminationofmarriagearethetwodistinctrightswhichareunderlyingthemarriagecontract.Itisnotedthatwomenwillchoosetoleaveeconomicadvantagesduringdivorcesettlementstoobtainsolecustodyoftheirchildren.Theconnectionsbetweenawoman’sclaimofchildcustodyandthedependencyitproduceswhileevolvingaframeworkforpropertydivisionposesachallengetotheequalitymodelofmarriageaspartnership.

Keywords:matrimonialrights,marriage,justice,divorcesettlements,childcustody,matrimonialproperty,matrimonialobligations


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SectionA:MaintenanceRightsofWomenThischapterexaminesthreecrucialrightswhichflowfromthecontractofmarriageandassessestheirimpactuponwomenwhenthereisabreakdowninmatrimonialrelationships.

Therightofmaintenance,whichisarightofsubsistenceandsurvival,warrantsanelaboratediscussion.Thisrightisaccessedbyawidesectionofwomenacrossclassandsocialstrata.Sinceitisawellestablishedrightwhichisdeeplyengrainedintoourmatrimonialstatutes,awiderangeofissuessurfaceduringthelegalcontests.Thisistheonlyprovisionforeconomicclaimswithinmarriageand,hence,ishighlycontested.Theimportantingredientsarethehusband’s‘obligation’andthewife’s‘need’,but,situatedwithinthepatriarchalorder,itrevolvesaroundissuessuchas‘matrimonialfault’and‘sexualpurity’.Rightsofchildren,issuesoflegitimacyandpaternity,inheritancerightsofillegitimatechildren,andtheimpactofmen’sbigamyuponwomen’sclaims,arecontextualized.

Apartfromtherightsofwomen,whichistheprimaryconcernofthisbook,incorporatedwithintheprovisionofmaintenancearealsoclaimsofminorchildren,majorunmarrieddaughters,disabledchildren,educationalexpensesofmajorsons,andtherightsofparents.Morerecently,therehavealsobeeninstancesofhusbandsclaimingmaintenancefromtheirwiveswhomaybeinamoresecurefinancialposition.Theimplicationsofthisprovisionuponwomenisalsoexamined.Mostchallengingamongtheproceduralaspectsofthelitigationistheprocessofenforcingadecree,orinotherwords,executionproceedings.Anattemptismadeinthissectiontoexposethereadertothevariousnuancesandtheordealofaccessingjustice.Theseissuesareaddressedinthesecondsection.

Thethirdsectiondealswithyetanotherimportanteconomicrightwhichaffectswomeninconflictmarriages,therighttomatrimonialproperty.Thisrightcanbefurtherdividedintoarighttoassetsandarighttoshelter.Though,therighttoshelterisimplicitinthemarriagecontract,itwasnotclearlyarticulatedinmatrimonialstatutes.Devoidofstatutoryrecognition,this(p.118) righthasevolvedthroughjudicialinterventions.Therighttodivisionofthematrimonialhomeandjointassetsisalsobeingrecognized,tentativelyandhesitantly,byourcourtsinafewcasesonthebasisofcontribution.

SinceIndiafollowstheEnglishcommonlawtraditionofseparatepropertyregime,marriagedoesnotimpactpropertyrelationsandthecourtsdonothavethepowertoorderdivisionofallmatrimonialassets.Thenotionofcommunityofpropertyorjointmatrimonialassetshasnotyetbeenawardedstatutoryrecognition.Thisimportantaspectofmatrimoniallitigationrequireslegislativeinterventioninordertosafeguardwomen’sfinancialinterestsupondivorce.Hence,thetheoreticalframeworkofthisright,theruleswhichgovernthedivisionofproperty,andthedevelopmentofthisrightinEnglandandothercommonlawtraditioncountries,arebrieflysketchedout.

Women’srighttocustodyoftheirchildrenandconcernoveraccessrightsarediscussedinthefourthsection.Thissectiontracesthetransitionfromthelegalmaxim‘fatheras


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naturalguardian’to‘bestinterestofthechildisparamount’andthedoctrinalshiftfromfather’s‘rights’toparental‘dutiesandobligations’.

TheRighttoMaintenance

Maintenance:AnOverview

Maintenancecanbeclaimedbywives(forthemselvesaswellastheirchildren)underallmatrimonialstatutes(exceptundertheDissolutionofMuslimMarriagesAct)asanancillary1reliefinmatrimonialproceedings.Therightcanbeclaimedonlyasasubsidiaryreliefwhileclaimingaprimarymatrimonialreliefsuchasdivorce,judicialseparation,annulmentofmarriage,orrestitutionofconjugalrights.Thereareotherstatutes/legalprovisionswhichgrantwomen,children,parents,andwidoweddaughters-in-law,anindependentrighttomaintenanceaccordingtotheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct,1956,theuncodifiedMuslimLaw,Section125oftheCriminalProcedureCode(Cr.PC),etc.TheProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct,2005(PWDVA,alsoreferredtoasDVA),providesanadditionalavenueforwomentoclaimmaintenanceandcompensationfromtheirhusbandsandliveinpartners.Underthese(p.119)provisions,maintenancecanbeobtainedwithoutthenecessityofinitiatingproceedingsforaprimarymatrimonialrelief.

Table2.1indicatesthevariousstatutoryprovisionsunderwhichtherighttomaintenancecanbeclaimed.

Table2.1LegalProvisionsGoverningMaintenanceClaimsCategory HMA SMA DA ML PMDA HAMA Cr.PC MWA DVAWives S.25 S.

37Uncodified S.40 S.18 S.

125S.3/4 S.

20MinorChildren S.26 S.38 S.

41Uncodified S.49 S.20 S.

125S.3 S.

20Parents S.

125S.20*

Husbands S.24/25

S.40

Widoweddaughters-in-law

S.19 S.20

AdultDaughters S.20

InterimMaintenance

S.24 S.36 S.36

Uncodified S.39 S.18 S.125

S.23

Notes:HMA–HinduMarriageAct,SMA–SpecialMarriageAct,DA–DivorceAct,ML–MuslimLaw,PMDA–ParsiMarriageandDivorceAct,HAMA–HinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct,MWA–MuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsuponDivorce)Act,PWDVA–ProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct.


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*OnlythemotherisentitledtomonetarycompensationunderDVA

MaintenanceasaMeasureofSocialJusticeThelegalprovisionofmaintenanceisreflectiveofasocialobligationwhichthestatecastsupontheeconomicallystrongermembersofthefamilytoprovideshelterandsustenancetoweakermembers,thatis,women,children,theelderly,andthedisabled.TheprovisionforadditionalsafeguardsandspecialprivilegesfordisadvantagedgroupsisgroundedinArticle15(3)ofourConstitution.2TheSupremeCourt,inCaptainRameshChandraKaushal3v.VeenaKaushal,commentedthatSection125ofCr.PCisameasureofsocialjusticewhichisspeciallyenactedtoprotectwomenandchildrenandfallswithintheconstitutionalsweepofArticle15(3)reinforcedbyArticle39.4InBalanNairv.BhavaniAmmaValalamma,5theKeralaHighCourtcommentedthatthoughprovisionsofSection125ofCr.PCalsobenefitsthefather,themainbeneficiaryoftheprovisionarewomenandchildrenindistress,andtheprovisionisconsistentwithArticle15(3)oftheConstitutionasameasureofensuringsocialjustice.

Theprovisionofmaintenanceneedstobegroundedwithintheconstitutionalparadigmofensuringsocialjustice.Itisbasedonthesocialobligationofpreventingdestitutionandvagrancy.TheSupremeCourt,inBhagwanDuttav.KamalaDevi,6hasexplainedtherationalegoverningtheprovisionofmaintenanceunderCr.PCinthefollowingwords:‘Section488,7whichprovidesforthemaintenanceofwivesandchildrenisameasuretopreventvagrancy,oratleasttopreventitsconsequences.Itisintendedtofulfilasocialpurpose:tocompelamantoperformthemoralobligationwhichheowestosocietywithrespecttohiswifeandchildren.’InVimalav.Veeraswamy,8theSupremeCourtnotedthatbyprovidingsimpleandspeedybutlimitedrelief,theprovisionseekstoensurethattheneglectedwifeandchildrenarenotrendereddestituteand,thereby,driventoalifeofvagrancy,immorality,andcrime,fortheirsubsistence.

Morerecently,in2008,theSupremeCourtinChaturbhujv.SitaBhai9explainedtheobjectiveoftheprovisionofmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCinthefollowingwords:‘Theobjectiveofmaintenanceproceedingsisnottopunishapersonforhispastneglectbuttopreventvagrancy,bycompellingthosewhocanprovidesupporttothosewhoareunabletosupportthemselves,andwhohaveamoralclaimtosupport.Itprovidesaspeedyremedyforthesupplyoffood,clothing,andshelter,tothedesertedwife.Itgiveseffecttofundamentalrightsandthenaturaldutiesofamantomaintainhiswife,children,andparents,whentheyareunabletomaintainthemselves.’Similarly,inKomalamAmmav.KumaraPillaiRaghavanPillai,10whichwasalsoreportedin2008,theSupremeCourt(p.120) explainedthat‘maintenance’,undertheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct,includesprovisionsforfood,clothing,residence,education,andmedicaltreatment,andemphasizedthatitmustincludeaprovisionforresidence.Themaintenanceprovidedshouldenablethewifetoliveinamannerthatsheisaccustomedtoinhermatrimonialhome.

Ascanbeobservedfromthesejudicialcomments,theprovisionofmaintenanceiscrucial


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towomenwhoareinconflictmarriages,andtodesertedanddestitutewomen.ItisobviousthattherightofawomantomaintenanceneedstobelocatedwithincitizenshipclaimsenshrinedinourConstitution.Withinthehistoricaloriginsoftheinstitutionofmarriagebasedonapatriarchalsocialorder,foravastmajorityofwomen,marriageresultsineconomicdependency.Therolesandresponsibilitiesassignedtowomenwithinmarriagecompelmanytogiveuptheirjobsorsacrificetheircareerstomeetthedemandsoftheirmaritalobligations.

Duringmatrimonialconflict,atrumpcardoftenusedbythehusbandistowithdrawfinancialsupporttothewife.Further,wheneitherpartyoptsforadivorcetobringanendtoaconflictmarriage,itisthewomanwhofaceseconomichardshipandhastoengageinalonglitigationtoenforcehercrucialrighttoeconomicsubsistence.Usually,theissueofmaintenance/economicsettlementbecomesthemostcontestedaspectofanymatrimonial/divorceproceedings.

Thenon-recognitionofawoman’scontributiontothemarriageandhomereduceshertoastateofdestitutionwhenthemarriagebreaksdown.Neitherthelawnorsocietyrecognizesherroleasahomemakerinconcretemonetaryterms.Irrespectiveofthefactthatawomanhaslookedafterthehome,nursedandraisedherchildren,andinaninvisiblemannercontributedtothefamilysavings,whenthemarriagebreaksdown,thelawrecognizesonlythehusband’stitletothefamilyassets.Thematrimonialhome,assets,savings,andsecurities,aredeemedtheexclusivepropertyoftheman.Thewomen,who,forthedurationoftheirmarriage,livedashomemakers,oftenfindthemselveswithoutsignificantpersonalpropertyorasteadyincometosustainthemselvesduringthedivorceandinthepost-divorcephaseoftheirlife.Formostwomen,re-entryintothehighlycompetitivejobmarketisalmostimpossible.Evenwhentheydoenter,duetoconstraintsofage,experience,andqualifications,theirearningswillbefarlowerthantheircounterparts.

Allthesefactorspushwomenfromanaffluentclassintoalowereconomicbracketandrenderwomenofthelowerclass,destitute.Thisisaviolationoftheirconstitutionalguaranteeofarighttolifewithdignity.Thelawofmaintenancehasemergedasafeebleattempttoremedythismaladyandprovidewomenwithsomesemblanceofeconomicsustenanceandsecuritywhenthemarriagebreaksdown.Admittedly,theprovisionisbasedonthepatriarchalpremiseofaprotectionistapproachtowardswomen.Weneedtoshiftthediscoursebeyondtheprotectionistparameterandlocateitwithintheconstitutionalschemeofcitizenshipclaimsofarighttolifewithdignityandasameasureofsocialjustice.

Asthissectionunfolds,securinganorderofadequatemaintenancecanbeanextremelyhumiliatingexperience.Sincetheclaimofawoman’seconomicsustenancewithinthepatriarchalorderispittedagainsthersexualconduct,allegationsofadulteryandimmoralityareconstantlyhurledagainstwomenduringlitigation.Thiscanextendfurthertoadenialofthemarriageitselfand,consequentially,thelegitimacyandeventhepaternityofthechildren.Sexualcodesandthemoralitydictatesofapatriarchalmarriageoftengetentangledwiththeeconomicclaimsofwomen.InthecaseofMuslimwomen,


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theirrights(p.121) getfurtherentwinedwithincommunalbiasesanddeliberatemisinterpretationsofIslamiclaw.

Itisinthiscontextthatstatutorylawandjudicialinterpretationsmustleaninfavourofdestitutewomenandvulnerablechildren,bymovingawayfromtherubricofformalequalityofArticle14towardsthesubstantiveequalityofArticle15(3)withintheconstitutionalscheme,inordertosetrightahistoricalwrong.

Inviewofthehighquotientofsexualmoralitywhichengulfsthequestionofmaintenance,thecategorizationofcasesundervariousheadingsissuperficialandisdoneonlyforconvenience’ssake.Theissuesconstantlyoverlapandlinesgetblurredastheyareintrinsicallyinterwoventoformthecomplexwholeofthefabricoflife.Thenotionofaguiltywifemayspillovertoadisputeoverpaternity.Validityofmarriageimpactstheissueoflegitimacyofchildrenandmayalsoadverselyaffectsuccessionrights.Casesdiscussedunderthesectiontitled‘ProlongedCohabitationandPresumptionofMarriage’,concernstheclaimsofwomeninbigamousmarriages.Hence,theattempthasbeentomerelyexposethereadertotrendswithinanadversariallegalsystem.Whatisindeedstrikingisthateveryfactualandimaginarylegalployisresortedtoduringprotractedcourtbattlesbut,increasingly,thecourtsareabletoseethroughthemanipulationsandareabletopiercetheveneeroffalseclaimswhileupholdingwomen’srights.Butthefalseandfrivolousinterventionsentanglewomenincircuitouslegalrigmaroleswhicharetimeconsuming,financiallydraining,andemotionallycharged.

Despitetheprogressiveinterpretationsandinnovativelegalmaxims,thepathtojusticehasnotprogressedinalineartrajectory.Thereisagreatdealofjudiciallatitudewhichallowscontradictoryverdictstoemergeonthesameissue,notjustbetweenvarioushighcourtsbutalsowithinthesamecourt.Inadditiontothefactsandcircumstancesofeachcase,thelegalstrategyadoptedbylawyers,thequalityoflegalrepresentation,andthepresidingjudge’snotionofjusticeandequity,playacrucialroleinthefinaloutcome.Thelegalprecedentshavetobecontextualisedwithinthislitigationreality.

Thissectiontracesthechallengesandmilestonesinwomen’sstruggleforsurvivalwhilepursuingtheirlegalclaimofmaintenance.

MaintenanceUnderPersonalLaws/MatrimonialStatutesUndermatrimoniallaw,thetermalimonyisalsousedtodenotemaintenance.ThistermisderivedfromEnglishlaw.Intheeventofseparation,thewifecouldsueherhusbandforalimonyifthehusbandrefusedtomakeafinancialarrangementtoenablehertolivealifecorrespondingtoherhusband’ssocialstatus.Thehusband’srefusaltomaintainhiswifewasconstruedasaninjurytoher,theremedytowhichcouldbesoughtbycompellingthehusbandtopayforheralimonyormaintenancethroughecclesiasticalcensures.11

ThelawofmaintenanceisbasedontheancientEnglishprincipalofunityofpersonswithinmarriage.Uponmarriage,thehusbandbecamethelegalguardianofthewife’spersonandproperty.Thewifewaslegallycompelledtoassignherpropertiestoherhusband.12Sincewomencouldneitherworknorownproperty,intheeventofdesertiontheywould


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berendereddestitute.Inordertoavertthissituation,thehusbandwaslegallycompelledtoprovidemaintenancetohiswife.

Later,whendivorcebecameacceptable,theMatrimonialCausesAct,1857,andthematrimonialcourtmandatedthatthedecreeofdivorcewasconditionalonthehusbandsetting(p.122) asidesomepropertyforthewifeaspartofheralimony.TheMatrimonialCausesAct,1886,conferredpoweronthecivilcourtstopassordersdirectingthehusbandtopaythewifeareasonableweeklyormonthlysumasmaintenance.Thehusbandwasobligatedtomaintainhiswifeandpayforherexpenses,notonlyduringtheirmaritallifebutevenafterthedivorce,solongasshedidnotremarry.TheprovisionsofmaintenanceunderIndianmatrimonialstatutesandunderSection125ofCr.PCarebasedonthisprinciple.

AncientHindulawanduncodifiedMuslimlawalsocastanobligationonthehusbandtomaintainhiswife.TherightundertheHindulawwascodifiedin1946byenactingtheHinduMarriedWoman’sRighttoSeparateResidenceandMaintenanceAct.Subsequently,thiswasincorporatedintotheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceActof1956(HAMA).TheuncodifiedMuslimlawrecognizedthewife’srighttomaintenanceduringthesubsistenceofmarriageandduringtheiddatperiod.But,sinceMuslimmarriageswerecontractualandsincethewomanwasentitledtoremarry,Muslimlawdidnotcastanobligationonthehusbandforpostdivorcemaintenance.Buthewasrequiredtopaythewifea‘fairandreasonable’settlementatthetimeofdivorce,inadditiontosettlinghermehrdues.Thisrightreceivedlegalrecognitionthroughthestatutoryenactment,MuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsuponDivorce)Act,1986,(MWA).13

Aclaimformaintenancecanbemadeduringthesubsistenceofmarriage,atthetimeofinitiatingadivorce,oranyothermatrimonialrelief,orevenafterobtainingadecreeofdivorce.Anorderofpermanentalimonyandmaintenanceasancillaryreliefindivorceproceedingscanbemadeduringthepassingofadecreeofdivorce,orevensubsequently.Permanentalimonyisawardedbasedontheincomeandpropertyoftheparties,othereconomicliabilitiesofthespouses,aswellasthespecialcircumstancesofthecase.Partiescanalsoenterintoagreementswithrespecttomaintenancethroughseparationagreementsorthroughconsentagreementswhileobtainingadecreeofdivorcebymutualconsent.

Sincemaintenanceisanancillaryrelief,thesamecannotbeclaimedifaprimarymatrimonialreliefsuchasdivorceorannulmentofmarriagehasnotbeenprayedfor.Insuchasituation,aHinduwomancanfileunderHAMA,butforwomenfromtheMuslimminoritycommunity,theonlyavenueistoclaimmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.

Interimmaintenancecanbeclaimedduringthelitigationprocessunderalllegalprovisionswhichentitleawomantoclaimmaintenance.Theseproceedingsaresummaryinnatureandhavetobedecidedattheearliest,toensurealevelplayinggroundforthewife,andsothatshehasthemeanstosurviveduringthelitigationperiod.Evenifdivorceproceedingsareinitiatedbythehusbandonthegroundofthewife’smisconduct,the


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courtcannotdismissthewife’sapplicationformaintenance.ThecourthasinherentpowerstoawardinterimmaintenanceunderSection18ofHAMA,eventhoughitisnotstatutorilyprovided.InterimmaintenancecanalsobeawardedunderSection125ofCr.PC.14

Maintenancemaybepaidasalumpsumsettlementorbywayofperiodicinstalments.Lumpsumsettlementsareonetimepaymentswhichareusuallymadeatthetimeofthedivorce.Periodicpaymentsmaybesecuredwithachargeonthepropertyorunsecured.Themostcommonpracticeofperiodicpaymentsisbywayofmonthlyinstalmentstocatertotherequirementsofthesalariedclass.

Table2.2RelevantSectionsofCr.PCRelevantSections RelevantProvisionsSection125 Orderformaintenanceofwives,children,andparentsSection126 JurisdictionandProcedureSection127 Alterations/ModificationsoftheOrderSection128 EnforcementofOrder

(p.123) MaintenanceUnderSection125ofCr.PCTheprovisionsrelatingtomaintenanceundertheCr.PCarelocatedinChapterIX(Sections125–8),butthepopulartermusedwhilereferringtothisprovisionismaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.Hence,thistermisusedthroughoutthissection.Thisprovisionisuniformlyapplicabletowives,children,andparents.

Thepurposeoftheseprovisionsistopreventdestitutionandvagrancyandnottoprovideeconomicsecuritytodependents.Sincetheproceedingsaresummary,adestitutewifecanavailofthisremedywithouthavingtofileformatrimonialrelief.Though,situatedwithintherealmofcriminallaw,theprovisionisviewedmoreasaquasicivilproceeding.15

Whileitprovidedaspeedyremedyforthelowerstrata,womenfromtheupperstrataofsocietydidnotavailofanybenefitfromthisprovisionastheamountawardedwasmeagreandfarbelowtheirneeds.In1898,whenthisremedywasfirstintroduced,theamountwhichcouldbeclaimedwasonlyRs100.In1955,tochangewiththetimes,theceilingwasraisedtoRs500,but,thereafter,itremainedunchangedfornearlyhalfacenturyeventhoughthebuyingpowerofRs500dwindleddrastically.NoeffortsweremadetoraisetheceilingdespiterecommendationsbytheLawCommission.16TheonlytwostatesthatbroughtanamendmenttothissectionwereWestBengal17andMaharashtra,18wheretheamountwasenhancedfromRs500toRs1,500.

Withthesettingupofthefamilycourt,thejurisdictionshiftedfromtheMagistrate’scourttothefamilycourt,buttheamountsawardedcontinuedtobemeagre.Finallyin2001,throughaCentralamendmenttoSection125ofCr.PC,theceilingwasremoved.19Hence,thereiscurrentlynolimitontheamountthatcanbeclaimedunderthissection


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(K.D.Sehgal,Advocate,Chairman,PublicInterestLitigationCellv.UnionofIndia).20

TheprovisionofmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCofferscertainadvantagesasopposedtopersonallaw.Sinceitisaprovisionunderthecriminalstatute,itdoesnotdeterminethematrimonialstatusoftheparties.Hence,thecourtsareempoweredtoawardmaintenanceevenwhenawomanisunabletoprovehermarriage.21Courtsalsohavethepowerofarrestinexecutionproceedings,whichactsasadeterrentagainstthenon-paymentofmaintenance.22

Incontrast,underthecivil/matrimonialstatutes,thoughhusbandscanbearrestedfor(p.124) non-paymentofmaintenance,itisconstruedasacivilimprisonmentandtheburdenfallsonthewifetopayforthecostofcivilimprisonment.Thisisparadoxical,asitdefeatstheverypurposeofawardingmaintenancetoadestitutewomanknockingthedoorsofthecourtforapaltrysumofmaintenanceandcastsanadditionalburdenuponher.TheadvantageofthecriminalprovisionwasoffsetbytheceilingofRs500.23Butaftertheremovaloftheceiling,courtsareatlibertytoawardmaintenancecommensuratewiththeeconomicstatusofthehusbandandtheneedsofthewife.Thishasprovedtobehighlyadvantageous,notjusttothewomanbutalsotoherchildrenandtheelderlyasonecandiscernagradualupwardtrendintheamountsawardedasmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.

AftertheenactmentoftheMuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsuponDivorce)Act,1986,therightofadivorcedMuslimwomantomaintenancehasbeenplacedunderthisstatute.Aspertheprovisionsofthisenactment,adivorcedMuslimwomanisentitledtomaintenancefortheIddatperiodandforafairandreasonablesettlementforlife.ThisstipulationentitlesadivorcedMuslimwomantoclaimlumpsumsettlementsforherfuture.Onthepositiveside,thisprovisionrelievesthedivorcedMuslimwomanoftheliabilitytoexecutetheorderofarecurringmonthlymaintenance.Butonthenegativeside,apoorMuslimhusbandmaynothavetheresourcestopayanadequateamountasalumpsumsettlement,andthedivorcedwifemaybecompelledtoacceptameagreamountasalifetimesettlement.24

Maintenance/CompensationUndertheProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct,2005TheProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct(PWDVAorDVA),enactedin2005,offersyetanothereconomicremedytowomenandgirls.Wives,sisters,mothers,oranyotherfemalerelative,livinginasharedhouseholdinadomesticrelationship,includingawomaninaninformalrelationship,canapproachthecourtforawiderangeofrelief.Thisincludesprotectionorders,maintenanceorders,custodyorders,andcompensationorders.Whiletheprovisionofmaintenanceordersenablesthewomantoclaimmaintenance,theprovisionofcompensationordersenableshertoclaimdamagesforinjuriessufferedduetodomesticviolence.

Thisprovisionhasprovedtobehighlybeneficialforwomenseekinganorderofinjunctionagainsttheirhusbands/partnersforprotectionagainstdomesticviolenceandforprotectingtheirrighttothematrimonialhome/sharedresidence.Womenwhoarenot


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abletoprovetheirmarriage,orareinanon-marriageorlive-inrelationship,havealsobenefitedfromthisprovision.25

MatrimonialMisconductandRighttoMaintenance

HistoricallyunderEnglishlaw,onlyvirtuousorgoodwomenwereentitledtomaintenance.Ifahusbandobtainedadivorceonthegroundofthewife’sadultery,cruelty,ordesertion,shewasdeniedmaintenanceandattimeseventhecustodyofherchildren.ThereisampleevidenceofthisphenomenoninbothEnglishandIndianmatrimonialjurisprudence.

(p.125) Forexample,inDaileyv.Dailey,26reflectingtheoldEnglishposition,itwasheldthatawifewhowasguiltyofadultery,desertion,cruelty,oranyothermatrimonialmisconduct,wasnotentitledtoreceivemaintenance.Atbest,shecouldbeawardedacompassionateallowancetosaveherfromutterdestitution.Endorsingtheviewoftheecclesiasticalcourtthatwiveswhohadviolatedtheirvows‘shallbefedwiththebreadofafflictionandwiththewaterofadversity’(Manbyv.Scott),27inSardariLalv.Veshano28itwasheldthat‘awomanoncedivorcedonthegroundofunchastityshouldbelefttotheresourcesofherimmortality.’

TheCalcuttaHighCourtinSachindrav.Bammala29hadcommented:‘Unchastityonthepartofawoman(andsexualintercoursebyamanwithawomanoutsidewedlock)isasinagainsttheethicsofmatrimonialmoralityinthiscountry.’Thejudge,whileconcedingthatmorallawisnotthecivillawofthecountry,madethesweepingassumptionthatthemeetingplaceoflawandmoralitywasSection25oftheHinduMarriageActandSection18oftheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct.Thisapparentlyjustifiedthedenialofmaintenancetothewife,lettinghersurviveontheresourcesofherimmortality.

ACompassionateApproachTowardsthe‘Guilty’WifeFromthe1980s,onecandiscernagradualshifttoamorecompassionateapproachtowardswomenwhoareaccusedofmatrimonialfaultindivorceproceedings.Itisnowanacceptedjudicialviewthatmerelybecausethehusbandhasobtainedadecreeofdivorceongroundsofthewife’scrueltyoranyothermatrimonialfault,thesamecannotbeusedtodepriveheroftherighttomaintenance.

In1985,theBombayHighCourt,inGulabJagdusaKakwanev.KamalGulabKakwane,30heldthatmerelybecausethehusbandhadobtainedadecreeofdivorceonthegroundofthewife’sadulterydoesnotdisentitleherfromclaimingmaintenance.In1986,theGujaratHighCourt,inDwarkadasGurmukhidasv.Bhanuben,31whileupholdingawoman’srighttointerimmaintenancestated:‘UnderSection24oftheHinduMarriageAct,itistherightofthewifewhoisunabletosupportherselftogetmaintenance.Maintenanceshouldbemadeavailabletoherwithoutanyreferencetoherconduct.’In1990,theAndhraPradeshHighCourt,inT.RajaRaov.T.Neelamma,32heldthatthegroundofadulteryindivorceproceedingsipsofactodoesnotdisentitlethewifefromclaimingmaintenance,andthewifeisentitledtoclaimmaintenancetillsheremarries.

Inacasereportedin1986,ShantiDeviv.RaghavPrakash,33thewifehadburnedthe


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husband’sthesis.Thehusbandfiledapetitionfordivorceonthegroundofthewife’scruelty.Thecourtawardedadecreeinthehusband’sfavourbutawardedRs200permonthasmaintenancetothewife.Inanappeal,theRajasthanHighCourtheldthatinviewofthefactthatthedivorcedwifeisacursedhumanbeing,abhorredbysociety,andilliterateaswell,shewouldnotbeabletosupportherself.Remarriagewouldalsobeadifficultandfarfetchedproposition.Therefore,thecourtdecreedthatalimonyshouldbeasubstantialreliefforherandraisedtheamountfromRs200toRs350.Although(p.126) thiscanbeconstruedasapositiveruling,italsoreflectsthecontemptuousattitudeofthejudiciaryandsocietytowardsdivorcedwomen.

InRe:SamsuddinMohalat,34thehusbandchallengedthemaintenanceofRs250awardedtothewifeonthegroundthatsheislivinginadultery.Rejectinghisplea,theCalcuttaHighCourtcommentedthattheonlyintentionofthehusbandinmakingsuchallegationsistocausedeathbystarvation.Thecourtheldthatmaintenanceneednotbebasedonlawbutonhumanrightsanddirectedthelowercourttoenhancetheamount.Italsodecreedthatifthehusbanddoesnotpay,hispropertyshouldbeattachedandsoldtosavethewifefromdeath.

AmorerecentandsignificantrulinginthecontextofthepresentdiscussionisUsharaniLenkav.PanigrahiSubhashChandraDash.35Inhispetitionfordivorce,thehusbandmadeeverypossibleallegationagainsthiswife.Heallegedthatthewifewasimpregnatedbyanotherpersonandhadterminatedthepregnancyjustbeforethemarriage.Hence,themarriagecouldbeannulledonthegroundsofSection12(1)(d)(pre-marriagepregnancy)ofHMA.Healsoallegedthatthewifehadapermanentgynaecologicalproblemonaccountofwhichsherefusedtohavesexualrelationswithhimand,therefore,claimedthatSection12(1)(a)(nonconsummationofmarriageowingtoimpotencyoftherespondent)couldalsobeinvokedtoannulthemarriage.Healsoaccusedherofcrueltyanddesertion.Thecourtheldthattheconductofthewifeamountedtomentalcrueltyandthehusbandwasgrantedadecreeofdivorce.Butthehusband’spleathatthewifeisnotentitledtomaintenance,assheistheguiltyspouse,wasrejected.ThecourtnotonlyupheldherclaimformaintenancebutincreasedtheamountofpermanentalimonyfromRs40,000toRs1,00,000onthegroundthatitwouldbejust,adequateandreasonable.

Distinguishing‘LivinginAdultery’from‘OccasionalLapsesofVirtue’Despitethispositiveshiftinjudicialapproach,theterrainofmaintenancelitigationcontinuestobecontentious.Anotionstillprevailsthatanadulterouswomanisnotentitledtomaintenance.Hence,thereisaconstantefforttodefeatthewoman’sclaimbymakingbaselessallegationsandcastingaspersiononhercharacter.Twosub-clausesunderSection125Cr.PCcontributetothisconfusion:

(4)Nowomanshallbeentitledtoreceiveanallowanceifsheislivinginadultery.(5)Onproofthatanywifeinwhosefavouranorderhasbeenmadeunderthissectionislivinginadultery,themagistrateshallcanceltheorder.

Thesestipulationsprovidethearmourforhusbandstoentanglewomeninviciousand


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dilatorylitigationoverapittanceofmaintenance.Butthedefenceisavailabletothehusbandonlyifheisabletoprovethatthewifeislivinginadultery.Itisnotavailableifitisprovedthatthewifewasleadinganunchastelifepriortohermarriage.Onlypostmarriageadulterousconductisrelevant.Awifecanonlybedeniedmaintenanceifsheislivinginadulteryanditcanbeestablishedthatsheisbeingmaintainedbytheadulterer.

InMahalingamPillaiv.Amsavalli,36itwasheldthatawomanwhoisaccusedofadulteryisentitledtoareasonableamountofmaintenanceasamatterofright,exceptincaseswherethehusbandisabletoprovethatthewifeisbeingsupportedbythepersonsheiscommitting(p.127) adulterywith.InSandhav.Narayan,37itwasexplainedthatthereisanimportantdistinctionbetweenapersonwhoislivinginadulteryandwhohasmerelycommittedadultery.Livinginadulterydenotesacontinuouscourseofconductandnotisolatedactsofimmorality.InBaishnabCharanJenav.RitaraniJena,38itwasheldthatasingleactofunchastityorafewlapsesofvirtuewillnotdisentitleawifefromclaimingmaintenancefromherhusbandunderSection125Cr.PC.

InLaxmanNaikv.LalitaNaik,39thecourtclarifiedthatwhileasingleactofadulteryissufficientforthepurposeofjudicialseparationundermatrimoniallaw,forthepurposeofawardingmaintenanceunderSection125Cr.PC,merelyprovingoneormoreinstancesofsuchlapsesisnotsufficienttoabsolvethehusbandfromhisliabilitytopaymaintenance.

Theaboverulingsclarifythatthedenialofmaintenanceisnotintendedasapunishmentforadultery.Rather,itisinthecontextofacontinuedandstablerelationshipwiththepersonsheisallegedtohavecommittedadulterywith.Thestandardofproofrequired,toproveadulteryonthepartofthewife,ishighinordertopreventthisprovisionfrombeingmisusedbyhusbandsasameansofescapingfromthelegalobligationofmaintainingtheirwives(S.S.Manickamv.ArputhaBhavaniRajan).40

Facedwithanumberofcasesinvolvingfalseallegationsofadulterybyhusbandsinproceedingsformaintenance,thecourtinBaishnabCharanJenav.RitaraniJena41heldthatsuchbaselessallegationsbythehusbandandhisfamilymemberswillentitlethewifetoliveseparatelyandclaimmaintenancefromherhusband.InKamalKishorev.StateofUP,42thecourtreprimandedthehusbandformakingrecklesschargesofimmoralityagainsthiswife.InMaheshChandrav.Addl.CivilJudge,43theAllahabadHighCourtheldthatthehusbandhadcausedincalculableharmtothewifebytermingherawomanofloosemoralsandawardedRs20,000asexemplarycosts.Thefactsofthiscaseareratherabsurd.Whenthewife,whowashearingimpaired,filedformaintenance,inordertocreateevidenceofimmoralcharacter,thehusbandrequestedafriendtofileafalseandfrivolouscaseofrestitutionofconjugalrightsagainsthiswife,andlaterusedtheseasproofofherimmorality.InMaheshv.Madhu,44thewifewasdrivenoutofthematrimonialhousewhenshewasthreemonthspregnant.Later,thehusbandmadeallegationsofadulteryagainstheranddisputedthepaternityofthechild.ThecourtdirectedthehusbandtopayacompensationofRs100,000alongwithinterestat6percentperannumfromthedateoffilingthesuittillitsrealization.Thecourtcommentedthattheallegationsarebasedonillusionratherthanreality.


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Aswecanobserve,thecourtstakeaseriousviewofbaselessallegationsofimmoralitywhichareadvancedonlyasalegalploytoavoidthepaymentofmaintenancetowivesandtohumiliatethemincourtroomsduringproceedings.

AninterestingcommentonthisissueisfoundinArunKumarv.MeenuKumar.45Inthisruling,S.RavindraBhatJ.oftheDelhiHighCourt,warnedthelowerjudiciarytoadoptacautiousapproachandrestrainfrommakingpresumptionsonthebasisofallegationsofadultery.HisLordship’scommentsonthisprovisionareilluminatingandcontributesubstantially(p.128) towardsusheringanewgender-justlegalorder,awayfromconventionalpatriarchaldictates.Followingisanexcerptfromthisruling:

ThoughSection125Cr.PCisinthenatureofawelfaremeasure,andperhapsfallswithinthedescriptionof‘specialprovision’underArticle15(3)oftheConstitution,theexceptionunderSection125(4)isloadedwithgenderunequalterms,againstthewoman.Hence,itmustbeinvokedwithduecareandcircumspection.TheenactingpartofSection125,whichentitlesawomantomaintenance,makesnodistinctionwhetherthecauseforherapproachingthecourtisadulteryorinfidelityofthehusband.Yet,thepossibleeffect,viz,estrangementandthesituationofherlivinginadulteryissoughtasagroundtodenythatwelfaremeasure.Withoutexaminingthelogicofthisenforcementofmoralitythroughthelegalprocess,whichhastoreceiveawiderdebate,whatcanbesaidisthatthecourtshouldbeloathtorushtoconclusionsoraprioriassumptions,sinceSection125(4)enactsanexception.Itshouldbesatisfiedaboutthesoundnessofsuchachargeandcannotbecontenttoelevateallegationsintofindings(Para13pp.824–5).

Incaseswherethehusbandisabletoprovetothecourtthatthewifehasbeenlivinginadultery,thecourtsareboundtodenyhermaintenance(Angooriv.PhoolKumar).46InSubalChandraSahav.PritikanaSaha,47thewomanhadlefthermatrimonialhomeandwasfoundlivingwithanothermaninrentedpremises.Thecourtheldthattheirintentiontocontinuelivingwitheachothercannotbebrushedasideandheldthatthewomanwas‘livinginadultery’withinthescopeofSection125(4)ofCr.PC.Morerecently,inSukroDeviv.StateofJharkhand,48itwasprovedthatthewifehadvoluntarilylefthermatrimonialhome,withoutreasonablecauseorexcuse,andwaslivingwithanotherman.Hence,thefindingofthetrialcourtandrevisioncourt,thatitwasnotanisolatedinstanceofalapseincharacteronthepartofwife,wasupheldbythehighcourt.

Evenaftermaintenancehasbeenawarded,ifthewifeislivinginadultery,thehusbandcanapproachthecourtforcancellationoftheorderofmaintenanceunderSection125(5).Ifitcanbesatisfactorilyprovedthatthewomanislivinginadultery,themagistratehasthepowertocanceltheorderofmaintenance.Butinsuchcases,thewomanwillbeentitledtomaintenancetillthedateshecommencedlivinginadultery(RamKishorev.BimlaDevi).49

Lumpsumamountsawardedtothewifeasadivorcesettlementcannotberescindedifadivorcedwomansubsequentlyremarries.InNanigopalChakravartyv.RenubalaChakravarty,50theOrissaHighCourt,whiledismissingthehusband’sapplicationfor


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rescindingthelumpsumamountawardedtothewifeasdivorcesettlementuponherremarriage,heldthatsuchanorderwouldamounttoanannulmentofapastliabilityandnotafutureobligation.

PostDivorceAdulteryNotWithintheAmbitofSection125(4)Cr.PCIfafterdivorcethewomanremarries,thehusbandisentitledtomovethecourtforacancellationoftheorderofmaintenance.ButthisstipulationorthestipulationunderSection125(4),discussedabove,cannotbeinvokedtodenymaintenancetoadivorcedwomanonthegroundofheradulterousconduct.ThecourtshaveheldthatthestipulationunderSection125(4)that‘nowomanshallbeentitledtoreceiveanallowanceifsheislivinginadultery’referstoherconductwithinaprevailingmarriageandnottoherconductaftersheobtainsadecreeofdivorce,orevenwhensheisdivorcedonanallegationofadultery.

(p.129) ThisclarityonthestipulationwasprovidedbyaninterestingrulingoftheSupremeCourtinRohtashSinghv.Ramendri.51Throughthisruling,thecourthasattemptedtocontainthemischiefcausedinthissectionbyholdingthatitappliesonlytocaseswherethemarriagebetweenpartiesissubsistingandnotwhereithascometoanend.Thecourtexplainedthattherelevantprovisionpresupposestheexistenceofamatrimonialrelationsinceadulterydenotesthesexualintercourseoftwopersons,eitherofwhomismarriedtoathirdperson.

InValsarajanv.Saraswathy,52thewifewasrefusedmaintenanceonthegroundthatshewaslivinginadultery.Later,thehusbandobtainedadivorceonthisground.Afterdivorce,thewifefiledformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.Thehighcourtheldthatherclaimasadivorcedwifecannotbedefeatedonthegroundthatshewaslivinginadultery,orhadlivedinadultery,orhadsufferedanorderofdivorceonthegroundthatshewaslivinginadultery(Gopiv.KrishnaandDalipSinghv.Rajbala).53

InSanjeevKumarv.Dhanya,54thehusbandchallengedtheorderofthefamilycourtwhichawardedthewifeRs1,500permonthasmaintenanceonthegroundthatthewomanwhohassufferedanorderofdivorceonaccountofcontumaciousmatrimonialconductisnotentitledtomaintenance.Thecourtheld:MerelybecausethewomancontinuestobethewifeforthepurposeofclaimingmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC,nohusbandcandemandcohabitation,loyaltyorchastityfromhisdivorcedwifeasaconditionforawardinghermaintenance.

Thefactthatanypersonwasbornduringthecontinuanceofavalidmarriagebetweenhismotherandanyman,orwithin280daysafteritsdissolution,andthemotherremainingunmarried,shallbeconclusiveproofthatheisthelegitimatesonofthatman,unlessitcanbeshownthatthepartiestomarriagehadnoaccesstoeach

Box2.1TheIndianEvidenceAct,1872,Sec.112:BirthDuringMarriage,ConclusiveProofofLegitimacy


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otheratanytimewhenhecouldhavebeenbegotten.

PresumptionofPaternityandDNATesting

PresumptionUnderSection112oftheIndianEvidenceAct,1872Theallegationofadulteryandimmoralitysometimesextendstodenyingthepaternityofthechild.Butifcohabitationisproved,orifthewifeisabletoprovethattherewasalikelihoodofsexualcontactduringthetimeofconception,thecourtsgenerallyupholdthevalidityofthemarriageandpaternityofthechild.Thelawleansinfavouroftheinnocentchildandpreventsitfrombeingbastardizedifthereissomeindicationofthechild’sparentslivingtogetheraroundthetimeofconception,oreveniftherewasapossibilityofsexualaccessbetweenthetwo.ThewellestablishedlegalmaximwhichisinvokedindisputesoverpaternityisPaterestquemnuptiaedemonstrant:Heisthefatherwhomthemarriageindicates.TherightsofthechildtopaternityandlegitimacyareprotectedthroughapresumptioncontainedinSection112oftheIndianEvidenceAct,1872(IEA).

InDukhtarJahanv.MohammedFarooq,55theSupremeCourtstipulatedasfollows:

(p.130) …Section112ofIEAlaysdownthatifapersonwasbornduringthecontinuanceofavalidmarriagebetweenhismotherandanymanorwithintwohundredandeightydaysafteritsdissolutionandthemotherremainsunmarried,itshallbetakenasconclusiveproofthatheisthelegitimatesonoftheman,unlessitcanbeshownthatthepartiestothemarriagehadnoaccesstoeachotheratanytimewhenhecouldhavebeenbegotten.Thisruleoflawbasedonthedictatesofjusticehasalwaysmadethecourtsinclinetowardsupholdingthelegitimacyofachildunlessthefactsaresocompulsiveandclinchingastonecessarilywarrantafindingthatthechildcouldnotatallhavebeenbegottentothefatherandassuchalegitimizationofthechildwouldresultinrankinjusticetothefather.Courtshavealwaysdesistedfromlightlyrenderingaverdictonthebasisofslenderevidence,whichwillhavetheeffectofbrandingachildabastardanditsmotheranunchastewoman.

Thechildwasbornaftersevenmonthsofmarriage.Tenmonthslater,thehusbanddivorcedthewife.Whenthewifefiledformaintenancethehusbanddeniedpaternity.Thecourtheldthatthewifecouldnothavehidherpregnancyfromherhusband.Butthehusbandcontinuedtocohabitwithheruntilthechildwasbornandfortenmonthsthereafter.Sincethepartieswerecloserelatives,thehusbandhadaccesstothewifeevenpriortomarriage.

InBanarasiDassv.TeekuDutta,56theSupremeCourtelaboratedthisconceptfurther:

Thelawleansinfavourofapresumptionofmarriageandlegitimacyofchildrenandagainstapresumptionofviceandimmorality.Thelawpresumesboththatamarriageceremonyisvalidandthateverypersonislegitimate.Itisinthiscontextthatmarriageandfiliations(parentage)arepresumed.Itisarebuttalpresumption


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ofthelawthatachildbornduringlawfulwedlockislegitimate,andthataccessoccurredbetweentheparents.Thispresumptioncanonlybedisplacedbyastrongpreponderanceofevidenceandnotbyamerebalanceofprobabilities.Inmattersofthiskind,thecourtmusthaveregardforSection112oftheEvidenceAct.Thissectionisbasedonthewellknownmaximpaterestquemnuptiaedemonstrant(heisthefatherwhomthemarriageindicates).Thepresumptionoflegitimacyisthatachildbornofamarriedwomanisdeemedtobelegitimate.Theburdenofprovingthatitisnotathrustonthepersonwhoisinterestedinmakingacaseofillegitimacy.

ContextinWhichtheDemandforDNATestisRaisedRecentinnovationsinmedicaltechnologyhavecontributedtowardsamoreaccuratedeterminationofpaternity.BloodgrouptestinghasbeenreplacedwithanadvancedprocessofgeneticidentificationthroughtheuseofaDNA(DeoxyribonucleicAcid)test.Thissophisticatedmethodofdeterminingtheidentityofapersonwasfirstdevelopedbyscientistsin1985inEngland,andhasbeenacceptedbythelegalsystem(AnilKumarv.TurakaKondalaRao).57Demandsforconductingthesetestshavebeenmade,bothinmatrimonialandmaintenanceproceedings,forachievingdifferentobjectives.

Ininstanceswherethebiologicalfatherhasdeniedpaternity,womenhavedemandedDNAtestsoftheirhusbands/partnerstoconclusivelyprovepaternityandclaimtheirrighttomaintenance.Whilethecourtshaveheldthatnoonecanbecompelledtoundergothetest,adverseinferencecanbedrawnifthemanrefusestoundergothetestsandhiscontentionofdenyingpaternitygetsweakenedbythisdenialduringthelitigationprocess.TherearecaseswhereanillegitimatechildhasalsodemandedaDNAtestwhileclaimingmaintenancefromhisputativefather.

Atothertimes,demandsforDNAtestsaremadefrivolouslybyhusbandstodelaythejudicialprocessofawardingmaintenancetothewifeandchild,merelyasa‘roving’enquiryora‘fishing’enquiry.Insuchcases,courtshavedeclinedtograntrelieftothehusband,based(p.131) onthepresumptionoflegitimacyunderSection112oftheIEA.Incaseswhereaprimafaciepleaofnon-access(thepossibilityofsexualintimacyandconsequentconception)hasnotbeenmade,thepresumptionunderSection112oftheIEAprevailstosavethewomanfromthehumiliationofundergoingaDNAtesttodeterminepaternity.Theproceedingsformaintenancearenotcriminalandthestringentruleofevidenceapplicableincriminalproceedingsofproof‘beyondreasonabledoubt’cannotbeapplied.Butatthesametime,theruleofevidenceappliedincivilproceedings,‘preponderanceofpossibility’istoolax.Hence,courtshaveattemptedtostrikeabalanceandarriveatamiddlegroundwheretheburdenofproving‘non-access’isthrustuponthepersondisputingpaternity.

InKantiDeviv.PoshiRam,58theSupremeCourtexplainedtheconceptasfollows:

Thestandardofproofofprosecutiontoproveguiltbeyondanyreasonabledoubtbelongstocriminaljurisprudencewhereasthetestofpreponderanceofprobabilitiesbelongstocivilcases.Thetestofpreponderanceofprobabilityistoolightandmayexposemanychildrentotheperilofbeingillegitimatised.Hence,by


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wayofcautionandasamatterofpublicpolicy,thelawcannotaffordtoallowsuchaconsequencetobefallaninnocentchildonthestrengthofameretiltingofprobability.Itscorollaryisthattheburdenonthehusbandshouldbehigherthanthestandardofpreponderanceofprobabilities.Thestandardproofinsuchcasesmustatleastbeofadegreeinbetweenthetwosoastoensurethattherewasnopossibilityofthechildbeingconceivedthroughtheplaintiff-husband.

RegardingtherelevanceofpresumptionunderSection112oftheIEAinthecontextoftheDNAtest,thecourtexplained:

Section112oftheIEAactwasenactedwhenmodernscientificadvancementswithDeoxyribonucleicAcid(DNA)aswellasRibonucleicAcid(RNA)testswerenotincontemplationbythelegislature.TheresultofagenuineDNAtestissaidtobescientificallyaccurate.ButeventhatisnotsufficienttoescapefromtheconclusivenessofSection112oftheAct.Forexample,ifahusbandandwifearelivingtogetherduringthetimeofconceptionbuttheDNAtestrevealsthatthechildwasnotborntothehusband,theconclusivenessinlawwouldremainunrebuttable.Thismayseemunfairfromthepointofviewofthehusbandwhowouldbecompelledtobearthefatherhoodofthechildofwhichhemaybeinnocent.Buteveninsuchacase,thelawleansinfavouroftheinnocentchildifhismotherandherspousewerelivingtogetheratthetimeofconception.

AsexplainedbytheSupremeCourtintheabovepassage,thecourtswillexerciseabundantcautionbeforeachildissubjectedtoDNAtests,whichmaycausestigmaandhumiliationandjeopardisehis/herrightsasachild.Hence,underthelawofmaintenancewhichisabeneficiallegislationenactedtopreventdestitutionandvagrancy,thecourtswillrarelyconcedetothisdemand.CourtshaveheldthatsinceproceedingsformaintenanceunderSection125oftheCr.PCaresummaryanddonotfinallydeterminethemaritalstatusofthepartiesconcerned,thecourtshavegrantedmaintenancetothewifeandchildanddirectedhusbandstoinitiatecivilproceedingsbywayofdeclaratorysuitstodeterminelegitimacyandpaternity.Onlyinveryrarecaseswhennon-accessisproved,willthecourtsentertainthedemandforaDNAtestduringmaintenanceproceedings.

ThethirdcategoryofcaseswherethedemandforDNAtestsisraisedisinmatrimoniallitigation,specificallyinproceedingsfortheannulmentofmarriageonthegroundofpre-marriagepregnancyorinproceedingsfordivorceonthegroundofadultery.Again,courtswillnotconcedetoaflippantdemand.Butifitisnecessarytoconclusivelyproveadulteryorpre-maritalpregnancy,thecourtsmayconcede(p.132) tothehusband’sdemandandsubjectthewomanandchildtoaDNAtest.Thereareinstanceswheretherefusalofthewomantoundergotestshasledtoanadverseinferencebeingdrawnagainsther.

Thefollowingcasesillustratethevariousstrandsofthiscomplexlegaldiscourse.

DenialofPaternityandLegitimacy


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DNAtestshaveproventobeextremelyusefulindeterminingtherightsofillegitimatechildren.Whilefathershavetriedtowriggleoutoftheobligationofmaintainingchildrenbyclaimingthattherewasnovalidmarriage,thelawhaspinnedtheresponsibilityofmaintenanceonthefatherevenwhenthereiscohabitationorapresumptionofmarriagebetweenthemotherofthechildandtheputativefather.AsperthestipulationunderSection125ofCr.PC,theobligationtomaintainthechildextendstobothlegitimateandillegitimatechildren.Courtshaveadoptedtheprinciplethatwhilegrantingmaintenancetoanillegitimatechild,theprimaryconcernispaternityandnotthelegitimacyofthechild.

DNAtestinghasbeenahighlydisputedmatter.TheconstitutionalityofDNAtestinginsuccession,maintenance,andmatrimonialcases,hasbeenupheldbytheMadrasHighCourtinBommiv.Munirathinam,59Inthiscase,thehusbandchallengedtheorderofthetrialcourtdirectinghimtoundergoaDNAtesttodeterminepaternity,buttheMadrasHighCourtdeclaredthatsuchadirectionisnotinviolationofArticle21oftheConstitution.InSyedMohdGhousev.NoounnnisaBegum,60thehusbanddeniedbothmarriageandpaternitybutchallengedtheorderofthefamilycourttoundergoaDNAtest.ThehighcourtheldthatwhileaspertherulinginGoutamKundu(discussedlater)thecourtcannotcompelapersontogiveasampleofblood;thecourtcandrawinferencesasanecessarycorollaryinsequelthereof.TheimportanceoftheDNAtestinclarifyingacasehasbeenexpressedinJosephv.StateofKerala,61wheretheKeralaHighCourtupheldthedirectionsissuedbytheKeralaStateWomen’sCommissiontotwomenintwodifferentcasestoundergoDNAtests.Uponthemendisputingmarriageandpaternity,thewomenhadfiledcomplaintsbeforetheStateWomen’sCommission.Thelatterissueddirectionswhichwerechallengedbybothmenbeforethehighcourt.ThecourtupheldthedirectionoftheWomen’sCommissionandheldthatthetestmayabsolvethewomenoftheslursufferedbythemandredeemthemofthetraumatheywereundergoingforseveralyears.Ontheotherhand,ifthestandadoptedbythetwomenwascorrect,theytoowouldbeabsolvedofthefalseallegationsmadeagainstthem.

CourtsexercisethepowertodirectthepersondisputingpaternitytoundergoaDNAtestinordertoprotecttherightsandentitlementsofthechildand,thus,leantowardsprotectinganinnocentchild.DNAtestinghas,therefore,beenusedinanumberofcases.

Forexample,inAnilKumarv.TurakaKondalaRao,62anillegitimatesonclaimingmaintenancefromhisbiologicalfatherpleadedthathisfather,amarriedman,workingasStationSuperintendentintherailways,hadasexualrelationshipwithhismotherandhewasbornoutofthisunion.Thetrialcourtrejectedhisapplicationonthegroundthatitcouldnotbeestablishedthattherespondentwashisputativefather.Inanappeal,hisclaimwasupheld(p.133) basedonthereportofDNAtestsandhewasawardedRs300asmaintenance.Similarly,inNaniGopalKarv.StateofWestofBengal,63awomancohabitedandconceivedunderapromiseofmarriage.Whentherespondentrefusedtomarryher,thewomanfiledacriminalcomplaintofrapeandcheatingandclaimedmaintenanceforherselfandherchild.ADNAtestprovedpaternityandthewomanandchildwereawardedmaintenance.Thecourtcommentedthatpendencyofcriminalcase(ofrape)isnotabaragainstgrantinginterimmaintenancetothechild.


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Ifthehusbanddeclinestoundergothetest,thecourtshavethepowertodrawadverseinference.ThisisseenintheSupremeCourtdecisionofDwarikaPrasadSatpathyv.BidyutPrayaDixit,64whereitwasheldthatifthehusbanddeclinestoundergoaDNAtesthewillbedisentitledtodisputethepaternity.TheapexcourtcommentedthattheprovisionunderSection125Cr.PCisnottobeutilizedfordefeatingtherightsconferredbythelegislatureupondestitutewomen,children,orparents,whoarevictimsofthesocialenvironment.

InKanchanBediv.GurpreetSinghBedi,65whenthewifefiledformaintenanceforherson,thehusbanddeniedmarriageandpaternity.Inordertoconclusivelyprovepaternity,thewifepleadedforDNAtesting.Thehusbandvehementlyopposedthisonthegroundthatifthetestrevealedthathewasnotthefatherthechildwouldbedefamedandexposedtotheriskofbeingdeclaredabastard.But,sincethehusbandhadalreadychallengedthepaternityofthechildinhiswrittenstatementandallegedthatthechildwasillegitimate,thecourtheldthathehadnoconcernforthewelfareofthechildandhispleadingsonthisgroundlackedcredibility.Thecourtbrandedtheconcernas‘crocodilian’anddirectedthehusbandtopresenthimselfatthehospitalforaDNAtest.

MaintenanceProceedingsandRovingEnquiriesThefollowingcasesillustratethesternresponseofthehigherjudiciarytothedemandsraisedbyhusbandsforaDNAtestasadelayingtactic,andtoavoidthepaymentofmaintenancetotheirwives/partnersandchildren.

Inaleadingcase,GoutamKunduv.StateofWestBengal,66theSupremeCourtlaiddownthefollowingguidelinesfororderingbloodteststodeterminepaternity.

1.CourtsinIndiacannotorderabloodtestasamatterofcourse;2.Wheneverapplicationsaremadeforsuchprayersinordertohavearovinginquiry,theprayerforabloodtestcannotbeentertained;3.Theremustbeastrongprimafaciecasethatthehusbandmustestablishnon-accessinordertodispelthepresumptionarisingunderSection112oftheIEA;4.Thecourtmustcarefullyexaminetheconsequenceoforderingabloodtest—whetheritwillhavetheeffectofbrandingachildabastard,andthemotheranunchastewoman;5.Noonecanbecompelledtogiveasampleofbloodforanalysis.

ItwasheldthatthereisaverystrongbutrebuttablepresumptionunderSection112infavouroflegitimacyandthesectionrequiresthatthepartydisputingpaternityshouldprovenon-accessinordertodispelthepresumption.Thecourtalsoexplainedthetermaccessasthe(p.134) existenceofopportunitiesforsexualintercourseandnotactualcohabitation.

Inconclusion,thecourtcommentedthatthepurposeoftheapplicationwasnothingmorethanaploytoavoidthepaymentofmaintenance,withoutmakinganygroundwhatsoevertohaverecoursetothetest.


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TherulingsinLaxmikantv.Premwati,VYedukondaluv.V.Nageswaramma67andNandlalv.Shankari68servetoclarifythepointregardingaccessandcohabitation.InV.Yedukondalu,thefamilycourtatVijayawadagrantedmaintenanceofRs400permonthtothewifeandRs100permonthforeachofthethreechildren.Inappeal,thehusbanddeniedpaternityofthethirdchildandpleadednonaccess.Whileupholdingtheorderofthetrialcourt,thehighcourtheldthatthemerefactthatthewifehadleftthematrimonialhomecanscarcelyconstituteevidenceofnon-accesswhenbothhusbandandwifewerelivinginthesamedistrictandthechildwasbornduringthecontinuanceoftheirvalidmarriage.Thecourtalsocommentedthatchargesofadulterywerenotraisedinthedivorcepetitionfiledbythehusband.Thewifehadleftthematrimonialhomeduetocrueltyandharassmentfordowry.InNandlalthehusbandchallengedthemaintenanceawardedtothewifeandchildonthegroundthathewasinjudicialcustodyatthetimewhenthechildcouldhavebeenconceived.Thehighcourtheldthatsincethewifeusedtoregularlyvisithimwhilehewasincustodyandlookafterhim,sexualcontactcannotberuledout.Thecourtcommented:‘Nowadays,nothingisimpossible.’

InRajeshChaudharyv.NirmalaChaudhary,69theDelhiHighCourt,whileadmittingthattheresultofagenuineDNAtestissaidtobescientificallyaccurate,ruledthatitisnotenoughtoescapetheconclusivenessofSection112oftheIEA.Forexample,ifahusbandandawifearelivingtogetherduringthetimeofconceptionbuttheDNAtestrevealsthatthechildwasnotborntothehusband,theconclusivenessinlawwouldstillremainirrefutable.Inthiscontext,Section112assumesprimaryimportancewhiledefendingtheclaimofthepaternityofthechild.Thehusbandhadchallengedthepaternityofhisdaughterbutinhispleadings,headmittedthathehadclearaccess.Hence,hisapplicationforaDNAtestwasrejected.

InMd.MhasinSk.v.SayedaKhatunBibi,70thehusbanddisputedthepaternityofthechildallegingthatthewifehadsexualrelationswithothermen.Butthewifewasabletoprovethatherhusbandalonehadaccesstoherand,thus,hadfatheredthechild.TheCalcuttaHighCourtupheldthewife’scontentionsandrejectedthehusband’spleaforaDNAtestashehadnobasisfordemandingit.ThecourtcommentedthatDNAtestscannotbeorderedwithoutsomeevidencetosubstantiatetheallegationsofnon-accessorsomeproofofthewife’sadultery.

Similarly,inDiddeSundaraManiv.DiddeVenkataSubbarao,71theAndhraPradeshHighCourtquashedtheorderofthetrialcourtpermittingaDNAtest.Thiswasdoneonthegroundthatthepartydisputingthepaternityofthechildhastoprovenon-accesstothemotherduringthetimewhenthechildcouldhavebeenconceived,todispelthepresumptionunderSection112oftheIEA.ThepresumptionwouldhavetobedisplacedbyleadingstrongpreponderanceofevidenceandnotmerelybyfilingapetitionfordeterminingthepaternitythroughaDNAtest.

(p.135) InParthaMajumdarv.SharmishtaMajumdar,72thetrialcourtrejectedthehusband’spleaforDNAtesting.TheCalcuttaHighCourtupheldtheorderofthemagistrateandheldthatthehusband,throughthisapplication,wantedtointroducenew


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andinconsistentfactswhichweretotallyirrelevantwhiledecidingmaintenance.Hewantedtoprojecthiswifeasaprostitute,whichcannotbepermittedinproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PC.

ItwasalsoheldthattheSupremeCourtrulinginShardav.Dharmpal,73whichdealtwiththeissueofannulmentofmarriageonthegroundofamentaldisorder,hasnorelevancetothepresentcase.Thatrulingwasgiveninproceedingstoobtainamatrimonialremedyofannulmentofmarriage.ThesameprinciplecannotbeappliedtosummaryproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PC.Thisprovisionisasocialdevice,introducedforthewelfareandbenefitofpoorandneglectedwiveswhoareunabletomaintainthemselves.Thecourtcommentedthatallegationsofadulteryandaccusationsthatthebirthofthechildduetotheadulterouslifeofthewifearenothingbutwild,vague,andbaselessand,hence,theprayerforaDNAtestwasrightlyrejectedbythemagistrate.Thecourtfurthercommentedthatifafterthedecisioninproceedings,underSection125ofCr.PConthebasisofevidenceandmaterialsonrecord,thehusbandfeelsaggrieved,heisatlibertytoapproachtheappropriatecivilcourtforchallengingthepaternityofthechildandforanecessarydeclarationinthisrespect.

InHeeraSinghv.StateofUP,74whiledismissingtheappealfiledbythehusbandforaDNAtest,theAllahabadHighCourtheld:Whenthelawrequiresstrictanddirectprooftorebutthepresumptionoflegitimacy,theDNAtestofaminorchildcannotbeallowedintheabsenceofevidenceandonvaguepleadings.Thecourt,inthecapacityofadlitemguardianoftheminorcannotdirectsuchatestintheabsenceofdirectandpositiveevidenceofnon-accessasrequiredunderSection112oftheEvidenceAct.

InAmarjitKaurv.HarbhajanSingh,75inapetitionfordivorcefiledbythehusbandonthegroundofcrueltyandadultery,thewifefiledformaintenance.Sincetheapplicationwasrejected,shefiledanappealinthehighcourtwhichawardedmaintenancetoherandtheminordaughter,butdirectedthetrialcourttoconductaDNAtestwithrespecttotheson,whosepaternitywasdisputedbythehusband.Thecourtheldthatifthereportisnegative,thewifeandtheminorsonwouldnotbeentitledtomaintenance.TheSupremeCourtsetasidetheorderandheldthatthecourtcannotimposeconditionsfortheDNAtesttobeconducted,andsuchaconditionisunreasonable.

ThefollowingtwocasesareillustrativeofthecancellationofmaintenanceawardsuponcogentevidencewhichrebuttedthepresumptionofpaternityunderSection112oftheIEA.InNoorAlamv.StateofBihar,76thetrialcourtawardedRs300permonthasmaintenancetothedaughter.Thehusbanddeniedpaternity,pleadingthatthedaughterwasborntwoyearsafterhehaddivorcedhiswife.Thisexplanationwasacceptedbythehighcourt.(p.136) InAbdulRazakHajiGulambhaiQureshiv.JohrabibiHajiKalubhaiQureshi,77thetrialcourtawardedRs200permonthasmaintenancetotheminorchilddespiteevidencethatthehusbandhadnoaccesstothewifewhenthechildcouldhavebeenconceived.Inanappeal,thehighcourtheldthatachildwhowasbornwhilethemarriagewassubsisting,butwithoutthefatherhavingaccesstowifeattherelevanttimeisnotentitledtomaintenance.However,thecourtissuedawordofcautionandcommented:Itisnecessarytoobservethateventhoughthewifeherselfhasnot


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challengedthefindingsagainsther,thefindingortheinferencethatshewaslivinginadulterymaynotbetakenasapprovedorconfirmedbythiscourt.

DeterminationofPre-MarriagePregnancyandAdulteryWhileinmaintenanceproceedingscourtsareextremelyreluctanttoentertainapplicationsforaDNAtesttodefeatthewomen’sclaims,indeclaratorysuitsandmatrimonialproceedings,testsarereliedupontoprovethehusband’sallegationofadulteryorpre-marriagepregnancy.Highcourtshaveupheldthetrialcourtspowertodirectthepartiestoundergotestswhiledecidingmatrimonialdisputes.CourtshaveheldthatsuchdirectionsarenotinviolationofArticle21oftheConstitution.Butthispoweristobeexercisedsparinglyandonlywheresufficientmaterialisavailablewiththecourtthataprimafaciecasehasbeenmadeoutbytheapplicant.

Forinstance,inJyothiAmmalv.K.Anjan,78thecourtupheldthehusband’spleaofadulteryandgrantedhimadivorcebasedonthereportsofDNAtestswhichexcludedhimasthefather.Sincethehusbandhadnoaccesstothewifeduringthetimeshecouldhaveconceivedthechild,thecourtheldthatallegationsofadulteryhadbeenproved.

InB.VandanaKumariv.P.PraveenKumar,79thehusbandhadfiledforannulmentonthegroundofpre-marriagepregnancy.Thewifedeliveredthechildduringthependencyofthepetition.ThehusbandsoughtaDNAtestofthewifealongwiththechildwhichwaspermittedbythetrialcourt.Inappeal,thehighcourtuphelditandstated:Todeterminethepaternityofthechildandforaneffectiveadjudicationofthecontroversybetweentheparties,aDNAtestisnecessary.ThedirectionisnotcontrarytoconclusiveproofenjoinedunderSection112oftheIEA.

MayaRamv.KamlaDevi80isalsoacaseofpre-marriagepregnancy,whereadaughterwasbornwithinsixmonthsofmarriage.Thehusbandwasabletoprovethathehadnoaccesstothewifeatthetimewhenthechildwasbegotten.WhileupholdingthedirectionofthetrialcourttoconductaDNAtest,thecourtcommentedthatwhileithasthepowertodirectthepartiestoundergothetests,itcannotcompelanypartytosubjectthemselvestoit.Butincaseapartydoesnotundergothetest,adverseinferencecanbedrawn.

However,thecourtswillnotentertainanyapplicationsbyathirdpartytodeterminepaternity.InRenubalaMoharanav.MinaMohanty,81thecourtrejectedtheapplicationfiledbythemotherofthedeceasedforadeclarationthatthechildistheillegitimateprogenyofherdeceasedson.Thecourtheldthatdeclaratoryreliefasregardstheillegitimacyofthechildcannotbegrantedasitwouldviolatetheprinciplesofnaturaljustice.

Section50–OpiniononRelationship,WhenImportant

Box2.2TheIndianEvidenceAct,1872


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Whenthecourthastoformanopinionastotherelationshipofonepersonwithanother,theopinion,expressedbyconduct,astotheexistenceofsucharelationship,ofanypersonswho,asamemberofthefamilyorotherwise,hasspecialmeansofknowledgeonthesubject,isarelevantfact.

Section114–CourtMayPresumetheExistenceofCertainFactsThecourtmaypresumetheexistenceofanyfactwhichitthinksislikelytohavehappened,regardbeinghadtothecommoncourseofnaturalevents,humanconductandpublicandprivatebusiness,intheirrelationtothefactsoftheparticularcase.

Similarly,inSunilTrambakev.LeelavatiTrambake,82thewifefiledanapplicationfora(p.137) DNAtestofherhusband’schildthroughabigamousmarriageincivilproceedingsforadivorcefiledbythehusband.Thetrialcourtallowedtheapplication,butinanappealthehighcourtheldthataDNAtestcannotbedirectedasamatterofroutine.Thetestscanbedirectedonlywhentheybecomeindispensabletoresolvethedispute.Thecourtshouldrecordareasonastohowandwhysuchatestisnecessarytoresolvethecontroversy.Thisisnecessarysincethesetestswillhaveanadverseimpactonthechildandmother.Thecourtheldthatthewifecanproducedocumentaryproofsuchasabirthcertificateandschoolrecordtoprovehercase.Sincethesecondwifeandherchildwerenotpartytodivorceproceedings,itwouldviolatetheprincipleofnaturaljustice.Suchtestswouldnotbeintheinterestoftheminorchild.Further,thecourtcommentedthatevenifthetestwaspositive,itwouldnothelpthewifeproveherhusband’ssecondmarriage.

PresumptioninFavourofaValidMarriage

Acorollarytothedenialofpaternityisadenialofthemarriageitself.Thislegalployisconstantlyusedinproceedingsformaintenancefiledbythewife,bothunderSection125oftheCr.PCaswellasincivilsuitsandmatrimonialproceedings.Ifamarriageisnotvalid,thestatusofthewomanisreducedfromthatofawifetoamistressorconcubine.Thechildrenwillalsosufferstigmabybeingbrandedillegitimateandwillhavetobeartheeconomicconsequencesofthedenialoftheirrights.Toavoidthiseventuality,thelawleansinfavourofapresumptionofthemarriagebeingvalidratherthaninfavourofitsbeinganillegitimaterelationship,whichthecourtswouldviewasavice.

