UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTWESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANALAFAYETTE-OPELOUSAS DIVISION

Brice Lejeune Civil Action No. 6:09-CV-0194

versus JudgeTuckerL. Melançon

Omni EnergyServicesCorp., et a! MagistrateJudgeHanna

MEMORANDUM RULING

BeforetheCourtaretwo relatedMotions for SummaryJudgmentfiled by defendants

Omni EnergyServicesCorporationandPreheat,Inc. (jointly referredto as“Omni”) [Rec.

Doc. 57; 77], plaintiff Brice Lejeune’sOppositionsthereto[Rec.Doc. 62; 81] andOmni’s

Reply [Rec. Doc. 74]. For the following reasons,defendants’motions for summary

judgmentwill be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Brice Lejeune,went to work for Preheat,Inc. in approximately1994,and

in February2006,Omni purchasedPreheat.R. 57-2, ¶ 1. Lejeuneremainedemployedat

Omni as the Stress-RelievingDivision Manager. As part of the sale transaction,aKey

EmployeeEscrowAgreementwasexecutedprovidingthatcertainpaymentswouldbe made

to key Preheatemployees,includingplaintiff, if theywere still employedon the third year

anniversaryof theAgreement.In July2007,plaintiff wasconfrontedby Omni management

aboutrumorsthat he wasbuying drugsatwork. R. 57-2, ¶11 3 & 4. Plaintiff admittedthat

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Lejeune v. Omni Energy Services Corp et al Doc. 82 Att. 1

Dockets.Justia.com

he had beenpurchasingprescriptionpain medication,200 pills twice a month, from a

coworker and that he had becomeaddictedto the medicine. Id. Omni immediately

terminatedthe employeeselling the drugsto plaintiff. Id. at 5. Ratherthanterminating

plaintiff, Omnipermittedplaintiff to takea 30 dayleaveof absenceto seekrehabilitation.

Id. at 6. When plaintiff advisedOmni that he wasnot readyto returnto work, he was

allowedto takeadditionalunpaidleavefor his rehabilitation.Id. Plaintiff begantreatment

for substancedependencewith Dr. StanleyHooveron August28, 2007. R. 57, Exh.D. On

November16, 2007,Dr. Hooverreleasedplaintiff to returnto work. Id. In late November

2007,plaintiff indicatedto Omni that hewasreadyto returnto work. Id. at 8. Within the

weekhe returned,plaintiff wastold that becausehe had beenon extendedleaveof absence,

hewasrequiredto beevaluatedandclearedbythecompanydoctorbeforehe couldofficially

returnto work. Id. at 9; Exh.A, Plaintiff’s Depo.,pp. 86-89;Exh. C, Declaration ofLisa

Jacob, # 4. Plaintiff agreedto thereturn-to-workphysicalwhich wasperformedby Verne

Thibodeaux,M.D., in December2007. Id. at 10. Dr. Thibodeauxwasadvisedthatplaintiff

would be working in a salesposition driving a companyvehicle. R. 57, Exh. E. Dr.

Thibodeauxdid notclearplaintiff to returnto workbecausehehadbalanceandcoordination

problems.Id. at 10; Exh.E. Dr. Thibodeauxrequesteda full work-upofplaintiff, in part

becausehe wasconcernedaboutwhetherplaintiff’s balanceissueswerecausedby either

Suboxone,themedicationprescribedto alleviateplaintiff’s opiateaddiction,orXanax,which

plaintiff was taking for anxiety. Id. Omniplacedplaintiff backon unpaidmedicalleave.

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Id. at 11.

Thereafter,plaintiff’s treating physician,Dr. Stanley Hoover, referredhim to a

neurologist, Dr. Shelly Savant. Id. at 13. In completing Dr. Savant’s “New Patient

Questionnaire”on December26,2007,plaintiff statedthathisproblemwas“instability while

standingor walking,” andthattheproblemhadexistedfor acoupleof years. Id. at 14; Exh.

F. In her report concerningplaintiff’s January2, 2008 examination,Dr. Savantnoted

“impairedtandemwalk” and“[d]ifficulty with tandemgait....[o]therwiseuprightandsteady

with respectto his gait.” Id. at 16; Exh. G. Dr. Savantdiagnosedplaintiff with ataxiaand

opinedthathecouldreturnto work, but restrictedhim fromdriving andclimbing laddersand

orderedhim to adhereto fall precautions.Id.

Also on January2, 2008,Dr. Thibodeauxagainadministeredtheneurologicalpart of

the return-to-workphysicalandplaintiff againexperiencedbalanceproblems. Id. at 17. A

handwrittennotealsodatedJanuary2, 2008,indicatesthat Dr. Thibodeauxspoketo Dr.

Savantandshe“agrees[plaintiff] is agreaterrisk for falling thanthenormalperson.” Id.;

Exh. J. In his sworndeclaration,Dr. Thibodeauxstatedthatwhenhe spokewith Dr. Savant

that day, sheinformed him thatplaintiff was scheduledfor anMRI andshefelt plaintiff

possibly could work. Id.; Exh. E. In response,Dr. Thibodeauxexpressedcontinued

concernsaboutplaintiff’s ability to returnto work andhe andDr. Savantagreedto speak

after theMRI. Id. When Dr. Thibodeauxspokewith Dr. Savant“a weekor so later,” she

‘In herApril 8, 2008 examinationreport, Dr. Savantopinedthatplaintiff’s gaitdifficulties were

likely aresultof hisdrug abuse.R. 62-10,p. 15.

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explainedthatasplaintiff’s MRI resultswerenegativeandhe hadpassedadriving test,she

wouldremovethedriving restrictionbutwould not removeplaintiff’s restrictionof climbing

ladders. Id. at 18. Dr. Savantalso told Dr. Thibodeauxthatplaintiff had reportedhis

symptomsweregettingbetter. Id.; Exh. G.

