Agora

Trinity College Dublin’s Political Magazine

Trinity

Ukraine From A Russian Perspective

April 2014

Rwanda: Twenty Years On

EU Embargo On US Death Penalty Chemicals

Populism and Ideology

From Our EditorThe Agora in Ancient Greece was the locus of public life. It was the marketplace and meeting point, where the social and commercial business of the city took place. For those few who could vote, it was also where political matters were decided. In Trinity, we want to our Agora to be a place that is more open than the Greek Agora, a place that is both international and local, and a place in which every member of our politi-cal community has a voice. It is our hope that Trinity Agora can be this place.

This issue of Trinity Agora is international in every sense. Our cover story on the developing situation in Crimea was written by Eoin O`Leary, an Erasmus student currently studying in Moscow. We have two other articles written by students abroad, one from the University of Exeter, and another from a Trinity alumnus in the University of London.

The Africa section features a piece on the genocide in Rwanda, and its legacy 20 years on from the mas-sacres, and a piece on French intervention in Mali. In Asia and Pacific, we have pieces dealing with the multifaceted relationship between China and the WTO, and the somewhat more fraught relationship be-tween Tony Abbott and the Australian media. In the Middle East, we have two pieces tackling very different aspects of the crisis in Syria.

The Agora is also the place where people gather to discuss issues of local governance. With this in mind, we feature articles dealing with issues of more immediate political relevance, namely Irish banking reform and Gerry Adams’s Twitter account.

Separatism is an issue with a long history in Ireland, and its current relevance is not limited to Crimea. Our writers deal with two instances, in Scotland and Quebec, where separatist parties are attempting to throw off the shackles of Union. In both of these cases, those in favour of independence have one last chance to free themselves from their historical oppressors. These two accounts of the application of political ideology are complemented by an article examining the ideologies implicit within the very framework of our political system.

On a final note, I would like to thank the whole team of Trinity Agora for their hard work in putting this mag-azine together. I particularly wish to thank our Design and Photo Editor Kevin Threadgold, who has worked tirelessly to make sure that this issue meets his meticulous standards. I hope that you will read the prod-uct of our efforts with pleasure.

Conor McGlynnEditor-in-Chief

The opinions expressed in this magazine are of the respective authors and are not necessarily those of the magazine.

Photo Credits:p.3 Brian Higginsp.4 & 7 Wikimedia Commonsp.10/11 Calum Hutchinsonp.15 Adam Jones, Ph.D.p.17 Russell Watkinsp.18 Middle East Online, MAPp.19 Philip Engelsp.21 Fabio Rodriguez Pozzebom

Section EditorsJonathan McKeonEmma TobinFionn McGorryDaire Collins

General ManagerCatalina de la Sota

Dynamic Synergy CoordinatorBrian Higgins

Online EditorClementine Yost

Design/Photo EditorKevin Threadgold

CartoonistTaylor Smariga

Thanks to the Ecumenics, Natural Sciences (MDP), and Economics departments; Trinity Publications; particular thanks to our contributors.

Contents4 ECHR Challenges DemocracyThe European Court of Human Rights overreaches its mandate.

5 Populism and Ideology The capitalist frame of today’s big picture is being noticed less and less.

7 The New Quebec ElectionIs this the region’s last chance for sovereignty?

8 A Broken SystemEuropean politics is hampering lethal injections in the United States.

10 The Hour of Scotland?Raising the saltire for Scottish independence from Britain.

12 Ukraine from a Russian PerspectiveTake a look through a Russian lens at Ukraine’s attempted Europeanisation.

14 What Is France Fighting For?The legacy of imperial power hangs over France’s military actions in Africa.

15 Rwanda Twenty Years OnProgress has been made, but the scars of genocide are still deep and painful.

18 An Afro-Arab RenaissanceAfrica is now looking eastwards for economic development.

21 The Inept Dictator Bashar al-Assad is even more incompetent than he is barbaric.

22 Blood and Diplomacy in SyriaScrutinising the politics of a humanitarian crisis that isn’t going away.

24 The World Trade Organisation and ChinaA source of economic reform, or scope for much more?

26 Estate Agents: An Australian Media PuzzleIs the new Liberal government treating the press hypocritically?

28 A Crisis of CreativityThe future of Irish banks and property is highly uncertain. This is a unique opportunity.

30 A Political Twitter MachineTwitter, politics, and one of the more unusual Irish combinations of the two.

Get involved with Trinity AgoraWrite or join the 2014/15 teamSend submissions to agoratrinity@gmail.comRead the latest articles at trinityagora.wordpress.com

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) usurps the role of politicians, threatens the most fundamental principles of democ-racy and imposes upon states binding obligations they had not intended to assume when ratify-ing the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR has given it-self the right to treat the Conven-tion as a ‘living instrument’. This self-appointed power allows the Court to read the Convention un-der the light of present day con-ditions. Therefore, its effects are no longer confined to the concep-tions of the period when it was drafted. By applying this rather controversial technique, the scope of the articles of the Convention has been unilaterally extended without member states’ consent. For instance, despite the fact that Article 8 of the Convention was in-tended to only regulate the right to respect for private and family life (“everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”), nowadays it covers, inter alia, mar-riage and parental links, environ-mental regulations, bad smells, cultural identity, assisted suicide,

transsexual and homosexual re-lations, sadomasochism, immi-gration and extradition issues, abortion, and the law of landlord and tenant. The connection to Ar-ticle 8 of these sets of rights and obligations are questionable, and none of them are covered by the express language of the Conven-tion. The ECHR was meant to rule only on cases in which a right enshrined by the Convention was breached. However, since the Court is reading new rights and obligations in this creative role of reinterpretation, it seems difficult to determine what can and can-not fall within the framework of the twelve rights protected under Section I of the Convention. The ECHR is not a court of appeal for all matters but a legal system of protection for the most fundamen-tal human rights in Europe. Thus, the Court should limit its scope to these rights. The ‘living instrument’ technique of interpretation has given rise to fundamental laws made by judges, which extend well beyond the actual scope of the Convention’s wording. This has un-dermined the democratic process of law-making. Moreover, the fact

that the same institution holds both judicial and law-making pow-ers carries legal uncertainty and challenges the fundamental dem-ocratic principle of the separation of powers. Furthermore, the Court is not only extending the scope of the articles but also modifying the threshold of severity required for an act to be considered in con-travention of the Convention. For instance, what was considered degrading treatment in the past could be considered torture in the future. Although we might think that this is a positive outcome, it goes against one of the most ba-sic and fundamental principles of any democratic society: legal cer-tainty. Legal certainty is the root of the rule of law and without it we cannot foresee the legal implica-tions of any act. Hence, if the ECHR contin-ues to apply this inherently flawed technique of interpretation, the Court would represent a major threat to democracy, legal certain-ty and parliamentary sovereignty in Europe.

Borja Fernández BurgueñoLaw

University of Exeter (UK)

The European Court of Human Rights Challenges Democracy

4 | Agora

International | 5

Populism and IdeologyHistory, said Marx, repeats itself – first as tragedy, then as farce. In the 1930s, we had tragedy: the Left was smashed by fascism, brutally and bloodily, in every fight that counted. Today, we have the farce: the Left would struggle to even get into the ring for another round against its historical enemy. The political outcome of the Great Recession has not been, as some would have predicted in 2008, a resurgence of the radical Left. The only real gains, excepting those made by Syriza in Greece, have been made by populist parties which place themselves, explicit-ly or otherwise, on the right, such as the Dutch Party For Freedom, the French National Front, and the British UKIP. The reason for this trend is quite simple, and it relates to the total dominance of a particular form of bourgeois ideology in the developed world. The characteris-tics of this ideology are that it is politically technocratic, cultural-ly postmodern and economical-ly neoliberal. One of its decisive characteristics is its adaptability and amorphous nature. Whereas preceding forms of ideology erect-ed monolithic, untransgressable values, today’s hegemonic ideolo-gy thrives on contingency and vari-ability. The emphasis postmodern-ism places on relentlessly shifting, infinitely elastic identities lends itself well to a consumerist soci-ety in which we present ourselves through the acquisition of an end-lessly changing list of essential

commodities. This extends to the very material substance of our bodies – painted by tattoos, pum-melled into shape by cosmetic surgeons, and prised into clothes which yawn in the face of ergono-mity. In the words of literary critic Terry Eagleton: “flesh is converted into a sign, staving off the moment when it will subside into the sheer pornographic meaninglessness of a corpse.” This consumerism is naturally a comfortable bedfellow of neo-liberalism (a polyamorous ideology if ever there was one). But despite its contingen-cy, the nebulous superstructure of the contemporary ruling ideol-ogy is built on solid foundations. These foundations impose an implicit horizon on all political debate, invisible borders uncon-sciously recognised. This is so much the case that, in many ways, theoretically debateable aspects of modern ideology are effectively agreed upon by all political actors. But as Slavoj Zizek has pointed out, the modern ruling ideology could only assume its hegemonic role once the (mainstream) Left chose to accept its strictures as being the “rules of the game”. As he remarks, nothing was inevita-ble about the victory of Thatch-erism – the Conservative govern-ment of the eighties was “chaotic, impulsive, marked by unpredict-able contingencies.” It was Tony Blair’s New Labour which institu-tionalised Thatcherism and thus converted a contingency into a necessity. Blair is, in the Hegelian

sense, the Augustus to Thatcher’s Caesar who transformed “a (con-tingent) personal name [Caesar] into a concept, a title.” As Blair ad-mitted recently, Thatcher changed not only the “political landscape of [her] country, but the political landscape of the world.” But he does not see his own complici-ty in this landscape engineering. Thatcher, on the other hand, is said to have regarded New Labour as her greatest achievement. This ideological domi-nance has led to the emergence of a technocratic post-politics where political parties compete purely on the basis of who is most technically competent to manage the country, so that the political precepts of neo-liberalism re-cede into a neutral background. This triumph of the ruling ideolo-gy reached its local apotheosis in the context of the economic crisis, where opposition leaders located the cause of the collapse in the moral standards of bankers and the incompetence of Fianna Fáil, rather than in the internal dynam-ics of capitalism. It is the nature of ideology that it embeds itself into the very fabric of social reality. It creates a sort of Kantian a priori mental framework which gives its own, ideologically determined meaning to every event. Look at the recent outcry against the strike threat of the ESB workers who were au-tomatically portrayed as spoiled children, churlishly and irrespon-sibly acting out. “Common sense” – the set of readymade ideas and opinions – is not, as it appears, a group of neutral and indisputably obvious notions; it is a highly ideo-logical construct, determined by the dominant ideas of the day. This is why right-wing pop-ulists have had so much more success: they appeal to “common sense” – it’s just common sense that more immigration leads to

