8/14/2019 Travis 021910 Opening

1/1

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00402.x

Thoughts Social Nature

Charles Travis

Abstract: Wittgenstein, throughout his career, was deeply Fregean.Frege thought of thought as essentially social, in this sense: whateverI can think is what others could think, deny, debate, investigate.Such, for him, was one central part of judgements objectivity.Another was that truths are discovered, not invented: what is trueis so, whether recognised as such or not. (Later) Wittgensteindeveloped Freges idea of thought as social compatibly with thatsecond part. In this he exploits some further Fregean ideas: of a

certain generality intrinsic to a thought; of lack of that generality inthat which a thought represents as instancing some such generality.(I refer to this below as the conceptual-nonconceptual distinction.)Seeing Wittgenstein as thus building on Frege helps clarify (interalia) his worries, in the Blue Book, and the Investigations, aboutmeaning, intending, and understanding, and the point of the rulefollowing discussion.

Not just agreement in definition, but also (strange as it may sound)agreement in judgements, is part of what an understanding is.(Philosophical Investigations 242. Throughout all translations are mine.)

It is not hard, and not always wrong, to see Frege and later Wittgenstein asopponents. But it is often more productive to see Frege as bequeathing deep andseminal insights which Wittgenstein then adopts, unfolds, and brings to fullfruition. This essay concerns a case in point. Freges insights, in this case, are, firstand foremost, two ideas about thoughts: one about a thoughts essentially socialcharacter; one about a sort of generality which is intrinsic to being a thought.

Wittgensteins main idea here is contained in the motto above. It is thus the mainmoral of the rule-following discussion of the Investigations. It is an idea he isalready working towards in the Blue Book when he says,

What one wishes to say is: Every sign is capable of interpretation; but themeaning mustnt be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.(Wittgenstein 1958: 34)

It is an idea of how to conceive our meaning our words as we thus must. It isan idea Wittgenstein also is working towards in the Investigations from about429464, e.g. in this passage:

European Journal of Philosophy ]]]:]] ISSN 0966-8373 pp. 122 r 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.