UBS House View · Sparkles and bubbles anuary UBS House View Monthly Letter 4 2010 2013 2016 2019...
Transcript of UBS House View · Sparkles and bubbles anuary UBS House View Monthly Letter 4 2010 2013 2016 2019...
This report has been prepared by UBS AG. Please see important disclaimers and disclosuresattheendofthe document.
UBS House ViewMonthly Letter 14 January 2021
ChiefInvestmentOfficeGWMInvestment Research
Equity excess?
Some elements of the current rally are consistent with bubbles according to our framework. Weseepocketsofspeculation,but the broader equity market is notinabubble,inourview.
Bond bubble?
Bysomemeasures,bondmarkets can be described as a bubble. But central banks have almost unlimited capacity to maintain their policies.
Irrational exuberance?
The cryptocurrency markets are exhibitingsignsofexcessivespeculation and the IPO/SPAC markets are the hottest in two decades.Butthesemarketsdo not yet pose a broader systemic risk.
Asset allocation
Weretainapro-riskstance.We moveourpreferenceforUK equitiesbacktoneutralaftertheir recent good performance andshiftfocustowardemerg-ing market stocks.
Sparkles and bubblesI have some gray hairs. I am glad there are people in this world who lovingly call them“sparkles.”Ifyouhavesparkles,too,thenyouhavealsolivedthroughsomemarket bubbles. The experience that brought about those sparkles has taught me thatmarketenvironmentsthatfeaturecheapfinancing,easyaccesstoinvestments,theincentivetoengageinspeculativeactivity,andatechnologicalorpolitical“spark” tend to lead to bubbles. These conditions exist today.
Bond prices are so elevated that a quarter of all global bonds are trading with nega-tiveinterestrates.Teslanowhasamarketcapbiggerthanallmajorlistedauto-makersinEurope,Japan,andtheUScombined.TheUSIPOmarketisthehottestin morethantwodecades,withfirst-dayperformanceaveraging40%.Tappingintoinvestordemandfornewlistings,special-purposeacquisitioncompanies(SPACs)raisedmorethanUSD 70bnin2020,morethantheentirepriordecadecombined.Bitcoin almost quadrupled in just three months.
Lastyear,wenotedthatultra-lowinterestratesandgovernmentstimuluswouldpush investors toward accepting the idea that “There Is No Alternative” to equities. Thisideaisnowmorewidelyaccepted,andisleadingtoindividualspeculativebub-bles.Butwithnewfiscalstimulusbeingaddedtoalreadyaccommodativemonetarypolicy,wethinktheequitymarketoverallstilllooksappealingrelativetobonds.Wethereforeretainapro-riskstance.
Thatsaid,wefocusequityexposureawayfromsomeof2020’swinners(particularlyUSmega-caps),andtowardlesservaluedemergingmarketstocks.WealsomoveourpreferenceforUKequitiesbacktoneutralaftertheirgoodrecentperformance.Withinfixedincome,inthecontextofcontinuedlowyields,welikehard-currencyemergingmarketsovereignbondsand,forinvestorsbasedoutsidetheUS,Asiahighyieldcredit.Forlong-termgrowth,wecontinuetoseethebestcurrentoppor-tunitiesinadiversifiedexposuretocompaniespositionedin5G,fintech,greentech,healthtech,andwithinprivatemarkets.
Mysparklesalsotaughtmethattreesdon’tgrowtothesky,andinthemonthsaheadwewillneedtopayparticularattentiontorisksofamonetarypolicyreversal,risingequityvaluations,andtherateofthepost-pandemicrecovery.
Mark HaefeleChiefInvestmentOfficerGlobalWealthManagement
Follow me on LinkedInlinkedin.com/in/markhaefele
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Equities Government bonds Cryptocurrencies IPOs and SPACs
Are prices high relative to traditional measures?
Yes. Equity valuations are high based on P/E ratios.
Yes. Financial repression has pushed bond prices above fair value implied by expectedgrowthand inflation.
Yes. Traditional metrics are notapplicable,butafourfold increase in three months looks excessive.
Yes in terms of the size of first-dayIPOpricerisesandthe amount of capital raised by SPACs.
Are prices discounting future rapid price appreciation?
No. Valuations can be justifiedinthecontextof bondyields.Long-termreturn expectations are low.
No. Fewinvestors,includ-ingcentralbanks,owngovernment bonds in the expectationofrisingprices.
Yes. Speculation appears to be playing an important role in rising prices.
Yes. First-dayIPOperformance is the highest in around two decades.