“Whereas preceding forms of ideology erected monolithic, untransgressable values, today’s hegemonic ideology thrives on contingency and variability.”

fewer jobs, that the long-term un-employed are lazy, that there is widespread benefits fraud and so on. It appeals to common sense that the political, social and eco-nomic institutions of modern soci-ety are fundamentally sound – the only problem is that they are being run by the wrong people. Right-wing populism is all about giving power to the right people; funda-mentally it remains comfortably within the framework of techno-cratic post-politics.So not only do modern Leftists have to face all the mighty coer-cive power of the state appara-tus and the social hegemony of the bourgeoisie; they also have to fight against “common sense” itself. This is why Leftists such as Orwell are wrong to identify social-ism with common sense – social-ism must reveal common sense to be a self-sustaining network of cultural arbitraries in which the special interests of the ruling class are disguised as politically neutral axioms. Of course, it is also com-mon sense that you don’t put the teabags in the kettle in an effort to economise your morning ritual. It is the implicitly political precepts of common sense that the Left must expose to reason. However, where the ruling ideology’s dominance is not so complete (i.e. outside of Europe and the USA) Left-wing populism has met with much success. As Zizek points out, populism has the potential to bust the formal proce-dural rules of bourgeois liberal de-mocracy, leading to more radical organisations of power. Zizek gives the example of Venezuela, where the authority which underwrote Chavez’s radical reforms was not derived from the electoral process but from the self-organisation of the peasantry and the working class outside of the framework institutions of liberal democracy. In India, the communist Naxalite

movement has waged a locally popular class war against land-owners. The movement does not appeal to the Indian peasant’s understanding of the laws of mo-tion of capitalism but to their lived experience of oppression, pov-erty and exploitation. This high-lights the ultimate shortcoming of populism – it is, as Zizek puts it (borrowing a phrase from Garret FitzGerald), sometimes good in practice, but not good enough in theory. Populist politics ultimately require a theoretical supplement.

The Bolshevik slogan “Peace! Land! Bread!” was supported by a precise Marxist understanding of Russian capitalism. The Left thus has a moun-tain to climb when it comes to a return to political relevance. It must dismantle common sense and crack the fetters of bourgeois ideology. Otherwise it will be fated to remain caught in a destructive loop, forever hurtling from tragedy to farce and back again.

William FoleySF PPES6 | Agora

“It is the nature of ideology that it embeds itself into the very fabric of social reality.”

Americas | 7

The New Quebec Election: Last Chance For Sovereignty?

Since losing the last referendum, held in 1995, by the slimmest of margins, the Quebecois separatist par-ty the Parti Quebecois (PQ) has kept conspicuously silent on the prospect of a new referendum. That all changed almost immediately after Premier Pauline Marois dropped the writ on 5 of March. The entry of the charismatic Pierre Karl Péladeau, CEO of Quebe-cor Inc., one of the largest media companies in Can-ada, has made sovereignty once again an issue in the campaign. Not previously known as a separatist, going so far as to tell the Globe and Mail newspaper in 2000 while working in Paris that he doesn’t “care what’s happening in Quebec or Canada”, Péladeau’s single-minded focus on the sovereignty issue in re-cent campaigning has all but derailed the PQ’s cam-paign to date. Can sovereignty make a comeback in this election? Traditionally, Quebecers have been thought to have ‘sovereignty fatigue’, preferring instead to fo-cus on other issues, although there are signs that this is changing. To begin with, Prime Minister Ste-phen Harper’s Conservative party is deeply unpop-ular in Quebec, holding just five seats nationally. A referendum with Harper leading the federalist side would be significantly preferable to one conducted against the leaders of the two other major federal parties, Thomas Mulcair of the New Democratic Par-ty and Justin Trudeau of the Liberal Party, both of

whom hail from the province and have a great deal more support. Péladeau’s involvement in the sovereignty

question also makes a referendum more attrac-tive. His successful business acumen lends a

credibility to the economic feasibility of independence that is traditionally miss-ing. That same business acumen also means that he controls, through Que-

becor Media Inc., more than half of the media outlets in Que-

bec, including the widely read

Le Journal n e w s p a -

pers in Que-bec City and

Montreal. Many c o m m e n t a to r s ,

both in Quebec and in the rest of Canada, are spec-

ulating that this could be the last chance for the separatist movement:

it is the older generations, who grew up through the tumultuous Quiet Revolution in Quebec in the 1960s and 1970s who provide the core sup-port for the movement, and demographically, this support is fast running out. This new referendum may never come to pass, however. While early polls showed Marois and the PQ on track to a full majority government after two years of minority rule, the resurgence of sover-eignty as a campaign issue appears to be shifting support towards the Liberal Party of Quebec, the fed-eralist alternative at the provincial level in Quebec. As of 18 March, the Liberal party has even pulled ahead, with 39% support to 36% for the PQ, in a poll published by the Montreal newspaper La Presse. The campaign, however, is far from over- Marois may be able to weather the separatist storm, or even gain support from it, in the weeks to come. Either way, this could be the last chance at an independence referendum in Quebec, at least for the next twenty years.

Matthew RitchieSS History and Political Science

8 | Agora

I seek not to revisit the exhaust-ed path of questioning the legiti-macy of capital punishment itself. Rather, the method so familiar to Americans citizens and foreign on-lookers, the lethal injection, has for the first time in nearly thirty years been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. Originally developed to give capital punishment a respect-able façade, many now argue that the lethal injection has instead become a stain on the practice of medicine. Execution by lethal injection has been the favoured method of al-most all US states since the early 1980s. The concoction typically used throughout this period con-sisted of three separate drugs: a general anaesthetic, a paralytic agent, and potassium chloride,

which would stop the patient’s heart. Quiet and effective, the three drug procedure would, ac-cording to the relevant authorities, render the patient dead, pain-free, within a matter of minutes.So what of the seemingly protract-ed, agonising death of Dennis McGuire? Prior to 2010, the vast majority of drugs used in US exe-cutions were procured from Euro-pean pharmaceutical giants, but a 2009 Amnesty report on the mat-ter triggered outrage and revulsion across the European community. Measures prohibiting the sale of drugs intended for use in capital punishment, such as of Pentobar-bital and Sodium Thiopental, were first introduced by the UK govern-ment in 2010. Similar regulations were soon adopted by the Europe-

an Commission in 2011, mirroring an original 2005 framework that had committed the EU to opposing Capital punishment worldwide. As State authorities looked to domes-tic suppliers many US pharmaceu-ticals, similarly concerned about their public image, joined the ranks of those unwilling to capi-talise on capital punishment. As stockpiles have dwindled, states have been thrown into chaos. Anx-ious to maintain their steady rate of executions, authorities have ne-glected proper avenues of sourc-ing tried and tested replacement drugs. Rather, they have become accustomed to experimentation, switching between various types of drug, or mixture of drugs. Many drugs are acquired not from regu-lated suppliers, but secretly from

A Broken System: Last Rites for the Death Penalty?

“Between 10.33am and 10.44am – I could see a clock on the wall of the death house – he struggled and gasped

audibly for air.”Fr. Lawrence Hummer, Guardian (22nd January 2014)

Father Lawrence Hummer was one of several people to witness the ex-ecution of Dennis McGuire in Ohio’s purpose built death chamber on the 16th January 2014. Convicted in 1994 for the rape and murder of a 22 year old woman, McGuire was injected with a concoction of untest-ed drugs never before used in the execution of a death row prisoner. To be precise, the injection consisted of a combination of the sedative midazolam and morphine derivative hydromorphone. State authorities concluded that the execution, ‘had worked very well,’ despite taking up to 26 minutes for McGuire to be pronounced dead.

local Compound Pharmacies, where concoctions are mixed and altered to meet the buyer’s spe-cific needs. Such drugs, not de-signed to kill, are largely untested and bought with serious questions marks over their quality and po-tency. Unfortunately the execution of Dennis McGuire represents just one case in a continuing narrative. In 2012, Mario Swan was not pro-nounced dead until nearly 30 min-utes after his lethal injection was administered. Michael Lee Wil-son, executed on the 9th January in Oklahoma, allegedly uttered, “I feel my whole body burning,” upon the injection of one new drug pro-cedure. Indeed, the Death Penalty Information Centre has reported that lethal injections since 2011 have on average taken twice as

long as those conducted before the EU ban.The consequences of such harrow-ing tales have been far reaching. Campaigners, lawyers and family members have argued that the use of untested drugs, and com-binations of drugs, contravenes the US Constitution’s 8th Amend-ment; ‘Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-posed, nor cruel and unusual pun-ishments inflicted.’ States such as California have suspended the death penalty altogether pending a judicial decision, while Ohio re-cently postponed two upcoming executions until drugs, untainted by scandal, have been sourced. In July 2013, Missouri Attorney Gen-eral Chris Koster even pledged to rebuild Missouri’s gas chambers

as a means of overcoming the cur-rent shortage. Measures enacted by the Euro-pean Community deserve praise. In 2013, only 39 executions were conducted in the US, a dramatic fall from a peak in 2000 of nearly 100. Public support for the death penalty has deteriorated, whilst Jimmy Carter recently called for a Moratorium to be imposed by the Supreme Court. For abolitionists and the thousands of US prison-ers awaiting execution, the cur-rent shortage of tried and tested drugs has provided reinvigorated hope that capital punishment is itself being finally laid to rest.

