Transmilenio & Transantiagositeresources.worldbank.org/INTTRANSPORT/Resources/336291... ·...
Transcript of Transmilenio & Transantiagositeresources.worldbank.org/INTTRANSPORT/Resources/336291... ·...
Transmilenio & Transantiagosimilarities and differences
Pierre GraftieauxSenior Transport SpecialistBBL, September 21, 2006
PrologueBogota and Santiago
Transmilenio and Transantiago
Simultaneous conception
but…
one has been operating for 5 years, which allows to draw lessons and measure impacts, while the other is
still to be born…
Diagnosisoversupply / overlapping, long and winding routes / excess of old buses,
low occupancy rates especially off-peakLong travel times
Poor evaluation of bus services High level of accidents (payment per passenger and “penny war”)
Air pollutionDisintegrated and atomized industry, weak regulation
Explosive mobility growthExistence of subway
Strong reduction in public transport modal share (83% in
1977, 69% in 1991, 52% in 2001)
Share of Public Transport: 81%Continuous deterioration
95% of road space for cars (19% of the trips)
“Yellow Plague” in Santiago
13th Streetand Caracas
Av.in Bogotá
ObjectivesGive priority to public transport
Improve quality of service without increasing transport faresEliminate the “penny war” (road safety and efficiency)
Improve air qualityProvide an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable
service
Stop public transport declineReduce pollution
Offer a good service to the majority of people, including the
poorest and… that could attract car drivers
How?Trunk-feeder logic
Transparent, open and great scale tendering processCompetition for-the-market, not in-the-market
Special institution to run the new system Tariff integration
Create a separate entity responsible for fare collectionNew labor and business concept
Fleet renewal, incorporation of high capacity vehicles
Extension of subway and few km of segregated busways
(complementary)
High investment in high capacity, high quality segregated busways
Transmilenio vs. TransantiagoDifferences
Possible explanation Context, political decision, etc.
Consequences, advantages, questions, comments
Topics for Discussion
All the following slides will follow this pattern
Transmilenio Transantiago
Gradual implementation, corridor by corridor in Bogotá, but each corridor “comes with the full BRT attire” (with all BRT features)
Gradual implementation along the years in Santiago (including the re-regulation of services in the 1990’s), but each step of improvement affects the whole metropolitan area (city-wide)
“Big-Bang” planned for 2006-2007Short Mayor’s mandate: 3 years (4 years now) it had to be done quickly
Magnitude of investment/km
Existence of extended metro network, covering already a large part of the area, backbone of the trunk network
Willingness to implement a drastic change
Show-case to replicate, convincing example
More gradual impact on workers from traditional system
Conflictive coexistence between old and new system (competition and aggressions…).
Traditional operators still carry 75% of the demand: willingness to restructure them as well (bigger companies, payment per bus-km)
All areas in the city will benefit from it simultaneously
Great blow to traditional operators, difficulties adapting to changes
Huge scale of the reform made it more complex to implement
Implementation Type
Cover 85% of urban area and meet mobility needs for the majority of the population with 388km of trunk
routes, to attend 5 million passengers/day (investment of US$2,300 millions)
Bogota: current network & 2036 network (ex-2015…)
Transantiago: Implementation by Phases
1. 2. 3.
Phase 1Phase 1October 2005 - May 2006
Phase 2Phase 2May - August 2006
Phase 3Phase 3Feb 07 (ex Aug, 06)
BUSINESS APPROACH
•New business and labor model•Inflow of 1.800 new buses
CONTACTLESS CARD•Start up of contactless card system
INTEGRATION
•Change in routes•Tariff integration•Metro is integrated with Transantiago.
90’s: re-regulation, scrapping of old vehicles, establishment of minimum requirements for service supply
2002: immediate measures (exclusive streets for buses & reversible streets for cars at morning peak hours, Alameda Av. with 3 bus lanes/direction).
2006-20??: expansion of segregated busway network
Presidential Election
Transmilenio Transantiago
Feeders only cover catchment areas of terminals
Flat fare whether feeder buses are used or not (feeder services are “free”)
Local services feed the trunk routes but cover all metropolitan area, and are not for free
Fare is a function of the number of transfers
Political decision to implement a cross-subsidy, social motivation behind project
Practical side of the flat fare option
Trunk routes high profitability
Belief in market mechanisms
Fear that feeders could break the financial balance of the system.
Different purpose of local services (not only feeders)
Congestion and pollution reduction (rather than social) overriding objectives
what happens if feeder routes mileage increases?
Next stage profitability is not as high sustainabilty at risk?