Are purchases being financed by high leverage?
No. Margin lending is currently lowerthan historical norms.
Yes. Central bank balance sheets grew by USD 8 tril-lionin2020.
No. High levels of volatility meanleverageisdifficultto employ.
No. IPOs are generally not funded by leverage.
Are buyers or companies making forward purchases?
Yes. Call option volumes are elevated.
Yes. Central banks have made forward purchase commitments.
Yes. The entire market is aneffective“forwardpurchase.”
Yes. SPACsareaneffective“forward purchase” on a future investment opportunity.
Have new participants entered the market?
Yes, as seen from new account openings on digi-tal platforms and increased shareofcapitalflowsfromretail investors.
Yes. Central banks now own more of the govern-ment bond market; the Fedowns24%ofUS Trea-suries,upfrom9% in2009.
Yes. New wallet growth indicates increased participation.
Yes. SPAC sponsors now include politicians and celebrities.
Is there broad bullish sentiment?
Yes.Thebull-bearspreadof investor sentiment from the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII)ismorethantwicetheaverage(19vs.8onaveragesince1990).
No. Consensus expects yields to rise.
Yes. Cryptocurrency investors almost uniformly expect higher prices or user adoption.
Yes. SPACs raised a record volume of new funds in 2020.
Does tightening risk popping the bubble?
Yes. Higher bond yields or interestrateswouldmake valuations look less appealing.
No. Central banks them-selves control the path of thebubble.Inflationlooksfaroff.
Yes. Higher interest rates maynotbemeaningful, but regulation or taxation is a potential risk.
Yes. Higher yields would likely reduce the appeal of growthstocks,whichmakeupahighshareofthe IPOand SPAC markets.
Source: UBS
Intheremainderofthisletter,weaddresssomeofthekeyquestionswehavebeenaskedaboutbubblesintoday’smarkets.Onlyoneyearago,whenmarketswerestartingtocrash,investorsfacedaseeminglydifferentsetofchallengesthantoday.Yetbydealingwiththeiremotions,diversifying,andkeepingawatchfuleye,inves-tors can successfully protect and grow their wealth.
Wheredoyouseebubblestoday?
Thepresenceofsufficientoxygen,heat,andfuel—the“firetriangle”—combinedwithaspark,willtriggerafire.InBoom and Bust: A Global History of Financial Bubbles,authorsWilliamQuinnandJohnD.Turnerarguethatasimilarprincipleappliestofinancialmarkets.Sufficientmarketability,accesstocredit,andwilling-nesstoengageinspeculativeactivity,combinedwithtechnologicalorpolitical“sparks,”arepreconditionsthattendtotriggermarketbubbles.
Today,allofthebubblepreconditionsareinplace.Financingcostsareatrecordlows,newparticipantsarebeingdrawnintomarkets,andthecombinationofhighaccu-mulated savings and low prospective returns on traditional assets create both the meansandthedesiretoengageinspeculativeactivity.Atthesametime,accelerateddigitalizationhasgeneratedacompellingnarrativeabouttechnologicalchange,while elevated debt levels create the political imperative to support asset markets.
Today,allofthepreconditionsforbubbles to emerge are in place.
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So we should expect to see some bubbles emerging. Identifying bubbles while they areoccurringisnotoriouslychallenging.However,drawingonattemptsbyeco-nomichistorianCharlesKindlebergerandbyBridgewaterAssociates’RayDaliotoputarationalframeworkaroundirrationalexuberance,welistinthetableaboveanumber of features of historic bubbles and attempt to apply them to various assets today.
Inshort,wedonotthinkequitiesasawholeareinabubble,althoughweseesignsofirrationalexuberanceinthecrypotcurrencymarkets,andnotethatIPOandSPACmarkets look hot. Government bonds can be considered to be in a bubble by many metrics,thoughthisbubbleisunlikelyto“pop,”giventhatitissupportedbypolicy-makers themselves.
Are equities in a bubble?
Therearereasonsforconcern,butwedonotbelievethatequitiesasawholeareina bubble.
The21%returnonUSequitiesand16%returnonglobalequitiesin2020haveleftstockslookingexpensiveonprice-to-earningsratio(P/E)metrics.TheS&P 500tradesonaforwardP/Eof22.5xandtheNasdaqat33.5x.Since1880,theUSmarket’scyclicallyadjustedP/E(CAPE)hasonlybeenhigherin1929and1999–2000,priortostock market crashes.