Alex SloanSS History and Political Science

Americas | 9

“lethal injections since 2011 have on average taken twice as long as those conducted before the EU ban (on chemicals)”

If Scotland leaves the United Kingdom a major step will be taken on the road to ending the imperial pre-tensions of the British state. Never again would we hear another British politician express the desire to “put the ‘Great’ back in Great Britain”. The dominance of London in the United King-dom’s economy is both a symptom and a cause of these pretensions. The British state is clearly dom-inated by the interests of the multinational and fi-nancial sectors of the economy. While there is much talk of how ‘unbalanced’ the British economy is, very little practical measures have been taken to remedy this. The capital budget has been slashed by both Chancellors Alistair Darling and George Osborne, and the new governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney has suggested the financial sector could be an important source of growth by becoming nine times the size of Britain’s GDP by 2050. Unsurprisingly, the recovery so far is just a rerun in miniature of the pre-crisis credit boom. Consumer credit is growing fast while business in-vestment and exports are stagnating. This is a con-tinuation of a perennial problem for British industry. The dominance of imperial interests centred in the City, more interested in the export of capital than in-vestment in domestic industry was one of the chief reasons for Britain’s relative industrial decline com-pared with Germany, in particular, which had no ma-jor empire. This power of the multinational and finan-cial sectors in Britain’s political system has been revealed in the referendum campaign. In recent weeks, Royal Dutch Shell, Barclays and Lloyd’s have all raised concerns about Scottish independence. As usual the threat of job cuts is being used to cow people into voting to maintain the status quo. Simi-lar hoary talk about “stability and continuity” is used in most referendums by business leaders, such as during the campaign for a Yes vote in the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland in 2008. For the institutions that caused the greatest economic dislocation in living memory, Barclays rigging interbank lending rates and Lloyd’s requiring a £20 billion bailout, to blame an exercise in democracy for instability, and for this argument to be used as ammunition by the No cam-paign, shows how debased politics has become. The Labour left wing radical Tony Benn, who died recently aged 88, said that he opposed Scot-tish independence because he would be upset to think that his Scottish born mother would be con-sidered a foreigner. However, his own political tra-jectory reveals some of the reasons why Scottish independence would be good for Britain. The most radicalising political event in his life was his support

of the shipyard workers of the Clyde in 1971, when they took part in a yearlong ‘work in’ to stop the clo-sure of the shipyards. However, instead of Benn’s ‘Alternative Eco-nomic Strategy’ of public ownership and massive public investment to modernise British industry, Britain got Thatcherism and the rusting away of Brit-ain’s industrial heartlands. High interest rates and a strong pound, while effective in suppressing infla-tion and a boon for the City, resulted in mass un-employment and in Scotland, the disappearance of almost a third of its industry in a decade. This dedication to ‘sound money’ continued into the 1990s with the desperate struggle to main-tain the link with the Deutschmark. The disastrous state of British industry is illustrated by the absence of any real recovery in manufacturing or an improve-ment Britain’s yawning trade deficit, despite the massive devaluation of the pound since 2008. Brit-

10 | Agora

The Hour of Scotland?

ain may finally realise that the export of physical goods is superior to financial services and the genuine proletariat Britain had is preferable to the ‘precariat’ that replaced it. It is unthinkable that a Scottish govern-ment most of whose members went to ordinary schools, in contrast to Cameron’s clique of Eto-nians, the number of whom involved in his govern-ment was dismissed recently by the rather toffish but self-made Education Secretary Michael Gove as ‘ridiculous’, would show the same unconcern for working class jobs. Nor would they tolerate the fact that life expectancy is 71 for Glaswegian men while their brethren in the salubrious London bor-ough of Kensington and Chelsea can expect to live to 85. The British divide was and is as much political as economic. Scotland voted against Thatcher in every general election and her evi-

dent disregard for traditional industries resulted in a collapse in support for the Scottish Conservatives. By 1997 they had been completely wiped out. To-day with only one Tory MP and five Liberal Democrat MPs among Scotland’s fifty nine representatives in Westminster, Scotland could be said to be ruled by a foreign government. The division of these islands into the Repub-lic of Ireland and the United Kingdom prevents the close affinities we share from being truly acknowl-edged. A union would always be dominated by En-gland representing 53 million out of the 68 million people in Britain and Ireland. An independent Scot-land would open up new possibilities. If our peoples could deal with each other as independent self-con-fident nations, we could also recognise our interde-pendence without fear. Most Unionists in Northern Ireland trace their ancestry to Scotland. An indepen-dent Scotland would inevitably seek close relations with Ireland, the other independent nation in these islands. This would undoubtedly improve relations between Dublin and Belfast. Recently at the Trinity Economic Forum, the former Taoiseach and current Chairman of the Irish Financial Services Centre John Bruton (notice again the confluence of politics and high finance) said that Ireland’s rejection of EU treaties in referenda, by making EU leaders more reluctant to implement more treaty changes, has contributed to the shift in power back to the big member states. However if Ireland’s no votes have exposed the contempt in which Europe’s elite hold the democratic will of the European people, a contempt revealed by the Irish people being made vote a second time to ensure the ‘correct’ outcome, surely that should be welcomed by anyone who values democracy. The outrageous intervention by Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, in the independence debate is the latest manifes-tation of this contempt. An independent Scotland, would he said find it difficult to gain entry to the EU, because, members like Spain wouldn’t want a prec-edent to be set for its own separatist movements. Once again a referendum in a small nation has re-vealed the hypocrisy of EU leaders. A rejection by Scotland of the scaremongering of economic and political elites would be most welcome. And this time there’ll be no second vote.

James PrendergastJS BESS

Europe | 11

“An independent Scotland would inevitably seek close relations with Ireland, the other independent nation in these islands. This would undoubtedly improve relations between Dublin and Belfast.”

It is appropriate to note at the out-set that the most popular views among the Russian people on the Ukrainian situation and on much besides, are closer than might be thought to the message coming to the world from the Kremlin. This happy coincidence of understand-ing leads to media sources which espouse contradicting views be-ing marginalised, dropped by pro-viders, banned for participation in breaches of public order or finding it timely to restructure their edito-rial staff. Besides, when the Russian public is presented with the num-bers of convicted criminals among those critical of the government, while close Kremlin friends main-tain such clean records, many people find it quite easy to form a picture of who the ‘good guys’ are. As is so often the case, the actual sum of two and two is of far less importance than what people be-lieve their sum to be. And it is this latter which is the subject at hand.

Discourse is important here. For example, where western media might have voiced regret at the small involvement, when recognising any at all, of far-right groups in the Maidan protests. A reader of mainstream Russian media would understand a far greater, leading role of ‘natsion-alisty’ - glossed in English as ‘na-tionalists’. The term generally car-ries strongly negative, xenophobic associations in Russian - if not serving to compare the Maidan protesters with Russophobic ex-tremists outright. It is a rare Rus-sian who considers those who ‘seized’ power in Kiev to represent the people of Russia’s dearest brother-nation - the extent of the shared history of the territories and the ideological significance of Kievan Rus’ to Russian identi-ty weigh heavy. Add this with the economic relations that bind the states and their importance in the minds of many Russians and the new Kiev leaders are generally understood to bear ill will towards

the ethnic Russian population of Ukraine. And so, even as western politicians brandish the phrase ‘territorial integrity’ like a talis-man, among the large support base for the Kremlin’s military action, the discussion centres on the need to protect ethnic Rus-sians in Ukraine from persecution by the new Kiev government. Cat-egorisation matters: especially be-cause of the Russian language’s apparent fondness for absolute descriptions and encompassing nomenclature. For a lot of Rus-sians, naming the Ukrainian peo-ple ‘brothers’ and those in power in Kiev ‘nationalists’ is all the ex-planation that is required for their support of Russian military action in Ukraine. Two other significant dis-courses concern the global con-text and the very localised context of the Crimea. Firstly, there has long been growing, and more recently bloom-ing, the sense that the west doesn’t

Ukraine From . . .

. . . A Russian Perspective

12 | Agora

much care for Russia, particularly that it wants a weak Russia, a sen-timent not helped by statements made by US politicians, to essen-tially this precise effect. This, in the minds of many Russians, also goes someway towards explaining confusing phenomenon like west-ern propagandists’ attempts to exacerbate Russia’s demographic problems by turning young Rus-sians gay. Add to this a discourse on Libya and Syria which has the US, with European support, war-mongering around the world (with the Kremlin portraying Russia radiant as champion of peace), and also the popular understand-ing of Ukraine’s relationship with Russia, and a picture soon forms of western attempts to incite Ukrainian antipathy towards Rus-sia, to weaken Russia by pitting brother against brother. The special Rus-so-Ukrainian relationship and the aberration that Ukrainian moves towards Europe were seen as are one thing, but the peninsula where events have come to a head is something yet more. Whatever about Ukrainian independence, Crimea’s status as foreign territo-ry has been viewed by much of the Russian public as no more than a quirk of political cartography. Not only was the peninsula part of Rus-sia until 1954 - when it was trans-ferred to another constituent re-public of the USSR in what is often referred to as a symbolic gesture, a purely administrative affair, or a mistake - but it was a particularly important part. Crimea is indeed seen to be of strategic importance to Russia (an advantage the west would deny Russia), but the idea of Crimea - the most beloved re-sort for rewarded soviet workers, a dream of sunshine for those toiling in the frozen north, a place of beauty and of poetry - has per-haps an even greater cultural im-portance for Russians. For many,

annexing Crimea is a long-overdue correction of the strange 1954 mistake. Of course there are a vari-ety of opinions among the Russian population. Even as a description of the dominant views, what is above is a necessary simplifica-tion. There are Russians as critical of the Kremlin in this as they are of everything Putin touches, even as there are those who would con-sider the successful unification of Crimea with Russia to be Putin’s only chance of earning a positive mention in history books. Espe-cially among those old enough to have had significant experience of soviet times, there are those for whom Russian moves to increase influence in Ukraine and else-where reeks too strongly of action towards a union to which they bade good riddance in ‘91. For others, any extension of Moscow’s reach is a cause only for celebra-tion. There are those chanting Pu-tin’s name in praise of the man who stood up to the west. Then, there are those fearing the conse-quences of Russian isolation and proclaiming the importance of abiding by international law with such conviction their righteous-ness, if not their sincerity, could have come straight from Putin’s New York Times editorial last year. One of my university teachers broke down into a teary-eyed ad-monition of her country following the sanctioning of military inter-vention, while another can cheeki-

ly referred to Kiev as the capital of Ukraine, but soon a city of Russia. There are certainly those who recognise the tragedy of Ukraine’s long-standing failure to reconcile the two dominant currents, towards Europe and to-wards Russia, which have always characterised the country, though such recognition yet precedes di-verse ideas on solutions. There are those who tuned in diligently to the state news stations’ coverage of the ‘Pro-Crimea and Anti-Fas-cist’ demonstration in Moscow on March 15. However, there are the tens of thousands, not con-sidered newsworthy by the state-owned stations, who had taken to the streets nearby to voice their protest against Russian action in Crimea. Even as there are Russian reporters, editors, bloggers and photographers for the Kremlin to fight a propaganda war against - as there are Russians who seek out these and as many other in-formation sources as they can in order to find some idea of truth among the chaos - they are, it would seem, out-matched for the foreseeable future by the popu-larity of the sentiments represent-ed by the chilling simplicity of a placard held at a pro-intervention demonstration in Moscow - ‘We believe Putin’.