Thepleaforinvalidityofmarriageisoftenbasedontechnicalitiesthatcertainessentialceremonieswerenotperformedorsomeessentialconditionswerenotfulfilledatthetimethatthemarriagewassolemnized.Summarisedbelowaresomefrequentlyusedgroundsfordenyingwomenmaintenanceandthepositiveapproachofthecourtswhiledecidingthesecases.

ViolationofEssentialConditionsofaMarriageChallengestothevalidityofmarriagearebasedontheabsenceofanyessentialconditionsforavalidmarriagesuchasfreeconsent,minimumage,etc.Thecourtshave


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heldthataviolationofthestipulationoftheminimumageofmarriagecannotbeusedtodeprivetheminorwifeofherrighttomaintenance.

Regardingtheabsenceofconsent,inBasantiMohantyv.ParikhitRout,83whileupholdingthewife’srighttomaintenance,theOrissaHighCourtheldthatevenifitcanbeprovedthatthe(p.138) marriagewasenteredintowithouttheconsentofthehusband,themereabsenceofconsentwillnotrenderamarriagethathasbeenperformedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheHinduMarriageAct,invalidforthepurposeofclaimingmaintenance.

Similarly,violatingtheagebarwillnotrenderthemarriageinvalidandthehusbandcannotescapetheliabilityofpayingmaintenancetothewifeonthisground.84

Non-PerformanceofEssentialCeremoniesofMarriageAnotherchallengetothevalidityofmarriageisthenon-performanceofcertainessentialceremoniesasprescribedbytheHinduMarriageAct.However,variouscourtshaveheldthatifthereisotherevidencetoprovethemarriage,evidenceoftheperformanceofsaptapadi(inthecontextofHindumarriages)isnotnecessary,especiallysinceceremoniesvaryindifferentcastesandcommunities.

InDwarikaPrasadSatpathyv.BidyutPrayaDixit,85theSupremeCourtheldthatonceitisadmittedthatsomemarriageprocedurewasfollowedandifthecourtisprimafaciesatisfiedwithregardtotheperformanceofthemarriage,itisnotnecessarytoprobefurtherintowhetherceremonieswerecompleteasperHinduritesoriftheceremonyisinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheHinduMarriageAct.Themarriagewouldbedeemedvalid.

Numeroushighcourtshavealsoheldsimilarly.Forinstance,inSubhashPopatlalShahv.LataSubhashShah,86themarriagewasperformedbyapriestinatemplewhochantedmantras,tilakwasapplied,thebrideandgroomgarlandedeachother,andthemarriagewasconsummated.Later,thehusbandchallengedthevalidityofthemarriageonthegroundthatsaptapadiwasnotperformed.Butthecourtheldthatsaptapadiwasnotproventobeanessentialceremonyasperthecustomsprevailingamongbothpartiestothemarriage.Thecourtfurthercommentedthatevenifitcanbeproven,itcannotbeheldthatthemarriageisinvalidonthisbasis.Whensomeceremoniesofmarriagehavebeenperformed,thereisalwaysapresumptionofthevalidityofthemarriageunderSection114oftheIEA.Untilthispresumptionisrebuttedbycogentandsatisfactoryevidence,themarriagewillbedeemedvalid.Basedonthispresumption,theBombayHighCourtupheldtheclaimofthewomanandawardedmaintenanceofRs400permonthtothewifeandRs500permonthtoherson.ThecourtalsocommentedthattheSupremeCourtrulingrequiringstrictproofofavalidmarriageinthecontextofprosecutionforbigamyunderSection494ofIPCisnotrelevantinmatrimonialproceedings.87

TheviewthatsaptapadiisnotrequiredforavalidHindumarriagewasalsoupheldbytheRajasthanHighCourtinRoopSinghv.StateofRajasthan,88wherethemarriagewas


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performedasperthecustomofnata,89whichispermissibleamongstmanylowercastecommunitiesof(p.139) Rajasthan.Whileacknowledgingthatsaptapadimaynotbeanessentialceremonyamongstsomecommunities,thecourtruledthatthenecessaryceremonieshadbeenperformed,andthatthestandardofproofneededtoproveamarriageisnotashighasthatrequiredinconnectionwithproceedingsundertheIPCfortheoffenceofbigamy.

ThePatnaHighCourtcommentedinVeenaDeviv.AshokKumarMandal,90thatitisirrelevantfortheplaceofmarriagetobementionedandsaptapaditohavetakenplaceintheapplicationinproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PC.Thecourtalsocommentedthatthefailuretonamethepriestandbarberwhowerepresentattheweddingcouldhardlyserveasagroundtodisbelievethefactumofmarriagebecauseeverybrideandbridegroomarenotexpectedtorecollectthenamesofattendeesaftertwentyyearsofmarriage.

InLaxmikantv.PremwatiDevi,91thewifehadfiledforrestitutionofconjugalrightsagainstherhusbandinthetrialcourt.Although,thehusbandpleadedthatnomarriageexistedbetweenhimandthewoman,thewifepleadedthatsomemarriageceremonieshadbeenperformed.Basedonthisshewasawardedadecreeinherfavour.When,thehusbandappealedandproducedavoterslistasevidence(wherethewomanwasnotlistedashiswife),thecourtheldthatoncemarriagebetweenthepartiesisproved,presumptionwouldbedrawnthatalltherequiredceremoniesofmarriagewereperformed.Thecourtcommentedthatthepolicyofthelawwastoleaninfavourofthevalidityofmarriageratherthanagainstit.

InMuthumanicamv.Sekaran,92despitethehusband’scontentionthattherewasnovalidmarriage,theMagistrate’scourtawardedmaintenanceofRs175tothewifeandRs125tothechild.Thesessionscourtreversedtheorderonthegroundthatthemarriagehadnotbeenprovedassaptapadiwasnotperformed.Inanappeal,theMadrasHighCourtupheldtherightofthechildtomaintenance,butdidnotgrantmaintenancetothewife.TheSupremeCourtreversedtheordersofthetwoAppellatecourtsandupheldtheorderoftheMagistrate’scourtandcommented:‘InTamilNadu,marriagebyexchangeofgarlandsispermissible.Thesmalldiscrepancyregardingthetimeofmarriageisnotagroundfordiscardingevidenceanddenyingmaintenancetothewife.’

InManmohanVaidv.MeenaKumari,93theDelhiHighCourtcommented:Asregardstheallegednon-performanceofsaptapadi,firstly,itshallbepresumedinthecircumstancesintheformoflaganferasand,secondly,non-performanceinitselfisnotasufficientconditiontodeclareamarriageinvalid/voidorvoidable.ThecourtdeclaredamarriagesolemnizedinaGurudwaraSahebaccordingtorulesofthecommitteeasvalid.Thiswasalovemarriagewherethecouplewerehavingarelationshipforfouryearsandthemarriagewasperformedagainstthewishesofparentsonbothsidesbutthematernalunclesonbothsidesattendedthewedding.Laterthehusbanddeniedthemarriageandallegedthathewasdrugged.Butthecourtcommentedthatthetrialcourtandthehighcourthadobservedthedemeanorofthehusbandandwereconvincedofthefalsityof


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hiscontentions.Thehighcourtcommentedthathewasapersonwhocouldgotoanyextent(todeposefalsity).

TheCalcuttaHighCourt,inJitendraNathDasv.MinatiDas,94uponthehusband’sdenial(p.140) ofthemarriage,permittedaphotographofthewifewiththehusbandalongwithitsnegative,asevidence.Inanelaborateandwellreasonedorder,theMagistrateupheldthewife’sclaimandawardedRs400permonthasmaintenance.Whiledismissingtheappealfiledbythehusband,theCalcuttaHighCourtheldthatSection125ofCr.PCisapieceofwelfarelegislationtoprotectthewifefromdestitutionandvagrancy,andproceedingsaresummarytofacilitateaspeedydisposal.RigoursofstrictproofofalltheformalitiesofaHinduMarriagecanbedispensedwith.Thehusbandcouldnotadduceevidencethatwassufficienttoquestiontheveracityofthetestimonyofwitnessesforthewife,whowerefoundtobesound,authentic,anddependable.

InNamitaPatnaikv.DillipPatnaik,95thehusbandallegedthatadocumenttitled‘BibahaBandhanAgreement’registeredbeforetheDistrictSub-RegistrarofCuttackwasfraudulent.Hecontendedthatnomarriagehadtakenplacebetweenthepetitionerandhimself.Intheregistereddocument,thehusbandhadcategoricallystatedthathehaddulymarriedthewomanandtheDistrictSub-Registrarstatedincourtthatthedocumenthadbeenpresentedtohimbythehusband.Itwasheldthatarightaccruedbymeansofaregistereddocumentcannotbetakenawaybyadeedofcancellationand,hence,anysuchdeedhasnolegalbasis.

InJagdishv.Shobha,96thewifepleadedthatshewaspregnantatthetimeofmarriage,whichwasperformedasperBuddhistrites.Soonafter,shegavebirthbutthechilddied.Thehusbanddeniedthemarriagebutadmittedtothepre-marriagepregnancy.TheMagistratecourtdismissedherapplicationbutthesessionscourtawardedherRs400asmaintenance.Thehighcourtupheldtheorderofthesessionscourtandheld:‘Evidencetenderedbythewifeshowsthatthehusbandtiedthemarriagenecklaceandappliedvermiliononthewife’sforeheadinthepresenceofseveralothers.ThisisinaccordancewiththecustomsapplicabletoBuddhists.’

Itisevidentthatinapluralisticsociety,therigidapplicationofstipulationsregardingtheessentialceremoniesofmarriageundertheHinduMarriageAct,onlyservetodenythecrucialrightsofbasicsurvivaltowomenandchildren.Thebenefitsofsucharigidapplicationoflegalprovisionsonlyhelpshusbandsvalidatetheirmanipulationstotakeadvantageoftheirownwrongdoing.Hence,ascanbeobservedfromtheaboverulings,astrongpresumptionofthelawoperatesinfavourofmarriageandlegitimacy,whichcannotberebuttedbyamerebalanceofprobability.Theevidenceforrebuttingthevalidityofamarriageshouldbecogent,satisfactory,andconclusive.

Inter-ReligiousMarriagesChristianlawpermitsaChristianmarriagetobesolemnizedbetweenacouple,evenifoneofthemisafollowerofChristianity.Hence,inter-religionmarriagesarevalidunderChristianlaw.Muslimlawpermitsinter-religiousmarriagesundercertainspecificcircumstances.ReligionisnotabarundertheSpecialMarriageAct.ButHindulawapplies


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onlytoHindusand,hence,aninter-religiousmarriageperformedasperHinduritesisnotvalid.ThesameconditionappliestoaParsimarriagewherein,ifaParsimarriesanon-Parsi,suchamarriageisinvalidundertheParsiMarriageandDivorceAct,1936(DiwanandDiwan1997).97

(p.141) But,sinceHindusocietyispluralistic,Hindulawvalidatesdiverseceremoniesandnonoticeperiodorwrittendocumentofmarriageisrequired,itiscommonpracticeforaninter-religiouscoupletooptforaHinduMarriage.Later,whenconflictsarise,thehusbandconvenientlyadvancesthepleathatsincethemarriageisinter-religious,itisnotlegallyvalid.

Sreedharanv.PushpaBai98isacaseofamarriagebetweenaHinduandChristianbelongingtotheNadarcommunity.Thevalidityofthemarriagewasbeingcontestedbythehusband.JanakiAmmaJ.oftheKeralaHighCourt,reiteratedthatthestandardofproofofmarriageforawardingmaintenanceisnotasstrictasitisforbigamyundertheIPC.Thecourtheldthatawomancannotbedeniedthestatusofawifeafterundergoingaceremonyofmarriage,merelybecausethehusbandandwifefollowdifferentreligions.Itisaninsufficientconditiontosurmisethattherewasnomarriage.

InK.SelvarajSurendranv.P.Jayakumary,99afterthedeliveryofachild,thehusbandrefusedtotakethewifebackanddeclinedtopaymaintenancetoherandthechild.Whenthewifefiledformaintenance,thehusbanddeniedtheexistenceofthemarriageandthepaternityofthechild.HeclaimedthatsinceheisaChristianandabachelor,andthewifeaHindu,therecannotbeamarriagebetweenthem.ThewifepleadedthattheywerebothHindusandmarriedundertheHMA.Thefamilycourtconcludedthatthewomanislegallymarriedandthatthechildwasbornwithinthemarriage.Itfurtherheldthatthedenialofmarriageandpaternitywastantamounttocruelty.Inanappealfiledbythehusbandagainsttheorderofthefamilycourt,theKeralaHighCourtuphelditandstatedthatthewifeisentitledtoaseparateresidenceandmaintenance.

InPatriciav.Purushothaman,100thehusbandpleadedthatheisHinduandsincethewifeisChristian,therecouldbenovalidmarriagebetweenthem.Butthecourtrejectedthispleaandheldthatsincethepartieswereacceptedbytheirrespectivefamiliesashusbandandwife,itisdifficulttoinferthattheirrelationshipwasconstruedbyfamilymembersasmereconcubinage.Further,itcanbejustifiablypresumedthattherewasalegalmarriagebetweenthemduetotheirlongcohabitationforthepurposeofawardingmaintenanceunderSection125Cr.PC.

InMadhaviRameshDudaniv.RameshK.Dudani,101themarriagewasbetweenaChristianwifeandaHinduhusband.Whenthewifeleftthematrimonialhomeduetoestrangementandfiledformaintenanceforherselfandhertwodaughters,thehusbanddeniedthevalidityofthemarriageonthegroundthatcertainessentialceremonieslikesudhikaranwerenotperformed.Thetrialcourtupheldthisplea.Inanappealfiledbythewife,whilesettingasidetheverdictofthetrialcourt,theBombayHighCourtheldthatpurificationceremonyisnotnecessaryasperSection4oftheHinduMarriageAct 102andhencetheabsencethereofcannotleadtotheconclusionthatsuchapersondidnot


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converttoHinduismpriortothemarriageceremony.Further,itheldthatSection114oftheIEAexpectsthecourttopresumethe(p.142) existenceofcertainfactswhichitbelievesarelikelytohavehappened,regardbeingshowntothecommoncourseofnaturalevents.

Courtsusuallydeclinetoupholdfrivolouspleassuchastheinvalidityofinter-religiousmarriages.Theseclaimsprovideanescaperoutetohusbandsfromthelegalobligationofmaintainingthewifewithwhomtheycohabited,inwhatwasperceivedbythepartiesaswellastheirfamilies,asavalidmarriage.Ifthecourtsweretoacceptsuchfrivolouspleasadvancedbyhusbands,thelegislativeintentofprovidingmaintenancetowomeninavulnerablesituationwouldbedefeated.Hence,thecourtsareboundtoappreciatetheevidenceinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthestatuteinordertoachievethegoalofsocialjustice.

Ifthegirlherselfallegesfraudandmisrepresentationregardingreligionandsocialstatus,thecourtsarelikelytoannulaninter-religiousmarriageperformedasperHinduritesasheldbytheSupremeCourtinGullipilliSowriaRajv.BandaruPavani.103

RightsofWomeninBigamousMarriages

Oneofthemostcommonlyusedlegalstrategiestodenyawomanmaintenanceistoclaimthatthemarriageisbigamous.Priorto1955,Hindumarriageswerepolygamous.Butthecodifiedstatuteof1955,theHinduMarriageAct,renderedHindumarriagesmonogamous.104But,whileitwasdeemedmonogamousinletter,Hindumarriagescontinuetobepolygamousinreality.Withinthelegaldomain,thesemarriagesarevoid.Buthistorically,mostcommunitiesacceptedthecustomarypracticeofbigamousmarriagesandtreatedtheseunionsasvalidmarriages.Ironically,thissituationisprevalentnotonlyinruralareas,buturbancentresaswell.

Theadvantageofthemandateoflegalmonogamylieswiththehusbandashecanescapefromtheeconomicliabilityofmaintaininghiswifeonthepleathatthemarriagesufferedfromalegaldefectorlackedlegalsanctity.SinceancientHindulawandcustomarypracticesvalidatedtheinstitutionofconcubinage,eveninpresenttimes,thepleathatthewomanconcernedisa‘concubine’or‘mistress’andnotthe‘wife’canbeadvancedwitheaseinlegalarguments.Thefactthathusbandshavetakenundueadvantageandgrosslymisappropriatedthismandateisexemplifiedbythevolumeofcaselawonthesubject.Anoftinvokedlegalployistotermthewomanthedomesticmaid,amistressora‘keep’,andnotthewifewithrights,statusandentitlements.

MaintenanceRightsofSecondWivesOnthepositivesideistherulingofM.H.KaniaJ.oftheBombayHighCourt,inGovindraov.Anandibai,105deliveredin1976.InthiscaseitwasheldthatsincetheHMAisasociallegislation,itcouldnothavewhereaHinduwomanwasdupedintocontractingabigamousmarriagewithaHindumale,sheshouldbedeprivedofherrighttoclaimmaintenance.

Severallaterdecisionsfollowedthislegaldictum.Inaleadingcase,Vimalav.


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Veeraswamy,106theSupremeCourtheld:Section125ofCr.PCismeanttoachieveasocialpurpose.Theobjectiveistopreventvagrancyanddestitution.Whenanattemptis(p.143) madebythehusbandtonegatetheclaimoftheneglectedwifebydepictingherasakeptmistress,onthepleathathewasalreadymarried,thecourtinsistsonstrictproofoftheearliermarriage.Aprovisioninthelaw,whichdisentitlesthesecondwifefromreceivingmaintenancefromherhusbandunderSection125ofCr.PCforthesolereasonthatthemarriageceremony,thoughperformedinthecustomaryform,lackslegalsanctity,canbeappliedonlywhenthehusbandprovesthesubsistenceofalegalandvalidmarriage.ThisissoparticularlywhenSection125ofCr.PCisameasureofsocialjusticeintendedtoprotectwomenandchildren.Intheabsenceofclearproofthattherespondentislivingwithanotherwomanashusbandandwife,thecourtcannotbepersuadedtoholdthatthemarriagedulysolemnized,betweentheappellantandrespondent,suffersfromanylegalinfirmity.

Thisviewwasfurtheredinalaterruling,Mallikav.P.Kulandai,107wherethewomangotmarriedtoamanwhoclaimedtobeawidowerandtherewasadaughterbornoutofthisunion.Whenshelaterfiledformaintenance,thehusbandchallengedthevalidityofthemarriageonthegroundthathehadanearliermarriagesubsisting.Thelowercourtupheldthehusband’spleathatthemarriagewasnotlegalanddeniedmaintenancetothewoman.Butinanappeal,theMadrasHighCourtheldthatthoughthemarriagecouldnotbestrictlyproven,therewassufficientevidencetoestablishthatthepartieslivedtogethercontinuouslyforaperiodoftimelongenoughforachildtobeborn.Thecourtupheldthewoman’sclaimofRs250maintenanceforherselfandRs50tothechildbornofthisunion.In2002,theBombayHighCourt,inR.Arorav.B.Arora,108upheldtherightofthesecondwifetoaseparateresidenceandmaintenanceunderSection18oftheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct.Inthiscase,whiledivorceproceedingswerependingagainstthefirstwife,thehusbandenteredaninformalrelationshipwithanotherwoman,butlater,reconciledwithhiswife.Thewomanfiledforadeclarationthathermarriageisvalid,foraninjunctionagainstdispossession,andformaintenance.Thefamilycourtpassedanorderrestrainingthehusbandfromthrowingthewomanoutoftheflatinwhichshewasresidingalongwithherdaughter,andawardedmaintenanceofRs10,000.Inanappeal,theBombayHighCourtruledthatsincethehusbandhadreconciledwithhisfirstwife,thesubsequentpartnercouldnotbeexpectedtoresideinthesamehouseandthatshewasentitledtoaseparateresidence.

TheturningpointinthislineofargumentscamewithacontraryviewadvancedbythefullbenchverdictinBhausahebRaghujiMagarv.LeelabaiBhausahebMagar,109in2003bytheBombayHighCourt.Inthiscase,itwasheldthattheearlierdecisionoftheBombayHighCourt,upholdingtherightofmaintenancetotheillegitimatewife(orfaithfulmistress)byaliberalconstructionoftheword‘wife’ascontainedinSection25ofHMA,isnotgoodlaw.Thecourtcommentedthatthoughsuchaliberalconstruction,whichmaybenefitsecondwiveswhoareinnocentlydrawnintomarriages,itmayencouragebigamousmarriageswithfullknowledge,inspiteoftheexistenceofalegislationpreventingbigamousmarriages.


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TheSupremeCourtrulingin2005,inSavitabenSomabhaiBhatiyav.StateofGujarat,110alsoendorsedthisview.Inthiscase,awoman,claimingtohavebeenmarriedaccordingtocustomaryritesandrituals,pleadedthather(p.144) husbandhadanillicitrelationshipwithawomannamedVeenaben.ThehusbanddeniedthemarriageandpleadedthatVeenabenwhomhehadmarried22yearsagowashislawfulwife.TheGujaratHighCourtupheldthevalidityofhismarriagewithVeenaben.Endorsingthisverdict,theSupremeCourtheldthatitisinconsequentialthatthemanwastreatingSavitabenashiswife.Howeverdesirableitmaybetotakenoteoftheplightoftheunfortunatewoman,itistheintentionofthelegislaturewhichisrelevantandnottheattitudeoftheparty.Thereisnoscopeforenlargingitbyintroducingawomannotlawfullymarriedintheexpression‘wife’.Followingthisruling,theBombayHighCourt,inAtmaramTukaramSuradkarv.SauTrivenibaiAtmaramSuradkar,111heldthatthepositionofawomanwhoismarriedtoapersonwhosespouseislivingatthetimeofthesecondmarriageisamistressandnotamarriedwife,andisnotentitledtomaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.SimilarlyinBuddepuKhogayyav.BuddepuKamalu,112thewomanadmittedthatthehusbandwasmarriedatthetimeofhermarriagetohim,butthathehadpromisedtodivorceherinthecourseoftime,whichhedidnotdo.Later,aftertwochildrenwereborn,hedesertedher.TheMagistrate’scourtawardedherRs400asmaintenance,butrelyingontheSupremeCourtrulinginSavitaben,thehighcourtreversedtheorderandheldthatsuchapleaunderSection125ofCr.PCwasofnoavailtoher.

ThederogatoryattitudetowardswomenwhoareinsuchrelationshipsisfurtherreflectedinMaltiv.StateofU.P.,113wherethehusbanddevelopedasexualrelationshipwiththedomesticmaidandstartedcohabitingwithher.Whenthewifereturned,heturnedthemaidoutofthehouse.Whenaclaimformaintenancewasfiledbythedomesticmaid,thejudgedeclared:‘Thetwomayagreetolivetogethertosatisfytheiranimalneeds.Butsuchaunionisnevercalledamarriageandawomanleadingsuchalifecannotbebestowedwiththesacrosancthonourofawife.Nomaritalobligationsaccruetosuchawomanagainstherhusband.’Whilecommentsaboutthehighmoralstandardsmayappearsalutary,itdoesseemthatthepriceforimmoralityistobepaidonlybythewoman,whilethemanisleftfreetoexploitbothwomen.ThisseemstobetheoutcomeofenforcingastrictcodeofmonogamyundertheHinduMarriageAct.

Inthiscontext,oneneedstoelaborateontworecentjudgmentsdeliveredbytheDelhiHighCourt,reportedin2008.ThesejudicialpronouncementshaveattemptedtocrossthestumblingblockposedbythestipulationofmonogamyunderSection5oftheHMAbyinvokinginnovativelegalmaximstoprotecttherightsofwomen.

Inthefirstcase,SureshKhullarv.VijayKumarKhullar,114whilecontractingthepresentmarriage,thehusband’sfirstmarriagewasdissolvedbyacourtoflaw.Thewifewasinnocentandobliviousofthefraudulentcircumstancesunderwhichthehusbandhadobtainedanexpartedecreeofdivorceagainsthisfirstwife.Afterafewmonthsofhermarriage,thewomanwasdrivenoutofthematrimonialhome.Thereafter,thehusband’sexpartedecreeofdivorcewassetasideonthegroundoffraudand,throughthislegal


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incidentSureshKhullar’smarriagewasrenderedbigamousandinvalid.Thewomanfiledasuitfordamagesagainstthehusbandandhisfirstwifeonthegroundoffraudandcheating,whichwasdecreedbyaciviljudge.While(p.145) upholdingtherightofthewoman,thecourtwithrespecttoSection18ofHAMA,theDelhihighcourtheldasfollows:‘Whileinterpretingastatute,thecourtsmaynotonlytakeintoconsiderationthepurposeforwhichthestatutewasenacted,butalsothemischiefitseekstosuppress.’Thecourtinvokedthelegalmaximconstructionutresmagisvaleatquampereat,thatis,wherealternativeconstructionsarepossible,thecourtmustgiveeffecttothatwhichwillberesponsibleforthesmoothworkingofthesystemforwhichthestatutehasbeenenactedratherthanonewhichwillputaroadblockinitsway.Thecourtcommentedthatifthisinterpretationisnotaccepted,itwouldamounttogivingapremiumtothehusbandfordefraudingthewife.ItwasheldthatforthepurposeofclaimingmaintenanceunderSection18ofHAMA,thewomanshouldbetreatedasthelegallyweddedwife.

ThesecondrulingwaspronouncedinNarinderPalKaurChawlav.ManjeetSinghChawla.115ThewifehadapproachedthecourtformaintenanceunderSection18ofHAMAin1997andpleadedthatherhusbandhaddupedherbysuppressinghisearliermarriage.Thecouplehadlivedtogetherforfourteenyearsandhadtwodaughters.Thehusbandpleadedthatsincehisearliermarriagewasvalidandsubsisting,hismarriagewithNarinderPalKaurwasvoid.Afteraprolongedandcontentiouslitigation,shewasabletosecureanorderofinterimmaintenanceofRs1,500permonthBut,whenthecasewasfinallydecidedin2005,thetrialcourtdismissedherpetitiononthegroundthatshecouldnotbetreatedasaHinduwifeunderSection18ofHAMAasshedidnothavethestatusofalegallyweddedwife.Butinappeal,theDelhiHighCourtupheldtherightofthewifeandheldthatevenifthewomancannotbetreatedasaHinduwife,sheisentitledtoalumpsettlementbywayofdamages.

CustomaryDivorceandSubsequentRemarriageDespitetheenactmentoftheHinduMarriageAct,whichprovidedforajudicialdivorce,thepracticeofcustomarydivorceisprevalentamonglargesectionsofsociety,andmoresoamongthepoorinruralareaswhofinditdifficultandexpensivetoaccesstheformalcourtstructures.Thecustomarydivorceandremarriagewasanacceptedpracticeamongthelowerclassesandeventhecodifiedlawvalidatessuchpractices.116But,whenwomeninsuchmarriagesclaimmaintenance,thehusbandschallengethecustomarydivorcetoinvalidatethepresentmarriageanddefeatthewoman’sclaimofmaintenance.Here,too,thecourtshaveheldcontradictoryviews.Whilesomejudgmentshaveseenthroughthefalsityofsuchclaims,othershaveheldinfavourofhusbands,thus,renderingwomentrappedinsuchsituationextremelyvulnerable.

OnthepositivesideisthecaseofPushpabaiv.PratapSingh.117WhenthewifewasawardedmaintenanceofRs500permonthbythetrialcourt,thehusbandfiledanappealandpleadedthattherewasnovalidmarriagebetweenthepartiessincethewifehadnotobtainedadivorcefromherfirsthusbandand,hence,sheisnothislegallymarriedwife.Thesessionscourtsetasidetheorderofmaintenance.Inappeal,thewifepleadedthatshehadbeendivorcedaccordingtothecustomofthecasteandthedivorcetookplace


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beforetheGonaceremony.118Onexaminationofevidence,theMadhyaPradeshHighcourtupheld(p.146) theorderoftheMagistrate’scourtthatthecustomarydivorceandthesubsequentmarriageisvalid,andawardedRs1,000ascoststothewife.Whilethejudgmentispositive,ithighlightsthelongandcircuitousroutetojusticewhichwomenhavetoundertakeforapaltrysumofmaintenance.In2004,inRameshchandraDagav.RameshwariDaga,119thehusbandhadmarriedRameshwari,whohadobtainedacustomarydivorce(chorchittee)throughadivorcedeed,whichwasallegedlyshowntothehusbandpriortothemarriage.Later,whensheclaimedmaintenance,thehusbanddeniedthemarriageonthegroundthatthewomanhadnotbeenformallydivorced.BoththefamilycourtatMumbaiaswellastheBombayHighCourtupheldthewife’sandherdaughter’srightofmaintenance.Inthefinalverdict,theSupremeCourtupheldthewoman’spleathatthehusband,anadvocate,wasawareofthecustomarydivorceatthetimeofhismarriage.

ThefactsofthiscasetellthetragictaleofanIndianwoman,whohavinggonethroughtwomarriageswithachildborntoher,apprehendsdestitutionasbothmarriageshavebrokendown’,thejudgescommentedwithanoteofcompassion.Further,theSupremeCourtacceptedthatHindumarriages,likeMuslimmarriages,werebigamouspriortothe1955enactment.Thereisalsoatacitacceptancethatthegroundrealityhasnotchangedmuchsincetheenactment.So,thoughsuchmarriagesareillegal,asperthestatutoryprovisionsofthecodifiedHindulaw,theSupremeCourtruledthattheyarenotimmoraland,hence,afinanciallydependentwomancannotbedeniedmaintenanceonthisground.

InK.Surammav.K.Rammayyamma,120itwasheldthatthepartiesrelyingoncustommustprovethecustom.Sincetherewasnoevidenceofthepracticeofcustomarydivorcebeingancientandcontinuous,andnoevidenceonrecordtoprovethatherdivorcewithherearlierhusbandwasfinal,thecourtdeclinedtoupholdthewoman’srightstothedeathbenefitsofherdeceasedhusband.121

Inthesecasesthechallengebeforethecourtistoexaminewhetherthemarriagecontractedbythewomansubsequenttoherdivorceandobtainedthroughcustomarypracticesisvalid,orwhetherthesubsequentmarriagecanbedeclaredbigamousand,hence,invalid.Thecourtsalsoexaminetheintentionoftheparties—whethertherewasanintentiontodivorce,orwhethertherewasanintentiontodeceiveandfraudulentlyenterintoasecondmarriagewhiletheearlieronewassubsisting.

InParikshatv.StateofUP,thehusbandchallengedtheorderofmaintenanceawardingthewifeRs500permonthasmaintenanceonthegroundthatsinceshehadnotobtaineddivorcefromherprevioushusband,hermarriagewithhimisnotvalid.Thehighcourtupheldtheorderofthetrialcourtandheldthatwhenthefactumofmarriageisadmitted,itshouldbepresumedthatthewifeisthelegallyweddedwife.Thetrialcourthadheldthattherehadbeenacustomarydivorcecalledchuttachuttiand,hence,thewoman’spreviousmarriagestoodterminated.Neithertrialcourtnortherevisioncourtspecifiedthatthehusbandhadmadeacontentionthatthepracticeofcustomarydivorcewasunacceptableonthebasisofthewellestablishedprinciplethatcustomcannotoverride


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writtenlawand,further,thatdivorcecouldbeacceptableonlyifitwasbroughtaboutinaccordancewithprovisionsofHindulaw.

AftertheSupremeCourtrulinginRameshchandraDagav.RameshwariDaga(p.147)(discussedearlier),itappearedthatitwillnolongerbepossibleforaHinduhusbandtoescapefromhisliabilityofmaintaininghiswifeonthepleathatthewifeisnotformallydivorcedfromherprevioushusband,oronthepleathatthewomanishisconcubinesincehisownpreviousmarriageisstillsubsisting.ButthesubsequentrulinginSavitabenSomabhaiBhatiyav.StateofGujarat(alsodiscussedearlier)hasagainrenderedthesituationambiguous.Butsubsequenttothisruling,theProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceActwasenactedin2005,whichhasawardedlegalrecognitiontoinformalrelationshipsandcohabitteerights.Thislegalprovisionwhichisdiscussedsubsequently,aswellasjudicialpronouncementsofvarioushighcourts,havebroughtinarenewedhopetowomenwhosemarriagesufferfromlegalortechnicaldefect.

SuccessionRightsofSecondWivesChallengestotherightsofthesecondwifeextendbeyondissuesofmaintenanceandspilloverintothedomainofsuccessionrights.Casesarisebecausetheclaimsofthesecond(orsubsequent)wifeorherheirsarecontestedeitherbythefirst(orformer)wife,herchildren,orthehusband’srelatives.Here,too,onecanfinddivergentviewsontheissue.

OnthepositivesideistherulinginShantaramPatilv.DagubaiPatil.122Inthiscase,whiledecidingtherightofawidowinaninvalidmarriage,theBombayHighCourthadheldasfollows:Evenifthemarriageisvoid,thewomanhasarightagainstthehusband.TherightcanbeenforcednotonlyinaproceedingunderSection25oftheHMA,butinanyproceedingwherevalidityofmarriageandtherightsflowingfromitaredetermined.Therightcanbeenforcednotonlyduringthelifetimeofthehusbandbutalsoafterhisdeathagainsthisproperty.Inthiscase,thecourtalsoruledthatthesonfromthesecondmarriageisentitledtoashareinthefather’spropertyalongwiththefirstwifeandherthreechildren,andthesecondwifeisentitledtomaintenancefromthepropertyofherdeceasedhusband.

Followingisaninterestingcasewherethechildofthesecondwifecontestedtheclaimofsuccessionofthethirdwifeandwhereissuesofcustomarymarriageanddivorcewerealsoinvolved.InShakuntalabaiv.Kulkarni,123thehusbandhadremarriedasthefirstwifecouldnotbearchildren.AfterthedeathofthesecondwifehemarriedforthethirdtimeinthecustomaryUdikiform.Afterhisdeath,thedaughterofthesecondwifechallengedthesuccessionclaimofthethirdwife.Theissuebeforethecourtwaswhetherthedivorceincustomaryformandsubsequentmarriageincustomaryformwasvalidunderthelaw.Thecourtobservedthatinmattersofthiskind,hearsayevidence,liketraditions,maybereceivedasdirectevidencesincedirectevidenceofsuchmarriageswasnotalwaysavailable,andoneofthewaysinwhichthemarriagecanbeprovedwasfromthemanneroftheirlivingandfromthewayinwhichtheyweretreatedbytheirneighbours.

ThecaseofReshamBaiv.Shakuntalabai124involveddistributionofassetsbetweenthe


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motherandthetwowivesofthedeceased.ThetrialcourthaddirectedthatthedepositofRs52,248shouldbedistributedequallybetweenmotherandtwowives.Boththewivesweretogetthefamilypensioninequalshare.Thehighcourtheldsuchdistributionofassetstobefair,reasonable,andbasedonequitableconsideration.

(p.148) In2008,theSupremeCourt,inTulsav.Durghatiya,haslaiddownthatifacoupleislivingtogetherforaverylongperiodashusbandandwife,therewouldbepresumptioninfavourofwedlock.Thispresumptionisrebuttable,butaheavyburdeniscastuponthepersonwhoseekstodeprivetherelationshipofitslegalorigintoprovethatnomarriagetookplace.TheCourtreiteratedthatthelawleansinfavouroflegitimacyandfrownsuponbastardy.Inthiscase,thecouplehadlivedtogetherforthirtyyearsandhadfivechildren.Thedaughtersweregiveninmarriagebythehusband.Afterherhusband’sdeath,thewomanhadlegitimateclaimoverthepropertyashiswife.Shehadincurreddebtatthetimeofherson’smarriageandhadsoldpartofthelandforthispurpose.TheSupremeCourtheldthatshehadtherighttoselllandandthereisnoquestionofhavinganyillegalpossession.Whilethetrialcourtupheldherclaim,theappellatecourtwithoutanyevidence,hadcometoanabruptconclusionthatthewomanhadstartedlivingwiththemanduringthelifetimeofherhusbandand,hence,sheisnotthewifebutmerelyaconcubine.Hence,shedoesnotacquiretherightsofawidowandcannotinherithisproperty.Butevidenceclearlyprovedthatherformerhusbandwasnotalivewhenshecameandstartedlivingwiththedeceased.TheSupremeCourtconcludedthatcontinuouslivingashusbandandwifehadbeenestablished.

Whiletheaboverulingsfavourwomenininvalidmarriages,thefollowingjudgmentsareindicativeofacontradictorytrend.

InRajeshbaiv.Shantabai,125thefirstwife,Shantabaicontestedtheclaimofsuccessionofthesecondwife,Rajeshbai,whowasinpossessionofthepropertyafterthedeathofherhusband.Thecourtcommented:Theinjunctiverulethatneitherpartyshouldhaveaspouselivingatthetimeofmarriageisenactedtoprohibitpolygamyandtoinstitutemeasuresofmonogamy.Theremaybecaseswherethatstatusmaynotbeavailabletoawomanbecauseoftheinjunctiveprocessoflaw.Thoughsuchawomanmighthaveundergoneaformalmarriage,herstatuswouldbethatofanillegitimatewife,andsuchawifeisnotconferredwiththestatuswhichisavailabletoalegitimatewifenordoesshehaveanyentitlement,asthelawfulwifeofherhusband,tothepropertyundertheprovisionoftheHinduSuccessionAct,1956.Hence,itwasheldthatbothbyvirtueofstatusandlaw,Shantabaialonewouldbeconsideredasawidowandassuchwouldsucceedtothepropertiesofthedeceased.However,thecourtorderedpaymentofRs20,000toRajeshbaiasfullandfinalsettlementofherclaim.

Similarly,inNimbammav.Rathanamma,126thecourtruledthattheprovisionsofSection5(i)and11ofHMArenderthepositionofawomanmarriedtoapersonwhosewifewaslivingatthetimeofthesecondmarriagetobethatofakeptmistressandnotthatofalegallymarriedwife.Statingthatabigamousmarriageisnullandvoidabinitio,thecourtheldthatsuchawomanwasnotentitledtosucceedtothepropertiesofthatperson.


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AnotherinterestingcaseisFelixv.Jemi.127Thefirstwifeandherchildrenchallengedthesuccessionclaimsofthesecondwifeandherchildren.ThepartiesandthedeceasedhusbandwereChristians.Thecourtheldthatthedivorceobtainedin1971,bythemutualconsent,ofthefirstwifeandthedeceasedwasnotvalidunderthelawapplicabletoChristians.Hence,asthepetitionerwasstillthelawfullyweddedwifeofthedeceasedatthetimeofthelatter’smarriage(p.149) withthesecondwife,thecourtstatedthattherelationshipbetweenhimandthesecondwifewasmereconcubinageandthechildrenbornofthatunionwereillegitimate.Statingthatonlybecausetheylivedunderoneroof,thewomancouldnotclaimthestatusofthewifeofthedeceased,thecourtheldthatoncethemarriagebetweenthefirstwifeanddeceasedwasadmittedandthemarriagewasnotdissolvedinmannerknowntolaw,thewomaninasubsequentrelationshipwilllosethestatusofawife.ThecaseisrathertragicbecausetheChristianlawhadremainedarchaicforaverylongtimeandthenotionofjudicialdivorcebymutualconsentwasintroducedonlyin2001.Therewasnolegalavenueforthepartiesconcernedtoobtainajudicialdecreeofdivorcebyconsent.128So,thoughthedeceasedandthefirstwifehadseparatedwithconsent,theycouldnotobtainajudicialdecreetothiseffectandthesecondwifewhohadinfullfaith,wasdeniedhersuccessionrights.

SuccessionRightsofChildrenofVoidMarriagesRatherinterestingly,eachofthecasesdiscussedearlierconcernedthesuccessionrightsofchildrenofsecondwives.Insomecases,theirrightshavebeenupheldinvokingtheprovisionofSection16ofHMA.Priortothe1976amendmentonlychildrenwhoseparentshadobtainedadecreeofnullityweredeemedlegitimateandwereentitledtorights.Butafterthe1976amendmenttoSection16,thechildrenofvoidmarriageswereawardedtherightofmaintenanceandsuccession,irrespectiveofwhetherthepartieshadobtainedadecreeofnullity.Thismoveservedtowidenthescopeofthissectionandbroughtwithinitsambitalargenumberofchildrenwhoseparents’marriagesweredeemedinvalidduetothestipulationofmonogamy.Thesechildrenarenowdeemedlegitimateandareawardedrightsofmaintenanceandsuccessioninselfacquiredpropertyoftheirparents.Whileawardingsuccessionrightstoanillegitimatechild,thecourtshavealsoinvokedtheinstitutionofdasiputra(sonofaslave)whichwasprevalentundertheancientHindulaw.(p.150) Theseprinciplesaredemonstratedinthefollowingcases.

Section16:LegitimacyofChildrenofVoidandVoidableMarriages

(1)NotwithstandingthatamarriageisnullandvoidunderSection11,anychildofsuchmarriagewhowouldhavebeenlegitimateifthemarriagehadbeenvalid,shallbelegitimate,whethersuchchildisbornbeforeorafterthecommencementoftheMarriageLaws(Amendment)Act,1976,andwhetherornotadecreeofnullityisgrantedinrespectofthatmarriageunderthisAct,andwhetherornotthemarriageisheldtobevoidotherwisethanona

Box2.3TheHinduMarriageAct


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petitionunderthisAct.(3)NothingcontainedinSub-Section(1)orSub-Section(2)shallbeconstruedasconferringuponanychildofamarriagewhichisnullandvoidorwhichisannulledbyadecreeofnullityunderSection12,anyrightsinortothepropertyofanyperson,otherthantheparents,inanycasewhere,butforthepassingofthisAct,suchchildwouldhavebeenincapableofpossessingoracquiringanysuchrightsbyreasonofhisnotbeingthelegitimatechildofhisparents.

S.P.S.Balasubramanyamv.Suruttayan@AndaliPadayachi129concernedthesuccessionrightsofRamaswamywhowasthesonofawomanPavayee,wholivedwithoneChinathambiashissecondwife.Thecouplehadbeenlivingtogethersince1920.ThefactthatRamaswamywasthesonofthiscoupleandwasbornwhiletheylivedtogetherashusbandandwifewasnotdisputed.ButthetrialcourthadrejectedRamaswamy’ssuitfordeclarationandpossessionofthelandwhichbelongedtohisfatheronthegroundthattherewasnovalidmarriagebetweenhisparents.Butthefirstappellatecourtupheldhisclaimonthepremisethatlongcohabitationleadstopresumptionofavalidmarriage.ButtheMadrasHighCourtsetasidethisorderandrestoredtheorderofthetrialcourt.Inappeal,theSupremeCourtrejectedthecontentionthatRamaswamy’smotherhadleftherownhusbandandwaslivinginanadulterousrelationshipwiththedeceasedChinathambi,thefatherofRamaswamy,andsinceshewasamereconcubine,herchildhadnoclaimoverthepropertyofhisfather.Thecourtheldthatthiscontentionisirrelevantfordecidingtheissueofsuccessionrightsofthechildaschildrenbornevenofavoidmarriagearedeemedtobelegitimate.TheSupremeCourtsetasidetheorderofthehighcourtandrestoredtheorderofthefirstappellatecourtandupheldtherightsofRamaswamyoverthelandwhichbelongedtohisfather.

InLalithammav.AgriculturalEngineer,KarnatakaAgroIndustriesCorporation,Dharwad,130thedeceasedwasentitledtocompensationundertheWorkmen’sSaleCompensationAct,1923.Theappellant,amistressofthedeceased,claimedmaintenanceforherminorson.Whiletheclaimwasrejectedinthelowercourt,inappeal,theKarnatakaHighCourtheldthattheillegitimatechildofaworkmancanclaimdamagesforthelossofhisfather,andheisentitledtoashareequaltotheotherlegitimateheirs.

InRameshwariDeviv.StateofBihar,131itwasheldthatchildrenbornoutofaninvalidmarriagearelegitimateandareentitledtofamilypensionandgratuitypaymentsoftheirfather.Thecourtheldthatitwasprovedthatthesecondwifeandthedeceasedlivedashusbandandwifesince1963.ThisgivesrisetoapresumptioninfavourofavalidHindumarriage.ButitisnotalegalmarriagesinceitwasincontraventionoftheprovisionofmonogamyunderSection5oftheHinduMarriageActand,hence,itisvoidandthewomancannotbedeemedasawidowofthedeceased.Butthesonsofavoidmarriagebeinglegitimateareentitledtopropertyofthedeceasedinequalsharesalongwiththefirstwifeandherson.


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InLakshmammav.Kamalamma,132thedaughterofthesecondwife,ofthedeceased,claimedsuccessionrightstothepropertyofherfather.Theotherclaimantschallengedherclaimonthegroundthattherewasnovalidmarriagebetweenthedeceasedandhermother.Butupholdingherclaim,theKarnatakaHighCourtruledthatifthepartieslivedtogetherashusbandandwifeforseveraldecadesandthecommunityacceptedthemashusbandandwifetherewouldbeapresumptionofavalidmarriagebetweentheparties.Theoralevidencethatthemarriagetookplaceseveralyearsagowasalsoacceptedasvalidevidence.

(p.151) InParmanandv.Jagrani,133theclaimofthechildrenofthesecondwifewasopposedbythechildrenofthefirstwifeonthegroundthatthechildrenareillegitimate,asneitheroftheirparentsweremarriednorcouldtheyhavemarriedasthesecondwife’spreviousmarriagewasstillsubsistingatthetimeshestartedlivingwiththeirfather.Thesecondwifewasmarriedearlier,butafterseparatingfromherearlierhusbandshehadbeenlivingforalongtimewiththedeceasedandsevenchildrenwerebornoutofthisunion.Thehighcourtheldthatinviewofthelongcohabitationbetweenthedeceasedandthemotheroftheclaimants,amarriagecouldbepresumedbetweenthem.Onthebasisofthispresumption,thechildrenbornwouldbedeemedlegitimateandobtainbenefitsasperSection16(1)oftheHMAandwouldbeentitledtoinheritthepropertyoftheirputativefather.TheMadhyaPradeshHighCourtcommentedthatinKhatricommunitytowhichthepartiesbelonged,thecustomofnatramarriageprevailedwhichpermittedawifetocontractasecondmarriageduringthelifetimeofherfirsthusband.Aftercontractingmarriagethroughnatra,ifthewifeliveswiththemanasawifeforanumberofyearsandifherformerhusbandtakesnoactionregardinghisrightsofthemarriagethenitispresumedthatthenatraislegal,andchildrenoutofthisunionwouldbeconsideredlegitimate.134

Thecourtobservedfurther:TheHinduMarriageActisabeneficiallegislationand,therefore,ithastobeinterpretedinsuchamannerastoadvancetheobjectofthelegislation.TheActintendstobringaboutsocialreforms.Conferringthestatusoflegitimacyoninnocentchildren,whoareotherwisetreatedasbastards,istheprimeobjectofSection16oftheHinduMarriageAct.

InMinorGopi,Rep.byMotherandnextFriendSanthiv.Rathinam,135itwasheldthattheillegitimatechildofavoidmarriageisentitledtoclaimashareonlyinthepropertyoffather.Whilethefatherisalive,thesoncannotclaimhisshareintheproperty.Therightwouldaccrueonlyafterthedeathofthefather.

InChinnammalv.Elumalai,136itwasheldthatunderSection16oftheHMA,illegitimatechildrenareentitledtoanequalshareintheindividualandself-acquiredpropertyoftheirfather,thoughnotintheancestralproperty.InSarojammav.Neelamma,137theKarnatakaHighCourtpushedtheboundariesoftheclaimsofillegitimatechildrenandheldthatthechildrenbornoutofwedlockareentitledtoashare,notonlyintheself-acquiredpropertiesoftheparents,butalsointhejointorancestralpropertiesofparents.


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ASupremeCourtrulingof2003,inJiniaKeotinv.KumarManjhi,138hascontradictedthisviewandheld:‘ThoughSection16wasenactedforlegitimatechildren,whowouldotherwisesufferbybecomingillegitimate,inviewofanexpressmandateoftheLegislatureitselfunderSub-Section(3),thereisnoroomforaccordinguponsuchchildrenwhobutforSection16wouldhavebeenbrandedasillegitimateanyfurtherrightsthanenvisagedthereinbyresortingtoanypresumptiveorinferentialprocessofreasoning,havingrecoursetothemereobjectorpurposeofenactingSection16oftheAct.(p.152) AnyattempttodosowouldamountnotonlytovoilatingtheprovisionspecificallyengraftedinSub-section(3)ofSection16oftheActbutalsowouldamounttocourtre-legislatingonthesubjectundertheguiseofinterpretation,againsteventhewillexpressedintheenactmentitself.’Morerecently,theBombayHighCourt,inMarutiRauManev.ShrikantMarutiMane,139whiledeterminingsuccessionrightsofthechildrenofthesecondwifehasheldthatthesechildrenarenotentitledtoinheritancestralcoparcenerproperty.Buttheyareentitledtoanequalshareinthefather’sshareincoparcenerproperty.

WhiletheamendmenttoSection16oftheHinduMarriageAct,in1976,hasstrengthenedthesuccessionrightsofillegitimatechildren/childrenofvoidmarriages,theSupremeCourtin1961,inSinghaiAjitKumarv.Ujayarsingh,140hadheldthatevenundertheshastricandtextuallaw(orancientHindulaw),anillegitimatesonofamistressorconcubineisentitledtotherightsofsurvivorshipashebecomesacoparceneralongwiththelegitimatesonand,hence,isentitledtoenforceapartitionafterthefather’sdeath.

Somecourtshavedistinguishedbetweenavoidorvoidablemarriage,andmereconcubinagewhiledeterminingtherightsofillegitimatechildrenininvalidmarriagesandinformalcohabitation.Whilethemaintenancerightsofillegitimatechildrenareclearlylaidout,whenitcomestosuccessionrights,thesituationcontinuestobeambiguous.Relyingontechnicalnuances,borderingontheabsurd,andignoringthelegislativeintent,somecourtshaveheldthatchildrenofasecondwifeareentitledtomaintenancebeingchildrenofavoidmarriagesincesomesortofmarriageceremonymighthavetakenplace.Butifthewomanismerelycohabitingwithoutundergoinganyceremony,thecourtshavetermedherasaconcubinewhoisdevoidofrights.HerethecourtshaveadoptedaveryconstrainedviewofbeneficialprovisionofSection16ofHMAandhaveheldthatanillegitimatechildcaninheritthepropertyofthefatheronlywhenitcanbeprovedthattheparentshaveundergonesomemarriageceremony.Inordertoattractthissectionthereshouldhavebeena‘marriage’betweentheparentsandthatmarriageshouldhavebeennullandvoidunderSection11.SincebigamousmarriageisvoidunderSection11,thesamewouldbecoveredunderthisprovision,butbenefitscannotbeextendedtothechildofamistressorconcubine.

Forinstance,inSingaramUdayarv.Subramaniam,141itwasheldthatchildrenacquirenorightsthroughconcubinage.Thereshouldbevoidorvoidablemarriagebetweenparentsoftheindividualwhoclaimsthestatusofanillegitimatechildtogetasharefromtheestateofhisfather.Ifthereisnoproofofanymarriage,thechildrenbornoutofthis


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unioncannotbetreatedasillegitimatechildrenentitledforshare.Section16ofHMAdoesnotdealwithrightsofchildrenthroughconcubinage.

InChodanPuthiyothShyamalavalliAmmav.KavalamJisha,142theKeralaHighCourtheldthatifamarriagewassolemnizedbetweentheparents,thebenefitofSection16wouldhavebeenaccordedtothechildren.Butifitisestablishedthattherewasnomarriagebetweentheparents,thechildrenbornofthisrelationshipcannotacquirethebenefitsofSection16.Onthisground,thecourtrejectedtheclaimofthedaughterofthedeceasedtoinherithisproperty.

(p.153) Inanotherextremelynegativeruling,KesariBaiv.Parwati,143theMadhyaPradeshHighCourtheldthatchildrenbornoutofarelationshipwithamistressarenotentitledtoasuccessioncertificate,evenifnominatedbythedeceasedduringhislife-time.Thelowercourthadupheldtherightofthesechildren.Inappeal,thehighcourtsetasidethisorderandheldthatthestatusofsuchawomanisnotthatofamarriedwife.Thewomanhadstatedthatshehadgonethroughamarriageceremonybyexchangeofjaimala.ButthecourtheldthatsincethepartieswereBrahmins,saptapadiisanessentialceremonyofmarriage.Sincethewomanhadnotgonethroughanysuchritual,shecannotbeheldtobethewife/widowofthedeceased.Thecourtcommentedthatawomancanclaimherrightsonlywhenthecouplehasundergoneamarriageceremony.Otherwise,ifsheislivingtogetherwithapersonwithoutundergoingavalidlegalformofmarriage,itwillbedeemedthatsheismerelya‘keep’andnotawifeandthereisadifferencebetweenawifeandamistress.

Thisjudgmentiscontrarytoseveralrulingsdiscussedearlierinthissectionandarereflectiveoftheanti-womenbiaswithinthejudiciary.ButperhapssincethechildrendidnothavetheeconomicmeanstochallengeitintheSupremeCourt,therulingsremainedbindingonthem.

RightsofWomeninInformalRelationships

ProlongedCohabitationandPresumptionofMarriage

Thelawpresumesinfavourofmarriageandagainstconcubinagewhenamanandwomanhavecohabitedcontinuouslyforanumberofyears.

1929PrivyCouncilinMohabhatAliv.Md.IbrahimKhann.144

Thediscussiononsuccessionrightsofchildrenofvoidmarriagesbringsustoournextpoint—presumptionofmarriagewhicharisesduetolongcohabitation.Evenwhenthereisnoproofofanyceremoniesofmarriagehavingbeenperformed,thecourtswouldleantowardsvalidityofmarriagebasedonthepresumptionofmarriageunderSection114oftheIndianEvidenceAct.Section50oftheIndianEvidenceActprovidesadditionalsafeguards.Theseprovisionsstipulatethatthepresumptioninfavourofmarriageisnotmitigatedorweakenedmerelybecausetheremaynotbeconcreteevidenceofanymarriagehavingtakenplace.Insuchcases,thecourtswillexaminewhetheracommonperceptionprevailedthatthecouplearemarried.Ifthepartiescohabitedforlongtime


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andifsociety(forexample,thepeopleoftheareainwhichthepartiesresided)recognizedtheirrelationshipasamarriage,presumptionwouldarisethattheyarelegallywedded.

In1952,theSupremeCourt,inMohammedAminv.VakilAhmed,whiledecidingthesuccessionrightsofaMuslimwifeandherchildren,reliedupontheprincipleofpresumptionofmarriage.Thevalidityofmarriagewaschallengedbyotherrelativeswhowereclaimingthepropertyofthedeceased.Therewerenodocumentstoprovethemarriagebutthecouplehadlivedtogetherfor23–4yearsandfourchildrenwerebornoutoftheirrelationship.Basedonthisfactandonotherfacts,suchasthatthehusbandhadpurchasedpropertyinthenameofhissonsandhadmentionedthemashissonsinthesaledeed,thecourtinvokedthepresumptionofalawfulmarriage.

ThetheoreticalframeworkforthispresumptionwasprovidedbythePrivyCouncilin1929intheMohabhatAlicaseandwas,subsequently,followedbytheSupremeCourtintheMohammedAmincase.Thatcaseconcerneda(p.154) Muslimmarriagewherebigamyispermittedandthenotionofconcubinageisshunned.ThiswasalsopronouncedatatimewhenbigamywaspermittedevenundertheHindulaw.ButthesituationchangedaftertheenactmentoftheHinduMarriageActin1955.Section5(i)oftheActreadwithSection11stipulatesthatbigamousmarriagesarevoid.Butwhilemonogamywasthestatutorydictate,atthegroundleveltherewashardlyanychange.Customarypracticesandcommunitynormscontinuedtovalidatebigamousmarriages,thoughlegallytheyweredeemedasvoidanddevoidofanyrights.

Confrontedwithdiversepractices,itwasleftforthecourtstofindaviamediatodojusticeandprotecttherightsofwomenandchildrenwithinthesepluralistictraditionsandsocialrealities.Itisinthecontextofsafeguardingtherightsofinnocentchildren,whowerebeingdeprivedoftheirrightsandwerefacingsocialstigma,thatthelegislaturebroughtinanamendmenttoSection16HMA(andSection26ofSMA)andbestowedrightsofmaintenanceandsuccessiononchildrenofmarriageswhichwerevoid,irrespectiveofwhethertherewasajudicialdecreetothiseffect.Thisledtoagradualrecognitionoftherightsofillegitimatechildrenorchildrenofvoidmarriages,butwomencontinuedtosuffergreathardships,particularlyafterthedeathoftheirhusbands.Theirrightswereseverelyconstrainedornegatedinlitigationinitiatedbythechildrenfromtheirhusbands’previousmarriageorotherrelatives.

Technically,themovetoawardrightstoillegitimatechildrenofvoidmarriageswouldhavevalidatedtherightsofallchildrenwhowerebornininformalrelationships.Butthecourtswentintoafurthergradationbetweenawifeofavoidmarriageandameremistress.Aswehaveseenintheprecedingsection,therewassomerecognitionawardedtochildrenwhoseparentshadgonethroughsomeceremony,asopposedtothosewhohadnot.Thewomenwhocouldnotprovetheritualsandceremonieswererelegatedtoaderogativepositionofamistress,concubine,orkeep,andhadtoendurenotjustjudicialcontemptbutalsolossoftheireconomicrights.

Thewomenwhoweredeprivedoftheirstatusandrightsthroughthemandateof


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monogamy,introducedbytheHinduMarriageActof1955,hadtosufferforfiftyyearsbeforesomerecognitioncouldbeawardedtothem.TherehadbeenanattempttovoicetheirconcernsthroughtheenactmentoftheDomesticViolenceAct,2005,andbestowsomesocialstatusandlegalrightsonwomenwhowerepartofaprevailingsocialsystemandyetcouldbebrandedthus.

TheDVAtransformedtheyesteryearconcubinesintopresentdaycohabiteesandtheirrighttoprotectionfromdomesticviolenceandrightsofmaintenanceandresidencehavebeenawardedstatutoryrecognition.Whilesomemaydismissthetermcohabiteeasawesternorurbanphenomenon,thistermcannowbeinvokedtoprotecttherightsofthousandsofwomen,bothurbanandrural,whowereearlierscoffedatasmistressesorkeepsinthejudicialdiscoursebecauseofsometechnicaldefectintheirmarriage.TheDVAdoesnotclearlyprescribewhetherthenewtermcohabiteewillsafeguardtherightsofwomenwhowereearlierdenigratedasconcubinesandmistresses.Thatisleftforjudicialinterpretation.Butithelpstobringthedebatetoanewerplane.

TherecentrulinginNarinderPalKaurChawlav.ManjeetSinghChawla145hasaninterestingcommentregardingtheinstitutionofconcubinage.ItwasheldthatHindulawrecognizesthe(p.155) institutionofmarriageaswellasconcubinagewhichisreflectedintheprovisionsofSection18(e)ofHAMA146andsuggestedthatthisconceptneedsfurtherdilationandjudicialrecognitioninordertobringinanotionofjusticetowomen.RegardingtheprotectionsawardedtowomenininformalrelationshipsundertheancientHindulaw,thecourtcommented:

OneofsuchrecognizedobligationsinscribedintothepropertyofaHinduwasthatofmaintenanceofdependents.Thereisnoreasontoholdthatbycodificationofthelaws,thisbasicconceptforprovidingasortofsocialsecurityandhavinggeneralinsuranceinfavourofdependentshasbeencompletelytakenawayorabrogatedbyenactingHAMA.ThenecessitytoprovideevennowmayariseoutofthepremisesofthatActandwillhavetobesoworkedout.

Thecallforawiderdebateissalutaryandalsotimely.Inthiscontext,weneedtoexaminethejudicialpronouncementsoftheprecedingyearswhichhadattemptedtoraisethisconcern,thoughnotasclearlyandforthrightlyastheNarenderPaljudgmenthasattemptedtodo.ButtheNarenderPalrulingbuildsontheseearlierlegalprecedents.

IntheleadingcaseBadriPrasadv.DyDirectorofConsolidation,147in1978,adistinguishedbenchoftheSupremeCourtcomprisingofV.R.KrishnaIyerJ.,D.A.DesaiJ.,andO.ChinnappaReddyJ.,laiddownthatifamanandwomanhavelivedashusbandandwifeforaboutfiftyyears,underSection114ofIEA,astrongpresumptionarisesinfavourofwedlock.Althoughthispresumptionisrebuttable,aheavyburdenliesonhimwhoseekstodeprivetherelationshipoflegalorigin.Thecourtreiteratedthatthelawleansinfavouroflegitimacyandfrownsuponbastardy.Itwasheldthatthecontentionthatlongaftertheallegedmarriageevidencehasnotbeenproducedtosustainitsceremonialprocess,byexaminingthepriestorotherwitnesses,deservesnoconsideration.Thecourtcommentedthatifamanandwomanwholiveashusbandand


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wifearecompelledtoprovehalfacenturylaterbyeyewitnessevidencethattheywerevalidlymarried,fewwillsucceed.

Morerecently,inRadhammav.UnionofIndia,148thefactofmarriagewaschallengedbythemotherofthedeceasedinthecontextofsuccessionrights.TheKarnatakaHighCourtheldthatlongco-habitationbetweenthedeceasedandconcernedwomanwasprovedandthesocietytreatedthemasamarriedcouple.Therehadnotbeenanyallegationmadeagainstthewomanthatthedocumentsproducedbythewifewereconcoctedorforged.Hersignatureswerealsoadmitted.Thewomanconcernedandthesonofthepetitionerlivedashusbandandwife,andthiswaswithintheknowledgeoftheappellantandherfamilymembers.Hence,thecourtcommentedthataveryheavyburdeniscasteonthepersonwhochallengesthevalidityofsuchamarriage.

InDnyanobaKamblev.MuktaKamble,149thefactthattherespectiveparentshadrecognizedthepartiesasamarriedcoupleandthatthehusbandhimselfhadacceptedthewomanashiswifewasheldtobesufficienttoconsiderthemarriagevalid.Whileupholdingtheorderofmaintenanceawardedbythefamilycourt,thehighcourtcommented:‘Consideringthatthewifeisnotaneducatedladyandshecomesfromabackwardcommunity,therecannotbeanydocumentaryevidenceonanyoftheseaspects.(p.156) Theseaspectsaretobeconsideredfromanappropriateangle.’

InRajlinguv.Sayamabai,150whenthewifefiledformaintenancethehusbandallegedthatsheishissecondwifeand,hence,themarriageisvoid.Heproducedtheearlierwifeandadaughterbornthroughthatmarriageaswitnessestoprovehiscase.Thepresentapplicationwasfiledin1993.Butthewifehadearlierfiledformaintenancetwicein1971andin1973andonbothoccasionsacompromisewasreached,andthepartiesagreedtolivetogetheramicably.Atthattime,thehusbanddidnotraisethepleaabouthisearliermarriage.Thiscontentionwasraisedforthefirsttimein1993whichthecourtheldwasamereafterthought.Whiledismissinghisappeal,thehighcourtheldthattheconductofthepartiesinsuchmattersplaysaverydominantroleindeterminationoftherelationshipofhusbandandwife.

SobhaHymavathiDeviv.SettiGangadharaSwamy151raisesaslightlydifferentbutrelatedquestioninthecontextoflegitimacy.152Contrarytothegeneraltrend,herethedaughterclaimedillegitimacy,whichwouldhaveawardedhercertainadvantagesSinceaccordingtolaw,anillegitimatechild’sidentityisattachedtohermother,andnottothefatherasincasesoflegitimatechildren,sheclaimedillegitimacysothatherelectioninthereservedcategorywouldbeheldasvalid.Ironically,basedonpresumptionthatlongcohabitationleadstoapresumptionofvalidmarriage,thecourtsconferredonherlegitimacywhichprovedtobedisadvantageoustoher.

Shehadmarriedherfirstmaternalcousin,whobelongedtoabackwardcaste.Butherpleawassetasideonthebasisthatherfatherwasnotfromabackwardcaste.Soshepleadedthatshewastheillegitimatechildofherparentssincehermother’spreviousmarriagewithamanfromherowncastewassubsistingwhenthemothermarriedherfather.ThemotherbelongedtotheBhagathaCommunity(ascheduledtribe)whileher


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fatherhailedfromaslightlyhighercaste.Thoughshedeniedmarriage,sheadmittedtoprolongedcohabitationfromwhichsheandfiveothersiblingswereborn.Sinceanillegitimatechildacquiredhermother’scaste,shepleadedthatherelectioninthecategoryreservedforscheduletribeswasvalid.ThehighcourtrejectedherpleaandheldthatshewasthelegitimatechildofherfatherandhenceitcouldnotbeheldthatsheisamemberoftheBhagathaCommunity.Onthisgroundherelection,contestedinthereservedcategory,wassetaside.

Inappeal,theSupremeCourtupheldtherulingofthehighcourtonthegroundthatprolongedcohabitationleadstothepresumptionofavalidmarriage.Hence,itwasnotpossibletoholdthatitwasonlyarelationshipofconcubinage.Evenassumingthattherewasanearliermarriageofthemothersubsisting,itcanbepresumedtohavebeenterminatedinviewofthesubsequentlongcohabitationofthecouple.

Though,personallythewomanconcerneddidnotgain,theSupremeCourtrulingisimportantinbridgingthegapbetweena‘voidsecondmarriage’and‘mereconcubinage’basedonthelegalpresumptionprolongedcohabitationleadstoavalidmarriage.Itwillbestowcertainlegitimacyanddignityuponchildrenofsuchunionsandservetoovercomeprevailingjudicialbiasesinthisrealm.

Section125ofCr.PC:BeneficialProvision,notDeterminationofMaritalStatusThesuccessionclaimsarecivilsuitsandthecourtsareempoweredtoexaminethemaritalstatusoftheparties.Butwhileawarding(p.157) maintenancetowomenunderSection125ofCr.PC,themagistratedoesnothavethepowertoexaminethevalidityofmarriageastheproceedingsaresummaryinnatureandithasbeenenactedasameasureofsocialjustice.

InSunitaKavitaMorev.VivekanandMore,153theBombayHighCourtcommentedthatinproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PC,themagistrateisnotcompetenttodecidethevalidityofmarriage.Thepropercourseinsuchcasesistograntmaintenancetothewife.Itisuptothehusbandtoestablishinvalidityofmarriageinacompetentcivilcourt.Inthiscase,thewomanwasdrivenoutofthematrimonialhomeandwhensheclaimedmaintenance,thehusbanddeniedthemarriageandthecohabitation.Healsoallegedthatthewifewasinanillicitrelationshipwithanotherpersonandhadbecomepregnant,andhedeniedpaternityofthechild.Thewifepleadedthattheywerechildhoodfriendsanduponapromiseofmarriageshehadcohabitedwithhimandhadachild.Thetrialcourtupheldthewoman’sclaimandawardedhermaintenanceofRs250permonth.Thesessionscourtreversedtheorderonthegroundthatthemarriagewasnotproved.Thehighcourtupheldthewife’sclaimregardingcohabitationandpaternityofthechildandrestoredtheorderoftheMagistrate’scourt.

InPradeepGuptav.KantiDevi,154theJharkhandHighCourtreaffirmedthatstrictproofofmarriageisnotnecessarywhileawardingmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.Theevidenceofpersonsresidinginandaroundthearea,whohadformedanopinionthatthepartieswerelivingashusbandandwife,washeldtobesufficienttoprovethewife’scase.


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InKrishnaChandraJeraiv.StateofJharkhand,155thetrialcourtrejectedtheapplicationformaintenancebythewifeonthegroundthatshecouldnotprovethemarriage,thoughthefactoflongcohabitationwasnotdisputedbythehusband.Inrevision,thesessionscourtawardedRs500asmaintenancetothewife.Thehighcourtdismissedtheappealfiledbythehusbandandheldthatstrictproofofmarriageisnotrequiredinsummaryproceedings.ThecourtalsoheldthatanorderunderSection125ofCr.PCdoesnotfinallydeterminerightsandliabilitiesofparties.Thepartiesareentitledtofileacivilsuitfordeterminationoftheirrights.

InShyamlalPathakv.StateofBihar,156inacriminalcomplaintfiledbythewifeunderSection494ofIPC,thehusbandwasacquitted.ButthemagistrategrantedmaintenanceofRs400permonthtothewomanunderSection125ofCr.PC.Inappeal,itwasheldthattheproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PCareofsummarynatureandtheproofofmarriageisnotashighasinproceedingsunderSection494orinaproceedingfordivorce.Allthatisrequiredtobeshownisthattherehasbeenmarriagebetweenthewomanandtheman.Ifsheisabletoshowthatsheandthemanconcernedlivedtogetherashusbandandwife,thecourtcanpresumetheyarelegallymarriedandawardmaintenanceevenwhenthemarriageisdisputedbythehusband,leavinghimtoestablishinvalidityofthemarriageinacompetentcivilcourt.