Those who had direct service before Transantiago and now have to do one or two transfers may end up paying more for a worse service
Feeders vs. localsFlat fare vs. distance-related fare
The Network in Santiago
Rates in Santiago
Transmilenio Transantiago
Segregated lines financed with public funds (Central Government and Mayor’s office, including tax on gas) with a 15-year plan
Part of the bus infrastructure (60% for 2004-2005 period) is financed by the private sector, and finally by the farebox revenues
Public transport considered a public service, social approach
Initial concerns about the financial sustainability of the concessions
Rationale: car driver do not pay for the infrastructure, why should bus users?
Infrastructure represented a bigger share of total costs than in Santiago
Free-market oriented philosophy: tariffs should fully reflect costs of the system
Make the most out of the user’s willingness to pay
Previous successes in infrastructure sector were financed by private sector (highways), better investment climate
Already US$ 1600 millions of public money invested in subway
The subsequent phases have become more expensive/km pressure on public budget
Due to public funds scarcity, recourse to private financing, to be repaid by the Municipality
Eventually, infrastructure does not represent a big share of the tariff (5%)
Strangely enough, bus users cross-subsidize car users (Santa Rosa, Conexión Las Rejas)
Infrastructure Financing
Revenues breakdown in Bogota
4,51%
11,00%
20,00% 64,45%
0,0387%
Operadores Troncales (%Mín) Operadores de Alimentación (%Máx)Operadores de Recaudo (%Max) TRANSMILENIO S.A. (% Fijo + %Mín)Administrador Fiduciario (% Fijo)
Revenues breakdown in Santiago
Servicios Alimentadores
14,2%
Metro32,1%
CIG0,3%
Infraestructura5,6%
AFT5,2%
Servicios Troncales
42,6%
Total cost of the System : US$716 millions/year
Transmilenio Transantiago
In Bogota, all trunk buses are new In Santiago, only part of the trunk buses had to be new buses providing they comply with maximum levels of emissions
Average age before Transm. >13 years, maximum age 30 years with refurbishment
Interest in a drastic change
All trunk buses are articulated with left doors, high platforms (there were no buses like this in Bogotá before the Transmilenio)
Average age 5 years
Loosen requirements as long as air pollution objectives are met, private sector should decide which is the best option to meet said objectives
Huge impact image-wise
Big investment in rolling stock, and serious problems at the time to obtain financing, but there was no other option after the decision to purchase high capacity buses had been made
This option meets the air pollution requirements and addresses the complaints of the operators who had already invested in new buses.
New Buses vs. 2nd Hand Buses
Rolling Stock
Transmilenio Transantiago
Almost 100% of trunk routes are on segregated busways
High platform, median, lane for overtaking
Doors on the left
Trunks routes extend way beyond the segregated busways
At-grade access from sidewalks
Doors on the rightPrevent informal sector invasion, “freeze” the system, ensure continuity (fear that a new Mayor could decide to open trunk routes to informal sector)Bi-directional stations: space savings, fewer turnstiles, less station staff requiredTwo-lanes per direction: express services
More flexibility (allows trunk buses to operate on general street network)Lower platform and the use of bus lanes on the right makes possible the use of second hand buses
High Platform: vehicle cost are lower, more availability, less time during purchase process Boarding time: 0,1 - 0,3 sec/passengerHigh capacity
Longer boarding and alighting times(high floor: 1,5 -1,9 sec/pas, low floor: 0,4 -0,6 sec/pas)Low floor buses more expensive (+20%)
Trunk Routes: totally or partially segregated , high or low platform…
Segregated Lanes in Bogota
Segregated Lanes in Santiago
A total of close to 20 km will be implemented in Santa Rosa, Pajaritos and Las RejasAvenues. ( total of 26 km, including the pre-existing Av.Grecia busway)
Transmilenio Transantiago
For the first phase, payment to operators proportional to the # of bus-km and to the cost per bus-km offered by each operator
After some controversies, Santiago adopted payment per passenger
Eliminate “penny war” (still, according to this formula, the payment received by the operator is as well determined by the system-wide number of users, therefore, there is an incentive to improve the quality of service)
Rejection of contingencies generated by bus-km payment
Avoid multiplication of bus-km
Don’t de-link tariff from operational cost
Keep the incentives to improve quality
Transmilenio S.A. responsible for levels of service definition.
End of “penny war”, almost no accident
Private sector has more possibilities to define the levels of service
How to ensure that drivers don’t receive financial incentives tied to the number of passengers?
Trunk Routes, type of payment:
bus-km or passenger?