Eoin O’LearyJS European Studies

(on Erasmus at Lomonosov Moscow State University)

Europe | 13

What Is France Fighting For?

Last December, French troops were deployed in the Central Af-rican Republic. Meanwhile, oth-er soldiers are still stationed in Mali. Intervening on the grounds of a United Nations resolution and helped militarily or financially by other members of the NATO, this country is the only one interfering frequently in African crises. But that is not much of a surprise giv-en their common history. In the day and age of the French Empire, those countries were key colonies. Part of the French federations in Africa, Mali, then referred as Soundan, was part of the western one, while Central African Republic was in the eastern one. Yet, ongoing ac-tions in Mali call to the question the implication of French actions in modern African geopolitics. And what are the outcomes of the Ma-lian intervention one year on? In April 2013 a ceasefire between the Tuaregs, the former government and Islamic extrem-ists, was declared, followed by the establishment of the MINUSMA by the United Nations. A peace deal was brokered between the govern-ment and the Tuaregs. But it did

not last for long, and the ceasefire fell apart by September. Now, the situation is still marked by insecu-rity. Even if a new ceasefire was agreed, France has no guarantee of political stability if, or when troops will leave Mali.So why did they intervene? One argument is that it was economically motivated. But this hypothesis should be dis-missed. Although the country has gold and idle uranium, the justifi-cation of the intervention appears to be more political. France priori-tises its army: in 2010, the military budget was the third largest in the world. Yet its geopolitical influence is decreasing at breakneck speed, and that can be seen in Syria: when in September François Hol-lande announced he would go to Syria, Barack Obama asked him to shy away, and so he did. If an in-ternational armed conflict were to occur today, there is no doubt that French involvement will have no influence on the outcome. Yet in Africa it is different: through histo-ry, cooperation agreements, and economic connections, France is still influential. If those grounds alone are considered then France

is a good economic and diplomat-ic ally for those now independent states. But if France interferes in political matters, then it is coloni-sation. But each time these ac-tions are justified the same way to the people: as the country which created the first declaration of Hu-man Rights, France has to guar-antee their enforcement. If the Islamists take power, freedom of religion will be abolished and many other basic rights violated, and France should not let this hap-pen. It could be true, but then on this logic the country should inter-vene in many countries across the world. Or is it simply that France feels responsible for the civil wars happening nowadays in the ex col-onies and feels it has a duty to fix it somehow ? Perhaps France is not in its proper place by having that influ-ence in Africa. After all, if a politi-cal crisis were occurring in Ireland, it is hard to imagine that an unso-licited English intervention would be seen as legitimate.

Camille Maye-HauspiéLaw, Université Montesquieu

Bordeaux IV (France)14 | Agora

Rwanda Twenty Years On: Reconstruction,

Reconciliation and Forgiveness in the Wake of

Genocide

Africa | 15

Twenty years ago Romeo Dallaire faxed the UN office in New York. One of many such letters, the Force Commander of the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) detailed the plans for the anti-Tutsi genocide underway in the state, including locations massacres were to occur and means to be used. The now infamous ‘Genocide Fax’ was ignored. Several more letters would be sent. Most would be lost in the midst of UN bureaucracy.

Then, as the international community watched from the sidelines, some 800,000-1 million ethnic Tutsis, Twa and moderate Hutus would be killed between April and July of 1994, over 250,000 women would be raped, while 2 million Rwan-dans would be displaced. Dallaire’s continued pleas for international response met deaf ears. A haphazard French military intervention would provide shelter to the killers, and the genocide would only be put to an end once Paul Kagame’s Rwanda Patriotic Front, a paramilitary group composed of Rwandan refugees based in Uganda, would take control of the country. The NGOs which flocked to the country to aid the reconstruction and help refugees inadvertently protected and fed members of the genocidal Interahamwe, who then kept residents of the refugee camps as hostages and human shields against their arrest until 1996, before fleeing into Eastern Congo.

Rwanda was a country ripped apart at the seams.

It is surprising then that twenty years on the Rwan-dan state has rebounded so quickly. Its economy is growing at a rate of 4% per annum, an impressive feat given the state of the global economy, and the poor growth of some of its neighbours. Foreign Di-rect Investment is flocking to the country. Its tourist industry is booming. This economic growth is result-ing in slow but steady improvements in its Human Development indicators. Much of this can be attributed to a concen-trated effort by the regime to overcome the demons

of the genocide. Identification on the basis of eth-nicity has been made illegal. Children are now taught that they are Rwandan first, not Hutu or Tutsi. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set up by the UN, has convicted 29 persons involved in or-chestrating the genocide, with 11 trials in progress, and 14 more await trial. Domestic courts have con-victed hundreds more for their involvement in the mass slaughter. Perpetrators of the slaughter are encouraged to confess their deeds, while victims are pressed to accept such confessions and reintegrate them back into society. This is all part of a wider state policy urging citizens to forgive, but not to forget. Economic recovery can be attributed to a system of tight state controls. President Kagame is known for his intolerance of corruption, and favours a centralised system of economic governance. Thus the patronage networks which hinder the prospective growth of other African states are actively discour-aged. The state holding companies which dominate the economy re-invest their rents into infrastructure projects, while the government focuses on educa-tion and health investments. A developmentalist ap-proach, favouring consistent and sustainable growth, is favoured over rapid returns. Yet these exterior improvements mask the deeply rooted psychological trauma the state is strug-gling to overcome. Outbreaks of violence still occur in parts of the country. Survivors often struggle to rebuild their lives. Having been forced out of their homes, witnessing family members murdered or tor-tured, and having their homes burnt and their pos-sessions looted, many survivors returned to Rwanda with nothing but the mental and physical scars they sustained. They were forced to reintegrate alongside those who hunted them, and many struggle to, or simply refuse to follow the state policy of reconcili-ation. The Rwandan expatriates who lived overseas prior to the genocide flocked back to the country in order to help with the reconstruction, but the lack of a shared experience and the self-perceived superi-ority of the migrants created a schism between the two groups. ‘Genocidaires’ remain at large in East-ern Congo, carrying out periodic violence against the Tutsi affiliated groups in North and South Kivu, and raiding Western Rwanda. The international community remains in two minds about whether or not to support the Kagame regime. For every positive – the stability, the lack of corruption, the strict line on zero ethnic divisions – there are negatives – military incursions into the Democratic Republic of Congo “in search of genocid-aires”, human rights suppression, and questionable democratic processes. And Kagame refuses to bow

“Exterior improvements mask the deeply rooted psychological trauma the state is still struggling to overcome. Outbreaks of violence still occur in parts of the country. Survivors still struggle to rebuild their lives.”

16 | Agora

down to international pressures to address these negatives. His attitude towards the international community is rooted in their failure to act in 1994. In 2012 comments on the situation in the DRC, he states that: “Actually the problem of DRC came from outside....it was created by the international com-munity - our partners - because they don’t listen, they are so arro-gant to listen and in the end they don’t actually provide a solution

they just keep creating problems for us. We know better our prob-lems, we know better about this region’s problems”

In the wake of genocide the inter-national community could have prevented, Kagame will continue to rebuild his country as he sees fit, the international community will continue to have to face the consequences of its inaction, and the Rwandan people will press

on with reconstructing their lives. While the external indicators state that Rwanda is recovering, inter-nally the state struggles to forgive perpetrators, but has not forgot-ten that it was all but abandoned by the world in its time of need.

Emma TobinSS BESS

Africa | 17

“Actually the problem of DRC came from outside....it was created by the international community - our partners - because they don’t listen, they are so arrogant to listen and in the end they don’t actually provide a solution they just keep creating problems for us. We know better our problems, we know better about this region’s problems”Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda

The majority of the world’s fastest growing economies are in Africa. This growth is partly fed by the dis-covery of natural resources such as oil and gas off the Swahili coast but also by the re-emergence of ancient trading hubs such as Mombasa in Kenya and Dar-Es-Salaam in Tanzania. The latter have attracted investment from states that had long remained aloof from Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, the Arab Gulf states, In-dia, and China have all become an important source of FDI. After centuries of western colonisation that had caused a thaw in trade between the Middle East, Asia and Africa, old ties are re-surfac-ing. Low western-held debt and in-creasingly open economies have created an ideal environment for a true Afro-Arab renaissance.This renaissance is underpinned

by a critical, geographical reality described by Robert D. Kaplan in ‘Monsoon’. In his book, Kaplan ar-gues that the geographic proximity and the common pre-colonial rela-tions between East Africa, India and South-East Asia are creating fertile ground for the flourishing of Trans-Indian Ocean trade. The most obvious signs can be seen in Africa’s transform-ing infrastructure and agricultural sector. Indian multinationals such as Kuruturi have invested heavily in Ethiopia’s expanding floral in-dustry. Chinese state-owned firms have laid down roads and railways from Ethiopia’s landlocked capital Addis to the port of Djibouti and from the copper mines of central Zambia to Dar Es-Salaam. Mean-while, Saudi and Kuwaiti sovereign funds have purchased large plots of land in an effort to ensure food security at home and the Emira-

ti provider Etisalat has taken the lead in fueling Africa’s awakening telecommunication revolution. Other companies such as Kuwaiti Zain and Chinese ZTE (which re-cently signed a $800m deal with Ethiopia’s Ethio Telecom in August 2013) have followed. Moreover, Islamic finance has become increasingly popular across the continent. Javier Blas (Financial Times reporter based in Johannesburg) has pointed out that Nigeria (Africa’s second larg-est economy) has already com-mitted to a $100bn market per year for Sukuk, or Islamic bonds. Senegal and South Africa have ex-pressed their interest in following this example. However, Linklaters’ head of Islamic Finance, Neil Mill-er has indicated that the absence of a robust legal framework re-mains an important challenge to the industry.

