Trust, But Verify- Reagan, Gorbachev, And the INF Treaty

The Hilltop ReviewVolume 5Issue 1 Fall 2011 Article 5

December 2011

Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INFTreatyWilliam D. WatsonWestern Michigan University

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Recommended CitationWatson, William D. (2011) "Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty," The Hilltop Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 5.Available at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview/vol5/iss1/5

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TheHilltopReview,Spring2011

TRUST,BUTVERIFY:REAGAN,GORBACHEV,ANDTHEINFTREATY

ByWilliamD.WatsonDepartmentofHistorywilliam.d.watson@wmich.eduEveryman,womanandchildlivesunderanuclearswordofDamocles,hangingbytheslenderestofthreads,capableofbeingcutatanymomentbymiscalculation,oraccident,orby

madness.Theweaponsofwarmustbeabolishedbeforetheyabolishus.1JohnF.Kennedy

OnDecember8,1987,PresidentRonaldReaganandGeneralSecretaryMikhail

GorbachevsignedtheIntermediateNuclearForceTreaty(INF),whichaimedtoeliminateshortandmediumrangenuclearweaponsfromtheirrespectivenationalarsenals.ItwasasmallbutsignificantstepinthelongprocessofeasingColdWartensionsbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.However,whenReaganfirsttookofficein1981,thisoutcomewasfarfrominevitable,andbytheendof1983,relationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwereasfragileastheyhadbeensincetheCubanMissileCrisisin1962.ThepotentialforbrinksmanshipenduredwellintoReaganstenure,despitepreviouseffortsatdtentebybothgovernments.ThegreatsuccessofReaganandGorbachevwastheiragreementinGeneva,Switzerlandin1985toputasideallotherpolicyissuesandagreethat,sinceitcannotbewon,nuclearwarmustneverbefought.Thismayseetobeanobviousconclusion,buttoputsuchanagreementintopracticerequiredeliminatingthemeansofdeterrence.

Thispaperisadiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenthedeploymentoftwotypesofintermediate(medium)rangemissilesystemsinEurope,howleadersonbothsidesviewedthesituation,andhowthepotentialuseofsuchweaponsaffectedsuperpowerrelationsduringthelastdecadeoftheColdWar.TheseeventsledtothesigningoftheINFTreaty.IarguethattheINFTreatyrepresentsanagreementthattheprospectofintercontinentalannihilationtrumpstherealityofregionalprovocation.Thereisnoneedforshortormediumrangenuclearweaponswhenmutuallyassureddestruction(MAD)isthefoundationofaglobalnuclearpeace.Asaresult,bothleadersagreedtoaverificationschedulebackedupbythepotentialforunilateralnuclearactionifthetreatywasviolated.Byeliminatinganentireclassofnuclearweapons,andsignificantlyreducingthetotalnumberinexistence,ReaganandGorbachevdecreasedthelikelihoodofanucleardominoeffectexchangewherebyatacticalormediumrangeattackmightleadtofullscaleretaliation.Inamodernretellingoftheoldparadox,tosecurelawfulenforcementoftheINFTreaty,whichaimedatpreventingwar,bothnationsreservedtherightofmutuallyassureddestruction.

ThemostrecentColdWarscholarshiptendstoportraythepositivepersonalrelationshipbetweenReaganandGorbachevaskeytobuildingtrustandunderstandingbetweentheUSandSovietgovernments.Gorbachevisfurthersingledoutforhisroleinthepartnershipfortworeasons.Thefirstreasonischronological.GorbachevwasthelastleaderoftheSovietUnion,andhistimeinofficebeganafterReaganhadalreadybeenelectedforthesecondtime.Bythisreasoning,Gorbachevisthedifferencemakerbecausechangehappenedonhiswatch.SimilarargumentshavebeenmadeaboutReagan,too.ThislineofthinkingisbasedontheideathatReaganandGorbachevweresimplyinofficeattheculminationofdecades

1JohnF.Kennedy,AddresstotheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblySeptember25,1961,AmericanRhetoricOnlineSpeechBank,http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkunitednations.htm(accessedJanuary27,2011).

worthofpoliciesonbothsides,thetotalityofwhichinitiatedashockinglyabruptendtotheColdWarunderGorbachev,andthebreakupoftheformerSovietempirelessthreeyearsafterReaganssuccessorGeorgeH.W.Bushtookoffice.2

ThesecondreasonGorbachevscontributionisemphasizedismorecomplicatedtoisolate,butismoreorlessaresultofGorbachevspersonality,hisintellect,andanopennesstochange.IndescribingtheatmospherejustaftertheGenevaSummit,preeminentColdWarhistorianJohnLewisGaddiswrote:

Twoyearsearlier[Yuri]AndropovhadthoughtReagancapableoflaunchingasurpriseattack. NowGorbachevfeltconfidentthat theUnitedStateswould never do this. Reagans position had not changed: he had alwaysaskedSovietleaderstotrustme.AftermeetingReagan,Gorbachevbegantodoso.3

ByarguingthatReaganhadnotchanged,GaddisimplicitlymakesthecasethatGorbachevwastheonlyoneofthetwowhocouldbreakthedeadlockofmutualantagonism.OnGorbachevasanindividual,Gaddiswrote,Hechoseloveoverfear,violatingMachiavellisadviceforprincesandtherebyensuringthatheceasedtobeone.Itmadelittlesenseintraditionalgeopoliticalterms.ButitdidmakehimthemostdeservingrecipienteveroftheNobelPeacePrize.4 HistorianMelvynP.LeffleralsoportraysGorbachevasthecentralfigure,highlightinghisintellectandinternationalism.Duringthe1970sGorbachevworkedfortheCommunistPartyonimprovingtheSovietagriculturalinfrastructure,whichallowedhimtherarefreedomtotraveloutsidethecountry,and,inparticular,totheWest.Gorbachev,Lefflerexplains,Likedtalkingtoforeigners,exchangingideas,andmakingcomparisonsbetweenhiswayoflifeandtheirs.HefeltprideintheSovieteducationalsystem.Hebelievedhiscountrymenhadbetteraccesstomedicalcareandsuperiorpublictransportsystem.Buthistravelsabroadbreddoubt.5LefflerdescribesGorbachevasextremelypersonableandengaging,buthewasalsotoughandintelligent.Hisintellectallowedhimtorecognizefromtheoutset,thathisdomesticgoalscouldnotbeachievedwithoutreadjustingSovietforeignpolicy.6Inthisobservation,LefflerandGaddisareinagreement.GaddisarguesthatGorbachevsopenmindednessfreedhimto[sweep]awaycommunismsemphasisontheclassstruggle,itsinsistenceontheinevitabilityofaworldproletarianrevolution,andhenceitsclaimsofhistoricalinfallibility.7GorbachevscuriositydidnotgounnoticedbyWesternleaders.

TheHilltopReview,Fall2011

23WilliamD.Watson

2HistoriansMelvynP.LefflerandJohnLewisGaddisdiscusstheimportanceofGorbachevasanindividualwithintheSovietsystembasedonhisuniquecombinationofintelligenceandopportunity.LefflerandGaddiseachnotethatGorbachevsaccesstoeducation,andforeigntravelinparticular,allowedhimtomakecomparisonsbetweenlifeintheSovietUnionandlifeabroad.TheobservationsGorbachevmadewhentravelingspurredhisopennesstochangeinanefforttoraisethestandardoflivingwithintheSovietUnion.AfterhavingseenthreeconsecutiveSovietleadersdieinoffice,RonaldReaganfinallyfoundanenthusiasticnegotiatingpartnerinGorbachev.BothLefflerandGaddisarguethatthetwomentrulylikedoneanother.See:JohnLewisGaddis,TheColdWar:ANewHistory(NewYork:PenguinPress,2005)andMelvynP.Leffler,FortheSoulofMankind:TheUnitedStates,TheSovietUnion,andtheColdWar(NewYork:HillandWang,2007).3JohnLewisGaddis,TheColdWar:ANewHistory(NewYork:PenguinPress,2005),231.4Gaddis,TheColdWar,257.5MelvynP.Leffler,FortheSoulofMankind:TheUnitedStates,TheSovietUnion,andtheColdWar(NewYork:HillandWang,2007),370.6Leffler,FortheSoulofMankind,381and376.7Gaddis,TheColdWar,197.