There are also elements of the rally that are consistent with bubbles according to our framework. The rally has coincided with new participants entering the market: PlatformslikeRobinhood,whichaddedmorethan3millionusersin2020,havecontributed to broadening the accessibility of stocks. Retail investors now account forafull20%ofUSequityorderflow,upfromjust10%in2010,androughlyequivalenttoflowsfrombanks,hedgefunds,andlong-onlyfundscombined.
Even though there are reasons for concern,wedonotbelieveequities as a whole are in a bubble.
New participants are entering the market.
80x
70x
60x
50x
40x
30x
20x
10x
0x1989 1997 2005 2013 2021
Nasdaq forward P/EFigure 1
Source: Refinitiv Datastream, as of 6 January 2021
25x
23x
21x
19x
17x
15x
13x
11x
9x
7x
5x1985 1991 1997 2003 2009 2015 2021
S&P 500 forward P/EFigure 2
Average since 1985
Source: Refinitiv Datastream, as of 6 January 2021
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2010 2013 2016 2019 2020
US equity order flows, by sourceFigure 3
Source: Bloomberg, UBS, as of January 2021
Market makers / High-frequency traders Banks Quant funds Hedge funds Long-only funds
10.1%
11.3%
12.1%
7.5%
8.7%
50.3%
13.0%
11.0%
13.4%
11.2%
10.3%
41.1%
15.0%
12.0%
13.2%
14.5%2.0%
43.3%
14.9%
9.7%
13.4%
16.7%
6.0%
39.3%
19.5%
6.4%9.0%
15.9%
5.8%
43.4%
Retail
Options activity and the growth in the SPAC market also suggest a willingness to “buy forward.” Average trading in call options has more than doubled over the courseof2020,andput-to-callratiosareindicativeofprevailingbullishsentiment.Thisisalsobackedupbyequityflows.GlobalequitiesrecordedUSD 46.4billionof weeklyinflowsintheweekending16December,exceedingapriorrecordofUSD 45billion,whichitselfwasonlyseton11November.Asof11January,netinflowsintoequitiesoverthepastthreemonthshadreachedUSD213billion.
However,althoughthesesignalsbearmonitoring,wedonotthinkthatequitiesasa wholeareinabubble.
First,althoughleveragecanincreaserapidly,itremainscontainedfornow.Persis-tentlyhighlevelsofequitymarketvolatilitythrough2020havehelpedpreventhedgefundsandriskparityfundsfromaddingleveragethroughtherally,althoughrecentlytherehavebeenindicationsthatleverageisrising.Meanwhile,margindebtrelativeto theS&P500marketcapisatlowerlevelsthenthenormformuchofthepast decade.
Options activity and the growth in theSPACmarketalsosuggesta willingnessto“buyforward.”
Call option volumes, in thousands, 20-day moving average
Figure 4
Source: Bloomberg, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
CBOE weekly equity put-to-call option volume ratio
Figure 5
Source: Bloomberg, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
1.15
0.95
0.75
0.55
0.35
12.2
019
02.2
020
04.2
020
06.2
020
08.2
020
10.2
020
12.2
020
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Margin debt as a % ofS&P 500 market cap
Figure 6
Source: Bloomberg, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
4.0%
3.5%
3.0%
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2021
Implied equity leverage of risk parity funds
Figure 7
SPXT10TE Index 50D moving average
100D moving average
Average
200D moving average
Source: Bloomberg, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
02017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Second,wecanpointtolargepartsofthemarketthatarenotexpensivelyvaluedbyhistoricalcomparison.Forexample,strippingouttheFAAMNGstocks(Facebook,Amazon,Apple,Microsoft,Netflix,andGoogle),theS&P500onlyrose6%lastyear.
ExcludingITandtheIT-relatedpartsofconsumerdiscretionarytheforwardP/Eforglobalstocksdropsfrom20.2xto17.7x.Onacyclicallyadjustedbasis,P/Eratiosarecloseto,orbelow,long-termaveragesinallmajormarketsexceptfortheUS,wherevaluationshavebeenskewedhigherbymega-captechstocks.
Finally,valuationsofequityindexeslookmorereasonableifweconsidertheback-dropoflowinterestrates.NobellaureateRobertShiller’s“excessCAPEyield”impliesaforward-lookingexcessreturnofequitiesoverbondsofaround3.8%,consistentwithlong-termaverages.Anequityriskpremium(ERP)approach,com-paringequityearningsyieldswithbenchmarkyields,showssimilarresults,withstocks looking cheap relative to bonds.