18 | Agora

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI welcomed to Mali by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (February 2014)

An Afro-Arab Renaissance

In addition, Michael Peer points out that the rise of Dubai as a hub has played an instrumental role in enabling Gulf but also Indi-an and Chinese companies to in-vest in Africa (and vice-versa). For instance, UK-born, ethnic Indian and former resident of Kampala, Ashish Thakkar settled in Dubai in order to establish the Mara Group – a global conglomerate of IT, real estate and manufacturing com-panies. The rise of Dubai was en-hanced by the crucial presence of its own airline, Emirates Airlines. Along with Etihad and Qatar air-ways, it connects medium sized African cities to Asian and Europe-an markets, allowing a new gen-eration of entrepreneurs such as Thakkar to hop from on emerging city to another. But Gulf States are not the Arab countries to benefit from the Afro-Arab renaissance. Countries in the Maghreb have also real-

ised the importance in developing relations with their sub-Saharan neighbors. A recently published article in the Economist argued that Morocco should “make more” of its relations with Africa. The king’s recent visit to a weakened Mali and his reluctance to address the current stalemate in the West-ern Sahara indicate that the King-dom wishes to take advantage of its natural geographical location in order to reinforce its claim of ‘el-Maghreb el-Kebir’ [or Greater Morocco]. In the Huffington Post new Maghreb Edition, a similar case was made for Tunisia. The article was entitled ‘Africa is the economic future of Tunisia’ and it underlined the role of the Tuni-sian diaspora in French-speaking Africa in blowing life into the coun-try’s battered economy as well as its dormant foreign policy. From Rabat to Dubai, Arab entrepreneurs and larger multina-

tionals have come to appreciate the importance of opening up ties with African countries. Africa is closer and more accessible than it ever was before. Despite the numerous obstacles involved in land grabbing and the continent’s shaky legal as well as financial sys-tems, the prospect of an Afro-Arab success story has never looked so attainable. It is by embracing the forces of globalisation under-pinned by geographical realities that two regions that are in dire need of development can emerge as winners in tomorrow’s world.

Philip EngelsLaw

University of London (Queen Mary, UK)

Africa | 19

“Two regions that are in dire need of development can emerge as winners in tomorrow’s world.”

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The Inept Dictator

Middle East | 21

Bashar al-Assad is not the first of his family to rule Syria with an iron fist and massacre dissenters with ruthless vigour, but he is by far the most incompetent. Bashar’s fa-ther, Hafez, was the quintessential Arab dictator; a man who crawled up through the military ranks until he found himself at the very top, with no tools to assist him but his brute cunning, callousness and cruel methods. Bashar al-Assad had leadership thrust upon him and unwillingly accepted, whereas his father pursued power with grit-ty determination. Hafez al-Assad was a realistic man, who forged alliances and stirred sectarian tensions in order to divide the population and rule with abso-lute authority. In contrast, Bashar al-Assad has done little other than inherit his family name, and this incompetency demonstrates itself in his policies. Bashar al-Assad has alienated his father’s traditional allies, namely the urban bourgeoisie, who sup-ported Assad’s nationalistic poli-cies after decades of political and economic instability. However, the disintegrating infrastructure, cro-ny capitalism and nepotism that have defined Bashar Al-Assad’s reign have left many former sym-pathisers disillusioned with the regime. The administration’s only permanent concern has been self preservation and survival, and even in this regard, with all its at-tention focused on continuing its existence, it appears to be failing. Pan-Arabism, the traditional ideol-ogy of the Arab dictatorships, was nothing but a propaganda ploy for both father and son. Hafez al-As-sad destroyed hopes of a Pales-tinian leftist victory in Lebanon, supported Iran against Iraq and joined the US coalition during the

first Gulf War. The difference is that Hafez directed this hypocrisy in a way that was beneficial to his own interest, whereas Bashar, be-ing incapable to respond to emer-gency conditions, presided over the decline of Syrian influence in the Middle East, becoming little more than a pawn for the Ayatol-lahs of Tehran. Syria’s foreign poli-cy has been marked by stagnation and an inability or unwillingness to reconstruct Syria’s approach to-wards its neighbours and its own people. Bashar al-Assad seems to prefer instead to follow his father’s outdated plans and stubbornly ad-here to them regardless and obliv-ious of reality. Even as the peace-

ful reform movement grew within Syria following the Arab Spring, the government’s response was the same as it had been in the 1980’s; counter any opposition with brute force. Thus, the question of who real-ly runs the Syrian regime is sur-rounded in secrecy and ambiguity. Publicly, the image of Assad domi-nates the canvas, but what is clear is that the dictator is merely a fig-urehead, further suggesting that actions carried out by some Syrian military personnel may not have been directed by Assad himself. Essentially, the Syrian government relies heavily on others to survive; oil from Iran, diplomatic support from Russia and China, and fight-ers from Hezbollah and other

proxies. Furthermore, according to some reports, the Syrian army is in such disarray that Hezbollah is increasingly taking a leading role in the conflict, occasionally even commanding Syrian troops inside Syria. All this points to one conclusion; Assad is incapable of outliving his many enemies with-out external help and any halt in this support will cause the Syrian government to crumble. Even with ominous warnings emerging from Syria regarding Al Qaeda’s presence in the conflict and its assaults on both mod-erate Syrian rebels and secular Kurdish militants in the north of the country, Assad has been un-

able to exploit the divisions that scar the rebel movement and this does little other than demonstrate his political inability. Having de-ployed the same techniques that his father used to crush an Isla-mist uprising in Hama in 1982, which killed between 10,000 and 40,000 people, Bashar al-Assad has revealed his weakness; his failure to govern creatively, instead relying on outdated techniques, has created a violent insurgency where once there was a peaceful reform movement. No doubt, this fatal flaw will be his undoing.

Deepkamal VirkSF BESS

“Assad has been unable to exploit the divisions that scar the rebel movement and this does little other than demon-strate his political inability.”

round of discussions is currently taking place in Geneva, which will hopefully come to some sort of agreement on a course of action to solve what has become not only a devastating civil war for Syria, but also a frighteningly escalating refugee crisis for the surrounding nations. Expectations of a solu-tion are low. After the first round of talks, one cannot help but feel that it will be another case of ‘dip-

lomats talk, meanwhile Syrians die’. Among those attending are Russia, the US, the UK, France, China, Germany, alongside nu-merous other nations. The Assad government is in attendance, as well as the opposition in exile Syr-ian National Coalition (SNC), and much diplomatic wrangling was needed to get them both to come to the table. A notable absence among the attendees, however, is Iran. In one of the messier and more embarrassing episodes of the diplomatic efforts to resolve the war, Iran was initially invited to the Geneva talks. Cue outrage on the part of the SNC – a group on which the West expended much diplomatic capital in order to get them to even attend the talks. As-sad is a member of the Alawite sect in Syria, a branch of Shia Is-lam – as the largest Shia nation in the world, Iran was one of his strongest regional allies. More

The civil war in Syria is now three years old. In that time well over 100,000 people have lost their lives. An exact number of deaths is almost impossible to establish or verify – despite the best efforts of local organisations and several international NGOs such as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights – due to extraordinarily high risks to anyone attempting to work within the country. Jour-nalists and Red Cross workers are among the fatalities of the war, showing how dangerous the situa-tion is for foreign nationals as well as Syrians caught in the crossfire. The UN has recently taken the decision to no longer attempt to track the number of dead due to the immense logistical difficulties in doing so. It is not difficult to see how this decision could seem to an ordinary Syrian that the UN and the international community has all but given up on them. Another

22 | Agora

Blood and Diplomacy in Syria“After the first round of talks, one cannot help but feel that it will be another case of ‘diplomats talk, meanwhile Syrians die’.”

than this, Syria provides a link be-tween Iran and another regional ally, the Hizbollah in Lebanon. As such, Iran have been providing the Syrian government with as-sistance in the form of weapons, troops, and funding. Following the objections to Iran attending by the SNC, there was a hurried about-face by Ban Ki Moon and the UN, who are facilitating the talks. Iran was seen to be too partisan to approach the conflict objectively, unlike the other ma-jor powers attending the talks, who had merely armed, funded, and provided logistical support to various groups taking part in the war. In any case, Iran’s invitation was swiftly revoked. This begs the question of why was there such a lack of foresight exhibited by those who decided not to discuss Iran’s invitation privately with all the other parties attending before announcing it publicly. At best, it makes those organising the talks look sloppy and unprofessional; at worst, it put the talks themselves at risk. Regardless, the peace conference went ahead without Iran’s input. Aside from setting a poor tone for proceedings before they had even begun, it is most certainly ill-advised not to invite a major actor in the conflict to talks aimed at resolving it just because another actor doesn’t want them there. It seems inherently counter-productive. These are peace talks, this is where you air your differenc-es and come to agreements. As previously mentioned, Syria under Assad has been an important ally of Iran. It should be recognised, abhorrent a thought as it is, that Assad may not be stepping down any time soon despite the best ef-forts of the international commu-nity. Would it not be more sensible to have the new, less hawkish Iran involved in the negotiations, since they may be able to approach

and exert pressure from anoth-er angle? But alas, there was no place set at the table for them. It should be noted what a fine table Montreux in Switzerland is – a far cry from the wretched misery of the conditions in the underfund-ed refugee camps in the countries surrounding Syria, in which more than 2 million people are trying to flee the war. It is scandalous and tragic that representatives of the Assad government – led by foreign minister Walid al-Mouallem – are being treated to such lavish facili-ties by those organising the talks, while the UN has only received 70% of the funding it has been try-ing to raise for the refugee crisis. The appetite for an interna-tional intervention could scarcely be smaller. It would be highly ill-ad-vised, especially as we watch Iraq sit on the verge of a violent civil war a decade after intervention there. The time for intervention has come and long since passed. It was when the conflict was less complex and the opposition was less fractionalized. The opposition is split into many different groups, and violent in-fighting between them has become frequent. They range from moderate to extremist, and secular to Islamist. There are also some Al-Qaeda linked groups operating in Syria. Recent revela-tions about systemic torture and the executions of up to 11,000 people by the Assad government make the idea of his presidency continuing on into the future all

the more unpalatable. However, Assad may well retain his position as president. He has signalled his intention not to step down, and will contest the next elections – whatever form they take in a coun-try ravaged by civil war and an au-tocratic government. It should be noted that Assad is not solely the reprehensible actor in this con-flict; both opposition and govern-ment forces have been linked to, and accused of, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In such a volatile environment, any attempt to predict the outcome of an intervention is entirely futile at this stage. Unfortunately, if one side in a civil war does not does emerge as a clear victor in the first year, then the conflict is like-ly to drag on. This is exactly what has happened in Syria. Thankfully, however, civil wars are shorter in recent times; the average length of civil wars has fallen to 3.7 years since the end of the Cold War. One can only hope that those or-chestrating carnage in Syria can at least agree to a ceasefire while they reluctantly deal with one an-other in Montreux. If they can, then perhaps it will be the beginning of the long and difficult process of re-building a country ruined by three years of brutality and bloodletting.