Trust,butVerify 24


8MargaretThatcher,TheDowningStreetYears(NewYork:HarperCollins,1993),463.9JeremiSuri,ExplainingtheEndoftheColdWar:ANewHistoricalConsensus?,JournalofColdWarStudiesVol4No4(Fall2002):6092.10Suri,Explaining,78.

AftermeetingGorbachevin1984,BritishPrimeMinisterMargaretThatcherfamouslyobserved,ThisisamanwithwhomIcoulddobusiness.8

GaddisandLefflerarerepresentativeofrevisionistColdWarhistorianswhohavemadetheleaptopostrevisionism.TheopeningofEasternEuropeanarchives,inadditiontoarunningstreamofmemoirs,andthereleaseofSovietinternaldocumentsforpublicconsumption,hasinfusedatangiblesenseofexcitementtorecentColdWarresearch.Todaysscholarshavemuchgreateraccesstoinformationthaneverbefore.CombinedwithanewemphasisonglobalizationinwritingAmericanHistory,thataccesshasfedagrowingnumberofColdWarreexaminations.

HistorianJeremiSurihasalsowrittenabouttheendoftheColdWar.Ina2002article,SuriexplainedtheendoftheColdWarbyborrowingaconcentriccircleanalogyfromJamesJoll.Inhisdescription,SurinotedthatReaganwas,themanlargelyresponsibleforthecrisisatmosphereof1983,butthatafteraseriesoftenseeventsthroughouttheyear,ReaganmadeadecisiveturntowardimprovedSovietAmericanrelations.9LikeGaddisandLeffler,however,SurialsoholdsaspecialplaceforGorbachev,arguingthat:

GorbachevunderstoodthathishopesforimprovingtheSovieteconomyandthequalityofdomesticlifeingeneralrequiredapeacefulinternationalcontext.ContinuedColdWarcompetitionwouldperpetuatethatsocialstagnationhewanted toeliminate. OnlyextensiveandunprecedentedEastWestcooperationcouldpermittheallocationofresourcesnecessaryfordomesticrestructuring(perestroika).10

Suriframedtherelationshipasonebetweentwoindividualswhowantthesamething,butapproachitfromtwodifferentdirections.Reaganistheparanoidideologuealwayssearchingforpeacethroughstrength,whileGorbachevisthepragmatist,willingtoexpendpoliticalcapitalinordertobringaboutchange. WhatallofthesehistorianshaveincommonisthebeliefthatReaganandGorbachevwerebothmenoftheirtimeandcircumstance.Theywerebothmoralandrational,andtheysincerelylikedoneanother.Theabsenceofpretensionincombinationwithanopenstyleofdialoguehelpedfosteranhonestrapportbetweenthetwo,whichinturnhelpedthawColdWartensionfromthetopdown.Theirmeeting,however,wasfarfrominevitable,andthepathleadingtotheINFsigningdateinDecember1987wasfraughtwithnearmissesandrealtragedy.FromReaganspointofview,theSovietSS20deploymentduringthelate1970swasaclearattempttotipthebalanceofpowerinEuropeawayfromtheWest.Onceinoffice,heworkedtorespondmultilaterallythroughtheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)bysupportingaplantomatchtheSovietnuclearthreat.FirstMoverAdvantage

Properbalanceisthekeytoenduringpowerrelationships.ForEuropeintheearlyyearsoftheColdWar,balancewasmaintainedbymeasuringtheoverwhelmingnumberofconventionalSovietforcesagainsttheAmericannuclearumbrellawhichprotectedNATOallies.Thatis,ifleadersintheKremlindecidedtochallengethestatusquobyadvancingmilitarilyagainstWesternEurope,AmericanandNATOleaderscouldretaliatewithnuclearweaponstooffsettheirnumericaldisadvantageversustheoncomingforce.However,thisbalancewasbasedupontheideathattheSovietmilitarywouldbetheaggressor.FromMoscowspointofview,NATOleadersfirststrikeoptionwasalwaysnuclear,whichmeantaSovietconventionalforceadvantagewasonlyasgoodasanenemysreluctancetousenuclear

25WilliamD.Watson


weapons.AsweaponstechnologyimprovedduringtheColdWar,thisconceptualbalanceitself

wasshakenbytheintroductionofintercontinentalballisticmissiles(ICBMs).Sinceitwasnolongernecessarytobeanywherenearatargetinordertohitit,conventionalforceswerenolongerafirststrikeoptionwhentheexpectedretaliationisoverwhelmingmissileretaliation.UnderthethreatofintercontinentalMAD,thenumberofdivisionstheSovietshadintheEuropeantheatrewasirrelevant,sinceICBMscouldbeusedasthegreatequalizerofthe20thcentury.ThedebateoverwhatconstitutedbalanceandsecurityinEurope,andwhetherornotthetwowerelinked,wasanongoingonethroughouttheColdWar.Onegroupofhistoriansputisthisway:

Thirty years of successful containment in Europe had never resolved theperenniallydivisivemilitarydilemmasinherentinthe[NATO]alliance.Theheavyrelianceonnuclearweapons,astheonlyeffectiveandaffordabledeterrentandguaranteeofpeace,placedEuropecompletelyunderthedecisionmaking power of the United States. Washington alone would determinehowEuropewouldbedefendedduringanyhostilities.11

ThelimitedtechnologyofjetbombersandartilleryhelpedsecuretheinitialNATOviewofthebalance,butconsideringtheacceleratedrateofresearchanddevelopmentinthepostWorldWarIIworld,itcouldneverlast.

ThesteadilyincreasingtotalnumberofnuclearweaponsledtoanotherseriousColdWarconcern:antiballisticmissiletechnology(ABM).ThedesiretopossessareliableABMsystemisdirectlyrelatedtothesizeofanenemysnucleararsenal.Ifonesidebelieveditcouldeliminatetheothersabilitytocounterattackbylaunchingafirststrike,thenitwouldberationaltostrikefirst.Itistheabilitytoretaliatewhichmaintainsbalance.Ifonenationbegandevelopingtheabilitytodefendagainstafirststrike,itwouldbeinthebestinterestofabelligerentnationtolaunchanattackbeforethedefensesystemwasoperational.Otherwise,oncethedefendersshieldisinplace,theycouldstrikewithimpunity.ThisisthelogicbehindtheAntiBallisticMissileTreatyof1972banningsuchtechnology,signedbyRichardNixonandSovietPremierLeonidBrezhnev.TheABMtreatyrepresentsthespiritofdtente,alesseningoftensionbetweenthesuperpowers.TheUSinterpretationofdtentewasovertlyshatteredduringtheJimmyCarterLeonidBrezhnevyearsbySovietinterventionismintheThirdWorld,andbythetimeReagantookofficeinJanuary1981,therewereproxywarsinAfghanistan,Nicaragua,andAngola.

InEuropeduringthedtenteperiod,Sovietleaderschosetodeployanewkindofmissile,theSS20.Itscapabilitieswereastonishing:theSS20hadatargetrangeofthreethousandmiles,carriedmultiplenuclearwarheads,andwascapableofbeinglaunchedfromhighlymobileplatforms.TheSS20deploymentwasastrategicmove,athreat,thatifeithertheUSoranyofitsNATOalliesattackedtheSovietUnionoranyofitsWarsawPactallies,massiveretaliationcouldbearealityforanyorallofthem,somewithinjustafewminutes.Inordertomaketheirthreatcredible,theSovietgovernmentmadesurethatthedeploymentwasobservable.Thereisnobenefittodevelopingweaponsofdeterrenceiftheenemyyouhopetodetercannotconfirmthedanger.ThethreatwasthenbackedupbyapromisethattheSS20sweredefensiveinnature,butwouldbelaunchedinretaliationofanuclearfirststrikeagainsttheSovietUnionoranyoftheWarsawPactnations.Thepromiseofretaliationisapromisetodosomethingthatarationalormoralleaderwouldnotnormallydo:participateinnuclearwar.