Ofcourse,collapsingbubblescan,intherightcircumstances,drivebroadereco-nomic weakness and impact the equity market even if the market itself is not in a bubble.However,thepartsofthemarketthatmaybeexperiencingbubblestoday(suchascryptocurrencies)donotappeartobehighlyinterconnectedwiththefinan-cialsystemandarenotparticularlycapital-orlabor-intensive.Thisshouldlimitthebroadereconomicfalloutandimpactoncorporateearningsmorebroadly,intheevent of any individual bubbles collapsing.
Strippingouttherallyinmega-captechstocks,theS&P 500onlyrose6%in2020.
Valuations of equity indexes look more reasonable if we consider the backdrop of low interest rates.
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Are government bonds in a bubble?
Talkofabondbubbleishardlynew:Yieldson10-yearUSyieldshavebeeninaseculardowntrendsincetheearly1980s.ButwithcentralbanksaroundtheworldprintingmorethanUSD8trillionin2020tosupporteconomicrecovery,fearsofa bondmarketbubblearerising.
Bysomemeasures,thecurrentsetupcanbedescribedasabubble:Itinvolvesnewmarketparticipants(intheformofcentralbanks),leverage(ofcentralbankbalancesheets),anelementofspeculation(thattheeasingwillwork),forwardcommit-ments,andpricesthatareatrecordhighs.Butwhereasotherbubblesarepronetocollapsingbecauseofasuddenshiftinbuyers’sentiment,alackofnewfunds,orchangesinregulation,centralbankshavealmostunlimitedcapacitytomaintaintheirpolicies,iftheyseefit.
Sothequestionbecomes:Whenwillcentralbanks,andmostimportantlytheFederalReserve,takeawaythepunchbowl?Wecurrentlydonotseeconditionsthatcouldchangetheirmindsaboutkeepingmonetarypolicyultra-looseoverourmedium-term investment horizon:
– Inflation is not a threat.Aftertheglobalfinancialcrisis,theFeddidnothititsinflationtargetsustainablyevenafteradecade-longexpansion,andtheCOVID-19pandemichasnowdeliveredanadditionalseveredisinflationaryshock.Givenelevatedunemploymentandamplesparecapacity,aprolongedriseininflationislikelytobeyearsoff.
– The Fed’s reaction function has changed, even if inflation rises.Inthepast,theFedactedundertheassumptionthatinflationhasmomentumandthat,inordertopreventanundesiredovershooting,itneededtohikeproactivelyinadvanceofinflationrisingtotarget.ButtheFedhasnowshiftedtoanaverageinflationtargetapproach,meaningitwilldeliberatelywaituntilinflationisovershooting2%before hiking rates. Fiscal policymakers are also committed to running the econ-omy “hot” to support the recovery.
Wecurrentlydonotseeconditions that could change centralbanks’mindsaboutkeepingmonetarypolicyultra-looseoverourmedium-terminvestment horizon.
Excess CAPE yield and annualized subsequent 10-year total excess return
Figure 8
Excess CAPE yield
Subsequent 10-year excess return
Excess CAPE yield is calculated by taking the cyclically adjusted earnings for the S&P 500 divided by its price, and then subtracting the 10-year Treasury yield
Source: R. Shiller, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
–5%
–10%
1881
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1941
1951
1961
1971
1981
1991
2001
2011
1920
19321982 2009
19493.8%
Equity risk premium, median since 1960
Figure 9
Median since 1960
Source: Factset, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
–2%
–4%
–6%1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Stocks cheapvs bonds
Stocks expensivevs bonds
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– The yield curve is unlikely to steepen much further. One of the main arguments for steepercurvesistheincreasedbondissuancerequiredtofundthedeficit.Butthere is no empirical evidence from the past several decades to support the idea that greater supply leads to higher yields in the US. Increasing debt means peak Fedfundscontinuestomovelowereachcycle—lastcycle’sequilibriumappearedtobeabout1.6%.AndtheappointmentofformerFedchairJanetYellenasUS TreasurySecretarycouldalsosuggestincreasedwillingnesstousefiscalstimu-lus in combination with easy monetary policy.
Bydesign,policymakershavechosentomakesafeassetsexpensive,andriskyassetsrelativelyappealing.Thismayleadtohighervaluationsrelativetohistory,butthereare reasons to believe this policy environment may persist for years.
Are cryptocurrencies a bubble?
Recently,theUK’sfinancialregulator,theFinancialConductAuthority,warnedthatcryptocurrencyinvestorsshouldbepreparedtoaccepttotalloss.WiththeweeklyvolatilityinBitcoinexceedingthatoftheannualvolatilityinstocks,wethinkinves-tors looking to protect and grow their wealth over the long term should maintain discipline and exercise extreme caution on cryptocurrency speculation. Read more in ourrecentpublication on Bitcoin.