Dr. Thibodeauxreportedto Omni that,basedon his conversationwith Dr. Savant,he

hadconcludedthatplaintiff shouldbesafedrivingandworkingwhile takinghismedication.

Id. at 20;Exh.E. During thatsametime,Omni wasprovidedwith informationthatplaintiff

had cut back on his Xanax medication. Id. at 19; Exh. K. In light of the foregoing

developmentsandplaintiff’s reportedimprovement,Omni askedDr. Thibodeauxto provide

anotherindependentexaminationof plaintiff. Id.; Exh. E. Upon advisingplaintiff thathe

neededto return foranotherevaluation,plaintiff refusedto do so. Id. In aJanuary17,2008

e-mail, Dr. Savanttold plaintiff that he neededto undergo the examinationwith Dr.

Thibodeaux. Id., Exh. 19, 20; R. 57, Exh. A, p. 122, Exh. N. Plaintiff told her thathis

“anxiety/stressmakes my balancemuch worse,” to which Dr. Savantresponded,“[Dr.

Thibodeaux]would be obligatedto do this regardlessof his affiliation with the clinic. It’s

astandardpartof the neuroexam.I needto do it too andwill write anotefor you after we

sit down with each other again.” Id. Plaintiff continued to refuse to return to Dr.

Thibodeauxfor anotherevaluationandon January22, 2008,Omni dischargedhim from

employment. Id. at 26; Exh.A.; E. On February2, 2009 theBoardof Directorsof Omni

officially determinedthat plaintiff was “terminated for cause’ within the meaningof

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Paragraph3(b) of theKey EmployeeEscrowAgreement.” R. 6-1, KeyEmployeeEscrow

Agreement.

On March 3, 2008, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

EmploymentOpportunityCommission(“EEOC”)in whichheindicatedthathewasclaiming

discriminationbasedon ageand disability. R. 5 7-5, Exh. L. More specifically,plaintiff

indicatedthat he had“No disability but theorganizationtreatsmeasif I amdisabled.” Id.

Plaintiff further statedhis disabilities were: (1) “addiction to prescriptionsmedicines.

Successfullytreatedfor condition by physicianand otherprofessionals”;(2) “ataxis of

unknow[sic] origindiagnosedafter1/22/07”;and,(3)“ProstateCancerdiagnosedduringthis

period.” Id. On October28, 2008 Lejeunefiled an EEOC Chargeof Discriminationwith

theLouisianaCommissionon HumanRightsstating, “The reasongiven for my discharge

was thatI did not recoverfrom my medicalconditionquickly enough.I believethat I have

beendiscriminatedagainstin that I ambeingregardedashavingadisability in violation of

theAmericanswith DisabilitiesAct of 1990.” Id.

Lejeunefiled this lawsuitonFebruary4, 2009 in theFifteenthJudicialDistrict Court,

Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, alleging damagesunder “disability discrimination and

accommodationlaws” and“agediscriminationlaws” aswell asstatecontractanddetrimental

relianceclaimsrelatedto theKey EmployeeEscrowAgreementprovidedin thestocksale

ofPreheatto Omni. R. 1. OnFebruary9, 2009,defendantsremovedplaintiff’s actionto this

Court. R. 3. OnFebruary21, 2009, aBill Of Interpleaderrelatedto plaintiff’s stateclaims

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undertheKeyEmployeeEscrowAgreementwasfiled by JeffW. ElmoreasEscrowAgent

whichadded14 defendants-in-interpleader.2R. 6. In an orderdatedNovember5, 2009,the

CourtstatedthattheMarch22, 2010trial ofthismatterwould be limited to plaintiff’s federal

claimsforagediscriminationandaccommodationlaws. Omni filedthismotionforsummary

judgment on November18, 2009. On December19, plaintiff’s First Supplemental&

AmendedComplaint was filed into the record of this proceeding. R. 72. Plaintiff’s

AmendedComplaintaddedallegationsthatOmniterminatedhim in retaliationfor his EEOC

claim and lawsuit “and were steps takenspecifically to attemptjustify [sic] Lejeune’s

disqualificationfrom receiptof thekey employeebonushe hadearned.” Id., ¶ 12. On

December28, Omni filed a supplementalmotion for summaryjudgmentbasedon the

plaintiff’s allegationsofretaliationin theAmendedComplaint. R. 77.

II. Standardfor SummaryJudgment

Summaryjudgmentis appropriateonly whentherecordreflects“that thereis

no genuineissueasto anymaterialfact andthatthemovingparty is entitled tojudgmentas

a matterof law.” Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c).To determinewhetheragenuineissueofmaterialfact

exists,“we view factsandinferencesin the light mostfavorableto thenonmovingparty.”

Mahaffeyv. Gen.Sec.Ins. Co., 543 F.3d738, 740(5thCir. 2008). Initially, thepartymoving

for summaryjudgmentmustdemonstratetheabsenceof anygenuineissuesof materialfact.