Alan DempseySS History and Political Science

Middle East | 23

“Both opposition and government forc-es have been linked to, and accused of, crimes against humanity. In such a vola-tile environment, any attempt to predict the outcome of an intervention is entirely futile at this stage.”

China became a full member of the World Trade Organisation in 2001, but technically this was not the country’s first stint in the inter-national body. Under very different political circumstances, the pre-decessor to the People’s Republic was one of the first signatories to the WTO’s precursor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This initial arrangement was short-lived due to radical changes in the domestic situation of the country and it would take until 1986 for admissions talks and multi-lateral negotiations to restart. While perhaps politically awkward at first glance, China’s rediscov-ered interest in the international trading body fit perfectly within the economically-focused shift promoted through the ideas of for-mer Chairman Deng Xiaoping. The WTO entered the Chinese picture because its unique admission procedure required China to fully consolidate the reforms already initiated. The relationship between China and the WTO is fascinating because the evolving nature of the effects the organisation has had on the country has meant that it has provided a stimulus for change, in areas beyond econom-ic reform. The economic effect of the WTO has been undeniable; a small example of this being the foreign investment regime in Chi-na. The amendments to the main statutory law, the Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment Di-rection and Catalogue are a clear illustration of this. Esther Lam has noted, that in the past few decades, an increase in the in-dustries in which investment is encouraged, and, conversely, a decrease in the sectors in which investment is restricted. What is even more important, according to Randall Perenboom, is that as these categories are part of the WTO admission requirements,

China cannot whimsically re-allo-cate the types of investment from one category to the other without incurring into a violation of the ac-cords with the WTO. Although these changes are clearly important, it would be a mistake to focus solely on them without delving into the more elu-sive and unquantifiable ‘collateral effects.’ An interesting phenom-enon that has been observed, is the development of trade and economic domestic measures into changes that could have ad-vanced the rule of law in China. A cautionary note should be men-

tioned at this point: the rule of law theory discussed in this context is a more nuanced, procedural version, the so-called “thin” rule of law, as argued by the likes of Raz. Yet despite its procedural na-ture, there is no reason why this idea of the rule of law should not ‘overflow’ into even more substan-tive issues. These changes, which are direct consequences of WTO membership, relate to the ideas of fairness, transparency and equal-ity. With regards to fairness, this idea is strictly connected with the notion of due process. In taxation and criminal law, statutes such as

24 | Agora

The World Trade Organisation and China

the Provisional Rules for Taxation Administrative Reconsideration 2004 and the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 2012, seem to be pointing towards an approach of exclud-ing all illegally-obtained evidence, such as that obtained through a violation of the integrity of a per-son and torture. Transparency has its origins in measures such as the Enquiry Measures of China WTO Enquiry Offices 2002 that allowed WTO Members, Chinese and foreign enterprises, and individuals, to re-quest information relating to trade

or other WTO matters. The scope was extended when the Regula-tions of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Infor-mation, was introduced in 2008. The regulation marked an inter-esting turn in governmental policy, in the adoption of a proposal rela-tively similar to the Freedom of In-formation Acts as seen in Ireland and the UK. The main difference between the Chinese regulation and the statutes in the UK and Ire-land, is the more generic nature of the grounds for refusal found in the Chinese law, where the word-ing is very vague at some points.

The other interesting area that has seen improvement is equal-ity. Though more nuanced than the previous two, its development can be seen through some prac-tical examples. The United States “2005 Congressional-Executive Commission On China Annual Re-port” describes, for example, a case where the issues discussed involved regulations that favoured urban residents over rural resi-dents. The innovation was derived from the fact that WTO language was being used, both by Chinese scholars and the government, to describe discriminatory treatment in the wider context. If anything can be said about the examples seen in the areas of fairness, transparency and equality, it is that the WTO, because of its unique characteris-tics, has had a real overreaching effect on the Chinese domestic political system. The remarkable fact is that despite the initial eco-nomic nature of these reforms, there has been a spill-over effect into other areas. This last point however has to be tempered by the fact that notwithstanding the impetus for reform in other areas, the main interest of the WTO rela-tionship still consists very much in economic matters. One can ques-tion whether even advancements of the rule of law discussed in the Chinese example are not a com-promise of an economically prag-matic approach rather than an un-foreseeable collateral effect of the WTO-induced economic reforms. Though perhaps overly optimis-tic, the small examples seen here might be pointing towards a situa-tion where international organiza-tions have more of a say, and can provide a real impetus for change, in more controversial areas.

Riccardo SavonaSS Law

Asia/Pacific | 25

The World Trade Organisation and China

Australia’s Fourth Estate has been pretty crowded of late, with wide-ranging implications. Tony Abbott had never been the most media friendly. He has shied away from television in-terviews, doesn’t go on the Q&A programme on ABC Television, and was reportedly quite intimidated by the tough interviewing style of ABC Journalist Leigh Sales. None-theless, recent politicisation of the media is something that has caused widespread commentary. The first foreign interview Abbott took, published in the Washington Post on October 25 2013, was deemed scandalous for his direct criticism of policies of his predecessors in government. In the interview he lambasted Labor’s Carbon Pricing Scheme, which he said was “socialism masquerading as environmental-ism”, used the phrase “Australia is once again open for business”, and made the comment that he “thought it was the most incom-petent and untrustworthy govern-ment in modern Australian histo-ry.” While in a domestic interview this would be par for the course, there is a convention that a new government leaves that kind of discourse at home. A predeces-sor, Julia Gillard, had made quite an impression in a speech before the US Congress, and seemed the darling of Obama. However, it is the domes-tic media where Abbott’s biggest battles lie. Abbott’s policy “Opera-tion Sovereign Borders”, aimed at deterring refugees from attempt-ing to enter Australia by boat, has limited media exposure as one of

its pillars. The policy allows for lim-ited reporting, usually through a single weekly press briefing, on at-tempted boat arrivals or boat turn-backs, and Abbott has defended this secrecy as being fundamen-tal for national security. On 2GB Radio on January 10, Abbott said “the point is… uh… not to provide sport for public discussion, the point is to stop the boats…” before going on to say “If we were at war we wouldn’t be giving out informa-tion that is of use to the enemy just because we might have an idle curiosity about it ourselves.” This policy has had rever-berations throughout the press, and the primary victim has been the State Broadcaster, the Aus-tralian Broadcasting Corporation. ABC have reported video evidence of asylum seeker injuries, sug-gesting that these refugees be-ing towed back to Indonesia were made by the navy to hold on to hot engine pipes, later suffering burns. This reporting was brand-ed by the government as unac-ceptable, and various officials de-manded an apology. The practice of turning back boats in to Indonesian wa-ters has put strain on the Austra-lian-Indonesian relationship, not least because of a number of ter-ritorial breaches. The “Fifth” Es-tate provided fuel to the fire, with the Snowden leaks showing that Australian intelligence agencies tapped the phone of the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that of his wife, with the Guardian Australia and the ABC both reporting on the is-sue. Though these actions appar-ently took place under the previ-

ous government, Abbott said on radio that “the ABC seems to take delight in broadcasting allegations by a traitor.” Politicians on both sides of Parliament have advised that newspapers weigh up the balance of harms. Editors, they say, should examine the poten-tial damage that the stories they publish may cause to Australia’s relations with its neighbours. Min-ister for Agriculture Barnaby Joyce compared it to spreading scandal about one’s neighbour, advising that eventually one would find one’s house burnt to the ground. The implication is that a newspa-per editor should self-censor with the aim of protecting the reputa-tions of those involved. There has been a great at-tempt to paint this with a national-ist tint. With Abbott regularly citing the Guardian Australia’s links with its parent, by describing it as “a newspaper based in London”, and declaring that the ABC is “taking everyone’s side but Australia’s”, we see a strong appeal to nation-alism. Recently the government have suggested they may take the

Estate Agents: An Australian Media Puzzle

26 | Agora

“One has to ques-tion the role of the free press and a citizen’s right to know, and the role of the public broadcaster within that narrative.”

Australia Network contract away from the ABC, which would severe-ly cripple the ABC’s news budget. The Australia Network broadcasts abroad, much in the vein of the BBC World Service, and has been branded an “organ of soft diplo-macy”. The reduction in funding would severely hamper the ABC’s news efforts. One has to question the role of the free press and a cit-izen’s right to know, and the role of the public broadcaster within that narrative. Painting an issue with these nationalistic colours presupposes that the state’s ac-tions have the support of the cit-izens. There is absolutely no way of knowing that unless the citizens are fully informed of all the issues. Of course, attempts with-in Australia to curtail freedom of the press have been made be-fore. In the wake of the News of the World phone hacking scan-dal, it was announced by then-Prime Minister Gillard that there should be a press inquiry, despite no evidence to suggest that such practices were being performed in Australia. However, that inqui- ry’s finding was that there should

be a News Media Council to reg-ulate the press, a policy that has not been implemented. This isn’t an issue of the Liberal Party vs the Press or the Labor Party vs the Press, rather, it’s an issue of Freedom of the Press more gener-ally. The arguments for Freedom of the Press stem from those for Freedom of Speech: If my oppo-site number is wrong, their right to speak will prove them wrong. If they are right, their right to speak will prove them right. And if they are neither right nor wrong, then freedom of speech will allow us

to understand better the nature of truth. The electors have a right to know what the effect of govern-ment policy is and it seems that the only way that this is possible is through the fourth, and now fifth, estates. Though a principle that Labor could well adopt, too, they are currently out of power, and for a government led by a “Liberal” party, it seems that that a lesson in Mill may be required.