Giventheabsenceofcashflowsorwidespreadusecasesforcryptocurrencies,valu-ingtheseassetsinatraditionalwayischallenging.Indeed,onecouldviewcrypto-currenciesasaneffective“forwardpurchase”(oneofthehallmarksofabubble)onfutureusecasesbeingdeveloped.Yetwhatevertheseusesmightbe,itwouldseemimprobable that they could have changed so dramatically as to drive a fourfold increase in price in just three months.
Publiclyavailabledatafromblockchain.com,theworld’sleadingBitcoinwalletpro-vider,shows1millionnewwalletswerecreatedinthepastthreemonths,asmanyas werecreatedintheprioryear,meaningthatnewusersappeartohavebeenattractedbyrisingprices.Italsoshowsasignificantincreaseinthenumberofaddressesused(roughlyequivalenttodailyusers),likelyindicativeofanincreaseinspeculativetradingactivity.Whilestillinitsinfancy,theopeninterestintheBitcoinfuturesmarkethasalsoincreasedmorethanthreefoldsinceOctober.All this,andwith95%ofcoinsheldbyjust2.5%ofaddresses(notethatoneusercanalsohavemultipleaddresses),thepotentialforprice“squeezes”shouldalsobe evident.
Ofcourse,findingsignsofspeculationandtimingacollapsearedifferentthings.In thepast,regulatoryfearshavecontributedtodeclinesincryptocurrencyprices.Priceshavealsofallensharplywithoutanobviouscatalyst(forexample,the69%dropfollowingtheDecember2017bubble).Butthehistoryofbubblesshouldteachusthattheycanalsoinflatefurtherandforlongerthanseemsplausible.Changesin thewayassetsareperceivedcanalsomeanthatbubblesmayneverfullydeflate,andthiscouldholdtrueforcryptocurrencies,too.Rememberthatgoldhasbeendescribedastheworld’soldestbubble.
Thatsaid,withpricescurrentlylikelybeingdrivenmorebyspeculationthanfunda-mentals,investorslookingtoprotectandgrowtheirwealthshouldexerciseextreme caution.
Bydesign,policymakershavechosen to make safe assets expensive,andriskyassetsrelatively appealing. There are reasons to believe this policy environment may persist for years.
Wethinkinvestorslookingtoprotect and grow their wealth over the long term should maintain disci pline and exercise extreme caution on cryptocurrency speculation.
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Do the hot IPO and SPAC markets pose a risk?
SincefewwillinvestineverynewIPOandSPAC,itishardtotalkaboutthevalua-tion of the IPO and SPAC markets. But even if sentiment changed and the IPO and SPACmarketscooled,wedon’tthinktheyarecurrentlybigenoughtohavesys-temicconsequences.IntheUS,arecordofoverUSD65billionwasraisedinIPOsin2020(plusmorethan70billioninSPACs),withaveragefirst-dayreturnsaround40%(AirBnB,forexample,jumped113%onday1).The ChineseIPOmarketwasevenhotter,witharoundUSD100billionraisedandfirst-dayreturnsforChina-domiciledIPOscloseto80%.Remindersofthedotcomeraareclear.
Even if sentiment changed and theIPOandSPACmarketscooled,wedon’tthinktheyarecurrentlybig enough to have systemic consequences.
Bitcoin price, in USDFigure 10
Source: Bloomberg, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
02010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Open interest in CME Bitcoin futures contracts, in USD mn
Figure 11
Source: CME, JPMorgan, UBS, as of 31 December 2020
2,400
2,100
1,800
1,500
1,200
900
600
300
001.2019 07.2019 01.2020 07.2020 01.2021
Total number of unique blockchain.com wallets created
Figure 12
70,000,000
60,000,000
50,000,000
40,000,000
30,000,000
20,000,000
10,000,000
001.2018 07.2018 07.2019 07.2020
Source: Blockchain com, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
Total number of unique addresses used
Figure 13
Source: Blockchain com, UBS, as of 11 January 2021
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
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US SPAC capital raised (USD bn, lhs)
Number of deals (rhs)
Source: SPAC Insider, UBS, as of January 2021
US SPAC capital raised and number of deals
Figure 15
80 250
200
150
100
50
0
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
080 85 90 95 00 05 10 15
Source: Jay Ritter, Bloomberg, IPOScoop, UBS, as of 1 December 2020
Average US IPO first-day return, in %
Figure 14
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
080 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
39%
Yet the total money invested in IPOs is negligible in the context of the overall equity market. A crash in the IPO market might destroy several hundred billion dollars in totalwealth,comparedwithaUSD34trilliontotalmarketcapforUSequities.Lim-ited leverage used to make these investments also means the systemic risk is low.