When a partyseekingsummaryjudgmentbearstheburdenof proof at trial, it mustcome

2 TheCourthasnot dismissedthe InterpleaderasEscrowAgentfrom this litigation.

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forwardwith evidencewhich would entitle it to adirectedverdict if such evidencewere

uncontrovertedat trial. CelotexCorp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). As to issues

which the non-movingparty hastheburdenof proofat trial, themoving party maysatisfy

this burdenby demonstratingtheabsenceof evidencesupportingthe non-movingparty’s

claim. Id. If themovingparty fails to carry this burden,his motion mustbe denied.If he

succeeds,however,theburdenshifts to thenon-movingpartyto showthatthereis a genuine

issuefor trial.3 Id. at 322-23. Oncetheburdenshifts to the respondent,he mustdirect the

attentionof the court to evidencein the record and set forth specific facts sufficient to

establishthatthereis agenuineissueof materialfact requiringatrial. CelotexCorp., 477

U.S. at 324;Fed.R.Civ.Pro.56(e). The respondingpartymaynot reston mereallegations

or denialsof theadverseparty’s pleadingsasameansof establishingagenuineissueworthy

of trial,butmustdemonstratebyaffidavitorotheradmissibleevidencethattherearegenuine

issuesofmaterialfactor law. Andersonv.LibertyLobby,Inc.,477U.S.242,248-49(1986);

Adickesv. S.H.Kress & Co., 398U.S. 144, 159 (1970);Little, 37 F.3dat 1075.Theremust

be sufficient evidencefavoring the non-movingparty to supportaverdict for thatparty.

Anderson,477 U.S.at249; Woody.HoustonBelt& TerminalRy.,958 F.2d95,97(5thCir.

~ Wherethenonmovingpartyhastheburdenof proofat trial, themovingpartydoesnot havetoproduceevidencewhichwouldnegatetheexistenceofmaterial facts. It meetsits burdenby simplypointingout theabsenceof evidencesupportingthenon-movingparty’scase.CelotexCorp., 477U.S. at325. To opposethe summaryjudgmentmotion successfully,thenon-movingpartymustthenbe abletoestablishelementsessentialto its caseon which it will beartheburdenof proofattrial. A completefailure ofproofby thenonmovingpartyof theseessentialelementsrendersall otherfactsimmaterial.Id.at322.

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1992). Thereis no genuineissueof material fact if, viewing theevidencein the light most

favorableto thenon-movingparty,no reasonabletrier of factcouldfind for thenon-moving

party.MatsushitaElec. Indus. Co. v. ZenithRadio Corp., 475U.S. 574,587 (1986).

If no issueof fact is presentedandif themover is entitledto judgmentasamatterof

law, thecourt is requiredto renderthejudgmentprayedfor. Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c); Celotex

Corp., 477U.S.at 322. Beforeit canfind thatthereareno genuineissuesof materialfact,

however,thecourtmustbesatisfiedthatno reasonabletrier of factcouldhavefound for the

non-movingparty. Id.

III. Analysis

In its first motion for summaryjudgment,Omni assertsthat: (1)plaintiff hasfailed to

exhausthis administrativeremedieswith regardto his actualdisability andaccommodation

claims;and(2) Omni did notdiscriminateagainstplaintiff on thebasisof disability or age.

In its secondmotionfor summaryjudgmentrelatedto plaintiff’s AmendedComplaint,Omni

arguesthat plaintiff’s amendedallegationof retaliation is merely an attemptto createa

relationshipbetweenthediscriminationclaimsandtheinterpleader/bonusclaim,whenbefore

therewasnone.4

In his oppositionto OMNI’s motions,plaintiff maintainsthathis terminationwas

motivatedby the fact thathe was “perceivedor regardedas disabled” as definedby the

“While OMNI objectsto plaintiffs AmendedComplaint,becauseit was filed after the August20, 2009amendmentdeadline,the Court’sDecember1, 2009orderinstructedplaintiff to file hisAmendedComplaintby December7, 2009. R. 77.

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Americanswith Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101,et seq.(ADA)or becauseof his age

undertheAgeDiscriminationin EmploymentAct (ADEA) of 1967,29 U.S.C.§ 621. In his

amendedComplaint,plaintiff contendsthat he wasterminatedin retaliation for filing the

March3, 2008 federalandOctober28, 2008stateEEOCclaims. Plaintiff furthercontends

that the February2, 2009 action takenby the Boardof Directors of Omni, of officially

determiningthatLejeunewas“terminatedfor cause’within themeaningof Paragraph3(b)

of the Key Employee Escrow Agreement” was an attempt to justify plaintiff’s

disqualificationfrom receiptof thekey employeebonus. R. 62; 81.

A. TheADA Claims

TheADA, 42 U.S.C.§~12102etseq.,prohibits discriminationby privateemployers

againstanyqualified individual with adisability. When claimingdiscriminationbasedon

disability, a plaintiff must establishthat: (1) he was disabled; (2) he was none-the-less

qualified to do thejob; (3) anadverseemploymentactionwastakenagainsthim; and(4) that

hewasreplacedby or treatedlessfavorablythannon-disabledemployees.If aplaintiff can

assertaprimafacie casefor disability discrimination,theburdenshifts to the employerto

articulatealegitimate,non-discriminatoryreasonfor theadverseemploymentaction;should

theemployersucceedin doing so, theburdentheshiftsbackto theplaintiff to establishthat

thearticulatedreasonwasmerelyapretextfor discrimination.Mclnnisv.Alamo Cmty.Coil.

Dist., 207 F.3d276,282 (5th Cir.2000).

An individual qualifiesas disabledundertheADA if he demonstrates:(1) hehasa

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physicalor mental impairmentthat substantiallylimited one or more of his major life

activities; (2) hehasa recordof suchimpairment;or (3) he is regardedas having such an

impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). “[T]o be substantiallylimited meansto be unableto

performamajorlife activity that theaveragepersonin thegeneralpopulationcanperform,

or to be significantly restrictedin theability to performit. “ E.E.O.C.v. ChevronPhillips

ChemicalCo., LP 570F.3d606, 614 (5

th Cir. 2009). TheEEOC’sregulationsstatethatthe

term“majorlife activities”includes“functionssuchascaringforoneself,performingmanual

tasks,walking, seeing,hearing,speaking,breathing,learning,and working.” 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(I). Cutrerav. BoardofSup’rsofLouisianaStateUniversity, 429 F.3d 108, 111 (5t~~

Cir. 2005).