11NormanA.Graebner,RichardDeanBurns,andJosephM.Siracusa,Reagan,Bush,Gorbachev:RevisitingtheEndoftheColdWar(Westport,CT:PraegerSecurityInternational,2008),23.

Trust,butVerify 26


ThepromisetouseSS20swasanobservable,crediblethreattoregionalsecurityinEurope,andtheworld.IndeployingtheSS20,theSovietgovernmentshiftedthebalance.In1981,formerNationalSecurityAdvisorMcGeorgeBundywrote:

ExpertshavebeenfoundtodoubtthecomfortforEuropeineachsuccessiveAmericandoctrine,whetherofmassiveretaliation,or flexible response,ortheseamlessNATOTriad.AndSovietthreatsofallsorts,politicalandmilitary,conventionalandnuclear,actualandhypothetical,haveintermittentlystrainedthebalance.Itendures.12

ByNovember1987,Moscowhaddeployed470mediumrangemissiles,capableofstrikingfromNorthAfricatoScandinavia,fromeithersideoftheUralMountains.13 IndependentoftheSovietdevelopmentoftheSS20,Americanmilitarycontractorsdesignedanearlyequivalentmissilesystem:thePershingII.ThehistoryofthePershingIIresearchanddevelopmentdatesbackto1974,buttherealimportofthesystemwasnotrelevantuntil1979whenNATOapprovedbasingofthePershingIIsinWestGermanyinresponsetotheSS20threat.However,twoyearspassedbeforetheprogramenteredtheproductionphase.BythattimetheSovietmilitarywasintegratingtwonewSS20sperweekintotheirarsenal.14

WhenviewedfromtheSovietperspective,thePershingIIsystemwasjustasunsettlingastheSS20systemwastoNATOallies.ThePershingIIisalsoagroundmobile,surfacetosurface,nuclearweaponsystem,buthasarangeofonlyonethousandmiles.BydeployingthePershingIIsinWestGermany,thetargetzoneincludedeveryWarsawPactnation,aswellasthehighestconcentrationofSovietcivilians(westoftheUrals),andMoscowitself.FormerSecretaryofStateAlexanderHaigrecalledthatSovietForeignMinisterAndreiGromyko,madetheexpectedpointthattheSS20sandotherSovietnuclearsystemstargetedonEuropedidnotthreatenUSterritory,butthePershingIIwouldbewithinrangeofmajorSovietcities.15ThissituationissimilartoputtingtheAmericaneasternseaboardwithinrangeofSovietnuclearforceswhichWashingtonarguedwasunacceptableduringtheCubanMissileCrisis.

Becauseoftheunevenresearchanddevelopmenttimelinesofthetwomissilesystems,theactualdeploymentofthePershingIIcanbeviewed,bylogicofchronology,asareactiontothedeploymentoftheSS20s,butthisdeploymentwasnotguaranteed.

12McGeorgeBundy,StrategicDeterrenceThirtyYearsLater:WhatHasChanged?,inTheFutureOfStrategicDeterrence,ed.ChristopherBertram,(Hamden,CT:ArchonBooks,1981),10.13MemorandumofUnderstandingRegardingtheEstablishmentoftheDataBasefortheTreatyBetweentheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsandtheUnitedStatesofAmericaontheEliminationofTheirIntermediateRangeandShorterRangeMissiles,December8,1987,http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf3.htm(accessedDecember14,2010).Thisdocumentincludesinformationonthetotalnumber,andthemaximumrange,ofbothAmericanandSovietmissiles,includingtheSS20andPershingII.Thegeographicrangementionedinthispapersimplyfitsthelistedrangecapabilities.14AlexanderHaig,Caveat:Realism,Reagan,andForeignPolicy(NewYork:MacMillan,1984),225.ConsideringthisstatisticcomesfromaformerUSSecretaryofState,itshouldbereadwithsomecaution.However,theMemorandumofUnderstandingwhichaccompaniestheINFTreatyconfirmsthatarateoftwodeploymentsperweek,startinginthelate1970s,couldadduptothetotalof470byNovember1987outlinedtherein.15Haig,Caveat,231.

27WilliamD.William


Thereare,ofcourse,atleasttwowaystoreacttoanysequentialmovesituation:actionorinaction.Sincetheresearchanddevelopmentofthetwomissilesystemswasindependent,theirexistencealonecannotbeconsideredasareactiontotheother.Inmilitaryterms,WashingtonwantedtheoptionofpeacefuldestructionoftheSS20sasamilitarythreat.Inpoliticalterms,byarguingfortheeliminationoftheSS20s,WashingtonwasaskingMoscowtoretractitsretaliatorypromiseimplicitinthethreat,whichwouldreturnthebalanceinEuropebacktothepredtentestatusquo.Inordertoachievethatend,WashingtonhadthechoicetorespondtotheSS20deploymentbyeitherbasingPershingIIsinWesternEurope(action,orhardlineapproach),orrelyingontheexistingcountermeasuresalreadyinplace(inaction,softlineapproach)andnegotiatetheeliminationoftheSS20sfromtheexistingposition.ThedebateoverhowtoreturntotheNATOpreferreddefinitionofbalanceinEuropesplitReaganscabinet.SoftLinevs.HardLine ThesoftlineapproachtoremovaloftheSS20threatwascalledtheZeroOption.ThedebateovertheZeroOptioneffectivelypittedSecretaryofStateAlexanderHaigagainstSecretaryofDefenseCasparWeinberger.Inhismemoir,Haigwrotethat:

ThefatalflawintheZeroOptionasabasisfornegotiationswasthatitwasnotnegotiable.ItwasabsurdtoexpecttheSovietstodismantleanexistingforceof1,100warheads,whichtheyhadalreadyputintothefieldatthecostofbillionsofrubles,inexchangeforapromisefromtheUnitedStatesnottodeploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that hadarousedsuchviolentcontroversyinWesternEurope.CasparWeinberger,inhisenthusiasmfortheZeroOption,couldnotconcedethispoint.16

HaigsuggestedanaggressiveresponsetotheSS20sasquicklyaspossible.IftheUSgovernmentwereabletocounterwithdeploymentofthePershingIIsysteminashortperiodoftime,thentheSovietgovernmentwouldbeforcedtoreactinkind,continuingthecycleoftheexistingarmsrace.ByemphasizingthefinancialcostofSS20deploymentoverthedangeritrepresentedasaweapon,HaigshowsthathewaswillingtoacceptthestatusquoMADinordertofighttheSovietseconomically.HefeltthatMoscowcouldnolongermatchtheUSinfinancingtheColdWararmsrace,andthiswasaclearopportunitytoattacktheirrationalityoftheireconomicsystem,ratherthantherationalityoftheirleaders.HaigfeltthattheonlywaytheSovietswouldnotcheataverificationtreatywasiftheUShadacomparablethreattotheSS20inthefield.17

Earlyinthedebate,Weinbergerclearlysawthesituationdifferently.LikeHaig,heneverdoubtedthattheKremlinwouldneedsomesortofincentivetodestroyitsSS20s,butWeinbergerfeltthatthemereexistenceofacomparablemissilesystemwouldbeenough,andthatactualdeploymentwouldbeunnecessary.However,Weinbergerspositionwascontingentontwopoints.Hewrites:

Bythefirstof the two, theSovietswouldnotonlyremove theSS20s,butwouldactuallydestroythem.ThatwasimportantbecausetheSS20sweremobile.Theotheressential,Ifelt,toanytreatyonanysubjectwiththeSovietUnion,was throughonsiteverification. Meanwhile, Ididnot feelweshouldstopourworkon thePershing IIsor thecruisemissiles. I felt thattherewouldbenopossibilityof the Soviets agreeing to takeout theirSS20s,unless,anduntil,theyhadthekindofinducementthatdeploymentof

16Haig,Caveat,229.17Haig,Caveat,229.