Second,financialbubblesarecostlyforaneconomyiftheyentailasignificantmis-allocation of capital to unproductive investments. But with the current batch of IPOs focusedonrelativelycapital-lightbusinesses,andwiththeroughlyUSD65billionraisedin2020equivalenttojustover0.25%ofUSGDP,evenifcapitalisbeingmis-allocated,itdoesn’tappeartobeparticularlylargeinscale.
Finally,frothyIPOpriceswouldbealargerconcerniftheywereindicativeofabuildupofexcessesintheoverallequitymarket.Butasdiscussedearlier,wedonotthink that equity markets as a whole are in a bubble.
How should I think about investing in a speculative environment?
1) Face your fear of missing out (“FOMO”).Wechosetotakethebubbleques-tionondirectlyinthisletternottoscareinvestorsoutofequities,buttohelpcreatebetterconversationsaroundtheemotionalsideofinvesting.Withcertainassetssoaring,therearetemptationstotryandhitcharide.Butgettingrichandstayingrichrequiredifferentattitudestofearandgreed.Inaspeculativeenvironment,investors looking to protect and grow their wealth over the long term will need to remain disciplined. Our Liquidity. Longevity. Legacy.* approach to wealth manage-mentshouldhelpinvestorsright-sizeriskyinvestmentsandkeeptheirportfoliosalignedwiththeirfinancialgoals.
2) Think beyond the bubbles. One reason that bubbles can be so deceptive is thatthereisoftenagrainoftruthbehindtheirnarratives.Thedotcombubble,forexample,correctlyanticipatedtheimpactoftheinternet.Manyofthenarrativeslinkedtotoday’sbubblesmayalsoprovetobecorrect.Investorsmaybeabletocapture some upside but reduce the risk associated with bubbles by identifying the narrative,yetinvestinginamorediversifiedway.Today,investorexcitementabout
Withcertainassetssoaring,thereare temptations to try and hitch a ride. But getting rich and staying richrequiredifferentattitudestofear and greed.
*Timeframesmayvary.Strategiesaresubjecttoindividualclientgoals,objectivesandsuitability.Thisapproachisnotapromiseorguaranteethatwealth,oranyfinancialresults,canorwillbeachieved.
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fintech,industrydisruptors,andgreentechnologyiscontributingtoindividualassetpricebubbles.Butwheninvestinginthemisdoneinadiversifiedway,wethinkeach of these themes represent attractive opportunities for the decade ahead.
3) Invest around the bubbles.Someassetsdolookexpensive,andmayevenbe“inabubble.”Butthisclearlydoesnotapplytoeverysinglelistedequity.Wecon-tinuetoseeattractiveopportunitiesamongmorecyclicalcompanies,sectors,andmarketsasthepost-pandemicrecoverygainsground.Wemaintainapreferenceforglobalsmall-andmid-caps,andthismonthweshiftourpreferenceforglobalequi-tiestofocusonemergingmarketstocks,whicharecheaperandshouldbenefitfroma global economic recovery. This is consistent with the “Diversify for the Next Leg” message discussed in our Year Ahead outlook.
Key scenarios and asset class impact
Upside Central Downside
Investment ideas Top ideas 1. Positionforaweakerdollar2. Investin“TheNextBig
Thing”(5G,fintech,healthtech,greentech,)
1. Gocyclicalfortherecovery(includingEMequities)
2. Huntforyield(includingdividendsandcredit)
3. Buy into sustainability4. Diversifyintoprivatemarkets
1. Protectagainstthedownside(usinggold,dynamicallocationstrategies,longduration,andoptionstructures)
2. Easeintomarkets
Scenario Description Developedcountries’GDPreturnstopre-pandemiclevelsbyend-2021
Central banks stay accommoda-tive,butstarttoconsidertight-eninginlate2021orearly2022
Discretionaryfiscalimpulsecon-tinues to support the economy.
Lower real rates and a weaker dollar boost global growth over thenext12months
Vaccinerolloutaccelerates.Suffi-cient part of the key risk group arevaccinatedin1Q.