A. Plaintiff’s Failure to ExhaustHis AdministrativeRemedies

Administrativereviewby theEEOCisnormallyrequiredbeforetheCourtmayreview

a complaintbroughtunderTitle VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)(“Title VII”); Messerv.

Meno,130F.3d130, 134(5th Cir.1997). As with Title VII cases,anADA plaintiff mustfirst

exhaustadministrativeremediesby filing achargewith the EEOCor with a stateor local

agencybeforecommencingacasein federalcourt. Dao v. AuchanHypermarket,96 F.3d

787,789(5th Cir.1996)(“Employeemustcomplywith ADA’s administrativeprerequisites

prior to commencingan actionin federalcourtagainstemployerfor violation ofthe ADA”).

In a“deferral” statelike Louisiana,an aggrievedemployeehas300daysfrom thedateof the

last allegedactof discriminationto file an EEOC chargein orderto preservehis right to

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make federalclaims in a district court suit on a later date.5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);

Huckabayv. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir.1998); Messer,130 F.3d at 134 & n. 2;

Griffin v. City ofDallas,26 F.3d610,612 (5th Cir.1994). An individualwho files anEEOC

complaintandreceivesaDismissalandNotice of Rights(or aright to suenotice)from the

EEOChasninety(90) daysfrom thedateof noticeto file a claimwith theappropriatedistrict

court. 42 U.S.C.2000e-5(f)(1).

A Title VII complaint,andhencean ADA action,is limited to thescopeof theEEOC

investigationwhichcanreasonablybeexpectedto growout ofthe chargeof discrimination.

Thomasv. TexasDept. OfCriminal Justice,InstitutionalDivision, 220 F.3d389 (5th Cir.

2000). Essentially,anyissuesthatplaintiff did notbringbeforetheEEOCforconsideration

andwere not investigatedby theEEOCduring its investigationcannotbe consideredby a

district court. Dollis v. Rubin,77 F.3d777, 781 (5th Cir. 1995).

Omni contendsthatdespiteplaintiff’s allegationsof discriminationin hisComplaint:

(1) disability dueto his “stutter, managedbalanceproblems[ataxia] cancerandcontrolled

drug addiction;” (2) perceiveddisability dueto theseimpairments;(3) failure to providea

reasonableaccommodationbywaivingthereturn-to-workphysicalexamination;and(4)due

~A deferralstateis onein whichstatelaw prohibitsdiscriminationinemploymentandastateagencyhasbeenestablishedto grantor seekrelief for suchdiscriminatorypractice.Clarkv. ResistoflexCo., 854F.2d762,765 n. 1(5thCir.1988).TheLouisianaCommissiononHumanRights (“LCHR”) hasbeenfundedandoperatingsinceApril 1994,makingLouisianaadeferralstatesincethattime.La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 51:2233(WestSupp.1997);G. Guidry,EmploymentDiscriminationClaims inLouisiana,45 La. B.J. 240,241 (Oct.1997);G. Huffinan, TheLouisianaCommissionon HumanRights-NowIt’s forReal,Briefly Speaking,Spring1995,at4(NewOrleansBarAss’n).

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to his age,R. 1, ¶11 4(c), 5, 6, andhis allegationofretaliationin his AmendedComplaint,the

only allegationsactuallymadein his EEOCclaimswere of discriminationbecauseof his

disability andperceiveddisabilityandbecauseof his age. Thus,Omni asserts,plaintiff’s

claimsof failureto providereasonableaccommodationandretaliationmustbedismissedfor

failure to exhausthis administrativeremedies.

Therecordindicatesthatplaintiff filed achargeof discriminationagainstOmni with

theUnitedStatesEqualEmploymentOpportunityCommission(“EEOC”) on March3, 2008

andwith theLouisianaCommissionon HumanRightson October15, 2008. R. 57, Exh.L;

R. 62, Exh. 1. Questionnumber10 of theEEOCQuestionnaireaddressesaccommodation

andasks,“Did you askyour employerfor any assistanceor changein working condition

becauseof your disability?” and “Did you need this assistanceor changein working

condition in order to do your job?” Plaintiff responded“No” to both questions. Id. The

EEOC Questionnairecontains nothing more relatedto accommodation. Id. Nor do

plaintiff’s “Initial Notesto theEEOCCharge”datedOctober28, 2008makeanyreference

to a claim even relatedto Omni’s failure to accommodatehis disability or perceived

disability. Id. As thereis nothing in the scopeof the EEOC investigationwhich could

reasonablybe expandedto includeplaintiff’s claim of failure to accommodate,this claim

mustbe dismissed.6Carpenterv. Wal-Mart Stores,Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 745 (W.D. La.

6 PlaintiffsJanuary21, 2008medicalrecordsindicatethatthe‘only limitation Dr. Savant

placedon plaintiff was climbing ladders. Sheplacedno limitationson him from taking neurologicalexaminationswhichplaintiff assertsasthebasisof hisclaimfor failure to accommodate.

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2008) (J. Drell) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s analysisin Miller v. SouthwesternBell

TelephoneCo., 51 Fed.Appx. 928,2002WL 31415083,*6..*8 (5th Cir.2002)(unpublished

tableopinion).