Trust,butVerify 28


thePershingIIswouldbring.18Weinbergerfeltthatexistingsystemswereenoughdeterrenceinthefield,butwantedtopreparefor,ratherthancommitto,futuremissiledeployment.Hehadfaiththatsubmarinebasedmissiles,F111bombers,andInterContinentalBallisticMissilesystems(ICBMs)wouldbeenoughincentiveforMoscowtobackdownfromthisparticularengagement,providedthatWashingtoncontinuedmovingforwardwiththeresearchanddevelopmentofthePershingII.19 HaigwarnedReaganthattheZeroOption,wasamistakethathewouldhavetomodifywithintheyear.20WeinbergerwaspleasedthatReaganatfirstfavoredtheZeroOption,butlaterrecalled,Haigneednothavefeared,becausetothePresidentsdisappointmentandmine,theimmediatereactionwasalmostallnegative.21

IftheZeroOptionbestrepresentsthesoftlineapproach,thentheNATODualTrackpolicybestrepresentsthehardlinepointofview,withacaveat.TheDualTrackwasanattempttocombinebothmilitary(hardline)andpolitical(softline)policies.TrackonewasadirectdeploymentresponsetotheSS20.InDecember1979,asnotedabove,NATOleadersapprovedthebasingofPershingIImissilesinWestGermany,andgroundlaunchedcruisemissiles(GLCMs)intheNetherlands,Belgium,England,andItaly.InDecember1981,thePershingIIprogramenteredtheproductionphase,andbyJune1984,deploymentofthefirstPershingIIbattalionwascomplete.

TracktwowasanaccompanyingpolicytoTrackone.ThroughoutthelatterprocessWesternleadersmaintainedanopenpositiononnegotiatingtheeliminationofSS20swithleadersfromtheKremlin.ByleavingtheSoftLineapproachopen,bothReaganadministrationandNATOofficialscouldclaimtobeadvocatesofpragmaticarmscontrolattheleast,andbenevolentarmsreductionatthebest.Ifsuccessful,theTwoTrackpolicywouldachievetheNATOdefinitionofbalanceeitherway.FromtheSovietpointofview,thiswasanaggressivemovewhichputMoscowatriskoftotaldestructionwithintenminutesofalaunch.

ThePublicSphere TheDualTrackpolicyostensiblyshowedthatleadersinbothWashingtonandNATOsawnochangeintheoverallprecariousnatureofColdWardeterrence.Theultimatedeterrencewastheabilitytoretaliateagainstanyfirststrike,whetheritoccurredinEuropeorelsewhere.However,thispositionwasterrifyingtomanyEuropeans,aswellaspeoplewhoheldphilosophicaldisagreementswiththeexistenceofnuclearweaponsaltogether.TheonlywaytotestifWashingtonwouldsacrificeNewYorkforParisisforParistobedestroyedfirsteverytime.

SincebothSovietandAmericangovernmentsmadethreatsoffullscaleretaliationifanallywereattacked,MADhadtobeconsideredacrediblethreatbecauseofthecostoftestinganopponentsresolve.ThislineofthinkingputanextraordinaryamountofpressureontheUSgovernmenttobackupitsallieswithindependentdeterrents.IfWesternEuropewasatarget,thenNATOalliesneededtobeabletostrikebackindependentlyoftheUS,hencethenecessityofNATOcountrieshavingPershingIImissilesandGLCMsonsite.ThequestionofwhetherornotAmericanleaderswerewillingtoriskNewYorktodefendPariscouldbeeliminatedbygivingNATOleaderstheabilitytoretaliateontheirown.FailurebyNATOtoretaliate,ortheincapabilityofretaliation,couldstillbeoverriddenbythepotentialofWash

18CasparWeinberger,FightingforPeace:SevenCriticalYearsinthePentagon(NewYork:WarnerBooks,1990),337.19Weinberger,Fighting,340.20Haig,Caveat,229.21Weinberger,Fighting,341.Italicsintheoriginal.

29WilliamD.Watson


ingtontostrikeontheirbehalfwithICBMs.ThebasingofPershingIImissilesinWesternEuropemerelyresettheregionalbalanceofterror. Palpableconcernsovertheuseofnuclearweaponsdrovemanypeopletodemonstrateagainsttheirveryexistence.By1982peopleweremarchingbythethousandsinChicago,andhundredsofthousandsinNewYork.TheCatholicBishopsofAmericaspokeoutagainstthearmsraceasimmoral.Andbytheendof1982,theantinuclearmovementwasactiveinfortythreestates.22Europeanswerejustasconcerned,ifnotmoreso,consideringfirststrikepossibilities.Injustonemonth,thenumberofprotestersinBonn,London,andParisnumberedoverhalfamillionpeople.23 AvisualrepresentationofthenuclearfreezemovementwaspublishedinnewspapersacrosstheUSinJuly1985.Theimageshowsasmall,singlemissilesilhouetterepresentingallthebombsdroppedinWWIIcontrastedagainst6,667tinysilhouettesrepresentingthecurrentcollectivenucleararsenaloftheworld.TheaccompanyingtextincludedsoberingstatisticsaboutthepotentialdestructivepoweroftheUSandSovietarsenals,encouragedpeopletocontactbothPresidentReaganandSecretaryGorbachevinsupportofupcomingsummittalks,andasked,Howlongcanwelivewiththearmsrace?24

IfReaganshardlineapproachtotheColdWarwasterrifyingtothepeopleinthefreezemovement,itwasreassuringtopeoplewhobelievedinhisconcept of a positionof strength. In a letter to thePresident in1984,CharlsWalkerof theprivate interestgroupCommitteeon thePresentDangerexpressedhissupportforReaganandhispolicies:Asyouhave longrecognized,badarmscontrolagreementsareworse thannoneatall.EquitablearmscontrolagreementscouldplayapartininsuringU.S.securitybutwhethertheSovietsarepreparedtoenterintoequitableagreementsissubjecttodoubt.Today,withthemilitarybalanceprecariously tipped against us, Americas security is directly dependent on growingstrengthinourdefenseforces.25

Theideathatbadarmscontrolagreementsareworsethannoneatallwassharedbymany,butthisconceptholdsinherentlogicalfallacies.Thisideaisamoralisticone,inwhichtheUSonlyparticipatesinthearmsraceinareactiveway,ratherthanasthefirstcause.Ifthereisalegallybindingtreaty,thenbothpartiesmustanswertotheletterofthelaw.Butintheabsenceofatreaty,valuejudgmentsruletheday,feedingthenuclearhysteriaratherthanfosteringpeacefulnegotiation.

ManyCongressmen,bothRepublicansandDemocrats,recognizedthisproblem,andencouragedReagantomakethenecessaryeffortstofindcommongroundwithSovietleaders.RepublicanSenatorLarryPresslerwrotetoReagan,pleading,weoweittotheworldtonegotiate,andthatsuspendedtalkswouldnotbeintheinterestofanynation.26Shortlythereafter,agroupofDemocraticHouseRepresentativesencouragedReagantobelessconfrontational,andmorediplomatic.Theyarguedthatitwas,intheinterestofallmankindthatseriousbilateralnegotiationsberesumed.27

22Graebner,etal,Reagan,Bush,Gorbachev,32.23Graebner,etal,Reagan,Bush,Gorbachev,33.24Letter,JoanB.KroctoRonaldReagan,July12,1985,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.25Letter,CharlsE.WalkertoRonaldReagan,January11,1984,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.26Letter,LarryPresslertoRonaldReagan,November25,1983,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.27Letter,BillGreentoRonaldReagan,February10,1984,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.