InRamakrishnanv.Subadra,157thewifepleadedthatshewasmarriedin1979aspercustomaryritesandtheylivedtogetherashusbandandwife.In2003,therewasanestrangementbetweenthemandshefileda(p.158) petitionformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.Thehusbandadmittedcohabitationforalongperiod,butcontendedthatitwasnotcohabitationasalegallymarriedcouple.Heallegedthatshewashisdistantrelativeandlivedinhishouseasadomestichelp.Hecontendedthathewasmarriedin1966andhadachildfromthisrelationship.Toprovehiscase,healsocontendedthathispreviouswifewasawardedmaintenancein1980.Thewifeproducedtherationcardandelectoralcardtoprovethattheywerecohabitingtogetherashusbandandwife.TheCourtconcludedthatthesubsistenceofavalidmarriagehadbeensatisfactorilyestablished.

ThehighcourtupheldtheorderofMagistrate’scourtandheldthatunderSection125ofCr.PC,acriminalcourtisnotjurisdictionallycompetenttomakefinalandauthenticpronouncementsonthedisputedstatusofthemarriage.Thatjurisdictionvestsincivilcourts.Thehusbandisentitledtoapproachacivilcourtforobtaininganappropriatedeclarationregardingthevalidityofthemarriage.ThehusbandcontendedthatonlybecausehecouldnotproducetheorderpassedbyaMagistrate’scourtawardingmaintenancetohisearlierwifeintimeintheMagistrate’scourt,thepresentclaimantwasawardedmaintenancewhichhadresultedinmiscarriageofjustice.Inresponse,thehighcourtcommented:Nojustifiablereasonshavebeenadvancedtoexplainwhythemaintenanceordergrantedtothefirstwifeearlierbythecourtwasnotproducedbeforethecourtsbelow.Thescandalousdelayinthejudicialprocessiscertainlyattributableinparttotheunrestrainedyearningofthecourtstodosubstantivejustice.Inlife,onedoesnotgetanopportunitytostartthegameafresh.Whatlifeanddivineor


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nature’sjusticecannotoffer,litigationcannotobviouslyaspireto.Theimpressionthatanyandeveryerrororinadequacycommittedintheconductofthecasecanberectifiedlater,andcourts,intheirindulgenceandanxietytodojustice,wouldpermitthepartiestocorrecttheirerrors,settheclockback,andproceedafresh,hascertainlycontributedinnomeanmeasuretothescandalousdelayinthejudicialprocess.Thelawhasbeenwellsummarizedinthestatementthattheinterestsofjusticemay,attimes,transcendtheinterestsofmerelaw.

InLakhwinderKaurv.GurmailSingh,158themagistrateawardedmaintenanceofRs500permonthtothewifeandRs300permonthtothedaughter,respectively,underSection125ofCr.PC.Thehusbandhaddeniedthemarriageandpleadedthathisearliermarriagewassubsisting.Thesessionscourtupheldthisplea.Inappeal,thePunjabandHaryanaHighCourtsetasidetheorderofthesessionscourtandrestoredtheorderoftheMagistrate’scourtandheldasfollows:TheorderpassedbythemagistrateinproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PCdoesnotfinallydeterminetherightsandobligationsoftheparties.Forthepurposeofgettinghisrightsdetermined,thehusbandhadfiledacivilsuitfordeclarationthatthewomanisnothislegallyweddedwife.Thesaidsuitwasdismissedbythecivilcourtonthegroundthattheevidenceadducedbythehusbandwasnotsufficienttoprovethatthewomanconcernedwasnothislegallyweddedwifeandthedaughterwasnothislegitimatechild.Thefindingsofthecivilcourtwerebindingnotonlyonthepartiesbutalsoonthecriminalcourt.Further,thestrictproofwhichisrequiredtoproveanoffenceunderSection494ofIPCisnotrequiredinproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PC.IfthewifesucceedsinprovingthatsheandtheRespondentlivedtogetherashusbandandwife,thecourtcanpresumethattheyarelegallymarried.

(p.159) TheSupremeCourthasalsoupheldthisviewinDwarikaPrasadSatpathyv.BidyutPrayaDixit159andlaiddownthatproofofvalidityofmarriageforthepurposeofsummaryproceedingunderSection125ofCr.PCisnotasstrictasisrequiredinatrialofoffenceunderSection494oftheIPC.Further,theorderpassedinanapplicationunderSection125ofCr.PCdoesnotfinallydeterminetherightsandobligationsoftheparties.InVeenaDeviv.AshokKumarMandal,160thePatnaHighCourtheldthattheproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PCareofasummarynature,andarenotintendedtodeterminethestatusandpersonalrightsofpartiesandquestionsofmarriageneednotbedecidedlikeamatrimonialcourt.Evenwhentheissueisbeingdeterminedbythefamilycourtwhichhasthejurisdictiontodeterminethematrimonialstatusoftheparties,thecourtcannotexaminethisissueinproceedingsunderSection125Cr.PC.

MaintenancetoWomeninLive-inRelationshipsunderPWDVAMorerecently,theProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct,2005hasawardedstatutoryrecognitiontoinformalrelationshipsorlive-inrelationships.Undertheprovisionofthisstatute,anywomanwhoclaimsreliefsuchasprotectionorders,restrainingorders,orevenmaintenance,neednotprovethevalidityofhermarriage,asheldbytheMadrasHighCourtinM.Palaniv.Meenakshi.161Inthiscase,themanhadfiledanapplicationforadeclarationthathewasnotmarriedtothewomanconcernedandforan


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orderofinjunctionrestrainingherfromrepresentingandreceivingthebenefitsashiswife.Inthesaidproceedings,thewomanfiledanInterimApplicationformaintenanceundertheProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct,2005.Thefamilycourt,Chennai,grantedherRs1,000permonthasinterimmaintenance.

Thiswaschallengedbytheappellent,whocontendedthatthewomanisnotentitledtoanymaintenanceundertheprovisionsofDVAsincetheyhavenotlivedtogetheratanypointoftimeashusbandandwife.However,headmittedthattheyhadvoluntarysexualcontactbutallegedthatthewomanhadvoluntarysubmittedtosexualcontactdespiteknowingfullywellthathedoesnotbelieveintheinstitutionofmarriageandthatthewomanherselfhadnotinsistedonaformalmarriage.Hadtherebeenevenaslightreferencetomarriageasapre-conditiontothesexualcontact,hewouldneverhavehadeventhecasualsexualcontactwithher.Further,mereproximityforthesakeofmutualpleasurecanneverbecalledadomesticrelationship,heargued.Rejectingthisargument,theMadrasHighCourtheldthatthereisnostipulationundertheActforthepartiestolivetogetherforaparticularperiod.Sincethemanhadadmittedtosexualcontactitwasevidentthatthecoupleenjoyedacloserelationshipwithinwhichsexualcontacthadtakenplace.

TheconstitutionalvalidityofthisprovisionwaschallengedintheDelhiHighCourtinArunaParmodShahv.UnionofIndia,162onthegroundthatitdiscriminatesagainstthelegalwife.Whileupholdingitsvalidity,thehighcourtheldthatthereisnoreasonwhyequaltreatmentshouldnotbeaccordedtothewife,aswellasawomanwhohasbeenlivingwithamanashiscommon-lawwifeorevenasamistress.Thecourtfurthercommentedthatliketreatmenttobothdoesnot,inanymanner,derogatethesanctityofmarriage.

(p.160) SincethisconceptisrelativelynewtotheIndianjurisprudence,itwouldbeusefultodrawuponthefollowingguidelinesissuedbyacourtinSouthAfrica,fordeterminingtherightsofwomeninrelationshipsinthenatureofmarriage.

i.Thecommitmentsofthepartiestothesharedhousehold;ii.Theexistenceofasignificantperiodofcohabitation;iii.Theexistenceoffinancialandotherdependencybetweenthepartiesincludingsignificantmutualfinancialarrangementsvis-à-visthehousehold;iv.Theexistenceofchildrenoftherelationship;and,v.Theroleofthepartnersinmaintainingthehouseholdandinthecareofthechildren.

InChanmuniyav.VirendraKumarSinghKushwahatheSupremeCourtwhiledecidingacaseunderSection125Cr.PC,referredthematterofmaintenancetowomenininformalrelationshipstoalargerbenchinviewoftheconflictingopinionsoftheSupremeCourtinSavitabenSomabhatBhatiya(discussedearlier)andseveralpositiverulingswhichhadgrantedmaintenancetowomenininformalrelationshipsandbigamousmarriages.

ThedivisionbenchofG.S.SinghviandA.K.GangulyJJrecommendedthatabroadandexpansiveinterpretationshouldbegiventotheterm‘wife’toincludethosecaseswhere


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amanandwomanhavebeenlivingtogetherashusbandandwifeforareasonablylongperiodoftime,andstrictproofofmarriageshouldnotbeapre-conditionformaintenancesoastofulfillthetruespiritandessenceofthebeneficialprovisionofmaintenanceunderSection125,Cr.PC.Itwassuggestedthatthebenefitsawardedto‘live-inrelationships’underthePWDVAshouldbeextendedtowomenclaimingmaintenanceunderSection125oftheCr.PCassuchaninterpretationwouldbeajustapplicationoftheprinciplesenshrinedinourConstitution.

Thecaseconcernedawidowwithtwodaughters,whohadmarriedherhusband’syoungerbrotherasperthecustomofthecommunity.Duringsuchmarriages,saptapadiisnotperformed.AsperthecustomoftheKushwahacommunity,themarriagewasperformedthrough‘katha’and‘sindur’.Whenherhusbanddesertedher,thewifefiledformaintenance.Whilethetrialcourtupheldherplea,thehighcourtheldthathermarriagewasnotvalidsincesaptapadiwasnotperformed.

Whilethisreferencewaspendingbeforethelargerbench,alaterrulinginD.Velusamyv.D.PatchaiammaldeliveredbyMarkandeyKatjuandT.S.ThakurJJon21October2010createdafreshcontroversybyconstrainingthescopeofPWDVAbyholdingthat‘mistresses’,‘keeps’and‘maids’withwhomamarriedmanmayhavehadsexualrelationshipsarenotentitledtomaintenance.Thisrulingleavesthegroundwideopentomentoenterintobigamousrelationshipwithoutanycivilorcriminalliability.Therulingshiftstheburdenonwomentoprovethattheirrelationshipisnotbigamous,disregardingcommunitypracticesaswellasthefraudmencommitbynotrevealingtheirpriorsubsistingmarriage.Duetothedifficultywomenfacetoprovetheirmarriages,thePWDVAhadsoughttograntmaintenanceandcompensationtowomenin‘live-inrelationships’.Evenpriortothis,severalrulingsoftheSupremeCourtandvarioushighcourtshadprotectedtherightsofvulnerablewomentrappedinsuchsituations,andthereferencetoalargerbenchinChanmuniyacasewasmadetoobtainaclearandunambiguousverdictindefenseofwomen,whichwouldoverruletheverdictintheSavitabencase.

(p.161) TherulinginVelusamycaseisdevoidofthecautiousapproachadoptedinChanmuniyacase.Theruling,whichseemstobebasedonamoralhighgroundandWesternethosdisregardsIndiansocialrealityasreflectedinthenumerousjudgementsdiscussedearlier.Thelargerbench,willhopefullyundotheharmcausedbythisrecklessandinsensitiverulingwhichviolatestheconstitutionalmandateofprotectingthedignityofwomen,andrestoretherightsofwomenininformalandbigamousrelationships.

MuslimWomen’sRighttoMaintenance

Notionof‘FairandReasonableSettlement’UndertheMuslimWomen’s(ProtectionofRightsonDivorce)ActTheMuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsonDivorce)Actwasenactedin1986,afterthecontroversialShahbanojudgment.Throughthisenactment,therightofadivorcedMuslimwomanwastakenoutofthepurviewofthegenerallawofmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCandplacedunderspeciallegislation.163Aftertheenactment,several


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groupsfiledwritpetitionsintheSupremeCourtchallengingtheconstitutionalvalidityoftheAct.Whilethewritpetitionswerepending,severalhighcourtsbegantointerprettheActinnovatively.TheyheldthatadivorcedMuslimwomanhastherighttoafairandreasonablesettlementforherlifetime,inadditiontomaintenanceduringtheiddatperiod.164Further,thecourtscommentedthatafairandreasonableprovisionforthewoman’sfutureneeds(mataaoonbilma’aroofe)isaQuranicinjunction.

TheleadingjudgmentoftheSupremeCourtonthisissuewaspronouncedin2001inDanielLatifiv.UnionofIndia.165TheSupremeCourtconfirmedthattheMWAhassubstitutedtheearlierrightofrecurrentmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCwithanewrighttoalumpsumprovisiontobemadeandpaidtothewomansoonafterherdivorce.Ifthehusbandfailstomakethesettlement,adivorcedMuslimwomanhastherighttoapproachtheMagistrate’scourtforenforcementoftherightunderSection3oftheMWA.

ThecourtheldthataMuslimhusbandisliabletomakeareasonableandfairprovisionforthefutureofhisdivorcedwife,whichmustbemadewithintheiddatperiod.ThecourtfurtherclarifiedthattheliabilityoftheMuslimhusbandtothedivorcedwife,topaymaintenanceundertheAct,isnotconfinedtotheiddatperiod.AMuslimwifeisentitledtoafairandreasonableprovisionwithrespecttoherfutureneeds.166

Incaseswherethehusbandisunabletopaytheentireamount,theFullBenchoftheBombayHighCourt,inKarimAbdulRehmanShaikhv.ShehnazKarimShaikh,167heldthattheamountcanbepaidininstalments,anduntilthepaymentismade,themagistratecandirectmonthlypaymenttothewifeevenbeyondtheiddatperiod.

InMustafav.Fathimakutty,168thehusbandwasemployedabroad.Thecourtheldthatthe(p.162) husband’scontentionthatafterthecircumstanceswhichledtodivorcehebecamedistractedandwasnotabletoconcentrateonworkisafancifultheorywithnothingtangibletosubstantiatethesame.ThecourtawardedalumpsumofRs1.20lakhwhichwascomputedatRs2,000permonthforfiveyearsasmaintenanceofthewifeandtwochildren.

InHaseenav.AbdulJaleel,169itwasheldthattheprovisionforeducationalexpensesisanimportantcriteriontofixthequantumofreasonableandfairprovision.Itwasheldthatadivorcedwomanwhohaslostthesupportofherhusbandcansustainherselfandmaintainherchildonlybygettinganeducation.Denyingawomaneducationalsupportisnotjustifiedinsuchcircumstances.Thoughaformerhusbandcannotbeentrustedwiththeliabilitytoprovideforthehighereducationofhisdivorcedwife,whichisexpensive,thedesireofthewifetocontinueherstudiescannotbesaidtobeunreasonable.ItwasheldthatthefactthatthewomanwasstudyingatthetimeofhermarriageandshewantedtocontinueafterdivorceisnotanirrelevantfactorinfixingthequantumofreasonableandfairprovisionandmaintenanceunderSection3(1(a)oftheMuslimWoman’sAct.Inlightofthis,theamountpayablewasincreasedfromRs2,00,000toRs2,50,000.


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InNizarv.Hyrunneessa,170theKeralaHighCourtrejectedthepleathatsincethewifehadremarried,sheisnotentitledtoafairandreasonablesettlementforthefuture.Thecourtheldthatthere-marriageofadivorcedwomanisnotacriterionindeterminingafairandreasonablesettlement.TheonlyaspecttobeconsideredistheliabilityoftheformerhusbandtomakeareasonableandfairprovisiontothedivorcedwifeandfixthequantumsumascontemplatedunderSection3(3)oftheAct.ThecourtawardedRs90,000calculatingtheamountonthebasisofRs1,500permonthandcommentedthattheamountawardedasfairandreasonablesettlementcannotbesetasideonapleathatthedivorcedwifeisleadinganadulterouslife(seealsoM.Alaviv.T.V.Safia,I(1992)DMC62).

Ifthehusbandfailstocomplywiththeorderanddefaultsinpaymentsoftheamountordered,hecanbeimprisoned.InRayinkuttyv.StateofKerala,171itwasheldthatthis,initself,willnotabsolvehimfromtheliabilityofpayingtheamountwhichisduetothewife.

RightsUnderSection125ofCr.PCWhenadesertedordestituteMuslimwifefilesformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC,theusualployadoptedbythehusbandistopleadthathehasalreadydivorcedhiswifeandhenceheisnotliabletopaymaintenance.ThistendencyincreasedaftertheMuslimWomen(ProtectionofRightsonDivorce)Actwasenactedin1986.ThemediareportsonthisenactmentledtoapopularperceptionthataMuslimhusbandisnotliabletopaymaintenancetoadivorcedwife.

Intheleadingcase,ShamimArav.StateofUP.172theSupremeCourtheldthatamerepleaofpreviousdivorceinthewrittenstatementcannotbetreatedasapronouncementoftalaqbythehusbandonthewife.Theliabilityofthehusbandtopaymaintenancetohiswifedoesnotcometoanendthroughsuchcommunication.Thecourtcommentedthatfortalaqtobevalid,ithastobepronouncedaspertheQuaranicinjunction.Severallaterjudgmentshavereiteratedthisposition.Someofthesejudgmentsaresummarizedlater.173

(p.163) Whenthehusbandisnotabletoprovetalaq,thetrialcourtisboundtoentertainthewife’sapplicationformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCandawardanadequateamountastheabovecasediscussedindetailillustrates.Butthereareseveralotherrulingswhichendorsethisview.Forinstance,inMusaratJahanv.StateofBihar,174itwasheldthatadivorcedMuslimwifeisentitledtomaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCcontinuouslyandbeyondtheiddatperiodtillsheremarries,orisabletomaintainherself.Inresponsetothewife’sclaimformaintenance,thehusbandpleadedthathehaddivorcedhiswife.Thecourtcommentedthatthefamilycourtjudgehaderredinholdingthatthewifeisentitledtomaintenanceonlyfromthedateoffilingtheapplicationtillthecopyofthewrittenstatementwasserved.

InKhairunnissaBegumv.Aslamkham,175itwasheldthattherecannotbeapresumptioninfavouroftalaq.Talaqhastobestrictlyproven.Sincethehusbandcouldnotprovetalaq,thewifewasawardedmaintenanceofRs1,000permonthunderSection125ofCr.PC.


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InMoidenv.Ramlath,176thehusbandpleadedthatthewomanishissecondwifeand,hence,isnotentitledtomaintenance.Healsopleadedthathehadsubsequentlyremarried.Thecourt,whileupholdingthewoman’srighttomaintenance,statedthatthefactthatsheisdivorcedorthatherhusbandhasanotherwife,whichispermittedunderpersonallaw,isirrelevantinadjudicatingtherightsofthedivorcedwife.

InMuneerAhmedv.SafiaMateen,177whilerejectingthehusband’spleathathehaddivorcedhiswife,thecourtawardedRs1,000asmaintenance.Thecourtdescribeditasthebareminimumforkeepingbodyandsoultogetherinthecontextofthepresentcostofliving.Thecourtheldthatsincethewomanissufferingfromvariousdiseases,shewouldneedmoneyforhermedicalexpensesinadditiontohermaintenance.

Though,therightsofdivorcedMuslimwomenwereplacedunderaspecificAct,theMuslimWomen’sAct,somecourtshaveheldthattherightunderSection125ofCr.PChasnotbeendeleted.Forinstance,inAbdulLatifMondalv.AnuwaraKhatun,178thehusbandchallengedtheorderofmaintenanceawardedbytheMagistrate’scourtonthegroundthathehaddivorcedhiswifetwoyearspriortoherfilingtheapplicationformaintenance.ButtheCalcuttaHighCourtrejectedthiscontentionandheldthattheMuslimdivorcedwifeisentitledtoclaimmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCandthesameareinadditiontoherclaimsundertheMWA.

ButtheviewsofvariousotherhighcourtsaswellasthatoftheSupremeCourtinNoorSabaKhatoonv.Mohd.Quasin,179arecontrarytothisview.HeretheCourtheldthatafterdivorce,therightofaMuslimwifearelocatedwithintheMuslimWomen’sActandnotunderSection125Cr.PC.InShaikhMohamedv.Naseembegum,180theBombayHighCourtheldthatadivorcedMuslimwomancannotapplyformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.Herremedyisonlyunderthespeciallawenactedforthispurpose,thatis,theMuslimWomen’sAct.InAbdulSalamv.GousiyaBi,itwasheldthatanorderofmaintenancethatwaspassedinfavourofthedivorcedwifeunderSection125ofCr.PCwasunsustainable.

MorerecentjudgmentshavereaffirmedthatMuslimwoman’srighttoclaimmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCarenotextinguished(p.164) upondivorce.TherightisextinguishedonlywhenshereceivesafairandreasonablesettlementasstipulatedunderMWA.InIqbalBanov.StateofU.P.,181itwasheldthatproceedingsunderSection125arecivilinnature.Henceevenafterthedivorce,thewomanisentitledtoclaimmaintenanceunderthisSection,consideringitsbeneficialnature.InShabanaBanov.ImanKhan,182theSupremeCourtheldthatwheresociallegislationsenactedtosecuretherightsofneedywomenareconcernedadherencetorigidrulesofprocedureandevidenceshouldbeavoided.ThecourtheldthatifapetitionfiledbythewifeunderSection125ofCr.PCispendingbeforeafamilycourtatthetimeofherdivorce,thesamemustbedisposedofundertheprovisonsofMWAanduntilsuchtimesheshouldbeawardedmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCTheKeralaHighCourtinKunhimohammedv.Ayishakutty183hasheldthatahusband’sobligationtopaymaintenanceisnotextinguishedupondivorce.Thewifewillbeentitledtoreceive


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maintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCuntilthehusbandfulfillshisobligationunderSection3oftheMuslimWomen’sActoruntilthewiferemainsunmarried.ThesejudgmentshaveplacedtherightofMuslimwomentomaintenanceunderasecurefooting.

SectionB:Maintenance:IncidentalandProceduralAspects

MaintenanceRightsofChildren

StatutoryandPiousObligationofaFathertoMaintainhisChildrenTheobligationofthefathertomaintainhischildrenisbothapiousandreligiousobligationaswellasastatutorydutyunderallpersonallaws.InVinodBabbarv.BabySwati,184theDelhiHighCourtexplainedthatunderHindulaw,afatherhasnotonlyamoralbutevenastatutoryobligationtomaintainhisminorchildren.Thescopeofhisdutyistoberegulateddirectlyinrelationtothemoneyandstatusheenjoys.Therightofmaintenanceofachildfromhisfathercannotberestrictedtotwomealsaday,butmustbedeterminedonthebasisofthebenefit,status,andmoneythatthechildwouldhaveenjoyedifhewaslivingwithhimaspartofhisfamily.Irrespectiveofthedifferencesandgrievanceswhicheachspousemayhaveagainsttheother,theendeavourofthecourthastobetoprovidethebesttothechildunderthefactsandcircumstancesofeachcaseand,moreso,keepingthewelfareofthechildinmindforallsuchdeterminations.Liabilitytomaintainone’schildrenisclearfromthetextoftheprovisionsunderHAMA,aswellasthevariousdecidedcasesinthisregard.Thestatutoryobligationisparamounttothewishofthefatherandhecannotbepermittedtolimitthisclaimofthechildonflimsyandbaselessgrounds.Itisthedutyandliabilityofparentstoprovidetheirchildthebesteducationandstandardoflivingwithintheirmeans.Thefactthatthechildislivingwiththemother,whohassufficientincome,willnotabsolvethefatherofhisobligationstowardsthechild.

InP.M.Devassiav.Ancy,185aChristianfatherchallengedhisdutytomaintainhisdaughterwhowaslivingwiththemother.TheKeralaHighCourtexplainedthattheobligationofaChristianfatherspringsfromthefactthatheistheguardianofhisfamily.Thus,hehasanobligationtomaintainhischildrenandcarriesthedutytogivethemthebestcare,and,necessarily,thereisacorrespondingdutytomaintainthem.(p.165)Therewasalsoacorrespondingrightthatthechildhastherighttobemaintained.Thehusbandhadnotdisputedthepaternityofthechildrenandthemarriagewassubsisting,buttheparentswerelivingseparatelyandthechildrenwerelivingwiththemother.Thefatherhadadecentincome.ThecourtcommentedthatitcannotbecontendedthatmerelybecauseoneprofessestheChristianreligion,onedoesnothavetheliabilitytomaintainone’schildren.Inviewofthelawwhichislaiddown,aChristianfatherhasanobligationtomaintainhisdaughters,whoarenotcapableoflookingafterthemselves,notwithstandingthefactthattheyhaveattainedmajority.

ThepersonalobligationofaMuslimfathertomaintainhischildrenisintegrallylinkedtohisproperty.Explainingthisposition,inIbrahimFathimav.MohammedSaleem(Minor),186theMadrasHighCourt,afterexaminingthepositionunderMohammedanlaw,heldthat


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thechildren’srighttomaintenanceinaMuslimhouseholdalwaysattachestothefather’spropertyinsuchawayandinsuchmeasurethatitisnotaffectedbyanysubsequentalienationofthepropertybythefather.ThefactthattheMuslimfather’sobligationtomaintainhisminorchildrenispersonaldoesnotmeanthattheonlysanctionwhichthelawimposes,fortheperformanceoftheobligation,istoproceedagainsthispersonwheneverhefailstodischargethatobligation.Itisquitereasonableandcivilizedtoexpectallsystemsoflawtolinkchildren’smaintenancewithpropertyassecurityandMohammedanlawisnotanexception.Inthecontextoftherelationshipbetweenafatherandhisminorchildren,allthattheideaofpersonalobligationimportsisthatheisunderadutytomaintainthemevenonthemereaspectofhisbeingtheirparent.

InK.MasthanBeev.AppalagariVenkataramana,187theAndhraPradeshHighCourtreaffirmedthispositionandheldthattheaMuslimfatherisunderalegalobligationtomaintainhischildrenundertheMuslimpersonallawandifhehasalienatedanypropertyprejudicialtotheinterestoftheminors,theyareentitledtocreateachargeunderSection39oftheTransferofPropertyAct,1882,overthesaidproperty.ItismandatoryonthepartofthecourtstonotifyunderOrder21,Rule66oftheCivilProcedureCode(CPC)totheintendingbuyersthatthepropertyundersaleissubjecttosuchencumbranceorlitigation.

SingleMothersandClaimsofChildrenintheirCustodyTheabovediscussionmakesitamplyclearthatthelegalobligationofmaintainingthewifealsoextendstoanobligationtomaintainminorchildren.Butinthecourseofamatrimonialdispute,inordertocausefurtherhardshipstodesertedwomenandsinglemothers,severallegaltacticsareadoptedtodenychildreninthecustodyoftheirmothertheirlegalrightsofmaintenance.Whiledenyingpaternityisoneployusedtoescapefromtheliabilityofmaintainingthechild,thereareseveralotherswhichhavebeenadvancedinthecourseoflitigation.Thehusbandshavegonetotheextentofdenyingthatthereisastatutoryobligationtomaintaintheirchildren.

InPraveenMenonv.AjithaPillai,188thehusbandcontendedthatSection24oftheHMAimpliedmaintainingonlythewifeandnotthechild.ButrejectingthiscontentiontheKeralaHighCourtheldthatabeneficialprovisioncannotbeinterpretedsorestrictivelyandthatthefather’sobligationtomaintainthechildmustbe(p.166) readintohisobligationtomaintainthewife.Sincethewifehadtomaintainthechild,itwasheldthatthehusbandhadtopaythewifeanamountthatwassufficienttomaintainthechildtoo.InPrakashKhotv.ChandaniKhot,189itwasheldthatawardingmaintenancetothewifeunderHMAwillnottakeawaytherightoftheminorchildrentoclaimmaintenancefromtheirfather,underSection20oftheHinduAdoptionandMaintenanceAct.InMandeepSharmav.KiranSharma,190itwasheldthatthefactthatthewifewasbeingsupportedbyherparentswasnogroundforthehusbandtoclaimdischargeofhisobligationtopaymaintenancetothechild.Itwasalsoheldthatthehusbandcouldnotshirkhisliabilitytoprovidemaintenancemerelyonthegroundthathemetwithanaccidentandhadtotemporarilyrestrainfromworkingduetohisinjuries.

Thecourtshavealsoheldthattherightsofminorchildrencannotbedefeatedthrough


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consentagreementsbetweenthechild’sparentsorthroughdivorcedeeds.InHappyAnandv.BabyDeepali,191thedaughter,whowasonlysevenyearsoldatthetimeofthedivorce,filedformaintenanceandwasawardedmaintenanceofRs2,500permonth.ThehusbandhadagreedtopayRs50,000tothewifeinproceedingsformutualconsent,buthadpaidonlyhalftheamount.Inappeal,thehighcourtupheldtheorder.InDeepaDeviv.DhirajKumarSingh,192thewifecontendedthatherconsentforadivorcebymutualconsentwasfraudulentlyobtainedbyherhusbandandthehusbanddidnotmakeanyprovisionformaintenanceforherselfandherminorchild.TheJharkhandHighCourtheldthatthatSection13B(divorcebymutualconsent)doesnotempowerpartiestodecidetherightsofminorchildrenregardingmaintenanceanddirectedthehusbandtopayRs2,00,000tothewifeandtheminorsonbywayoflumpsummaintenance.

Whileaminorchildisentitledtomaintenance,assoonasthechildattainsmajoritythechildisdeniedmaintenance.Thisplacesanadditionalburdenonsinglewomensincemostoftenthechildwouldnotbeindependentattheageofeighteenandwouldstillneedsupportuntilthechildcompletestheeducation.Somejudgesadoptalenientviewandmandatethehusbandtocontinuewithpaymentofmaintenance/educationalexpensesforafewmoreyearsuntilthesoncompleteshiseducationandisabletosupporthimself.Butusuallymaintenancewillbediscontinuedassoonasthechildturnseighteen.Thereissomeleniencytowardsdependentmajordaughters.Butifshehasanindependentsourceofearning,themaintenancewouldbediscontinued.

InAvnishPawarv.SunitaPawar,193thecourtheldthatthemajorsonwasnotentitledtomaintenancefromthefather,andtheexceptionunderSection20(3),HAMAcoversunmarrieddaughtersbutnotmajorsons.ThispositionwasreiteratedinViswambhranv.Dhanya,194whereitwasheldthattheliabilitytomaintainthechild,whateverbethesex,wouldcontinueonlytillthechildattainsmajority.Then,irrespectiveofwhetherchildisabletomaintainitselfoutofitsearningsorotherproperty,itwouldnotbemaintainedifitisamalechild.

However,therulingofthePunjabandHaryanaHighCourt,inNikhilKumarSinghv.RakeshKumarMahajan,195advancesamorehumaneapproachtowardsmaintenanceofsons(p.167) whohavenotyetcompletedtheireducation.Inthiscase,thesonhadfiledanapplicationformaintenancewhilehewasaminorandwasgrantedinterimmaintenanceofRs5,000permonth.Whenthesonattainedmajority,thefathermovedthecourtforcancellationofthemaintenanceorderonthegroundthathisobligationtomaintainhissonhadcometoanend.Inanappealagainsttheorderofcancellationofthemaintenanceamountfiledbytheson,thehighcourtheldthatthemajorsonwasentitledtoclaimmaintenancefromhisfatherforstudiesanddirectedthefathertopayRs8,000permonthtowardshiseducationalandotherrelatedexpenses,andRs25,000lumpsumperannumtowardsadditional/ancillaryexpenseslikepurchaseofbooks,instruments,etc.Thecourtdirectedthatthisarrangementshallremaintillthesoncompletedhiseducationuptothepost-graduationlevel.

Butsofarasthefemalechildisconcerned,suchrightwillcontinueevenaftersheattains


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majorityuntilshegetsmarried,providedsheisunabletomaintainherselfoutofherownearningsorotherproperty.Forinstance,inJitendraNathSarkarv.DaliaSarkar,196itwasheldthatamajorunmarrieddaughterisnotentitledtomaintenanceifshehasanindependentsourceofincome.Itisonlywhensheisabletoprovethatsheisunabletomaintainherselfthatherparentsareliabletomaintainher.

AsperthecustomsprevailingamongseveralcommunitiesinIndia,afatherisboundtomakeprovisionsforthemarriageexpensesofhisdaughters.Thecourtshaveawardedjudicialrecognitiontothiscustomaryright.InKusumKrishnajiRewatkarv.KrishnajiNathujiRewatkar,197itwasheldthatafatherisboundtomakeprovisionsforthemarriageexpensesofthedaughtersaspartofmaintenance.Ifthewifehasspentfortheperformanceofmarriageofdaughter,thehusbandwouldbeliabletoreimbursehiswife.Hecannotescapehisliability.

Thecourtshavealsoupheldtherightsofadoptedchildrentomaintenancefromtheirfather.WeldoneLyngdohv.EvaPhawa,198isacaseconcerningachildbelongingtotheKhasicommunity.Thecustomarylawofthecommunityrecognizesthenotionofadoptionandthechildisentitledtoclaimmaintenancefromitsadoptivefather.WhileupholdingtherightoftheadoptivechildformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC,theGauhatiHighCourtheldthatthedominantpurposebehindthebenevolentprovisionsengraftedinSection125clearlyisthatthewife,child,andparents,shouldnotbeleftinastateofdistress,destitution,andstarvation.Havingregardtothisspecialpurpose,theprovisionsofSection125ofCr.PCshallhavetobegivenaliberalconstructiontofulfilandachievetheintentionofthelegislature.

InLeelaYadavv.StateofBihar,199theapplicationfiledbythegrandmotherofthetwominorchildrenformaintenancefromtheirfatherwasdismissedbytheMagistrateonthegroundthatshelackslocusstanditofileformaintenanceonbehalfoftheminorchildren.Themotheroftheminorchildrenhaddiedunderunnaturalcircumstancesandatthetimeofherdeath,hadhandedoverthecustodyofhertwodaughterstohermother.Inappeal,thehighcourtheldthatthequestionofcustodyisamattertobedecidedbyacivilandnotcriminalcourt.TherightwhichisconferredunderSection125ofCr.PCformaintenanceisnotdependentonguardianship.Maintenancetochildrenlivingwitheithermother,orevengrandmother,(p.168) cannotberefusedonthegroundthattheyarenotnaturalguardians,lawfulguardians,orlegalguardians.Thehusbandpleadedthatheiswillingtotaketheircustodybutheisnotinapositiontoprovidemaintenance.Thedaughterswhowereinterviewedrefusedtogowiththefatherandtheystatedthataftertheirmother’sdeaththeirfatherhadnotcaredforthem,andhadnoloveandaffectionorattachmenttowardsthem.ThecourtcommentedthatthefatherhasnotclaimedthecustodyandguardianshipofthechildrenandheldthattheprovisionsunderSection125ofCr.PCarenottobeutilizedfordefeatingtherightsconferredbythelegislatureondestituteandneedychildren.

RightsofChildrenofDivorcedMuslimCoupleAftertheenactmentoftheMuslimWomen’sAct,therewereseveralapplicationsfiledbyhusbandstoabsolvethemnotjustoftheobligationofmaintainingtheirwivesbeyondthe


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iddatperiodbutalsooftheirresponsibilityofmaintainingtheirchildren.TheconfusionwascausedbythewordingsofSection3(b)oftheAct.

Section3(b):Wheresheherselfmaintainsthechildrenborntoherbeforeorafterherdivorce,areasonableandfairprovisionandmaintenancetobemadeandpaidbyherformerhusbandforaperiodoftwoyearsfromtherespectivedatesofbirthofsuchchildren.

WhilemostcourtsupheldtheexistingrightsofchildrentoclaimmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC,insomeinstances,thecourtsheldthatthechildisentitledtomaintenanceonlyuptotheageoftwo.TheambiguitywasfinallyresolvedbytherulingoftheSupremeCourtinNoorSabaKhatoonv.Mohd.Quasin,200in1997,whichupheldtherightsofchildrenunderSection125ofCr.PCinclearandunequivocalterms.ThetrialcourthadgrantedRs200tothewifeandRs150toeachofthethreeminorchildren.Meanwhile,thehusbandhaddivorcedthewifeandapproachedthecourtformodifyingtheorder.Thetrialcourtheldthatthedivorcedwifeisnotentitledtomaintenancebeyondtheiddatperiodand,accordingly,revokedtheorderofmaintenanceforthewife,butupheldthemaintenanceforthechildren.Therevisionapplicationwasdismissedbythesessionscourt.Butinappeal,thehighcourtcancelledthemaintenanceorderoftheeldertwochildrenwhowereabovetheageoftwoyears.TheSupremeCourtheldthatthehusbandhasanobligationtomaintainhischildrentilltheyattainmajorityorareabletomaintainthemselves,whicheverdateisearlier.

ThispositionwasreaffirmedinMahaboobAliv.AbdulRasheed201bytheKarnatakaHighCourt,whichheldthattheobligationofafathertomaintaintheminorchildrenisabsolute,irrespectiveofreligion.AsfaraschildrenbornofMuslimparentsareconcerned,thereisnothinginSection125ofCr.PCwhichexemptsaMuslimfatherfromhisobligationtomaintainhischildren.Itwouldindeedbeunreasonable,unfair,unequitable,andevenpreposterous,todenythebenefitofSection125ofCr.PCtothechildrenonlyonthegroundthattheyarebornofMuslimparents.

Similarly,inRiazFatimav.Mohd.Sharif,202thecourtreaffirmedthattherightofthechildtogetmaintenanceisnotaffectedevenafterthefatherhasdivorcedthemotherofthechild.ThecourtsetasidetheorderoftheSessionsJudgeandrestoredtheorderoftheMagistrate’scourt.InMufeesv.StateofUP,203thedaughterhadapproachedthecourtformaintenanceandthefamilycourthadawardedherRs1,000permonthasmaintenance.Inanappealfiledbythe(p.169) father,thehighcourtupheldthemaintenanceawardedtoherbythefamilycourt.

MaintenanceClaimsAgainstBothParentsThough,traditionallytheobligationtomaintainthechildrenwasalwaysuponthefather,ifthemotherisalsoemployed,bothparentsareboundtocontributeforthemaintenanceofthechildinproportiontotheirrespectiveincomes.

InPadmjaSharmav.RatanLalSharma,204bothparentsweregainfullyemployed.Butthehusbandearnedtwiceasmuchasthewife.TheSupremeCourtheldthatboththe


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parentsareboundtocontributetowardsthemaintenanceoftheirchildren,proportionately.ThecourtawardedasumofRs3,000permonthtowardsmaintenanceofeachofthechildrenanddirectedthatthesameshouldbebornebyboththeparentsin2:1proportion.Thecourtrejectedthemother’sclaimonthegroundthatshehadsufficientearning.

InSayaliPathakv.VasantPathak,205theDelhiHighCourtclarifiedthatmaintenanceisnotgrantedaspenaltyagainsteitherofspouses.Thepurposeistoensurethatpartiesareabletomaintainastandardoflivingthatisincloseconsonancewiththatenjoinedbythemasafamilypriortotheoutbreakoftheirmatrimonialdifferences.Inthisparticularcase,thewifeearnedapproximatelyRs40,000permonthandthehusbandRs1,00,000permonth.Thecourtheldthatthereisnoreasontodeprivethechildofanaffluentlifestyleandculturalexposureiftheparentscanaffordit.Sincethewifeherselfhadsubmittedthattheexpensesofthechildshouldbesharedinratioof2:1,keepingtheirrespectiveearningsinperspective,thecourtdirectedthehusbandtocontributeRs12,000permonthtowardthemaintenanceofthechild.

TheAndhraPradeshHighCourt,inN.SreeRamuduv.N.Lahari,206alsoendorsedthisviewandheldthatsinceboththemotherandfatheroftheminorchildaregainfullyemployedandarehavingequalfinancialcapacity,theresponsibilityofmaintainingthechildoughttobesharedequally.

OtherSubstantiveIssues

HusbandGuiltyofMatrimonialFaultWhenadesertedwifeapproachesthecourtsformaintenanceandisonthevergeofreceivingafavourableorderdirectingthehusbandtopaymaintenance,aploy,whichisoftenused,istosubmittothecourtthatheiswillingtoreconcilewithhiswifeandiswillingtomaintainher.Attimes,apetitionforrestitutionofconjugalrightsisalsofiledtodefeatthewoman’sclaimofmaintenance.

Ifthewomanrefusestoaccepttheofferwithoutareasonableandjustifiablecause,hermaintenanceclaimcanbedefeated.Butifthewifeisabletoproveamatrimonialfaultsuchasbigamy,adultery,andcruelty,thecourtsareboundtoupholdthewoman’sclaimofseparateresidenceandmaintenance.Thecourtshavealsoheldthatifthehusbandmakesbaselessallegationsofadulteryandunchastityagainstthewife,sheisentitledtoliveseparatelyandclaimmaintenance(BaishnabCharanJenav.RitaraniJena).207

Ifthehusbandisimpotentandisunabletofulfilhismaritalobligations,thewifewouldbejustifiedinlivingseparately.Forinstance,inAshokKumarSinghv.Addl.SessionsJudge,Varanasi,208theSupremeCourtupheldthe(p.170) woman’srightofmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PConthegroundofhusband’simpotency.InPoonamGuptav.GhanshyamGupta,209thehusband,arichandprosperousbusinessman,hadremarried.Consideringthestatusofthefamiliesandthebasicrequirementformaintenanceofwifeandchild,costsofchild’seducation,upbringing,etc.,thehighcourtofAllahabadupheldthelumpsumofRs8,00,000awardedtoherasjustandproper.InPuliyullaChalil


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NarayanaKurupv.ThayyullaParabhathValsala,210theKeralaHighCourtheldthatthewifeisfullyjustifiedinrefusingtolivewiththehusbandasthehusbandwaslivingwithanotherwomanandhadthreechildrenthroughher.InSangeetaKumariShawv.StateofWestBengal,211thewifewascompelledtoleavethematrimonialhomeduetomentalandphysicalcrueltyoverdemandsfordowry.TheCalcuttaHighCourtupheldthewoman’srighttoliveseparatelyandclaimmaintenance.InMohanlalv.LadKunwarBai,212thehusbandcontractedasecondmarriage.TheMadhyaPradeshHighCourtheldthatonthisgroundthewifewasentitledtoliveseparatelyandgetmaintenancefromherhusband.

InVinodKumarJollyv.SunitaJolly,213afterdivorcinghissecondwife,thehusbandhadmarriedforthethirdtimeandhadtwochildren.Thecourtcommentedthatifthehusbandcanhavetheluxuryofathirdmarriageandcanbringupthechildrenbornofthesaidmarriage,heshouldownresponsibilityofthetwoearlierwivesandpaythemmaintenance.ThewifewasawardedRs1,500permonthandthesonwasawardedRs2,500permonthwhichthecourtcommentedwouldhardlyensuretheirbareexistence.

EvenunderMuslimlaw,thewifeisentitledtoresideseparatelyandclaimmaintenanceifthehusbandhascontractedasecondmarriage,hasamistress,orvisitswomenofillrepute.InBegumSubanuv.A.M.AbdulGafoor,214theSupremeCourtheldthatirrespectiveofthehusband’srighttotakeasecondwifeunderthepersonallaws,uponhisremarriage,thewifeisentitledtoclaimmaintenanceandseparateresidence.Thecourtheldthattheprovisionofmaintenancemustbeconstruedfromthepointofviewoftheinjurytothematrimonialrightsofthewifeandnotwithreferencetothehusband’srightofremarriage.

InMumtazBegumv.YusufKhan,215whenthehusbandremarried,thewifelefthermatrimonialresidenceandclaimedmaintenance.Herapplicationwasrejectedonthegroundthatthehusband’sremarriageisnotasufficientreasontoliveseparatelyandclaimmaintenance.Onappeal,theRajasthanHighCourtheldthatthehusbandcannotdenymaintenancetothefirstwifebytakingrecourseunderthepersonallawspermittingbigamy.

InKadeejav.Aboobacker,216thewifeandherfourminorchildrenwereawardedRs200permonthmaintenanceunderthepersonallaw.Sincethehusbanddidnotpay,thewifefiledforrecovery.Onthehusband’spleathathehasnomeanstopaythearrears,thecourtdismissedherapplication.ThewifechallengedtheorderinthehighcourtwhichheldthatunderMuslimlawhusbandisboundtomaintainhiswife,solongashehastheabilitytoearn.Thecourtcannotexaminethehusband’searningswhileenforcingmaintenanceorders.

(p.171) InSirajmohmedkhanJanmohamadkhanv.HafizunnisaYasinkhan,217thehusbandwasimpotentandwasunabletodischargehismaritalobligations,whichthecourtheldwasthemainobjectiveofmarriage,moreparticularlyunderMohammedanlawwheremarriageistreatedasasacrosanctcontractandnotapurelyreligiousceremonyasinthecaseofHindulaw.Thecourtcommented:‘Whenahusbandis


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impotentandisunabletodischargehismaritalobligations,itwouldamounttobothlegalandmentalcrueltywhichwouldundoubtedlybeajustground,ascontemplatedbySection125(3)ofCr.PC,forthewife’srefusaltolivewithherhusbandandthewifewouldbeentitledtomaintenancefromherhusbandaccordingtohismeans.’

Ashabiv.BashasabTakke218isanothercasewherethehusbandhadremarried.Rejectingthewife’sapplicationformaintenance,thefamilycourtheldthatthewifewasnotabletoprovethatthehusbandhaddesertedher.Inappeal,theKarnatakaHighCourtheldthatthewifecannotbedeniedmaintenanceonthegroundofnotjoiningherhusbandinviewofthehusband’sremarriageandhence,sheisentitledtoliveseparatelyandclaimmaintenance.

UnderMuslimlaw,failuretoprovidemaintenanceisagroundforthewifetodissolvehermarriage.219

Husband’sObligationtoMaintaintheWifeThehusbandhasalegalobligationtomaintainhisdependentwife.Unlessthewifeisguiltyofaseriousmatrimonialoffence,thecourtswillupholdthewoman’sclaimofmaintenance,oftenoverridingthehusband’sallegationsofadultery,immorality,denialofmarriage,contestationofpaternity,etc.Evenwhenthewifeisnotabletoprovideproofofherhusband’sincome,thecourtswillgrantmaintenancetothewifeandchildren,usingthecriterionofminimumwagesonthepremisethatanablebodiedman,whoiscapableofearningalivelihood,hasalegalobligationtomaintainhiswife.Onlywhenthehusbandisold,infirm,orphysicallyormentallydisabled,hewillbeabsolvedofhisobligationtomaintainhiswife.

InRajeshKumarv.StateofBihar,220itwasheldthatahusbandcannothidebehindthepleaofhisunemployment.Thecourtcommentedthatinanycasehemustbemaintaininghimselfwithwhatevermeans.

InMeenuChoprav.DeepakChopra,221itwasheldthatthestatusofthewife’sparentsisanirrelevantconsiderationwhiledecidingtheissueofmaintenance.Theonlydeterminingfactorforconsiderationisthestatusofhusband.Thehusbandhadpleadedthatsincethewifecomesfromafamilywithmodestmeans,theamountofRs20,000awardedasinterimmaintenancewasexcessive.TheDelhiHighCourtheldthatifthehusbandiswealthyandisleadinganopulentlife,hiswifealsohastherighttobeapartnerinhisprosperityandlivewiththesamestandard.

Evenwhenthewifeisbeingsupportedbyherparents,thehusbandisnotabsolvedfromhisobligationofmaintaininghiswife(Radhakumariv.M.K.Nair).Thecourtswillnotacceptthehusband’scontentionthatthewoman’sownparentsarewelloffandcanprovideforher,orthatshedoesnotneedmaintenanceassheislivingwithherparents.

InG.C.Ghoshv.SushmitaGhosh,222thetrialcourtawardedRs5,500tothewifeasmaintenanceandRs2,000forherseparateresidence(p.172) fromthedateoffiling.Thehusbandpleadedthatsincethewifewaslivingwithherparents,shehadnotactually


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spentthisamountandhencewasnotentitledtothesame.Whileupholdingtheorderofthetrialcourt,theDelhiHighCourtmadethefollowingscathingcomments:

Thehusbandislivingwithanotherwife.Theentitlementofthewifetoliveseparatelyisnotindispute.Inthefirstinstance,thehusbandrefusestomaintainhiswifeandprovidehershelter.Hemarriesanotherwomanandwalksoutofherlife.Hedoesnotgivehermaintenanceorprovideforseparateresidencetowhichsheislawfullyentitled,forcinghertoliveseparatelyonherown.Sheisforcedtoresorttolitigationandhusbandpleadsthewifeisnotentitledtomaintenanceforperiodduringpendencyofthesuitasshehadallegedlynotspentanysuchamountonhermaintenanceoronseparateresidence.Thisiswhollyunjust.Section18ofHAMAisabeneficialprovisionforthepurposeofsecuringadecentlivingforaHinduwifeandtoamelioratethesufferingsofadesertedwife.Theseprovisionsmustbeconstruedinamannerwhichbetterservestheendsoffairnessandjustice.Whensuchlawsaremade,itispropertoassumethelawmakersenactlawswhichthesocietyconsidersashonest,fair,andreasonable,and,thus,justiceandreasonconstitutethegreatgenerallegislativeintentinsuchapieceoflegislation.Thecourtsmustleantowardsaninterpretationwhichisjustreasonable,andfair.Iftheinterpretationsuggestedbythehusbandisaccepted,itwouldoffendtheverysenseofjustice.Thehusbandcannotavoidhisobligationunderthelawbytakingshelterofsuchingeniouspleas.

Thefactthatthesonismaintainingthewifecannotbeusedasadefencetodefeatthewoman’srighttoclaimmaintenancefromherhusband.InMerubhaiMandanbhaiOdedarav.RanibenMerubhaiOdedara,223upholdingthewoman’srighttomaintenance,thecourtcommentedthatthesoncannotbemadeliableforthewife’smaintenanceunlessthehusbandhasdiedorotherwisehasnosourceofincome.InRattanBalav.PrahladAggarwal,224theDelhiHighCourtcommentedthatthetrialcourterredindeclininginterimmaintenancetothewomanmerelyonthegroundthatsheisnotadestituteassheissupportedbyherson,whoisaqualifiedCharteredAccountant.Thecourtcommentedthatthehusbandislegallyandmorallyobligedtomaintainhiswife.

Ifthehusbandisoldandinfirm,heisabsolvedoftheobligationofmaintainingthewife.InMugappav.Muniyamma,225wherethehusbandwas75yearsoldandthewife65years,andthesixchildrenwereallemployedandwellplacedinlife,theKarnatakaHighCourtsetasidetheorderofmaintenanceandheldthatthepetitionfiledbyherwaswithmalafidemotive.Thecourtcommentedthatifherneedisgenuine,shecouldhavesuedhersonsforprovidingmaintenance.

ArecentjudgmentdeliveredbytheDelhiHighCourtbringsacurioustwisttothelegalpremise,‘anablebodiedman’byextendingthisnotiontowomen.Inthiscase,RituRajKantv.Anita,226itwasheldthatmaintenanceistobeawardedonthebasisofactualearningsandnotbyapplyingthenotionofanablebodiedperson.Thewifefailedtoprovideanyproofofherhusband’searnings.WhilequashingtheorderofthetrialcourtawardingherRs1,500permonthasmaintenance,thecourtcommentedthatthewifeisequallyablebodied.


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MaintenancetoWorkingWomenThough,theprinciplebehindtheconceptofmaintenanceistoprovideeconomicsecurityforthosewhoareunabletomaintainthemselves,incertaincases,adoptingapro-womenpolicy,thecourtshaveruledthataworkingwifeorone(p.173) whoisqualifiedtoworkisalsoentitledtomaintenance.Ifthewomanisearningameagreamount,whichisnotsufficientforhertomaintainherself,orifshehassecuredatemporaryjob,thecourtshaveheldthatthewomanisentitledtomaintenance.Also,incaseswherethereisgreatdisparitybetweentheincomeofhusbandandwife,thecourtswillstrivetobringinsomeparitybyawardingmaintenancetothewife.Although,theamountsawardedarefarbelowtheexpectationsofmiddleandaffluentsectionsofwomen,thecourtsattempttohelpdivorcedandseparatedwomentomaintainacertainstandardoflivingandnotrenderthemdestituteandforcethemtoliveinpenurybyvirtueoftheirdivorceorseparation.

InRajathivC.Ganesan,227theSupremeCourtexplainedthattheexpression‘unabletomaintainherself’wouldmeanthemeansavailabletothedesertedwifewhileshewaslivingwithherhusbandandwouldnottakewithinitselftheeffortsmadebythewifeafterthedesertiontosomehowsurvive.TheapexcourtalsopointedthatSection125ofCr.PCwasenactedonthepremisethatitistheobligationofthehusbandtomaintainhiswifeandchildren.ThispositionwasreiteratedbytheGauhatiHighCourtinWeldoneLyngdohv.EvaPhawa.228

InChaturbhujv.SitaBai,229theSupremeCourtheldthatitisnotnecessarythatthewifemustbeabsolutelydestitutebeforeshecanapplyformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.Similarly,inJohnsonJosephv.AnitaJohnson,230itwasheldthattheexpression‘unabletomaintain’doesnotmeanthatsheshouldbeadestitutebeforeshecanapplyformaintenance.Thecourtalsocommentedthataworkingwomanisrequiredtospendmorethanahousewifeasshehastoworkinofficeandkeepherhousehold.ThewifewasearningRs1,800permonthandthehusband’ssalarywasRs7,500permonth.ItwasheldthatRs1,000permonthawardedtoherasmaintenancewasnotunjustorunreasonable.

InSheelaDeviv.SwarupNarainBijoria,231thetrialcourtdeclinedtograntmaintenancetothewifeonthegroundthatshewasearningsomeamountofmoneybyrollingbeedis.Inappeal,theAllahabadHighCourtawardedherRs500asmaintenanceandheldthatthefactthatthewifewasearningameagreamountcannotbeagroundtorefusehermaintenance.Thehusband,whowasagovernmentemployee,wasdrawingahandsomesalary.

InAnitaSharmav.RamjilalSharma,232thewifewasworkingasanAnganwadiworkerandearningRs1,000.Thecourtheldthatthisamountwasnotsufficienttomeettheneedsofpresentdaylife.ThehusbandwasearningRs8,500,hence,itwasheldthatthewifeisentitledtoamaintenanceofRs750permonth.

InMuraleedharanv.Vijayalakshmi,233thecourtaddressedtheissueofmaintenancetoeducatedwomenandheldasfollows:‘Qualificationbyitselfcannotbeheldtobe


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synonymouswithabilitytomaintainone’sself.Themerefactthatwifehasqualificationisnotsufficientipsofactotoconcludeshewasinapositiontomaintainherselfatthetimewhentheclaimwasmadeorbeforethespousesstartedlivingseparately.Themerefactthatafterseparationonsomeoccasionssheworkedasateacherinsomeschoolisnotsufficienttotakeheroutofthecategoryofpersonsunableto(p.174) maintainthemselves.Thereisnoadamantrefusalonherparttoengageherselfinanyincomegeneratingactivitytomaintainherself.Itwasclearlyacaseofherinabilitytosecureanysuchincomeearningactivitiesandearnanincomesufficienttomaintainherself.

InSudhirDiwanv.TriptaDiwan,234theDelhiHighCourtawardedmaintenancetoaworkingwomanonthegroundthatthewomanwasdischarginghermoraldutyofmaintainingherchildren.Thisisawelcomeshiftinjudicialapproach,asinmostcasesassoonasthesonturnedmajor,thecourtsdiscontinuethemaintenanceawardedtohim.Inthisinnovativeapproach,thefactthatthewifewhowasemployedwasspendingfortheneedsofthechildrenbecameanimportantcriterionwhileawardingmaintenancetoher.ThehusbandwasworkingasanagentwithLIC,butdidnotdisclosehisincomeearnedbywayofcommission.Basedonhisinvestments,thetrialcourtarrivedatapresumptivefigureofRsFourlakhsperannum.ThewifewasworkingasastenointhedistrictcourtandhernetsalarywasRs19,000permonth.Thesonwasamajorbutwasstillastudent.UpholdingtheorderofawardingRs10,000asmaintenancetoher,theDelhiHighCourtheldthatthewifewasspendingaroundRs7,500onhiseducationalandincidentalexpenses.ShewouldbeleftwithonlyRs12,500permonthforherselfandherminordaughterifthehusbandwasnotdirectedtopayhermaintenance.Sincethehusband’smonthlyincomewouldbearoundRs30,000,hewasdirectedtocontributeatleastonethirdofthisamounttothewifetowardsexpensesofmaintainingthechildren.ThecourtcommentedthatthehusbandwouldstillbeleftwithoverRs20,000forhisownpersonalexpenses.

InAshokKumarBhallav.RoopaBhalla,235thegrossmonthlysalaryofthewifewasaroundRs19,000.Thehusband’ssalarywasaroundRs22,000.Inaddition,hewasearningRs20,000bywayofrentfromhisproperty.ThemonthlyeducationalandotherexpensesofthetwochildrenweredeterminedatRs15,000p.m.Since,theearningsofthehusbandandwifewereintheratioof2:1,itwasheldthattheparentswereliabletosharetheexpensesinthesameratio.AndthehusbandwasdirectedtocontributeRs10,000permonthtohiswifeforupkeepofthetwochildren.

InSushilKumarGuptav.ReenaGupta236andRadhikav.VineetRungta,237twocaseswhicharediscussedinProofofIncomebelow,middleclasswomenhavingmoderateincomeswereawardedmaintenancefromtheiraffluenthusbandstohelpthemtomaintainastandardoflifewhichtheywereusedtointheirmatrimonialhome.

InRekhaMalhotrav.DeepakMalhotra,AIR1999Bom291FN,boththehusbandandwifewereprofessionals.ThehusbandpleadedthathisincomeisonlyaroundRs40,000andthewifeadmittedthatshewasearningRs12,500.Therewerenochildrenofthismarriage.Whenthewifecametoknowaboutthehusband’saffairwithayounggirl,sheleftthematrimonialhomeandwaslivingwithherparents.Thewifehadallegedthat


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subsequently,thesaidwomanwaslivinginthematrimonialhomeandalsohadachildthroughherhusband,whichwasdeniedbythehusband.Hepleadedthatthecauseforthebreakofmarriagewasthewife’srefusaltohaveachildasshewasonlyinterestedinherowncareer.Healsopleadedthatsheisabletomaintainherselfandhenceisnotentitledtoanymaintenance.ExaminingtheirlifestyletheBombay(p.175) HighCourtcommentedthattheearningspleadedareonalowersideandtheactualincomeofbothwouldbemuchhigher.Consideringallthefactors,thecourtawardedthewifeRs7500permonthasmaintenancetomaintainalifestylesimilartothatofthehusband.

Therehavealsobeeninstanceswherethecourtshaveheldthatifthewifeisabletomaintainherself,orifthehusband’sstatusisnotmuchabovethatofthewife’s,thewifeisnotentitledtomaintenance.InRakeshv.Smt.Nandu,238theRajasthanHighCourtdismissedthemaintenanceapplicationofthewifewhoearnedRs20–5perdayasadailywagelabourer.Itwasruledthatthestatusofthehusband,whoearnedRs100–150asalabourerwasnotmuchaboveincomparisontohiswifeasbothwereworkingasdailywagelabourers.InSatvendraKumarv.MithleshKumari,239thewifewhowasservingasateacherinapublicschoolandgettingasalaryofmorethanRs6,000permonthwasheldascapableofmaintainingherselffromherownearningsandwasnotentitledtomaintenance.Butthecourtenhancedthemaintenanceawardedtoherdaughter.Theserulingsseemparticularlyharshtowardswomen.

MaintenanceClaimsbyHusbandsThenotionofmaintenancetohusbandsisrelativelynewwithinourfamilylaws.Theancientlegalsystemsdidnotprovideforit.BothHinduandMuslimlegalsystemsfunctionedfromaprotectionistapproachtowardswomen.Muslimlawwentfurtherandprovidedforthefuturesecurityofwivesbysecuringtheirrightofmehrwithinthemarriagecontract(nikahnama)itself.TheancientHindulawsalsoprotectedthewoman’srighttoseparateproperty(stridhan)andforbadethemalerelativesfromusurpingthepropertyanddeprivingthewomanofherrights.

Thecoloniallegalsystem,whichwasintroducedinIndiaduringthelatenineteenthcentury,alsoadoptedaprotectionistapproachtowardswomenandgrantedthemtherightofmaintenanceunderthepersonallawsaswellasunderthesecularlaw,thatis,Section125ofCr.PCandtheSpecialMarriageActof1872(re-enactedin1954)aswellasthelawapplicabletoChristians,theIndianDivorceActof1869(evenafterthe2001amendment)didnotbestowuponthehusbandtherighttoclaimmaintenancefromthewife.Sincetheobligationofmaintenancewasframedwithinthecontextofdependents,therightwasconfinedtowives,minor/disabledchildren,andunmarrieddaughters,whoaredeemedtobetheweakermembersofthefamily.

ThisrightwasfirstgrantedtoHinduhusbandsinthepost-Independenceperiod,underthecodifiedenactment,theHinduMarriageAct,1955(HMA).DuringthecodificationoftheHindufamilylawinthe1950s,theconstitutionalmandateofequalitywasanoverarchingpresence.Sothisrightwasformulatedinthecontextofanillusorynotionofequalitybetweenthespouses.Atthispointinhistory,Hinduwomenwerenotgranted


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equalrightstoancestralpropertyandonlyamalewasawardedtherightbybirthtothejointfamilyproperty.In1988,whentheParsiMarriageandDivorceAct,1936(PMDA)wasamended,thisnotionofequalitywasincorporatedwithinit.

Underthesetwoacts(HMAandPMDA),theprovisionofmaintenanceisformulatedinagender-neutraltermusingthewordspousewhichenablesthehusbandtoclaimmaintenancefromhisestrangedwife.Thisreflectsanewtrendinmatrimoniallawsand,apparently,itappearsthatthelawofmaintenanceisinchingtowardsgenderequality.Butsuchsuperficialnotionsofequalityandgenderneutrality,ina(p.176) societywhichisstructureduponpatriarchalpremisesandnurturesdeeprootedbiasesagainstwomen,causemorehardshipstowomenbyentanglingthemintovexatiousandvindictivelitigation.

InLalitMohanv.TriptaDevi,240thehusbandwhodidnothaveindependentsourceofincomewasawardedinterimmaintenance.

Inanotherunreportedjudgment,theAllahabadHighCourtawardedmaintenancetoahusbandinadivorcepetitionfiledbythewife.Thehusbandnotonlyopposedthedivorce,butalsoclaimedmaintenanceandlitigationexpensesonthegroundthatheisunemployed.Thefamilycourthadrejectedtheclaimforinterimmaintenanceonthegroundthatthehusbandwasanablebodiedandhealthyman,capableofearninghisownlivelihoodand,therefore,didnotdeserveanymonetarysupportfromhisspouse.Thehusbandchallengedthisorderinthehighcourt.On7November2005,asinglejudgeoftheLucknowHighCourtallowedtheappealandorderedthewifetopayRs2,000permonthasmaintenancetothehusband.Thecourtexplainedthereasonsforawardingthemaintenanceinthefollowingwords:‘Sincethepetitioner(husband)isresidinginhisownhouseandhastoincurexpensesofhiswidowedmother,hisresponsibilitiesseemtobehigherthanthatoftheRespondentwife.’Whilethewife,‘ahardworkingandenterprisingwoman’isemployedwiththebank,thehusband,a‘happy-go-luckyandlaid-back’person,pleadedthatheisjobless.Itappearedtobeoflittleconsequencethatthewifehadfiledthepetitionfordivorcein1997onthegroundofcrueltyanddowryharassmentbyhusbandandhisfamily.241

Thoughcasessuchastheonediscussedabovearefewandfarbetween,thestipulationprovidesanarmourtohusbandstocausefurtherharassmenttowivesindivorceproceedings.Itappearstoberatherunjustthatwhilecourtshavedeniedmaintenancetoayoungboyofeighteen,whohasnotyetcompletedhiseducationandisdependentuponhisdivorcedmother,onthegroundthatheisanadultcapableofearninghislivelihood,thecourtsentertainapplicationsfromadultmaleswhohaveaprimaryobligationtomaintaintheirwivesandarealsoablebodiedandcapableofearning.Aswecandiscernfromthediscussioninthischapter,women’srightstomaintenancearehingedupontheirchastity.Remarriageorlivinginadulterydisentitlesawomanfromclaimingmaintenance.Thesearegenderednotionswhichareappliedonlytowomen.Thereisnocorrespondingpremisetodisentitleahusbandfromclaimingmaintenance.Astheaboveunreportedcaserevealsmaintenancecanbegrantedtoahusbandwhohasbeenguiltyofcausingviolenceanddowryrelatedharassmenttohiswife.


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Merelybyadoptingagenderneutralterm,thesegenderednotionswillnotgetdiminishedorfadeaway.Notionsofequalityandgenderneutralitycanmeaningfullybeappliedonlywithinanegalitariansocialstructureandnotwithinapatriarchalandgenderbiasedone.Evenconsideringthatmoreandmorewomenarenowenteringthejobmarketandholdinghigherpositionswithinthecorporateworld,itstilldoesnotjustifytheprovisionofmaintenancetohusbandsunlessthegenderedroleassignedtowomenasprimarycaretakersoftheirchildrenandhomemakersisreversedundersuchasituation.

Clarifyingtheconceptofmaintenancetohusbands,inGovindSinghv.Vidya,242the(p.177) RajasthanHighCourtheldthatthisprovisiondoesnotentitlethehusbandwhoiscapableofearninghislivingtoclaimmaintenancefromhiswife.Theprovisiondoesnotempowerthehusbandtostopearningandstartdependingonhiswife.ThecourtrelieduponthemaximofAngloSaxonjurisprudencethatnopersoncanbeallowedtoincapacitatehimself,andheldthatthehusbandhadvoluntarilyincapacitatedhimselffromearningand,hence,hewasnotentitledtoclaimmaintenancefromhiswife.

EffectofConsentAgreementsRelinquishingtheRightofMaintenanceAttimes,consentagreementsdrawnupeitherduringthemarriageoratthetimeofdivorce,stipulatingthatthewifewouldnotclaimmaintenance,arerelieduponbyhusbandstodefeattheclaimsoftheirwives.Butwhenawifeapproachesthecourtsformaintenance,somecourtshavedeclinedtorelyupontheseagreementsandhavedecidedtheissueofmaintenanceafresh.ThecontestarisesduetoaclauseinSection125(4)ofCr.PCwhichstipulatesthatawifewillnotbeentitledtomaintenanceifsheislivingseparatelyasperanagreementtothiseffect.InKaushalyabaiMulev.DinkarMule,243wherethewiferelinquishedherclaimsofmaintenanceunderadeedofdivorce,itwasheldthatthewifewasentitledtomaintenancedespitethisbecausesuchadeedofdivorcehasneitherthebackingoflaworcustom.

SimilarlyinManokaChatterjeev.SwapanChatterjee,244itwasheldthatinproceedingsfordivorcebymutualconsent,termsofconsentwhichincludeaclausethatthewife,uponreceivingalumpsumamountperpetuallybindsherselffromanyfutureclaimofmaintenance,wasnottenableunderthelaw.ItwasheldthatsinceSection125ofCr.PC.isapieceofsocialwelfarelegislationanditsprimarypurposeistoprotectthewifefromvagrancyanddestitution,evenifthewifebindsherselfconsciouslyorunconsciouslytosuchanagreement,thelawhastocometoheraidandprotectherstatutoryrighttomaintenanceandalsotoherrighttolife,whichprovisionmustmeanalifewithdignity.Itwasheldthatfutureclaimscannotbefrozenmerelybecausethewifewasawardedalumpsumamountatthetimeofthedivorce.Theclaimisflexibleandchangesfromtimetotimeaccordingtochangesincircumstances.Inviewofthisreasoning,theCalcuttaHighCourtsetasidetheparticularclauseintheagreement.

InBiswapriyaBhuiyav.JhumiBanik,245thewifehadfiledfordivorceonthegroundofcrueltybut,subsequently,thepetitionwasconvertedintoapetitionfordivorcebymutualconsentandthewifeagreedforanunconditionaldivorce.Aweeklater,shefiled


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formaintenanceunderSection125Cr.PC.ThefamilycourtatAgartala,awardedherRs1,500permonthasmaintenance.Thehusbandchallengedthisorderonthegroundthatsincethewifehadsurrenderedherrightbyagreeingforanunconditionaldivorce,sheisbarredfromclaimingmaintenancesubsequentlyasperstipulationsunderSection125(4)ofCr.PC.ButtheGauhatiHighCourtheldthatthereisnobaragainstthewifefromclaimingmaintenanceatalaterstagesinceshehasnotbeenawardedanymaintenanceinthedivorceproceedings.

[email protected],246itwasheldthatthereisnobartoclaimingmaintenanceifthereisachangeinsituationevenaftermaintenancehadbeen(p.178) awardedatthetimeofdivorcebywayofcompromisebetweentheparties.ThecourtcommentedthatsuchaninterpretationwoulddefeattheveryobjectofSection25.Further,itwasheldthatanagreementdefeatingtherightofmaintenance,providedunderthestatute,beingcontrarytopublicpolicyisnotavalidcontract,andcannotoperateasabartoexercisejurisdictionconferredunderSection25(2)247oftheAct.ItwasheldthatthefamilycourtofHyderabadcommittedanerrorinholdingthatthewife’sclaimisnotmaintainableandremandedthematterbackforretrial.

ButtheBombayHighCourt,inaseriesofjudgments,hasheldacontraryview.InPopatKashinathBodkev.KamalabaiPopatBodke,248thepartieswereresidingseparatelybyanagreementandsomeagriculturallandwastransferredinthewife’sname,andthewifehadsignedadeedofrelinquishment.ItwasheldthatinviewofSection125(4)ofCr.PC,thewifewouldceasetohavearighttoclaimmaintenanceafterexecutionoftheagreementandiftheagreementhasbeenactedupon.