Plaintiff allegesin his December10, 2009AmendedComplaint,R. 72, that he was

retaliatedagainstbecausehe filed an EEOC claim andthis lawsuit. In particular,plaintiff

allegesthatthe Omni BoardofDirectors’ February2, 2009actionofficially determiningthat

plaintiff was “terminatedfor cause’ within the meaningof Paragraph3(b) of the Key

EmployeeEscrowAgreement”wasa retaliatoryaction. Plaintiff maintainsthat the Omni

BoardofDirectors’ actionalongwith aFebruary2,2009emailbetweenhis supervisor,Andy

Dufrene,andOmni President,Brian Recatta,statingthatplaintiff was “terminatedfor two

reasons:‘grossmisconduct’andalsobeingunableto passacompanyphysical,”were“steps

takento attempt [sic] justify Lejeune’sdisqualificationfrom receiptof the key employee

bonushehadearned.”R. 72, ¶~J12 & 13.

The EEOCrecordis void of anymention of retaliationandprovidesno inferenceof

retaliation. A plaintiff mustexhausthis administrativeremediesprior to filing aretaliation

claim,unlessthe ‘retaliationclaim ... arise[s]afterthe filing of theEEOCcharge.” Williams

v.AT&TInc., 2009WL 4884954,4 (5t~~Cir. 2009)quotingGuptav.EastTex.State.Univ.,

654F.2d411,414 (5th Cir.1981). Plaintiff wasterminatedon January22,2008,beforehe

filed his EEOC complaints in March and October2008 or this lawsuitwhich he filed in

February2009. Hence,plaintiff hasfailed to exhausthis administrativeremediesrelatedto

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aretaliationclaim for his January22, 2008 terminationfrom Omni.

Plaintiff contendsin his AmendedComplaintthatOmni’s February2, 2009 action

regardingtheKey EmployeeEscrowAgreementis relatedto his retaliationclaimunderthe

ADA. The Court agreesthat the allegedclaim is a “strainedeffort to combinethe two

claims.” R. 77. The Key EmployeeEscrowAgreement,paragraph3(b) statesthat “[a]ny

Key Employeethat is terminatedfor causeasdeterminedin the solediscretionof Omni’s

Board of directors shall become ineligible to participate in the Fund.” R. 6-1. (emphasis

added). TheFebruary2 actionby theBoardwasrequiredundertheAgreementbecauseof

plaintiff’s January22, 2008 terminationfor cause,that is, refusing to takethe mandatory

companyreturn to work examinationafter being placedon unpaidleave resulting from

illegally purchasingprescriptiondrugsat work. The elementsof aprimafacie retaliation

claimarethat: (1) theplaintiff engagedin an activity protectedby thestatute;(2) an adverse

employmentactionoccurred;and(3)acausallink existsbetweentheprotectedactivity and

theadverseemploymentaction. McCoyv. City ofShreveport,492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5t~~

Cir.2007). To satisfythe third elementof aprimafacie caseof retaliation,plaintiff must

demonstrateacausalconnectionbetweentheprotectedactivity (filing theEEOCcharge)and

theadverseaction. Id. at 562.Plaintiff cannotestablishacausallink betweenthemandatory

February2, 2009 action by the Board andfiling his EEOC complaint and lawsuit, and

therefore,his claim for retaliationmustbe dismissed.

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B. Plaintiff’s Disability ClaimsUnder TheADA

Plaintiff allegesin his Petitionthathis disabilitiesincludestutter,“managedbalance

problems,” cancerand “controlled drug addition.” R. 1, ¶5. Plaintiff’s EEOC Intake

Questionnaire,however,indicatesonly “Addiction to prescriptionsmedicines.Successfully

treated...;Ataxia ...; andProstateCancer.” R. 57, Exh.L, #9. In his depositiontestimony,

plaintiff concededthathis stutterwasnot a factor in Omni’s decisionto terminatehim.

Moreover,therecordcontainsno evidencethatplaintiff’s stutteringsubstantiallylimits any

major life activity as requiredunder the ADA. Batesv. Wisconsin-Dept.of Workforce

Development,636F.Supp.2d797, 809(W.D.Wis.,2009)(Plaintiff admittedthathis stutter

was not adisability and that it did not interferewith his ability to work or talk.). As to

plaintiff’s claim thathis prostatecancerwas adisability, the recordindicatesthatLejeune

was not diagnoseduntil February 2008, after he was terminated, and that plaintiff’s

supervisor,Andy Dufrene,andOmni’s HumanResourcesDirector,Lisa Jacob,statedthat

theywereunawareof plaintiff’s diagnosiswith cancer. R. 57, Exh.A, Plaintiff’s Depo.,pp

22-23; Exh. 0, Depo. OfDufrene,pp. 46-47; Exh. C, Declaration ofLisa Jacob. Thus,

plaintiff’s claims for discriminationunderthe ADA are limited to his “managedbalance

problems”andhis “controlled drug addition.”

1. WhetherPlaintiff WasActuallyDisabled

“To establishaprima facie caseof discriminationundertheADA, aplaintiff must

demonstratethat he is a qualified individual with a disability and that the negative

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employmentactionhappenedbecauseof the disability. Sherrodv. Am. Airlines, 132 F.3d

1112,1119(5thCir. 1998)(citing 42U.S.C.§ 12112(a)).” Tabatchnikv.ContinentalAirlines

262Fed.Appx.,674,675 (5t~~Cir. 2008). Omni arguesthatplaintiff cannotestablishthe first

elementof aprimafaciecasefor eitherhis “managedbalanceproblems”orhis “controlled

drugaddition” becausehedoesnothaveadisability - aphysicalor mentalimpairmentthat

substantiallylimits oneor moreof his majorlife activities. Omni supportsits positionwith

the following: (1)plaintiff responded“no” to theEEOCQuestionnaire,question1, “do you

haveadisability?”; (2)he did not indicate in EEOC question4 thatthe reasonfor his claim

of employmentdiscriminationwas“Disability” ratherheindicatedonly“Age”; (3) in EEOC

question8 he checkedonly “No disabilitybuttheorganizationtreatsme asif! amdisabled’;

(4)plaintiff testifiedinhis October21,2009deposition,“in my mind, I hadno disabilitythat

wouldpreventme from performingmyjob functions,”R. 57, Exh.A,p. 21; (5)heconfirmed

in hisdepositionthathis impairmentsor perceivedimpairmentsdid notaffecthis day-to-day

living, Id. atp. 22, 24; (6) he consideredhimself in “top notch” healthduringthe periodin

question,Id. atp. 103; (7) in plaintiff’s December12,2007 letterto Omni he stated,“I am

in the best health I’ve been in since age 20”; and, (8) on February 1, 2008, plaintiff

representedto asubsequentemployerthat he hadno disability, Id. at Exh.P.