Fionn McGorrySF History and Political Science

Asia/Pacific | 27

“‘Operation Sovereign Borders’ has limited media exposure as one of its pillars … Tony Abbott has defended this secrecy as being fundamental for national security.”

“This isn’t an issue of the Liberal Party vs the Press or the Labor Party vs the Press, rather, it’s an issue of Free-dom of the Press more generally.”

28 | Agora

You wouldn’t have to be an eco-nomic expert to know that the Irish banking sector has endured a disastrous seven years. After the giddy heights of 2006, the peak of the Celtic Tiger, the ensuing fall and fallout have been well docu-mented. Driven by a boom in prop-erty lending, aided by a climate of light-touch regulation and me-dia frenzy, easy credit was every-where. Only a handful of commen-tators were willing to stick their heads above the parapet and say that boom would most likely lead to bust, as it always had done throughout history. You wouldn’t have blamed them for going along with the crowd and predicting a ‘soft land-ing’. The Taoiseach at the time, Bertie Ahern, wondered aloud in 2007 why people who had nega-tive opinions didn’t “commit sui-cide”. Radical thought, it seemed,

wasn’t an option. Only when the bubble burst did people really be-gin to question why the consensus was so overwhelming. In typically Irish style, the discussion on do-mestic banks has gone full circle from a criminal lack of scrutiny when it was most needed to an almost agonising level of analysis and squabbling over the wreckage of the crash. And yet, some uniformity of opinion remains. Spokesmen from both of the traditionally ma-jor political parties, Leo Varadkar for Fine Gael and Michael Mc-Grath for Fianna Fáil, agree that more competition in commercial banking is needed. The argument is that the consumer will benefit as a result of banks competing for their business. Is this necessarily the case? Those trumpeting the benefits to the average Irish con-sumer would do well to remember the mid-2000s. Even though I was in my

early teens, it’s hard to forget the moment when 100% mortgages began to arrive on the Irish market, shortly followed by 110% mortgag-es. How many of the homeowners who took on such loans were first-time buyers? How many are now in negative equity? Again, the Irish market seems to have lurched from one unhealthy extreme to another. The reckless climate of competing banks and building so-cieties throwing money at anybody who applied for a mortgage has evaporated into a credit drought, particularly afflicting the econom-ically crucial small-and-medium enterprise (SME) sector. Consen-sus seems to be that there was too much competition during the boom, but that there is too little now. Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz makes a simple but per-tinent point: banking is a public good. Not hedge funds and deriv-atives, but the kind of everyday commercial banking that is es-sential to any developed economy worthy of the name. The current situation in Ireland, with large-scale government intervention in the domestic banking sector, rep-resents a chance to go for a really radical approach. Now is the time for politicians, who like to speak of Ireland as being unique on the world stage and full of innovation and creativity, to put their capital where their mouths are. Being, nominally at least, a republic, could we develop some kind of republican banking system, which first and foremost caters to the basic needs of its citizens? Rath-er than setting privately owned banks loose on each other and hoping that the resulting dogfight for market share provides positive externalities for the economy, is

A Crisis of Creativity?

Ireland | 29

there a more controlled and effi-cient way to get what is needed? Rather than having to nationalise the losses of a haywire private sys-tem that gorged on its own profits, why not retain state control to en-sure things are done properly this time around? U n f o r t u n a t e l y , a n y high-minded idealism is likely to encounter some very practical stumbling blocks. Colm McCarthy, writing for the Irish Independent, offers little in the way of positivi-ty. He agrees it is time we “cut our banking cloth to fit our measure”, repeating the idea that the bank-ing sector constituted far too big a share of economic activity during the boom, and that historic incar-nations of Irish banks as “hybrid building-societies-cum-proper-ty-hedge-funds” have been “total-ly unfit for purpose”. A future Irish banking system needs to be fit for purpose, “big enough to sup-port the real economy but small enough to avoid exposing state fi-nances to excessive bank bailout costs.” What exact form such a system would take is still far from clear. The Irish economy is inching for-ward under the weight of a gigan-tic property debt burden. Tackling this burden, getting homeowners out of arrears, ending the credit drought to SMEs: all of these must

be done if the economy is to re-cover properly, but it is hard to see where to begin. In the absence of leniency from our paymasters in Frankfurt, policy so far has basically been to kick the debt can down the road and hope it gets inflated away at some point in the distant future, when the Eurozone has returned to health.

Government efforts to tackle the problems of mortgage arrears and banks reluctant to give credit to small business have had little tangible effect so far. Whether in-creased state involvement would improve this situation is open to question. Popular opinion and politi-cal wrangling pose another threat. There is a commitment from the current coalition to prop up the two ‘pillar banks’, with the state currently holding a 99.8% stake in Allied Irish Banks. As always, however, elections are at the back of political minds. In January this year, at the World Economic Fo-rum in Davos, Minister for Finance Michael Noonan suggested that some of the AIB stake would be sold, to “test the market” and ap-proximate a value for the bank, before a general election in spring 2016. The reputation of Irish fi-nancial institutions amongst the electorate is dire, with the 2008 blanket guarantee still rankling. As such it may be an obvious but effective political move to visibly reduce, as much as possible, tax-payer funding of banks. Precedent

suggests the government will be only too happy to wash its hands. When full nationalisation of Bank of Ireland loomed in 2011, limiting of state shareholding to 15% was heralded by Noonan as a success-ful move to “break the bonds with our toxic banking past”. Regardless of the prospect of large state shareholding, it may prove difficult to keep the Irish banking system under control. This is the era of globalisation; whatever changes occur in the future certainly won’t occur in a vacuum. Any regulatory moves will surely require EU, ECB, and tacit German approval at every stage of the process. There may even be opposition from across the Atlan-tic. An attempt to keep the realm of domestic business and prop-erty banking separate from high-risk investment activity would be a bold step away from the Amer-ican paradigm, one in which the Glass-Steagall act was considered dead even before it was repealed. Given the traditional Irish aversion to rubbing our American partners up the wrong way, the appetite for radical banking reform may re-main hidden behind deference to the status quo. Some things seem never to change.

Kevin ThreadgoldJS PPES

“The current situation in Ireland represents a chance to go for a really radical approach to banking”

Turkey has recently joined the ranks of China, North Korea and Iran, blocking the social media site Twitter. Twitter’s role in politi-cal upheaval is hotly debated and in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring a flurry of journalistic articles and later, academic pa-pers appeared attributing much to this social network. These theories have not been entirely welcomed and the research has failed to stand up to rigorous testing. De-spite this, the idea that Twitter has considerable political weight gained much attention from the mainstream public and among Turkey’s political elite. Contentious politics aside, Twitter is big busi-ness and in the last two years has matched Facebook for politicians and businesses attempting online marketing campaigns. There are courses online aimed at explain-ing the intricacies of sub-tweeting, retweeting and hashtags to the uninformed, trying to cash in on this must of marketing. Yet, what do we want our politicians to use

Twitter for, what is the right way? And does it help them? Given Ireland’s Porportion-al Representation voting system with Single Transferable Vote, peo-ple vote for politicians rather than a party or a policy. Thus the impres-sion of a candidate as a person is one of the most important aspects for voter choice. Irish politicians, like most, have long been keen to show their connection to the ordi-nary man. In many ways they are connected, with each TD repre-senting a much smaller number of constituents than most countries. As of 2011, 42% of TDs were on Twitter. This is much higher than the percentage of the general pop-ulation using Twitter regularly. Out of this figure, the number of those using it for political purposes is dramatically reduced. Nonethe-less, Twitter does change politics.

It is a responsive instantaneous mouthpiece, which is often left in the hands of the politician rath-er than some well oiled PR guru. More often than not, politically loaded tweets only gain publici-ty for the negative reasons. Back in 2010, Simon Coveney tweet-ed about Brian Cowen sounding drunk on the radio, allowing the mainstream media to pick up on what everyone else was talking about privately. Another formida-ble event for Twitter and politics was the Late Late Show debacle during the 2011 presidential elec-tion; when RTE broadcast a claim from a Twitter account seemingly linked to Sinn Féin’s election cam-paign. This tweet, which had no substantial backing or evidence, effectively derailed the campaign of Sean Gallagher. The source of a tweet can legitimise anything as a story rather than just cheap gos-sip. Ireland’s small constituen-cies allow for politicians to offer genuine accessibility to voters. In fact the current system in the Dáil has been criticised for allow-ing TDs to dominate their sched-ule with local political issues. This is an even more frequent occur-rence for backbench TDs who are effectively eliminated from any meaningful role in national poli-tics. In any case, the current sys-tem allows for a TD to hold twice weekly meet and greets with the local pub acting as their office. While this isn’t seen as unusual, the public does not usually equate Irish politicians with the media savviness often exhibited in US politics. There, personalised mes-sages from Michelle Obama are the norm, raising millions for cam-paign coffers. An email from Mrs

30 | Agora

@GerryAdamsSF

“The source of a tweet can legitimise anything as a story rather than just cheap gossip.”