InVitthalJadhavv.HarnabaiJadhav,249thewifewasgivenRs.20,000bythehusbandinaccordancewithanagreementbyvirtueofacustomarydivorce.Thecouplehadagreedtoliveseparatelybymutualconsent.Subsequently,thewifefiledapetitionformaintenanceandwasawardedRs400asmonthlymaintenance.TheBombayHighCourtquashedtheorderoftheJudicialMagistratewhichawardedthewifeRs.400asmonthlymaintenance.Itfurtherheldthattheorderofthemagistratesufferedfromlegalinfirmityasawifelosesherrighttoclaimmaintenancefromherhusbandifsheandherhusbandareresidingseparatelybymutualconsent,inlightofSection125(4)oftheCr.PC.

Similarly,inGajananSolankev.SheelaSolanke,250thewoman’sclaimofmaintenanceafterdivorce,forherselfandherminorsonwhowasbornafewmonthsaftertheconsentdeedwassigned,wasupheldbythesessionscourt.Butinappeal,thehighcourtsetasidetheorderofmaintenanceonthegroundthatsincethewomanhadrelinquishedherclaimtomaintenanceindivorceproceedings,shewasbarredfromclaimingfurthermaintenancebyprovisionofSection127(3)(c)ofCr.PC.251Thehusbandalsodeniedpaternityofthechild.Butthecourtheldthatatthetimeofsigningtheconsentdeedthewomanwaspregnantandthisfacthadnotbeenmentionedintheconsentdeed.Thewomanwasalsonotcrossexaminedonthisissue,hence,thechildwasheldtobethelegitimateandtheamountofRs400permonthawardedtotheminorsonwasupheld.

Attimes,thehusbandshavetakenthepleathatthepartieshavegonethrougha


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customarydivorcewherethewifehasrelinquishedherrighttomaintenance.InJairamv.Sindhubai,252itwasheldthatcustomcannotonlybepleaded,buthastobeprovedthatthepartieswereentitledforthecustomarydivorce.Inthiscontext,thedeedofdivorcecouldnothavetheeffecttodissolvethemarriagebetweentheparties.Oncethepartiesaremarried,thesaidmarriagecannotbedissolvedexceptbyadecreeofdivorcepassedundertheprovisionsofthe(p.179) HinduMarriageAct,1955.Theordergrantingmaintenancetothewifecannotberevokedmerelyonthisbasis.

InRajeshKumarMadaanv.Mamta@Veena,253aftercriminalproceedingswereinitiatedbythewifeagainstthehusbandonthegroundofcrueltyanddowryharassment,therewasacompromiseandthehusbandagreedtopayRs4,50,000assettlement.ButaftertheinitialinstalmentofRs50,000onthedateofthecompromise,hedefaultedandlaterfiledfordivorceonthegroundofdesertionandcrueltystatingthatthecriminalproceedingsfiledbythewifeconstruedcruelty.Thecourtrejectedhispleaanddismissedthepetition.Thehusbandchallengedthisorderinthehighcourt.Later,hepleadedthattherewasacustomarydivorcebetweenthem.ThehighcourtheldthatamarriagecanonlybedissolvedbyadecreeofdivorcebyacompetentcourtandnotinanyproceedingsbeforethePanchayat.Thewifeisnottobeboundbyacompromiseunlesssheherselfconsentstothesame.

Whilethereareinstanceswherethecourtshavevalidatedcustomarydivorce,ifthepleaisadvancedtodefeatawomen’srighttomaintenance,thecourtsareboundtorejectthispleaandawardwomentheirstatutoryrights.Hence,acustom,denyingwomenmaintenance,cannotbepleadedassuchacustomisagainstpublicpolicy.

MaintenanceClaimsbyParentsTheaboveprovisionhasimposedastatutoryliabilityonbothsonsanddaughterstomaintaintheirfatherormotherwhoisunabletomaintainhimselforherself.Section488oftheoldcodedidnotcontainanysuchprovisionaimedatpreventionofvagrancyanddestitutionofparentswhodonothavemeanstomaintainthemselves(VijayaMonoharArbatv.KashiraoRajaramSawai).254Iftherearetwoormoresons,theparentsmayseekremedyagainstanyoneormoreofthesons.Theliabilitytomaintainthefatherisnotdependantonfailureorotherwiseofthefathertofulfilhisnormalobligationofmaintainingchildrenduringchildhood(PandurangDabhadeBaburaoDabhade).255Theadoptivefatherisalsoentitledtomaintenance.

Evenamarrieddaughterisliabletomaintainherparents.Butinthiscontext,PaladugulaVijayalakshmiv.NomulaRamanadham256raisesaninterestingquestion.Inthiscase,theparents,aged60and50,hadtheirownpropertyandwererunningasmallgrocerystore.Theyhadnotgivenanyshareofthepropertytotheirdaughtertowhichshewasentitledto.Buttheson,uponattainingmajoritywasgivenashare.Theparentsalsodidnotperformthemarriageceremonyoftheirdaughterasshehadmarriedagainsttheirwishes.Thedaughter,sincethen,waslivingwiththehusband.TheparentsclaimedmaintenancefromthedaughterandwereawardedRs400permonth.Thehighcourtsentthematterbackforretrialasitwasheldthattheprocedureaslaiddownunder(p.180) Section126wasnotscrupulouslyfollowedbythelowercourt.Thehighcourt


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directedthetrialcourttoconsiderallrelevantfactorsbeforeupholdingtheparentsclaimformaintenancefromthedaughter.

ifanypersonhavingsufficientmeansneglectsorrefusestomaintain,hisfatherormother,unabletomaintainhimselforherself,aMagistrateofthefirstclassmay,uponproofofsuchneglectorrefusal,ordersuchpersontomakeamonthlyallowanceforthemaintenanceofsuchfatherormother,atsuchmonthlyrateassuchMagistratethinksfitandtopaythesametosuchpersonastheMagistratemayfromtimetotimedirect.

InAkhamIbobiSinghv.AkhamBiradhwajaSingh,257thefatheraged74yearsandthemotheraged71yearswereclaimingmaintenancefromtheirson.Thefamilycourtrejectedtheirclaim.Inappeal,theGauhatiHighCourtupheldtheirclaimandheldthatitisnotrequiredtostrictlyprovetheirinabilitytomaintainthemselvesandcommentedthatwhilerejectingtheclaimoftheparents,thefamilycourtslostsightofSection14oftheFamilyCourtsAct,wherethecourthaswidepowerstoreceiveevidencewhichisnotadmissibleinotherproceedings.TheIndiansocietycastsadutyonthechildrenofapersontomaintaintheirparentsiftheyarenotinapositiontomaintainthemselves.Itistheirdutytolookaftertheirparentswhentheybecomeoldandinfirm.Thecourtlamentedoverthefactthattherewasalongdrawnlegalbattlebetweenparentsandsonsforamatterwhichis,unfortunately,amoralobligation.TheyhavebeenfightingfromthefamilycourtuptotheSupremeCourtviathishighcourt,andmighthavespentalotofmoneyforthatpurpose.Thecourtcommentedthatthereisnolawwhichstipulatesthattheparentsmustclaimmaintenancefromallsonsanddaughtersandtheyshouldbejointlyimpleadedintheproceedings.Itwillsuffice,ifitisprovedthattheRespondenthasthecapacitytomaintainandtheparentsdonothavethecapacitytomaintainthemselves.

InMakiurRahamanKhanv.MahilaBibi,258itwasheldthatadivorcedMuslimwomanisentitledtomaintenancefromherchildrenunderSection125ofCr.PC.ThedivorcedwifehadfiledproceedingsundertheMuslimWomen’sActforafairandreasonablesettlementagainstherhusband.Whiletheseproceedingswerepending,shealsofiledformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCagainsthersons.ShewasawardedRs250fromeachofhertwosons.Inanappealfiledbythesonsagainstthisorder,thehighcourtheldthatwomen’srightsagainsttheirsonsunderSection125ofCr.PCarenotsubstitutedbytheenactmentofMuslimWomen’sAct.TheprovisionsofMWAareinadditiontoherrightsunderSection125Cr.PCagainstherchildren.

TheSupremeCourt,inKirtikantD.Vadodariav.StateofGujarat,259heldthatevenanadoptivemotherandachildlessstep-mother,isentitledtoclaimmaintenanceallowancesagainstheradoptedsonorherstep-son,ifsheisawidoworherhusband,ifliving,isincapableofmaintainingher.Thecourtreiteratedthatthewhiledealingwiththeambit

Box2.4Section125(1)(d)ofCr.PC


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andscopeofSection125Cr.PC,itmustbeborneinmindthattheprimaryobjectissocialjusticetothosewhoareunabletomaintainthemselves,buthaveamoralclaimforsupport.

TherecentlyenactedMaintenanceofParentsandSeniorCitizensAct,2007,providesanadditionalremedytoelderlymenandwomentoclaimmaintenancefromtheirchildren.TheActgoesastepfurtherandsecurestherightsofchildlessseniorcitizensagainsttheirnextofkinorpersonswhowouldbeentitledtoinherittheirproperty.TheActalsoseekstoprotectthelifeandpropertyofseniorcitizensandparents.Inadditiontomaintenanceandprovision,theActalsoseekstoensurebettermedicalfacilitiesandmandatesthestatetosetupoldagehomesandprovideinstitutionalizedcaretotheelderly.

(p.181) Inordertoprovideforaneasilyaccessibleavenueofaccessingjusticeandtoensureaspeedyremedy,theActprovidesforestablishmentoftribunalsandofficeofMaintenanceOfficerwhowillrepresenttheparentortheseniorcitizenintheseproceedings.Inordertoprotectthisvulnerablesectionfromtheclutchesofunscrupulouslawyers,theActprohibitslegalrepresentation.Inordertoarriveatasettlement,ratherthanengageinlengthylitigation,theActalsoprovidesforconciliationproceedings.Ifthedisputeisnotresolvedatthisstage,itwillproceedbeforethetribunalandwillbedecidedwithinamaximumperiodofninetydays.ThemaximumamountwhichcanbeawardedunderthisActislimitedtoRs10,000permonth.

TheadditionalsafeguardthatthenewActprovidesispunishmenttothechildrenandrelativeswhoabandontheirparentsorseniorcitizensinordertoavoidvagrancyanddestitution.Also,ifthereisanytransferofpropertywhichhasbeencarriedoutwithmalafideintention,orbyresortingtofraud,orundueinfluence,itcanbesetaside.

TheActempowerssocialorganizationstointerveneonbehalfoftheelderlyandalsoempowersthemtoinitiateproceedings,suomoto.

Whilethisisatimelymeasureenactedwiththerightintentions,theworkingofthisActatthegroundlevelisyettobeobserved.Hopefully,itwillnotposemorehurdlesonthepathoftheelderlywhiletheyseekremedialandprotectivereliefagainstneglectanddestitution.

Whileitisapositiveendeavour,itmaytakesometimetillalltheinfrastructuralandinstitutionalsupportisdeveloped.Inthemeantime,theparentscanstilltakerecourseundertheprevailingprovisionunderSection125ofCr.PC.Sincetheproceduresareallsetinplaceandthemagistratesarewellversedwiththeprovisionsandtheprovisionsarealsosummaryinnature,itwouldprovideaviableremedytoadestituteparent.TwoadditionalbenefitsoffilingunderSection125ofCr.PCwouldbethatnoceilingisstipulatedunderitandtheatmosphereofacriminalcourtmightexertgreaterpressureontheoppositesidetocomplywiththeorderduetothefearofimprisonment,whichcanbeavailedofinexecutionproceedings.


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ProceduralAspects

Ascanbeobservedfromtheexhaustivelistofsubstantiveissuesdiscussedabove,thetaskofclaimingmaintenancecaneasilybecomparedtoanordealbyfireforthewomeninvolved.Everylegalployisinvokedinordertohumiliatewomenanddefeattheirclaimstomaintenance.Evenifthesehurdlesofsubstantivelawarecrossed,womenarestilllefttodealwithcomplexand,attimes,absurdproceduralaspects,someofwhicharebrieflydiscussedinthissection.

JurisdictionJurisdictionbecomesanimportantissuewhileinitiatingmatrimonialproceedingsorwhileclaimingmaintenance.Forwomen,theplaceofmarriage,thematrimonialresidence,andhernatalhome,couldbesituatedatdifferentplaces.Inaddition,afterseparation,shemaybeconstrainedtosetupresidenceatyetanotherplace,eithertoseekemploymentortosecureschooladmissionsforherchildren.Keepinginviewthedisplacementwhichmostwomenarecompelledtogothroughbyvirtueofmarriagepatternswhicharepatrilocal,thelawgiveswomenwidejurisdictionwhileinitiatingmatrimonialandmaintenanceproceedings.

Initiallythejurisdictionundermostmatrimonialstatuteswasconfinedtotheplaceofmarriageandtheplacewherethecouplelastresidedtogether,ortheplacewheretherespondentresides.Thiscausedagreatdealofhardshiptowomenwhousuallyreturntotheirnative(p.182) placeafterthemarriagebreaksup.Inviewofthis,theprovisionofjurisdictionundertheHinduMarriageActandtheSpecialMarriageActwaswidenedin2003260toincludetheplacewherethewomanresidesafterthebreakupofhermarriage.Socurrently,thewomancaninitiateproceedingsattheplaceofherpost-separationresidence.Similarly,proceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PCcanbefiledattheplacewherethewomanlastresidedwithherhusbandorwheresheispresentlyresiding(SyedKhajaMohiuddinv.StateofAP).261

Attimestherearemultipleproceedings.ThewifemayhavefiledformaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCattheplaceofherresidenceand,inthemeantime,thehusbandmayhavefiledfordivorceattheplaceofhisresidence.Insuchcases,uponapetitionfortransferoftheproceedingsfiledbythehusband,thecourtswouldbeinclinedtotransferthehusband’spetitiontoacourtwhichwouldbemoreconvenientforthewifetolitigate.

Thelawiswellsettledonthisaspect.Theapexcourthasrepeatedlyheldthatthematrimonialdisputeshavetobedealtwithbycourtswhichareeasilyaccessibletowomen(VinayPandeyv.RoshanKumarandRinkuGoelv.RajeshGoel).262Thefactthatwomen’slackofexposuretotheoutsideworld,theunduehardshipcausedtothemwhiletravellingalonetoadistantplacetodefendthelitigation,theconcernfortheirsafety,thecostoftravel,thefactthattheremaybeyoungchildrenwhoneedconstantcare,ortheelderchildrenwhosestudiesmaybedisruptedwhilethemothertravelstodefendthecourtcase,thefactthatsheisemployedattheplaceofherresidence,etc.,arefactorswhichthecourtshaveconsideredwhiletransferringthehusband’spetitiontotheplacewherethewomanisresiding.


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InRachanaKanodiav.AnukKanodia,263thewifewasresidinginVaranasi,whichwasthepermanentplaceofresidenceofherparents.TheSupremeCourttransferredthepetitionfordivorcefiledbyherhusbandinthedistrictcourtatThaneinMaharashtratothedistrictcourtVaranasionthegroundthatgreathardshipwillbecausedtohertotravelallthewaytoThane.InChayanaDasv.TarunKumarDas,264thewifewasresidinginCoochBihar.ThehusbandhadfiledapetitionfordivorceinTinsukiya.TheSupremeCourtheldthatsincethedistancebetweenCoochBiharandTinsukiyaisabout830kmandinvolves20hoursoftravelandcostsRs300to400,itisnotpossibleforthewifetoundertaketravelallbyherselftodefendthepetition.

InNeelamBhatiav.SatbirSinghBhatia,265thewifefiledapetitiontotransferproceedingsfromKorbatothefamilycourtatKolkataonthegroundthatshelacksfinancialmeanstotravel,shehadnosourceofincome,andshehadaminordaughteroffiveyears.ThehusbandresistedtheTransferPetitionbutassuredtoco-operateandsettlethecasewithoutdraggingontheproceedings.Hence,theTransferPetitionwasdismissed.InSamitaBhattacharjeev.KulashekarBhattacharjee,266thewifewasresidingwithherparentsatHowrah,WestBengal,alongwithherminorchild.ThehusbandhadfiledapetitionfordivorceinthefamilycourtatAgartala,WestTripura.TheSupremeCourt(p.183) transferredthecasetothecourtofdistrictjudgeatHowrah,WestBengal.

Whentheplaceofresidenceofthewifeandtheplacewherethehusbandhadinitiatedproceedings,botharewithinthedirectionofahighcourt,thehighcourthasalsoissuedsimilardirectionsfortransfer.InKirtiv.VikasBhagiratRaoYeskade,267theBombayHighCourtupheldthewife’spleathatshewasdependentonheragedparentsandshehadnoindependentsourceofincome,andthatitwasnotpossibleforherparentstocometoNagpurtoattendthehearing.Herplaceofresidencewasabout200kmawayfromNagpur.Thecourtupheldhersubmissionthatthejourneywillcauseconsiderablehardshiptoher.ThecourtalsoupheldherpleathatsheapprehendsdangertoherwhenshecomestoattendproceedingsinNagpur.ThecourtcommentedthattheconvenienceofthewifeistobepreferredoverconvenienceofthehusbandanditoughttobethehusbandwhoshouldtravelfromNagpurtoChandrapur,ratherthanthewifefromBallarsha(Chandrapur)toNagpur.InP.Himabinduv.P.Jayasimharaja,268theAndhraPradeshHighCourtheldthattheprimaryconcernforthecourtshouldbetheconvenienceofthewife.SinceshehadnomaleassistancetotraveltoChittoor,thetransferpetitionfiledbyherwasallowed.InShakuntalav.PankajChourasiya(Dr),269theMadhyaPradeshHighCourt,whiletransferringtheproceedingsfromacourtinIndoretothefamilycourtatPannawherethewifewasresiding,commentedthattherewasnothingonrecordtoshowthattherewasdangertothelifeofthehusbandifhetravelstoPannatoattendthecourtproceedings.ThewifewasemployedinPannaandwasalsolookingafterhertwo-year-oldchildthere.

TheOrissaHighCourtinSujataMohantyv.RudraCharanMohanty,270rathercuriouslyhasgivenajudgmentwhichiscontrarytothisposition.Rejectingthewife’spetition,thecourtheldthatthefactthatthewifefeelsunsafetotravelaloneisnotasufficientground


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fortransferofthecase.

Thehighcourt’spoweroftransferislimited.Itcanonlytransfercasesfromacourtunderitsjurisdictiontoanothercourtoverwhichithasjurisdiction.InJencyElizebathPeterv.BijuThomas,271itwasheldthatthehighcourtofKeralalacksjurisdictiontotransferthecasefiledbythehusband,whichwaspendingbeforethefamilycourt,Ernakulam,tothefamilycourtatChennaiwherethewifewasresiding.But,consideringthefactthatthewifewasresidingwithhermotherinChennaiandhadathree-year-oldchild,thehighcourtdirectedthefamilycourtatErnakulamtoconsidertherequestmadebythewifeforexaminingherthroughacourtcommissioneratChennai.

TravellingExpensesForwomen,travellingexpensesalsobecomeanimportantaspectoflitigation.Unlesswomenareprovidedadequatetravellingexpenses,theymaynotbeinapositiontodefendthecasefiledbytheirhusbandsagainstthem.

AnimportantcaserelatingtotheissueoftravellingexpensesisAnitaLaxmiNarayanSinghv.LaxmiNarainSingh.272ThefamilycourtatBombayhadawardedaverylowamounttowardstravel,lodging,andotherexpenses,forthewifewhowasstayinginGhaziabad.Sincethismadeitimpossibleforthewifetotraveltodefendherself(p.184)duringlitigation,thehusbandwasabletosecureanexpartedecreeofdivorce.Whilesettingasidetheexpartedecreeofdivorce,theSupremeCourtpassedstricturesagainstthefamilycourtforitscallousnessinawardingsuchalowamountastravelexpenses.TheSupremeCourtalsotransferredtheproceedingsfromthefamilycourt,Bombay,tothedistrictcourt,Ghaziabad,fordisposalinaccordancewithlaw.Therespondent-husbandwasaskedtopaythecostoftheproceedingswhichwasquantifiedatRs5,000.

Ifthehusbandiswillingtopaythetravelcostsofthewoman,thecourtsmaynotpassanordertotransfertheproceedingsataplacewhichisconvenienttothewife.InTeenaChhabrav.ManishChhabra,273theSupremeCourtacceptedthehusband’soffertobeartheexpensesforthetravel,boarding,andlodging,ofthewifeanddismissedhertransferpetitionwhichwasfiledonthegroundthatshehadnosourceofincometotravel.Similarly,inKanagalakshmiv.A.Venkatesan,274theSupremeCourtacceptedthepleaofthehusbandthathewouldbeartheexpensesnotonlyforthewifebutalsohercompanionfortheirtravel,andstayattheplacewherethecasewaspendingand,accordingly,dismissedhertransferpetition.ThesameprinciplewasalsofollowedinM.Sivagamiv.R.Raja.275Whiledisallowingthetransferpetitionbasedonmonetarygrounds,theSupremeCourtdirectedthehusbandtopaythewife’slitigationcostsandalsohertravelcostsandexpensesalongwiththoseofherwitnesses.

DelayinFilingApplicationWhileawomanisexpectedtofileformaintenancewithinareasonableperiodafterthedesertion,thecourtswillnotrejectherapplicationmerelyonthegroundthattherewasdelayinfilinganapplicationformaintenance.Manytimes,womenwhoaredeserteddelayfilingformaintenanceinthehopethattheremaybeapossibilityofreconciliationand


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approachingthecourtsformaintenancemightenragetheirhusbandsandmartheirchancesofreconciliation.Thelegalentitlementforclaimingmaintenancearisesfromthedateoffilingtheapplicationandnotfromthedateofdesertion.Hence,thewomanwouldloseoutifaclaimformaintenanceisnotfiledsoonafterthedesertion.

Sincethehusbandislegallyobligatedtopaymaintenancetohiswife,non-paymentofmaintenanceisacontinuingoraninchoateoffence,andeverymonthwhenthehusbandfailsinhisobligationtomaintainthewife,anewrightiscreated.ItisinthiscontextthatinManglaDeviv.Baluram,276itwasheldthatthoughtheapplicationformaintenanceshouldbefiledwithinareasonabletime,nolimitationcanbeprescribedforthesame.Thecourtcommentedthatifthereisasatisfactoryexplanationforthedelay,theapplicationcannotberejectedmerelyonthegroundofdelay.Thewomanpleadedthatsinceherfatherwasinservicehehadmaintainedher,butafterhisretirementfromservicehewasnotinapositiontomaintainherand,henceshehadfiledanapplicationformaintenance.Itwasheldthatthedelaywassatisfactorilyexplained.

AsimilarlineofreasoningwasalsoadoptedinNirmalabaiv.Dr.Omprakash.277TheApplicantNo.1wasahousewifeignorantaboutthetechnicalitiesofthelaw,andtheApplicantNo.2wasaminorchild.Thecourtheldthatsufficientexplanationhadbeengivenforthedelay.StatingthattherevisioncourtcannottakeatechnicalviewofmatterignoringthefactthatSection125ofCr.PCisabenevolentprovision.InShobhav.KrushnakantPandya,278(p.185) therewasadelayoftwenty-fiveyearsinfilingtheapplicationformaintenance.Sinceherparentsweresupportingherandsinceshehopedforreconciliation,thewifehadnotapproachedthecourtsformaintenance.Acceptingthisexplanation,shewasawardedRs3000permonthasmaintenanceandsetasidetheorderofthefamilycourt,whchhadrejectedherapplication.InThakurVyasnarayanSinghv.Hemlata,279thewifewaslivingwithhermaternaluncleafterthedeathofherfather.Inviewofthis,itwasheldthattheinordinatedelayinfilingthepetitionhasbeencorrectlyexplained.Thecourtalsoobservedthatthewifehadnosourceofincomeandwasincapableofmaintainingherself.

Eveniftheapplicationwasdismissedonanearlieroccasion,asubsequentapplicationonanothergroundisnotbarredandthepetitionwillbeentitledtomaintenanceonthefreshground,ifshesucceedsinprovingthisground(PuliyullaChalilNarayanaKurupv.ThayyullaParabhathValsala).280

InterimMaintenanceThepurposeofawardinginterimmaintenanceandlitigationexpensesistoprovidetheclaimantbasicminimumfinancialsupportinordertosurviveandcarryonwiththelitigationprocess.Attimes,incontestedcases,thelitigationmaygoonforseveralyearsandthepartyclaimingmaintenancewillbesubjectedtogreathardshipsifinterimmaintenanceisnotawarded.Thecourtsareextremelycautiousifchildrenareinvolved,asintheinterveningperiodtheireducationandhealthmaysufferandthedamagewouldbeirreparablebythetimethecourtsdeliverthefinalverdictontheissue.

Anapplicationforinterimmaintenance(maintenancependentelite)canbefiledalongwith


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apetitionforamatrimonialrelieforafteracopyofthepetitionfiledbythehusbandformatrimonialreliefisservedonthewoman.ItcanalsobefiledalongwithanapplicationunderSection18ofHAMA,Section125ofCr.PC,orundertheDomesticViolenceAct.Itcanalsobefiledsubsequently,butbeforethetrialofthemainpetitioncommences.Theprovisionofinterimreliefisbasedonanurgencyandmustbedecidedexpeditiouslybeforetakingupothercontestedissues(SushilaVireshChaddvav.VireshNagshiChhadva).281

Evenwhenthestatutedoesnotexplicitlyprovideforit,thepowertoawardinterimmaintenancehasbeenreadintothepowerofthecourttodojustice.

InSavitriv.GovindSingh,282theSupremeCourtupheldthepowertoawardinterimmaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PCasfollows:‘Whileinterpretingtheprovision,ithadtobedoneinsuchamannersoasnottodefeattheobjectiveofthelegislation.Intheabsenceofanyexpressprohibition,theprovisionmustbeinterpretedastopaysomereasonablesumbywayofmaintenancetotheapplicantpendingfinaldisposaloftheapplication.ApplicationsunderSection125ofCr.PCtakeseveralmonthsbeforefinaldisposal.Inordertoenjoythefruitsoftheproceedings,theapplicanthastobealiveuntilthedateofthefinalorder.Inalargenumberofcases,thesameispossibleonlyifanorderforinterimpaymentofmaintenanceismade.Everycourt,therefore,mustbedeemedtopossess,bynecessaryintendment,all(p.186) suchpowersasarenecessarytomakeitsordereffective.’

InP.SrinivasaRaov.P.Indira,283theAndhraPradeshHighCourtexplainedtheinherentpowertograntinterimmaintenanceunderSection18ofHAMAasfollows:‘IndependentoftheinherentpowerofthecourtunderSection151ofCPC,evenundertheprovisionsoftheActitself,bynecessaryimplication,powerhasbeenconferredonthecourttograntinterimmaintenancetothewifeandminorchildrenwherecircumstancessowarrantandjustify,todojusticeonaprimafaciesatisfactionofthecaseonmerits.Insuchcases,thecourtcannotdeclinetograntinterimmaintenancependentelitetillthefinaladjudicationofthecontroversyonmerits.TheinherentpowersunderSection151ofCPCandthepowersconferredunderotherprovisionsofCPCareintendedtodocompletejusticebetweentheparties.Aconjointreadingoftheseprovisionsclearlydisclosesthattheyempowerthecourtstopassappropriateinterimordersasmayappeartothecourtsjustandconvenient,topreventjusticebeingdefeated.Theobjectoftheprovisionsistopreservetherightsofthepartiesatthesameplacetilltheircauseisadjudicated.Asamatterofprinciple,ifitisheldthatnointerimmaintenancecanbeawardedinmaintenanceproceedings,itcauseshardshiptothepartiesandinsomecasesthereisthepossibilitythatthemainreliefmayalsobecomeinfructuous,ifthepartyisnotabletomaintainherselfpendingproceedings.’

Ifthegroundforinterimmaintenanceismadeout,thecourtcannotimposeanyconditiononthespouseclaimingsuchmaintenance.Eveninapetitionfordivorcefiledbythehusbandonthegroundofwife’sadultery,thecourtcannotdismissthewife’sapplicationforinterimmaintenance.InDwarkadasGurmukhidasv.Bhanuben,284itwasheldthatitistherightofthewife,whoisunabletosupportherselffortheinterimperiod,toget


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maintenanceandthesameshouldbemadeavailabletoherwithoutanyreferencetoherconduct.InSarojDeviv.AshokPuri,285anorderimposingtheconditionthatthewifewouldundertaketorefundthealimony,iftheallegationsregardingherleadinganimmorallifewereproved,wasillegal.InBijalParagDavev.ParagLabhashankarDave,286itwasheldthatrefusaltoawardinterimmaintenancetothewifeonthegroundofmisconductisnotproper.InNeelamMalholtrav.RajinderMalhotra,287itwasheldthatrefusaltoawardinterimmaintenancebasedonhusband’sallegationsofgrossmisbehaviourandinfidelitywasimproperandthetrialcourtcouldnotgointotheallegationswhichwouldprejudicethemainissue.InJagirSinghv.JasbirKaur,288itwasheldthatdenialofinterimmaintenancejustonthebasisofsuchanallegationwouldnotbejustifieduntilandunlesstheallegationissubstantiatedbycogentevidence.

Evenwhenthevalidityofmarriageisdisputed,thecourtshavethepowertograntinterimmaintenance.Similarly,whenpaternityisdisputed,thecourtswillnotgointothelengthyquestionofdecidingpaternitywhileawardinginterimmaintenance.

TheDelhiHighCourt,inRajeshChaudharyv.NirmalaChaudhary,(discussedearlier)heldthatanestrangedwifeclaimingmaintenanceforherselfandherchildcannotbedeniedinterimmaintenancewhileawaitingtheresultsofcomplexDNAtestsfordeterminingtheissueofallegedillegitimacy.Sustenanceoftheminorchildanditsmother,educational,andother(p.187) householdexpensesdonotandcannotawaitthedecisionofthecourtonsuchacomplexissue.Thecourtdirectedthatinterimmaintenanceshouldbeorderedexpeditiously,iffoundpayable.

InBobbyPaulosev.RoniaMathew,289itwasheldthatwhiledecidingtheapplicationforinterimmaintenance,whichisasummaryproceeding,thecourtcannot,inanymanner,prejudicethewife’srights.TheKeralaHighCourtcommentedthatsincethematterwasbeingindefinitelyadjournedduetohusband’sinconveniencetoattendcourtproceedings,thefamilycourtadoptedarealisticapproachingrantinginterimmaintenancetothewife.

InSampaSahav.AmareshSaha,290itwasheldthatanorderrejectingtheprayerofinterimmaintenance,withoutassigninganyreasonandwithoutrecordinganysatisfactoryexplanationastowhyinterimmaintenancewasrefused,suffersfromseriousillegality.

Atthestageofawardinginterimmaintenancethecourtswillnotpermitthepartiestogointolengthylegalsubmissionsortocrossexamineeachother.Theapplicationforinterimmaintenancecanbedecidedbyaffidavitsoftheparties.

InRajeshBurmannv.MitulChatterjee(Burman),291theSupremeCourtupheldthegrantofmedicalexpensestothewifebywayofinterimrelief,andheldthattherewasnoinfirmityinthedecisionorinthereasoningwhileawardinginterimmaintenancetothewife.

Whileprotectingtherightsofwomen,children,andparentsforinterimmaintenance,thecourtshavealsoissuedacautionthatfabulousamountscannotbeawardedatthead-


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interimstageinexparteorderswithoutsubstantiveevidenceinsupportoftheclaimregardingtheincomeofthehusband(SaibalDeyv.ChaitaliDey).292

ThecourtsareempoweredtograntinterimmaintenanceundermatrimonialproceedingsevenifthewifeandchildrenhavebeenawardedmaintenanceinproceedingsunderSection125ofCr.PC.InAshokSinghPalv.Manjulata,293whileupholdingtherightofthewifetomaintenanceunderSection24ofHMAandunderSection125ofCr.PC,itwasheldthattheremediesunderbothsectionsareindependentofeachother.ThereisnorulethattheamountofmaintenancegrantedunderSection125ofCr.PCbeadjustedtowardstheamountgrantedunderHMA,orviceversa.ButacontraryviewhasbeenexpressedbytheBombayHighCourtinSanjayv.Swati294whichsetasidetheorderofthefamilycourtonthegroundthatitwaspassedwithouttakingintoconsiderationthehusband’sexistingliabilitytopaymaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PC.

Consideringtheurgencyofproceedingsforinterimmaintenance,thecourtsareboundtogiveshortdatestoavoiddelays.InSoniaKhuranav.State,295itwasheldthatthoughMagistratesareburdenedwithheavyworkandnormallyitisdifficultforthemtogiveshortdates,itwouldnotjustifygivingadateaftertenmonths.Thecourtsmustkeepinviewthenatureofproceedingsandwhenthereisurgency,shortdatesmustbegiven.Inthiscase,thepetitionersaredestitute,havingnomeansoflivelihood.TheyhadfiledanapplicationunderSection125ofCr.PCforinterimmaintenancetogetimmediatesupport.Suchapplicationsmustbedecidedwithoutanydelay.Thecourtcommentedthatissuingnoticeonpreliminary(p.188) hearingforadateaftertenmonthsisatravestyofjustice.

Whileawardinginterimmaintenance,thecourtsarealsoempoweredtoorderlitigationcoststotheclaimanttoenablehertogetadequatelegalassistance.WhileinRameshBabuv.Usha,296thehusbandchallengedRs2,500,awardedtothewifeaslitigationcost,onthegroundthatshecanavailoffreelegalaid.But,theMadrasHighCourtheldthattheclaimofadeservingpersonforinterimmaintenanceandlitigationexpensescannotberejectedonthegroundofavailabilityoffreelegalaid.Butatthesametime,inPritibenAcharyav.StateofGujarat,297theGujaratHighCourthasheldthatitisthedutyofthejudgesandadvocatestobringtothenoticeoflitigantstheirrighttofreelegalaid.

InJayaSanjivMehtav.SanjivBaldevMehta,thefamilycourt,whileawardinginterimmaintenancefromthedateoftheorder,assignednoreasonsastowhytheusualpracticeofawardingmaintenancefromthedateofapplicationwasnotfollowed.Thehighcourtsetasidethisorderandawardedmaintenancetothewifefromthedateoffilingtheapplicationforinterimmaintenance.Thecourtalsocommentedthatthesupertechnicalapproachadoptedbythefamilycourtofdemandingthatthewifeshouldgethertrainticketendorsedbytheconcernedsuperintendentorstationmasterisnotproper.OncethewifesatisfiesthecourtthatshehastravelledfromAgratoMumbaionavalidticketandtheticketbearsnameanddateofthetrain,sheisentitledtoclaimtravelallowance.

ProofofIncomeTheentirediscussiononmaintenancehingesonjustonefactor—whethertheapplicanthasbeenabletosecureafavourableorderofmaintenance,andtheamountwhichis


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awarded.Thereisnosetformulaforfixingtheamountofmaintenance.Withinastratifiedsociety,theamountwoulddependuponthefactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.Thecourtscannotbeexpectedtoadoptamechanicalapproachwhileinterpretingaprovisionoflawwhichisbasedonprinciplesofsocialjustice(PradeepKumarKapoorv.ShailjaKapoor),298andmuchwoulddependuponhumanitarianconcerns.Therelevantfactorsforconsiderationwouldbe:

1.Thestatusoftheparties;2.Theneedsoftheclaimants;3.Theincome,assets,andlifestyleofthehusband;4.Hisotherfinancialobligations;5.Thewife’sincomeandassets.

Theearliernotionofadoleforbaresurvivalhasgivenwaytothenotionofphysicalandemotionalwell-beingoftheclaimant.299Themaintenancewhichisawardedshouldsufficethewomantotakecareofherbasicneedssuchasfood,clothing,shelter,medicalexpenses,aswellastheexpensesofraisingherchildren,includingtheireducationalexpenses.

Fromtheearliernotionofawardingone-fifthoftheincome,thethumbrulenowistoawardone-thirdofthehusband’sincomeasmaintenancetothewife(Dineshv.Usha).300But,whilethisisthegeneralprinciple,ineachcasethe(p.189) courtisdutyboundtoenquireintotheactualearningsorincomeoftherespondent.Hence,theclaimantisexpectedtosubmitproofofincome,basedonwhichthecourtwilldeterminetheamountofmaintenance.

Itisratherironicthatmostwomenarenotabletoprovidethenecessaryproofasrequiredbyacourtoflaw.Womenlackbasicknowledgeregardingtheirhusbands’employment,income,assets,investments,bankaccounts,movableandimmovableproperty,agriculturalincome,orhusbands’shareintheHUFproperty.Duringthesubsistenceofmarriage,mostwomendonothaveeitheraccessoraninterestinthefinancialarrangementsoftheirhusbandsorthejointfamily.Theydon’thaveaccesstothedocumentssuchassalaryslips,bankpassbooks,receiptsoffixeddeposits,sharecertificates,propertycards,tenancyagreements,incometaxreturns,etc.Inaneconomicorderwhichthrivesonunaccountedmoney,provingactualincomeorassetsisadauntingtask,whichisbeyondmostdiligentandprudentwomen.Ontheotherhand,husbandspreferprotractedandexpensivelitigationratherthanconcedingtheclaimofmaintenance.Attimes,itbecomesamatternotjustoffinancialliabilitybutalsoofpersonalego.Defeatingtheclaimofmaintenance,throughadversarialproceedingsbecomesaretaliatorymeasuretosettlescoreswiththewife,whohasinitiatedlegalproceedingsagainstthem.Duetotheseconstraints,evenwhenwomendosucceedinsecuringanorderofmaintenance,theamountsawardedaremeagreandfarbelowtheexpectationsoftheclaimants.

Thechallengingtaskbeforethecourtistofindabalancebetweentheinflatedclaimsofwomenandthedeflateddisclosuresofincomebyhusbands.Inordertocircumventthis


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lacunaeregardingacceptablelegalproof,thecourtshaveevolvedcertainlegalmaximsfordeterminingtheamountofmaintenancewhichwouldbeequitable,just,andfairtothepartiesconcerned.Since,itisnotalwayspossibletoapplytheruleofbestevidenceinmaintenanceproceedings,thecourtswillrelyuponprobabilitieswhichwouldenlargethescopeofarrivingatreasonableinferences(PendiyalaSureshKumarRamaraov.SompallyArunbindu).301

Onebasiccriterionisthatofanable-bodiedmancapableofearningalivelihood.302Thecourtswillinvokethislegalpremiseifthehusbanddeclinestodisclosehisincome.Intheabsenceofevidence,thewife’ssubmissionswillbetakenintoconsiderationfordeterminingtheamount.

InAliHossainv.BabyFarida,303thewifewasawardedRs300permonthasmaintenanceforherselfandRs200permonthforeachofthetwochildren.Thehusbandworkedasarickshawpullerandcasuallabourer.Hechallengedtheorderonthegroundthattheamountwasexcessiveandpassedwithoutarealisticassessmentofhisincome.Thehighcourtheld:‘Thehusbandisanablebodied,young,healthyman,andadmitsthathehasaregularjobasarickshawpullerandcasuallabourer,buthedidnotcaretodiscloseevenhisaveragedailyincome.Thisomissiontodisclosehisincomeissufficienttowarrantaninferencethathehasthecapabilityofearningsufficientincome.’

InHaseenav.AbdulJaleel,304theKeralaHighCourtheldthatthesalarydrawnbythehusbandisafactwithinhisknowledge.Thewifecannotbefaultedfornotprovingit.Intheabsenceofevidencefromthehusband,theevidenceadducedbythewifeisaccepted.ThewifewasawardedRs2,50,000asreasonableandfairprovision,andmaintenance.

(p.190) InTabassumShaikhv.Sheikh,305thewifepleadedthatduetocrueltyandaccusationsofunchastitymadeagainsther,shewasterrifiedofreturningtohermatrimonialhome.Inherpleadingssheprovideddetailsofthehusband’spropertiesandbusiness.Thehusbanddidnotgivedetailsofhisincome.WhileawardingRs2,500permonthasmaintenancetoheritwasheldthatoncedetailsofpropertiesandbusinesshasspecificallybeenmentionedinthepetition,itwasforthehusbandtodisclosehisincomewhichhefailedtodo.

InJavedv.StateofUttaranchal,306wheretherewasnodocumentaryevidencetoprovethemonthlyincomeofthehusband,itwasheldthatnowadays,anordinarylabourerwhoworksonadailywagebasis,earnsaboutRs150perday.Hence,thecourtinferredthatthehusband’searningwouldbearoundRs4,000permonth.OnthisbasisRs1,500wasawardedasmaintenancetothewife.

InKishanDuttVermav.BabyParul,307thehusband,apracticingadvocate,hadasubstantiallegalpractice.Inaddition,healsoworkedasanoathcommissioner.HistotalincomewasassessedtobearoundRs10,000permonth.Thecourtcommentedthatassumingherequires50percentofthisamountforhimself,itwouldbeappropriateifhepaysthebalance50percenttowardsthemaintenanceofhiswifeandchildren.Theconductofthehusbandduringlitigationwasdeplorable.Hedidnotpaytheamount


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whichwasorderedbythetrialcourtandhisdefencewasstruckdown.Inthiscontext,thehighcourtmadethefollowingobservations:‘Theappellantisleastconcernedabouttheorderspassedbyanycourtandthinksthathecangetawaybyfloutingthemwithimpunity.Thisisunfortunate,inviewofthefactthattheappellantisanadvocate.’

Anothercriterionthatisoftenrelieduponisthestandardofliving.Whilethecriterionofanablebodiedmanwouldcometotherescueofwomenofthepoorersections,thestandardoflivingcriterionwillaidthewomenfromthemiddleandaffluentclasses.Thecourtshaveheldthatadivorcedorseparatedwomanisentitledtohavethesamestandardoflivingafterdivorceorseparation,assheenjoyedinhermatrimonialhome.InMeenuChoprav.DeepakChopra,308whileawardingRs20,000permonthasinterimmaintenance,thecourtheldthatifthehusbandiswealthyandisleadinganopulentlife,hiswifealsohastherighttobeapartnerinhisprosperity.Toarriveatthisfigure,thecourt,primafacie,reliedupontheavermentsmadebythewifethatthehusband’sincomeisaroundRs200,000permonth.

Whileapplyingthesamestandardformula,thecourtswilltakeintoconsiderationtheimmovableproperty,andincomefromfamilybusinessandagriculturalpropertyjointlyownedbythehusbandandhisfamilyasHUFproperty,typeofresidentialpremisesormatrimonialhome,membershipstoexclusiveclubs,numberofcars(orothervehicles),andtypesofcarsownedindividuallybythehusbandortheentirefamily,paymentsmadethroughcreditcards,andtheelectricalandelectronicgadgets.Thesewouldbefairlygoodindicatorsofthelifestyleenjoyedbythehusband.

Followingaresomeotherrulesthathavebeenevolvedthroughjudgemadelaws:Incomeofthehusbandfromthejointfamilybusinessshouldbetakenintoaccounttodeterminethestatusofthehusbandandforfixingthequantumofmaintenance(NeelamMalholtrav.RajinderMalhotra).309(p.191) Ifthehusbanddoesnotdisclosetheincomeearnedfromjointfamilybusiness(Dharamichandv.SobhaDevi)310orattemptstoconcealhistrueincome(JasbirKaurSehgalv.DistrictJudge,Dehradun)311adverseinferenceaboutthesamemaybedrawn,basedonthewife’spleadings.Thehusbandcannottakeadvantageofheavydeductionsfromhissalarywhichisvoluntaryinnature(SawinderjitSinghv.KuldipKaur).312

InHarminderKaurv.SukhwinderSingh,313thewifepleadedthatherhusbandownedtwobusinessesandhisincomewasnotlessthanRs12,000permonth.Commentingthatthewifewasentitledtohavethesamestandardoflivingasherhusband,thecourtawardedRs4,800permonthtothewifeandRs2,400permonthtothechild.

InD.N.NiranjanKaniv.N.Rajee,314thewifewaslivingwithherparentsandshehadnoseparateincomeofherown.Shewasalsolookingaftertwominordaughters.Thefinancialandsocialstatusofthefamilieswasnotindisputeandthehusbandwasleadingacomfortablelife.Itwasheldthattomaintainherselfinthesamestandardasherhusband,thewifewouldrequireRs10,000permonth.Inaddition,thetwodaughterswereawardedRs5000permontheach,towardstheirexpenses.InSushilKumarGuptav.ReenaGupta,315thepartnershipbusinessinwhichthehusbandwasinvolvedhada


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turnoverofapproximatelyRs2crore.HealsoownedanagencyofluxurycoachesandcarsfromwherehegeneratedanincomeofaroundRs4to5crore.ThewifewasearningRs6,000throughatemporaryjob.ThehighcourtupheldRs20,000permonthawardedtoherasmaintenancebythetrialcourt.

InIndiraSontiv.SuryanarayanaSonti,316thehusbandfailedtoprovideproofofhissalary,income,andexpenditure.ThecourtawardedUS$400permonthasreasonablemaintenance,andheldthatinthecourseofthelitigationhusbandhadadmittedthathisannualsavingswerearoundUS$9000.InRadhikaRungtav.VineetRungta,317thehusbandwaswellqualifiedandgainfullyemployedintheUSA.ThecourtarrivedatapresumptionthathisincomewouldbeUS$70,000perannum.ThecourtheldthateveniftheincomeisinferredatalowerlevelofUS$50,000thewifewouldbeentitledto20percentofthisamount.ConvertedintoIndiancurrencyitwouldamounttoapproximatelyRs5,00,000.ThewifewasearninganominalincomeofRs5000.ItwasheldthatapersonfromhersocialstatuswouldrequireRs20,000permonthformeetingroutineexpenditure.Takingintoconsiderationherownincome,shewasawardedRs15,000permonthasmaintenance.

InMukeshMittalv.SeemaMittal,318thecourtarrivedatapresumptionthatthehusbandwasearningRs30,000bywayofrentfromeightflats.Thehusbanddidnotproducehistaxreturns.Thecourtcommentedthatthisfactordemonstratesthathewasnotwillingtodisclosehistrueincome.Butonthecontrary,heproducedtheincometaxreturnsofhiswifetoprovethatshehadsufficientincome.HealsopleadedthatthewifeisnotentitledtomaintenanceassheisHIVpositive,thereby,imputingadultery.ItwasheldthatthefactthatthewifeandtheminordaughterareHIVpositivecannotbeused(p.192) todenythemmaintenance.Thewifepleadedthatshehadcontactedthediseasethroughbloodtransfusionduringherpregnancy.Shealsosubmittedthattheincometaxreturns,relieduponbyherhusband,werefiledbythehusbandhimselfonherbehalfandisnotareflectionofherownincome.ThehighcourtupheldthemaintenanceofRs6000permonthtothewifeandRs4000permonthtothedaughter.

InSanjayKapoorv.MeenakshiKapoor,319thehusbandapproachedthehighcourtonthegroundthattheamountawardedasmaintenancewasexcessive.ButupholdingtheorderofRs10,000permonthawardedtothewifeandchildtogetherandlitigationexpensesofRs11,000,theDelhiHighCourtcommentedthatthedistrictjudgewasrightindisbelievingthehusbandregardinghisavermentsthathisearningsareonlyaroundRs10,000permonth.ThecourtcommentedthatthehusbandspendsRs5,500permonthonhouserent,heistheownerofaplotofland,hepossessesthreeFDRs,heistheownerofaMarutiZencar,andheusesamobilephone.320Onthisbasis,hisincomewasassessedatRs25,000.

InKiranSejwalv.YeshDevSinghSejwal,321thehusbandwasresidingintheNetherlandsandheinitiateddivorceproceedingsathisplaceofresidence.ThewifeinitiatedcriminalproceedingsunderSections406and498AofIPCagainstthehusband,hisparents,andrelatives.Shealsofiledapetitionforrestitutionofconjugalrightsandclaimedinterimmaintenance.Shepleadedthatthehusbandwasemployedasamanager


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inaGermanfirmandwasdrawingmorethanRs1,50,000permonth,andwasalsorunningahotel.HistotalincomewasRs2,50,000permonth.Thehusbanddeniedtheseallegationsandalsodeniedthatshewashislegallyweddedwife.Heallegedthatthewomanandherparentshadtrappedhimandhisfamilyforgreedandsoughtannulmentofmarriage.Consideringallegationsandcounterallegations,thebackgroundofthefamilies,thestatusoftheparties,theperiodtheyhadlivedtogether,etc.,asumofRs20,000permonthwasawardedasinterimmaintenancetothewifeandRs10,000aslitigationexpenses.

Whilesuppressingincometaxreturnsadverseinferencecanbedrawn,thecourtshavealsoheldthatthesearenottrueindicatorsofaperson’sincomeandcannotbethesoleguidefordeterminingthetrueincome.322InBharatHegdev.SarojHegde,323itwasheldthatincaseofself-employedpersonsorpersonsemployedintheunorganizedsector,taxcomplianceisanexceptionandtaxavoidanceisanorm,and,therefore,ineachcasethecourthastocarefullyverifywhethertheincomedisclosedistruthfulandaccurate.Inthisrespect,thefollowingobservationsweremade:

Unfortunately,nobodypayspropertaxestotheGovernment.Selfemployedpersonsseldomdisclosetheirtrueincome.Prudenceandworldlywisdomgainedbyajudge,beforewhomcitizensofallstrataofsocietylitigate,canalwaysbeusedbyajudgetoascertainastowhatisgoingoninsociety.Bynomeanscanthesaidknowledgebeusedwherethelawrequiresafacttobeconclusivelyproved.Butwherethelawrequiresajudgetoformanopinionbasedonahostofprimarydata,ajudgecanformulateanopinionpertainingtothelikelyincomefromthecapitalassetofthehusband.

Thewifepleadedthatherhusbandwasthesonofanex-ChiefMinister,anindustrialist,(p.193) andco-ownerinvariousproperties.Thecourtcommentedthatkeepinginviewthecapitalassetsowned/co-ownedbythehusband,hissocialstatus,andplaceofresidenceitisdifficulttobelievethathedoesnothavetherequisitemeanstoprovidehiswifeamonthlymaintenanceofRs25,000.ThehusbandwasalsodirectedtopayRs25,000ascostoflitigation.

InGauravNagpalv.SumedhaNagpal,324thecourtupheldthegrantofRs25,000,whichwasawardedtothewifeasmaintenance,onthegroundthattheamountwasnotunrealisticorarbitrary.Thecourtcommentedthattherewassubstantialmaterialtodisapprovetheincomedisclosedbyhusbandinhisincometaxreturns.Itwasnotedthatthehusbandhadsustainablemeansandwaslivingaluxuriouslife.Hewasresidinginasprawlinghousewhilethewifewasresidinginmodestflatalongwithherparents.ThehusbandwasspendingaroundRs10,000permonthonhisson’seducationinaprivateschool.Heownedsubstantialimmovableproperties,buthedidnotdisclosethedetailsofhisassetsandincomefromtheHUFpropertyofwhichhewasacoparcener.

Inthecontextofappraisingthetaxreturn,itwasnotedthatSections56and57oftheIndianEvidenceActempowersthecourtstotakejudicialnoteofallmattersofpublichistory,literature,scienceorarts.Hence,whiledeterminingtheincome,courtscantake


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intoaccountthesocialandeconomicills,andunethicalmalpracticesprevailinginsociety.Thehighcourtcommentedthatrecognitionoffactswithoutformalproofisamatterofexpediency.Theneedandwisdomtorecognizeandacceptfactsinpublicknowledgeisunquestionable.RelyingonBharatHegde(citedearlier),itwasheldthatthecourtsinIndiaareconsciousofthefactthatthereisatendencyamongpartiesnottodisclosetruly,fully,andcompletely,theirincome.Theamountawardedshouldbesufficienttoenablethewifetoliveinsomewhatthesamedegreeofcomfortaswasavailabletoherinhermatrimonialhome.Butitshouldnotbeexorbitantandsohighthatthehusbandisunabletopayandisexposedtocontemptorothercoerciveproceedings.

S.S.Bindrav.Tarvinder325hasintroducedanotherprincipleofawardingmaintenancewhichisbasedonpercentageofincome.Thecourtorderedthat60percentofpayandallowanceasmaintenancetothewifeandchildren,andthehusbandwasallowedtoretainthebalance40percent.Thecourtdiscardedtheformulathatthewifeshouldberetainedatthesamestandardoflifewhichsheenjoyedatthetimeofherseveranceasbeingunfair.Thiswouldrestricttheprayerformaintenanceinamindlessmannertowhathasbeenmadeyearsearlier.Itwasnotedthatordersshouldbepassedkeepingthepresentinperspective,andbringaboutjusticebetweenparties.Mostoften,thecourtsdonotgrantexactlywhatisprayedfor,butawardanamountwhichismuchless.Bythatveryyardstickthecourtisalsonotprecludedtograntmore,ifcircumstanceswarrantthesame.ThehusbandhadstatedthathewasdrawingasalaryofRs29,000permonth.ButthisstatementdidnotinspireanyconfidencesinceaccordingtohisownadmissionhewasspendingaroundRs45,000permonthonhimself.ThetrialcourtconcludedthatheisearningasumofRs1,30,000permonth.Inordertoenablethewifeandchildrentoliveinthesamestatusinwhichthehusbandwasliving,thetrialcourtawardedRs75,000permonthasmaintenanceandRs1,00,000towardslitigationexpenses.

Whileupholdingawoman’srightforadequatemaintenance,thecourtswilldeclinethe(p.194) woman’sclaimtoalifeofluxury.326Gradually,thecourtsaremovingawayfromtheconceptofaperenniallydependentwifeincapableofearningalivingandhavestartedtakingnoteofthefactthatalargenumberofwomenareholdingresponsiblepositionsinthecorporatesectorandarecapableofearningandmaintainingthemselves.Hence,thewoman’seducationalqualificationsandearningcapacityisalsokeptinviewwhileawardingmaintenance.

DatefromwhichMaintenanceistobeAwardedWhethermaintenanceistobepaidfromthedateoffilingorfromthedateoftheorderisanissuewhichvastlyimpactstheactualamountwhichawomanwillreceivesinceapplicationsareheardseveralyearsaftertheyarefiled.Theearliernormwastoawardmaintenancefromthedateoftheorder,exceptinexceptionalsituations.Insuchacase,thecourtwoulduseitsdiscretionandrecordreasonsfordeviatingfromthenorm.Ifthehusbandisguiltyofcausingundueharassmenttothewife,thecourtswillgrantmaintenancefromthedateofapplication.

Forinstance,inKamalKishorev.StateofUP,327thehusbandhadlevelledchargesofadulteryagainsthiswifewithoutprovingthesameinthecourt.TheAllahabadHighCourt


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commentedthatrecklesschargesofacorruptlifeagainstthewifearelevelledwithoutanyhesitationbyhusbands.Suchaconductisincomprehensibleandthispracticeneedstobedeprecated.Ifsuchchargesarelevelledandnotproved,itcannotbesaidthatthecourthasfixedmaintenanceallowancefromthedateofapplicationwithoutgivingappropriatereasons.Todiscouragesuchpractices,thetrialcourtheldthatifthechargeofadulterycouldnotbeproved,thenmaintenancewouldbefixedfromthedateofapplication.Hence,thewifewasawardedmaintenanceofRs350fromthedateofapplication.

InRamNandanSaov.StateofBihar,328thewifewasawardedRs500asmaintenancefromthedateoforder.Inappeal,thesessionscourtdirectedthattheamountbepaidfromthedateofapplication.Thehusbandfiledanappealinthehighcourtcontendingthatthewifeisnotentitledtomaintenanceassheislivinginadulteryand,further,thattheamountofRs500wasexcessive,andthattheorderdirectingpaymentoftheamountfromdateofapplicationwasunjustandagainstthestipulatedprovisionsoflaw.Thecourtrejectedthecontentionsofadulteryandupheldthelowercourt’sorder.However,itheldthatthesessionscourt,inrevision,hadnopowertoordermaintenancefromthedateofapplication.Theissueofawardingmaintenancefromthedateofapplicationordateoforderislefttothediscretionofthemagistrate.

AcontraryviewisheldinNithaRanjanChakrabortyv.KalpanaChakraborty,329wheretherewasadelayofsevenyearsindecidingtheapplication.Themagistrateawardedmaintenancefromthedateoforder,butinappeal,thesessionscourtreverseditandawardedmaintenancefromthedateofapplication.Butthecourtdidnotgiveadetailedreasoningforthesame.Whileupholdingthesessionscourtorder,theCalcuttaHighCourtheldthatwhileitwasnecessaryforthecourtadoptingsuchcoursetogivereasons,theomissiontogivereasonisanactofimproprietyanddoesnotrendertheorderillegal.

InAmeenKhanv.StateofRajasthan,330whereadivorcecaseremainedpendingforaperiodof(p.195) nineyearsandtheminordaughterwassufferingasaresultofthisdelay,thecourtdirectedmaintenancetobegrantedtothewifefromthedateofapplication.

Gradually,takingintoaccountthehardshipscausedtowomenandchildrenduetoinordinatedelaysincourts,thejudicialapproachbegantochangeand,inmostcases,thecourtsstartedawardingmaintenancefromthedateofapplication.Overtime,thishasbecomeanorm,andcourtsbegantoholdthatifmaintenanceisawardedfromthedateoforderreasonsshouldberecordedfordeviatingfromthenorm.

InS.Jayanthiv.S.Jayaraman,331thecourtheldthatalimonyshouldbedecidedattheearliestkeepinginmindtheneedsofthewifeandmaintenanceshouldbegrantedfromthedateofapplicationandnotfromdateoforder,exceptinexceptionalcases.

InDeepav.Nandkishore,332whileawardingmaintenancefromthedateofapplicationinacaseunderSection125ofCr.PC,thehighcourtheldthatsincetheprovisionof


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maintenancehasbeenenactedforthebenefitofthedestitutewifeandchildrensoastopreventvagrancy,thecircumstancesdidnotwarrantadeparturefromtheestablishednormofawardingmaintenancefromthedateofapplication.Thehighcourtalsocommentedthatthetrialcourthadnotexercisedanydiscretionandthatthediscretionofthesessionscourtinthematterwasnotsound.

InPopriBaiv.TreethSingh,333acaseunderHMA,theRajasthanHighCourtreversedtheinterimorderofmaintenanceunderSection24oftheAct,whichawardedmaintenancefromthedateoforder,andheldthatthereisnojustificationfornotawardinginterimmaintenancefromthedateofapplication.Thecourtcommentedthatiftheorderofthetrialcourtwasallowedtostand,itwillcauseseriousprejudicetothewife.InFaniBhusanNandav.KshitiSundariNanda,334acaseunderSection18ofHAMA,itwasheldthattheorderofmaintenancewaseffectivefromthedateofapplication,unlesstherewascontrarydirectionofthecourtthatitwastobeawardedfromthedateoforder.

Morerecently,in2008,[email protected],335itwasheldthatmaintenanceoughttobegrantedfromthedateofapplicationanditisnotnecessarytorecordspecialreasons.Similarly,inVinodKumarJollyv.SunitaJolly,336itwasheldthatthenormalrulewhileawardingmaintenanceunderSection18ofHAMAistograntmaintenancefromthedateoffiling.Noreasonshavebeengivenbythetrialcourtastowhydirectionisgiventopaymaintenancefromthedateoforderandnotfromthedateoffilingofthepetition.Thecourtcommentedthatifthenormalruleistobedeviated,therehastobespecialreasonsforadoptingsuchacourse.

Whileseveraljudgmentshaveendorsedthisposition,therearestillinstanceswherethecourtsconsiderthatasanormalrule,maintenanceshouldbeorderedfromthedateoftheorderandonlyinspecialsituationsitcanbeorderedfromthedateofapplicationafterrecordingreasons.Forinstance,inA.Jairamv.A.Suman,337itwasheldthatinterimmaintenancecanbegrantedfromthedateofapplicationonlyifthesameisspecificallypleaded.Inanotherrecentcase,Gayatriv.OmPrakash,338theRajasthanHighCourtheldthatwhilegrantingmaintenancefromthedateofapplication,theMagistrateoughttorecordreasonsforthesame,(p.196) therebyimplyingthatsuchanordercanbepassedonlyifthefactsofthespecificcasemeritit,andifthewifehasnoothermeansofincomeduringthependencyofthecase.InParamveerSinghv.SureshKanwar,339itwasheldthatifmaintenanceisgrantedfromdateofapplicationandnotfromthedateoforder,reasonsaretoberecordedbycourtforthesame.

Aswecanobservefromtheabovediscussion,thejudicialambiguityregardingthisissuecontinues.Hence,itisprudenttokeepthisissueinmindatthetimeofarguments.

Non-ComplianceoftheOrder:DefencetobeStruckDownIntheeventthatthehusbandrefusestocomplywiththeorderofinterimmaintenance,thecourtcanstrikeoutthehusband’sdefence,whenheistherespondent,orbydismissinghispetition,whenheisthepetitioner(GhasiramDasv.ArundhatiDas).340InBaniv.PrakashSingh,341upholdingthetrialcourtorderofstrikingdownthedefence,it


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washeldthattherecanbenodoubtthatthedefiantconductofthehusbandmustbedealtwithsternlybydismissinghisapplication,orstrikingoutthedefenceofthedefaulter.

InS.L.Sehgalv.StateofDelhi,342whilequashingthepetitionfiledbythehusband,thecourtcommentedthatthemultipleproceedingsinitiatedbythehusbandamountedtoabuseoftheprocessoflaw.Byfilingonepetitionafteranother,thehusbandhadsuccessfullycircumventedtheorderofthetrialcourtdirectinghimtopaymaintenanceofRs250permonthtohiswife.Itwasheldthatthehusbandwastakingundueadvantageofthesituation.Thecourtcommentedthatanyfurtherindulgencetothepetitionerwouldleadtoseriousmiscarriageofjustice,andorderedthehusbandtodepositthearrearsofmaintenance.

InSantoshSehgalv.MurariLalSehgal,343whilequashingtheappealfiledbythehusband,itwasheldthatthefailuretopaymaintenancetothewife,asawardedbythecourt,willdisentitlethehusbandfromclaiminganyreliefinmatrimonialproceedings.Itwasfurtherheldthattheappealagainstthedivorcedecree,grantedtothehusband,canbeallowedwithoutgivinganyopportunitytothehusbandtodefendhimself,intheeventofhisfailingtopayinterimmaintenanceandlitigationexpensesgrantedtothewifeduringpendencyoftheappeal.

InMahadevanaikav.Shivakumar,344inarevisionpetitionfiledagainsttheorderofmaintenance,thecourtgrantedstayofrecoveryof50percentofthearrearsofmaintenanceuntilthedisposaloftherevisionpetition,butorderedthehusbandtodeposittheother50percentwhichwasnotcoveredbythestay.Butwhenthehusbandfailedtodepositthesaidamount,thepetitionwasdismissedbyimposingexemplarycostsofRs5,000.Thecourtcommentedthatthehusbandusedthejudicialprocessonlyasarusetoavoidpaymentofmaintenance.Thecourtfurthercommentedthatthehusband,whowaseconomicallyinamuchbetterposition,wastakingadvantageofhispositiontoharassanddeprivethewifeandchildrenevenofthemeagresustenancethattheyhadsecuredthroughtheorder.

Theprovisionofstrikingdownthedefenceisavailableonlyincivilproceedingsandnotforproceedingsundercriminalstatutes.TheBombayHighCourt,inVinodv.Chhaya,345(p.197) hasheldthatifthehusbanddefaultsinpaymentofmaintenance,theonlycourseopentothecourtistoissueanarrestwarrantundertheprovisionsofSection125(3)ofCr.PCforlevyingamountdue.

Wife’sClaimwhenHusband’sPetitionisDismissedWhenthepetitionfordivorcefiledbythehusbandiseitherdismissedorwithdrawn,theInterimApplicationandCounterClaimfiledbythewifeformaintenancedoesnotsurvive.AnyorderofInterimMaintenancepassedbythetrialcourtwillalsolapse.TheoptionopenforawifeistofileunderSection125ofCr.PC.AHinduwifeisalsoentitledtofileformaintenanceunderSection18ofHAMA.

BeforetheSupremeCourtrulinginChandDhawanv.JawaharlalDhawan(discussed


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later),therewereconflictingviewsonthisissuebetweenvarioushighcourts.TheGujarat,Calcutta,andAllahabadHighCourts,hadheldthattheexpression‘anydecree’underSection25(provisionforpermanentalimonyandmaintenance)oftheHinduMarriageAct,doesnotincludeanorderofdismissal(Harilalv.Lilavati;Minaraniv.Dasarath;VinodChandraSharmav.RajeshPathak).346ButtheBombayHighCourt,inShantaramv.Hirabai347andModilalKalaramjiJainv.LakshmiModilalJain348hadheldthattheterm‘anydecree’usedinSection25oftheActwouldincludeanorderrefusingtograntamatrimonialrelief.

ThispositionwasoverruledbytheapexcourtinChandDhawanv.JawaharlalDhawan.349TheSupremeCourtclarifiedthattheclaimtopermanentalimonyunderSection25ofHMAisbasedontheprinciplethatthereisadisruptionofthemaritalstatus.Sincethecourtisseizedofthematterofdecidingthemaritalstatusoftheparties,italsoacquiresthepowertoinvokeitsancillaryorincidentalpowertograntpermanentmaintenanceoralimony.Thecourtalsoretainsthispowersubsequently,tomodifyitsownorderwhenanapplicationismovedbyeitheroftheparties,inviewofchangedcircumstances.Thus,theentireexerciseiswithinthegamutofamarriagethathasbrokendown.Butifthereisnodivorceoranyotherdecree,thewifeisentitledtoliveseparately,butherclaimformaintenancedoesnotliewithinthescopeofHMA.Thewife’sclaimofmaintenancehastobeagitatedundertheHinduAdoptionsandMaintenanceAct,1956.Subsequently,inVishnuMayekarv.LaxmiMayekar,350theBombayHighCourtfollowedthisrulingandheldthatwhenapetitionfordivorceisdismissed,maintenanceunderSection25ofHMAcannotbegranted.TheremedyforthewifeliesunderSection125ofCr.PCorunderSection18ofHAMA.

Ratherironically,thepositionupheldbytheSupremeCourtcausesmorehurdlesinthepathofwomenclaimingmaintenanceandalsoleadstomultiplicityofproceedings.Thereareinstanceswherethehusbandswithdrawthepetitionfordivorcefiledbythemwhenanorderofinterimmaintenanceispassedinfavouroftheirwives,onlytodefeatthewomen’sclaims.Womenarethenleftwithnootherchoicebuttoinitiatefreshproceedings,eitherunderSection125ofCr.PCorunderSection18ofHAMA,whichcausesconsiderablehardships,monetaryburdenanddelay.

ExecutionProceedingsExecutionofanorderofmaintenanceisnextinpriorityonlytosecuringafavourableorder.(p.198) Withoutstringentandviableenforcementmachinery,theorderobtainedthroughastrenuousordealandprolongedlitigationwillremainasapaperdecreewithoutanyrelevanceorsignificancetowomen’slives.

Whenthepersonagainstwhomamaintenanceorderhasbeenobtaineddefaultsinpaymentordoesnotcomplywiththeorder,theclaimantwillhavetoinitiateyetanotherlegalproceedingtoexecutethedecreeorenforcetheorder.Atthisstage,thecourtbattlestartsalloveragain,totheutterdismayofwomen(orchildren,orparents,asthecasemaybe).Theproceduresforenforcingacivilandacriminalorderofmaintenancearenotidentical.Thereisaslightvariationbetweenthetwo.Theordersobtained,undertheHMAandHAMA,areordersofacivilnature,whiletheorderunderSection125of


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Cr.PCisofacriminalnature.

Incivilproceedings,theorderofmaintenancecanbeexecutedbyattachingthesalary,orattachmentandsaleofmoveableorimmovableproperty.TheorderunderSection125Cr.PCcanbeenforcedbyanarrestwarrantandimprisonment.Theattachmentofsalarybecomesthemostfeasibleandcertainwayofensuringpaymentofarrearsofmaintenanceforthesalariedclass.Maintenancecanalsobeachargeonproperty.Butthecourtshaveheldthatadecreerestrainingthedefendantfromalienatingthepropertyisnotvalid(P.M.Devassiav.Ancy).351

InRukhsanaKachwalav.SaifuddinKachwala,352thehusbandagreedtopayasumofRs2,00,000asdivorcesettlement,butdefaultedinpayment.Inordertoensureexecutionofthedecree,thecourtheldtheplaintiffasdecreeholdersandheldthatshewasentitledfortheappointmentofareceiverandthesaleofthehusband’sshop.InBinaMajumderv.RanjitMajumder,353thesubsistenceofdivorceproceedingsinstitutedbythehusband,whowasaClassIVGovernmentemployee,wasstayedfornon-complianceoftheorderofinterimmaintenanceandcostsoflitigation.Inexecution,thecourtorderedsalaryattachment.InRajendraPrasadPaul@RajendraPalv.StateofJharkhand,354thecourtissueddirectionstodeductthearrearsofmaintenancefromthehusband’sG.P.F.(GeneralProvidentFund)accountanddepositthesameinthenameofthewifeandchild.

InAbdusSovanv.RokiaBibi,355itwasheldthatthemerefilingofanapplicationforsettingasideanexparteorderofmaintenancecannotbeusedasagroundtograntthestayonexecutionproceeding.