A partial rollback of existing tradetariffsraisesglobalgrowth
Developedcountries’GDPreturnstopre-pandemiclevelsin 2022
Central banks stay accommodative
Real rates remain low and stable overthenext12months
Fiscal impulse fades moderately andgradually,asgovernmentsadapt to economic recovery
RecurringCOVID-19wavesarelikely, butlimitedpublicfearand restrictionsfadegraduallywithsufficientvaccinationsbymid-2021
Global trade policy is more nuanced and the US takes a targeted approach
Developedcountries’GDPreturnstopre-pandemiclevelsin2023or later
Diminishingfiscalimpulseisunable to compensate for economic weakness
Initially,monetarypolicyissupportive,buteventuallytapersasinflationrises(badtapering)
Vaccineavailabilityisdelayed,orvaccinesshowlowerefficacythaninitially thought
Heightened public fear of COVID-19andstrictrestrictionson business activity keep recurringthroughout2021
Growth is hurt by renewed global tradetensions
Anassetpricebubbleinflatingthen bursting
Asset class impact
(targetsforDecember 2021)
Spot*
S&P 500 3,794 4,300 4,000 3,200
Euro Stoxx 50 3,612 4,100 3,800 3,000
MSCI EM 1,350 1,600 1,450 1,050
SMI 10,875 12,000 11,300 9,500
USD IG spread** 67 50bps/+1.5% 80bps/+1% 200bps/–3%
USD HY spread** 382 320bps/+6% 400bps/+4.5% 700bps/–10.5%
EMBIG spread** 349 280bps/+9.5% 340bps/+6,5% 550bps/–7%
EUR USD 1.22 1.32 1.27 1.22
Gold 1,843 USD1,500–1,600/oz USD1,800/oz USD2,000–2,100/oz
* Spotpricesasof12January2021**Duringperiodsofmarketstress,creditbid-offerspreadstendtowidenandresultinlargerranges.Percentagechangesrefertoexpected
total return(t.r.)fortheindicatedspreadlevels
Note:assetclasstargetsaboverefertotherespectivemacroscenarios.Individualassetpricescanbeinfluencedbyfactorsnotreflectedinthe macroscenarios
Source:UBS,asofJanuary2021
Sparkles and bubbles
11January 2021 – UBS House View Monthly Letter
4) Be prepared to ride the waves. One risk with the presence of bubbles is that fearofcollapseleadsinvestorstoforgoopportunities,andstructuralshiftsoftenlooklikebubblesintheirearlystages.Forexample,Applestockhasrisensixtimessincethis article declared it was a bubble,Amazonstockhasrisentenfoldsincethis pro-nouncement,andeventhebroadS&P 500hasmorethandoubledsincethese com-mentsweremade.Providedinvestorsdiversifywellandkeepalong-termview,wethinkitwillpaytoremaininvestedinadiversifiedportfolioofstocks.Withinterestratessetto staylowforanextendedperiod,sittingincashoutoffearofbeingcaught in a collapsing bubble is likely to be more costly than being invested over the longterm,inourview.
Top investment ideas for the year and decade ahead
Go cyclical for the recoveryWeseefurtherupsideforequities,particularlythosewithexposuretoacyclicalrecovery.Atthistimewelikeglobalsmall-caps,andhaveaddedapreferenceforfinancialsintheEurozone,giventheirlowvaluationsandsolidearningsprospects.Regionally,wecontinuetoseebetterrelativeperformanceprospectsoutsidetheUS.Thatsaid,afterastrongperformancethatnarrowedtheUKmarket’svaluationdiscounttoglobalequities,wehaveclosedourpreferenceforUKstocks.
Wehaveshiftedourpreferencetowardemergingmarkets,whereweseevaluationsasmoreattractivethanglobalstocks.InAsia,wehaveapreferenceforChineseequi-ties,givenstrongEPStrends,reduceddomesticandinternationalpolicyuncertain-ties,andsupportivemonetarypolicy.WithintheChinesetechspace,whilethebipo-lartechnologyraceshouldcontinuebetweentheUSandChina,unilateralactionslike delisting are less likely under the new US administration. In an extreme scenario ofdelisting,affectedstocksmightexperiencesharpcorrections(15–20%)asaknee-jerkreaction,butfocusshouldeventuallyshiftbacktomedium-tolong-termfunda-mentals.Inourview,recentsharepricecorrectionshavediscountedmostofthecon-cerns over tighter regulation of the Chinese internet space.