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AgroupofRepublicanSenatorsledbyMalcolmWallopandJesseHelmscosignedalettertoReaganregardingtheadministrationspolicyofrecognizingtheparametersoftheunratifiedSALTIItreaty.Theyasked,ShallyoucontinuetoabideunilaterallybytreatiesandagreementsthattheSovietshaveviolatedandthathaveexpiredanyhow?Unilateralcomplianceisunilateraldisarmament.TheseSenatorsarguedforthenegative,andtheyrejectedthetitfortatstrategyofmatchingSoviettreatyinfractions.Wallop,Helms,andtheothersagreed,thatoptionwouldgivetheSovietUnioncontroloverwhatwedoanddontdo,and,aboveall,keepourdefenseplanningwithinaframeworkthatisfundamentallywrong.28

Reagan,ofcourse,agreedthataworldfreeofnuclearweaponswouldbeaworldmuchimproved.Yettherealitywasthatnoone,nomatterhowmuchpowertheywielded,hadtheabilitytosimplycallforthedestructionofanucleararsenal.Thereweretoomanyoverlappinginterestsinvolved,andalwaysthebalanceofpowertoconsider.

ThispointisperhapsbestsummedupbyformerdiplomatMilesCopelandinhisseminalwork,TheGameofNations.Hewrites,whenvitalnationalinterestsareatstake,andwhenitisaquestionofseeingthemendangeredorbowingtosomehighmoralprinciple,thereisnoquestionbutthatitisthehighmoralprinciplewhichwillsuffer.29Theendangeredhighmoralprincipleinthiscaseisthatthemereexistenceofnuclearweaponsisimmoral.Theparadoxisthatifjustonebelligerentnationpossessesnuclearweapons,itisimmoralnottopossessthemforyourownnation.Thisparadoxofpoliticsandmoralsisasoldastime.Intryingtoservethebestinterestofanationinaworldinwhichsomeotherleadersbehaveimmorally,behavingmorallymayputyouatadisadvantage,andthereforethreatensthebestinterestofyournation.Thosewhowouldbehaveimmorallycanmanipulatepredictablemoralbehavior.ReaganconfirmedasmuchinhisStateoftheUnionaddressin1985,stating,Wecannotplayinnocentsabroadinaworldthatsnotinnocent.30Whenitcomestothenucleararmsrace,behavingmorallyisimmoralwhenyouareinapositionofpower,unlessanduntilanothernationhasthecapabilityofMAD,atwhichpointmoralityonceagaintakesover.Thiskindoftheoreticalwordplayisdifficulttoimparttothemasseswhentheconsequencesofmiscalculationcouldmeantheendofcivilizationastheyknowit.Fearismucheasiertoconveythanreason.Inlookingacrosstheoceansatoneanother,bothnationssawdanger.TheMirrorImage TheyearsbetweenReagansfirstelectionandtheascendancyofGorbachevtoGeneralSecretaryweresomeofthedarkestdaysoftheColdWar.Theatmosphereledmanypeopletobelievethatescalationwastheonlyconstant,andthatthecruelteleologicalpathofanucleararmsracecouldonlyleadononehorrifyingconclusion.Reflectingonthetensioninearly1980s,Gorbachevwrote,Thiswasatimewhenmanypeopleinthemilitaryandamongthepoliticalestablishmentregardedawarinvolvingweaponsofmassdestructionasconceivableandevenacceptable,andweredevelopingvariousscenariosofnuclearescalation.31Inhismemoirs,Reaganrecalledthat,Icarriedasmallplasticcoatedcardwithme,[which]listedthecodesIwouldissuetothePentagonconfirmingthatitwasactuallythepresidentoftheUnitedStateswhowasorderingtheunleashingofournuclearweapons.Thedecisionto

28Letter,MalcolmWalloptoRonaldReagan,June4,1985,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.29MilesCopeland,TheGameofNations(NewYork:CollegeNotes&Texts,Inc,1969),28.30RonaldReagan,PublicPapersofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates:RonaldReagan,1985VolumeI(WashingtonDC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,1988),135.31MikhailGorbachev,TheNuclearThreat,inImplicationsoftheReykjavikSummitonItsTwentiethAnniversary,edSydneyD.DrellandGeorgeP.Schultz(Stanford:HooverInstitution,2007),9.

31WilliamD.Watson


launchtheweaponswasminealonetomake.32AssumeforamomentthatReagansstatementaboutbeingsolelyresponsiblefor

orderinganuclearstrikeistrue,andthateveryonefromthetopdownwouldfollowsuchanorder.IftheSovietswithdrewtheirSS20swithoutsomecombinationofthreatorconcessionfromWashington,theywouldappearweak,andlosecredibilityintheirreputationashardliners.Intheabsenceofeconomicpower,politicalwillbackedbymilitaryreputationisthestrongestfeatureofanygovernment,andthereforeindispensable.WhatevertheNATOresponsewouldbetotheSS20deployment,shortofnuclearwar,Moscowcouldnotblink.TodosowouldindicatelessthantotalfaithinthechoicetodeploytheSS20s.Intheresultinggeopoliticalatmosphere,everysituationinvolvingeithertheUSorSovietUnionwashighlyscrutinizedandpresentedasproofoftheothersaggressionorintransigence.InthecollaborativeeffortTheSwordandtheShield,historianChristopherAndrewdescribestheSovietpositionearlyintheReaganadministration.Andrewwrites,InasecretspeechtoamajorKGBconferenceinMay1981,avisiblyailingBrezhnevdenouncedReaganspoliciesasaseriousthreattoworldpeace.33Atthesameconference,KGBDirectorYuriAndropovannouncedoperationRYAN(RaketnoYadernoyeNapadenie,NuclearMissileAttack).Andrewcontinues,RYANspurposewastocollectintelligenceonthepresumed,butnonexistent,plansoftheReaganadministrationtolaunchanuclearfirststrikeagainsttheSovietUnionadelusionwhichreflectedboththeKGBscontinuingfailuretopenetratethepolicymakingoftheMainAdversaryanditsrecurrenttendencytowardsconspiracytheory.34

By1983,BrezhnevhadpassedawayandAndropovwasthenewGeneralSecretary.Unfortunately,AndropovshealthuponenteringofficewasnotmuchofanimprovementoverBrezhnevslateryears,andtheparanoidviewofWashingtoncontinuedunabated.IndescribingAndropovandthepoliticalclimateof1983,historianVladislovZubokwrites,OnSeptember29,PravdapublishedhisfarewelladdressonSovietAmericanrelations.AndropovinformedtheSovietpeoplethattheReaganadministrationwassetuponadangerouscoursetoensureadominatingpositionintheworldfortheUnitedStatesofAmerica.35PrevioustohisdutiesasGeneralSecretary,AndropovhadbeenthelongestservingheadoftheKGB,andhewaswellawareoftheAmericangovernmentsgeopoliticalstrategyandcapability.BasedonAmericanactions,notwords,Andropovmadeagoodpoint. Forhispart,Reaganwasalltoohappytoplaytheinsultgame,andconsistentlyderidedtheSovietUnioninpublic.InaspeechtotheBritishHouseofCommons,Reaganwarnedthat,themarchoffreedomanddemocracywillleaveMarxismLeninismontheashheapofhistory.36Inhisfirstterm,ReaganfamouslylabeledtheSovietUnionanevilempireandwarnedpeoplenottoremoveyourselffromthestrugglebetweenrightandwrongandgoodandevil.37GeorgeKennan,thefatherofUScontainmentpolicycalledReagansviewstowardtheSovietUnionintellectualprimitivism.38

32RonaldReagan,AnAmericanLife(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1990),257.33ChristopherAndrewandVasiliMitrokhin,TheSwordandtheShield:TheMitrokhinArchiveandtheSecretHistoryoftheKGB(NewYork:BasicBooks,1999),213.34AndrewandMitrokhin,SwordandtheShield,213.35VladislovZubok,AFailedEmpire:TheSovietUnionintheColdWarfromStalintoGorbachev(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2007),274.36RonaldReagan,PublicPapersofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates:RonaldReagan,1982(Washington,DC:GPO,1983),747.37Reagan,PublicPapersofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates:RonaldReagan,1983(Washington,DC:GPO,1984),364.38MarkA.Stoler,IdeologyAnew,Readbyauthor,TheTeachingCompany,2008.