InManiv.Jaykumari,356theMadrasHighCourthasheldthatfuturesalarycanbeattached.Thehusbandhadchallengedtheorderofattachmentonthegroundthatfuturesalarycannotbeattached.ButthehighcourtheldthatunderboththeCivilProcedureCodeaswellastheCriminalProcedureCode,thecourtshavethepowertoattachfuturesalary.Thecourtcrypticallycommentedthatthelawcannotexpectadestitutewomantoapproachthecourteachmonthforexecutionofthemonthlymaintenancewhichisduetoher.

Theliabilityofthehusbandtocomplywiththemaintenanceorderdoesnotceaseuponthedeathofthehusband.Itcanbeexecutedagainstthelegalheirs.TheSupremeCourtinaleadingcase,ArunaBasuMullickv.DorotheaMitra,357heldthattheassetsleftbehindbythehusbandareliabletobeproceededagainstinthehands(p.199) ofhislegalheirsforsatisfactionofthedecreeformaintenance.

InNagammav.Ningamma,358itwasheldthatthereisnorationalityinthecontentionthatadecreeformaintenanceoralimonygetsextinguishedwiththedeathofthehusbandwhenanyotherdecree,eventhoughnotchargedonthehusband’sproperty,doesnotgetsoextinguished.Itisoneofthesettledprinciplesofinterpretationthatthecourtshouldleaninfavourofsustainingadecreeandshouldnotpermitthebenefitunderthedecreetobelost,unlesstherearespecialreasonsforit.Ifthehusbandhasleftbehind


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anestateatthetimeofhisdeath,therecanbenojustificationfortheviewthatthedecreeiswipedoutandtheheirswouldsucceedtothepropertywithouttheliabilityofsatisfyingthedecree.Thedecreeindicatesthatmaintenancewaspayableduringthelifetimeofthewidow.Tomakesuchadecreecontingentuponthelifeofthehusbandiscontrarytothetermsandthespiritofthedecree.

InPavitrav.ArunVarma(Decd.)ThroughL.Rs,359thecourtcommentedthatthetendencyofclosingproceedingsabruptly,withoutdueapplicationofjudicialmind,needstobeabandonedandsincereeffortsneedtobemadeforinvokingtherelevantlegalprovisionsinaidofthepoorlitigantswhoareapproachingthecourtsforenforcementsoftheirrights.

Incasetheordercannotbeexecutedbywayofsalaryorpropertyattachment,itisalsopossibletoobtainanorderofimprisonment.Theonlysnaginpressingforcivilimprisonmentisthattheclaimantisexpectedtopayforthecostofthisimprisonment.Thisstipulationrenderstheremedy,toenforcethemaintenanceorderspassedbythecourt,outofreachofpoorwomenwhoarealreadyburdenedwithcomplicatedlitigationtoenforcetheorders.Thisisatravestyofjustice.Inthiscontext,theremedyunderSection125ofCr.PCappearstobemorefeasible,especiallyaftertheceilinghasbeenremovedsincetheimprisonmentunderthisprovisionisgovernedbycriminallawandhencetheapplicantisnotundertheburdenofbearingthecostofimprisonment.Itbecomestheresponsibilityofthestatetobearthisexpense.

ButapartfromexecutionproceedingsprovidedforunderSection18ofHAMAthepetitioncanalsoapproachthecourtincontemptproceedings.InAmitaDevnaniv.BhagwanDevnani,360theBombayHighCourtheldthatnon-paymentofmaintenanceamountsawardedunderSection18ofHAMAamountstoContemptofCourtandhencethepowerofthecourtforexercisingthealternateremedyofimprisonmentundertheContemptsofCourtActtorecovertheamountisnotousted.Thehighcourtcommented:‘Theconductofthehusbandissoreprehensiblethatthesamedeservesimpositionofmaximumpunishmentprovidedbylaw.Therewasnoreasonforthehusbandtodragtheproceedingsforsolongwithoutofferingevenasinglerupeetillnow.Theattitudeofthehusbandwasthatheshallnotpayanyamounttothepetititionerevenifitisinutterdisregardoftheorderofthecourt.’Butwhileimposingthesentence,thecourtexpressedsomeleniencyandvariedtheorderfor60days,withdirectionstothehusbandtoclearthearrearswithinthestipulatedperiod,failingwhichtheorderofcivilimprisonmentofsixmonthswouldbecomeoperational.

Thepowerofthecriminalcourttoarrestinexecutionproceedingsactsasadeterrent(p.200) againstnon-paymentofmaintenance.Butthepoweriscurtailedbythestipulationunder125(3)ofCr.PCwhichlaysdownthatamagistratecanorderimprisonmentofonlyonemonth.InShahadaKhatoonv.AmjadAli,361theSupremeCourtheldthatthelanguageofSection125(3)isquiteclearanditcircumscribesthepowerofthemagistratetoimposeimprisonmentforatermwhichmayextendtoonemonthoruntilthepayment,ifsoonermade.Butforafurtherbreachoftheorder,theclaimantcanapproachtheMagistrateagainforasimilarrelief.Thisrulingwasfollowedby


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varioushighcourts—thePunjabandHaryanaHighCourtinAngrejSinghv.StateofPunjab,362theAndhraPradeshHighCourtinAbdulGafaoorv.HameemaKhatoon,363andtheMadrasHighCourtinMahboobBashav.Nannima.364

TheKeralaHighCourt,inAloraSundaranv.MammaliSumathi,365hasgivenadifferentinterpretationtotheprovisionaswellastotheSupremeCourtrulinginShahadaKhatoon(discussedabove).R.BasantJ.oftheKeralaHighCourtcommented:

ThestatutoryprovisionsunderSection125(3)ofCr.PCmakeitveryclearthatonemonth’simprisonmentisthemaximumimprisonmentforeachmonth’sdefaultateachtime.Thismustleadtotheinevitableandunmistakableconclusionthateachmonth’sdefaultwouldbevisitedwiththemaximumsentenceofonemonth’simprisonment.Themerefactthatthedestitutehasnotchosentocomplaineverymonthandhaschosentocomplainofthebreachinrespectofpluralityofmonthsinonepetitionwithinaperiodoftwelvemonths,cannotatalldelivertothedefaulteranyundeservedadvantage.Onthefaceofit,thecontentionappearstometobeillogical,irrational,andunreasonable.Itisobviouslyunacceptableandunsustainable.Thepolicyoflawcannotbetocompelsuchclaimantstocometocourtwithseparatepetitionsforeachmonth’sdefault.Thatwouldbetotallyanunreasonablemannerofapproachingthequestion.

TheSupremeCourtwasobviouslynotconsideringthequestionwhethermorethanonemonth’simprisonmentcanbeawardedforbreachofthedirectiontopaymaintenancecommittedinrespectofmoremonthsthanone.IcannotacceptthesuggestiononlybecausemanyFamilyCourts/Magistrate’sCourtshavechosentofollowthisinterpretation.ItwouldbemyopicandpueriletoholdthattheSupremeCourtsaidso.Thispositiongoesagainstthepolicyoflawandspecificstipulations.Precedentscannotbereadorunderstoodignoringthespecificlanguageofthestatutoryprovisions.TheinterpretationswhichthePetitioner’s(husband’s)counselwantstoplaceonShahahKhatoonisunacceptableforthereasonthatthesamesuffersfromthatspecificvice.

Thecourtgavethefollowingformularegardingimprisonment:

Ifthereisnopaymentofmaintenanceduefor‘n’numberofmonths,thedefaulterinoneExecutionPetitioncanbesentencedtoimprisonmentuptoamaximumof‘n’months,provided‘n’doesnotexceedtwelve.

Ifthereisabreachofpaymentofmaintenancedueforoneparticularmonth–notwithstandingthefactthatsuchpaymentwasnotmadefor‘n’monthsfromthedateonwhichitbecamedue,thedefaultercanbesentencedonlytoamaximumimprisonmentforonemonthandnot‘n’months.Evenwhenthebreachinrespectofoneparticularmonthcontinuesforanylengthoftime,themaximumsentenceforbreachoftheliabilitytopayonemonth’smaintenancecontinuestobeonemonthonly.


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UnderSection125(3)ofCr.PC,ifthehusbanddefaultsinpaymentofmaintenance,applicationforissuingwarrantforrecoverymustbefiledwithinoneyearfromthedateonwhichtheamountbecamedue.Recoveryapplicationsformorethantwelvemonthscannotbefiledandtheamountwouldlapseiftheapplicationshavenotbeenfiledwithintheprescribedtimeframe.

(p.201) However,iftheapplicationhasbeenfiledwithinthistimeframeandwaspendingincourt,thentheamountwouldnotlapse.Theapplicantcanalsofileinterimapplicationformentioningtheamountswhichhavesubsequentlybecomeduewhiletheoriginalapplicationwaspendingincourt.TheSupremeCourtinShantha@Ushadeviv.Shivnanjappa,366hasheldthatsuchsubsequentapplicationsareonlysupplementaryorincidentaltotheapplicationalreadyfiledwithintheperiodoflimitation.TheAllahabadHighCourtfollowedthisrulinginDilshadHajiRisalv.StateofUP,367andheldthatarrearsof41months,whichhadbecomedue,arenotbarredbylimitationasthefirstapplicationwasstillpendingincourt.

InDikshaRaniv.DeepChand,368despitetheimprisonmentthehusbanddidnotcomplywiththeorder.Thehusbandtriedtoevadeserviceanddidnotappearincourtduringsubsequentproceedings.Butwhenthewifecouldnotbepresent,therevisioncourtdismissedherapplicationfordefault.Whilequashingthisorder,inanappealfiledbythewife,thehighcourtofPunjabandHaryanacommented:Thehusband,thoughawareofthepresentproceedingspendingagainsthim,wasdeliberatelynotappearingbeforethecourt.Thehusbandisviolatingtheordersofthecourt.Ifthisapproachisallowed,itwouldeffecttheadministrationofjustice.Therevisionfiledbythewifewasdismissedindefaultfornon-prosecutionasshecouldnotappearwhenthecasewascalledout.Thishasresultedininjusticetothewifeandchildandcannotbejustified.Thetechnicalitiescannotbeallowedtostandinthewayofadministrationofjustice.Therevisioncourtwasboundtoconsiderthatthiswasacasewhereawifeandayoungchildarefightingfortheirsurvival.Thelowercourtwasdirectedtosecurethepresenceofthehusband,inamannerconsideredappropriate,includingtakinghimintocustodytoensurethathewouldcomplywiththedirectionspassedbythehighcourt.

InPadmov.SuratRam,369itwasheldthatthepowertoexecutetheorderofmaintenancelieswiththejudicialmagistrate.Thegrampanchayatdoesnothavethepowertoissuewarrantsfordefaultinpaymentofmaintenancedues.

Though,thelawprovidesforimprisonmentasadeterrentagainstdefaultinpayment,therearecaseswhereahusbandmaychoosetheoptionofimprisonmentratherthanpayingmaintenancetohiswifeandchildren.Seeingthroughsuchmanipulations,theGujaratHighCourtinBhavanabenShamhjuvhaiv.DineshPremjibhaiKapadia,370hasheldthatevenwhenthehusbandhasundergoneimprisonment,theamountwhichisduedoesnotbecomeirrecoverable.Warrantforattachmentofpropertiesforaccumulatedarrearsofmaintenancecanbeissued.Similarly,inRayinkuttyv.StateofKerala,371itwasheldthatfornoncomplianceoftheorderforpaymentofareasonableandfairsettlementtoaMuslimwife,thehusbandcanbeimprisoned.Butthiswillnotabsolvehimoftheliabilityofpayingtheamountwhichisdue.


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Beforeconcludingthissection,Ifeelconstrainedtoelaboratelyprofilethreecaseswhicharebrieflymentionedabove,tohighlighttheordealthatwomenhavetoendurewhileenforcingtheirlegalrightofpittanceofmaintenanceamounts.Thedetailedhistoryprovidesthetimeframeofthewindingcourtbattle,butthelawreportersdonotprovideaninsightinto(p.202) thecostsincurredinthiswindinglegalbattle.Thatislefttotheimaginationofthereader.

[email protected],thewifefiledformaintenanceforherselfandherdaughterin1991andbyanorderdated20January1993,thetrialcourtawardedRs500permonthtoherandRs300permonthtoherdaughter.Whenthehusbanddefaulted,thewifefiledexecutionproceedingsunderSection125(3)ofCr.PCforarrearsofRs5,363fromthedateoftheorderto31August1993.ThehusbandfiledcriminalrevisionapplicationbeforetheSessionsJudge,Tumkur,againsttheorderpassedbythetrialcourt,whichwasdismissedon26June1997.TheappealfiledbythehusbandagainstthisorderintheKarnatakaHighCourtwasalsodismissed.Thereafter,thewifefiledanInterimApplicationforarrearsofmaintenancefrom20January1993,thatis,thedateofthetrialcourt’sordertillthedateoffilingtheInterimApplication,thatis,16June1998,forthesumofRs46,000.

ThehusbanddepositedasumofRs5,365towardsthemaintenancefrom20January1993till31August1993.ButheobjectedtothewifeclaimingRs46,000onthebasisthatarrearsbeyondtheperiodofoneyearcannotbeclaimedduetothestipulationunderthefirstprovisotoSection125(3)ofCr.PC.Upholdingthiscontention,thetrialcourtdismissedtheInterimApplicationfiledbythewifeon13July2000onthegroundthatitisbarredbylimitation.ThewifechallengedthisorderbeforetheSessionsJudge,Tumkur.ThecriminalrevisionpetitionwasallowedbytheSessionsJudgebyanorderdated23November2002,andthematterwasremandedbacktothetrialcourt.

TheSessionsJudgeobservedthatsincethefirstInterimApplicationwaswithinlimitation,therewasnoneedoffilingafreshpetitionduringthependencyoftheapplicationunderSection125(3)ofCr.PCformaintenancewhichhadfallenduefortheperiodpostthisapplication.ItisimplicitinthepowersofthecourttomakeanorderdirectingthehusbandtomakepaymentofarrearsofmaintenanceuptothedateofthedecisionwhiledisposingofthefirstInterimApplicationforrecoveryofarrearsofmaintenance.TheSessionsJudgecommentedthatitisnotrequiredtofileafreshapplicationwhichmayleadtomultiplicityoflitigations.

Thehusbandchallengedthisorderin2003beforetheKarnatakaHighCourt.On11March2004,thehighcourtallowedthecriminalrevisionandsetasidetheorderoftheSessionsJudgeandheldthattheapplicationforclaimingarrearsofRs46,000wasbarredbylimitation.Aggrievedbythisorder,thewifeapproachedtheSupremeCourtbywayofaSpecialLeavePetitionwhichwasdecidedon6May2005,inherfavour.Thecourtheldthatsuchsubsequentapplicationsareonlysupplementaryorincidentaltotheapplicationalreadyfiledwithintheperiodoflimitation.Bythen14yearshadelapsedsincethewomanconcernedhadfirstapproachedthecourtformaintenance.


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InDilshadHajiRisalv.StateofUP,373thewifeSmtHazaraBegumhadapproachedthemagistrate’scourtformaintenanceforherselfandhertwochildrenunderSection125ofCr.PCon20May1999.Throughanexparteorderdated27July2000,maintenanceofRs1,500permonthforthreepersonswasawardedfromthedateoftheapplication.Thehusbanddidnotcomplywiththeorderandthewifefiledexecutionproceedingson28August2000forrecoveryandawarrantwasissuedagainstthehusbandforRs22,500fortheperiod20May1999to20August2000.Sincethehusbanddidnotcomplywiththedirectionsofthecourt,the(p.203) husbandwasimprisonedforonemonth.Thereafter,thewifefiledanotherapplicationon13February2004forexecutionofRs61,500,beingtheamountpayabletoherfor41months,fortheperiodbetween21August2000to20January2004.Thehusbandfiledanobjectiontothisapplicationon21July2004contendingthattheclaimforRs61,500wastimebarredastheapplicationwasfiledafteroneyearofitsbecomingdue.Also,sincehewasimprisonedfortheamountwhichwasdueearlier,thismattercouldnotbere-agitated.Healsosubmittedthathewaswillingtoreconcilewithhiswifeandmaintainhiswifeandchildren.Overridinghisobjections,theMagistratedirectedthatarecoverywarrantbeissuedagainstthehusbandforthemaintenanceamountduefortheperiodoffifteenmonthsfrom20May1999to20August2000forRs22,500.ThehusbandapproachedtheAllahabadHighCourtforquashingthisorderunderSection482ofCr.PC.

Byitsorderdated12September2005,thehighcourtallowedtheappealandremandedthematterbacktotheMagistrate’scourttoconsidertheoffermadebythehusbandtotakebackthewifeandmaintainherand,ifnecessary,upholdthewife’srighttorefusesuchofferwhenthereisjustgroundfordoingso.Ifthewifegivesadequatereasonsforrefusingtolivewithherhusband,shewouldnotbedeprivedofherrighttomaintenance.Thecourtalsocommentedthatawardingasentenceofimprisonmentisnosubstitutefortherecoveryoftheamountofmonthlyallowancewhichisduetothewife.Thecourtalsoheldthattheapplicationforarrearsof41monthswasnotbarredbylimitationwhenthefirstapplicationwasstillpending.

InPadmo’scase,374thewifehadapproachedtheCourtofAdditionalChiefJudicialMagistrate,Theog,on7May1996formaintenanceforherselfandherthreeminorchildren.On5June1996,theMagistratereferredthemattertothegrampanchayat,Basa,TehsilTheog,DistrictShimla.Thegrampanchayat,on6June1997,awardedRs300permontheachtothewifeandtheeldestchild,andRs200permontheachfortheyoungertwochildren,atotalofRs1,000permonth

Sincethehusbanddidnotcomplywiththisorder,thewifefiledforexecutionoftheorderandforpaymentofarrearsofRs3,400fortheperiod7May1996to7September1996.Thegrampanchayatissuednoticetothehusbandtodepositthearrearsofmaintenancewithintendays,failingwhichthematterwouldbetransferredtothecourtoftheJudicialMagistrate.Sincethehusbanddidnotappearbeforethegrampanchayat,theapplicationwasforwardedtotheJudicialMagistrate,Theog,forexecution.

Thehusbanddidnotfilehisreply.Thereafter,thematterwasreferredtotheLokAdalat


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on18July1998,withthehopeofsomeamicablesettlement.Butsincethematterdidnotgetresolved,on3March1999,theSub-Judgetookupthematter.Afterhearingboththepartieson10May1999,hesentthematterbacktothegrampanchayatforexecution.HecommentedthattherewasnoprovisioninlawfortheGramPanchayattosendthefiletohiscourtforexecution.Thegrampanchayatdidnottakeanyfurtheractioninthematter.

SothewifeagainfiledanapplicationunderSection125Cr.PCinthecourtoftheAdditionalChiefJudicialMagistrate,Theog,on9April1999onthegroundthatsincetheearlierorderpassedbythepanchayatcouldnotbeexecuted,afreshorderofmaintenancemaybepassed.Thehusbandopposedthisapplicationonthegroundthatsincetheearlierorderexisted,afreshordercouldnotbepassed.Afterrecordingevidenceoftheparties,on17July2001,theAdditionalChiefJudicialMagistrateupheldthehusband’s(p.204) contentionandheldthatthefreshapplicationwasnotmaintainableasthepreviousorderpassedbythepanchayatstillexistedandthepetitionershavenotassailedthesame.Thewifechallengedthisorderinthehighcourt.

On12April2002,thehighcourtpassedthefollowingorder:Ifafterissuanceofnoticebythegrampanchayat,thedefaulterdoesnotcomeforwardtopaytheamount,itisdifficultforthegrampanchayattoexecutetheorderofmaintenance,andtheonlycourseleftforitistoforwardtheorderofmaintenanceforexecutiontothejudicialmagistrateinwhosejurisdictionitissituated.ThegrampanchayathadrightlyforwardeditsorderofmaintenanceforexecutiontotheAdditionalChiefJudicialMagistrate,Thoeg.WhilehetookcognizanceofitinhiscapacityasSub-Judge,hewronglypassedtheorderthatthegrampanchayathadnopowerstoforwardtheorderofmaintenancepassedbyitforexecutiontohiscourt.Evenwhilepassingthesecondorderdated17July2001,dismissingthesecondpetition,theAdditionalChiefJudicialMagistrate,hasnotcaredtoexaminetheprovisionsoflaw,withtheresultthatthepetitionersevenafterobtainingtheorderofmaintenanceintheirfavour,asfarbackason6June1997,couldnotgetapennyasmaintenancefromthehusbandandtheverypurposeoftheprovisionofSection125ofCr.PCisdefeated.Inthisviewofthematter,theordersdated10May1999and17July2001aresetaside,andtheAdditionalChiefJudicialMagistrate,Theog,isdirectedtoexecutetheorderdated6June1997,passedbythegrampanchayatinaccordancewithlawandtheobservationsmadehereinabove.Sincethematterispendingformorethanfouryears,thesaidcourtisdirectedtoexpeditethematterandprovidejusticeandsuccourtothehaplesswifeandchildren,leftinthelurchbythehusbandtofendforthemselves.

ThehighcourtalsodirectedthatacopyofthejudgmentshouldbeplacedbeforetheHonourableChiefJusticeforconsideringthedesirabilityofcirculatingacopyofthisordertoalltheJudicialMagistratesinthestatetoavoidsuchlapsesfromoccurringinfuture.

Attheendofthisordeal,itisleftforourimaginationtoguesswhetheranyofthethreewomenwhoseordealisrecordedherewereabletosecuretheamountswhichwereorderedasmaintenancefortheirbearsurvival.


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ModificationofOrdersMaintenanceordersarenotordersofafinalnature.Ifsubsequentcircumstancessowarrant,eitherofthepartiescanapproachthecourtsformodificationoftheorder.InShardaDeviv.StateofBihar,375itwasheldthatSection127ofCr.PCconfersastatutoryrighttoclaimenhancementoftheoriginalamountawardedunderSection125Cr.PCsubjecttothepersonconcernedsatisfyingthecourtofthechangeincircumstancesfromwhentheoriginalorderwaspassed.

Increaseinexpendituretowardsthechildren’seducation,woman’sownlossofjoborinabilitytoearn,thedemiseofherparentswhowereprovidingfinancialsupporttoher,asubstantialincreaseinthehusband’sincome,etc.,arefactorswhichthecourtwillconsiderwhileorderingenhancementofthemaintenanceamountthathasbeenawardedtothewife.Thecourtwillalsobearinmindtheinflationandthecostoflivingindexanddecreaseinthevalueofrupee,sothattheremaynotbesuchasituationthatwhilethemaintenanceandlitigationexpensesremainstatic,inflationmayerodeitsmoneyvalue(Latav.CivilJudge,Bulandshar).376

(p.205) Thewifesecuringpermanentemploymentorincreaseinherearnings,wife’sremarriageorlivinginadultery,thesonattainingmajority,themarriageofthedaughter,lossofjoborsignificantloweringofhisownincome,hisretirement,illnessoroldagearecircumstanceswhichwouldentitleahusbandtoapproachthecourtforareductionintheamountofmaintenanceordered,orevenforcancellationoftheorder.Husband’sremarriageisnotaconditionwhichwouldwarrantcancellationoftheorderofmaintenanceawardedtotheearlierwife.Buttheincreaseinthenumberofdependentsmaybeafactorthatthecourtsmayconsiderwhilehearingtheapplicationformodificationoftheorder.

Iflumpsumamountsareawardedtothewifeasdivorcesettlement,thesamecannotberescindedifthedivorcedwomansubsequentlyremarries(NanigopalChakravortyv.RanubalaChakravorty).377Similarly,inRohtashSinghv.Ramendri,378andSanjeevKumarv.Dhanya,379thecourtshaveexplainedthatamaintenanceordercannotberescindedonthegroundofpost-divorceadultery.380

InRajashreeR.Dixitv.RajeshNageshDixit,381alterationofmaintenanceamountonthebasisofchangeinemploymentofhusbandwasheldtobemaintainable.InBibhutiBhushanPandeyv.StateofJharkhand,382thefamilycourthadenhancedthemaintenanceawardedtothewifeanddaughterfromRs800permonthtoRs2,000permonth,basedonthewife’scontentionthatthehusbandisearningRs12,000permonthasateacher.Thehusband’scontentionwasthattheenhancedamountwasonthehighersideasheisearningonlyRs8,301andhehastomaintainhisparentsandthreechildrenfromhisfirstwife.TheJharkhandHighCourtheldthatthesubmissioniswithoutsubstance.Onaccountofinflationinexpenditure,thewifeanddaughterareentitledtotheenhancedmaintenanceasorderedbythefamilycourt.InNarayanDasv.GitaRaniDas,383whileenhancingthemaintenanceawardedtothewife,thecourtheldthatriseincostofliving,increasesinearningofhusband,etc.,arecircumstanceswhichwould


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warrantanincreaseinthemaintenanceamountawardedunderprovisionsofSection127ofCr.PC.

InLalitaRaniv.JagdishLal,384thewifechallengedtheorderwhichawardedRs3,500permonthasmaintenancetoherandhertwochildren.Thedaughter,thoughamajor,wasstilldependentasshewasstudyingincollege.ThesonwasintenthStandard.ThewifecontendedthatherhusbandwasworkinginthepublicsectorandhisincomehaddoubledfromRs10,000permonthtoRs22,000.Shepleadedthatthesumawardedisinadequatetomeettheneedsofmaintenanceandeducationalexpensesofherchildren.ThehighcourtenhancedtheamounttoRs10,000andheldthatreasonableexpensesforsustenanceandforthecare,maintenance,andeducationofchildrenlivingwithher,constituteimportantfactorswhichthecourtscannotignore,whilethehusband’sexpenditurehaddecreasedandhisearningshadincreased.Ontheotherhandthewifehadtospendmoreformaintenanceandcareofherchildren.Pricesofallessentialcommoditieshaddoubledinthelastsevenyearssincefilingofherpetition.Thetrialcourtattachedoverwhelmingimportancetowhat,perhaps,atbestcouldbe(p.206) onefactor,thatis,residenceofthewifeindisputedpremisesclaimedbyhusband’smother.Thisfactorcouldnothavecloudedthecourt’sapproachinappreciatingfactsintheproperperceptive.Thecourtcannotignoretheobligationofhusbandtomaintainhiswifeandchildren.

InVinodKumarRaiv.ManjuRai,385thedaughterwasaround16–17yearsofage.Thecourtcommentedthatprovisionswouldhavetobemadeforhermarriageinadditiontothecostofeducationandlivingexpenses.Thehighcourtheldthattheamountawardedbythetrialcourtthatis,Rs500forthedaughterandRs1,500forthewifewasmeagreandincreasedtheamounttoRs2,500each,forthewifeanddaughter.Thecourtalsodirectedthehusbandtobeartheexpensesofmarriageofhisdaughterwhenthetimecame.Thecourtcommentedthattheunjustifiedandbaselessaccusationsofinfidelityhurledatthewifeconstitutecrueltywhichwouldjustifythewife’sdemandtoliveseparatelyandreceivemaintenance.

InPremPrakashv.Nirmal,386theDelhiHighCourtheldthatthepleaofthehusbandtomodifythemaintenanceorderonthegroundofchangeofcircumstanceswasrightlyrejectedbythetrialcourt.AnorderofmaintenanceofRs5,000wassubsistingforfifteenyears.Thehusbandhadmadeseveralunsuccessfulattemptstohavetheordervaried,includingapproachingtheSupremeCourt.Thehusbandcontendedthatthewifehadremarriedandthedaughterdidnotbearhisname.Therewasalsodiscrepancyinthedateofbirthofthedaughter.Thehighcourtheldthatthehusband’sconductwascalumnious,inconstantlyquestioningparentageandlegitimacyofchild,andsuchconductcanhardlybeappreciated.TheHighCourtcommentedthatthetrialcourtrightlyagreedwiththecontentionofthewifethatthechild’sfatherwasshownasthematernalgrandfathersincetherewasathreatofconstantharassmentbythehusband.Thispossibilitycannotberuledout,havingregardtothehistoryofthecase.Theissueofawrongdateofbirthwasunnecessarilyhighlightedbythehusbandandthetrialcourthadrightlyheldittobeamistake.Asregardschangeofappellants’finances,thetrialcourt


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wasrightlyscepticalabouthisclaimsincehehadnotdisclosedhisassetsorproducedanydocumentaryevidencewhatsoever.

InSirivellaRaov.SirivellaGnanamani,387theincomeofthehusband,workinginapetrolpump,wasRs2,400permonth.Thehusbandhadtolookafterhisagedparentsandhimself.MaintenancegrantedbytrialcourtwasreducedtoRs400permontheach,towifeandchildrenfromRs1,500,asgrantedbythetrialcourt.InSatishKumarSinghv.StateofBihar,388thewifeandfourminorchildrenwerelivingseparatelyandthehusbandwasnotmaintainingthem.Thehusbandsubmittedthathewasreadytoacceptthewifeandthechildrenandmaintainthembutthewifewasnotwillingtolivewiththehusband.Hisonlysourceofincomewasfromgivingprivatetuitions.Inviewofthis,theamountofmaintenancewasreducedfromRs1,400permonthtoRs1,000permonth,Rs300forthewifeandRs175permonthforeachchild.

Remarriageofthedivorcedwifeisafactortobeconsideredforvaryingthemaintenanceorder.InTapashKumarPaulv.SomaPaul,389itwasheldthattherewasnoproofthatthewifewaslivinginadulterywithanotherperson,whichdisqualifiedherfromgettingmaintenance.Thewifewasdrivenoutofthematrimonialhouseandthehusbandhadneglectedtomaintainher.(p.207) Butbasedonthehusband’searning,thecourtreducedtheamountofmaintenancefromRs1,000permonthtoRs500permonth.Itwasheldthatthewifeisentitledtoreceivethisamountasmaintenancetillthedateofherremarriage.ThecourtfurthercommentedthatSection127nowherelaysdownthatitwasthedutyofthewife,afterherre-marriage,toapproachthecourttoalterorcanceltheorderofmaintenance.Theaggrievedperson,againstwhomtheorderofmaintenanceispassed,shouldmovethecourtforalteration,modification,orcancellationofthemaintenanceorderduetochangeofcircumstances.TherewasnoquestionofrefundofRs14,000,approximately,obtainedbywifeasmaintenancefrompetitionerwithinterest.Thewifewasexpectedtolivehappilywithherpresenthusbandwithoutanydisturbanceandthehusbandoughtnottoclaimthebalanceamount.InGomtiv.Ramanand,390thesamepointwasreiteratedandthecourtheldthatthedivorcedwomanisentitledtomaintenanceuntilherremarriageandtheburdenliesonthehusbandtoprovethatthewifehasre-married.

SectionC:RighttoMatrimonialHomeandPropertyTwodistinctrightswhichareimplicitinthemarriagecontractaretherighttoresideinthematrimonialhomeandtherighttoafinancialsettlementattheterminationofmarriageareexaminedhere.Whilemaintenanceisalsoaneconomicright,itisaconditionalrightcontingentuponaperson’sneedorabilitytosustainoneself.Apersoncapableofsupportingoneselfisnotentitledtomaintenance.Inthiscontext,therighttoresideinthematrimonialhomeandarighttofinancialsettlement,ordivisionofassetsattheterminationofmarriage,arecrucialeconomicrights.Whilemaintenancecanbeviewedasasustenance‘dole’forbasicsurvival,whichtheprevailingsocialconditionsnecessitate,matrimonialhomeandpropertycanbeconstruedas‘rights’whichwouldeconomicallyempowerawomanandredeemherfromthesituationofperpetualdependency.

Duringthelaterhalfofthelastcenturywhendivorcelawsbecamemorelax,most


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countriesenactedlawswhichwouldeconomicallyempowerwomenatthetimeofdivorce.Butthisissueseemstohaveescapedtheattentionoflegislatorsandlawreformersinourcountryduringthecorrespondingperiod.

Therightofresidenceinthematrimonialhomeisacrucialrightofsurvivalformostmarriedwomenandisimplicitwithinthecontractofmarriage.But,sincethisrightwasnotstatutorilyprotected,ahusbandcould,athiswhim,drivethewifeoutofthedomesticresidence.Devoidofstatutoryprotection,therighthingeduponastutelawyering,sympatheticandsensitivejudges,andstrayinnovativejudicialpronouncements.Women’sgroupsinIndiahadbeencampaigningforseveraldecadesforaspecificlawwhichwouldprotectthisright.Finally,undertheProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct,2005(PWDVA),thisrightwasawardedstatutoryrecognitionunderthenotionofasharedhousehold.

However,therightunderthePWDVAisofalimitednatureanddoesnotgivethewomantitleorinterestintheproperty.Italsodoesnotprotectthewomanagainstthirdparties(forinstance,thelandlord).Itisalsodifficulttoenforceafterdivorcesincedivorceseversthemaritalbond.

LoweandDouglas(1998:134)explainthattherearetwointerrelatedissueswithinthenotionofthematrimonialhome,ownershipandoccupation.Thefirstisinwhomarethelegalandbeneficialinterestsinthepropertyvested(p.208) and,thesecond,whatrightsofoccupationdoeseachpartyhaveinthehome,irrespectiveofownership.WhilePWDVAaddressedthesecondconcern,thefirsthadremaineddormantduringthecampaign.

Inordertoexpandthescopeofeconomicrightsupondivorce,thereisaneedtoevolvetheconceptofmatrimonialproperty.Sincemarriageisnotviewedasan‘economicpartnership’,onmarriageawomandoesnotacquireanyrightsinherhusband’spropertyand,hence,sheisnotentitledtoclaimdivisionofassetsatthetimeofdivorce.Theonlyrelevantfactorsfordeterminingpropertyclaimsaretitleandfinancialcontributions.Hence,thepropertyacquiredbythehusbandistreatedashisexclusiveproperty.Ourmatrimonialstatutesdonotawardanyrecognitiontoawoman’snon-monetarycontributiontothedomestichouseholdduringthesubsistenceofthemarriage.Thecontributionofthewifeincreatingfamilyassets,throughherunpaidlabourbyperformingherdomesticduties,isnotconsideredarelevantfactorfordeterminationofhershareintheseassets.

Inthisrespect,Indialagsfarbehindmostothercountrieswhichawardrecognitionofawoman’scontributiontocreatingfamilyassetsand,hence,haveevolveddetailedguidelinesfordeterminingawoman’sshareinthematrimonialproperty.Sincethisisanemergingaspectoffamilylaw,itisincludedhereforconceptualclarityandlegislativeinterventions.

RighttoMatrimonialHome

ConceptofMatrimonialHomeUnderEnglishLaw


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ConceptofMatrimonialHomeUnderEnglishLaw

SinceourlegalmaximsarederivedfromEnglishcommonlawandAnglo-Saxonjurisprudence,itwouldberelevanttohaveanoverviewofthedevelopmentoftheserightsundertheEnglishlawasitprovidessomeimportantmarkers.

TheEnglishwomenhadtocarryoutlongandsustainedcampaignsfortheirrighttoownproperty,forashareinthematrimonialproperty,andfortherightofresidenceinthematrimonialhome.Asdiscussedearlier,untilthemid-nineteenthcentury,marriedwomeninEnglanddidnothavearighttodivorceandtheyhadnorighttoownproperty.AccordingtotheBlackstonianprinciplesthenprevailinginEngland,aftermarriage,thewomanlostherrightoverherownproperty.Marriagevirtuallymeantalegaldeathforthewoman.Thehusbandbecamethecustodianofherpersonandherproperty,andhecoulddealwithitasperhisownwhimsandfancies.391

Duringthemid-nineteenthcentury,throughtheenactmentoftheMatrimonialCausesActof1857,Englishwomenwereawardedalimitedrightofdivorceundercertainstringentconditions.392Butthisenactmentdidnotdeterminewomen’srighttoseparatepropertyevenafterdivorce.Soduringthelaterdecades,alongwiththesuffragettemovementwhichdemandedtherighttovoteforwomen,theyalsoraisedthedemandforlegalrecognitionoftheirrighttoownproperty.Asaresponsetothiscampaign,thefirstenactmentwaspassedin1872whichwastitledtheMarriedWomen’sPropertyRightsAct,whichawardedrightsovertheirseparatepropertyforwomenwhoweredivorcedorlegallyseparated.Thiswasalimitedrightovertheirseparatepropertyacquiredafterdivorce/separationanddidnotalterthesituationofwomenwhilethemarriagewassubsisting.Thiswasfollowedbyanother(p.209) legislationwithasimilartitle,theMarriedWomen’sPropertyRightsAct,1882,whichslightlyimprovedthepositionofmarriedwomen.Butfromthenonwards,aseriesoflegislationswereenactedwhichfurtherstrengthenedthemarriedwomen’srighttoproperty.Finally,in1935,thedifferencebetweenamarriedandanunmarriedwomanwasabolishedandmarriedwomenbecamefullownersoftheirownindividualproperty,evenduringthesubsistenceoftheirmarriage.Throughthisenactment,theBlackstonianprinciplethatwomenarethepropertyoftheirhusbandsandtheyarenotentitledtoholdpropertyintheirnameduringthesubsistenceoftheirmarriage,wasfinallylaidtorest.393

Justwhenonesetofproblemswereresolved,womenwereconfrontedwithanother.Theseweredifficultyearsofrecessionandwar.Alargenumberofwomenhadtoforsaketheirtraditionalroleashousewivesornon-earningmembersoftheirhouseholdsandentertheorganizedlabourforce.Thisenabledthemtoearnaseparateincomeduringtheirmarriage.Theywerenolongerthedependentwives,butwereearningmembersoftheirfamiliesand,inthiscapacity,contributedtothefamilyincome.But,sincethematrimonialhomewasownedbythehusband,hecoulddispossessher.Shehadnoremedyagainstsuchdispossession.Afterthewar,thesocialandeconomicclimatechanged.Propertyownershipincreased,withpurchasesbeingmadewiththeaidofmortgages.Propertypricesescalatedanddivorceratesspiraled.Thecombinationofthesefactorsresultedinagreatdealoflitigationaroundtheprimaryasset,thefamilyhome.Thisbroughtintofocustheinjusticecausedtowomenthroughtheapplicationof


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strictrulesofpropertyownershipandthedoctrineofseparationofownership,asbetweenthespouses.Traditionally,theclaimdependeduponwhichspousehadpaidthemortgagebills,sinceonlypaymenttowardsthepurchaseofthepropertywoulddetermineownership.

ButLordDenning,alegendinhisowntimeandachampionofwomen’srights,pointedoutthatitmaybepurelyamatterofconvenienceastowhichspousepaysoffthemortgageandwhichonepaystheotherhouseholdexpenses(LoweandDouglas1998:135).Thecreditforevolvingarevolutionaryconceptofthedesertedwife’sequitymustbeattributedtohim.Hefirmlybelievedthatitwashisdutytodispensejusticeratherthanmerelyadheretolegaltechnicalities.InNovember1947,barelythreeyearsafterhewasappointedasaHighCourtJudge,whilehewassittingasKingsBenchjudge,hedeliveredthefirsthistoricjudgmentinacasetitledHv.H.394Aswastheestablishedpattern,thematrimonialhomewasinthenameofthehusband.Hehadlivedtherewithhiswifeandaninvalidson.Duringthewar,thehusbandlefthiswifeandwenttolivewithanotherwoman.Thewifeobtainedamaintenanceorderagainstherhusbandonthebasisthatshewouldgoonlivinginthematrimonialhomealongwiththeson.Thehusbandapproachedthewifeforadivorcewiththefollowingconditions:‘I’llgiveyouthehouse,ifyouwillgivememyfreedom.’Thewifedeclinedandthehusbandinitiatedproceedingsforpossessionofthehouse.

Thehousebelongedtothehusbandandthewifedidnotevenhavethestatusofatenant.Hence,shehadnolegalremedyagainstdispossessionbyherhusband.InvokingSection17oftheMarriedWomen’sPropertyAct,1882(MWPA),whichstipulatedthat‘incaseofanydisputebetweenahusbandandwifeastothetitleorpossessionofproperty,thejudgemight(p.210) makesuchorderashethinksfit,’heprotectedthewoman’srightofresidenceasagainstthehusband’stitletotheproperty.Thiswasahistoricalrulingwhichturnedthetideinfavourofwomenandbecamealegalprecedent(Heward2003:49–50).

Whiletherightofresidencewasgettingestablished,atleastagainstthehusband,anewersituationarosewhichbroughtinfurthercomplexities.Betweenhusbandandwife,the1882Actworkedwell,butdifficultiesarosewhentheinterestsofthirdpartieswereaffected.Ifthehusbandwentbankrupt,hiscreditorscoulddispossessthewifefromthematrimonialhome.Thewifehadnoprotectionagainstthecreditors.Afterthewar,ithadbeenestablishedthatwherethehusbandownedthematrimonialhomeandwaslivingtherewithhiswife,hecouldnotturnherout.LordDenningheldthatadeserterhusbandcouldnotbeplacedinabetterpositionthaniftheywerelivingtogetherbytakingadvantageofhisownwrong,thatis,desertion.Thehusband’sdutywastoprovidethewifewitharoofoverherhead,andbyprovidingamatrimonialhomehegiveshertheauthoritytobethere.Inlaw,adesertedwifehasanirrevocableauthoritytoremaininthematrimonialhome.Thisauthorityisrevocableonlybyacourt.

InBendallv.McWhirter,thehusbandwastheownerofthehouse,wherehelivedwithhiswifeandchildren.Hedesertedthewifebutbeforeheleft,heassuredherthatshecouldhavethehouseandfurniture.Later,hewentbankruptandhistrusteesin


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bankruptcyproceededtosellthehouseanddividetheproceedsamongthecreditors.Togetthebestpricetheywantedtosellwithvacantpossession,butthewiferefusedtoleavethehouseandthetrusteesinbankruptcybroughtanactionforpossessionagainsther.WhentheCountyCourtpassedanorderinfavourofthecreditorsforpossession,thewifeappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.In1953,LordDenning,whoheardtheappealaspartofathree-JudgeBench,reversedtheorderandheldthatadesertedwifeinoccupationofthematrimonialhomehadapersonallicense,revocableonlyuponthehusbandobtaininganorderunderSection17ofthe1882Act.Herrightofresidencedoesnotcometoanendautomaticallyonthehusband’sbankruptcy.Thetrusteeinbankruptcytakessubjecttoequities.Therefore,hetakessubjecttothewife’srightinequity(ibid.:50).

Fromthenonwardstill1965,throughaseriesofjudgments,hefurtherconsolidatedthepositionofthedesertedwife.In1956,theRoyalCommissiononMarriageandDivorceheld:Wethinkithasbeenrighttoaffordthisprotectiontoadesertedwife,toallowhertokeeparoofoverherhead;itwouldbeshockingtocontemplatethatahusbandcouldputhiswifeandchildrenintothestreet,sothathecouldhimselfreturntoliveinthehouse,perhapswithanotherwoman(ibid.:51).

Inalaterjudgmentdeliveredin1962,Hinev.Hine,395LordDenningruledthatfamilypropertyhadtobetreateddifferentlyfromotherformsofproperty.ExpandingthescopeofthecontroversialSection17ofMWPA,heheldthatthisprovisionwasnotmerelyproceduralinnature,butinfactconferredasubstantivepoweruponthejudgetoreallocatepropertyrightsbetweentheparties.Itwasruledthatthediscretiontranscendsallrights,legalandequitable,andenablesthecourttomakesuchordersasmaybefairandjust.

However,thisprinciplewasoverturnedbytheHouseofLordsinPettittv.Pettitt,396whichheldthatSection17ofMWPAwasmerelyprocedural.Thisviewwasreaffirmedagainin(p.211) Gissingv.Gissing.Thesedecisionsdealtasevereblowtotherightofadesertedwifeandcurtailedthepowerofthecourtstoreallocatematrimonialproperty.InPettittv.Pettitt,itwaspointedoutthatunderSection17thequestionforthecourtwas,whoseisthisandnottowhomshallthisbegiven.Followingthisunanimousruling,twofundamentalrulesemerged.First,thatEnglishlawdoesnotrecognizethedoctrineofcommunityofpropertyoranyseparaterulesoflawapplicabletofamilyassets.Consequently,ifonespousebuyspropertyintendedforcommonusewiththeother,whetheritisahouse,furniture,oracar,thiscannotpersegivethelatteranyproprietaryinterest.Thesecondprinciplewhichflowsfromthefirst,whichwasstatedinGissingv.Gissing,397thatifeitherofthemseekstoestablishabeneficialinterestinproperty,thelegaltitletowhichisvestedintheother,heorshecandosoonlybyestablishingthatthelegalownerholdsthepropertyontrustfortheclaimant(LoweandDouglas1998:136).

Despitetheseadversecomments,therulingprotectedthedesertedwife’srighttoresideinthematrimonialhomebyinvokinganotioncalled‘constructivetrust’.Thewifewasinoccupationofthehousethroughaconstructivetrustthroughthecontractof


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marriage,andahusbandcouldnottakeadvantageofhisownwrongbydispossessingthewifefromthematrimonialhomeorbydesertingher.

InNationalProvincialBankLtd.v.Ainsworth,398LordDenningdeliveredyetanotherhistoricalrulingandheldthatthebankcouldnotclaimpossessionagainstthewife,whowasinpossessionofthematrimonialhome.Heruledthatsincethewifehasarighttoremaininthematrimonialhome,itisunlawfulforthehusbandtoenterintoanyagreementdesignedtoturnherout.‘ItisacasewhereIwouldtemperjusticewithmercy.Justicetothebankwithmercytothewife’,heproclaimed.ButtheHouseofLordsoverruledthisdecisionin1965,whichmadethepositionofawifeprecariousagainstthehusband’screditors.LordDenningrespondedwithacommentthatthedecisionhadblownthedesertedwife’sequitytosmithereens.

Thepublicoutcry,againstthisdecisionoftheHouseofLords,ledtotheenactmentoftheMatrimonialHomesActin1967,whichspecificallyempoweredthecourtstodecidetheissueofpropertywhiledealingwithissuesofdesertionanddivorce.Butthewifehadtoregisterachargeagainstthehusband’sproperty.Subsequentenactmentshavestrengthenedwomen’srights,notonlytothematrimonialresidencebutalsotomatrimonialproperty.ImportantamongthemistheMatrimonialProceedingsandPropertyAct,1970.

Thenecessityofenactingthe1970Actaroseinthecontextofreformsinfamilylawwhichwerebroughtinthroughanenactmentin1969,theDivorceReformAct,whichintroducedthe‘breakdowntheory’ofdivorce.Thoughagenderneutraltermspousewasused,therewasafearthatmanyinnocentwives,divorcedagainsttheirwill,wouldbeleftwithinadequatefinancialprovisionsanddivorcewouldcausegraveeconomichardshipstothem.In1973,provisionsofboththesestatuteswereincorporatedintotheMatrimonialCausesAct,1973.399

Theseenactmentstipulatedthatthoughthecourtsmustgiveeffecttolegalrightsofparties,theymustalsohonourthewife’srightinequity(p.212) toresideinthematrimonialhome.Thecourtsbegantoorderthequantumofmaintenanceonthebasisofhercontinuedrightofresidenceinthematrimonialhome.Inseveralcases,ordersofpossessionwerepassedagainsttrustees,incasesofbankruptcyofthehusband,andinfavourofthewife,whohadapriorrightofresidence.

EvolutionoftheConceptinIndia

Thedesertedwife’srightinequitywasgettingformulatedaroundthetimewhentheHinduMarriageActwasbeingenacted,butthiscampaigndidnotinfluencethelawmakingprocessinIndia.Thisisobviouswhenweexaminetheprovisionsofthetwostatuteswhichwereenactedaroundthattime,theSpecialMarriageAct,1954,andtheHinduMarriageAct,1955.TheselawswereformulatedonthebasisoftheearlierrightsunderEnglishlawandconfinedonlytotraditionalmatrimonialreliefssuchasdivorce,separation,annulmentofmarriage,etc.,eventhoughtheEnglishlawhadmovedonfromthere.400


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Section27oftheHinduMarriageActmakesavaguereferencetoproperty,butcontextualizesitwithinalimitedscopeofaHinduwoman’srightsoverthecustomarygifts,receivedjointlybythespouses,atthetimeofmarriage.Thewordingis‘propertypresentedatoraboutthetimeofmarriage,whichmaybelongjointlytoboththehusbandandthewife.401Whileitispossibletostretchthescopeofthisprovisiontomatrimonialpropertyacquiredafterthemarriage,aswasdonebytheSupremeCourtinB.P.AchalaAnandv.S.AppiReddy(discussedlater),itisanextrapolationanditdoesnotunderminetheneedforaseparatelawregardingdistributionofmatrimonialpropertyondivorce.

Ondivorce,womenareentitledtoonlyameagreamountofmaintenancewhichisinsufficienttoprocureseparateresidentialpremisesforthemselvesandthechildrenundertheircustody.Womenwhohavesecuredajobarenotevenentitledtomaintenance,eventhoughduringthesubsistenceofmarriagetheymayhaveoptedoutofpaidemploymenttosupportthefamilyandtohaveandraisechildren.Adecreeofdivorcewilldisentitleawomanofherrighttoashelterormatrimonialresidence.Thisbecomesacompellingreasonforwomennottooptfordivorceeveninsituationsofextremedomesticviolence.Thefearofbeingrenderedshelter-lessisoverwhelming,particularlyforwomenintheurbansetting,wherehousingisexpensiveandbeyondtheaccessofordinarymiddleandlowincomegroups.

TheonlyrecognitionoftherightofwomentoresidenceisfoundundertheHinduAdoptionsandMaintenanceAct,1956,wheremaintenanceisdefinedasinclusiveofaprovisionofresidence.However,residencedoesnotspecificallymeanthematrimonialhome.But,sinceresidencecomesundertheambitofmaintenance,thecourtsseemtothinkthatanenhancedmaintenancewouldcompensatethewomanforthelossofshelter.

(p.213) Twolegalconceptsrelatedtopropertyarerelevantindisputesoverthematrimonialhome,ownershipandpossession.Whileownershipimplieslegaltitle,thecourtsareconstrainedtoprotectthewomen’srighttoshelterbyinvokingtheprincipleofpossession.Thecourtshavethepowertoprotectthisrightinlieuofthewomen’scontributiontothedomesticunit,botheconomicallyandthroughservicesrenderedthroughperformingdomesticduties.Thoughtherightisnotdefinedunderourprevailingmatrimonialstatutes,duetoescalatingpropertyprices,injunctionagainstdispossessionisemergingasahighlycontestedissueinmatrimoniallitigation.

Theearlieracceptednotionwasthatsincethetitleisinthenameofthehusbandorhisfamilymembers(father-in-law,mother-in-law,brother-in-law,etc.),itisthesoleprerogativeofthepersonholdingthetitletopermitresidenceinthesepremises.Thecontractofmarriagedidnotincludewithinitselfthewoman’srightinequitytoresideinthesepremisesanditdidnotprotectheragainstdispossession.Despitethegainsmadeinotherareas,here,thenotionthatamanisthemasterofhishomeseemedtoprevailuntilrecently.Thefactthatmostwomencontributetothematrimonialhomeeitherthroughtheirownearningsorthroughtheirunpaidlabour,wasoverlookedwhileascertainingtherightofresidenceandrighttopropertyinrespectofthematrimonialhome.Butgradually,thisnotiongavewaytoanotionakintotheconstructivetrustunderEnglishlawandcourtsbegantorecognizethewomen’srightofresidence.


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Formostmiddleandlowerclassfamilies,thedwellinghouse(ormatrimonialhome)istheironlyorprimaryasset.Inurbancentres,withescalatingpropertyprices,therighttothedwellinghomebecomesacrucialeconomicissueinmatrimoniallitigation.Thoughstatutoryprovisionwaslacking,theissueofrightofresidenceandsettlementofmatrimonialassetsemergedasahighlycontestedissueinurbanmatrimonialdisputes.Thematrimonialcourtsareconstantlycalledupontoadjudicateoverthisissueduringmatrimoniallitigation.

Tentativelyandgradually,thecourtsstartedawardingrecognitiontowomen’srighttomatrimonialresidence.Perhapsitisnotsurprising,giventhehighlyvolatilehousingsituationinMumbai,thattheconcernoverrightofresidenceinthematrimonialhomewasfirstarticulatedthroughdecisionsoftheBombayHighCourtinthe1960s,1970s,and1980s.

Inoneoftheearliestcasesontheissueofmatrimonialhome,BanooJalDaruwallav.JalC.Daruwalla,402itwasheldthatthecourtdoesnotdealwithquestionsoftitlestopropertiesandquestionsarisingbetweenahusbandandwifeasco-ownersofproperties,exceptinrespectofjointpropertiespresentedatoraboutthetimeofmarriage.Inrespectofallotherpropertiesownedorallegedtobeownedasco-ownersbetweenhusbandandwife,thecasewouldbedecidedasperthegenerallawofproperty.ButamentionwasmadetotherightofawifetoresideinthematrimonialhomebyrelyingupontheobservationsofLordDenning,inBendallv.McWhirter,thatitisthedutyofthecourttoensurethatthewifeisnotthrownoutofthematrimonialhome.Sinceitwasnotpossibleforthewifetoresideinthematrimonialhome,thewifewasawardedRs275permonthasmaintenance.

In1977,inalandmarkdecisionA.v.B,403theBombayHighCourtintroducedtheconceptofprotectiveinjunctionstosafeguardwomen’srightsandheld:‘Whilepassingamatrimonialdecree,thecourthasthepowertograntaninjunctionrestrainingthehusbandfromenteringthematrimonialhome….’Herethepremises(p.214) belongedtothewifewhowasseparated,andtheinjunctionwasgrantedagainstthehusband,restraininghimfromenteringherpremises.Afterfacingextremephysicalcrueltyandalsohumiliation,thewifehadfiledapetitionforjudicialseparationandforaninjunctionrestrainingthehusbandfromenteringthematrimonialhome.Whilegrantingherjudicialseparation,thecourtheld:‘…awoman,whowantstobeeconomicallyindependent…wouldbeapprehensivethatitwouldbedangeroustolivewithahusbandwhoisphysicallyabusiveandaccusesherofhavingextra-maritalrelationswithhercolleagues….’

TherulinginAbdulRahimv.Padma,404isyetanothermilestone.Inthiscase,therightofthewifeintheresidentialpremisesownedbythehusband’sfatherwasawardedrecognition.Thecaseconcernedacoupleinaninter-religiouscivilmarriage.Butthehusbandallegedthatlaterthewifehadconvertedandtheyhadperformednikah.Whentherelationshipsbetweenthemwerestrained,thehusbandpronouncedtalaqandthrewthewifeoutandrestrainedherfromenteringthematrimonialhome.Later,hefiledacivilsuitrestrainingherentryintothematrimonialhomeandobtainedanexparteinjunction


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againstheronthegroundthatsheisnolongerhiswife.Inappeal,thehighcourtheldthatsinceitwasacivilmarriage,itcouldnotbedissolvedthroughanoraltalaq.But,subsequently,onthepremisethatthemarriagehadbrokendownirrevocably,thecourtgrantedajudicialdivorce.

Thewifechallengedtheinjunctiononthegroundthatitwashermatrimonialhomeandshehadcontributedtowardsitfromhersavings.Thecourtruled:‘Thewifehasarighttostayinthehomesincethehusbandhadnotprovidedheranyalternateaccommodation.Itisjustandfairthattheflatbepartitionedandthewifeallocatedaspecificportion,thereof,forherresidence.’

Later,thisrightwasawardedrecognitionbyvariousotherhighcourts.InthematterofM/sBharatHeavyPlatesandVesselsLtd.,Vishakapatnam,405isaninterestingcasewheretheemployerofthehusbandwasrestrainedfromdispossessingthewifefromthecompanyquarters.Anemployeeofagovernmentownedandcontrolledcompanyandhiswifewerelivingtogetherinthecompanyquarterswiththeapparentconsentofthecompany.Thequarterallocatedtothecouplewastheirmatrimonialhome.Soon,differencescroppedupbetweenthemleadingtotheirestrangement.Finally,thewifewenttothecourt,chargingherhusbandwithcriminalneglecttomaintainherandthreeminorchildrenandwasawardedmaintenance.Consequently,thehusbandleftthematrimonialresidenceanditwasoccupiedsolelybythewifeandherminorchildren.Asaretaliatoryaction,thehusbandterminatedtheleaseofthequarter,exposingthewifeandtheminorchildrentoeviction,whichledthewifetoapproachthecourtforprotection.Accordingly,anorderofinjunctionrestrainingthecompanyfromevictingthewifeandtheminorchildren,pendingdisposalofthesuit,cametobepassed.Thehusbandwasdirectedtopaytherent,whichwastobeadjustedagainstthemaintenancethatwaspayable.Againstthisorder,thecompanyfiledarevisionpetition.However,thesamewasheldtobenotmaintainableasitneithercausedirreparableinjurytothecompanynoroccasionedfailureofjustice.Theorderofinjunctionprovidedfordeductingtheamountofrentfromthesalaryofthehusbandandfromtheamountofmaintenancewhichwasduetothewife.Duetothis,thecourtheldthatneitherthecompany(p.215) northehusbandsufferedanymonetarylossorirreparableinjuryinthecontinuedpossessionofthecompanyquarterbythewife.

Thecourtfurthercommentedthatthequarterwasownedbyalegalpersonandnotbyanaturalpersonandwasmeanttobeusedbyitsemployees.Thefactthatthecompanywasastateinstrumentality,underanobligationtoactinaccordancewithArticles14and21,wasanadditionalgroundforholdingthattherewasnofailureofjustice.Itwasalsoheldthatthehusbandhadanobligationtoprovidesheltertohiswifeandchildren.Thehusbandandthecompany,actingindifferentways,hadbeenrecognizingalltheseyearstherightofoccupationofthequarterbythewifeashermatrimonialright.Itwasheldthatinthesecircumstances,theinterlocutoryordercouldnotbesaidtooccasionanyfailureofjustice.Bypreventingthestateinstrumentalityfromrenderingthewifeandthechildrenhomeless,thecourtonlypreventedfailureofjustice.


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Theseearlylandmarkjudgmentsdidnotreceivewidemediapublicityand,attimes,evenlawyersandjudgesintrialcourtswerenotawareoftheselegalprinciples.Evenwomenthemselvesdidnotbelievethattheyhadarightinlawtoresideintheirmatrimonialhomeandthatthehusbandandhisrelativescouldnotdispossessthemattheirwhimsandfancies.Duringthisperiod,issuesofdowryharassmentanddowrydeathswereinthenews.Whenawomancomplainedofdomesticviolence,socialworkerinterventionswereaimedatadvisingwomennottotolerateviolenceandhumiliationandinsteadofcontinuingwiththemarriage,tooptforadivorce.Butwomenthemselveswerereluctant,astheywereawarethatenteringtherealmoflitigationwouldrenderthemshelter-less.Mostwomenbelievedthatacompromisethroughacquiescencetothedemandsofthehusbandandhisfamilywastheironlyoption.Theydidnotbelievethattheyhadalegalrightofresidenceintheirmatrimonialhomeagainstthehusband’swishes.So,theyagreedtoreconciliationsontermslaiddownbythehusbandinordertoprotecttheirrighttoshelter.

However,inlateryears,divorcepetitionsincreasinglybroughtintofocusissuesrelatedtomatrimonialhomeandpropertyandthecourtswereconstrainedtoexaminethisright.Therewereafewpositiverulingswhichrecognizedtherightofwomentoproceedsfromthesaleofthematrimonialhome.

InAjitBhagwandasUdeshiv.KumudAjitUdeshi,406thecourtupheldthewife’srighttooccupyapartofthematrimonialhomeafterherdivorcesinceshehadnootheralternateaccommodation.Thepartiesweremarriedfortwentyyearsandhadthreechildren.Duetoamatrimonialdispute,thehusbandfiledapetitionfordivorcewhichwasdecided,afteralongdrawnlitigation,infavourofhusbandonthegroundofdesertionbythewife.ThecourtawardedRs1000asmaintenancetothewifeandallowedhertoresideinonepartofthematrimonialhome.Thehusbandfiledanappealagainstthegrantoftherightofresidencetothewife.TheBombayHighCourtupheldthedecisionofthefamilycourtgrantingthewiferightofresidenceinpartofthematrimonialhome.Thecourts’rulingwasbasedonthepremiseoffinancialcontribution.Itwasprovedthatthoughboththepartieshadcontributedwhileacquiringthematrimonialhome,asubstantialamountofdeposit,whichispopularlyreferredtoaspagdi,waspaidbythewifeoutoftheamountreceivedbyherfromthelandlordoftheearlierpremisesthatthecouplewasoccupying.Thetenancyoftheearlierpremiseswasinthenameofthewife’sgrandmother.Thehusbandhadalsotakenawayhergoldornaments,(p.216) butatthattimehedidnotpurchaseanypremises.Thiscouldalsoberecognizedasthefinancialcontributionofthewife.

Whileupholdingthewoman’srightofresidence,thecourtcommentedthatthehusbanddidnotoccupytheaccommodationthoughhemaintainedhispossessionoveronefloorofthepremises.Whilehewasnotinneedofthesaidaccommodation,thewifehadnoalternateaccommodationandshehadcontributedsubstantiallytowardsacquiringthesepremises.Hence,theBombayHighCourtupheldtheorderandcommentedthattheorderawardingsheltertothewifebythefamilycourtcouldnotbeheldtobeperverseorunjustified.


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InSunitaShankarSalviv.ShankarLaxmanSalvi,theBombayHighCourtupheldthewoman’srighttothematrimonialhomewhichwasinthejointnamesoftheparties.Inthiscase,boththehusbandandthewifehadfiledfordivorcethroughseparateproceedings.Thepartiessettledtheissueofdivorceandfiledconsentterms,withdrawingallegationsagainsteachother,andadecreeofdivorce,bymutualconsentwasawarded.Thedisputeovertherightofresidenceinthematrimonialhomecontinued.Thewifecontendedthattheflatwasjointlyacquiredand,hence,bothhaveanequalright,title,andinterest,inthesaidflat.Shereliedupondocumentsadmittedbythehusbandinsupportofhercontention.Afterhearingtheparties,thefamilycourtconcludedthatthewife’snamewasaddedattherequestofthehusbandbutthewifehadnotpaidanyconsiderationorcostforacquisitionofthepremises.Hence,shehadnoright,title,andinterest,inthesaidflatandwasnotentitledtoclaimanyownership,orforthatmatter,anyright,title,orinterestinthesaidflat.Thefamilycourtheldthatthewife’spetitionclaiming50percentoftheshareintheflatwasdevoidofanysubstance.

Againstthisdecree,thewifeapproachedthehighcourt,whichoverruledthejudgmentofthefamilycourtandheldthatthoughtherewasnotenancyinthewife’sname,thepremiseswereforthebenefitofthefamily.Thewifewasalsooccupyingthepremisesalongwiththehusbandasamemberofthefamily.Thehusbandhadalsoadmitted,unambiguouslyandunequivocally,thatathisrequestthewife’snamewasaddedasco-ownerandtheadmissionwouldoperateasanestoppelagainsthim.Hewasprecludedfromcontendingcontrarytohisadmissionintheformofadmitteddocumentsoftitle.Fromtheveryfactthatthenameofthewifewasjoinedasoneoftheownersinthetitledeed,itwouldhavetobepresumedthatthewifewasentitledtoanequalshareinthesaidflat.Thecourtcommentedthatthefamilycourtwasnotjustifiedinrefusingtorecognizethewife’s50percentshareintheright,title,andinterest,intheflat.Inordertoexecutethisdecreethecourtgaveanoptionforeitherofthepartiestopurchase50percentshareoftheoppositeparty.Andifneitherofthemwasinapositiontomakeanofferofpurchase,thepremiseswouldbesoldandthesaleproceedswouldbedividedequallybetweenthem.

InMalaViswanathanv.P.B.Viswanathan,407thewifefiledanappealagainsttheorderoftheAdditionalDistrictJudge,Alipore,restrainingherentryintothematrimonialhome.TheCalcuttaHighCourtupheldtherightofthewifetoresideinthematrimonialhomeinthefollowingwords:

Whenaquestionrelatingtograntofinjunctionrestrainingoneofthespousesfromenteringintothematrimonialhousecomesbeforethecourt,thecourthastodealwiththesamewithutmostcareandcaution.Onceapersonbecomespartofthehousebyreasonofmarriage,herrighttoresideinmatrimonialhousecannotbedenied.Marriageconfersarighttoresideinthe(p.217) matrimonialhomeonbothpartiestothemarriageaswellastheiroffspring.Suchrightisajointandindivisiblecommonright.Suchrightcannotbetakenawayfromone,bytheother.Themarriagecarriesaliabilityandrighttomaintenanceofoneortheother.Onehalfofonecannotdenytheotherhalf’srightinthematrimonialhome.Maintenance


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includesresidence.Thecourthastobeverycarefulindenyingsuchrightbygrantinginjunctionrestrainingthewifefromenteringintothematrimonialhome,ofwhichsheisapartof.Aninjunctioncanbegrantedonlywhenanexceptionalcaseismadeout.Itcanbegrantedsparinglyinacasewhereclearcaseforitismadeoutandsuchagrantwillnotresultinhelpingonetoousttheotherfromthematrimonialhome.

Further,thecourtcommentedthattheinterestofthewifeneedstobeprotectedwhilegrantingsuchorderstothehusband.

Inanotherimportantcase,MadhaviDudaniv.RameshDudani,408theBombayHighCourtrecognizedthewife’srighttoshelterupondivorceanddirectedthehusbandtopurchasearesidentialpremisescomprisingofahall,kitchen,andonebedroom,fortheexclusiveuseofthewifeandtwodaughters.ThehusbandhaddisputedthevalidityofmarriageonthegroundthatthewifewasnotaHindupriortohermarriageandhadnotconvertedtoHinduism.Hence,amarriagebetweenaHinduandanon-HinducouldnotbeconsideredasvalidundertheHinduMarriageAct.Thiscontentionwasoverruledbythehighcourt.

Whilethesehighcourtrulingsbroughtinsomerespitetowomen,therewasnocleardirectionfromtheSupremeCourtregardingthewife’srightofresidenceinthematrimonialhome.Butfinallyin2005,inB.P.AchalaAnandv.S.AppiReddy,409theSupremeCourtupheldthewife’srighttoresideinthematrimonialhome,evenagainstthelandlord.ThisrulingpronouncedbytheBenchcomprisingofR.C.LahotiCJ,G.P.MathurJ.andP.K.BalasubramanyanJ.incorporatedintotheIndianlawtheageolddictumoftheEnglishlaw,‘desertedwife’srightinequity’discussedearlier.

Thehusbandhaddesertedthewifeandhadleftthematrimonialhome,whichwasatenantedapartmentand,thereafter,hestoppedpayingtherentfortheapartment.Sincehefaultedinthepaymentofrentaldues,thelandlordinitiatedproceedingsforeviction.Sincethewifewouldbeaffectedbyanyorderofevictionandrenderedshelter-less,sheapproachedthecourttobeimpleadedasapartytotheproceedings.TheKarnatakaHighCourtgrantedherrequestanddirectedhertopaythedues.Thecaseproceededfurtherand,finally,itwasheldthatthelandlordcouldnotevictthetenantsfromthepartofthepremisesoccupiedbythewife.Againstthisdecision,thelandlordfiledanappealinthehighcourt.Thehighcourtruledinfavourofthelandlordandheldthattherewasnorelationshipoflandlordandtenantbetweenhimandthewomanconcerned.

TheappealagainstthisorderprovidedtheSupremeCourtanopportunitytoexpandthescopeofwomen’srightstotheirmatrimonialhome.Initsopeningcomments,therulingreiteratesthepowerofthejudiciallawmarkinginthefollowingwords,‘Unusualsituationsposingissuesforresolutionisanopportunityforinnovation.Law,asadministeredbycourts,transformsintojustice.Thelawdoesnotremainstatic.Itdoesnotoperateinavacuum.Associalnormsandvalueschanges,lawstoohavetobere-interpreted,andrecast.’ItalsoborrowedthefollowingquotefromLordDenning,‘Lawdoesnotstandstill;itmovescontinuously.Oncethisisrecognized,thenthetaskofa


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judgeisputonahigherplain.Hemustconsciouslyseektomouldthelawsoastoservetheneedsofthetime.’

(p.218) SincetherewerenoIndianlegalprecedentswhichaddresstheissuedirectly,thecourtreferredtothelegalprinciplesunderEnglishlawandapprovinglyquotedLordDenning:‘Awifeisnolongerherhusband’schattel.Sheisbeginningtoberegardedbythelawasapartnerinallaffairswhicharetheircommonconcerns.Thus,thehusbandcannolongerturnthewifeoutofthematrimonialhome.Shehasasmuchrightashe,tostaythereeventhoughthehousedoesstandinhisname…Moreover,ithasbeenheldthatthewife’srightiseffective,notonlyasagainstherhusband,butalsoasagainstthelandlord.Thuswhereahusbandwhowasstatutorytenantofthematrimonialhome,desertedhiswifeandleftthehouse,thelandlordcouldnotturnthewifeoutsolongasshepaidtherentandperformedtheconditionsofthetenancy.’

ExpandingthescopeofSection27oftheHinduMarriageAct,whichempowersamatrimonialcourttomakerelevantordersregardingthejointpropertyoftheparties,410thecourtruledthatthissectioncanbeinvokedtopassordersregardingtheseparatepropertyofthepartiesoreventenantedpremises.