Position for a weaker dollarWeretainourviewforfurtherUSdollarweaknessin2021.Wethinkthatastherecoverygatherspace,drivenbyvaccinerollouts,morecyclicalcurrencies(euro,the Britishpound,selectoil-linkedcurrencies)haveupsidepotential.Weexpectacorrespondingdeclineindemandforsafe-havenassets,suchastheUSdollar. Invest in “The Next Big Thing”The next decade will likely reward investing in the companies using technology to disruptothersectors.Weexpect“TheNextBigThing”—marketsegmentswhereover thenextdecadeearningscouldtripleduetoalargepotentialmarket(overUSD 200bn),adisruptivecatalysttospurgrowth,andacyclicalcatalysttokick-startthingsin2021—tomaterializefromthe5Grollout,fintech,healthtech,orgreentech.
Hunt for yieldTheFedcontinuestoanchorshort-termratesclosetozero.Inourbasecase,policyratesremainunchangedforseveralyears,facilitatedbyaslowaccelerationininfla-tionexpectations.Whileweexpecteconomicnormalizationtoputsomeupwardpressureonlong-termrates,weexpectincreasestoremainmodest.Westillfavoropportunitiesintheriskierendofthebondmarket,includingUSD-denominatedemergingmarketsovereignbondsand,forinvestorsbasedoutsidetheUS,Asianhighyieldcredit.Wethinkthereisroomforfurther,albeitlimited,spreadcompres-sion,andyieldsremainattractiveat4.8%and7.2%respectively.Wealsocontinuetorecommendconsideringalternativestrategiestoboostincome,includingsellingstill-elevatedvolatilityandemployingleverageifappropriate.
One risk with the presence of bubbles is that fear of collapse leads investors to forgo opportunities,andstructuralshiftsoftenlooklikebubblesintheirearly stages.
Weseefurtherupsideforequities,particularly those with exposure to a cyclical recovery.
WeretainourviewforfurtherUS dollarweaknessin2021andprefer more cyclical currencies.
Whileweexpecteconomicnormalization to put some upward pressureonlong-termrates,weexpect increases to remain modest.
Sparkles and bubbles
12January 2021 – UBS House View Monthly Letter
Buy into sustainabilitySustainable investing remains our preferred solution for clients looking to invest globally.Governments,businesses,andindividualsaredrivingashifttowardsustain-ableinvestment,andmanyofthehighest-growthopportunitiesinthedecadeaheadaresettobesustainability-linked,suchasgreentech.Inapost-pandemicworld,webelievecompaniesthatreducetheirenvironmentalfootprint,strengthentheirsupply-chainrelationships,andembracediversityarelikelytobenefit.
Diversify into private marketsWeexpectreturnsontraditionalassetstobelowerinthecomingdecade.Inthiscontext,privatemarkets,whichcomewithadistinctsetofopportunitiesandrisks,mayofferaneffectivewaytoenhanceportfolioreturnsanddiversification.Theassetclasshashistoricallygeneratedhigherreturnsthanlistedmarkets,althoughitrequirescommittingoveralonger-terminvestmenthorizon.Thecurrenteconomicenvironment—oneshapedbythenegativeeconomicfalloutofthepandemic,lowinterestrates,andrapidtechnologicalchange—offersabroadrangeofopportunitiesforprivatemarketmanagers,includinginvestingindislocations,enhancedyield,andlong-termgrowth.
Mark HaefeleChiefInvestmentOfficerGlobalWealthManagement
Manyofthehighest-growthopportunities in the decade ahead aresettobesustainability-linked,such as greentech.
Privatemarkets,althoughnotwithoutrisk,mayofferaneffectivewaytoenhanceportfolioreturnsanddiversificationinthedecade ahead.
UBS Investor Forum InsightsAtthismonth’sInvestorForum,participantsdiscussedtheoutlookforfiscalandmonetarypolicyasgovernmentscontinuetowrestlewiththeeconomiceffectsoftheCOVID-19pandemic.
– Participantsagreedthatcentralbankshadlittleincentivetostarttaper-ing policy support over the coming year. The Federal Reserve is expectedtobethefirstdevelopedmarketcentralbanktostarttaper-ing,butonlyin2022.
– WiththeDemocratsachievingasweepoftheWhiteHouseandCon-gress,participantsagreedthatfurtherlarge-scalefiscalsupportwasonthewayintheUS.ButtherewasasensethatPresident-electJoeBidenwillstillstruggletowinsufficientsupportforlarge-scalespendingongreen projects.
– Overall,thecombinationofcontinuedpolicysupportandrecoveringcorporateearningsmeantthatparticipantsmaintainedabroadrisk-onstance.
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13January 2021 – UBS House View Monthly Letter
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14January 2021 – UBS House View Monthly Letter
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