ReaganalsocomparedSovietleaderstotheirmostbitterofantagonists,theNazis.FortheSoviets,thegreatestsourceofnationaltragedyandpridewaswinningtheGreatPatrioticWar.InaMarch1981interviewwithWalterCronkite,Reagansaid,IrememberwhenHitlerwasarmingandhadbuilthimselfupnoonescreatedquitethemilitarypowerthattheSovietUnionhas,butcomparativelyhewasinthatway.39ItwasnottheonlytimeReaganassociatedtheSovietswiththeirWorldWarIIadversary.InaspeechtoCongress,ReagancomparedtheSovietcommunistinfluencesinCentralAmericaandtheCaribbeanwithGermanUboatsoperatingintheGulfofMexicoduringtheearly1940s.40IndescribingthecurrentSovietleadershipassimilartoNazileadership,Reaganwasverballysaltingthepsychicwoundsincurredbymillionsofcivilians.Asonehistorianhasnoted,ProbablynoAmericanpolicymakeratanytimeduringtheColdWarinspiredquiteasmuchfearandloathinginMoscowasRonaldReaganduringhisfirsttermaspresident.41TheYearofLivingDangerously InJanuary1983,ReaganmadeantagonizingtheSovietsofficialpolicywhenhesignedNationalSecurityDecisionDirective75(NSDD75),titledUSRelationswiththeUSSR.NSDD75isthewrittenrepresentationofReagansconceptofapositionofstrength.ThepolicycallsfortheUStochallengetheSovietUnionmilitarily,subverttheauthorityoftheKremlinwithintheUSSR,andatthesametimealwaysextendanolivebranchtonegotiateshouldthefirsttwopointsaggravateSovietleaderstothepointofexhaustiononanyparticularissue.42

Themostsuccessfulportionofthispolicy,andalsopotentiallythemostdangerous,wasitsmilitarystrategy.Inpart,NSDD75reads:

TheUSmustmodernizeitsmilitaryforcesbothnuclearandconventionalsothattheSovietleadersperceivethat theUSisdeterminednevertoacceptasecondplaceoradeterioratingmilitaryposture. SovietcalculationsofpossiblewaroutcomesunderanycontingencymustalwaysresultinoutcomessounfavorabletotheUSSRthattherewouldbenoincentiveforSovietleaderstoinitiateanattack.43

Thislineofthinkingiscontingentupontwoveryprecariousassumptions,thefirstofwhichisbeingabletoguesshowSovietleadersperceiveasituation,and,second,whattheircalculationsmightbeifUSpolicymakerscorrectlydeterminedtheanswertothefirstassumption.ReaganaddedtothispolicyinastatementtoCongressinJune1985,whenhesaiditwasnecessaryto,makeitcleartoMoscowthatviolationsofarmscontrolobligationsentailrealcosts,andthattheUSshouldcontinuewithstrategicmodernizationprogramsasahedgeagainstthemilitaryconsequencesof[]SovietviolationsofexistingarmsagreementswhichtheSovietsfailtocorrect.44 Whenthetwodoctrinesarecombined,thesituationreadslikethis:ifWashingtonguesseswrongonSovietperceptionsofanygivensituation,andthenMoscowreactsinawaythatUSofficialsdidnotanticipate,thenUSofficialsreservetherighttorespondinatitfortatfashionbasedontheSovietreaction,eventhoughitwasWashingtonsfailedmodelthatal39RonaldReagan,PublicPapersofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates:RonaldReagan,1981(Washington,DC:GPO,1982),194.40Reagan,PPP1983,601.41AndrewandMitrokhin,SwordandtheShield,242.42NationalSecurityDecisionDirectiveNumber75,FederationofAmericanScientists,http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html(accessedMarch27,2011).43NationalSecurityDecisionDirectiveNumber75.44USDepartmentofState,BuildinganInterimFrameworkforMutualRestraint,SpecialReportNo.131,June10,1985.

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lowedfortheunanticipatedreaction.ThismiscalculationportionofKennedys1961warningwasarealpossibilityin1983. GrowingconcernsoverthearmsracecombinedwithabrutaleconomicrecessionledtoverylowpublicapprovalnumbersforReaganduringthisperiod.Aftertwoyearsinoffice,thefinancialslowdownthatReaganhadblamedonCarterwasstilllingering,whichledsometoquestionwhetherornotincurringalargenationaldebttofinanceamilitarymodernizationprojectwasgoodpolicy.AccordingtoaGallupPoll,Reaganbegan1983withapaltry35%approvalrating.45InJuly1983,RepublicanSenatorArlenSpectoraddressedthisconcerninalettertooneofReagansnationalsecurityassistants,WilliamP.Clark.RegardingtheprospectsofanewarmscontrolsummitwiththeSoviets,Spectorwrote:

Evenifthesummitdidnotproduceanagreement,Idonotbelieveitwoulddash expectations, as some suggest. Rather, ameetingbetween the twoleaderswoulddemonstratethatbothnationsareseriousaboutarmscontrol.Suchademonstration iscrucial, inmyopinion, tomaintainingpublicsupport for our defense buildup, strategic modernization, including the MXmissile,anddeploymentoftheEuromissiles.46

Bytakingthisposition,Specterwaseffectivelyarguingthat,inademocracy,informedpublicopinionislessdesirablethanmanipulatedpublicopinion.Specterfeltthatamerefaadeofgoodfaithnegotiationswouldbeenoughtodrumuppublicsupportfortherealbargainingtargetoftheadministration:apositionofstrength. ThetensioncontinuedtoriseintolatesummerofthatyearwhenaSovietfighterpilotshotdownKoreanAirlineFlight007overtheKamchatkapeninsulainfareasternRussia.KAL007hadgoneoffcourseandmistakenlyenteredRussianairspace.Thefighterpilotdidnotintendtokillcivilians,andinfactthoughthewasshootingatanAmericanmilitaryplane.TheUSregularlyprobedSovietradardefenses,includingintheareaaroundKamchatkawhereamajorSovietnavalbasewaslocated.Tragically,afteraseriesoftechnicalandcommunicationsproblems,intheblackofnight,thefighterpilotwasorderedtoshootdowntheplane.Onlyafterwardswastherealidentityofthecraftknown.Westernjournalistsandpoliticiansalikecriticizedtheattackasnakedaggression,andarepresentationofthecontemptforhumanlifeheldbyleadersinMoscow.47

Thetimingcouldnothavebeenworse.TheKALincidentoccurredinSeptember,followedbyweeksofdemagogueryinthepress.Inthemidstofalltheposturing,bothpublicandprivate,ReaganapprovedatendayNATOmilitaryexercisecalledAbleArcher83fromNovember211.AuthorDavidHoffmanexplains:

Theexercise,AbleArcher83,wasdesignedtopracticetheproceduresforafullscalesimulatedreleaseofnuclearweaponsinaEuropeanconflict.TheSovietshad long feared that trainingexercisescouldbeusedasadisguiseforarealattacktheirownwarplansenvisionedthesamedeception.48

AbleArcherwasexactlythekindofoperationthatRYANwasmeanttodetectandcounter,whichonlyheightenedtensionsbetweenthetwonations,aswellastheapprehensivenessof

45FrankNewport,JeffreyM.Jones,andLydiaSaad,RonaldReaganFromthePeoplesPerspective:AGallupPollReview,GallupNewsServicehttp://www.gallup.com/poll/11887/ronaldreaganfrompeoplesperspectivegalluppollreview.aspx(accessedMarch29,2011).46Letter,ArlenSpectertoWilliamP.Clark,July27,1983,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.47DavidE.Hoffman,TheDeadHand:TheUntoldStoryoftheColdWarArmsRaceandItsDangerousLegacy(NewYork:Doubleday,2009),94.48Hoffman,TheDeadHand,7279.