Plaintiff’s allegationsin his Complaint are contrary to those in his opposition

memorandumthathe hasadisability for purposesof the ADA. In his Complaint,plaintiff

characterizeshis “disabilities” as “managed” balanceproblems and “controlled” drug

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addition. Plaintiff furtherallegesthathis “balancecondition(ataxia)posedno impediment

to performinghisjob” andthathe“was capableof performingandhadbeenperformingthe

essentialfunctionsof hisjob,with or withoutreasonableaccommodation.”R. 1, ¶~J4(b); 5.

Now, in hisoppositionto themotion forsummaryjudgment,plaintiff contendsthattheataxia

“substantiallylimits hisability to walk, standorclimb”, “further limits [him] occupationally”

becausehewasprecludedfrom driving andclimbing, and“significantly restrictthemanner

in which [he] canwalk ascomparedto averagepersons,who commonlycanwalk straight

lines,climb, andstandwithout losingtheir balance.” R. 62.

Underthepertinentjurisprudence,climbing is notamajorlife activity undertheADA.

Rogersv. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 758 n. 2 (5tl~Cir. 1996)

(“climbing is not suchabasic, necessaryfunction and this court doesnot considerit to

qualify as a major life activity under the ADA”). The Fifth Circuit hasnot made a

determinationon whetheror not driving is a major life activity, however,othercourtshave

heldthatdriving is notamajorlife activity. See,Wilson v. Capital Transp.Corp., 234F.3d

29, n.4 (5

th Cir. 2000) (“Driving maybe ubiquitousin our society,but we arenot prepared

to hold today that driving is a major life activity for ADA purposes:it is not on the

non-exhaustivelist of major life activities (includingwalking, seeing,andbreathing)in the

EEOC regulations,29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I), Secondand Fourth Circuits have found that

driving is notamajorlife activity.SeeColwell v.SuffolkCountyPoliceDep‘t, 158F .3d635,

643 (2d Cir.1998); Wylandv.Boddie-NoellEnters.,Inc., 165 F.3d913, 1998WL 795173,

17

at *2 n. (4th Cir.1998)(unpublishedopinion)”).

As to plaintiff’s contentionthathis controlledbalanceproblemsimposea limitation

on his ability to walk, the January2 and22, 2008 examinationrecordsfrom Dr. Savant

indicatethat or thanan “impairedtandemwalk,”7 plaintiff wasableto standon his toesand

heelswithout difficulty, could maintainhis balanceandhad asteadywalk. Dr. Savant

opinedin herJanuary22 reportthatplaintiff was only restrictedfrom climbing laddersand

thathe could returnto work.8 Hence,Dr. Savantdid notbelievethatplaintiff’s capacityto

perform any activity otherthanclimbing differed from thatof non-impairedindividuals.

Even assumingthat the impairmentnotedby Dr. Savantrelatedto plaintiff’s abilities to

engagein oneor more of the major life ‘activities, suchinsignificant impairments,if they

existedasperceived,areinsufficient to constitutesubstantiallimitations. SeeAlbertson’s,

Inc. v.Kirkingburg, 527U.S.555, (1999) (holdingamere“difference” in aperson’sability

to perform major life activities as comparedto ordinarypersonsdoesnot qualify as a

“substantiallimitation” unlessthe limitation is significant). Moreover,plaintiff cannot

satisfyits summaryjudgmentburdenby assertingin conclusoryfashionthatDr. Savant’s

perceptionof him asunablesafely to climb “necessarily”meansthatsheregardedplaintiff

as also “substantiallylimited in one or more major life activities,” See,e.g., Pegramv.

~ “Tandemgait is theability to walkalongastraightline placingonefoot directlyin front of theother,heelto toe.... In ataxicdisorders,theability to tandemwalk is impaired,reflectingthe tendencyofsuchpatientsto compensatefor their in-coordinationby developingabroadbasedgait.” See,SpringerNetherlands,A Dictionary ofNeurologicalSigns(2002).

8 Following his termination,plaintiffstatesthathe becameemployedby Omni’ s competitor,

Analytic Stress,in asimilarsalesjob. R. 81.

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Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 286 (5th Cir.2004) (rejecting a plaintiffs “conclusory

allegations”thatshewassubstantiallylimited in amajor life activity); Deasv. RiverWest,

L.P., 152 F.3d 471,479 (5th Cir.1998) (rejectingplaintiff’s “bald assertion”thatbecause

defendant’smedicalproviderbelievedtheplaintiff sufferedfrom seizures,he mustalsohave

“perceivedherasbeingsubstantiallylimited in themajor life activitiesof seeing,hearing,

andspeaking”). Plaintiff hasproducedno evidencesupportingtheallegationthathisability

to walk or standwasaffectedin anyway.