Kenny is unlikely to elicit the same response. That said, politicians are flocking to Twitter and Face-book to inform the so-called Gen-eration Z of their actions for the constituency and country. Howev-er, one Irish politician in particular is breaking the mould, in an unex-pected way. Sinn Féin leader Gerry Ad-ams has gained cult status on Twitter for his unusual use of the social media site. With 45,000 fol-lowers on Twitter, @GerryAdamsSF is more popular than one would think. To offer some context, Enda Kenny has 17,000 and Mary Rob-inson comes in at 7,000. This puts Gerry Adams as the most followed Irish politician on Twitter. While Sinn Féin has been polling well re-cently, the content of Adams Twit-ter account may be more account-able for his massive following rather than his political popularity. A seemingly personal account, Adams juxtaposes serious polit-ical themed tweets detailing the upcoming Sinn Féin events, with what he ate for breakfast, along-side such bizarre pseudo republi-can references as this: (see above right).While Adams is clearly presenting a lighthearted look at republican-ism, it may offer a look into the future of political communication. As politicians flock towards social media, to increase their publici-ty with a new audience, they are attempting to fit into the inter-net generation. Big corporations began the move in the past few years, as they noticed unique re-sponses to Twitter interactions going viral. This has become the norm, with companies communi-cating with each other’s Twitter accounts, egged on by attentive crowds. There are no clear fig-ures or results as to whether this works or not, with much of Gener-ation Z unwilling to be taken in by such clear attempts to be ‘cool’.

As with all politicians’ images, it is difficult to tell whether the one presented through Adams’s Twit-ter account is genuine or a ploy to grab this generation’s attention. At any rate, his followers are in-creasing every day, but their value is debatable. I followed Adams on Twitter for about a month. I spent that month baffled by his tweets wishing us all a goodnight and in-forming me of his daily walk. How-ever, a month in I grew tired of his republican rhetoric, and decided that having the Sinn Féin leader as the only politician I follow didn’t reflect any political views of my own. Subsequently I left his ranks of followers, rather than follow more politicians, with their typical-ly dour political tweets, void of any personality. The gain for Adams from these 42,000 followers is al-most impossible to gauge. I would bet that the majority are there for his awkward Irish phrasing and impossibly bad puns. Because re-ally, would this inspire confidence

in Adams as leader? Twitter is here to stay, as evidenced by a share value cur-rently floating just above $50. Pol-iticians are likely to only increase their presence on the social me-dia platform, a free form of PR. However, this publicity comes at a cost. The frequency and scale of online faux pas by politicians are set to increase as they learn the rules of social media and realise the attention that they will get is more likely to be negative than positive. As to the future use of their social media accounts, per-haps more will take up Gerry’s mantle of attempting to attract our online generation, playing the in-formality and creating an internet persona more than trying to offer substance. It is certainly a political arena worth keeping an eye on.

Daire CollinsJS History and Political Science

Ireland | 31

TRINITY COLLEGEThe University of Dublin

Irish School of Ecumenics

The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin.

The Irish School of Ecumenics is a cross-border, graduate institute in Trinity College Dublin, located in both Dublin and in Belfast, committed to the study and promotion of dialogue, conflict resolution, peace and reconciliation in Ireland and worldwide. The approach of ISE is thoroughly interdisciplinary, in its three taught M.Phil. courses and in its range of Ph.D. topics – thirty students are currently doing doctoral research in such interdisciplinary fields as politics, sociology, ethics, theology and interreligious studies. ISE’s courses are internationally renowned for their innovative curriculum, embracing theoretical and contextually based research. Such research is at the heart of ISE, where students engage with crucial issues facing governments, international bodies such as the U.N., faith leaders, NGOs and peace organisations in an ill-divided yet increasingly cosmopolitan world. ISE currently runs three M.Phil. taught courses, two in Dublin and one in Belfast (these may be taken alternatively at diploma level) and an Evening Diploma in Conflict & Dispute Resolution Studies. M. Phil. in Intercultural Theology and Interreligious Studies (IT & IS) - Dublin: this course promises a rigorous and challenging time of study in an increasingly significant field that has emerged from theological and religious studies scholarship. Drawing on the school’s traditional strengths in ecumenics, IT & IS offers course participants a critical grasp of theoretical and practical issues involved in understanding inter-religious and inter-cultural realities.

M. Phil. In International Peace Studies (IPS) - Dublin: Ireland has gained a strong international reputation for peace studies. ISE’s International Peace Studies (IPS) course, regarded as pioneer in worldwide terms, is the longest-running of its kind on the island. Courses take account of perspectives from political theory, human rights, development and gender studies, and from conflict analysis and resolution processes. Our students are immersed in a forefront course of study that examines the causes and consequences of war and armed conflict, but so also in research on the resources and norms for, effective, ethical and sustainable peace building policies.

M.Phil. in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CRR) - Belfast: this course provides unique and unparalleled opportunities to learn about conflict transformation in the class-room and through varied community encounter and civic engagement opportunities. It combines taught modules, experiential modules, and independent research. The course is designed to suit the needs of specialists already working in the fields of conflict resolution and reconciliation, those new to the study of conflict resolution and reconciliation and those seeking to build towards a career in this field. Some modules are offered in week-long intensive blocks to accommodate the needs of busy professionals.

Diploma in Conflict and Dispute Resolution Studies (CDRS) - Dublin: This evening course examines the causes of conflict in corporate, statutory, voluntary, political, and community-based settings and provides training in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes such as adjudication, facilitation, ombudsmanship and mediation, and addresses internationally significant commissions and tribunals on post-conflict justice. Through an alliance with Mediation Forum-Ireland those who complete the CDRS course will have an

opportunity to have their names included in the relevant specialist panel of Accredited Mediators. The course is also accredited by the Mediators’ Institute of Ireland.The course enjoys a twelve year success record.

Graduates include trade unionists, members of the Garda Siochana, lawyers, senior policy makers in human resources and industrial relations, civil and public servants, members of the Probation Services and NGO leaders. Teaching takes place from September to April. There are two sessions (six hours) per week over 24 weeks, and two Saturday workshops.

Opportunities for ISE students and graduates: These courses attract students from every continent and during their time at ISE they have the opportunity to interact with established international scholars, leaders and diplomats in these fields. Students develop their capacity to think analytically and about some of the most pressing issues of our world, in an environment that values multicultural perspectives, intellectual rigour, creativity and best practice.

These competencies provide a solid foundation for a range of career and service opportunities. ISE graduates, at every level of society, help to shape public policy, and motivate others by their imaginative leadership. They are employed in a wide range of fields, including: the diplomatic service, international organisations such as the UN, NGOs, as workers in health, education, the media, and in church and community based organisations. Others continue to Ph.D. and higher research. Furthermore, their studies at ISE often prove a catalyst for change both personally and professionally.

FuRThER InFORMaTIOn:

M.Phil. students can study full-time for 12 months or part-time for 24 months.

The Master in Conflict Resolution will be delivered through short-block intensive modules.

Full details about these courses or all relevant closing are available at the following websites: www.tcd.ie/ise; www.tcd.ie/Graduate_Studies.

To apply on line – please refer to: www.tcd.ie/ise/_study/apply/

Applications will be considered after the closing dates only if places remain available.

Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin,Tel. +353.1. 8974770, Fax: +353.1.6725024.

683 antrim Road, Belfast BT15 4EG,Tel. +44.28.90770087, Fax: +44.28.90373986

Irish School of Ecumenics

M.Litt. and Ph.D. Degrees – Dublin and Belfast Email: ressec@tcd.ieISE is recognised world-wide for the unique manner in which it brings the fields of politics, sociology, ethics, theology and religion into a disciplined interaction. The School offers supervision of Masters of Letters (M. Litt.) and Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) work in a range of fields of specialisation including: Religion and Politics; Interreligious Studies; Politics of Peace and Conflict; Intercultural Theology; International Relations; Ethics in International Affairs; Ecumenical Theologies and Theologies of Reconciliation.

M.Phil. in Intercultural Theology & Interreligious Studies – Dublin Email: ecumsec@tcd.ieIntercultural Theology & Interreligious Studies (ITIS) is a ground-breaking course that explores the complex realities of intercultural and interreligious relationships. Participants are enabled to draw on a wide and interdisciplinary range of scholarship – combining emerging and established fields such as comparative theology, intercultural ethics, political science and religious studies. There are four module tracks through the course, of which students choose one; Christian Ecumenical Theologies, Comparative Theology and Interreligious Studies, World Christianity and Intercultural Theology, and Religions and Ethics in a Pluralist World.

M.Phil. in International Peace Studies – Dublin Email: peacesec@tcd.ieInternational Peace Studies provides an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the sources of armed conflict and war. It examines the conditions for achieving sustainable peace through peacemaking and peacebuilding. The course draws on the fields of international relations, ethics, development studies and conflict resolution. Our graduates are employed in the diplomatic service, in NGOs and international organisations such as the UN, in media and education. Others continue to PhD courses.

M.Phil. in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation – Belfast Email: reconsec@tcd.ieThis course is a unique opportunity to study in a society in transition from conflict. Students can specialise in Master courses in conflict resolution or reconciliation, or pursue a joint Master course across both areas. Conflict Resolution offers specialisation in practical skills, meeting the needs of both experienced practitioners and those wishing to enter this field. Reconciliation Studies offers an interdisciplinary approach to politics, theology and ethics and is excellent preparation for Ph.D. study.The Master in Conflict Resolution will be delivered through short-block intensive modules.M.Phil. students can study full-time for 12 months or part-time for 24 months.

Postgraduate Diploma in Conflict & Dispute Resolution Studies – Dublin Email: cdrssec@tcd.ieThis course interests those, in both the public and private sectors, who wish to study civil mediation and other non-adversarial dispute and conflict resolution processes (ADRs) which are increasingly a part of legislative and management structures in the EU and internationally. Through an alliance with Mediation Forum-Ireland those who complete the CDRS course will have an opportunity to have their names included in the relevant specialist panel of Accredited Mediators. The course is also accredited by the Mediators’ Institute of Ireland. This one year course is taught at ISE on two evenings per week over 24 weeks (September to April) with two practical, skill-based mediation training workshops held on Saturdays.

For further information about these courses or all relevant closing dates please refer to the following websites: www.tcd.ie/ise; www.tcd.ie/Graduate_Studies.To apply on line – please refer to: www.tcd.ie/ise/_study/apply/.Applications will be considered after the closing dates only if places remain.

Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin, College Green, Dublin 2. Tel. +353.1.8964770 Fax: +353.1. 6725024

683 Antrim Road, Belfast BT15 4EG. Tel. +44.28.90770087 Fax: +44.28.90373986

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The Irish School of Ecumenics, Trinity College Dublin.

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