33WilliamD.Watson

3434 3434

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Europeanalliesonbothsides.Incarryingouttheexercise,NATOforcesalteredtheirmessageformatsandmovednonexistentforcestohighalertstatus.KGBagentsmonitoringthecommunicationsandtheexerciseasawholewereshocked,andforatimebelievedthatNATOwasontheprecipiceofafirststrikeagainsttheSovietUnion.49cInresponse,duringtheexercise,theSovietFourthAirArmywasalsoplacedonanincreasedreadinesslevel,andcombatairoperationswerecalledoffforsevendaysinanticipationofNATOmoves.Reaganwasinitiallyscheduledtoparticipatepersonally,butafterwordofSovietandalliedapprehensiongottotheWhiteHouse,hedecidedagainstit.50Thesuccessfulcompletionofamocknuclearmissileattackonlyreinforcedtheideathatthescenariowasaviableoptionforpolicymakers.Bothsidesbelievedtheotherwascapableofafirststrike. Despitethemountingfearandpolarizationcausedbytheeventsof1983,ReaganstillclungtotheNATODualTrackpolicy,whichnecessitatedPershingIIdeployment.InresponsetoalettersignedbysixteenCongressmenwarningoftheincreasinglydangeroussituation,aWhiteHouseaidewroteonbehalfoftheReagan,thatthePresidentbelievesthatmakingconcessionsjusttogettheSovietsbacktothenegotiationsthattheythemselvesbrokeoffwouldonlyencouragefurtherintransigence.51Reagansnegotiatingpolicyneverchanged.ItwasnotoanyproposalbytheSovietgovernmentthatwaslessthantheAmericanstartingposition.Gorbachev,ontheotherhand,wasthefirstofthetwoleaderstoactontherecognitionofbothmenthattheexorbitantamountoftime,money,andresourcesbeingusedforaninternationalarmsracecouldbeoffarbetterusewithinthebordersoftheirowncountry.GorbachevbelievedthebenefitstotheSovietUnionfromendingthearmsracewouldoutweighanysecurityconcernsinherentindisarmament.Thisrecognition,andacceptance,iswhatmadeGorbachevsoimportantintheINFTreatynegotiations.PersonalityGoesaLongWay

TheinabilityofWashingtonandMoscowtofostersomeleveloftrustbetweenthetwogovernmentsintheearly1980sisclear.Bothnationswerescaredofwhattheysawontheothersideoftheworld.TheonlyreasonthatneithernationactedontheirfearistheconceptofMAD.AnAmericaneconomistandprofessor,ThomasSchelling,articulatedthispointinhisbookTheStrategyofConflict.Schellingwrote:

There is a difference between a balance of terror inwhich either side canobliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter whostrikesfirst.Itisnotthebalancethesheerequalityorsymmetryinthesituation that constitutesmutual deterrence it is the stability of the balance.Thebalanceisstableonlywhenneither,instrikingfirst,candestroytheothersabilitytostrikeback.52

ThechoicebySovietleaderstodeploySS20swithinrangeofWesternEurope,whentakenfromtheNATOpointofview,upsettheregionalstabilityofthatbalance.Opencriticismonbothsides,coupledwithmassiveintelligenceandmilitaryexerciseslikeRYANandAbleArcher,onlyservedtoexacerbatetheimbalanceandinflamefearofanuclearconfrontation.HistorianMelvynLefflerexplains,BrezhnevhadwarnedagainstanotherescalationofthearmsraceandevenofferedtoreducethenumberofSovietSS20siftheWestwouldtalkandnotact.ButNATOleadersmovedaheadon12December[1979],sayingtheywerewilingto

49JamesMann,TheRebellionofRonaldReagan:AHistoryoftheEndoftheColdWar(NewYork:Viking,2009),7778.50Hoffman,TheDeadHand,95.51Letter,LawrenceCoughlintoRonaldReagan,June15,1984andRobertF.TurnertoLawrenceCoughlin,July10,1984,WHORM:F00603,RonaldReaganLibrary.52ThomasC.Schelling,TheStrategyofConflict(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1980),232.


talkbutwouldnotstoptheirplanstodeploy464groundlaunchedTomahawkcruisemissilesinWesternEuropealongwith108PershingIIintermediaterangeballisticmissiles.Brezhnevandhiscolleaguesweredismayed.TheAmericanswereagainseekingtonegotiatefromstrength.53UnderReagan,officialUSnationalsecuritypolicyoutlinedinNSDD75meantthat,inreactiontotheSS20deployment,theonlyoptionforAmericanpolicymakerswastorespondinkind,andmoveforwardwiththePershingIIproductionanddeployment.

Evenbeforehetookoffice,thiswasapointwhichGorbachevunderstoodalltoowell.Inhismemoirs,Gorbachevwrote:

Thedecision todeploySS20missiles inEasternEuropehadreflected thestyle of the Soviet leadership at the time, decisionmaking fraught withgraveconsequencesforthecountry.Ihadarrivedatthesadconclusionthatthis step, fateful both for our country and Europe and for the rest of theworld,hadbeentakenwithoutthenecessarypoliticalandstrategicanalysisofitspossibleconsequences.Whatevertheargumentsadvancedatthetimeto justify the deployment of suchmissiles, the Soviet leadership failed totake intoaccount theprobable reactionof theWesterncountries. Iwouldevengosofarastocharacterizeitasanunforgivableadventure,embarkedon by the previous Soviet leadership under pressure from the militaryindustrialcomplex.Theymighthaveassumedthat,whilewedeployedourmissiles,Westerncountermeasureswouldbeimpededbythepeacemovement.Ifso,suchacalculationwasmorethannave.54

Inthissinglepassage,Gorbachevdemonstrateshowhistoryisneverinevitable,butinhindsight,canseemoverdetermined.BeforetheNATODualTrackpolicyof1979,beforeNSDD75in1983,andbeforeReagansstatementtoCongressin1985,Gorbachevcouldseewhathefeltwasinevitableunfoldingbeforehiseyes.WhenReagantookoffice,henotonlyupheldtheUSagreementwithNATOtoresponddirectlytotheSS20deployment,heencouragedamassivemilitarybuildupinordertoshowtheSovietleadersthathewashappytoplaythetitfortatgame.ToReagansgreatcredit,by1985,hewasalsowillingtoplaytitfortatonarmsreductions.

Inthisway,itreallydidtakeGorbachevtobreakthecycleofcounterdeployments,warscares,andparanoidliving.BothReaganandGorbachevrecognizedthedangerofperpetuallytestingtherationalityoftheirgovernmentsinresponsetocrisis.Unfortunately,GorbachevwasnottheGeneralSecretaryuntilthreeconsecutiveSovietleadersdiedwhileinoffice.Assuch,thepossibilityofcontinuityinalreadystrainedrelationswasmadeevenmoredifficultbytherealityofhumanfrailty.BetweenthetimeReagantookofficeinJanuary1981tothetimeGorbachevtookofficeinMarch1985,Brezhnev,Andropov,andConstantineChernenkoallpassedaway. TherapidsuccessionofSovietleadersmadeitnearlyimpossibletobuildanykindofrapportbetweenReaganandhisKremlincounterparts.ThestabilityofrelationsbetweenWashingtonandMoscowwas,fromacertainpointofview,dangerouslyreliantonthehealthoftwomenatanygiventime.Inbothpoliticalphilosophyandphysicalvitality,GorbachevrepresentedaclearchangewithintheKremlin.AtfiftyfourGorbachevwaseasilytheyoungestmemberofthePolitburo.WhenhebecameGeneralSecretary,Gorbachevwasthirteenyearsyoungerthantheaverageageofthevotingmembership.55TheINFTreatyismorethan

53MelvynP.Leffler,FortheSoulofMankind:TheUnitedStates,TheSovietUnion,andtheColdWar(NewYork:HillandWang,2007),33254MikhailGorbachev,Memoirs(NewYork:Doubleday,1996),443444.55Hoffman,TheDeadHand,187.