As to plaintiff’s “controlled drug addiction,” currentillegal drug usersareexcepted

from theADA’s definitionof qualified individuals. Zenorv. ElPasoHealthcare,176 F.3d

847, 856 (5t~~Cir. 1999). A personwho hasusedillegal drugs in the monthsprecedinga

negativeemploymentactionis properly characterizedas“currently engagingin the illegal

useof drugs.” Id. Althoughasafeharboris affordedto personswhostopusingillegal drugs

andeitherbeginparticipatingin asuperviseddrugrehabilitationprogramorwhosuccessfully

completesuchaprogramandno longeruseillegal drugs,apersonmustbedrug-freefor a

considerabletimeperiodandin recoverylongenoughto havebecomestablein orderfor the

safeharborto apply. SeeZenor, 176 F. 3d at 858(citing McDaniel v. MississippiBaptist

Medical Center, 877 F.Supp.321 (S.D.Miss.1995)(holdingthat the ADA’s safeharbor

provisionappliesonly to a long-termrecoveryprogramandrequiresthatthe individual be

drug-free for aconsiderableperiod), afJ’d 74 F.3d 1238 (5th Cir.1995) andBaustian v.

Louisiana,910 F.Supp.274, 276 (E.D.La.1996)(holding thatbeing drug free for seven

19

weeksdid not satisfystatute’ssafeharborprovisioneventhoughplaintiff hadenrolled in

rehabilitationprogram)).

In his October21, 2009depositiontestimony,plaintiff statedthathe stoppedusing

illegal drugson July 31,2007,when Dr. Hooverbegantreatinghim with Suboxone.R. 57,

Exh. A, p. 70. Sometimethereafter,plaintiff beganparticipatingin an outpatientdrug

rehabilitationprogramat the Gloria CurranCenterin BreauxBridge,Louisiana. Plaintiff

continuedtreatmentatthe Centerfor overayearandwas thereforestill undertreatmenton

January22,2008,whenhe wasterminatedfrom Omni. Id. atpp. 55-57. At the time of his

deposition,plaintiff continuedto takeSuboxoneto treathis addiction. Id. atp. 146. As his

druguseis characterizedas“current,” plaintiff is precludedfrom beingaqualifiedperson

with adisability. However,evenassumingarguendothatplaintiff wasnot a“current” drug

useratthetimeof histermination,plaintiff mustdemonstratethattheconditionsubstantially

limits, or is perceivedbyhisemployerassubstantiallylimiting, his ability to performamajor

life function. Zenor, 176 F.3dat 860.

Plaintiff has“producedno evidencewhatsoeverthathe ispreventedor evenseverely

restrictedfrom performing [daily living] activities” becauseof his allegeddisabilitiesor

impairments.Hinojosav. Jostens,Inc., 128 Fed.Appx. 364,366 (Sth Cir. 2005) (emphasis

inoriginal). Rather,therecordis repletewith plaintiff’s ownrepresentationsconfirming that

hisimpairmentswerenot substantialandcreatedno limitationson his “major life activities.”

Accordingly,Omni’s motionwill be grantedas to plaintiff’s claimsfor disability underthe

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ADA. ToyotaMotorMfg. Ky,Inc. V. Williams,534U.S. 184, 198 (2002)(citingAlbertson‘s

Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.557, 557 (1999)). (“[T]he ADA requiresthose‘claiming the

Act’s protectionto proveadisability by offering evidencethat theextentof the limitation

causedby their impairmentin termsof their own experienceis substantial.”).

2. WhetherOmniRegardedPlaint~ffAsDisabled

Plaintiff furtherassertsthatOmni “regarded”him asdisabled.R.62. “In orderto be

‘regardedas’ disabledaplaintiff must: (1) haveaphysicalor mentalimpairmentthatdoes

not substantiallylimit major life activities,but be treatedas suchby an employer;(2) have

aphysicalormentalimpairmentthatsubstantiallylimits oneor moremajorlife activities,but

only becauseof the attitudesof others toward the impairment; or (3) have no actual

impairment at all, but be treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting

impairment. Theplaintiff alsomustestablishthatthe impairment,if it existedasperceived,

would be substantiallylimiting.” Mclnnis v. Alamo CommunityCollegeDist., 207F.3d

276, 281 (5t~~Cir. 2000)(citationsomitted); Rodriguezv. ConAgraGroceryProductsCo.,

436 F.3d468,475 (5

th Cir. 2006).

The focus of a “regardedas” claim is the reactionandperceptionof the relevant

decisionmakersworking with theplaintiff; theopinionsor perceptionsof otherindividuals

involved are of little legal significance. Deas, 152 F.3d at 476 n.9. Evidencethat an

employerwasmerelyawareofanimpairmentis not sufficientto survivesummaryjudgment.

Under the ADA, a plaintiff must show he is “regarded as” having an impairment that

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substantiallylimits one or more major life activities. Id. at 476 (plaintiff must produce

“sufficient evidencefor areasonabletrier of fact to concludethat [the employer]perceived

[him] ashavingan ‘impairment’ andthatthis impairment,if it existedasperceivedby [the

employer],wouldhavesubstantiallylimited oneormoreof [plaintiffs] majorlife activities”).

To survivesummaryjudgmenton a“regardedas” claim, “an employeemustshowthatan

employerregardedtheemployeeassubstantiallylimited inhisability to work by finding that

the employee’simpairmentforecloseshis ability to performaclassof jobsor abroadrange

ofjobs.” Pegramv.Honeywell,Inc.,361 F.3d272,287(5thCir.2004). “[A]n employermay

regardan employeeas impairedor restrictedfrom onepositionor anarrow rangeof jobs

without regarding[him] as ‘disabled.” E.I. Du PontdeNemours,480 F.3dat724,729 (5t~~

Cir. 2007). The“inability to performasingle,particularjobdoesnot constitutea substantial

limitation in themajor life activity of working.” Pryor v. Trane, 138 F.3d 1024,1027 (5th

Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff alsoallegesthathe suffersfrom amanagedbalanceproblemwhich did not

affecthisjob performance,but thatOmni consideredhim limited in hisability to performhis

job andunreasonablyrequiredhim to take acompanyevaluation. Plaintiff, however,has

offeredno evidenceto establishthatOmni consideredhim as limited inhis ability to perform

majorlife activitiesor unableto performawiderangeofjobs. Whenaskedin his deposition

if he thoughtOmni perceivedhim as being disabled,plaintiff responded,“I don’t know.”