Thecourtempoweredthewifetointerveneinanyproceedingsfiledbythelandlordagainstherhusbandandcommentedthatadesertedwife,whohasbeenorisentitledtobeinoccupationofthematrimonialhome,isentitledtocontestthesuitforevictionfiledagainstherhusbandinhiscapacityastenant,ifheisnotinterestedincontestingthesame,asitwouldprejudicethedesertedwife,whoisresidinginthepremises.Itwasruledthatthedesertedwifeinoccupationofthetenantedpremisescannotbeplacedinapositionworsethanthatofasub-tenantcontestingaclaimforevictiononthegroundofsubletting.Havingbeendesertedbyherhusband,shecannotbedeprivedoftheroofoverherheadwherethehusbandhasconvenientlylefthertofacetheperilofeviction,attributabletodefaultorneglectbyhim.Thecourtheldthatthepositionofthewifeisakintothatofanheirofthehusband.Sincethehusbandhadlostinterestinprotectinghistenancyrights,thesamerightwoulddevolveuponthewifesolongasshecontinuesinoccupationofthepremises.

Thedecisionamountedtojudiciallawmaking.TheSupremeCourtclarifiedthatitwasusingitspowersoflawmakingunderArticle142oftheConstitution,whilerespondingtothedemandsofsocialandgenderjustice,andinordertodocompletejustice.Theprinciplesproclaimedinthisrulingwouldbebindinguntilasuitablelegislationisenacted.Thejudgmentispathbreakingandwhichsubstantiallyexpandedthescopeofwomen’srighttothematrimonialhome.Butthewomanherselfdidnotgainfromitas,pendingproceedings,shehadobtainedadecreeofdivorcebymutualconsentandtherewasnoagreementbetweenthepartiesregardingherrightofcontinuedresidenceinthetenantedpremisesaspartofthehusband’sobligationtomaintainher.

Therehavealsobeenimportantjudgmentsinrespectofwomen’srighttoresideinthematrimonialhome,asagainstthehusband,whichhaveprotectedthewifebyanousterorderagainstthehusband.Significantinthisrealmisanunreportedcasedecidedbythe


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BombayHighCourtin1998(A.F.v.A.F.M.J.SuitNo.3264of1994dated14August1998(unreported)).Thepartiesbelongedtothelowereconomicbackground.Thereweresixchildrenofthemarriage,fivedaughtersandason.Theoneroomtenement(p.219) wasinitiallyinthenameofthehusband’smother,waslatertransferredtothehusband’sname.Thehusbandwhowasanalcoholicanddrugaddictthreatenedtotransferthetenancyandrenderthewifeandfamilyshelter-less.Whenhewasarrestedonaccountofsomepettycrime,thewifebailedhimoutonconditionthathetransfersthepremisestohername.Heconceded,andenteredintoanagreementtothiseffect.Thewifeandchildrenweresubjectedtoextremecrueltyandabuse.Thegirlswerelivingundertheconstantfearofsexualabusebyadrunkenfather.WhentheseriesofpolicecomplaintsandNGOinterventionsdidnotyieldanyresults,acasewasfiledforaninjunctionrestraininghisentryintothepremisesalongwithaprayerforjudicialseparationundertheIndianDivorceActintheHighCourtofBombay.Therightsofthewifeandchildrenwereprotected,boththroughaninitialad-interimandinterimorder,aswellasafinalorder.Theorderswereexpartesincethehusbandrefusedtoattendcourtproceedings.Andthewomanfacedextremedifficultiesinenforcingthisorder.Violenceandabusecontinued,but,finally,proceedingsunderSection498A(crueltytowives)resultedinhisconvictionforthreeyears,andthewifeandchildrencouldliveinpeace.Thiswasanextremecaseofphysicalandsexualabuse.Inordertodojusticeandprotecttherightsofbasicsurvivalanddignity,evenintheabsenceofastatutoryprovision,thecourtsareempoweredtopassprotectionorders,intheinterestofjustice,usingitsowninherentpowers.

ProtectionofMatrimonialResidenceUndertheDomesticViolenceAct,2005

Whiletherehavebeennostatutoryprovisionswithinthematrimonialstatutes,therecentlyenactedProtectionofWomenfromDomesticViolenceAct,2005,providesindependentrelieftowomenbyprovidingforprotectiveinjunctionsagainstviolence,dispossessionfromthematrimonialhome,andalternateresidence.NowavictimofdomesticviolencecanseekprotectionundertheprovisionsofthisAct.TheActalsoprovidesthescopeforclaimingeconomicprotection,includingmaintenance.Thewidedefinitionofdomesticviolence,physical,mental,economical,andsexual,bringsunderitspurviewtheinvisibleviolencesufferedbyalargesectionofwomenandentitlesthemtoclaimprotectionfromthecourts.

WhiletheActdoesnotcreateanynewrightswhichwerenotavailabletowomenpriortothisenactmentthroughstatutoryorjudgemadelaws,itprovidesasinglewindowandsimpleproceduresforclaimingrightswhichwerescatteredunderdifferentstatutesandlegalprovisions.Thelitigationforumisthemagistrate’scourtwhichiseasilyaccessiblebywomen.Inaddition,simultaneously,theprovisionsofthisActcanbeinvokedinanyproceedingswhicharependinginanyothercivilorcriminalcourt.411

Thecampaignsbywomen’sgroups,priortotheenactmentandmediapublicityitreceivedaftertheenactment,hashelpedtobringaboutawarenessregardingthewoman’srighttoresideinthematrimonialhome.SincetheActgivesastatutoryrecognitiontotheprinciplewhichwasadvancedthroughjudgemadelaws,manymore


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womenarestakingtheirclaimstoresidenceinthematrimonialhomeandforprotectionordersrestrainingthehusbandsfromdispossessingthemandcausinganyharmtothem.AjudgecalledupontoproviderelieftoawomanunderthenewActisboundbynotjusttheprovisionsoftheAct,buttheideologicalframeworkwhichunderscorestheenactmentthatahusbandisboundtoprovidehiswifearoofoverherhead,andthatshehasarighttoliveinthathousewithoutthefearofviolence.

(p.220) Afterthisenactment,itisnolongerpossibletoholdthatthematrimonialhomeistheexclusivedomainofthehusband,andthewomanhasnorighttoresideinitagainstherhusband’swishes.Evenifthewomanisnotresidinginthepremises,itispossibleforhertoobtainanorderofre-entryalongwithaprotectionorder,residenceorder,andanorderofmaintenanceforherselfandherchildren.

TheActwidensthescopeofprotectionagainstviolencebeyondthecategoryofwivesandextendsitnotonlytomothers,daughters,andsisters,buteventowomenininformalrelationships.Agedwomen,unmarriedgirls,andwidowed/divorcedsisters,cannowseekprotectionfromtheirrelativesunderthisAct.Anentiregamutofwomen,whosemarriagesaresuspectduetosomelegaldefectonthegroundthatessentialceremonieswerenotperformedorthatthemanorthewomanhasanearliersubsistingmarriage,areabletoseekreliefunderthisAct.Theinvalidityofamarriagecannolongerbeusedasdefencebythemantodispossessthewoman,ordenyhermaintenance.412

InVandanav.TSrikanth,413theMadrasHighCourtprovidedabroadinterpretationtothenotionsof‘sharedhousehold’and‘domesticrelationship’undertheAct,asdefinedunderSection2(s)andSection2(f),respectively.Inthiscase,thehusbandhadcontestedtherightoftheaggrievedwifetoresideinthesharedhouseholdunderSection17ofthePWDVAbecausethepartieshadnotlivedtogetherinthesharedhouseholdforevenasingledayaftertheirmarriage.Thehusbanddisputedtheveryfactofmarriageitself.Butthecourt,upholdingtherightoftheaggrievedwifetoresideunderSection17,heldthatthewifehasadejurerighttoliveinthesharedhouseholdbecauseofherstatusasawifeinthedomesticrelationship.Thisrulingawardedjudicialrecognitiontotheconceptthatthecontractofmarriageencompasseswithinit,arightofresidence.

InIndia,mostcouples,aftermarriage,liveinajointhousehold,sharedwiththehusband’sparentsandsiblings.Thequestionthathassurfacedinjudicialdiscourseiswhethersuchdwellingscanbeconstruedasthe‘matrimonialhome’or‘sharedhousehold’ofthewoman,andwhethersheisentitledtoobtainanorderofinjunctionrestrainingthehusbandandhisfamilymembersfromdispossessingher.Thishasbecomeahighlycontestedissuewhiledeterminingtherightsofresidenceofwomeninsuchhouseholds.Whilethereissomerecognitionoftherightofresidenceagainstthehusband,especiallyifthewifeisinpossessionofthepremises,therewasnorecognitionoftherightofresidenceagainstthehusband’sfamilymemberswherethecoupleislivingwithinajointfamilyunit.Itwashopedthattheenactmentwouldstrengthenthisrightandbroadenitsscope.

Ratherunfortunately,thefirstrulingoftheSupremeCourtpronouncedin2007,inS.R.


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Batrav.TarunaBatra,414hasconstrainedthescopeofthisstipulationandhasheldthatthesharedhouseholdundertheActconstitutesonlythepremisesownedbythehusbandorthepremiseswhereheholdsanHUFinterestinthefamilyproperty.TheSupremeCourt,whileexaminingthedefinitionofthesharedhouseholdunderPWDVA,heldthatasharedhouseholdindicatesahousebelongingtoortakenonrentbythehusband,orahousewhichbelongstothejointfamilyofwhichthehusbandisamember.Sincethehousebelongedtothemother-in-law,thedaughter-in-lawcouldnotclaimanyrightsinthesaidpremises.Further,itwasheldthattheclaimforalternativeaccommodationcanonlybemadeagainstthehusbandandnotagainstthein-laws,orotherrelatives.Thismightprovedetrimentaltotherightsofwomenlivinginjointfamilyhouseholdsownedbytheparents-in-lawinwhichthehusbandhimselfhasnolegalrighttoresidebywayoftitleorinterest.

Subsequently,ascanbepredicted,thispleawastakenbyseveralhusbandstovacatetheinitialprotectionorderspassedbylowercourts.Varioushighcourts,followingthedecisionoftheSupremeCourt,struckdowntheordersgrantingprotectiontowomenintheirmatrimonialhomeandwomenweredeprivedoftheirrightsofresidinginjointfamilyhouseholds.

Forinstance,inHemaxiAtulJoshiv.MuktabenKarsandasJoshi,415theBombayHighCourt,relyingupontheaboveruling,heldthatsharedhouseholdindicatesthehousebelongingtoortakenonrentbythehusband,orthehousewhichbelongstothejointfamilyofwhichthehusbandisamember.Thehusbandhadfiledapetitionfordivorceandthewifehadfiledacorrespondingpetitiontoprotectherrighttoresideinthematrimonialhome,andsoughtaninjunctionagainstherdispossession.Priortofilingofproceedingsfordivorce,thepartieshadshiftedoutofthejointfamilyhouseholdintoaseparateapartment.Thewifestakedherclaimofresidenceinthepremisesownedbyhermother-in-lawandnotagainstherhusband.Thecourtrejectedherclaimonthegroundthatmerelybecausethewifestayedinthehouseofhermother-in-lawalongwithherhusbandforsometime,shedidnotaccruealegalrightofresidenceinthesaidpremises.Itwasnotthepropertyinwhichthehusbandhadaright.Therightisavailabletothewifeonlyagainstherhusbandandnotagainstanyothermemberofhisfamily.

AbhaArorav.AngelaSharma416isanothersimilarcaseofthewifeclaimingarightofresidenceagainsthermother-in-law,relyinguponthenotionofasharedhousehold.Themother-in-lawhadinitiatedproceedingstorestraintheentryofthedaughter–in-lawintothepremisesownedbyher.Thedaughter-in-lawfailedtoobtainacounterinjunctioninherfavourforherre-entry.Subsequently,themother-in-lawsoldthepremisesandmadeanapplicationtothecourtforpermissiontowithdrawtheproceedingsfiledbyher.Thedaughter-in-lawopposedthisonthegroundthatherrightsunderPWDVAwouldbedefeatedifthemother-in-lawisallowedtowithdrawhersuit.Butthehighcourtrejectedthispleaandheldthatsincethepropertyisownedby(p.221) themother-in-law,thedaughter-in-lawcannotclaimtherightofresidence,asthesameisnotasharedhouseholdundertheprovisionsofPWDVA.Thehighcourtcommentedthatthedaughter-in-lawwasnotresidinginthesuitpropertybutwasresidingandworkinginthe


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UK,andwasearningasubstantialincome.Theproceedingsfiledbyherweredismissedfordefault,asshedidnotfollowupthesuit.Hence,therewasnoreasonforpreventingthemother-in-lawfromwithdrawinghersuitandcompellinghertoproceedwithit.

InNeetuMittalv.KantaMittal,417thewifefiledproceedingsagainstherin-lawsforanorderofpermanentinjunctionunderOrder39,Rule1and2ofCPC,andalsoinvokedtherelevantprovisionsforherrighttoresidence(p.222) underPWDVA.Whilethewifeadmittedthatshehadbeenlivingseparatelywithherhusband,shepleadedthatthisaccommodationisnotadequate.Herrelationshipwiththein-lawswasnotcordialandthecouplewerelivingseparatelyduetothesettlementarrivedat,atthepolicestation,betweentheparties.Hence,itwasheldthatherstayingwiththein-lawswouldbedetrimentaltotheirhealthandinterest,andtheirrighttolivewithdignity.Thetrialcourtorderwasaffirmedbythehighcourt.RelyingupontheBatracase,thecourtcommentedthatthewife’sclaimofresidenceisonlyagainstherhusbandandnotagainstherin-laws.

ThefactsofM.Nirmalav.Dr.GandlaBalakotaiah,418areslightlydifferent.Here,thewifehadfiledanapplicationunderOrder39readwithSection151ofCPCseekinganinjunctionagainstherhusbandfromdispossessingher.ShealsoinvokedSection19(f)ofPWDVA.Shecontendedthatthepropertywaspurchasedin1997outofherownandherfamily’sfunds,butstoodinthenameofherhusband.Whilesheresidedinthepremises,thehusbandhadleftthehomeandwasnowtryingtodispossessher.Thehusbanddeniedthiscontentionandpleadedthatthepremiseswerepurchasedfromhisownfundsandthroughabankloanandrelieduponrelevantdocumentstoprovehiscase.Healsostatedthatherecognizedtherightofthewifeforshelterandwasreadytopayforanalternativeaccommodation.Thetrialcourtdismissedthewife’spetition,butdirectedthehusbandtopayasumofRs3,500permonthtowardsrent.ThewifechallengedthisorderinthehighcourtonthegroundthatshewasentitledtothepossessionofthematrimonialhouseasperSection19oftheDomesticViolenceAct.Thehighcourtupheldtheorderofthefamilycourtonthegroundthatshecouldnotprovehercontributiontowardsthepurchaseofthepremises.

Ascanbeseen,withinafewyearsofthenewenactmentaconstrainedscopeoftheprovisionofthesharedhouseholdisbeginningtoemerge,whichwoulddrasticallycurtailtherightsofwomen.Thishasbecomearoutineploytodeprivewomenoftheirrightofresidence.Insomecases,thecourtshaveseenthroughthesestrategiesandhavedeclinedtoapplytheratiooftheBatracase,basedonfactsandcircumstancesoftheparticularcase.

InNidhiKumarGandhiv.TheState,419thewifehadfiledforre-entryintothematrimonialhomefromwheresheandherminordaughterhadbeendispossessed.Thehusbandresistedherclaimbystatingthatthepremisesbelongedtohisfatherandthathewasnotresidinginthesaidpremises.Thewifecontendedthatheshiftedhisresidenceonlyaftershehadinitiatedproceedingsagainsthim.Inviewofthis,interimorderswerepassedinherfavour.Thehusbandchallengedtheorders,relyingupontheBatracaseandpleadedthatthepremiseswereneitherownednorrentedbyhim,anditwasnotthejointfamilypropertyand,thus,couldnotbeconstruedasasharedhousehold.Inviewof


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this,thesessionscourtvariedtheresidentialorderpassedbythemagistrate’scourt.Inappeal,theDelhiHighCourtrestoredtheordersofthemagistrate’scourtandobservedthatitwasprematureonthepartoftheSessionsJudgetoapplytheratiooftheBatracasewithoutanyevidencehavingbeenledtodeterminewhether,infact,thehusband’sfatherownedthepremisesandwhetherthehusbandhadnorighttolivethere.Thehighcourtcommentedthatitisinconceivablehowataninterlocutorystage,inviewofthemandateundertheActtoprovideurgentrelief,afinaldeterminationonthis(p.223)aspectcouldbemade.Further,itwasheldthattherightsofthehusband’sfamilyarenotaffectedbytheorderofrestorationandthewife’soccupationofthepremises.

InP.BabuVenkatesh,KandayammalandPadmavathiv.Rani,420thewifehadbeenbeatenandthrownoutofthematrimonialhomeatmidnight.Sheapproachedthecourtsforanurgentresidenceorderagainstherhusbandandin-laws.Thetrialcourt,takingintoconsiderationtheurgencyofthecase,passedad-interimreliefsinherfavourpermittinghertore-enterthematrimonialhome.Sincethein-lawshadlockedthehouse,shewaspermittedtobreakopenthelocksandenterthepremises.Thehusbandandin-lawsfiledanappealandsubmittedthatthedivorcepetitionfiledbyhimispending.Further,thehousewasinthenameofhisfatherandreferredtotheBatracasethatawifecannotclaimfromherin-laws.Thewife,however,contendedthathehadalienatedthehouseinthenameofhisfatherduringthependencyofthecase.Thecourtcommentedthatifthecontentionofthehusbandisacceptedtheneveryhusbandwillresorttotransferringhispropertyinfavourofsomeoneelsewhenamatrimonialdisputearises,andthenpleadthatthepremisesisnotthesharedhousehold,and,therefore,thewifeisnotentitledtoseekarightofresidence.Thecourtfurtherobservedthatthependencyofthedivorcepetitionhasnothingtodowiththepresentapplication.Whileupholdingtheordertobreakopenthelocks,thecourtcommentedthatthewifecannotbemadetowaitinthestreetandthathusbandswillpreventthewivesfromreapingthebenefitsoftheorderbysimplylockingthepremisesandwalkingaway.

InRazzakKhanv.ShahnazKhan,421itwasthewoman’ssecondmarriageand,subsequently,therewasadivorce.Thereafter,shefiledforresidentialordersunderSection18to20ofPWDVA.Thewifecontendedthatshelivedwithherhusbandandhistwobrothersintheirancestralhouse.Thelowercourtgrantedhertheprotectionorderandmaintenanceforherandtheminorson,thesessionscourtmodifiedthereliefanddirectedtheProtectionOfficertoprovidealternativeaccommodationtoherintheancestralhouseofherhusbandandevengrantedmaintenancetothefosterson.Itwasherhusband’scontentionthatshewasworkingasaclerkandcomfortablylivinginherparentalhouse,whilehewasamechanicandwasnotgettingregularsalaryandwasaheartpatient,and,further,thatafterdivorceitisnotproperforhertoliveintheancestralhouse.Thehighcourtafterperusingthedefinitionsofaggrievedwoman,domesticrelationship,andsharedhousehold,concludedthatevenadivorcedwomanisentitledtothesereliefsundertheAct,hence,thefactthatshewasadivorcedMuslimwomanandherstayingatherhusband’splaceisharamcannotbeaccepted,andupheldtheordersofthelowercourtsinherfavour.


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InShammiNagpalv.SudhirNagpal,DirectorofHotelTaj,President,IndianHotelsCompanyLtd.andCommissionerofPolice,422thewifehadfiledforaninjunctionagainstthehusbandandhiscompanyforrestrainingthemfromcreatinganythirdpartyrightsinrespectofthesuitpremisesandtohandoverandrestorevacantandpeacefulpossessiontoher.Shecontendedthatthesuitpremiseswerehermatrimonial(p.224)homewhichhadbeenallottedtoherhusbandbyhiscompany.Whileshehadgoneabroadforashortvisit,thehusband,incollusionwithhiscompany,terminatedtheleaseandtookawayallherbelongings.Shewasinformedaboutitthroughemailafteraday.WhenshereturnedtoMumbai,shecouldnotenterthesuitpremisesasthelockshadbeenchanged.

Thecourtobservedthatthefamilymemberscannotclaimexclusivepossessionorrightintheresidentialpremisesallottedbythecompanyasaconditionofservice.However,thehusband’sactofsurrenderingthesuitpremisestohisemployer,uponterminationoftheserviceoccupancyagreementinherabsence,wasnotbonafideanddeservedtobecondemned.Thecompanyofferedtoallowhertooccupythepremisesforafurtherperiodofsixmonthsuntilshecouldmakeherownalternatearrangements.

Thecasesdiscussedaboverevealthattherightofresidenceinpremisesownedbyathirdparty(includingthein-laws)isnotunconditional,aswasinitiallyprojectedinthemediasoonaftertheenactment.Thecourtswillexaminetherightonacasetocasebasis.Theconductofthepartiesconcernedisrelevantfordeterminingtherights.Also,theordersaresummaryinnatureandthereforetemporary.Thefinaldeterminationoftherightswillhappeninthecourseofcivilproceedings.

NotionofMatrimonialPropertyandRulesforitsDivision

HistoricalOriginsoftheDoctrineofPropertyDivision

Aswehaveobserved,themajorstruggleforwomeninEnglandhadbeentoacquiretherighttoownpropertyduringthesubsistenceoftheirmarriageandtofightthelegalprovisionwhichmergedtheirpropertywiththatoftheirhusbands.Hence,undertheEnglishcommonlawtradition,propertyofthespousesremainedseparateandmarriagedidnotcreateanyrightsinthepropertyoftheotherspouse.Incontrast,theEuropeanfamilylawsorthecontinentallegalsystemadoptedthenotionofcommunityofproperty.Underthisdoctrine,marriageitselfalterstherulesofpropertyownershipandmaintenance,andentitlesboththespousesrightsandinterestsineachother’sproperty.Allpropertyacquiredduringthesubsistenceofmarriagebyeitherofthespousesorjointlybythem,ispooledintoacommunityofpropertyoverwhichbothspousesacquireequalinterestsandrightsofcontrol.Upondivorce,thispropertybecomesdivisiblebetweenthespousesonanequalbasis.Underthelegalpremiseofdifferedcommunityofpropertythepropertyremainstheseparatepropertyofspousesduringthesubsistenceofmarriageandisthrownintoacommonpoolonlyatthetimeofdivorce,whenitbecomesdivisible.

Undertheseparatepropertyregime,themarriagehasnoimpactuponthetitleorrightsovertheproperty,andthepropertyandassetsaregovernedbythegeneralrulesof


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propertylaws.Hence,thepropertydoesnotbecomedivisibleatthetimeofdivorce.Thewoman’sfinancialclaimisconfinedonlytomaintenanceand,morerecently,toarightofresidenceinthedwellinghouse.

WhilethePortuguese(andotherEuropeanpowerssuchastheFrench,theDutch,etc.)introducedthecontinentalsystemintheircolonies,theBritishintroducedthecommonlawsystem.Hence,thefamilylawsofGoa,whicharebasedonthePortuguesefamilylaw,adoptedthesystemofcommunityofproperty,whereasBritishIndiaadoptedtheEnglishtraditionofseparateproperty.Thissystemcontinuedinthepost-Independenceperiod.ThenotionofcommunityofpropertyhasnotbeenintroducedintotheIndianfamilylawsystem.

(p.225) SomestatesintheUnitedStatesandmostprovincesofCanada,commonwealthcountriessuchasAustralia,NewZealand,Malaysia,Singapore,etc.,followedtheEnglishcommonlawtraditionsofseparateproperty,butinthe1970s,graduallyshiftedtothesystemofcommunityofproperty.

Theintroductionofvariousstatutoryprovisionsforeasydivorcescreatedsevereeconomichardshipstowomenastheylostthebargainingpowerfornegotiatingsettlements.Earlier,infaultbaseddivorces,womencoulddefendthefrivolouslitigationinitiatedbytheirhusbandsasthehusbandsweremandatedtoprovetheallegations,andiftheyfailed,theirpetitionwaslikelytobedismissed.Inthiscontextthehusbandwasreadytobargaininordertoobtainthewife’sconsentfordivorceand,duringthesenegotiation,womencouldstrikesomeeconomicbargainsasdivorcesettlements.Withtheintroductionofno-faultdivorce,thispowerwastakenoutofwomen’sreachasthehusbandsdidnothavetoproveanymatrimonialfault,butcouldmerelypleadbreakdownofmaritalrelations.Thiscreatedagreatdealofhardshiptowomenintermsoftheirrightofresidenceandtherighttomatrimonialassets.

Researchstudiesconfirmedthatdivorcehasamajordetrimentaleffectonthestandardoflivingofwomen.Thereasonforthedifferentialisprimarilythattheearningcapacityofdivorcedwomenislessthanthatofmen––theyaremorelikelytohaveinterruptedtheircareerstohavechildrenand,hence,earnloweramountsthanmen,andtheyarelesslikelytobeabletoresume(orremainin)full-timeemploymenttomakeuptheshortfallwhentheirmarriagebreaksdown.Evenaftertheirchildrenhavegrownup,theyarelikelytoremainlesswelloffbecausetheyareunabletobuildupsufficientfundsfortheirretirement.Hence,fromthe1970s,greatersignificanceisbeingattachedtothefinancialconsequencesofdivorceuponwomenandchildren.

Thishasledtotheintroductionofthenotionofdivisionofpropertyupondivorcetoensurejusticeandequitytowomenatthetimeofdivorce.Thisconcepthasbeenintroducedwithinthefamilylawsofseveralcountries,whichhaveadoptedvariousmodelsofpropertydistribution.Whilesomerelyuponthepremiseofequality,othersfunctionfromthepremiseofdependency.Thefirstquestionwhichariseswhileadjudicatingoverpropertydisputesiswhatconstitutesmatrimonialproperty,andthesecondandequallyimportantquestionistheruleswhichgovernthedivision.Thissection


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addressesthesetwoconcerns.

Thefourbasicconceptswhichareinvokedwhileprescribingtherulesfordivisionofpropertyatdivorcearetitle,fault,need,andcontribution.Titleindicateslegalownershipandthisconceptfavouredthehusbandasheusuallyheldthetitletothepropertyaccruedduringthemarriage.Thenotionofmatrimonialfaultwasusedtodenywomenaccusedofcrueltyoradulterytheirentitlements.Therightofmaintenance,alumpsumsettlement,ortherighttoresideinthematrimonialhomewasbasedonthewoman’sdependentstatuswithinmarriageduetowhichtheneedforeconomicsupportwaslocated.Thetheoryofcontributionwasthelatest,whichwasevolvedtoawardrecognitiontothenon-monitorycontributionofwomentothehouseholdwithinthecontextofapartnershipofequality.WhiletitlehasceasedtobeadeterminativefactorundermostmatrimoniallawsinWesterncountries,needandtoalesserextent,faultarestillrelevantinevolvingaconceptualframeworkforthecreationandimplementationofvariousdistributionfactors.Thesequencingofthefourcategoriesisoftenusedtosuggestaprogressionfromthesimplecommonlawemphasisontitletothemore(p.226) complexunderstandingofthefunctionandpurposeofthedistributionsystem.

DevelopmentoftheDoctrineofDistributionofMatrimonialPropertyinVariousCountries

EnglandandWalesAftertheintroductionoftheDivorceReformAct,1969,whichintroducedthebreakdowntheory,therewasafearthatmanyinnocentwives,divorcedagainsttheirwill,wouldbeleftwithinadequatefinancialprovisions.ThisledtothepassingoftheMatrimonialProceedingsandPropertyAct,1970,whichwasre-enactedasPartIIoftheMatrimonialCausesAct,1973.

The1973ActwasamendedbytheMatrimonialHomesandPropertyAct,1981,whichgavethedivorcecourtstheexpressstatutorypowertoorderthesaleofanyofthespouses’property.Moreimportantly,theMatrimonialandFamilyProceedingsAct,1984,extendedthecourt’spowersbyenablingittoimposeacleanbreak(thatis,aonce-and-for-allsettlementbetweenthespouseswithnocontinuingfinancialties)uponaspouse,andalteredthewaythepowerstobeexercised.Twoofthemostimportantchangeswere:

1)Torequirethecourt,whendecidingwhatordersshouldbemade,togivefirstconsiderationtothewelfare,whilstaminor,ofanychildofthefamilyunder18;and,2)Toimposeadutyuponthecourttoconsiderwhetheritisappropriatetoexerciseitspowersthatthefinancialobligationsofeachpartyterminateimmediately,orassoonaspossible.

The1984Actalsoendedtheobligationofthecourttoattempttoplacethepartiesinthepositionthattheywouldhavebeen,hadthemarriagenotbrokendown.Subsequently,thePensionsAct,1995,extendedthecourt’spowerstoenableittomakeordersdirectingthatallorpartofanylumpsumorpensionarisingonaspouse’sretirementbe


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paidtotheotherspouse(LoweandDouglas1998:778–9).

TheMatrimonialCausesAct,1973,wasfurtheramendedbytheFamilyLawAct,1996,principallytoreflectthechangestothesubstantivelawofdivorce,andthenewpolicythattheparties’financialandotherarrangementsforthefuturearetobesettledbeforeamarriageisbroughttoanend,ratherthanthereafter.

Thematrimonialcourtsnowhavethestatutorypowertomakeanorderagainsteitherspousewithrespecttoanyoneormoreofthefollowingmatters:

1.Unsecuredperiodicalpaymentstotheotherspouse;2.Securedperiodicalpaymentstotheotherspouse;3.Lumpsumpaymentstotheotherspouse;4.Unsecuredperiodicalpaymentsforanychildofthefamily;5.Securedperiodicalpaymentsforanychildofthefamily;6.Alumpsumpaymentforanychildofthefamily;7.Transferofpropertytotheotherspouseorforthebenefitofanychildofthefamily;8.Settlementofpropertyforthebenefitoftheotherspouseoranychildofthefamily;9.Variationofanymarriagesettlement.

Orderswithinthescopeofpoints1–6arecollectivelyknownasfinancialprovisionordersandthosewithinthescopeofpoints7–9,aspropertyadjustmentorders(LoweandDouglas1998:779–80).

Whereacourtmakesasecuredperiodicalpaymentsorder,alumpsumorder,orapropertytransferorder,itcanfurtherorderasaleofpropertybelongingtoeitherorbothspouses.After1996,thecourtsalsoacquiredthepowertomakefinancialprovisionorders(periodicalpaymentsandlumpsum)directingthatashareofaspouse’s(p.227)pensionbeearmarkedandpaidtotheotheronretirement.

TheFamilyLawAct,1996,emphasizesonmediationasaprocessbywhichthepartiesmightreachagreementonfinancialandotherdisputesarisingonmarriagebreakdown.Anintegralpartofthenewproceduresistheholdingofanearlyfinancialdisputeresolution(FDR)appointmentwherethespouses,inthepresenceofadistrictjudge,willbeencouragedtoaddresstheoutstandingissuesbetweenthemwithaviewtoarrivingatasettlement.Negotiatedsettlementsmayworktoreducehostilityandacrimonybetweentheparties.Further,itmakessenseforthepartiestoreachanagreementtosavethecostsofafullcourttrial,whichcanbeextremelysteep(LoweandDouglas1998:801–2).

Whilethisdiscussion,inanutshell,summarizesthepositionofstatutorylaw,thefollowinglandmarkcasesreflecthowthelawofdivisionofpropertyhasprogressedinEngland.

Thenotionofdivisionofpropertywasintroducedinaverytentativemannerduringthe


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1970sinWachtelv.Wachtel,423whenLordDenningintroducedtheonethirdruleofpropertydistributionasareasonablestartingpoint.Herefrainedfromapplyingtheruleofequaldistributiononthebasisthatitmaybeappropriateinfuture,butisnotappropriateinthepresentcase.Althoughhedidnotstatethatthisruleshouldbeapresumptioninsubsequentcases,courtsroutinelyappliedthisprincipleinclaimsbywivesfordivisionofmatrimonialproperty.

In1982,inPrestonv.Preston,424theconceptofneedwasintroducedanditwasheldthatanappropriateapproachwouldbetolookatthewife’sreasonablerequirementsandattempttoascertainwhatcapitalsumshewouldneedtoachieveacleanbreakandlivecomfortablyfortherestofherlife.ThisgaverisetotheDuxburycalculation,namedafterasubsequentcaseDuxburyv.Duxbury,425whichwasessentiallyanactuarialcalculationmadeonthebasisofthewife’sreasonablerequirements,normallycalculatedonhermonthlyexpenseswithreferencetoherage.Basedonthesefactors,acapitalsum,whichwasdeemedasappropriate,wouldbeorderedtobepaidtothewifebywayofacleanbreak.TheDuxburycalculationwassuchthatthecapitalwouldslowlydiminishuntiltheprojectedendofthewife’slifewhenshewouldbeleftwithnocapital.

Thisapproachwascriticizedforbeingdiscriminatoryagainstwomen.ButcourtscontinuedtoapplythisprincipleanditwastakentoanextremeinThyssen-Bornemiszav.Thyssen-Bornemisza.426Thiscaseintroducedthemillionaire’sdefence,whichwasessentiallythatonthebasisthatthecourtwouldadjudicateonthewife’sreasonablerequirements,therewouldbenoneedtomakeathoroughinvestigationintothehusband’sassetsashewassowealthythathecouldaffordwhateverthewife’sreasonableneedswereassessedat.

InthecaseofGojkovicv.Gojkovic,427wheretherehadbeenalongcohabitationbutarelativelyshortmarriageandnochildren,itwasconsideredrelevanttoexaminewhetherthewifehadmadeasubstantialcontributiontothebusiness.Itwasahotelbusiness,anditwasdeemedthatthewife’sreasonablerequirementswouldincludethetransferorpurchaseofahotelforhertorun.Hence,shewasawardedagreaterproportionofthetotalmaritalassets,inexcessof(p.228) merelyherreasonablerequirementsbecauseshehadcontributedfinanciallytothemarriage.

Thisapproachseemedtodiscriminateagainstthewifeandmother,whohadnotdirectlycontributedtothefinancialwell-beingofthefamily.Anotherproblemwiththisapproachwastheratherillogicalresultthatifawifewasolderherneedswouldbeless,thus,alongmarriagewouldaffordherasmallerproportionoftheassets.Atthesametime,asthehusband’sneedswerenotassessed,hewouldbeleftwiththelion’sshare,eventhoughhewasofacomparableagetothewife.

TheprincipleofPrestonwasfollowedintheUKuntiltheHouseofLordsdecisionin2000inWhitev.White,428whichestablishedequalityasareasonablestartingpointinthedivisionofmatrimonialassets.ItwasheldthatthefactorssetoutunderSection25oftheMatrimonialCausesAct,1973,shouldbemeasuredagainstayardstickofequality.Inthiscase,thewifereceivedslightlyoverone-fifthofthetotalmatrimonialassets.Onappeal,


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theCourtofAppealincreasedtheamounttoapproximatelytwo-fifthsofthetotalassets.Thewifewasapartner,butitwasheldthatshewasentitledtomorethanherpartnershipshareinrecognitionofthecontributionshehadmadetothefamilyaswifeandmother,overandaboveherpartnershiproleinthefarmingbusiness.TheHouseofLordsupheldthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealandgaveadetailedanalysisinrelationtoequality,thefinancialresources,andfinancialneedsoftheparties,andtheDuxburyparadoxdiscussedearlier.Alsoconsideredwastheparties’wishtoleavemoneytotheirchildren,whichwasdeemedtobeanaturalparentalwishinacasewhereresourcesexceedthefinancialneeds.Itwasheldthatajudgeisentitledtohaveinmindthewishesofawifethatherawardshouldnotbeconfinedtoanaccommodationandadiminishingfundofcapital,earmarkedforlivingexpenses,whichwouldleavenothingforhertopassontoherchildren.Themostimportantaspectofthisdecisionwasthenowmuch-usedstatementcoinedbyLordNicholls,thatajudge‘…wouldalwaysbewelladvisedtocheckhistentativeviewsagainsttheyardstickofequality.Asageneralguide,equalityshouldbedepartedfromonlyif,andtotheextentthat,thereisagoodreasonfordoingso.Theneedtoconsiderandarticulatereasonsfordepartingfromequalitywouldhelpthepartiesandthecourttofocusontheneedtoensuretheabsenceofdiscrimination.’

Threelandmarkcases,whichcameupinsubsequentyears,arediscussedheretoascertainthelegalprincipleswhichthecourtsnowadoptwhiledecidingtheissueofdivisionofproperty,429

Inthefirstcase,Millerv.Miller,itwasashortmarriageofthreeyearswithsignificantassetswhichwereacquiredduringthecourseofthemarriage.Thehusbandarguedthatsincethedurationofmarriagewasshort,thewife’sawardshouldbeless.Thewifearguedthatshehadgivenupheremploymentandadjustedherlifestyleaccordingtothestandardofthemarriageand,therefore,herawardshouldbesubstantial.Itwasheldthatthewifewasentitledtosomeshareoftheassets,includingtheconsiderableincreaseinthehusband’swealthduringthemarriage.Hadtheyardstickofequalitybeenappliedtoalltheassetswhichaccruedduringthemarriage,thewifewouldhavereceivedsubstantiallymore.However,sincethe(p.229) substantialgrowthwasattributedtocontactsandcapacitiesthehusbandbroughttothemarriageandsincetheassetswerebusinessassets,generatedsolelybythehusbandduringashortmarriage,thenormofequalitywassidestepped.Adistinctionwasmadebetweenmatrimonialandnon-matrimonialpropertyincasesofmarriagesofshortduration.

InMacFarlanev.MacFarlane,themarriagewasofsixteenyearsandtherewerethreechildren.Bothpartieswerequalifiedprofessionalsand,untilshortlybeforethebirthoftheirsecondchild,earnedsimilarincomes.Thereafter,thewiferemainedathometocareforthechildrenwhilethehusbandcontinuedaprofessionalcareerwithasalaryincreasingconsiderablyyearafteryear.Inthissituation,thefamilyhadinsufficientcapitaltoachieveacleanbreak,butthehusband’sincomewassubstantiallymorethantheparties’budgetedhouseholdexpenditure.Itwasheldthatthewifeshouldbeentitledtoashareofthefutureearningswhichhadbeenmadepossiblebyherpastcontributiontothehusband’scareer.Thecourtfurtherheldthat,inexceptionalcases,periodical


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paymentsshouldbeusedbytherecipienttoaccumulatecapital,particularlyinviewoftheinabilityofthepartiestosatisfythewife’sdemandforacleanbreak.Itwasheldthatthewife,havinggivenupherownhighlypaidcareerforthefamily,wasnotonlyentitledtoagenerousincomeprovision,includingsumswhichwouldenablehertoprovideforherownoldage.Shewasalsoentitledtoashareintheverylargesurplusonboththeprinciplesofsharingandcompensation.Thiswastocontinueforherlifetime,andtheburdenwasonthehusbandtojustifyareductionifhewishedtomakeanapplicationtothiseffectinthefuture.

Thethirdcase,Charmanv.Charman,concernedalongmarriageoftwenty-eightyearsandthereweretwoadultchildren.Thematrimonialassetswerebuiltupduringthecourseofthemarriage,fromnothingtoover£130million.Thehusbandarguedthathehadmadeaspecialcontribution,whichwasconcededbythewifewhosought45percentofthematrimonialassets.Thewifewasawarded36.5percentoftheassets(£48million).Thejudgebasedhisdeparturefromequality,bothonthespecialcontributionbythehusbandandonthegreaterrisksinherentontheassetsretainedbyhim.TheHouseofLordsreliedupontherulingsinMillerandMacFarlane.Thethreemainprincipleswhichwererelieduponinthiscasewere:need(generouslyinterpreted),compensation,andsharing.

Itwasheldthattheyardstickofequalityofdivision,identifiedbytheHouseofLordsinWhite,hadfilledthevacuum,whichhadarisenfromabandonmentofthecriteriaofreasonablerequirements,butithadnowdevelopedintotheequalsharingprinciple.Underthis,propertyshouldbesharedinequalproportionsunlesstherewasagoodreasontodepartfromsuchproportions.

ItwasfurtherheldthateachofthethreedistributiveprinciplesidentifiedbytheHouseofLordsinMillercouldbederivedfromSection25oftheMCA:

1.Theprincipleofneedrequiredconsiderationofthefinancialneeds,obligations,andresponsibilitiesoftheparties,thestandardoflivingenjoyedbythefamily,theageoftheparties,andanyphysicalormentaldisabilityofeitherspouse;2.Theprincipleofcompensationrelatedtoprospectivefinancialdisadvantagewhichsomepartiesfacedupondivorceasaresultofdecisionstakenforthebenefitofthefamilyduringthemarriage;and,3.Theprincipleofsharingwasdictatedbyreferencetothecontributionsofeachpartytothewelfareofthefamily,tothelengthofthe(p.230) marriageand,inanexceptionalcase,totheconductoftheparty.

LordNichollssuggestedthepossibilityof‘anincreasedrecognitionthatbybeingathomeandhavingandlookingafteryoungchildren,awifemayloseforevertheopportunitytoacquireanddevelopherownmoneyearningqualificationsandskills.’

UnitedStatesandCanadaIntheUnitedStatesandCanada,familylawsarestatelawsorprovinciallaws,andeachstateorprovinceenactsitsownlaws.ThestatesfollowthetraditionofEnglishcommon


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lawortheContinentalorEuropeanlaw,dependinguponthehistoryoftheircolonization.

Thestates/provincesfollowingthecommonlawtraditionofEnglishlawstartedadoptingthecontinentalmodelofdivisionofpropertyinthe1970sonthebasisofequality.Withtheintroductionoftheno-faultdivorce,itbecamenecessarytomoveawayfromtheearliernotionofmaintenance,whichindicatesacontinueddependencyonatheoryofcleanbreak,bydividingtheassetsthataccruedduringthesubsistenceofmarriage.

Theearliernotionofstatusmarriageswiththenotionofwomen’sdependency,whichrequiredthecourtstoordermaintenance,wasnolongerfoundtoberelevantwithinthenewschemeofequalpartners.Thelanguageofthestatutesbecamegenderneutralandthelawfunctionedfromthepremiseofcompleteequalitybetweenthespouses.Withinthisframework,obligationsendedwithdivorceandanyongoingeconomicobligationwhichisrecognizedasappropriate,suchaschildsupportorpaymentofexistingmaritaldebts,isconsideredasharedandequalresponsibility.

DifferentstatesintheUnitedStatesadoptavarietyofspecificdistributionfactorsthataretypicallynotedincommonlawstatestatutes,orcourtopinionsinstateswithgeneralstatutorydirectives.Thesefactorsinclude:

1.Thelengthofthemarriage;2.Thepropertybroughttothemarriagebyeachparty;3.Thecontributionofeachpartytothemarriage,oftenwiththeexplicitadmonitionthatappropriateeconomicvalueistobegiventocontributionsofhomemakingandchild-careservices;4.Thecontributionbyonepartytotheeducation,training,orincreasedearningpoweroftheother;5.Whetheroneofthepartieshassubstantialassetsnotsubjecttodivisionbythecourt;6.Theageandphysicalandemotionalhealthoftheparties;7.Theearningcapacityofeachparty,includingeducationalbackground,training,employmentskills,workexperience,andlengthofabsencefromthejobmarket;8.Custodialresponsibilitiesforchildren;9.Thetimeandexpensenecessarytoacquiresufficienteducationortrainingtoenablethepartytobecomeself-supportingatastandardoflivingreasonablycomparabletothatenjoyedduringthemarriage.

Increasingly,someconsiderationisgiventothedesirabilityofawardingthefamilyhome,ortherighttolivethereforareasonableperiod,tothepartyhavingcustodyofanychildren.Inaddition,othereconomiccircumstancesmaybeconsidered.Theseinclude,vestedorunvestedpensionbenefits,futureinterests,thetaxconsequencestoeachparty,andtheamountanddurationofanordergrantingmaintenancepayments.

Ifawrittenagreementwasmadebythepartiesbeforeorduringthemarriageconcerning(p.231) anyarrangementforpropertydistribution,suchagreementsareoftenpresumedbindinguponthecourtunlessinequitable.Somestatutorysystemsthat


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enumeratevariousfactorsexplicitlyendwithageneralcatch-allforjudicialdiscretionthatallowsconsiderationofsuchotherfactors,asthecourtmay,ineachindividualcasedeterminetoberelevant.

Thistendencytolimitthediscussionofrightsandobjectivestothoseofthespousesreflectsanimportantsocialdimensionandisconsistentwiththecontemporarypartnershipmodelofmarriage.Thisindividualisticapproach,coupledwiththeundeniablefactthatmoreresourcesarenecessarywhenanadulthastocareforchildreninadditiontoherself,meansthattheallocationofprivateresourcesatdivorcehasaprofoundeconomicandsocialimpactbecauseitaffectsthefutureabilityofacustodialparenttocareadequatelyforherchildren(Fineman1991:42).

TheCanadianstatutesgenerallyprovideforanunequaldivision,butdosocautiouslyandunderthebannerofjudicialdiscretion.Eachspouseisgenerallyentitledtohalfofbywhatevernameitgoesby–allfamilyassets,familyproperty,matrimonialassets,maritalassets,ormatrimonialproperty.McLeodandMalimo(2006)comment:‘Anequaldivisionofpropertydoesnotalwaysresultinafairdivision,forahostofreasons.Onepartymayhavetakenonallthedebts,inanothercase,apartymayhaveincurredgamblingdebtsandhidtheminthemortgageonfamilyloan.Agiftorinheritancemaybringhavocuponthefairnessofanotherwise“equal”division’.

Thelawisnotuniform,theterminologyisnotuniform,and,also,thecriteriaisnotuniform.Eachprovinceusesdifferentterminologyinthestatutebooks.Forinstance,lawyersinBritishColumbiaspeakofdetermininganddistributingfamilyassets,whileinOntariothetermusedisequalizingfamilyproperty.

Everystatutebeginswiththepresumptionthateachspouseownshalfofanymatrimonialproperty,butthefirsttaskistodeterminewhatconstitutesfamilyassets.Onceitcanbedeterminedwhatiswithinthepooloffamilyassets,apresumptionofequaldivisionwillapply.FromthatgeneraltheorytowhichallCanadianprovincessubscribe,thecourtcanusuallydeviate,ifequaldivisionispatentlyunfair.

AseloquentlystatedintheMaritalPropertyAct,1980,ofNewBrunswick,childcare,householdmanagement,andfinancialprovision,arejointresponsibilitiesofspousesandarerecognizedtobeofequalimportanceinassessingthecontributionoftherespectivespousestothematrimonialpropertyaswellastothemanagement,maintenance,andimprovementofmatrimonialproperty.Thecontributionofeachspousetothefulfilmentoftheseresponsibilitiesentitleseachtoanequalshareofthematrimonialproperty,andimposesoneachspouse,inrelationshiptotheother,theburdenofanequalshareofmaritaldebts.

TheOntarioFamilyLawAct,1990,stipulatesequaldivisionoffamilyproperty.Thefirstbattleistodeterminewhatisandwhatisnotafamilyassetand,therefore,subjecttothecleaveofthejudicialknife.TheOntariostatuteusesanesoterictermtodescribefamilyassets,anyinterest,presentorfuture,vestedorcontingentinrealorpersonalproperty.Thefollowingaretheexceptionstothisrule:


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1.Property,otherthanamatrimonialhome,thatwasacquiredbygiftorinheritancefromathirdpersonafterthedateofthemarriage;2.Incomefrompropertyreferredto(above),ifthedonorortestatorhasexpresslystatedthatitistobeexcludedfromthespouse’snetfamilyproperty;3.Damagesorarighttodamagesforpersonalinjuries,nervousshock,mentaldistressorlossof(p.232) guidance,careandcompanionship,orthepartofasettlementthatrepresentsthosedamages;4.Proceedsorarighttoproceedsofapolicyoflifeinsurance,asdefinedunderthe(Ontario)InsuranceAct,thatarepayableonthedeathofthelifeinsured;5.Property,otherthanamatrimonialhome,intowhichpropertyreferredto(above)canbetraced;and,6.Propertythatthespouseshaveagreedbyadomesticcontractisnottobeincludedinthespouse’snetfamilyproperty.

Section5(6)oftheOntarioActhasauniqueclausewhichexcludesthefollowingfromequaldistribution:

1.Aspouse’sfailuretodisclosetotheotherspousedebtsorotherliabilitiesexistingatthedateofmarriage;2.Thatdebtsorotherliabilitiesclaimedinreductionofaspouse’snetfamilypropertywereincurredrecklesslyorinbadfaith;3.Thepartofaspouse’snetfamilypropertythatconsistsofgiftsmadebytheotherspouse;4.Aspouse’sintentionalorrecklessdepletionofhisorhernetfamilyproperty;5.Thattheamountaspousewouldotherwisereceive…isdisproportionatelylargeinrelationtoaperiodofcohabitation,thatislessthanfiveyears;6.Thatonespousehasincurredadisproportionatelylargeramountofdebtsorotherliabilitiesthantheotherspouseforthesupportofthefamily.

TheAlbertastatute,theMatrimonialPropertyAct,usesthewords,‘thecourtshallnotdistributethepropertyequallybetweenspouseswhenitappearstothecourtthatitwouldnotbejustandequitabletodoso,takingintoconsiderationthematterinjudicialdiscretioninSection8.’Section8definescertaincircumstancesandgivesscopeforjudicialdiscretionbyadding,‘afactorcircumstancesthatisrelevant.’Thisallowsunequaldistributionandprovidesthescopeforjudicialreapportionmentonthebasisoffairness.

AsimilarprovisionisalsofoundinSection65oftheFamilyRelationsAct,1996,ofBritishColumbiawhichistitled‘JudicialReapportionmentontheBasisofFairness’andwhichliststhedatewhenpropertywasacquiredordisposedof,aswellasthegeneralclause‘anyothercircumstancesrelatingtotheacquisition,preservation,maintenance,improvementoruseofproperty,orthecapacityorliabilitiesofaspouse.’

So,overall,judicialdiscretionplaysanimportantrolewhiledeterminingtheactualdistributionofpropertybetweenthespouses.

AustraliaandNewZealand


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Though,bothAustraliaandNewZealandbelongtothecommonlawtradition,thelegalprovisionsofdistributionofpropertyvaryagreatdealbetweenthesetwocountries.NewZealandenactedtheMatrimonialPropertyAct,1976,whichempoweredthecourtstodividematrimonialpropertybetweenthespousesatthetimeofdivorceandlaiddownelaborateguidelinesinrespectofthis.Thebasicpresumptionwasequality.In2002,thisActwasrenamedasthePropertyRelationshipsAct,1976,toawardlegalrecognitiontodefactocouplesandpartnersofsamesexrelationships.UndertheprovisionsoftherevisedAct,propertyisreferredtoasrelationalpropertyasopposedtotheearliertermmatrimonialpropertyandincludestherightsofdefactocouplesandsamesexrelationships.TheActwasfurtheramendedin2005toincludecivilunioncouples.

Australiafollowsthecommonlawapproachtofamilyrelatedissues,whichisessentiallynon-interventionistduringthesubsistenceof(p.233) marriage.Marriagehasnolegalimpactonaspouse’sownershipofproperty.Anythingownedbeforemarriageoracquiredinanymannerduringit,remainsthepropertyoftheownerandisunderhisorhermanagementandcontrolwhilethemarriagesubsists.Detailedprovisionsdefiningthenatureoffamilyassetsorentitlements,andpredeterminingsharesondeathordivorce,arequiteforeigntotheAnglo-Australianlegalsystem.TheFamilyLawAct(FLA)enactedin1975,containsnodefinitionofwhatisorisnotmatrimonialproperty,otherthanitsunhelpfulreferencetopropertytowhichthosepartiesare,orthatpartyis,asthecasemaybe,entitled,whetherinpossessionorreversion.Italsohasnopresumptionsorrulesastodistribution(Harrison1992).

TheActconferswidepowersonthecourttoadjustpropertyafteramarriagebreakdowninamanneritconsidersappropriate,provideditissatisfiedthat,inallthecircumstances,theparticularorderisjustandequitable.Thediscretionisnotcompletelyunfettered,asissuesofcontributiontothepropertyandneedsoftheparties(bothdefinedintheAct)mustbetakenintoaccount,althoughthereisnoobligationtospecifywhatweightageistobegiventothevariouscriteriawhensharesaredetermined.

TheAustraliansystemfordividingthematrimonialassetsondivorceisaseparatepropertyregime.Onseparation,thestartingpointwhendividingpropertyisthateachspouseretainsownershipofthepropertylegallytheirs.Thisis,however,onlyastartingpoint.UnderthefinancialprovisionsofFLA,thefamilycourtshavethediscretionarypowerstoalterparties’propertyinterestsonmarriagebreakdownifitisjustandequitabletomaketheorder.Exercisingthispowerrequiresthecourtstoconsidertheparties’respectivecontributionstothepropertyandotherfactorsunderSection75(2),includingtheirfuturefinancialneeds.Whendividingtheproperty,thecourtisdirectedtotakeaccountofthefinancialandnon-financialcontributionsmadetothepropertyandtothewelfareofthefamily.Non-financialcontributions,inparticular,includeanylabourthatmayhaveincreasedthevalueoftheproperty,aswellascontributionsmadetothewelfareofthefamilythroughunpaidworkathomeandcareofthechildren[Section79(4)].

Intheory,thetaskofdividingpropertybasedontheparties’respectivecontributionsappearssimple.However,inpractice,therearecleardifficultiesinvolvedincomparing


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contributionswhicharefundamentallydifferent.Inthecaseofnon-financialcontributions,therearedifficultiesinvolvedinplacingamonetaryvalueonthecontributions.Thereisamovetorestrictjudicialdiscretioninevaluatingcontributionsbyintroducingastartingpointofequalsharinginthevalueofthematrimonialproperty–astartingpointthatisbasedontheprincipleofequalcontributionbythepartiestothepropertyofthemarriage.

Havingdeterminedtherespectivesharesofpropertybasedonthesecontributions,thecourtisdirectedtomakeanadjustmentwhichwouldtakeaccountofotherfactorsincludingthefutureneedsofeachoftheparties.Theestimationoffutureneedisbasedonfactorsorcircumstancesofabroadlyfinancialnature,suchastheageandhealthoftheparties,employmentprospects,andfinancialresources,responsibilityforthecareofchildrenpost-separationanddivorce,thedurationofthemarriage,andtheextenttowhichithasaffectedthefutureearningcapacityoftheparties.Inall,therearefifteenlargelyprospectivefactorsforconsiderationcoveringwhateachpartyislikelytoneedandwhateachisabletopaytosupporttheother.430.Inpractice,thissecondstagein(p.234) achievingajustandequitablesettlementisfrequentlyemployedtotakeintoaccountthefuturefinancialneedsofwomenandchildren.Womenwithdependentchildrencanbeataconsiderabledisadvantagecomparedtomenintermsoftheirfinancialcircumstancesandtheirincomeearningpotentialfollowingmaritaldissolution(SheehanandHughes2001).

Whilesimplifiedhere,thedetailedfinancialprovisionsthatgoverntheallocationofpropertyondivorceareinherentlycomplex,andthereisamplescopefordisagreementamongstthejudiciaryandthepartiesthemselvesastotheinterpretationoftheseprovisions.Thisisnotsurprising,giventhatthelawconferssuchwidediscretioninsettlingpropertymatters.Inaddition,thelawguidestheparties’actionsatatimeintheirliveswhentheyareunderconsiderableemotionalandfinancialstress,whenmutualconsiderationforoneanother’swelfareandduerecognitionoftheirrespectivecontributionstothemarriagemaynolongerbethenorm.

Insuchanenvironment,dividingpropertyondivorceisadifficulttask,andonewhichismadeevenharderforthesizeableminorityofwomenandmenwhosettletheirpropertymatterswithoutformallegalrepresentation.Thereis,therefore,apotentialfordiscordancebetweentheprovisionsofthelawdescribedabove,andtheapplicationoftheseprovisionsbywomenandmenwho‘bargainintheshadowofthelaw’(MnookinandKornhauser1979).

ThestudyconductedbytheAustralianInstituteofFamilyStudiesfoundthatpropertydivisionfailedtoshowequaloradequateconsiderationofindirectcontributionstothemarriageeconomybywomen(McDonald1986).Mothershadusuallywithdrawnfromthepaidworkforcetocareforyoungchildrenand,consequently,wereofteninaparlousfinancialpositionwhenthemarriagecametoanend.Theeconomicarrangementsmadeduringmarriagedidnothelpwomenafterseparation,whentheylostthebenefitofthemainincomeearnerbutretainedresponsibilityforalargeproportionofchild-related


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expenses.Theirinterruptedjobhistoriesandchildcareresponsibilitiesalsodidnotequipthemforregularpaidemployment.

InNewZealand,marriedcoupleswerecoveredbytheequal-sharingrulesintheMatrimonialPropertyAct,1976.431TheActclassifiedpropertyundertwoheadings—matrimonialandseparate—andprovidedthatmatrimonialpropertywould,ingeneral,bedividedequally.TheActdividedmatrimonialproperty,inturn,intotwofurthercategories:

Thefamilyhomeandchattels(includingthefamilycarandfurniture)wouldbedividedequallyunless:

1.Themarriagewasforlessthanthreeyears(amarriageofshortduration);2.Therewereextraordinarycircumstancesthatwouldhavemadeequalsharingrepugnanttojustice;3.Inwhichcase,thehomeandchattelsweredividedaccordingtotheparties’contributionstothemarriagepartnership.

Othermatrimonialproperty(propertysuchasfamilybusinesses,investments,andinsurancepolicies,includingsuperannuationbenefits)wasdividedequallyunlesstheparties’contributionstothemarriagepartnershipwereclearlyunequal,inwhichcaseitwasdividedaccordingtotheparties’contributionstothemarriagepartnership.Thiswascalledbalancematrimonialproperty.

Thepresumptionthatthepropertyshouldbesplitfifty–fiftywasstrongerforthefamily(p.235) homeandchattelsthanitwasforothermatrimonialproperty.

Intheassessmentofthedifferentcontributionsmadetothemarriage,financialcontributionsdidnotrateanymorehighlythancontributionsofotherkinds,suchascaringforchildrenorperformingdomestictasks.

Theseparateproperty(allpropertynotclassedasmatrimonialproperty)remainedthepropertyofthepersonwhoowneditandwasnotdivided.Itincluded:

1.Propertythatthepartiesownedbeforetheymarriedandthattheykeptseparateduringthemarriage;2.Anygiftsandinheritancesthatthepartiesreceivedduringthemarriageandthattheykeptseparate

Separatepropertyalsoincludedallpropertyacquiredoutofseparateproperty,andtheproceedsofsellinganyseparateproperty.

Butifanincreaseinthevalueofoneparty’sseparateproperty,oranyincomeorgainsderivedfromtheproperty,wascausedwhollyorpartlybytheapplicationofmatrimonialproperty,thentheincrease,ortheincome,orgains,wasmatrimonialproperty,notseparateproperty.


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Similarly,ifanincreaseinthevalueofoneparty’sseparateproperty,oranyincomeorgainsderivedfromtheproperty,wascausedwhollyorpartybytheactionsoftheotherparty,theincrease,ortheincome,orgains,wastreatedasmatrimonialproperty.

Inthecaseofamarriageoflessthanthreeyears,equalsharingdidnotapplyto:

1.Thefamilyhomeoraparticularfamilychattel,ifitwasownedwhollyorsubstantiallybyonespouseatthedateofthemarriage,or,2.Thefamilyhomeoraparticularfamilychattel,ifitcametoonespouseafterthemarriagebegan,bysuccession,bysurvivorship,asabeneficiaryunderatrust,orbygiftfromathirdperson,or,3.Thefamilyhomeandallthefamilychattels,ifthecontributionofonespousetothemarriagewasclearlydisproportionatelygreaterthanthatoftheother.

Inthesecases,eachspouse’sshareinthepropertyinquestionwasdeterminedaccordingtothecontributionthateachspousemadetothemarriage.

Inthecaseofmatrimonialpropertyotherthanthefamilyhomeandchattels,eachspousewasentitledtoshareequallyinthepropertyunlesshisorhercontributiontothemarriagehadclearlybeengreaterthanthatoftheotherspouse,inwhichcase,thesharesweredeterminedaccordingtoeachspouse’scontributiontothemarriage.

Ingivingeffecttothedivisionoftheproperty,thecourtcouldmakevariousordersinrelationtotheproperty,generallyortoaspecificitemofproperty,suchasorderingpropertytobesoldor,inthecaseofthehome,orderingthatonepartyhastherighttooccupyit.

Thecourtconsideredtheinterestsofanydependentchildren.Indeterminingtheamountandvalueoftheproperty,thecourttookintoaccountanyoutstandingdebts.Ifthespouseshadenteredintoavalidmatrimonialpropertyagreement,matrimonialpropertywasdividedaccordingtothatagreementratherthantheAct.ThisismandatedtoascontractingoutoftheAct.However,inmakingtheagreementthespousesweremandatedtofollowstrictrequirements(includingeachpartyreceivingindependentlegaladvice),orelsetheagreementwasinvalid.

In2002,thereweremajorchangestothedivisionofpropertylaws.TheMatrimonialPropertyAct,1976,wasrenamedastheProperty(Relationships)Act,1976,andthepropertyofdefactocouples(includingsame-sexcouples)(p.236) wasbroughtwithinthepurviewoftheAct,andwassubjectedtothesameequal-sharingruleswhichearliergovernedpropertyofmarriedcouples.Further,inApril2005,civilunionswereestablishedasalegallyrecognizedformofrelationship,andcivilunioncouplesarenowtreatedthesameasmarriedcouplesundertheProperty(Relationships)Act.

Justastheoldequal-sharingruleswerelimitedinthewaytheyappliedtomarriagesoflessthanthreeyears(marriagesofshortduration),thereformedlawsalsoapplyonlytocivilunionsanddefactocouples,whohavelivedtogetherforatleastthreeyears.Prior


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tothesereforms,defactocoupleswerenotcoveredbytheequal-sharingrulesthatappliedtomarriedcouples,butinsteadbytheordinaryrulesofpropertyownership.Itwas,therefore,presumedthatpropertyownedjointlybythecouplewouldbedividedequally,andthatpropertythatwasownedexclusivelybyonepartnerwouldnotbedivided.

SingaporeandMalaysiaTheRepublicofSingaporeandtheFederationofMalaysiawereadministrativelyconnectedandshareacommonlegaltraditioninheritedfromtheBritish.WhileMalaysiabecameindependentin1957,SingaporeevolvedastheStateofSingaporein1959,withthepowersofinternalselfgovernmentwhilethepowersofforeignaffairsanddefencewerecontrolledbyBritain.In1965,SingaporesevereditslinksfromBritainandevolvedasanindependentstate.OneofthefirsttasksundertakenwastoenactaWomen’sCharterin1961forempowermentofwomen.ThefamilylawreformsinMalaysiawereintroducedthroughtheLawReform(MarriageandDivorce)Act,1976.Duetothecommonlegaltraditions,thelegalprecedentsofSingaporecanberelieduponinMalaysia.BothSingaporeandMalaysiahaveseparatefamilylawsforMuslims.FamilycourtsweresetupinSingaporein1995.

ThelawsrelatedtomarriageandfamilyrelationsarelocatedinSection46oftheWomen’sCharterwhichstipulatesasfollows:

1.Uponthesolemnizationofmarriage,thehusbandandthewifeshallbemutuallyboundtoco-operatewitheachotherinsafeguardingtheinterestsoftheunionandincaringandprovidingforthechildren.2.Thehusbandandthewifeshallhavetherightseparatelytoengageinanytradeorprofessionorinsocialactivities.3.Thewifeshallhavetherighttouseherownsurnameandnameseparately.4.Thehusbandandthewifeshallhaveequalrightsintherunningofthematrimonialhousehold.

ThisprovisionwasadoptedfromSection159oftheSwissCivilCodeandprovidesamoralframeworkforregulationofmatrimonialrelationshipsinSingapore.ThesecondpartofSection46(4),whichwasalogicalprogression,containedtheprovisionofmatrimonialproperty,‘…Andintheownershipandmanagementoftheproperty’hadtobedeletedasitwasvehementlyopposed(Leong2008:25).Butin1996,Section112wasaddedtotheWomen’sCharterwhichempoweredthecourtstoorderthejustandequitabledivisionofmatrimonialassets.Thisamendmentchangedthelawwhichwasbasedonthecommonlawtraditionofseparationofproperty,withalimitedpowertomakesomeadjustmenttosettlementsupondivorce,totheconceptofdifferedcommunityofproperty.Underthedifferedcommunityofpropertyregime,whilethemarriagesubsists,thecommonlawnotionofseparationofpropertyprevailsandthespousesgaininterestintheother’spropertyonlybythegeneralrulesofpropertylaw.Butuponterminationofmarriage,(p.237) thecivillawofcommunityofpropertygetsinvokedandthepropertyisdividedequitablybetweenthespouses,irrespectiveoftheroleeachspousedischargedduringthecourseoftheirmarriage.Inparticular,whetheritwasa


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financialoranon-financialrole,atthetimeofdivorce,thecourtsareempoweredtodividethepropertyequitablybetweenthem.

FromthetimewhenthispowerwasfirstusedbycourtsinKooShirleyv.MokKongChuaKenneth432in1989,thebodyofcaselawshasgrowndramatically.Inastudyconductedonthedivorcesettlement,itwashighlightedthatwomenwereabletosecureadequateeconomicsettlements:

Nohomemakerwifehasbeengivenlessthan35%ofthematrimonialassets,exceptintwocasesinvolving‘hugemoney’.Indeedhomemakerwiveswhoservedtheirrolesfor20yearsormorehavereceived50%…Thenextmostcommonproportionswerewhereonespousereceived10%morethantheother.Withthesetwocategoriesformingthevastmajorityofdecisionsgiveninrecentyears,itmaybesuggestedthatanorderofdivisionofmatrimonialassetsinSingaporeislikelytobeofequaldivisionorwithinanarrowrangefromequaldivision(Leong2007:696–8).

TheMalaysianCourtofAppeal,in2003,inSivanesRajaratnamv.UshaRaniSubramanium,433relieduponthedecisioninKooShirleyv.MokKongChuaKenneth(mentionedabove)whiledecidingthequestionofdivisionofmatrimonialassetsupondivorceundertheMalaysianfamilylaw.Thecourtcommentedthatwhileitwouldbedangeroustorelyuncriticallyondecidedcasesfromotherjurisdictions,asfarasthedecisionsofSingaporecourtsareconcerned,thismaynotnecessarilybesoasthetwoshareacommontradition.

InMalaysia,Section76(1)oftheLawReform(MarriageandDivorce)Act,1976(LRA),stipulatesthatthecourtshallhavethepower,whengrantingadecreeofdivorceorjudicialseparation,toorderthedivisionbetweenthepartiesofanyassetsacquiredbythemduringthemarriage,eitherbytheirjointeffortsorthesaleofanysuchassets,andthedivisionbetweenthepartiesoftheproceedsofsale.

Abdullah(2006:212–4)inherbook,FamilyLawforNon-MuslimsinMalaysiadiscussesthefollowingtwocases(amongothers)toelaboratethelegalprovisionsregardingthedistributionofmatrimonialpropertyupondivorce.

InChingSengWoahv.LimShookLin,434itwasheldthatthematrimonialhomeandeverythingwhichisputinitbyeitherspouse,withtheintentionthattheirhomeandchattelsshouldbeacontinuingresourceforthespousesandtheirchildren,tobeusedjointlyandseverallyforthebenefitofthefamilyasawhole.Itmattersnot,inthiscontext,whethertheassetsareacquiredsolelybytheonepartyortheother,orbytheirjointefforts.Whilethemarriagesubsists,theseassetsarematrimonialassets.Suchassetsshouldbecapitalassets.Thecourtfurtherruledthattheearningpowerofeachspouseisalsoanasset.

KoayChengEngv.LindaHerawatiSantoso435concernedamarriagebetweenaMalaysianhusbandandanIndonesianwifewhoweremarriedintheUnitedKingdomin


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1980.Aftersixyearsofmarriage,thehusbandfiledforadivorceagainstthewife.Whiledecidingtheissueofdivisionofmatrimonialassets,thecourtheldthatthewife’sentitlementtohalfthematrimonialassetsinMalaysiaasisderivedunderSection76(1)and(2)ofLRA.Thecourtconsideredthewife’scontributiontowardsthehousehold,thatis,purchaseoffurniture,kitchenappliances,groceries,etc.,ascontributiontowardsacquiringthepropertyandheld(p.238) thatthewifeisentitledtohalfoftheassetsinMalaysiaandintheUnitedKingdom.Inaddition,thecourtconsideredtheEmployeesProvidentFund(EPF)contributionsasmatrimonialassetsacquiredduringthemarriage.Thecourtcommentedthatthewifehadenteredintothemarriagewiththeintentionofgrowingoldwiththehusband.OnhisretirementtheywouldbothenjoythebenefitfromthemoneysetasideinEPFcontributions.Therefore,withthebreakdownofthemarriage,thehusbandshouldnotbeallowedtosolelybenefitfromtheEPF.Hence,itwasheldthatthewifeisentitledtohalftheamountremaininginthehusband’sEPFaccountatthetimeofdivorceandsuchmoneyshouldbepaidtothewifewhenthesameispayabletothehusband.