35WilliamD.Watson


justadocument:itisthewrittenembodimentofGorbachevspoliciesandpersonality,basedonalifespentinandoutoftheSovietUnion.TheINFTreaty

Treatiesarecontractsbetweennations,enforceablebywar.Inthenuclearage,breakingatreatycouldmeandisasterforeverylivingthingonEarth.MADisthefoundationoftheINFTreaty,andthefoundationofMADisrationality.ThroughouttheColdWarbothgovernmentstestedtherationalityoftheirpolicymakersbypracticingbrinksmanship.TheKoreanWar,TaiwanStraitsCrisis,CubanMissileCrisis,andevenAbleArcherwerealltestsofrationality,whichthankfullybothgovernmentscontinuedtopass,atleastonamacrolevel.

Followingthisanalogy,ifMADisthefoundationoftheINFTreaty,thenverificationistheframework.Asnotedabove,boththreatsandpromisesarestrategicmovesinagameofnations.Butstrategicmoves,bydefinition,mustalsobedecisionsthataplayer,orinthiscaseanationalgovernment,wouldnotnormallymake.InitiatingMADisnotinthebestinterestofarationalpolicymaker,andisthereforeacrediblethreat.

Thepromisetoeliminatenuclearweaponsaltogetherisalsosomethingthatarationalpolicymakerwouldnotnormallydo,inpart,becausetheUnitedStatesandSovietUnionwerenottheonlytwonationswithnuclearweapons.AlthoughtheINFTreatyisbilateral,theparameterstakeintoconsiderationtheglobalbalancenecessarybeyondtheirownnationalinterests.Mostnotablyatthetime,China,India,Pakistan,andIsraelalsopossessednuclearweapons.ItwouldnotbeinthebestinterestofeithertheUSorSovietUniontocompletelydismantletheirnucleararsenalinaworldwherethelackofsuchweaponswouldbeageopoliticaldisadvantage.

TheagreementbyReaganandGorbachevthatnuclearwarcouldnotbewononlyreinforcedwhatgenerationsofleadersbeforethemunderstood.ThiscanbeconfirmedbyanalyzingtheINFpreamble.Thetreatyreads:

TheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics,hereinafterreferredtoastheParties,Consciousthatnuclearwarwouldhavedevastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective ofstrengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth inthisTreatywillhelpreducetheriskofoutbreakofwarandstrengtheninternationalpeaceandsecurity,andMindfulof theirobligationsunderArticleVIoftheTreatyontheNonProliferationofNuclearWeapons,haveagreedasfollows:56

WhilebothPartiesagreedthatnuclearwarwouldbeterribleforallpeople,theyarenotnegotiatingtheeliminationofallnuclearweapons.Theyarenegotiatingastrategicstabilitywhichwillreducetheriskofnuclearconfrontation.Byeliminatingshortandmediumrangemissilesfromtheirarsenals,bothPartiesreducedtheamountofcontingenciesavailabletopolicymakerswhowouldotherwiseconsidernuclearwarapossibility. TheINFTreatyisalsoloadedwithlanguagethatspeakstotheparanoidatmospherethatcametoacrescendoduringReagansfirstterm.ArticleV,SectionThreereads:

Shorterrangemissilesandlaunchersofsuchmissilesshallnotbelocatedatthesameeliminationfacility.Suchfacilitiesshallbeseparatedbynoless

56TreatyBetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsontheEliminationoftheirIntermediateRangeandShorterRangeMissiles,December8,1987,http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/inf2.htm(accessedDecember10,2010).

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than1000kilometers.57ThisprovisionisespeciallyimportantbecauseofthecontentfoundintheMemorandumofUnderstanding,whichaccompaniestheINFtreaty.TheMemorandumcontainsalistofdeploymentareasandmissileoperatingbases,completewithlatitudeandlongitudelocations.Thelocationinformationmakestargetingsuchfacilitiesamatterofdataentry.Thisinformationcouldbeutilizedtoplanafirststrikeagainsttheotherparty.Ifpolicymakersbelievedafirststrikebasedonthelocationinformation,incombinationwiththecapabilityofnontheaterweaponstotakeoutICBMlocations,werelikelytoresultintheinabilityoftheenemytoretaliate,thenitwouldberationaltoattack.Byoutlawingthepossibilityofaconfluenceofweaponsinonetheatre,thepossibilityofachievingafirststrikeadvantageislost,therebymaintainingbalance. FurtherproofofdistrustisevidentinArticleXII,whichdealswithinterferenceandobfuscation.ArticleXII,SectionTworeads:

NeitherPartyshall:(a)interferewithnationaltechnicalmeansofverificationoftheotherPartyoperatinginaccordancewithparagraph1ofthisArticleor(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliancewiththeprovisionsofthisTreatybynationaltechnicalmeansofverificationcarriedoutinaccordancewithparagraph1ofthisArticle.58

BothWashingtonandMoscowwereclearlyconcernedthattheirtrackrecordsregardingespionagemightrevealthemselvesinmanipulatingtheverificationprocess.Ifitcouldbeproventhateithersidechosetoactcontrarytotheprovisionsofthissection,thetreatywouldbebroken,andanotherescalationofnucleartensionwouldbelikelytooccur.Neitherpartywantedsuchanoutcome,buttheonlywaytoenforcesucharuleisembodiedinthespiritofthetreatytobeginwith.Thatis,thepointofthetreatyistoreducenucleartensionandthepossibilityofwar,butonlyifsufficientnonEuropeantheatreICBMsareheldinescrow. TheescrowofICBMsisguaranteedbyonesimpleconcept:theeliminationofallnuclearweaponsintheworlddoesnotprecludetheabilitytorearm.Becauseoftheriskinvolvedincompletebilateraldisarmament,andthecostintimeandmoneytorearm,itisnotrationaltoeliminateallnuclearweaponsfromanationalarsenalunlessanduntilallnuclearweaponsarebannedanddestroyedunderunanimousinternationalverificationtreaties.Itisonlyrationaltoholdasmanyweaponsasisabsolutelynecessarytodeterafirststrikeattemptagainstagovernmentsownretaliatorycapabilities.ThiswasthegoalofbothReaganandGorbachev.TheverificationpromisesintheINFTreaty,backedupbynuclearcapabilitiesinescrow,ensuredthattheonlyrationalchoiceforbothReaganandGorbachevwouldbetosignthetreatyandreapthemoralandpoliticalbenefits.

Tofurtherguaranteethatthetreatycouldnotbesuperseded,ArticleXIVreads:ThePartiesshallcomplywiththisTreatyandshallnotassumeanyinternationalobligationsorundertakingswhichwouldconflictwithitsprovisions.59TheINFwasgivenmostfavoredtreatystatus. RegardingtheinternaldebatebetweenHaigandWeinberger,theybothgotwhattheywanted.HaigsargumentthattheSovietgovernmentwouldnotnegotiateuntiltheyfacedacrediblethreatprovedtobetrue.ButWeinbergergotwhathewantedwiththepromiseofverification.TheNATODualTrackpolicywasvindicated.BydeployingthePershingII

57INFTreaty,ArticleVSection3.58INFTreaty,ArticleXII,Section2.59INFTreaty,ArticleXIV.

37WilliamD.Watson


missilestoWesternEurope,andsimultaneouslyextendingtheofferofbilateralarmsreduction,ReagangavetheSovietsincentivetoremovetheSS20s.AgreementonverificationdideliminateINFweaponsfromtheEuropeantheatre,therebyreturningtheColdWartothedtenteerastatusquoofproxywarsandinterventionism.ThisallowedReagantomaintainthepoliciesofNSDD75withoutfearofnuclearconfrontation.Thestrategicmodernizationprocess,incombinationwiththeINFTreaty,meantthattheUShadachievedunquestionedmilitaryhegemonyintheworld,confirmingReagansvisionofapositionofstrength. TheINFTreatywassignedintheEastroomoftheWhiteHouseonDecember8,1987.Intime,thetreatyledtotheeliminationof1,846SovietSS20s,and846AmericanPershingIIs.Atthesigning,Reagansaid,WehavelistenedtothewisdomofanoldRussianmaxim,doveryai,noproveryaitrust,butverify.Yourepeatthatateverymeeting,Gorbachevreplied.Ilikeit,Reagansaid,smiling.60

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39WilliamD.Watson

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