Whenaskedwhetheranyoneat Omni madeanystatementsto him thatledhim to believethe

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companyconsideredhim to be disabled,he responded“no.” R. 57, Exh. A, pp 62-63.

Plaintiff’s supervisor,Andy Dufrene,statedthat he was unawareof plaintiff’s balance

problemandthathehadno concernsthatplaintiff wasstill usingdrugs. He did not know

anythingaboutplaintiff’s first andsecondphysicals,only that plaintiff was terminated

becauseherefusedto takethere-employmentphysicalOmniwhich“youhadto passto come

backto work.” R. 57-6, Exh. 0, p. 45. Omni’s HumanResourcesDirector, Lisa Jacob,

statedthatafterbeingadvisedby Dr. Thibodeauxthatplaintiff’s treatingphysicianreported

his unsteadinesshadimproved,sheaskedDr. Thibodeauxto performa third examin order

to evaluatehis improvementandreassesshis limitations in order to allow him to return to

work. Id., Exh. C. In herdeposition,Jacobstatedthatsheencouragedplaintiff to retakethe

companyphysical“so he couldcomebackto work.” R. 81, Exh. 8, 12/30/09Depo.ofLisa

Jacob,p. 69.

In his oppositionmemorandum,plaintiff callsinto questionOmni’s policyof requiring

the return-to-work examination and speculatesthat the exam was required of plaintiff

because“[h]e wasprobablyregardedasanolderaddleddrugaddictwhowasin their minds

possiblystill under the influenceof drugs... to the point he could not walk straight; i.e.,

regardedas disabled.” R. 62. Plaintiff, however,has provided nothing to negatethe

depositiontestimonyofAndy Dufrenethattheexamwasrequiredfor all employeesreturning

to work, the testimonyof Lisa Jacobthat the requirementto passthe company’sphysical

beforereturningto work wasa “hard andfastrule,” R. 81,Exh.5, p. 32; Exh. 8, pp. 34-35,

23

or thestatementof Lisa Jacobthat“it wasOmni’s practice... to requireemployeeslike Mr.

Lejeuneon extendedmedicalleavesto undergoareturn-to-workphysical,” R. 57-6, Exh.

C. Plaintiff alsoarguesthatOmni’s policy of requiringthe return-to-workevaluationwas

neither job-relatednor consistentwith Omni’s businessnecessity. The recordindicates,

however,thatDr. Thibodeaux,asOmni’s companydoctor,andDr. Savant,plaintiff’s own

physician,opinedthatplaintiff could not return to work becausehis job requireddriving.

Also, Andy Dufrene andLisa Jacobtestifiedthattheyhadconcernsof asafetyissuewhen

plaintiff returnedto work becausehe hadto driveacompanyvehicle. R. 81, Exh.5, pp. 36-

37;Exh. 8, pp. 34-35. It wasonly afterDr. Savant’sJanuary21, 2008examinationthatshe

removedthedriving restrictionandreleasedplaintiff to returnto work. Plaintiff’s medical

recordsindicatethathistreatingphysician,Dr. Savant,advisedhim thatDr. Thibodeauxwas

obligated to re-exam him and that she should also perform the evaluation. Omni’s

requirementto requireplaintiff to be re-examinedby Dr. Thibodeauxwas thereforejob-

relatedandwas consistentwith Omni’s businessnecessityasrequiredunder42 U.S.C. §

12112(d)(4)(B). See,Hinojosav. JostensInc., 128Fed.Appx.364,368 (5tl~Cir. 2005)citing

42 U.S.C.§ 12112(d)(4)(B)(“theADA authorizesemployersto inquireaboutanemployee’s

ability to performjob-relatedfunctions).

Plaintiff hasfailed to establishthathe was“regardedas disabled.” Plaintiff failed to

produceevidencethatanyoneatOmni perceivedhim asdisabled. In orderto succeedon his

claim under the ADA, plaintiff would have to produceevidencedemonstratingthat his

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employer “entertain[ed] some misperceptionregarding[plaintiff] - either that he has a

substantiallylimiting impairmentthathe doesnothaveorthe impairmentis not so limiting

asbelieved.”Aldrupv. Caldera,274F.3d282, 287(5thCir.2001).Plaintiff failed to do so.

B. AgeDiscriminationClaim

Plaintiff also assertsa claim under the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 etseq.,allegingthatOmni discriminatedagainsthim basedon

hisagebecausehe wasreplacedwith ayoungeremployee.R. 1, ¶ 6. Plaintiff, however,has

providednot onescintillaof evidenceto supporthis claim thatagewasamotivatingfactor

in Omni’s decisionto terminatehim. Accordingly,plaintiff’s agediscriminationclaim will

be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasonsstatedabove,the Court will grant Omni’s Motion for Summary

JudgmentandBrice Lejeune’sclaimsof discriminationundertheADA andtheADEA will

bedismissedwith prejudice.As theCourtwill declineto assertits supplementaljurisdiction

overplaintiff’s statelawemploymentclaimsandtherelatedBill oflnterpleader,the statelaw

claimswill be remandedto theFifteenthJudicialDistrict Court,LafayetteParish,Louisiana

andtheBill of Interpleaderwill be dismissedwithoutprejudice.

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