CountriesGovernedbyIslamicLaw436

IncountriesgovernedbyIslamiclaws,generally,maritalassetsaredividedinequitably,withwomenreceivingthesmallershare.Suchinequitabledistributionresults,inpart,fromtheundervaluingofwomen’scontributionsinatleasttwodistinctways.Firstsomesystems(forinstanceIran)linkdivisionofmaritalpropertywithfaultratherthancomparativecontributionofeachspouseandifthewifeisjudgedtoberesponsibleforthedivorce,shemaynotbegivenhershare.Bytreatingawoman’srighttohershareofmatrimonialpropertyconditionally,thissystemfailstorecognizeawoman’srighttohershareofmatrimonialassetsasabsoluteandpresumethatonlyaman’srighttosuchpropertyisabsolute.Second,whendividingmaritalassetsthecourtsandotherstendtofocusonwomen’sdirectfinancialcontributionsthroughwagesandtoundervalueorfailtorecognizealtogethertheircontributionsthroughunpaiddomesticlabour.

Insomelegalsystems,whilegrantingdivorcethecourts,actingontheirowndiscretion,maydeterminethedivisionofmatrimonialproperty,forinstance,theCentralAsianRepublics,Fiji,Gambia,Malaysia,Singapore,Tanzania,andYemen.Undersomesystems(forinstanceCameroon,Iran,Philippines,Senegal),theassetsaredividedaccordingtothespouses’chosenmatrimonialpropertyregimes(communal/jointorseparate).

InFiji,unemployedwivesarenotrecognizedashavingcontributedtothemarriage.Senegal’sCodedelaFamilleenvisagesawoman’sownershipofassetswhichsheacquiredthroughherpaidprofession.Insuchsystems,thehusbandsbenefitfromawife’scontributionofherlabourandtimetothefamilyandanyfamilybusiness,yetthesebenefitsaregivennovaluewhenamarriageends.

InMalaysia,evenassetsacquiredindividuallybyonepartymaybedividedaslongasthepartywhichactuallypurchasedtheassetreceivesagreatershare.Though,thismayseemjustandequitableintheory,itleavesforaninsensitivejudgetoundervalueawoman’scontributionand,accordingly,awardherwithverylittle.However,awoman’shouseholdandfamilialeffortsaresometimestakenintoaccountincountriessuchasIran,


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Malaysia,andSingapore.

Optingforajointpropertyregime,whereallmaritalassetsareconsideredtobelongtothespousesequally,doesnotnecessarysolveawoman’sproblems,especiallywherepolygamyispracticed.Usuallythehusbandremainsinthemaritalhomeandcontrolstheassets,hence,lackofdivisionresultsinthewifeleavingthemaritalhomewithnothing.Also,courtsdonotalwaysdividejointpropertyequallyondivorce(p.239) andawomanmayhaveproblemsprovinghercontributiontowardsitsacquisition(Cameroon,Senegal).Sincewomenreturntotheirnatalhomesafterseparationordivorce,theyusuallylosetheirshareofthematrimonialpropertyasitiscontrolledbyhusbandorhisfamilymembers(CentralAsianRepublics).Thistendencyforpropertytoremainwiththehusbandandhisfamilycanmaketheenforcementofacourtsettlementthatfavoursthewifedifficult.

SincetheSouthAsiaregiondoesnotrecognizethenotionofmatrimonialproperty,PakistanandBangladeshdonothaveanylawsregardingpropertydivision.

InNigeriathereisnoconceptofdivisionofproperty.ThesuggestionfordivisionisdismissedasChristianand/orWesternimpositionwhich,inanycase,wouldbeunfairtoco-wives.

InIran,since1993,ahusbandwishingtodivorcehiswifeisrequiredtopaywagestoherforthehouseworkduringthesubsistenceofmarriage,providedsheisnotfoundtobeatfaultinthedivorceproceedings.In1995,itwasmadecompulsoryfordivorcinghusbandstopaythedeterminedwagesforhousework,alongwiththewife’sotherrights,suchasmehrandnafaqa,beforethedivorcecouldberegistered.

InSingapore,afterthe1999amendmentstotheAdministrationofMuslimLawAct,1966(ADMLA),thedefinitionofmatrimonialassetswasclarifiedandthefactorsthatthecourtscouldtakeintoaccount,whiledecidingthedivisionoftheseassets,wasalsoelaborated.ThefactorsthataretobetakenintoaccountareunderSection52(8)(a)ofADMLA:

1.Theextentofcontributionmadebyeachpartyinmoney,property,orwork,towardsacquiring,improving,ormaintainingtheproperty.2.Anydebtowing,orobligationincurred,orundertakenbyeitherparty,fortheirjointbenefitorforthebenefitofanychildofthemarriage.3.Theneedsofthechildren,ifany.4.Theextentofcontributionmadebyeachpartytothewelfareofthefamily,includinglookingafterthehome,orcaringforthefamily,oranyagedorinfirmrelative,ordependentofeitherparty.5.Anyagreementbetweenthepartieswithrespecttotheownershipanddivisionofthepropertymadeincontemplationofdivorce.6.Anyperiodofrentfreeoccupationorotherbenefitenjoyedbyonepartyinthematrimonialhometotheexclusionoftheotherparty.7.Thegivingofassistanceorsupportbyonepartytotheotherparty(whetherornotofamaterialkind),includingthegivingofassistanceorsupportwhichaidsthe


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otherpartyinthecarryingonofhisorheroccupationorbusiness.8.Theincome,earningcapacity,property,andotherfinancialresources,whicheachofthepartieshas,orislikelytohave,intheforeseeablefuture.9.Thefinancialneeds,obligations,andresponsibilities,whicheachofthepartieshas,orislikelytohave,intheforeseeablefuture.10.Thestandardoflivingenjoyedbythefamilybeforethebreakdownofthemarriage.11.Theageofeachpartyandthedurationofthemarriage.12.Anyphysicalormentaldisabilityofeitheroftheparties–thevaluetoeitherofthepartiesofanybenefit(suchasapension)which,byreasonofthedissolutionofthemarriage,thatpartywillloosethechanceofacquiring.

Section52(14)oftheAmendmenttoADMLA1999,definesmatrimonialassetsas:

1.Anyassetacquiredbeforethemarriagebyonepartyorbothpartiestothemarriagewhichhadbeensubstantiallyimprovedduringthemarriagebytheotherpartyorbybothpartiestothemarriage.2.Anyassetofanynatureacquiredduringthemarriagebyonepartyorbothpartiestothemarriage.

However,thisdoesnotincludeanyasset(notbeingthematrimonialhome)thathasbeenacquiredbyonepartyatanytimebygiftorinheritance,andthathasnotbeensubstantiallyimprovedduring(p.240) themarriagebytheotherpartyorbybothpartiestothemarriage.

InTanzania,Section144(2)(a)oftheLawofMarriageAct(LMA)doesnotdefinematrimonialpropertybutdirectscourtstoorderthedivisionofmatrimonialproperty/assetacquiredthroughjointefforts,whennamesdonotappearintitledeedandwhenawifecannotprovedirectfinancialcontribution,itislefttothediscretionofjudges.BecauseLMAdoesnotindicatewhatshouldbeconsideredasassets/propertyacquiredthroughjointefforts,sousually,onlyfinancialcontributiongetsrecognized.

Inanimportantcase,BiZawadiAbdullahv.IbrahimIddi(Dar-es-SalaamRegistry,unreported)itwasheldthatthedomesticdutiesofaspousedonotconstitutecontributionwithinthemeaningofSection114oftheActand,thus,donotentitleaspousetoashareofthematrimonialassets.Inthiscase,thecourtrefusedtoequatehouseworkandchildbearingwiththehusband’spaidworkinevaluatingwhatconstitutesmatrimonialproperty.437

Butinanearliercase,BiHawaMohamedv.AllySefu(CivilAppealNo.9of1983,DaresSalaamRegistry,unreported),heldamoresympatheticviewofwomenregardingtheirdomesticdutiesofawifeascontribution,entitlingthespousetoashareinthematrimonialproperty.Definingdomesticduties,spousesaretobetreatedasworking,notonlyfortheircurrentneedsbutalsofortheirfutureneeds,boththeextentofcontributionandsuchfutureneedsaretobeassessedfromfamilyassetsacquiredduringthemarriageinkeepingwithextentofcontribution.


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Inthiscase,thehusbandarguedthathehadgivenmoneytothewifetostartabusinesswhichshehadsquanderedaway.Ifshehadinvestedthesameinstartingasmallbusiness,hersituationwouldnotbesobad.Itwasheldthatshewasanirresponsiblewifeand,hence,shewasleftwithverylittlemoneyforafinancialsettlement.438Itseemsthatgenerallycourtsaremoreamiabletoargumentsbythemalepartiesthanthosebyfemalepartiesoverpropertyentitlements.

NeedVersusContributioninDivisionofProperty439

Whentheconceptofa‘nofaultdivorce’andthepartnershipmodelofmarriagebasedonequalitywasintroduceditwasfeltthattheearlierconceptoftitleaswellasneedandfaultwouldceasetohaveanyrelevancewhilearrivingatmatrimonialsettlements.Theearlierstatus,basedmodelofmarriage,wasreplacedbyanegalitarianorequalitymodelunderwhichobligationsofspousesideallyendwiththemarriageandanyoutgoingeconomicobligation,suchaschildsupportorpaymentofexistingmaritaldebts,areconsideredsharedandequalresponsibilities.But,sincemarriageisnotapartnershipbetweenequals,theseassumptionsendupbeingunjustandinequitabletowomenwhodonotfitintothisneatformulaofapartnershipmodel.

(p.241) Themovementfromthestrictcommonlawsystem,basedontitle,tothemodernnotionofapartnership,basedonequallyvaluedthoughdifferentinkind,contributionstoamarriagecannotbeassumedtohavebenefitedallcategoriesofwomen.Itcannotbeassumedthatthecircumstancesthatgeneratedargumentsforadistributionsystemfocussedonneedarenolongerinexistence.Butthematerialcircumstancesofdivorcingwomenandchildrenarebeingdetrimentallyignoredbysupplantingafocusoncontributionastheprimarydistributiveconcept.AccordingtoFineman(1991a:270),theascendancyofcontributionmayrepresentaconvenientmodelofconceptualprogresstolegalacademicsandlawreformers,butformanydivorcingspouses,aswellasthepractisingprofessionalstowhomtheyturnforadvice,adversematerialcircumstances,andtheneedstheygenerate,havenotbeenleftbehind.

Shearguesthatonesourceofcontroversyaboutpropertydistributionrulesistheexistenceoftwocompeting,andperhapsincompatibleandunrealistic,politicalvisionsofcontemporarymarriages.Thefirstisthemoremodernviewthatmarriageasaninstitutionhasbeentransformedsoastobemoreconsistentwiththeformalisticnotionsofequalitybetweenthesexes.Thesecondisthemoretraditionalpolicystancethatthefamilyistheappropriate,perhapssolitary,institutiontoresolvetheproblemsofdependencyorneedthatinevitablyarisesinthecontextoffamilies.Highlyscepticalofthecontributionmodel,whichisbasedontheassumptionthatmarriageisapartnershipbetweenequals,shearguesfora“need”basedframework(ibid.:265).

Thedominanceofequalitymeansthatitwillalsoprovidethepreferredmethodofvaluingcontributionsand,thus,furtheravoidtheneedforanythingresemblingdetailedfactfindingorconsiderationofindividualizedcircumstancesontheactualamountofcontribution.Theequalitynormisformallyembodiedinprovisionswhichestablishaninitialpresumptionthatallpropertyofthespousesistobeequallydividedupondivorce.


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Thisequalityparadigmisconsistentwiththeorganizingconceptofmarriageasanequalpartnership.Equalityhassignificantsymbolicimportance,andthepartnershipmodelisarguedasnotonlyreflectingthepreferredorcorrectvisionofwomen,butalsoassecondarilyaddressingneed.Thedependentwoman,throughanideologicalfiat,isconsideredtobebenefittedinbeingbroughtuptopartnershipstatusandmadeanequal(ibid.:272–3).

Marriageisconsideredaunion,apartnershipofequals.Thisviewmandatesthatifapartnershipends,theaccumulatedassetsshouldbedividedinamannerconsistentwiththemodelunderwhichtheywereacquired.Iftwopartiesaremorallyorlegallyequivalentforonepurpose,thattheymustbemorallyorlegallyequivalentforallpurposesisanerroneousassumption.

Equalitystandards,inthedistributionofpropertyataconceptuallevel,maybelinkedtobroaderidealsofplacingequalvalueandpromotingfreedomofchoiceinmarriageroles.Makingequalitytheongoingconceptofunderlyingdivorcemaybeconsideredpartofaseriesofconscioussymbolicchoicesabouthowtobestensureamorejustsociety.But,whenequalityrhetoricistranslatedintospecificrulesgoverningdistribution,theresultsmustbemeasuredandassessedinmorethansymbolicterms.Symbolicexpressionmaybeimportant,butFinemanarguesthatcareshouldbetakensothatwhentranslatedintolegislationhavingadirectimpactonthelivesofmanypeople,theresultsalsomeetthestandardsoffairnessandjustice(ibid.:276).

Needhasnoroletoplayinatruepartnershipofequals.Thedependencyimage,incontrast,(p.242) anticipatesthatawomanhasbeenvictimizedtoacertainextentinamarriage.Sheisviewedashavingsacrificedcareergoalsandambitionsforthemarriage.Atdivorce,sheisdependentandthatdependencywillcontinue.She,therefore,hasneedswhichshouldbecompensatedinadditiontohercontributiontothemarriage.Thisfactcannotbeoverlookedwhileapplyingtheprincipleofequalitywhiledividingfamilyproperty.

Theneedbasedmodelandtheequalitymodelrepresentpolarendsonthespectrumoftransformationsthathaveoccurredinthewaysocietyviewsmarriageandthepositionofwomenwithinit.Theneedbasedfactorsmaywarrantadeviationfromtheequalityideal.Unfortunately,inthestatutoryschemesandcaselawsofmanycountriesdiscussedabove,theneedfactorsareneithersufficientlydevelopednorsufficientlycleartooffsetthepartnershipmodelwithitseasilygraspedcontributionfactors.Thewholesaleacceptanceofthepartnershipmodelmeans,however,thattheburdenofproduction,proof,andpersuasion,willbeplacedupontheonewhowouldarguethattheruleofequalityconceptisinadequate,givenherspecificcircumstances(ibid.:271).

Thereareavarietyofsituationsexperiencedbywomenatdivorcethatwillnotconformtoasimplisticapplicationofthecontributionconceptualizationoftheequalpartnershipmodel.Thisfailuretoadequatelyaccommodatethesedifferencesinwomen’smaterialcircumstanceshasledtoasystemofrulesofpropertydistributionappliedtoallwomen,butbasedontheexperiencesonlyofsome.


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Thecareofchildrenproducesdependency,notonlyforthechildren,butfortheprimarycaretaker.Itmustberecognizedthatthisdependencydoesnotendwhenthechildreacheseighteenoranyothermagicage(ibid.:271).Somefamilyrelationshipstendtolast.Thisisparticularlytrueoftheprimarycaretakingparentwhoisattachedtoherchildren.Theobligationsthatsuchaparentmayfeelarenotlegal,butmoraloremotional.Aparentwhodesirestoassistanewlyadultchildmaynotbedictatedtodosobylaw,butthatdoesnotmeanthatthelawshouldbeinsensitiveto(orunsupportiveof)hersensibilitieswhenassessingthemostsociallyusefulallocationofpropertyatdivorce.

Womenwhoarenotmothersbutchoosetobeunemployedduringmarriagemaybeconsideredovercompensatedbytheimpositionofthepartnershipmodel.Theywillbeovercompensatedtotheextentthattheydonotcontributewagestotheaccumulationofassets,nordotheycontributebyprovidinganon-monetaryservice,suchaschildcare,forthefamilyunit.Motherswhoaregainfullyemployed(and,therefore,arenotconsideredpoor),however,maybeundercompensatedbecausetheneedfactorswillbeinterpretedtoonarrowlytoremedytheneedsgeneratedbytheirpost-divorcesituationbutmaynotcompensatethesewomenforthedoubleburdentheyhaveundertakenduringthesubsistenceoftheirmarriage.Thecosttowomenofdeviatingfromthetraditionalhousewifemodelisextremelyhigh.Whentheconceptofcontributionissimplifiedandemployedsolelyinanefforttomakethehousewifeanequalpartner,othercircumstancesareignored.Infactthisconceptworkstothedisadvantageofthenon-housewifewoman.Suchawomannotonlypayswithhertimeandeffortwhilesheisdoingtwojobs,forexample,butalsoatdivorce,shemaybeviewedasnotinneedofassistancebecausesheisnota‘traditional’housewife.Thereisadangerthatthecontributionconceptmight,infact,beusedagainstwomenwhoarenotintraditionalroles.

Commitmenttotheequalityideal,typifiedbythepartnershipmetaphorastheappropriateanalyticalconstructtoguidedivorcepolicy,doesnotpermitustofacethefactthatwomen’sand(p.243) children’sneedsinthissocietyhavecontinuedtobeundervaluedandignored.Finemanarguesthattheequalityrhetoricnowassociatedwiththemarriagerelationshipmustbechallengedasinappropriateforresolvingdifficultquestionsinsituationssuchasdivorce,wheretheystandininherentlyunequalpositions(ibid.:278).

Anequalityviewofmarriagedeniesrealityformanywomenwhoassume,duringandafterthemarriage,morethanapartner’sshareintheconductandburdensassociatedwithhouseholdandchildcare.Thepartnershipmetaphorslipseasilyintoequalsharingofproperty,children,debts,andsoonatdivorce.Themetaphorhassymboliccontentthatispreservedonlyatsignificantcosttomanywomenwhomustsufferequalityinthisoneareawhiletherestofthesocietyandculturecontinuestotreatthemunequally(ibid.).

WhilewomeninmanyWesterncountries,wheretheequalitymodelhasbeenadoptedandpropertyisdividedonthebasisofcontribution,maysufferduetotheequalitymodel,inIndia,theprimarydeterminingfactorcontinuestobeneed,whichgetstranslatedintoatraditionalremedyofmaintenanceclaimsatabasicminimalsurvivallevel.Aswehaveobservedinthefirstsectiononmaintenance,guiltcontinuestoovershadow


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maintenanceclaimsandtheamountsawardedrangefromconservativetomeagreandfarlessthanwhatadivorcedwomanwouldrequiretosustainherselfandherchildreninthesamestandardoflivingasherhusband.Hencedesertionanddiovrcerendersmultitudesofwomendestitute.Toremedythis,propertysettlementshavetobeincorporatedwithinmatrimoniallawsthroughlegislativereforms.Thereformswouldhavetotakeintoaccountboth,needandcontributionsothattheproblemfacedbywomeninWesterncountriesarenotreplicated.TheprincipleshavetoalsotakeintoaccountspecificIndianrealitiessuchasprevalenceofjointfamiliesasagainstthenuclearfamiliesoftheWestandthelegalincidentofaHindujointfamilyproperty.Theprinciplesadoptedhavetobenotjustequalbutalsoequitableandjustwhichwouldremedytheproblemofpovertyanddestitutionamongdivorcedwomen.

SectionD:CustodyandGuardianshipofMinors

HistoricalEvolutionoftheNotionofGuardianship

Thelegalterms,guardianshipandcustodyareusedinthecontextofchildrenandimplycertainlegalresponsibilitiestowardsthem.Guardianshipimpliestheproprietaryrightsoverthechild’spersonandproperty.Custodyimpliestheresponsibilityofraisingachild.Whilethefatherwasfavouredinissuesofproprietaryrights,themother’sroleascaretakerofherchildrenhadbeengrantedduerecognitionforwelloveracentury.

Amongtheancientsystems,bothRomanaswellastheMuslimlawrecognizedthefactthatminorchildrenorchildrenoftenderageneedcareandprotection.Itiswithinthecontextofthissocialneedthatanotionofguardianshipandcustodyfirstevolved.TheancientHindusocietywasorganizedonthebasisofthejointfamilysystemwhichwasmoreinclusive.Withinthissocialorganization,therewassufficientprotectionforallminorsanddependents.TheminorswerealwaysdeemedtobeinthecareandprotectionoftheKartaaswellastheeldersinthejointfamily.Withinthissocialstructure,evenanorphanchildwasawardedprotection.Hence,thenotionofguardianshipandcustodydidnotevolveundertheHindulaw.Evenundertribalcustomstheminorchildrenweredeemedtobelongtotheclanortribe.

TheMuslimlawlaysdowndetailedrulesregardingtheguardianshipofminor’sproperty,butthereareveryfewrulesregardingtheguardianshipofminor’sperson.ThisisbecausetheMuslimlawgiverscorrectlysurmisedthat(p.244) theguardianshipofaminor’spersonismoreamatterofcustody.ParasDiwancommentsthatthoughMuslimsocietyisessentiallypatriarchal,arulewaslaiddownthatcustodyofchildrenoftenderagebelongedtothemother(DiwanandDiwan1993:ix).TheEnglishlawrecognizedthisprincipleofIslamiclawonlyafteraprotractedstruggleextendingoveralmosttwocenturies,andthattoobylegislation.ItisratherunfortunatethatintheearlydaysoftheBritishrule,sometextbookwritersandjudgescouldnotdecipherthedistinctionbetweenguardianshipandcustodyunderMuslimlaw,andeitherundueprominencewasgiventopaternalrightsorthemotherwasdubbedastheguardianofherchildrenoftenderage.


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Hizanat(careandcontrolofthechild)isawelldevelopedconceptunderMuslimlaw.TheFatwaAlamgirideclares:Ofallpersons,themotherisbestentitledtothecustodyofherinfantchildrenduringmarriageandafteritsdissolution.Thetermhazinaisappliedtothewomantowhombelongstherightofrearingherchild.Ofallpersons,thefirstandforemostrighttohavethecustodyofchildrenbelongstothemotherandshecannotbedeprivedofherrightsolongassheisnotfoundguiltyofmisconduct.Themother’srightofhizanatcanbeenforcedagainstthefatheroranyotherperson.Buttherightofrearingthechildrenisnotabsolute;itisarighttowhichobligationsareattached.Ifsheisnotfoundsuitabletobringupthechild,orhercustodyisnotconducivetothephysical,moral,andintellectualwelfareofthechild,shecanbedeprivedofit.

StatutoryProvisions

TheGuardiansandWardsAct(GWA),1890,isoneoftheearlieststatutesenactedbytheBritishwhichaddressestheissueofguardianship.TheActwasofcommonapplication,thoughlegalprinciplesunderthepersonallawscouldalsobeinvoked.Later,duringthepost-Independenceperiod,whenlawsgoverningfamilyrelationshipsofHinduswerecodified,aspecialActwasenacted,thatis,TheHinduMinorityandGuardianshipAct(HMGA),1956,andHindusweretakenoutofthepurviewofthegenerallawandwereplacedunderthisspeciallawgoverningtheHindus.Despitethis,theprinciplesevolvedundertheGWAhavetobeappliedwhiledecidingcasesundertheHMGAasthefollowingcasesillustrate:

•TheSupremeCourt,inSurinderKaurSandhuv.HarbaxSinghSandhu,440whileawardingcustodytothemotherruledthatSection6ofHMGA,1956,cannotsupersedetheprinciplesevolvedunderGWAthatthewelfareofchildrenisparamount.

•ThePatnaHighCourtreaffirmedthisprincipleinBimlaDeviv.SubhasChandraYadavNirala,441andheldthatfromareadingofSection2andSection5(b)ofHMGA,1956,itbecomesclearthatthe1956Actistobetreatedasasupplementtothe1890statute.

Hence,principlesevolvedundertheGWAandHMGAcanbereadinterchangeably.So,thoughHMGAisappliedtoHindusandGWAtonon-Hindus,custodyandguardianshipissuesofboththeHindusandnon-Hindusaredecidedonthebasisofsamelegalmaxims.

CourtParensPatriaeofallMinors

SomeoftheearlieststatutesenactedbythelegislatureinBritishIndiaconcernedprotectionofminors.Theprovisions,scatteredundervariousBritishChartersandRegulations,regardingcareandcustodyofchildrenweresubsequentlyconsolidatedintotheGWAin1890.442

(p.245) TheIndiancourtswereconsideredtobethesupremeguardiansofallminorsduringcolonialrule.Assupremeguardians,thecourtsexercisedparentaljurisdictioninrespectofallchildren,irrespectiveoftheirreligion.ThisnotionprevailingundertheEnglishlawwasintroducedinIndia,firstthroughvariousBritishChartersand


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Regulations,and,subsequently,incorporatedundertheGWA.ThecourtswereentrustedwiththesamepowerastheCourtofChanceryinEngland.Thispowerispresentlyexercisedbythedistrictcourtandthehighcourtunderitsinherentjurisdiction.Thedutyofprotectionandpreservationofinfantsandtheirpropertydevolvesontheguardianjudge,therepresentativeofthesovereignstate(BabuGyanv.Sudan).443

Whenthechildisbroughtbeforethecourt,thecourtassumeschargeandendeavourstoensurethewell-beingofthechildinthesamemannerasanaturalparentwouldhavedone.Thisfunctionisdischargedbytheguardiancourtbyappointingasuitablepersonastheguardianofthechild.WhenaguardianisappointedundertheAct,thecontrolofthepersonandpropertyisvestedinthecourt,theguardianbeingitsnominee.FollowingtheEnglishdoctrine,parenspatriae,theActinvestsitspowersinanindividualtolookafterthechild.Theguardianactsunderthesuperintendenceandsupervisionofthecourt.

OnlyaminoriseligibleforprotectionundertheAct,buttheActdoesnotdefineaminor.TheIndianMajorityActof1875,definesaminorinnegativeterms,thatis,aminorisapersonwhohasnotattainedmajority.Sincetheageofmajorityiseighteen,itcanbeconstruedthatapersonbelowthisagewouldbeeligibleforprotectionunderthisAct.444Onceaguardianisappointedtheperiodofminorityextendsbyafurtherthreeyears,untilthechildattainstwentyoneyears.Hence,thecourtswillrestrainfromappointingaguardianinrespectofachildwhoisnearingmajority(ApagappaAyyangarv.Mangathai).445Thecourtwillappointaguardianonlyifitissatisfiedthatappointmentofguardianisnecessaryforthewell-beingofthechild.Thecourtshavealsoadoptedaviewthatintheabsenceofafather,ifthemotherisfitandcompetent,thereisnoneedtoformallyappointherasaguardian,sincesheisthenaturalguardianofthechild.

Apersonshouldbewillingtobeappointedasaguardian.Adefactoguardian(apersonwhohasalreadyassumedguardianshipofthechild),atestamentaryguardian,oraguardianunderadeedofinstrument,maybedeclaredasalegalguardianbythecourtinordertoavoidanyfuturedisputes.Declaringapersonasaguardianindicatesjudicialrecognitionofhis/herstatusasaguardian.Appointmentasaguardianisnotaquestionofprivateorcivilright.Anyexistingorpreviousrelationship,wishesoftheparents,andcharacterandconductofthepersontobeappointedasaguardian,arerelevantfactors.Thecourtsmayalsoconsiderthewishesofthechild.Whileallthesecanbecontributoryfactors,theonlyprinciplewhichismandatoryisthewelfareoftheminor.

Onceaguardianisappointed,theminorbecomesthewardoftheguardianandafiduciaryrelationshipisestablishedbetweentheguardianandward,whichisofajuridicalnature.Thisisarelationshipofutmosttrust,akintotheonethatsubsistsbetweenthenaturalparentandchild.Theguardianmustlookafterthechild’sgeneralwell-being,health,andeducation.Ifappointedasaguardianoftheminor’sproperty,theguardianmustnotprofitpersonallyfromit.(p.246) Iftheguardianisfoundunsuitable,thecourthasthepowertodeprivethepersonoftheguardianshipthroughacourtorder.


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CustodyDisputesandWomen’sRights

ChallengestotheNotionofPaternalRightsWhileaguardiancouldbeappointedforaminorwhoisanorphanorwhohaslosthis/herfather,itwaspresumedthatasanaturalguardianthefatherhasasuperiorrightoverhischildrenandthisrightisundisputed.Ontheotherhand,paternalobligationsandresponsibilitytowardschildrenwerenotgivendueimportance.Itwasmoreaquestionofafather’srightoverhischildrenthanhisobligationstowardsthem.Eventheobligationtomaintainthechildrenwasnotrecognized.UnderEnglishlaw,itwasamoral(andnotalegal)obligationandthiswasconfinedonlytolegitimatechildren.Therewasnoobligationtomaintaintheillegitimatechildren.ThoughbothMuslimandHindulawsrecognizedthatmaintenanceofchildrenisapersonalobligation,underHindulaw,theobligationwasnotabsolute.ButHindulawrecognizedthepaternalobligationtomaintainbothlegitimateandillegitimatechildren.

Therehasbeenashiftinmoderntimesandtodaythereisanobligationtomaintainbothlegitimateandillegitimatechildren.Theobligationtomaintainchildrenisimposedonbothparents.Alongsidetheobligationtomaintainandeducatechildren,themodernlawofmanycountriesalsoimposescriminalliabilityfordeliberatelyneglectingthem.ABombayHighCourtjudgmenthasgonetotheextentofstatingthatafatherwhodoesnotmaintainhischildrendoesnothavethewelfareofhischildrenatheartand,hence,heisnoteligiblefor(therightof)accesstothechild.

Astatuteenactedfortheprotectionofminorswhowereorphans,cametotherescueofwomenwhowereseparatedfromtheirhusbands.Soonaftermarriedwomenwereawardedtherightoflegalseparationanddivorce,thecontentiousquestionofcustodystartedformingasignificantaspectofthisstatute.TheGWAwasbasedontheprinciplesofEnglishfamilylawandsubscribedtothedoctrinethatthefatheristhenaturalguardianofthechild.AftertheenactmentoftheMatrimonialCausesAct,1857,separatedanddivorcedwivesstartedapproachingthecourtsseekingcustodyoftheirchildrenandintheprocesschallengedtheprincipleofnaturalguardianshipoftheirhusbands.Itisinthiscontextthattheprinciple,thebestinterestofthechildisparamountstartedgainingrecognitionasopposedtothepaternalrightsofthefather.Bythemid-twentiethcentury,theprinciplebecameoneoftheprimarypillarsofthefamilylawinEngland.

TheearliestjudicialpronouncementsoftheEnglishcourtsacknowledgedtheundisputedprimacyofthefather.Evenimmoralityormisconductcouldnotdislodgethepremisethatasanaturalguardian,hehastheprimaryrighttocustodyofhischildren.Forinstance,in1849,theEnglishcourtsinWardev.Wardeheld:‘Mereimmoralityofthefatherisnotsufficienttodeprivehimofcustody.’

TheGWAincorporatedthetensionthenprevailinginEngland.WhileSection19stipulatedthatfatheristhenaturalguardianoftheminor,Section17prescribedthatwelfareofthechildisparamount.Thereisaninternalinconsistencybetweenthesetwosections.HenceitwasleftforthecourtstofirmlyestablishthesuperiorityofSection17overthatofSection19andrenderthedoctrineofthewelfareofthechildisparamountasanon-


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negotiablemandateindecidingcustodyofchildrenasagainstthestipulationunderSection19thatthefatheristhenaturalguardianoftheminor.

(p.247) Initially,thecourtsacknowledgedthesuperiorrightofthefather,asthesecasesdemonstrate:

1.In1914,inAnnieBesantv.Narayaniah,446thePrivyCouncildeclaredthatthefatherhastheparamountrighttothecustodyofthechildren.Hecannotbedeprivedofthisrightunlessitisclearlyshownthatheisunfittobetheirguardian.2.In1924,inSukhdeov.RamChandra,447thecourtheld:Animmoralfatherhasjustasgoodarighttohisownchildrenasamoralone,andinmanycases,heisjustaslikelytoseethathischildrenareproperlybroughtupevenifhehimselfdoesnotliveproperly.3.In1940,inMstAlitaTawaifv.ParmatmaPrasad,448anerrantfatherwasgivencustodyofthechildasagainstthemotherwhowasatawaif(courtesan).

Butgradually,courtsbegantoconcedethatdespitebeinganaturalguardian,thefather’srightsoverhischildrenarenotabsolute(CaptainRattanAmolSinghv.KamaljitKaur).449Inthe1970s,thecourtswentfurtherandruledthatifthefatherisunfittobetheguardianoftheminor,orisnotinapositiontolookafterthewell-beingofthechild,thecourtiscompetenttoremovethechildfromhiscustodyandhandoverthechildtothemotheroranyoneelseappointedbythecourtasguardian(Kamalammav.LaxminarayanaRaoandBudhulalShankarlalv.AnInfantChild).450

Whileacknowledgingtherightsofthemother,thecourtsheldthatretentionofcustodywiththemotherisnotunlawfulandproceedingscannotbeinitiatedagainstherforwrongfulconfinement.Thecourtsalsobegantochastisethehusbandforremovingthechildfromthecustodyofthewife.Thecourtsalsoconcededthatevenanaffluentfathercouldbedeprivedofcustodyofthechildandaffluenceofthefatherandhisfamilyisnotacriterionwhichcouldtiltthebalanceinfavourofthefather(SurinderKaurSandhuv.HarbaxSinghSandhu).451Thecourtshavefurtherheldthatevenifthefatherisaffectionatetowardsthechildandisfoundtobenotunfit,thiscannotbeacriteriatodenythemother,whomightbeequallyaffectionate,caringandcompetent,thecustodyofthechild.Somerecentrulingsonthisissuearediscussedbelow:

1.In1987,inElizabethDinshawv.ArvandM.Dinshaw,452wherethefatherhadtakenawaythechildfromthecustodyofthemotherwhowaslivinginU.S.A.,theSupremeCourtobservedthattheconductofthefatherintakingthechildfromthemother,towhomitwasentrustedbyacompetentcourt,wasmostreprehensible.Theexplanationgivenbyhimabouthisfather’sillnesswasfarfromconvincingnotjustifyingthegrossviolationandcontemptoftheorderofthecourt.Thecourtalsoobservedthatthechild’spresenceinIndiawastheresultofanillegalactofabduction.Theconductofthefatherhadnotbeensuchastoinspireconfidencethatheisafitandsuitablepersontobeentrustedwiththecustodyandguardianshipofthechild.TheCourtheld:‘Wheneveraquestion


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arisesbeforeacourtpertainingtothecustodyofaminorchild,thematteristobedecidednotonconsiderationsofthelegalrightsofpartiesbutonthesoleandpredominantcriterionofwhatwouldbestservetheinterestandwelfareoftheminor.’Thecourtrestoredthecustodytothemother.

In1993,inVinodchandraGajananDeokarv.AnupamaVinodchandra,453B.N.Srikrishna,(p.248) JusticeoftheBombayHighCourtheldthatafathercanbedeniedaccessuntilhedisplayedevidenceofreformandpaidtheinterimmaintenancearrears.Thefatherhadrefusedtocomplywiththeorderofinterimmaintenancetothewifeandthechild.Observingthatfreshairandplentyoflovewouldhardlybesufficienttosustainlife,thecourtheldthatthenecessityofdailysustenancewouldhavetobeprovidedbythefatherifhelovedthechild.Thecourtcommentedthatthefatherhadactedwithaspiritofvengeanceandaveinofsadism.Accordingly,thecourtdeniedaccesstothefatherunlessanduntilhedisplayedevidenceofcontrition,penitence,andreform,andpaidthearrearsofinterimmaintenance.Thisjudgmentgoesalongwayincounteringthepremiseofpaternalright,notonlyofcustodyandguardianshipbutalsoofaccesstothechildandturnsitintoapaternalobligation.

Again,in1993,inOmPrakashBharukav.ShakuntalaModi,454theGauhatiHighCourtheldthatthefactthatthefatherloveshischildren,andisnototherwiseunfit,cannotnecessarilyleadtotheconclusionthatthewelfareofthechildrenwouldbebetterpromotedbygrantingtheircustodytohimasagainstthewife,whomayalsobeequallyaffectionatetowardsherchildrenandotherwiseequallyfreefromblemish,andwho,inaddition,becauseofherprofessionandfinancialresourcesmaybeinapositiontoguaranteebetterhealth,education,andmaintenanceforthem.

In1997,inAnjaliAnilRangariv.AnilKripasagarRangari,455theSupremeCourtheldthatitcannotbedisputedthatthemotherisalsoanaturalguardianunderSection6oftheHMGA,1956.Accordingly,theCourtheldthatthecustodyofthechildrenwiththemotherwasneitherunlawfulnorweretheywrongfullyconfinedbythemother.

DoctrineofChildofTenderAgeorHizanatIftheprinciplethatinapatriarchalsystem,thefather,asheadofthefamily,isthenaturalguardiancouldbeusedtoawardcustodytothefather,acorrespondingprincipleofthepatriarchalfamilysystemthatthemotheristhenaturalcaretakerofchildrenoftenderage,couldbeusedtosubstantiatethemother’sclaimtocustody.Incaseofinfantchildren,courtsaregenerallyinclinedtowardsthemother.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatmotheristhebestsuitedpersontolookafterachildoftenderageandthatthereisnosubstituteformother’scareandaffection.InitiallytheEnglishlawsubscribedtothenotionofthesupremacyofpaternalrightsandthetenderagedoctrinedidnotfindaplacewithinbattlesoverchildcustody.Thecourtsdidnothesitatetohandoverachildatthebreastofthemothertothefather(Kingv.DeMannerville).456TheTalfordActof1839wasthefirststatutorymodificationrecognizingthemother’spreferentialclaimtothecustodyofchildrenuptotheageofseven.TheCustodyofInfantsAct,1873,raisedtheageofthetenderagechildtosixteen.TheGuardianshipofInfantsAct,1886,popularlyknownasMothers’Actgavestatutoryrecognitiontothedoctrineofchildof


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tenderage.Thereafter,theEnglishcourtsbegantogiveaseriousconsiderationtothisprinciple.Inaleadingcase,InreA.andB.,457whilegrantingcustodyofthetwominorchildrentoboththeparentsthecourtheld:‘Itisimportantforchildrenthattheyshouldbebroughtupintheirtenderageontermsofaffectionwith(p.249) eachotherandthattheyshouldknowboththeparents.’

In1926,inW.v.W.,458thecourtlaiddownthatthechildoftenderageshouldordinarilyremainwiththemother.InAllenv.Allen,459thetrialcourtawardedcustodyofaneight-year-oldgirltothefatherasagainstthemotherwhowasfoundguiltyofadultery.Inappeal,itwasheld:‘Itwouldnotberighttosnatchthefemalechildfromhermotherandforcehertomakeanewstartwithherfatherandstepmother.’

TheIndiancourtshadnodifficultyinpropoundingthisprinciple.BothMuslimlawaswellasHMGArecognizedthisprinciple.TheMuslimlaw,underthenotionofhizanatlaysdownthatthecustodyofasonofsevenyearsandagirlofthirteenyearsshouldbewiththemother.Similarly,HMGAlaysdownthatachildunderfiveyearsshouldordinarilyresidewiththemother.460Buttheconversedoesnotholdtrue,anditcannotbeconstruedthatthecustodyofanychildabovethespecifiedagewillordinarilybewiththefather.Theprincipleofthewelfareofthechildhastobeappliedinallcases.

ThePunjabChiefCourt,461asfarbackasin1917,inAhmedv.Rehmatan,462heldthatthecustodyofachildoftenderageshouldbewiththemotherevenifshehadremarried.Similarly,in1926,theLahoreHighCourtinZainabBibiv.AbdulKareem463awardedcustodytoaMuslimmotherwhohadremarried.InSamuelv.Stella,464thecourtawardedthecustodyofafemalechildofthirteenyears,whowasdelicateinhealth,tothemother.

Morerecently,thecourtshaveexpandedthescopeofthenotionofhizanatandhavereadprinciplesofDeclarationoftheRightsoftheChild,1959,adoptedunanimouslybytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,intoitasthefollowingcaseillustrates.Thecourtsalsohaveexpandedthenotionofbestinterestoftheminorisparamount.

1.InMumtazBegumv.MubarakHussain,465thehusbandhadretainedthecustodyofasonwhowasonlyafewmonthsoldafterthrowingthemotheroutofhermatrimonialhome.ThecourtproceedingsdraggedonforfouryearsandcustodywasdeniedtothemotheronatechnicalgroundthatshehadnotfiledthepetitionundertheGWA.Inappeal,whileawardingthecustodytothemother,thehighcourtreliedupontheDeclarationoftheRightsoftheChild,1959,ThecourtalsorelieduponajudgmentbyRizviJ.oftheLahoreHighCourtinBaviv.ShahNawazKhan,466wherethestipulationofhizanatwasexplainedasfollows:

TheprincipleofMuhammadenlawasregardshizanatisfundamentallybasedontheprinciplethatitisforthewelfareoftheminors.…Thechildneedsmotherlyloveandaffection,morethananythingelse.Theenvironmentinwhichheisbeingnowbroughtupisunsuitedtohismentalgrowthanddevelopment.Thefatherhardlyfindstimeeventotalktohim,leavingthehouseinthemorningandreturningquitelateintheevening


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whenthechildwouldbeinbed.Hisstepmother,whohasa(tinyinfant)ofherown,wouldalso,definitely,havelittletimeforhim.Thechild’sgrandparents,admittedly,beingphysicallyhandicapped,alsocannotdoanythingforhim.

ThecourtexplainedthatinPrinciple2oftheDeclaration,thereisamandateforenactmentoflawsforspecialprotectionofthechild(p.250) toenablehimto‘developphysically,mentally,morally,spirituallyandsociallyinahealthyandnormalmanner’andstipulatedthat‘thebestinterestsofthechildshallbetheparamountconsideration’.Thecourtfurthercommented:

Whenpersonallawsaredivinelysanctioned,apresumptionwillnaturallyarisethatsuchlawshaveahumanisticcontentbecausewhengreatseers,saints,andprophets,foundanyfaith,theyactasbenefactorsofthemankindasawhole.Nopersonallawclaimingdivinesanctioncanaffordtodenyparamountconsiderationtothewelfareofthechild.Itisnotdifficult,therefore,toseewhytheDeclarationwasunanimouslyadoptedbytheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyin1959.

2.InMohd.AyubKhanv.SairaBegum,467thehusbandvehementlyopposedtheapplicationforinterimmaintenance,evenforminorchildren,toothandnail.Hence,theapplicationforinterimmaintenancewasrejectedbythetrialcourt.Thewifeapproachedthesessionscourtwhichsetasidethetrialcourtorderandremittedthematterbacktothetrialcourttodecidetheissueofinterimmaintenance.Finally,thetrialcourtawardedRs300foreachoftheminorchildrenasmaintenance.Thehusbandpleadedthathehasdivorcedhiswifeand,hence,shewasnotawardedanymaintenance.Thehusbanddidnotcomplywiththeorderofmaintenanceanddidnotpayanymoneytothewifeeitheratthetimeofdivorceoratanyothertime,eventowardsthemaintenanceofthethreechildren.Whiletheseproceedingswerepending,thehusbandrealizedthattheeldestsonhadturned7.HetookshelterundertheShariatlawandfiledanapplicationunderSection9readwithSection25oftheGWAforcustodyoftheeldestson.Thehusbandpleadedthatthewifewasnotlookingafterthechildwellandtheupkeep,maintenance,andeducation,ofthechildwasnotpossibleatthematernalgrandfather’splace.Afterinterviewingthechild,thetrialcourthasremarkedthatthechildwasbeingwellbroughtupbythemotherandthegrandfather,andwaslivinghappilywithhistwobrothersandattendingschoolregularly.Againstthistrialcourtorderrejectinghispetitionforcustody,thehusbandapproachedthehighcourt.Thecourtcommented:

Thefatherfailedtoprovehisentitlementtocustodyofthechild.OnonesidehewascontestingthelitigationunderSection125ofCr.PCandontheotherwasprojectinghimselftobeacaringfather,whowasinterestedinthefuturewell-beingofhisson.Apersonrefusingtopaymaintenancetohisownchildcannotclaimheisinterestedinbettermentofverysamechild.Theinterestofchildisofparamountconsideration.Whileclaimingthatheisinterestedinthewell-beingofhischildren,hehasclaimedcustodyofonly


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onechild.Ifthefatherwasreallyinterestedinthebettermentofhischildren,hewouldhaveconcededtosharehisincomewithhischildren.Butinstead,hedraggedthewifefromcourttocourtwhileopposingherapplicationformaintenance.Afterfilingthispetition,heagreedtodepositsomemoneyforthemaintenanceoftheelderson,butnotfortheothertwochildren.Finally,hedepositedRs6,000incourt.Butthiscannotbeprojectedasagroundforawardingcustodytothefather.Theprincipleofbestinterestofthechildmustprevail.

AllegationsofImmoralityandWomen’sRighttoCustodyWhilewomenwonthebattleagainsttheconceptofnaturalguardianshipofthefatherbyusingthedoctrineofchildoftenderageandtookbenefitofthefactthatsheistheprimarycaretakerofchildrenoftenderage,thebattleagainstthenotionofimmoralitywasfarmoredifficult.Prostitutes,tawaifs(courtesans),womenpresumedtobeofloosemoralcharacter,womenfoundguiltyofadulteryinmatrimonialdisputes,andwomenwhohadremarried,wereroutinelydeniedcustodyoftheirchildren.Butthesameyardstickofmoralcharacterwasnever(p.251) appliedtohusbands,asalreadydiscussedearlier.Thisisbecauseofthedifferingstandardsofmoralitywhichisappliedtomenandwomeninapatriarchalsociety.Sexualmoralityisperceivedtobethesinglerelevantfactorthatcouldbeusedtodenywomencustody.Attheinitialstage,theissueofthewomen’sconductandcharacterbecameacrucialingredientwhiledecidingissuesofcustody.Hence,allegationsofimmoralityandsexualmisconductwereroutinelyhurledagainstwomenincustodybattles.Awifewhohadcommittedamatrimonialfaultlikeadulterywasnotawardedcustodyofherchild.In1862,inSeddonv.Seddon,468theEnglishcourtsproclaimed:Itwillprobablyhavesalutaryeffectontheinterestsofpublicmoralitythatitshouldbeknownthatawoman,iffoundofguiltyofadultery,willforfeitallrightstothecustodyof,oraccesstoherchildren(ascitedinDiwanandDiwan1993:440).

IntheIndiancontext,initiallyawomanwhohadcommittedamatrimonialfaultwasdeniedcustodyofchildren.InSkinnerv.Orde,469thePrivyCouncilheldthatuponconversion,themotherlosesherrightofcustodytoherchild.InVenkammav.Savitramma,470thecourtheldthatamotherwhowasleadinganimmorallifewasnotentitledtocustodyofherchild.Butthesameprinciplewasnotappliedtohusbandsandthecourtsdidnothesitatetogivecustodytoanerrantorimmoralfather.InKaulesrav.Joral,471custodywasgiventoanimmoralmotherastherewasnoothersuitableperson.

Butonewitnessedalenientapproachtowardswomenwhodidnothavethemeanstosupporttheirchildrenorwomenwhohadbeenaccusedofadultery.In1934,theAllahabadHighCourt,inHaidriBegamv.JawwadAli,472ruledthatthemerefactthatthemotherdoesnothaveadequatemeansisnotsufficienttodenyhercustody,particularlywhentherewasnoallegationofadultery.InMadhuBalav.ArunKhanna,473thecourtsheldthatinordertodenycustodytothemotheronthegroundofadultery,averystrictstandardofproofhastobeapplied.Latercaseshaveheldthatevenremarriageoraccusationsofadulterycannotbethegoverningprinciplestodeprivethemotherofherrightofcustodyandguardianshipasthefollowingtwocasesillustrate:


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InChethanaRamatheerthav.KumarV.Jahgirdar,474thewifefiledanappealagainsttheorderofthefamilycourt,Bangalore,directinghertohandoverthecustodyofherminordaughtertoherhusbandonthegroundthatshehadremarried.TheKarnatakaHighCourtreversedtheorderofthefamilycourtandallowedthecustodyofthedaughtertoberetainedwiththemother.TheCourtheld:

Evenwhiletheparenthadnotdisqualifiedhimselforherselffrombeingthenaturalguardianofaminorchild,itmaystillbefoundthattheminor’sinterestisbetterservedifthecustodyofthechildiswiththeotherparent.Theremarriageofthemotherafterdivorcedoesnotsufferfromanydisqualificationordrawback.Themotheriswelleducatedandcansupportthechildfinancially.TheparamountconsiderationinappointinganypersonasguardianofaHinduminoristhewelfareoftheminor.

InSadhanaRandevv.SantoshKumar,475thefathersuedforcustodyofhischildren,levellingallegationsofunchastebehaviouragainsthisformerwife.Despitetheallegations,thecourtupheldtherightofthemotherforcustodyofherchildren.TheAllahabadHighCourtheld(p.252) thatthedecidingfactorwasthewelfareandwishesoftheminorandruledasfollows:Regardlessofwhetherornotthemotherwashavingrelationswithanyone(anaccusationwhichwasneverproved),sheshouldnotbedisqualifiedfrombeingthechildren’sguardianandretainingcustodyonthatground.Thechildren’spreferenceistostaywiththeirmother,andtheemotionalvalueofthemotherlyinstinctarefarmoreimportantthananyallegationsofimmoralityraisedbythefather.Thoughthechildrenhadpassedtheageof13years,theycannotbeturnedovertotheirfatheragainsttheirwishes.

MotherastheNaturalGuardian:GitaHariharan

InthecaseofGitaHariharanv.ReserveBankofIndia,476theSupremeCourtwascalledupontodecidetheconstitutionalvalidityoftheprovisionthatthefatherwasthenaturalguardianofaminor.

TheissuebeforetheSupremeCourtwaswhetherthemothercouldbethenaturalguardianofherminorchild.AsperAnandCJandM.SrinivasanJ.,thedefinitionofguardianandnaturalguardiandonotmakeanydiscriminationagainstthemotherandshebeingoneoftheguardiansmentionedinSection6wouldundoubtedlybeanaturalguardianasdefinedinSection4(c).TheSupremeCourtheldthatthewords‘afterhim’inSection6,meantthatifthefatherwasabsentforanyreasonwhatsoever,suchasdesertion,themotherwouldbethenaturalguardianandthatitdidnotmeanafterthelifetimeofthefather.ThethirdjudgeontheBench,BanerjeeJ.heldthat:‘BeitnotedthatgenderequalityisoneofthebasicprinciplesofourConstitutionandintheeventthewords“afterhim”istobereadtomeanadisqualificationofamothertoactasanaturalguardianduringthelifetimeofthefather,thesamewoulddefinitelyruncountertothebasicrequirementoftheConstitution,sincetheConstitutionandthestatutewouldhavetobeinaccordancetherewithandnotdehorsthesame.’


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Thecourtspeltoutcertainsituations—(1)whenthefatherisindifferenttowardsthechild,(2)ifthechildisintheexclusivecustodyofthemother,(3)duetophysicalormentalincapacitythefatherisincapableofactingastheguardian,(4)whenitisdecidedmutuallybetweentheparentsthatthemotherwillactastheguardian—themothercouldbedeemedasthenaturalguardian,evenduringthelifetimeofthefather.

Apointtonoteisthatonlywhenthefatherhasabdicatedhisresponsibilityor,byconsent,agreedtoelevatethemothertothestatusofanaturalguardian,wouldthejudgmentcomeintoeffect.However,inkeenlycontestedcustodybattles,thisjudgmentwillnotberelevant.

CustodyRightsofOtherRelatives

Morerecently,wherethemotherhasdiedinunnaturalcircumstancesandthefatherisfacingcriminalcharges,thecourtshavebeeninclinedtograntcustodyorguardianshiptomaternalrelatives.Applyingtheprincipleofbestinterestofthechildisparamount,thecourtshaveupheldtherightofcustodyoftherelativesasagainsttherightofthefather.

InKirtikumarMaheshankarJoshiv.PradipkumarKarunashankerJoshi,477themotherhaddiedundertragiccircumstancesandthefatherwasfacingcriminalchargesunderSection498AofIPC(crueltytowives).Afterherdeath,thechildrenleftthefather’shouseandwenttolivewiththeirmaternal(p.253) uncle,Kirtikumar,whofiledforguardianshipoftheminorchildrenonthegroundthatthefatherwasunfittobetheguardian.Thechildrenwerepresentedbeforethecourtinchamberproceedingsandtheirwisheswereascertained.Thecourtfoundthechildrenintelligentandmorematurethanotherchildrenoftheirage.Boththechildrenwerebitterabouttheirfatherandnarratedvariousepisodesshowingilltreatmentoftheirmother.Theycategoricallystatedthattheywerenotwillingtolivewiththeirfatherandwerehappywiththeirmaternaluncle.Assessingtheirstateofmind,thecourtwasoftheviewthatitwouldnotbeintheinterestsandwelfareofthechildrentohandovertheircustodytothefather.Whileacknowledgingthatthefatherbeinganaturalguardianhasapreferentialrighttothecustodyofhisminorchildren,theSupremeCourtheldthatkeepinginviewthefactsandcircumstancesofthecaseaswellasthewishesofthechildren,thecourtwasnotinclinedtohandovercustodytothefather.Thecustodywasretainedwiththematernaluncle.Thefatherwaspermittedtomeetthechildrenonholidaysonpriornotice.Itwaspointedoutthatthefatherwasatlibertytomovethecourtformodifyingtheorder,ifhewonovertheloveandaffectionofthechildren

InShakuntalaSonawanev.NarendraKhaire,478therewasmaritalconflictbetweentheparentsoftheminorchildandthewifehadreturnedtoherparents’housewhenshewaspregnant.Ontheverydayofthebirthofthechild,thehusbandhadfiledadivorcepetitioninthefamilycourtatBandra,Mumbai,onthegroundofcrueltyanddesertion.Duringthependencyoftheproceedings,thecustodyoftheminorchildremainedwiththewife,whowasstayingwithherparents.InFebruary2000,thewifediedundertragiccircumstances.Themother,ShakuntalaSonawane,(thematernalgrandmotheroftheminorchildandthePetitioner)allegedthatthedaughterhadbeensetonfirebythe


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husband,therespondentinthispetition.ThecontentionoftheRespondentwasthatshehadcommittedsuicide.Theminorgrand-daughterwaslookedaftersinceherbirthbythePetitioner.Whileawardingcustodyofthechildtothematernalgrandmother,theBombayHighCourtheld:‘Evenifanaturalguardianisaliveandstakeshis/herclaim,thecourtcanstillproceedtoappointsomeotherfitpersonastheguardianundertheprovisionsoftheAct,afterascertainingthewelfareoftheminor’.

InNilRatanKunduandAnr.v.AbhijitKundu(2008)9SCC413,themotherofthechildhaddiedduetoanunnaturaldeathandthefatherwaschargedunderSection498AofIPCforcrueltyandwasarrested.Theminorchildwasinthecustodyofmaternalgrandparents.Afterhisrelease,hefiledforcustodyandguardianshipandwasawardedcustodybythefamilycourtofCalcuttaandtheCalcuttaHighCourtonthebasisthatthefatheristhenaturalguardianofthechild.ButinappealtheSupremeCourtsetasidetheordersofthelowercourtandheldthatwhiledealingwithcustodycases,isneitherboundbystatutesnorbystrictrulesofevidenceorprocedurenorbyprecedents.Inselectingproperguardianofaminor,theparamountconsiderationshouldbethewelfareandwell-beingofthechild.Thecourtruledthatthewelfareofchildreniscontrollingconsiderationgoverningcustodyofchildrenandnotrightoftheirparents.Ifthechildisoldenoughtoformintelligentdecision,wishesofthechildshouldalsotobeconsideredincustodycases.BothcourtsweredutyboundtoconsiderallegationsagainstthefatherunderthecriminaloffenceofSection498A,IPCandhaveneglectedto(p.254) considertheimportantfactorof‘character’oftheproposedguardian.

InAtharHussainv.SyedSirajAhmed,AIR2010SC1414,theSupremeCourtupheldtheorderoftheKarnatakaHighCourtwhichawardedcustodyoftheminorchildrentothegrandparents.Themotheroftheminorchildrenhaddiedandthechildrenwerebeingbroughtupbygrandparentsandwereattachedtothem.Thecustodywasawardedtothefatherbythefamilycourt,Bangalore,butthehighcourtinappealreversedtheorderandtheparentswerepermittedtoretaincustodyuntiltheissueofguardianshipwasfinallydecided.Thecourtexplainedthatinterimcustodyandguardianshiparetwoentirelydifferentissueswhichareindependentanddistinctfromeachother.WhilethefatherremainsanaturalguardianunderSection19unlessdeclaredunfit,interimcustodyistobeguidedbythesolefactorofwelfareofthechildren.Thecourtcommentedthatwelfareofthechildrendemandsthattheircustodywhichispresentlywiththeirmaternalrelativesshouldnotbedisturbedtillthefinalsettlementoftheirguardianshipissuebythefamilycourt.Irreparableinjurywouldbecausedtothechildrenifthey,againsttheirwill,areuprootedfromtheirpresentsettings.

IssuesofCustodyinMatrimonialDisputes

Incontemporarytimes,themostbitterandacrimoniousbattlesovercustodytakeplaceduringmatrimoniallitigation.Theoldmaxim,fatheristhenaturalguardian,hasgivenwaytothenewermaxim,bestinterestofthechildisparamount.Thisistheprimarypillaronwhichtheissueofcustodyhastobedecided.Thebestinterestmaximoverridesthestipulationsindifferentpersonallawsandisapplieduniversallyinallcustodylitigations.


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Evenawife,whohascommittedamatrimonialfault,canbeawardedcustodyofthechildifthecourtcomestoaconclusionthatitisinthebestinterestofthechild,asthecasesalreadydiscussedearlierreveal.Todepriveachildoftenderageofitsmother’sloveandcarewouldnotbeinthebestinterestofthechild,hasbeenthewell-establishedlegaldoctrine.Thecourtshaveheldthattheaimofthelitigationisnottopunishtheguiltybutonlytoensurethewelfareofthechild.Amatrimonialcourtandcounsellorsattachedtoit,aswellaslawyersappearinginthematter,mustensurethatthechildisalwaysthecentreofallnegotiationsovercustodyandthatthisprincipleisneverundermined.Sincethechildremainsunrepresentedinmatrimonialdisputes,itisthedutyofthecourttoensurethatthechild’sinterestsarenotharmedornegated.Courtsdonotviewthechildasanobjecttobetossedaroundbetweenthewarringparents.

Butthedoctrine,bestinterestofthechild,ismorecomplexthanitappearsonthesurface.Whenthefatheriswealthyandthemotherhasnoindependentsourceofincome,wherewouldthebestinterestofthechildlie?Thecourtshaveruledinseveralcasesthatjustbecauseamotherdoesnothavethefinancialresources,itdoesnotmeanthatsheshouldbedeniedcustodyofherchildren.Thesuperiorsocialstatusofthefather,oreventhecharacterandconductofthemother(includinghermatrimonialfaults),cannotbefactorstiltingthebalanceinfavourofthefather.Theonlydeterminingfactorwouldbethecareandconcernshowntowardsthechildasthefollowingcasereveals.

InRaviShankarv.UmaTiwari,479thecouplewasdivorcedthirteenyearspriortothefatherfilingforcustodyofthechildwhowasallalonginthecustodyofthemotheronthegroundthathisgreaterwealthwouldpermithimtobetterprovideforthewelfareofthechild.(p.255) TheMadhyaPradeshHighCourtheldthatinacasewherethefatherclaimscustodyofaminorchild,hemustshowfromhisconductthatheisinterestedinthebettermentandupkeepoftheminor.Thefathermustdemonstratethroughactionthathewouldlookafterthewelfareandsecurityoftheminor,whichwouldbetheparamountconsiderationofthecourt.Inthiscase,forthirteenyearssincehisseparation,thehusbandhaddonenothingtotakecareoftheminororlookafterherinterest,eitherbymonetaryoranyothermeans.Thecourtheldthatthefathercouldnotclaimcustodyofhischildpurelyonthebasisoffinancialstatus.Financialsecuritycanonlybeoneofthecomponentstobeconsideredwhileprovidingfortheoverallwelfareofthechild.Thecourtdismissedthehusband’spleaandretainedthecustodywiththemother.

AsimilarviewwasalsoexpressedbytheBombayHighCourtinAshokShamjibhaiDharodv.NeetaAshokDharode.480Itwasheldthattheaffluenceofthefather,orhisparents,orrelatives,isnotarelevantfactorfordeterminingtheissueofchildcustody.

Whilenon-workingmothersarehauntedbythefearoflackofresources,workingmothersarefacedwithanothersetofanxieties.Wouldawomanwhoisemployedandspendsmostofherwakinghoursoutsideofthehomebeinabetterpositiontolookafterthechild?Recentcaseshaveresolvedthisissue.Ithasbeenheldthatamothercannotbedeniedcustodymerelybecausesheisgainfullyemployed.Thisprinciplehasnowevolvedintoanestablishedrule.


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Inmoderndaycustodybattles,neitherthefather,asthetraditionalnaturalguardian,northemother,asthebiologicallyequippedparenttocareforthechildoftenderage,areroutinelyawardedcustody.Theprinciple,bestinterestofthechildtakesintoconsiderationtheexistinglivingarrangementsandhomeenvironmentofthechild.Thecourtsareusuallyhesitanttoremovethechildfromafamiliarenvironmentandhandher/himovertothenon-custodialparents.Eachcasewillbedecidedonitsownmerit,takingintoaccounttheoverallsocial,educational,andemotionalneeds,ofthechild.

Thesimpleprinciplefollowedbythecourtsoncealegalbattlecommencesisusuallytoawardinterimcustodytotheparentwhoalreadyhasthephysicalcustodyofthechildandawardvisitationrightstotheotherparent.Thisisusuallyoverweekendsandschoolvacationssothatthestudiesarenotdisrupted.Itisimportanttorememberthataccesstothenon-custodialparentortherightofvisitationistherightofthechildtoseetheparent,andnotthatoftheparenttoimposeonthechild.

Theroutinemannerinwhichaccessisgrantedtofathersbecomesacauseofconcerntomostwomen.Whiletheystruggletomakeendsmeetandareraisingtheirchildrenagainstgreatodds,thefatherscaneasilywinthechildrenoverbyshoweringthemwithgifts.Whilethemothershavetheresponsibility,thefathersareleftwiththepleasanttaskofrecreationwiththechild.Hence,courtsmustensurethatthefather’seconomicresponsibilitytowardsmaintenanceofchildrenformsapartofthetermsofcustodyandaccess.Inthiscontext,thejudgmentofB.N.Srikrishna,J.,inVinodchandraGajananDeokarv.AnupamaVinodchandra,481(discussedearlier)isanimportantmarker,whereHisLordshipdeniedaccesstothefatherwhohadnotpaidinterimmaintenanceandheldthatuntilthefatherdisplayedevidenceofcontrition,penitence,andreform,andpaidthe(p.256) interimmaintenancearrears,hewillnotbeentitledtovisitationrights.

Inanothercasewhichhasbeenlitigatedoveraverylongperiod,GauravNagpalv.SumedhaNagpal,482whileupholdingthewife’srighttocustody,theSupremeCourtcommentedthatsimplybecausethefatherloveshischildren,andhasnotbeenprovedtobeotherwiseundesirable,itdoesnotnecessarilyleadtotheconclusionthatwelfareofchildrenwouldbebetterpromotedbygrantingthecustodytohim.Childrenarenotmerechattel,noraretheytoysfortheirparents.Thecourtdoesnotgiveemphasisonwhatpartiessubmitbutexercisesitsjurisdictionforthewelfareofminor.Thetermwelfaremustbeconstruedliterallyandmustbeinterpretedinitswidestsense.Though,provisionsofrelevantstatutesmaybetakenintoconsideration,inmattersofcustody,thecourtisentitledtoexerciseitspowerofparenspatriae.Thecourtalsocommentedthatthefatherhadplayedafrauduponthewifebyconcealingthefactofhisearliermarriage,whereinhiswifecommittedsuicidewithinsixmonthsofmarriage.Thehusband’sargumentthatthechildwaslivingwithhimforalongtimeoverlooksthefactthatbyfloutingvariousorders,leadingeventoinitiationofcontemptproceeding,hehasmanagedtoretainthecustodyofchild.Thecourtcommentedthathecannotbeabeneficiaryofhisownwrongs.

IntheproceedingsundertheHinduMarriageAct,thecourtcouldmake,fromtime-to-


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time,suchinterimordersasitmightdeemjustandproperwithrespecttocustody,maintenance,andeducationofminorchildren,consistentlywiththeirwishes,whereverpossible.

Custodyordersarenotpermanentordersandcanbevariedifthechangedsituationsodemands.Evenconsentorderspassedinpetitionsformutualconsentdivorcecanbesubsequentlyvaried.InVikramVirVohrav.ShaliniBhalla,AIR2010SC1675,theSupremeCourtupheldtheorderofthetrialcourtandtheDelhiHighCourt,permittingvaryingtheorderofaccessarrivedinthedivorcepetitionfiledbythespousesjointlyinapetitionfordivorcebymutualconsentandpermittedthechildtobetakentoAustralia.Thecourtcommentedthatthemother’sautonomyonherpersonhoodcannotbecurtailedbyacourtonthegroundofapriororderofcustodyofthechild.Everypersonhasarighttodevelophisorherpotentialandtherighttodevelopmentisabasichumanright.Themothercannotbeaskedtochoosebetweenherchildandhercareer.Sincethemotherandthechildareattachedtoeachother,separatingthechildfromhismotherwillbedisastroustoboth.Themotherwasrequiredtogiveanundertakingthatshewouldabidebytheordertoaccessthehusband.

Thecourtswouldviewanyviolationoftheundertakingseriously.Forinstance,inDavidJudev.HannahGraceJude,AIR2003SC2925,themotherwasallowedtotaketheminorchildtoU.S.A.onanunconditionalundertakingthatshewouldbringthechildbackwheneverthecourtrequiredhertodoso.Butsubsequently,shefloutedtheundertakinganddidnotproducethechildbeforethetrialcourtanddespiteseveralnotices,didnotherselfremainpresentbeforethecourt.ShealsofloutedtheseveralnoticesissuedtoherbytheSupremeCourtincontemptproceedings.TheCourtheldthatherattitudeinnotappearingbeforethecourtwasdefiantandcontemptuousandshewasheldguiltyofcontemptandwasawardedthreemonthsofsimpleimprisonmentandafineofRs50,000.

Thecustodybattletakesaharshertollonwomenduetotheiremotionalvulnerabilityandfinancialdependence.Whilefathersareleft(p.257) freeofallresponsibilities,themothersunilaterallybeartheemotional,social,andfinancialobligations,ofthechildrenduetotheirownsocializationprocess.Attimes,whentheeconomicburdenandprolongedlitigationbecomeunbearable,womensuccumbandgiveupcustody,ratherthanfacethedailyemotionalturmoilforthemselvesandtheirchildren.

Theissueofcustodybecomesevenmorecomplicatedinsituationswherethechildrenarecitizensofaforeigncountryandtheissuebecomesoneofconflictoflaws.483Inthiscontext,theSupremeCourtrulinginSaritaSharmav.SushilSharma484helpstoshedlightonthejudicialapproachestodealingwiththecomplexity.ThechildrenwerecitizensofUSA.ThemotherwasawardedcustodybutwasrestrainedfromremovingthechildrenfromthejurisdictionoftheconcernedcourtinUSA.ThemotherfloutedtheorderandbroughtthechildrentoIndia.Thehusbandhadanarrestwarrantissuedagainstthewife.Inahabeascorpuswritpetitionfiledbyhim,thehighcourtgrantedcustodytothefatherandallowedhimtotakethechildrenbacktoUSA.Inappeal,theSupremeCourtsetasidethehighcourtorderandcommentedasfollows:


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ThedecreepassedbytheAmericancourt,thougharelevantfactor,cannotoverrideconsiderationsofwelfareofminorchildren.ThefatherresidesinUSAwithhismotheragedabout80years.Heappearstobeinthehabitoftakingexcessivealcohol.Itisdoubtfulwhetherthehusbandwillbeabletotakepropercareofthechildren.Welfareofafemalechildlieswithmother.Themotherisnotfoundwantingintakingpropercaseofchildren.Consideringallaspects,itwasnotproperforthehighcourttohaveallowedthehabeascorpuswritpetitiondirectingthemothertohandoverthecustodyofchildrentothefatherandpermithimtotakethemawaytoUSA.SincethehusbandhadanarrestwarrantissuedagainstthewifeinUSAtheSupremeCourtcommentedthatthechancesofthemotherreturningtoUSAwiththechildrenwoulddependuponthejointeffortsofboththepartiestogetarrestwarrantcancelledbyexplainingthecircumstancestotheconcernedcourtinUSA.

Butintwoothercases,ShilpaAggarwalv.AviralMittal,2010Cri.LJ844andDr.V.RaviChandranv.UnionofIndia,2009(14)SCALE27,whichweredecidedsubsequently,wherethechildrenwereforeignnationalsandthemothershadbroughtthechildrentoIndia,theSupremeCourtdirectedthatthechildrenshouldbetakenbackandsubjectedtothejurisdictionoftheirrespectivecountries.TheCourtfurtherruledthatthebestinterestofthechildrenliesinsendingthechildrenbackasthecourtconcernedwiththeissueofcustodywouldbebestsuitedtodecidetheprincipleofwelfareofthechild.Inboththesecasesthemotherslostoutandhadtosendthechildrenbacktothecustodyoftheirfathersanditwasleftforthemotherstoagitatetheissueofcustodyintherespectivecourtsinaforeigncountry.

TraumatisedChildrenandAccessRights

Incaseswhereduetodomesticviolencethemotheriseitherforcedtoleavethematrimonialhomeoristhrownoutofthematrimonialhome,thechildrenandthemotheraremostvulnerableduetothesuddenseparation.Ifthewomanisunabletogetphysicalcustodyofthechildreneitherthroughtheinterventionofthepoliceorsocialworkorganizations,sheiscompelledtoapproachthecourts.Inthesesituations,itisimportanttoaskthatthechildrenbeimmediatelyproducedincourtandtointerviewtheminanon-threateningandnon-intimidatingenvironmentinordertoascertaintheirgenuinewishes.Whenthechildrenarecalledtocourtandaskedtodecideastowhichparenttheyprefertoresidewith,thechildrenarenotinapositiontospeakagainsttheparent(p.258) withwhomtheymayberesiding.Inthesecircumstances,thecourtsmustplayaproactiveroletoensurethatthechildrenfeelsecureandarenotthreatenedbyeitherviolenceagainstthemselvesortheirmother.

Theprincipleofbestinterestofthechildgetsfurthercomplicatedincasesofdomesticviolencewherethechildrenhaveeitherwitnessedincidentsofviolenceagainsttheirmotherorhavethemselvesbeenvictimsofviolence.Childrenrememberandrelivethesemomentsofabuseandthelitigationprocesscontributestokeepingthememoryofviolencealive.Greatersensitivityinsettlingissuesofaccessinthesesituationsshouldbeexercised,sothatthechildisnotfurthertraumatized.Thecourtsinsteadofallowing


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routineaccesstothefather,mustmakeanattempttorebuildthechild’srelationshipwiththefatherthroughshortsupervisedaccesshours.Inthisway,thechild’swishescanbeascertainedandaccesshourscangraduallybeincreased,dependinguponthechild’scomfortlevel.

Anareathathascometolightveryrecentlyistheissueofincestorsexualabuseofchildrenbyfathersandothermalerelatives.Manytimes,thisoccurswithinfamilieswherethereisalreadyamatrimonialdiscord.Attimesthechildrenareabusedasapunitivemeasureagainstthewife.Whileagradualawarenessregardingthisissueisbeginningtosurfacewithinthecontextofcriminallaw,therelevanceofthisissueinfamilylitigationand,inparticular,whiledealingwithissuesofcustodyandaccess,isyetevolve.Somecaseswhichhavecomeupinthecontextofcriminallawarelistedherewiththeviewofcreatingjudicialawarenessevenwithinthecontextoffamilylaw.

InthecaseofPooranRamv.StateofRajasthan,485whenthefatherlookedattheteenagedaughterlustfully,themothercommentedandthefatherbecamerevengeful.Afewdayslater,atnight,hegaggedthedaughterwithherdupattaandrapedher.Thenextdaythedaughterinformedthemotherandwhenthemotherconfrontedthefather,hebeatherruthlessly.Later,acomplaintwasfiled.Inhisdefencethefatherpleadedthattherewasamatrimonialdisputebetweenhimandhiswifeandduetothisshehadfiledafalsecomplaintagainsthim.Thetrialcourtdisbelievedhiscontentionsandconvictedtheaccusedforsevenyears.Inappeal,thecourtcommented:Theaccusedisapsychologicallysadisticpersonandneedspsychologicaltreatment.

Thecourtsdonotalwaystreatthesecasesascasesofurgency.Theprolongedlitigationresultsincausinginjusticetothevictimgirl.In1992,theBombayHighCourtreducedthesentenceofafather,whohadbeenconvictedofrapinghisseven-year-olddaughter,fromlifeimprisonmenttotenyears.Thehighcourtwhilereducingthesentencecommentedsympathetically:

Theappellantisahutmentdwellerandhispovertyhasplacedhiminthedifficultpositionofhavingtosleephuddledupinatinyarea.Eventhoughhiswifehadlefthim,heusedtoworkthewholedayandsendthechildrentoschool,arrangefortheirmealsfromthehotel,providethemwithtoysandpocketmoney,andcookthenightmealforthem.Therapewasamomentarylapse,duetohispatheticsituation(AbdulWahidShaikhv.StateofMaharashtra).

Thisnoteofsympathyandconcerngetsevenshrillerwhenthepartiesbelongtomoreaffluentstrataofsociety.InthecaseofSudeshJhakuv.K.C.J.&Ors,ahigh-rankinggovernmentofficialwaschargedwithindulginginoralsexandfingerpenetrationwithhissix-year-olddaughter.ThepolicerefusedtochargethefatherwiththeoffenceofrapeandinsteadregisteredthecomplaintunderSection377–unnaturaloffence.486(p.259)ThewifefiledawritpetitionintheDelhiHighCourttobringtheoffenceunderthescopeofSection376(rape).Thecourtrejectedthisargumentandheldthatinsertionofobjects,etc.,amountsonlytoviolationofmodesty.


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Thelast,N.N.v.P.N.Misc.GP.37/1999decidedon4March1999Bom(unreported)isanunreportedjudgmentoftheBombayHighCourtinachildcustodycase.Thepartiesbelongedtotheaffluentsectionofsociety.Thecaseconcernedmolestationofathree-year-oldbythegrandfather.Thewifeopposedthehusband’spetitionforcustody.Theinterimcustodywasawardedtothemotherbutaccesswasgrantedtothefatherathisresidenceeveryweekforfourhours.Thecommentsbythejudgeconcernedareaneyeopenerregardingjudicialunderstandingofchildsexualabuse:

Primafacie,IamoftheviewthattheallegationswhichtheRespondent(wife)hasmadeagainstthefatherofthePetitionerdonotappeartobetrue.Ijustcouldnotimaginethatthegrandfather,whomustbeofaroundsixtyyearsofage,wouldindulgeinsuchaheinousandpervertacttothechildrenofsuchtenderage.Adoubthaslurkedinmymind.TheRespondenthadatthefirstinstanceallegedthatherminordaughterwasmolestedbutlatersheagainaddedthatboththechildrenweremolested.ThechildrencouldnotspeakevenawordwithmewhenIaffectionatelypattedthemandaskedthemtheirnames.Bothofthemdidnotevenoffertoutteraword.IwasofcourseaskingtheminHindithinkingthattheirmothertonguewasHindi.However,boththeparentstoldmetotalkwiththeminEnglish.ItwasindeedagreatsurprisethatchildrenofthreeandfouryearsofagewerespeakinginEnglish.Thereafter,IspoketotheminEnglish,justputtingaquestiontothemaskingtheirnames.Itisnotasthoughtheywerelookingscaredorafraidoranythingaseventheirparentswerepresent.Itis,therefore,extremelydoubtfultoimaginethatbothofthem,thegirlofthreeandtheboyoffour,wouldhavetoldtheirmotheraboutthesocalledandallegedmolestationonthembytheirgrandfather.Iwonderwhatlanguagetheywouldhaveusedtodescribeasituationofthemolestation.

Thesecommentsclearlyindicatethescepticismandstigmawithwhichsexualabusecasesaremet,eveninthepresentday.Withoutanysemblanceofaninvestigationintothemother’sclaimsofabuse,herallegationswerebrushedasideasanimpossibility.Courtsmustmakeaconcertedefforttoidentifyinstancesofsexualabuse,especiallywhenperpetratedagainstchildren,howeverheinousorunbelievabletheymayseem.Turningablindeyetosexualviolence,especiallywhenperpetratedbyafamilymember,caneasilyplaceachildwithineasyaccess,orevenwithinthecustodyofhisorherabusers.

Issuesofcustody,guardianship,andaccess,cannolongerbeviewedasparentalrights.Thedeterminingprincipleiswelfareofthechildisparamount.Thecourtsmustexercisetheirpowerwithgreatprudenceandcaution,sothatitdoesnotresultinviolationofthebasichumanrightofchildren,therighttolife,whichincludestherighttolivewithoutfearandtrauma.

ConclusionThischapterexaminesthreedistinctrightswhichflowfromthemarriagecontract.Whilethelawsofmarriageanddivorcearegenderneutral,theissueofrightsandobligationsisclearlymarkedwithgenderedassumptions.Maintenanceandmatrimonialpropertyconcerneconomicrightsofwomenanddealwithentitlementstoshelterandsustenance.


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Thethirdissuealsoconcernsentitlements,butnotofeconomicnature.

(p.260) Motherhoodisagenderedstatusnotjustinitsbiologybutalsoinitssocialconstruction.Withinitsconfines,awoman’sroleastheprimarycaretakerofherchildrencreatesaneconomicdependency.Butthissociallyprescribedrolehasnoeconomicvalueattachedtoit.Women’sbiologicalstatusasamother,thesocialconstructionofthegenderedrole,andthedependencymotherhoodcreatesforwomen,arefactorswhichcomeintoplaywhiledeterminingwomen’srightstocustodyandguardianshipofthechildren.

Historically,childrenwereviewedasthepropertyofthefather.Hewastheirnaturalguardian,theycarriedhisname,thesonsinheritedhispropertyorweredeemedjointholdersofthepropertyalongwithhim,asinthenotionofcoparcenersorHUFproperty.Producingchildren(morespecificallysons)wasapiousobligationcastuponaHindufather.ThesoilandseeddoctrineoftheancientHindulawviewedthemothermerelyasacarrierofherhusband’sseed.Whilemotherhoodwasdesired,aspired,andrevered,awoman’sclaimoverherchildrenwasnotrecognizedbylaw.Thisnotionprevailedacrossallpersonallaws.Thesectiononchildcustodytracesthestrugglewomenhadtowageforbeingrecognizedasnaturalguardiansoftheirchildren,alongwiththefathers.Butwhileclaimingequalrightsoverchildreninmattersofguardianship,thesocialconstructofthespecificnotionof‘motherhood’andtheconstraintsitimposesuponwomenalsoneedstoberecognizedincustodybattles,beyondthegenderneutralterm‘parenthood’

Ifthenotionofequalityandgenderneutralitycreatesonesetofproblemsforwomen,whengenderiscontextualized,itforegroundsanother.Withinaframeworkofclearlydefinedgenderedroles,whatgetscontextualizedisthewoman’ssexuality,sexualpurity,andsubordinatestatuswithinthemarriage.AsdiscussedinChapter1ofthefirstvolume,whiletracingthehistoryofpersonallaws,thepatriarchalsocialstructurerestsuponnotionsofwomen’ssexualpurityandcontrolofwomen’ssexuality.Asurewayofensuringthisistochastisewomenfortheirsexualmisconductbydenyingthemtheirrights.Iftheentitlementsflowedfromthehusbandtothewife,thenthewife’scapacitytobeentitledtotheseclaimsrestsonhersexualpurity.Wecanclearlyseethistrend,bothinissuesofmaintenanceaswellaschildcustody.Itmustbeconcededthatthepremiseofgenderneutralitywasevolvedtocounterthesegenderedassumptions.Butratherironically,boththepremisesbecomeinadequatewhileaddressingwomen’sconcerns.

Theclaimsofwomentocustodyarelocatedwithintwostatutes,theGuardiansandWardsAct(GWA)andtheHinduMinorityandGuardianshipAct(HMGA).Here,womenhadtochallengethepatriarchalassumptionofnaturalguardianshipoffatherswhilestakingtheirclaim.Gradually,themotherwasawardedlegalrecognitionastheparentbestsuitedtocareforchildrenoftenderage.Thisrecognitionisbasedongenderedassumptionsandisattributedtotheirbiologyandtonature.Butwomenwerecontent,asthisassumptionhelpedthemtowincustodybattlesagainsttheirhusbands,astheirroleasnurturersoftheirchildrenbegantoberecognizedincourtbattles.Laterthisconceptwasexpandedfurtherandwasconvertedintothebestinterestprinciple.


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IndiancourtshavealsoreadtheUnitedNationsDeclarationoftheRightsoftheChildintodomesticstatutesinthecontextofcustodyandguardianship.Byinvokingthisprinciple,dueweightageisgiventothephysical,emotional,andmoralwell-beingofthechild.Further,sincemostwomenareinalowereconomiccategorythantheirhusbands,economicstatusofthepartiesisnotadeterminant.Today,thebestinterestdoctrineappliesoverthedoctrinethatthefatheristhenaturalguardianofthechild.Thisoftenoverridesmaritalfault(p.261) andtheeconomicconstraintsofthepartywhohasbeengrantedcustody.Thisprincipleisapplieduniformlyacrossallpersonallaws.Thishasbeenahardearnedvictory.

However,womenfindthemselvesatadisadvantage,astheeconomicsupportwhichisawardedtothechildismeagre.Beingtheprimarycaretakerofthechildcreatesdependencyandhampersjoboptionsforwomen.Motherhoodissointrinsicallylinkedtowomanhoodthatmostwomenareunwillingtogiveuptheirclaimofchildcustody.Forwomen,itbecomesanissueofemotionalbondingbeyondmererightsandentitlements.Mostwomenviewthemselvesandtheirchildrenasacompositefamilyunitandabondwhichcannotbeseveredatthetimeofdivorce.Hence,generally,womenwillopttoforsakeeconomicadvantagesduringdivorcesettlementstoobtainsolecustodyoftheirchildren.Itisnotthatfathersdonotwishtoobtaincustodyoftheirchildren,butthereasonsfordoingsoaredifferentfromthoseonwhichthemotherstakesherclaims.

Whiletheprinciplebestinterestofthechildworkswellforwomenwhiledeterminingissuesofcustody,itposesproblemswhenaccesstothenon-custodialfatherisawardedonaroutinebasis.Oncethebasicframeworkofawardingcustodyhasbeenevolved,thecourtsapplytheseprinciplesinamechanicalmannerwithoutcontextualizingthespecificityofthesituationorthespecialneedsofchildren.Courtspresumethataccesstothefatherisinthebestinterestofthechild,evenwhenfactsproveotherwise.Forinstance,evenwhendivorcepetitionscontainallegationsofcruelty,physicalabuse,neglectofthechild,orchildbattery,theseallegationsarenotcontextualizedwhiledeterminingtherightofaccess.Grantingaccesstothehusbandinsuchsituationsmaynotbeinthebestinterestofthechild.

Thereisalsothelingeringdiscomfortthatfromhisvantageeconomicposition,thefathercanadverselyinfluencethechildagainstthemotherorwinovertheaffectionofthechildbyshoweringexpensivegiftsand,thus,communicateawrongmessagetothechild.Inmostsituations,thefatherbecomestheindulgentparent,whilethemotherastheprimarycaretakerofthechildisreducedtotheroleofastrictdisciplinarian,whichattimeschildrenbegintoresent.Theloweringoftheeconomicstandardofthewife,inthepostdivorcephase,ascomparedtothemoreaffluentlifestyleofthefather,becomesapointofconstanttensionandworrytosinglemothers,whoaretheprimarycaretakersoftheirchildren.Forthefathers,theissueofaccessbecomesalevertosettlescoreswiththedivorcedwife.Butcourtsareunwillingtoexaminetheissuemoreminutelywhiledecidingtheclaimsofcustodyandaccess.

Worstarethecaseswheretheminorhasbeensubjectedtoincestorhasdevelopedafearpsychosisduetothedomesticconflict.Evenwithoutprovidingcounsellingtodeal


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withthetrauma,ormonitoringthechildduringaccesshours,courtsroutinelygrantaccesstothefather.Attimes,theaccessisovernightormayextendtohalftheschoolvacations.Whilethesemaycauseseriousharmtothechild’semotionalandpsychologicalwellbeing,courtsremainoblivioustoit,evenwhileapplyingthebestinterestprincipleastheunreportedcasesdiscussedreveal.

Inordertosavetheirchildrenfromthisemotionalstress,thereareinstanceswherethemothershavetakendrasticstepsofabscondingandbecomingfugitives.Forinstanceinthecustodybattle,inHemaRavishankerv.K.R.Ravishankar,487themotherwasawardedcustodyandthefatherwasawardedaccess.Sincethecouplelivedintwodifferentcities,theten-year-oldchildwouldhavetotravelandstayovernightwiththefather.Thechildrefused.Thechildalsosufferedfromchronicasthma(p.262) attacksandthemotherwasconcernedthatthetensionwouldinduceanasthmaticattack.Inappealagainsttheinterimorder,thechildwasinterviewedwherethechildmentionedcertainincidentsofsexualmolestationbythegrandfather.Thejudgesdisbelievedhimandheldthatthechildwastutoredandthiswasamereafterthought,sincethisfactwasnotpleadedearlier.Sinceshedidnotcomplywiththeorderofaccess,thewifewasheldforcontempt.Insubsequentproceedingsthecustodywasreversedandwasgrantedtothefather.Atthispointthewifeabscondedwiththechild.Sincethenthemotherandchildhavenotbeenheardof.488

Noncomplianceofanorderofaccessisviewedverysternlyandthewomanrunstheriskofbeingprosecutedforcontemptofcourtandmayalsolosecustodyofthechildasameasureofreprimandingher,astheabovecasereveals.Theseareextremesituationswhichrequiremoresensitivehandlinginordertosavethechildrenfromthesedrasticmeasures.Thecourtscannotabandontheircommitmenttotheprincipleofwelfareoftheminor,eveninsituationswhichposechallengestotheirauthority.Rightofaccessisnotparamountandcannotoverridethebestinterestprinciple.

Thereareseveralinstanceswherethechildrenaretakenoutofthemother’scustodyandareeithertakenoutofthecountryortakentoanotherstate,andwomenaredeprivedofbothcustodyandaccess.Mostoften,womengiveupthelegalpursuitasitbecomesimpossibleforthemtocontinuethelegalbattle.Therearemanywaysinwhichtheirrightscanbefrustrated.Unfortunately,mostwomenlackthefinancialresourcestofollowupthesecasestotheirlogicalendandhauluptheirhusbandsforcontemptofcourtinthesamemannerinwhichthehusbandsareabletodowhentheirwivesflouttheordersofaccess.Sotheygiveupthecourtbattlehalfway.

IntheIndianscenario,whenamanclaimscustodyofhischildren,heneednotassurethecourtthatheiscapableofbeingtheprimarycaretakerofthechild.Allheneedstoassureisthatthereisafemalememberinthehousehold,forexample,amotherorawidowedorunmarriedsister,whowouldplaytheroleoftheprimarycaretaker.Italmostappearsthatthemanclaimscustodyofthechildtosatisfytheurgeofmotheringofhisfemalerelatives.Insuchcases,inanattempttodeprivethemothersofcustody,frequently,allegationsofmentalinstabilityaremadeagainstwomentoprojectthemasunfitmothers.


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Thisisacauseofextremeanxietyforwomenbecausetheyruntheriskoflosingnotjustthecustody,buteventherightofaccess.Withinasetupofajointfamily,thecustodybattlesbecomethebattlefieldfortheentirejointfamily.

WhenweexaminetheeconomicentitlementsofwomenintheIndiancontext,weareconfrontedwithaglaringvoidasIndianmatrimonialstatutesdonotprovidefordivisionofpropertyupondivorce.Hence,loweringofeconomicstandardinthepost-divorcephaseisamajorconcernformostwomenduringdivorceproceedings.Underthelegalregimeofseparateproperty,thepropertyacquiredbyeitherspouseduringtheperiodofmarriagecontinuestobetheindividualpropertyofthespousethatacquiredit.Whilesuperficiallyitappearstobeajustandequitablepremise,whenweprobefurtherintotheascribedgenderroleswithinmarriage,itisagivenpremisethatthemanistheprimarybreadwinnerofthefamily,andinordertofacilitatethisprocess,awomanisexpectedtosacrificehercareeranddedicateherselftotallytothetaskoflookingafterthewell-beingofherhusband.Inaddition,(p.263) shemustalsotakeonthetaskofhomemakingandchildbearingandchildrearing.Evenifsheisrequiredorpermittedtowork,itwouldbeonlytoaugmentthefamilyincomeand,hence,herearningsaretreatedasasupplementaryincomeofthefamily.Thecourtswouldpenalizeawomanforpursuinghercareeratthecostofherprimaryroleasthecaretakerofthefamilyandthisinitselfcanconstituteagroundfordivorce(SumanKapurv.SudhirKapur).489Attimes,thechoiceforwomeniseithertoremainmarriedorholdontothejob.Thisisaconcernconfinednotonlytotheprivatedomainofmarriageandfamily,butspillsovertothepublicdomainofemployment,aswehavenoticedintheAirHostesscase,AirIndiav.NergeshMeerza,490inChapter2ofthefirstvolume.

Ratherironically,whilethisisexpectedofthewoman,thisrolehasnoeconomicvalueattachedtoit.Women’scontributiontothedomestichouseholdduringthesubsistenceoftheirmarriagedoesnotgetanyrecognitionunderthematrimonialstatutes.Thepropertyacquiredbythehusbandistreatedashisexclusiveproperty.Sincemarriageisnotviewedasaneconomicpartnership,awomanisnotentitledtoclaimdivisionofpropertyatthetimeofdivorce.Thecontributionofthewifeincreatingtheseassetsbyperformingdomesticchoresisnotconsideredasarelevantfactor.

Sinceonlynon-workingwomenorwomenwhoareunabletosustainthemselveswiththeirownearningsareentitledtomaintenance,mostworking/professionalwomenloseoutontheireconomicrights.Theyareperceivedtobeindependentwomenwhoarenotinneedoffinancialsupport.

Whenpropertyisboughtbysecuringbankloans,sincethehusbandistheprimaryearningmember,hewillhavethetitletotheproperty.Inmostcases,womenarenotevenawareoftheseassets.ThesituationisevenmorecomplexasthenotionofHinduUndividedFamily(HUF)propertystillprevails.ThehusbandmayhaveashareintheHUFassetsorbusinessesconductedinthenameandtitleoftheHUF,butthewiveswillnothaveaccesstothisinformation.Determiningthehusband’sshareinsuchpropertyandthendividingitbetweenthespousesisadauntingtaskwhichmostcourtsdonotventureintointhecourseofamatrimoniallitigation.Thereisnoclearmandatefor


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matrimonialcourtstoordersaleofmatrimonialproperty,partitionofjointfamilypropertyorforjudicialreapportionmentonthebasisoffairnessindivorcesettlements.

WithintheseparatepropertyregimethatisfollowedinIndia,thereisnoacknowledgementforthenon-financialcontributionofthewifethroughhouseholdlabour.Shedoesnotacquireanyright,title,orinterest,intheassetsacquiredbythehusbandduringthesubsistenceofthemarriage.Intheeventofdissolutionofthemarriagebythehusbanddyingintestate,thewidowiseligibleforashareofherhusband’sproperty,accordingtotherulesofthepersonallawgoverningthem.Thepersonallawsofmostcommunitiesaccordthewifeastatusnohigherthanthatofthechildren,thus,completelyignoringhercontributiontothehouseholdandfamilyintheformofunpaidwork.Sheistreatedasabeneficiary,withnoclaimsoverthedeceasedhusband’sestate,andcouldbewilledoutofhisestateshouldhewishtodoso(Shankaran2008:265).

Awomancanclaimashareonlyinpropertywhichispurchasedintheirjointnames.Thisisaspertherulesgoverninggeneralpropertylaws.EventheprovisionsofSection27ofHMAthataddressestheissueofpropertyiscladinquaintandobscurelanguageasproperty(p.264) presentedonoraboutthetimeofmarriageand,hence,propertyacquiredbytheirownindividualeffortsandnotgiventothematoraboutthetimeofmarriagetobeheldjointly,wouldnotbepropertycoveredbySection27ofHMA.InKamalakarGaneshSambhusv.MasterTejasKamalakarSambhus,491eventhoughthewifeestablishedthatshehadcontributedhalftheamounttowardstheconstructionofthehouseproperty,thecourtheldthatthiscouldnotbethesubjectmatterofanorderunderSection27oftheHinduMarriageAct,andsetasidetheorderofthefamilycourtonthesegrounds.

Inrecenttimes,therightofresidenceinthematrimonialhomeisprotectedbythePWDVA.Whilethisisanimportantdevelopment,forawomanwhowantstooptoutofthemarriagethisisaverysmallconsolation.Here,too,womenhavelostoutifthematrimonialhomestandsinthenameofthehusband’sparentsorcollateralrelativesasthecasesdiscussedabovereveal.Thereisnoconceptofadesertedwoman’srightsinequityorthenotionofconstructivetrustthroughwhichLordDenninghadprotectedtherightsofdesertedwomen,notonlyagainstthehusbandbutalsoagainsthiscreditors.Hence,undertheIndianstatutes,divorcedwomenarenotprotectedfromevictionfromthelandlords.InthepathbreakingrulingoftheSupremeCourt,inB.P.AchalaAnandv.S.AppiReddy,492thecourtawardedlegalrecognitiontothewoman’srightofresidenceandplacedherinthepositionofasub-tenant,awardinghertherighttobeapartytoalitigationwhichwoulddepriveherrightofpossessionofthematrimonialhome.But,whileimportantproclamationsweremadeinthisrulingregardingwomen’srighttothematrimonialhome,thewomanconcerneddidnotbenefitfromitasshehadalreadybeendivorcedandbecausethetermsofdivorcesettlementdidnotincludeaprovisionregardingthedwellinghome.Hence,theapexcourtruledthatshehadnorighttothematrimonialhome.

ThispositionwasaffirmedbytheSupremeCourtinanotherruling,RumaChakrabortyv.SudhaRaniBanerji,493whereadivorcedwomanandherchildrenwereevictedfrom


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theirhome,whichwasrentedinthehusband’sname,onthepretextthattheirrightoftenancywasterminatedwiththedivorceinwhichthewife’srighttoresidenceinthematrimonialhomehadnotbeennegotiated.Thecourtstatedthatalthoughtherighttomatrimonialhomeexistsforadesertedwoman,thesamecannotbeextendedtoadivorcedwoman.

Thesejudgmentsreflectthesocietalprejudicesagainstwomen’srightofpropertyownership.In1980,theInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO)calculatedthatwomendotwo-thirdsoftheworld’swork,for5–10percentoftheincome,andownonepercentoftheassets.ProfessorShivaramayya(1999:xiii),inhispioneeringworkonmatrimonialproperty,hasattributedthelowownershipofpropertybywomenintheworldtothesocialandlegalfailuretorecognizemarriageasaneconomicpartnership.Accordingtohim,thedisproportionateholdingofassetsoccursprimarilyforthreereasons:

1.Lawandpoliciesofthestatesdonotrecognizedomesticworkasproductivework–evenMarxdoesnot;2.Natureandnurtureburdenwomenwithbearingandrearingofchildren.Theyarefrequentlyforcedtogiveuptheircareerstolookaftertheirhomes;3.Evenwhenwomentakeupjobs,theyareconfinedtorelativelylow-paidones.

(p.265) Whenthetheoryofano-faultdivorcewasintroducedinthe1970s,mostcountriesfollowingthecommonlawtradition,includingEngland,introducedtheconceptofdivisionofmatrimonialassetsatthetimeofdivorce.Englandstartedofftentativelywiththeruleofonethirdallocation,oraneedbasedsettlement,buthasgraduallymovedtotheprincipleofequaldistribution.InUSA,Canada,andNewZealand,theprinciplegoverningpropertydistributionisequaldivision.Butjudgesalsohavethepowertousediscretiontoensurefairness.InAustralia,intheabsenceofclearguidancejudicialdiscretionplaysagreaterrole.OthercountriessuchasMalaysiaandSingaporehavealsoalteredtheirlawsmorerecentlyinthe1990stoincludethenotionofpropertysettlementupondivorce.

Thetendencyinmostcountriesseemstobetomoveawayfromdependencyandneed,toatheoryofcleanbreak,afterwhichthepartiesarefreetomoveoninlife.Maintenancesignifiesdependency,whichhasnoplaceinthegenderneutralterminologyofdivorcetheoriesthatareprevalentinmostcountries.So,evenwhenmaintenanceisawarded,itappearsmorelikeapropertysettlement.Butthistheoryofequalityismorearhetoricthanareality,andseveralstudieshavebroughtoutthepovertydivorcebringsuponwomen,despitetheclaimtopropertydistribution.

ThereareseveralstudiesconductedintheUnitedStatesandAustraliainthe1980s,toassesstheimpactoftheno-faultdivorceandpropertysettlementonwomenwhicharediscussedinthesectiononmatrimonialproperty,whichconfirmthis.Inparticular,singlemothersandolderwomenlivingalonepost-divorcecanexperienceadrasticfallinlivingstandards,withmanybecoming(andremaining)poor,alongwiththeirchildren.Thiseconomicvulnerabilityofwomenpost-separationcanbeattributedtoacombinationofsocialandeconomicfactors,manyofwhichoperateindependentlyofmarriage.These


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factorsincludewomen’sweakerpositioninthelabourmarketandtheirrelativelylowerearningscomparedwithsimilarlysituatedmen.WhilethiscommentwasmadeinastudytoassesstheimpactofdivorceuponAustralianwomen(Funder1986;McDonald1986)theanalysisisequallyrelevantforothercountries.

Otherfactorsrelatemorespecificallytotherolesthatwomenadoptduringandaftermarriage.Forexample,duringmarriagethecouplemaydecidethatthehusband’sincomeearningcapacitywillbepromotedwhilethewifeassumesgreaterresponsibilityforcaringforchildrenandhomemaking.Giventheneedsofchildrenandmen’susuallyhigherearningcapacity,thisarrangementcanworkwelluntilthemarriageends.Upondivorceorseparation,thecostsofthisdivisionoflabourduringthemarriage,suchaslossofimmediateearningsandreducedabilitytoearninthefuture,placethesewomenineconomicallyprecariouscircumstancespost-separationanddivorce(Funder1992).

Thelinkagesbetweenawoman’sclaimofchildcustodyandthedependencyitcreateswhileevolvingaframeworkforpropertydivision,posesachallengetotheequalitymodelofmarriageaspartnershipandneedsfurtherdeliberationswhileevolvingablueprintbasedonjusticeandequity.Afeministlegalargumentinthesecountireshasbeenthatequalitymodelisinadequateanddoesnottakeintoconsiderationtheneedsofwomenwhohavetheadditionalresponsibilityofcaringfortheirchildrenwhichdiminishestheirchancesofgettingbackintothejobmarket.Herethemorerecentargumentshasbeenthatinadditiontocontribution,theneedordependencyshouldalsobekeptinviewwhilearrivingatpropertysettlementterms.Incontrast,inIndia,westillsubscribetothenotionofadependentwife(p.266) whereneedandfaultplayagreaterrolewhileawardingmaintenance.Withinthisframeworkthecontributiongetstotallyexcludedfromjudicialassessmentandthecourtsdonothavethepowertosettlethehusband’spropertyinfavourofthewifeindivorceproceedings.Inaddition,asProfSivarammayahascommented,theexistinglawswhichaddressissuesofpropertysettlementaredisparate,chaotic,andscattered(1999:20).

Whatisratherironicinthisentirediscussiononpropertyclaimsisthatwhilemaintenanceisinherentlyproblematic,asitdoesnottakeintoaccountawoman’snon-financialcontributiontothemarriagethroughhouseworkandchildcare,takingtheneedfactortotallyoutofthepurviewofdivorcesettlementshasnotbeenofgreatvaluetowomen.TheEnglishcaselawdiscussedinthissectionalsobringoutthefactorthatneedalonedoesnotsuffice,andforwealthywomenthepremisecanbederogatory.

IntheIndiancontextthediscussionisconfinedtothelimitedscopewithinthestatutoryprovisionsofmaintenancedespiteitsderogatoryconnotations(reflectingwomen’ssubordinatestatuswithinmarriage)asitremainstheonlyavenueforwomentostaketheirclaimoffinancialentitlementupondivorce.Formostwomen,thisentitlementformsthecentralcoreoftheirmatrimonialdispute.Itisfareasiertocometoanamicableagreementregardingdivorceandcustodywhilemaintenanceremainsadisputedquestion.Thewidelycontestednatureofthemaintenanceprovisionmakesitacomplexterrainofmatrimoniallitigation,withseveralsubstantiveandproceduralaspectswovenintoit,andencompassesbothcivilandcriminalprocedures.


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Curiously,thecoreofthiseconomicdisputedoesnotrevolvearoundquestionsoffinancialarrangementsofthefamilyunit,buthingesuponissuesofsexualmores.Inthecontextofunequalpowerrelationsprevailingwithinpatriarchalnormativemarriages,women’seconomicrightsaredeterminedinthecontextofsexualnormsandcodes.Withinthisparadigm,itreallydoesnotmatterwhetherwomenarepromiscuous,ormenbigamous.Theendresultisthesame,denialofeconomicrightsofwomen.Ascanbeobserved,thenormofmonogamycanbefloutedwithimpunitybyhusbandsand,toaddinsulttoinjury,laterduringlitigation,thefactofabigamousmarriagecanbeusedasanarmourtodefeatwomen’sclaims.Thispleaisadvancedsoroutinely,thattheSupremeCourtinVimalav.Veeraswamy,494wasconstrainedtoholdthatwhenahusbandpleadsthatthemarriageisbigamous,thepreviousmarriagewouldhavetobestrictlyproved.Inasimilarmanner,theBombayHighCourtdismissedthepleaofbigamousmarriage,inRajlinguv.Sayamabai,495asamereafterthought.

Thisleavesusperplexedastohowamatrimonialmisconductorguiltcanbeflagrantlyinvokedbyahusbandtodefeatthewoman’seconomicclaim,withoutanyadversecriminalorcivilconsequencesvisitinghimduringcourtproceedings.Thistypeoffloutingofalegalmandateanditssubsequentinvocationtogainafinancialedgeagainstavulnerablepersoncantakeplaceonlywithinablatantlysexistsocialorder.

Despitetheprogressiveinterpretationsandinnovativelegalmaxims,thepathtojusticehasnotprogressedinalineartrajectory.Forexample,theBombayHighCourtrulingdeliveredbyM.H.KaniaJ.,waybackin1976.Whiledecidingtherightsofawomaninabigamousmarriage,hisLordshiphadheldthatsincetheHinduMarriageActisasociallegislation,itcouldnothavebeentheintentionofthelegislaturethateveninacase(p.267) whereaHinduwomanwasdupedintocontractingabigamousmarriage,sheshouldbedeprivedofherrighttoclaimmaintenance(Govindraov.Anandibai).496InstarkcontrastistheSupremeCourtrulingin2005,inSavitabenSomabhaiBhatiyav.StateofGujarat,497wheretherightofmaintenancewaslitigatedunderSection125ofCr.PC,aprovisionenactedtoensuresocialjusticeandpreventvagrancy.Here,ArijitPasayatJ.,andS.H.KapadiaJ.,commentedthathoweverdesirableitmaybetotakenoteoftheplightoftheunfortunatewoman,thelegislativeintentbeingclearlyreflectedinSection125ofCr.PC,thereisnoscopeforenlargingitbyintroducinganyartificialdefinitiontoincludewomannotlawfullymarriedintheexpressionwife.Thecourtfurthercommentedthatitisinconsequentialthatthemanwastreatingthewomanashiswife.Itistheintentionofthelegislaturewhichisrelevantandnottheattitudeoftheparty.

ChinnappaReddyJ.,aformerjudgeoftheSupremeCourtcommentedinthiscontext:ThecourtcouldprobablyextendthemeaningtobegiventothewordwifeinSection125(1)toanywomanwhohasgonethrougharecognizedformofmarriage,notwithstandingthesubsistenceofanearliermarriage.AfurtherquestionmayrequireconsiderationastowhetheracommonlawwifeisalsoentitledtomaintenanceunderSection125oftheCr.PC(Reddy2008:122).

Confrontedwithcontradictoryviewpointsregardingthecriterionfordeterminingthelegislativeintentofabeneficialprovision,whatarethecrutchesthattrialcourtjudges


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haveattheirdisposalwhiledeliveringconstitutionaljustice.A.K.SikriJ.andArunaSureshJ.haveattemptedtoprovideananswer:‘Wherealternativeconstructionsarepossiblethecourtmustgiveeffecttothatwhichwillberesponsibleforthesmoothworkingofthesystemforwhichthestatuehasbeenenactedratherthantheonewhichwouldputhindrancesinitsway.Ifthechoiceisbetweentwointerpretations,thenarrowerofwhichwouldfailtoachievethemanifestpurposeofthelegislationshouldbeavoided.WeshouldavoidaconstructionwhichwouldreducethelegislationtofutilityandshouldacceptthebolderconstructionbasedontheviewthatParliamentwouldlegislateonlyforthepurposeofbringingaboutaneffectiveresult.’

Inthistusslebetweentheoldworld,feudalvaluesystemsreflectedintheancientHindulaw,thelawoftheSmritis,alongsidepluralistictraditionsvalidatedbycustoms,atoneend,andthenewerstatutoryprovisionsofthemoderncodifiedHindulaw,attheother,whataretheavenuesforharmoniousconstructionsoflegalprinciples?HowdowerevisittheprovisionsoftheancientHindulawinthecontextofitsmoderndaydistortions,withinthestatutoryframeworkofcontemporaryHindulaw,whiledeliveringjustice?Thesamebench,comprisingofA.K.SikriJ.andArunaSureshJ.haveprovidedcertaintoolsofinterpretationsinthisrespect:‘TheprinciplesofHinduPersonalLawhavedevelopedinanevolutionarywayoutofconcernforallthosesubjecttoitsoastomakefairprovisionagainstdestitution.Thereisclearevidencetoindicatethatthelawofmaintenancestemsoutoftheseculardesireandsoastoachievethesocialobjectivesformakingbareminimumprovisiontosustainthemembersofrelativelysmallersocialgroups.Organicallyandoriginallythelawitselfisirreligious.Itsfountainspringishumanistic.Initsoperationalfieldalthoughitlaysdownthepermissiblecategoriesunderitsbenefaction,whicharesoentitledeitherbecauseofthetenetssupportedbyclearpublicpolicyor(p.268)becauseoftheneedtosubservethesocialandindividualmoralitymeasuredformaintenance.

Beyondprotectionofindividualrights,thecourtsalsohaveamandatetoevolvethescienceofjurisprudenceasitwasbroughttoournoticebyS.B.SinhaCJ.,RameshMadhavBapatJ.andN.V.RamanaJ.oftheAndhraPradeshHighCourt,inthefollowingwords:‘Theinterpretationoflawisnotmerelyforthedeterminationofaparticularcasebutalsointheinterestoflawasascience.Assuch,interpretationoflawmustbeinaccordancewithjustice,equity,andgoodconscience,andmoreso,infurtheranceofjustice.Ifthecourtprimafaciecomestotheconclusionthattheplaintiff/petitionerisentitledtointerimmaintenance,itcanawardinterimmaintenanceintheinterestofjustice,withoutbeingfetteredbyorthodoxprejudices,byshowingliberalreadinesstomovewithtimes.

Thiscalltomovewiththetimesandblendtheancientwiththemoderninpursuitofjusticeisthecallofduty.Thejudicialoathmandatesthis.TheprimaryaimofthecourtsistodojusticeasP.N.BhagwatiJ.andRanganathMisraJ.,hadsuccinctlypointedout:‘Theroleofthecourtisnotthatofsilentspectatororofapassiveagency.Whenadisputeisbroughtbeforethecourtwheremaintenanceofaneglectedwifeoraminorchildisinissue,thecourtmusttakegenuineinteresttofindoutthetruthofthematter.Ifthe


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magistratehadaskedproperquestionstothewitnesseswhentheywerebeforehimanddeposingaboutthemarriage,therelevantevidencewouldhavecomeupbeforethecourt.Itwasthedutyofthelawyerappearingfortheappellantalsotohaveplayedhisroleproperlyattherighttime.Duetothisjudicialandprocedurallapse,acaseforapittanceofmaintenance,filedin1971,hadtobesentbackfromtheSupremeCourttothemagistrate’scourtforretrialin1985.498

Withinthisframeworkofthecallofdutyandjudicialmandate,Iamconstrainedtoendthissectionwiththeframeworkprovidedtousin1978byyetanotherBenchoftheSupremeCourtcomprisingoflegalluminaries,V.R.KrishnaIyerJ.andD.A.DesaiJ.:‘Thebroodingpresenceoftheconstitutionalempathyfortheweakersectionslikewomenandchildrenmustinforminterpretationifithastohavesocialrelevance.Soviewed,itispossibletobeselectiveinpickingoutthatinterpretationoutoftwoalternativeswhichadvancesthecause–thecauseofthederelicts.499

Notes:

(1)Thisisalegaltermindicatingthatitisasupplementary,subsidiary,oradditionalrelief,butcannotbethemainreliefinamatrimonialpetition.

(2)Seesectiontitled‘LocatingWomen’sClaimswithintheConstitutionalDomain’ofChapter2ConstitutionalLawandCitizenshipClaimsofthefirstvolumeforfurtherdiscussiononspecialprovisionsforwomenandchildrenunderArticle15(3)oftheConstitution.

(3)AIR1978SC1807

(4)Article39(a)directsthestatetoprovideadequatemeansoflivelihoodtomenandwomen.

(5)AIR1987Ker110

(6)AIR1975SC83

(7)Thissectionwasre-numberedasSection125aftertheCr.PCwasre-enactedin1973.

(8)(1991)2SCC375

(9)I(2008)DMC22SC

(10)II(2008)DMC838SC

(11)Blackstone’sCommentaries,VolIII,94

(12)Blackstone’sCommentaries,VolI,430

(13)See‘MuslimWomen’sRighttoMaintenance’later.


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(14)Forfurtherdiscussiononthisissueseesectiontitled‘InterimMaintenance’inSectionBofthischapter.

(15)SeethecommentsoftheJharkhandHighCourt,inEhsanAnsariv.StateofJharkhand,II(2007)DMC751Jha,wheretheprayertoamendthepetition,areliefwhichispermissibleundercivillawbutprohibitedunderCriminallaw,wasallowed.Whileallowingtheprayer,thecourtcommentedthatproceedingsunderSection125Cr.PCarenotstrictlycriminaltheyaremoreinthenatureofcivilproceedings.

(16)LawCommission132ndReport,19April1989.

(17)VideW.B.Act25of1992(w.e.f.2August1993).

(18)VideMahAct21of1999,Section2(w.e.f.20April1999).

(19)ActNo.50of2001,whichcameintoeffecton24September2001.

(20)I(2003)DMC440P&H

(21)Seesectiontitled‘RightsofWomeninInformalRelationships’forfurtherdiscussiononthisissue.

(22)Seethediscussiononexecutionproceedingslater.

(23)Theamendmentdoesnothavearetrospectiveeffect.InShailKumariDeviv.KrishanBhagwanPathak@KishunB.PathakII(2008)DMC363SC,theSupremeCourthasheldthatmaintenanceaboveRs500permonthcanbeawardedonlyfromthedatefromwhichtheamendmentcameintoeffect,andnotfromanearlierdate.

(24)Seesectiontitled‘MuslimWomen’sRighttoMaintenance’laterforfurtherdiscussiononthisprovision.

(25)Seesectiontitled‘RightsofWomeninInformalRelationships’laterwherethisissueisdiscussedindetail.

(26)(1947)AllER847

(27)Manbyv.Scott,(1600)Smith’sLeadingCases

(28)AIR1970J&K150

(29)AIR1960Cal575

(30)AIR1985Bom.88

(31)AIR1986Guj6

(32)1990Cri.LJ2430AP


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(33)AIR1986Raj13

(34)II(1997)DMC212Cal

(35)AIR2005Ori3

(36)(1956)2Mad.LJ289

(37)II(1999)DMC411Ker

(38)1993CriLJ238

(39)II(2003)DMC275Ori

(40)1980Cri.LJ354

(41)1993CriLJ238

(42)I(2001)DMC313All

(43)I(2001)DMC229All

(44)I(2007)DMC779Del

(45)II(2007)DMC820Del

(46)II(2003)DMC688P&H

(47)II(2003)DMC640Gau

(48)I(2008)DMC425Jha

(49)AIR1957All658

(50)AIR1965Ori154

(51)I(2000)DMC338SC

(52)II(2003)DMC344Ker

(53)I(2002)DMC495P&H,II(2007)DMC273P&H

(54)II(2008)DMC19Ker

(55)AIR1987SC1049

(56)(2005)4SCC449

(57)II(1999)DMC693AP


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(58)I(2001)DMC763SC

(59)2004MLR609Mad

(60)II(2001)DMC454AP

(61)I(2007)DMC421Ker

(62)II(1999)DMC693AP

(63)II(2008)DMC462Cal

(64)AIR1999SC3348:2000Cr.LJ1SC

(65)I(2003)DMC458

(66)II(1993)DMC162SC:AIR1993SC2295

(67)II(2000)DMC90AP,2004MLR231MP

(68)II(2002)DMC530Raj

(69)II(2005)DMC814Del

(70)I(2006)DMC48Cal

(71)I(2006)DMC83AP

(72)I(2006)DMC793Cal

(73)I(2003)DMC627SCinthiscaseitwasheldthatdirectingthewifetoundergomedicalexaminationtodisprovetheallegationsofmentaldisorderdoesnotviolateArticle21oftheConstitution(RighttoLifewhichincludesRighttoLifewithdignity)andalsoheldthatadverseinferencecanbedrawnagainstherifthewiferefusestocomplywiththedirection.

(74)I(2006)DMC19All

(75)I(2006)DMC27SC

(76)II(2002)DMC634Pat

(77)II(2008)DMC341Guj

(78)I(2007)DMC756Mad

(79)I(2007)DMC246AP

(80)I(2008)DMC249HP


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(81)AIR2004SC3500

(82)II(2006)DMC461Bom

(83)I(2003)DMC214Ori

(84)Thisissuehasbeendiscussedindetailinthepreviouschapterunder‘RightsofMarriedMinorstoMaintenance’inthesectiontitled‘MarriageofMinors’.

(85)AIR1999SC3348:2000Cr.LJ1SC

(86)I(1994)DMC115Bom

(87)TheSupremeCourtrulingonconvictionforbigamywhicharereferredherearethefollowing:BhauraoShankerLokhandev.StateofMaharashtra,AIR1965SC1564;KanwalRamv.TheH.P.Administration,AIR1966SC614;PriyaBalaGhoshv.SureshChandraGhosh,AIR1971SC1153;LingariObulammav.L.VenkataReddy,AIR1979SC848.Inthesecasesitwasheldthattoprovethesecondmarriage,itisessentialtoprovethatsaptapadiwasperformed.

(88)II(1999)DMC318Raj

(89)Anacceptableformofinformalmarriage.Thetermappliesspeciallytothesubsequentmarriageofadivorceewoman.Themarriageceremonyisinformalandsincethegirlisnotvirgin,saptapadiisnotperformedduringthemarriage.

(90)2000Cri.LJ332Pat

(91)2004MLR231MP

(92)II(2001)DMC435SC

(93)II(2003)DMC723Del

(94)II(2004)DMC319Cal

(95)I(2002)DMC248Ori

(96)II(2006)DMC307Bom

(97)ParasDiwanandPiyushiDiwan,LawofMarriageandDivorce,Delhi:UniversalLawPublishingCo.Ltd.,1997(3rdEdn)p.92.

(98)(1978)KerLT26

(99)II(2001)DMC13Ker

(100)II(2006)DMC273Ker


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(101)I(2006)DMC386Bom

(102)Section4:Overridingeffectoftheact–saveasotherwiseexpresslyprovidedinthisAct,a)Anytext,ruleorinterpretationofHindulaworanycustomorusageaspartofthatlawinforceimmediatelybeforethecommencementofthisactshallceasetohaveeffectwithrespecttoanymatterforwhichprovisionismadeinthisact.

(103)I(2009)DMC164SC

(104)Section5(i)oftheHinduMarriageActstipulatesthatneitherpartyshouldhaveaspouselivingatthetimeofthemarriage.Seesectiontitled‘ConsequencesofMonogamy’inChapter1PersonalLawsandWomen’sRightsofthefirstvolumeforadetaileddiscussiononthisissue.

(105)AIR1976Bom433

(106)(1991)2SCC375

(107)I(2001)DMC354Mad

(108)I(2002)DMC136Bom

(109)AIR2004Bom283:II(2004)DMC321

(110)AIR2005SC1809:I(2005)DMC503SC

(111)I(2006)DMC203Bom

(112)I(2007)DMC451AP

(113)I(2001)DMC204All

(114)I(2008)DMC719Del

(115)I(2008)DMC529Del

(116)Section29(2)ofHinduMarriageAct,1955.

(117)I(2001)DMC110MP

(118)Thisisacustomarypracticeamongcertaincommunities.GonaorGownisperformedafterthemarriage,beforethegirlissentofftoherhusband’shomeforconsummationofmarriageorsexualcohabitation.Thesectiontitled‘MarriageofMinors’inthepreviouschapterhasareferencetothiscustom.

(119)I(2005)DMC1SC

(120)II(2002)DMC54AP


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(121)Seesectiontitled‘ValidityofCustomaryLaws’ofChapter1PersonalLawsandWomen’sRightsofthefirstvolumewherethisissuehasbeendiscussedindetail.

(122)AIR1987Bom182

(123)(1989)2SCC526

(124)II(2000)DMC724MP

(125)AIR1982Bom231

(126)DMCI(2000)579Kar

(127)I(2003)DMC430Mad

(128)Aftertheamendmentin2001,thisremedyhasbeenincorporatedintotheDivorceActunderSection10AoftheAct.So,aChristiancouplecannowavailoftheremedyofdivorcebymutualconsent.Seesectiontitled‘ChristianLawofMarriageandSuccession’ofChapter1PersonalLawsandWomen’sRightsofthefirstvolumewherethisissueisdiscussedindetail.

(129)AIR1994SC133:I(1994)DMC484SC

(130)II(1998)DMC503Kar

(131)I(2000)DMC164SC

(132)II(2001)DMC(DB)242Kar

(133)AIR2007MP242

(134)Natraisaformofcustomaryremarriageofdivorceesorwidowswhichislessformalthanthefirstmarriagebutcarrieswithitcontractualobligationsasinamarriage.CustomarydivorcesandnatramarriagesareacceptedcustomarypracticesamongmanylowercastesandtribesofNorthIndianstatessuchasRajasthan,MadhyaPradesh,UttarPradesh,etc.

(135)I(2002)DMC90Mad

(136)II(2000)DMC278Mad

(137)II(2005)DMC567Kar

(138)I(2003)DMC1SC

(139)II(2008)DMC177Bom

(140)AIR1961SC1334


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(141)I(2000)172DMCMad

(142)AIR2007Ker246

(143)I(2000)DMC392MP

(144)AIR1929PC135

(145)I(2008)DMC529Del

(146)Section18(2)(e)ofHAMAentitledaHinduwifetoliveseparatelyfromherhusbandwithoutforfeitingherclaimtomaintenance,ifherhusbandkeepsaconcubineinthesamehouseinwhichhiswifeislivingorhabituallyresideswithaconcubineelsewhere.

(147)AIR1978SC1557

(148)I(2000)DMC51Kar

(149)II(2002)DMC791Bom

(150)I(2007)DMC396Bom

(151)(2005)2SCC244

(152)Thiscasehasbeendiscussedundersectiontitled‘LegalIncidentsofMarriage’inChapter1MarriageanditsDissolution.

(153)II(2001)DMC693Bom

(154)I(2003)DMC265Jha

(155)I(2005)DMC437Jha

(156)I(2008)DMC461Pat

(157)I(2008)DMC421Ker

(158)I(2008)DMC148P&H

(159)AIR1999SC3348:2000Cr.LJ1SC

(160)2000Cri.LJ332Pat

(161)AIR2008Mad162

(162)WP-Crl425/2008(decidedon7April2008)Del.

(163)Seesectiontitled‘ConstitutionalValidityofPersonallaws’ofChapter2ConstitutionalLawandcitizenshipClaimsofthefirstvolumewherethisissueis


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discussedindetail.

(164)ArabA.Abdullav.ArabM.Saiyadbhai,AIR1988Guj141;Ahmedv.Aysha,II(1990)DMC110:1987CriLJ980;K.Zunaideenv.AmeenaBegum,II(1997)DMC91;KarimAbdulRehmanShaikhv.ShehnazKarimShaikh,2000Cri.LJ3560.

(165)2001(7)SCC740:2001Cri.LJ4660SC:II(2001)DMC714SC

(166)Seesectiontitled‘InnovativeJudicialInterpretationoftheMuslimWomen’sAct’ofChapter2ConstitutionalLawandCitizenshipClaimsofthefirstvolumewherethisissueisdiscussedindetail.

(167)2000Cri.LJ3560

(168)I(2007)DMC820Ker

(169)II(2007)DMC215Ker

(170)I(2000)DMC229Ker

(171)II(2008)DMC575Ker

(172)2002(7)SCC518

(173)Thesecaseshavebeendiscussedindetailundersectiontitled‘IslamicLawofMarriageandSuccession’inChapter1PersonalLawsandWomen’sRightsofthefirstvolume.

(174)II(2008)DMC225Pat

(175)II(2008)DMC332Bom

(176)II(2008)DMC348Ker

(177)I(2007)DMC550Kar

(178)2002Cr.LJ.2282Cal

(179)II(1998)DMC322SC

(180)I(2007)DMC226Bom

(181)AIR2007SC2215

(182)AIR2010SC305

(183)2010(2)KLT71

(184)II(2007)DMC73Del


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(185)II(2007)DMC677Ker

(186)AIR1980Mad82

(187)II(2002)DMC646AP

(188)I(2002)DMC288Ker

(189)II(2002)DMC798

(190)AIR2002J&K90

(191)I(2006)DMC520Del

(192)I(2006)DMC55Jha

(193)II(2000)DMC283MP

(194)II(2005)DMC56Ker:AIR2005Ker91

(195)II(2008)DMC111P&H

(196)II(1999)DMC127Ori

(197)II(2008)DMC113Bom

(198)II(2007)DMC550Gau

(199)I(2006)DMC444Jha

(200)II(1998)DMC322SC

(201)II(2000)DMC624Kar

(202)I(2007)DMC26Del

(203)I(2007)DMC22All

(204)AIR2000SC1398

(205)I(2004)DMC632Del

(206)2005MLR311AP

(207)1993Cri.LJ238

(208)(1996)1SCC554

(209)I(2003)DMC467All


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(210)II(2005)DMC266Ker

(211)II(2006)DMC471Cal

(212)I(2007)DMC714MP

(213)I(2008)DMC371Del

(214)1987Cri.LJ980

(215)1999Cri.LJ322Raj

(216)II(1995)DMC233

(217)(1981)4SCC250

(218)I(2003)DMC725Kar

(219)Section2(ii)ofDissolutionofMuslimMarriagesAct,1939.SeealsoRajMohammedv.SaeedaAminaBegam,AIR.1976Kar201.

(220)II(2002)DMC546Pat

(221)AIR2002Del131

(222)I(2001)DMC469Del

(223)AIR2000Guj277

(224)I(2002)DMC652Del

(225)II(2003)DMC188Kar

(226)II(2008)DMC827Del

(227)(1999)6SCC326

(228)II(2007)DMC550Gau

(229)I(2008)DMC22SC

(230)I(2002)DMC20MP

(231)II(2006)DMC35All

(232)I(2006)DMC786MP

(233)II(2006)DMC613Ker

(234)I(2008)DMC481Del


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(235)I(2008)DMC646Del

(236)II(2003)DMC656Del

(237)AIR2004Del323

(238)II(2002)DMC301Raj

(239)II(2003)DMC557Raj

(240)AIR1990J&K7

(241)AsianAge,(Bombay)10January2006p.10.

(242)AIR1999Raj304

(243)II(2001)DMC580Bom

(244)(2002)2Cal.LT336

(245)II(2007)DMC631Gau

(246)II(2008)DMC217AP

(247)Thesectionempowersthecourttovary,modifyorrescinditsownorderifthereisachangeinthesituation.

(248)II(2003)DMC193Bom

(249)I(2004)DMC572Bom

(250)II(2005)DMC134Bom

(251)Section127(3)(c)ofCr.PCstipulatesthatifawomanhasobtainedadivorcefromherhusbandandhasvoluntarilysurrenderedherrightstomaintenanceafterherdivorce,theMagistratemaycanceltheorderofmaintenance.

(252)I(2001)DMC407Bom

(253)II(2005)DMC101P&H

(254)AIR1987SC1100

(255)1979MahLJ729

(256)II(2003)DMC131AP

(257)II(2006)DMC523Gau


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(258)II(2002)DMC549Cal:2002Cr.LJ1751

(259)II(1997)DMC164SC:1996(4)SCC479

(260)ThroughMarriageLaw(Amendment)Act,2003(ActNo.50of2003)whichinsertedSection19(iii-a)inHMAandinSection31(iii-a)inSMAw.e.f.23December2003.

(261)I(2006)DMC32AP

(262)SeetherulingsinVinayPandeyv.RoshanKumar,II(2000)DMC571SC;II(2000)DMC511SC.

(263)II(2001)DMC171SC

(264)II(2001)DMC(SC)186

(265)II(2006)DMC594SC

(266)I(2008)DMC354SC

(267)II(2006)DMC436Bom

(268)I(2006)DMC118AP

(269)II(2006)DMC589MP

(270)I(2008)DMC708Ori

(271)I(2006)DMC189Ker

(272)(1992)2SCC562

(273)(2004)13SCC411

(274)(2004)13SCC405

(275)(2005)12SCC301

(276)II(2006)DMC565MP

(277)II(2001)DMC593MP

(278)II(2008)DMC639MP

(279)II(2002)DMC24MP

(280)II(2005)DMC266Ker

(281)AIR1996Bom94


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(282)AIR1986SC984

(283)I(2002)DMC749AP

(284)AIR1986Guj6

(285)AIR1988Raj84

(286)AIR1999Bom237

(287)AIR1994Del234

(288)2005Cri.LR572

(289)I(2007)DMC514Ker

(290)I(2006)DMC465Cal

(291)II(2008)DMC830SC

(292)I(2007)DMC398Cal

(293)II(2008)DMC352MP

(294)II(2007)DMC731Bom

(295)II(2006)DMC453Del

(296)I(2004)DMC581Mad

(297)II(2002)DMC557Guj

(298)AIR1989Del10

(299)TheremovalofceilingofRs500formaintenanceunderSection125ofCr.PChascontributedagreatdealinachievingthisobjective.

(300)Inactualfact,thesumsawardedaremuchlower,thoughinrecenttimesonecandiscernanupwardtrendintheamountsawardedasmaintenance.Thisislinkedtotheupwardsurgeinsalariesdrawnbythemiddleanduppermiddleclassesinthecorporateworld(AIR1979Bom.173).

(301)II(2005)DMC417Guj

(302)See‘Husband’sObligationtoMaintaintheWife’discussedearlier.

(303)1998Cri.LJ2762

(304)II(2007)DMC215Ker


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(305)I(2000)DMC95Bom

(306)I(2008)DMC271Utt

(307)I(2004)DMC675Del

(308)AIR2002Del131

(309)AIR1994Del234

(310)AIR1987Raj159

(311)AIR1997SC3397:II(1997)DMC338SC

(312)AIR2000P&H221

(313)II(2002)DMC114Del

(314)II(2002)DMC742Mad

(315)II(2003)DMC656Del

(316)I(2002)DMC56Del

(317)AIR2004Del323

(318)I(2006)DMC23Del

(319)I(2004)DMC618Del

(320)Theorderwaspassedinthedayswheremobilephoneswereconsideredasastatussymbol.

(321)I(2007)DMC64Del

(322)VinodDuleraiMehtav.KanakVinodMehta.AIR1990Bom120.SeealsoMukeshMittalv.SeemaMittalwherehusband’sincome-taxreturnswerenotproducedandadverseinferencewasdrawn.

(323)I(2007)DMC815Del

(324)I(2008)DMC166Del

(325)II(2004)DMC297Del

(326)TheTimesofIndia,Bombay,20February2009,P.11.

(327)I(2001)DMC313All


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(328)II(2001)DMC507Pat

(329)1II(2003)DMC142Cal

(330)II(1999)DMC536Raj

(331)I(1998)DMC699Mad

(332)II(2001)DMC381Bom

(333)I(2004)DMC445Raj

(334)I(2007)DMC751Ori

(335)II(2008)DMC363SC

(336)I(2008)DMC371Del

(337)II(2005)DMC345Raj

(338)I(2006)DMC709Raj

(339)II(2008)DMC276Raj

(340)AIR1994Ori15

(341)AIR1996P&H

(342)DMCI(2000)524Del

(343)II(2006)DMC179Del

(344)I(2007)DMC590Kar

(345)I(2003)DMC580Bom

(346)Harilalv.Lilavati,AIR1961Guj202;Minaraniv.Dasarath,AIR1963Cal428;VinodChandraSharmav.RajeshPathak,AIR1988All150.

(347)AIR1964Bom83

(348)AIR1991Bom440

(349)II(1993)DMC110SC

(350)II(2000)DMC727Bom

(351)II(2007)DMC677Ker

(352)II(2002)DMC712Bom


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(353)II(2006)DMC637Gau

(354)I(2004)DMC344Jha

(355)I(2006)DMC181Cal

(356)II(1998)DMC533Mad

(357)AIR1983SC916

(358)II(1999)DMC681Kar

(359)II(2001)DMC260MP

(360)II(2007)DMC119Bom

(361)I(2000)DMC313SC

(362)I(2000)DMC156P&H

(363)I(2004)DMC693AP

(364)I(2006)DMC106Mad

(365)I(2007)DMC136Ker

(366)II(2005)DMC1SC

(367)I(2006)DMC461All

(368)II(2007)DMC779P&H

(369)I(2003)DMC483HP

(370)II(2005)DMC315Guj

(371)II(2008)DMC575Ker

(372)II(2005)DMC1SC

(373)I(2006)DMC461All

(374)Padmov.SuratRam,I(2003)DMC483HP.

(375)II(2006)DMC270Pat

(376)AIR1993All133

(377)AIR1993All133


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(378)AIR1965Ori154

(379)II(2008)DMC19Ker

(380)Seethediscussiononpostdivorceadulteryinsectiontitled‘MatrimonialMisconductandRightofMaintenance’earlier.

(381)AIR2005Bom352

(382)II(2006)DMC120Jha

(383)II(2006)DMC629Cal

(384)II(2006)DMC310Del

(385)II(2006)DMC642All

(386)II(2006)DMC823Del

(387)I(2007)DMC82AP

(388)I(2007)DMC791Pat

(389)II(2007)DMC541Cal

(390)II(2007)DMC399All

(391)Seesectiontitled‘MaterialBasisfortheNotionofSacramentalIndissolubility’ofChapter1MarriageandItsDissolution.

(392)Seesectiontitled‘TheJourneyfromSacramenttoCompract’ofChapter1MarriageandItsDissolution.

(393)LawReform(MarriedWomenandTortfeasors)Act,1935(c.30).

(394)(1947)63TLR645(ascitedinHeward2003:49)

(395)(1962)3AllER345

(396)(1969)2AllER385:(1970)AC777

(397)(1971)AC886:(1970)2AllER780

(398)(1965)2AllER472HL

(399)ThepositionwasfurtheralteredthroughtheenactmentoftheFamilyLawActof1996,whichlayemphasisonconciliationandmediationratherthancontestedlitigation.

(400)Rathersurprisingly,theHindulawdidtakeintoaccountananti-womenpremise,


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whichwasgettingintroducedinsomeWesterncountries,ofequalityandgenderneutralitywithinmatrimonialstatutes,andawardedequalrightsofmaintenancetoboththespouses,thoughtheactualgroundlevelrealityofhusbandsandwivesvarieddrasticallyintheIndiancontext.

(401)‘TheActdidnotevenprovideforclaimingtheHinduwoman’scustomaryrightofstridhanatthetimeofdivorce.Theconceptofawoman’sclaimtostridhanwasevolvedincontemporarytimesthroughaSupremeCourtrulingunderthecriminallaw,underSection406ofIPC,CriminalBreachofTrustinPratibhaRaniv.SurajKumarAIR1985SC658.

(402)(1962)LXVBLR750

(403)(1977)Mh.LJ66

(404)AIR1982Bom.341

(405)AIR1985AP207

(406)I(2003)DMC602Bom

(407)II(2003)DMC809Cal

(408)I(2006)DMC386Bom

(409)I(2005)DMC345SC:(2005)3SCC313

(410)Section27—DisposalofProperty:InanyproceedingsunderthisAct,theCourtmaymakesuchprovisionsinthedecreeasitdeemsjustandproperwithrespecttoanypropertypresentedatoraboutthetimeofmarriage,whichmaybelongjointlytoboththehusbandandthewife..

(411)Section26oftheAct.

(412)Thisissueisdiscussedatlengthinsub-section,‘RightsofWomeninInformalRelationships’,inSectionAearlier.

(413)(2007)6MLJ205Mad

(414)I(2007)DMC1SC:20073SCC169

(415)SCSuitNo3072of2007(decidedon5December2007)Bom.

(416)I(2008)DMC507Del

(417)152(2008)DLT691

(418)2008(3)ALD486


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(419)157(2009)DLT472

(420)CrlRCNo.48&148of2008inMPNo.1of2008(decidedon25March2008)Mad.

(421)CRANo.501/07and595/07(decidedonon25March2008)MP.

(422)2008(5)Bom.CR149:(2008)110BomLR1797

(423)(1973)1AllER829

(424)(1982)1AllER41

(425)(1987)1FLR7

(426)(1985)1AllER328

(427)(1990)1FLR140

(428)(2001)1AC596

(429)IhaverelieduponanarticlebyPhilippaHewitt,‘DividingforEquality:TheMaturingofMatrimonialLawinHongKong’inHongKongLawyer,HongKong:July,2008pp.26–32.http://www.hwg-law.com/en/news̲articles/HWG-Article-Jul08.pdfwhilediscussingthesecasesandalsofortracingthedevelopmentofcaselawinEnglandandWales.

(430)ThefactorsaresetoutinSection75(2),FLA

(431)Thissectionisbasedontheinformationgatheredfromthefollowingwebsite:Howto:Thedivisionofpropertywhenamarriage,civilunionordefactorelationshipendshttp://www.howtolaw.co.nz/html/ml013.asp(NewZealand)

(432)1989SLR342

(433)(2003)3MLJ273

(434)(1997)1MLJ125

(435)(2004)4MLJ395

(436)ThissectionisbasedoninformationprovidedinKnowYourRightsbyWomenLivingUnderMuslimLaws(2003:316–19)andarecentnewsreportregardingthesituationinTanzania.

(437)Dar-es-SalaamDailyNews,1August2009

(438)Ibid

(439)IamrelyinguponanincisiveessaybyMarthaFineman(1991a265–77).Whiletheessayisdated,theargumentsarestillrelevantforourunderstandingoftheseconcepts.


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(440)(1984)3SCC698

(441)AIR1992Pat76

(442)PreambleoftheAct

(443)AIR1955Nag193

(444)Section4(1)oftheAct

(445)(1917)ILR40Mad672

(446)AIR1914PC41

(447)AIR1924All622

(448)AIR1940All329

(449)AIR1961P&H51

(450)AIR1971Mys211;AIR1971MP235

(451)(1984)3SCC698

(452)AIR1987SC3

(453)AIR1993Bom.232

(454)AIR1993Gau.38

(455)(1997)10SCC342

(456)(1804)KB5East221

(457)(1897)1Ch786

(458)(1926)AllER111

(459)(1948)2AllER413

(460)ProvisotoSection6(a)ofHGMA

(461)ThePunjabChiefCourtwassetupunderthePunjabChiefCourtsActof1866andwasconvertedintotheLahoreHighCourtlaterin1919.

(462)(1917)40IC107

(463)AIR1926Lah117

(464)AIR1955Mad451


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(465)AIR1986MP221

(466)PLD(WP)Lah509

(467)I(2002)DMC234Chh

(468)(1862)2SW&Tr640(ascitedbyDiwan&Diwan1993:476).

(469)14MIA309

(470)ILR188012Mad67

(471)ILR28All329

(472)AIR1934All722

(473)AIR1987Del81

(474)2003(2)HLRKar

(475)I(1998)DMC710All

(476)AIR1999SC1149

(477)AIR1992SC1447

(478)2003(2)HLRBom

(479)I(1999)DMC585MP

(480)II(2001)DMC48Bom

(481)AIR1993Bom.232

(482)I(2009)DMC523SC

(483)Thisissueisdiscussedinsectiontitled‘MarriageswithExpatriateIndians’ofChapter1MarriageanditsDissolution.

(484)I(2000)DMC413SC

(485)2001Cri.LJ91

(486)‘Unnaturaloffence’isatermwhichisusedinSection377ofIPCtodescribeactsofasexualnaturewhichareoutsideofthescopeofpeno-vaginalintercourse.ThissectionwasinthenewsinthecontextofsamesexrelationshipswhentheDelhiHighCourtreaddownthesectiontoexcludeconsentualsamesexrelationshipsinNazFoundationv.GovernmentofNCT,2010Cri.LJ94Del.


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(487)I(2004)DMC414Bom

(488)Cityseesriseincasesofparentskidnappingkids,Bombay:TheTimesofIndia,27April2009.

(489)II(2008)DMC774SC

(490)AIR1981SC1829

(491)AIR2004Bom.478

(492)I(2005)DMC345SC:(2005)3SCC313

(493)AIR2005SC3557

(494)(1991)2SCC375

(495)I(2007)DMC396Bom

(496)AIR1976Bom.433

(497)AIR2005SC1809:I(2005)DMC503SC

(498)Themagistrate’scourtsarethelowestintherungofjudicialhierarchies.BetweenthiscourtandtheSupremeCourtaretwootherrungs—thesessionscourtandthehighcourt.

(499)CaptainRameshChandraKaushalv.VeenaKaushal,AIR1978SC1807.

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