Transmilenio Transantiago
Fenced-off stations, pre-board fare collection, high platforms, with automatic doors coordinated with buses (with several entrance doors)
On-board payment, even in stations with high volumes of passengers. Boarding has to be made through the front door
Reduce stopping times (less time spent on boarding and alighting)
Less investment due to absence of closed-off, paying stations
Payment per passengers requires on board validation (in order to know how to share farebox revenues among operators)
At the beginning there were long lines at stations due to technical glitches with fare cards and validators. Improved later (initially, bus users had as well to validate their card when exiting the stations to collect OD data)
Bottlenecks in stations with higher volume of passengers?
Significant negative impact on commercial speed?
Trunk Routes: validation on board or in closed stations?
Stations in Bogota
Santiago
Transmilenio Transantiago
Transmilenio buses are Euro II & Euro III technology, diesel fuel with 1000 ppm sulphur
Bus scrapping process (for each articulated bus, between 2.7 and 8.9 old buses had to be scrapped)
Buses are, at least, Euro III technology , particulate filters, diesel fuel with 50 ppmsulphur
Metro use maximization and doubling of network (from 40 to 81 km).
Emission tradingAmong the objectives: respect life by reducing tailpipe emissions
Strong concern for environmental aspects (thermal inversion during winter season)
Anti-Pollution Plan Objectives: reduction in PM10: 75% and NOx: 40%
Emission reductions in the BRT corridor but up to 40% more in the rest of the city. What is ”saved” along the BRT corridors is partially balanced off with what happens outside the corridors
In theory, and thanks to a reform that will cover the whole city, and in the expected absence of informality, there should not be “leaks” and the anti-pollution plan objectives should be met
Environmental Impact
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
PM-10 (u/m3) +12%SO2 (ppb) +15%NO2 (ppb) -13%CO (ppm*10) -28%O3 (ppb) -6%
Air Quality in Bogota (whole city)
6560
52
34
Average Concentrations
Source: Departamento del Medio Ambiente; Red de calidad del aire
SantiagoAnti-Pollution Plan: Objectives
Transmilenio Transantiago
Recovery of public spaceLink between land-use and transport less conceptualized than in Santiago
PTUS: influence location tendencies and integrate town-planning and transport
School locations (P3), shops and services (P4), households (P5)
Mayor’s Office in Bogotá has a metropolitan character and is responsible for land-use planningCoordination with social housing program, Metroviviendas
Neither Transantiago nor the Subsecretaríade Transporte participate in Santiago’s urban development. Difficult to jointly plan land-use and transportMoreover, bus stops location is responsibility of the municipalities
Some significant real estate development near the corridors and the terminals (see pictures) Rise in rents and real state prices
Dichotomy between land-use and transport?2003: urbanization of areas formerly used for agricultural purposes allowing development of urban projects in pieces of land bigger than 300 ha, providing that impacts are mitigated
Urban Impact
Portal de la 80 Shopping Mall, Calle 80 Carrera 98, Pictures DHG, April 2004
First 56 Sports Center and Shopping Mall, Caracas Av. 56 St., Pictures DHG, April 2004
Urban Impact: Bogota
Metroviviendas Project, USME
Metroviviendas Project, USME
Transmilenio Transantiago
Operators are mostly locally owned and aggregate former traditional operators Promotion of local participation in the bidding process
Foreign firms share a significant portion of the business (Colombia, with participation from the French & the Spanish in the bidding) and/or outside the sector
Minimization of social impactsBut: Central Command’s technology awarded to Spanish group, money collection awarded to Colombian firm with support from a foreign group
Willingness to open the market
… and possibly to get rid of traditional operators…
But only to a certain extent (local routes=“done deal” for traditional operators)
Greater social peace (but traditional companies not participating have filed lawsuits that introduce some legal risks to system expansion)
Less competition and possibly higher prices
Disadvantage: intensification of social problems. Many traditional yellow buses continue to operate as pirates in corridors concessioned out to the Colombian companies, which protested and are seeking compensation.Advantage: foreign firms had investment and managerial resources that local firms wouldn’t have had
Foreign Participation
Transmilenio Transantiago
Approx. 10% of Transmilenio users are former car drivers
will see in 2006!
Restriction of car use according to license plate numbers during peak hours, increase of parking fares (+100%), 1 “car-free day” per year during a working day, increase in gasoline tax (+20%), etc.
Stabilize public transport modal share
Rationalize car use (P2)Internalize external costs of car use
Restrict car use only when there is a good-quality alternative to car use, i.e. not before Transantiago is operational
Referendum to prohibit the use of cars during peak hours in Bogotá in 2015 Was approved in 2000, but due to the low turnout, the result is not binding.
Urban highways in Santiago (US$$1800 millions), subsidy to Costanera Norte (US$120 millions), some car infrastructure financed by bus users… but possibly, in the long run, congestion pricing (Govt’scommitment if costs are not covered)
Policies for Car use
Other Topics …
Tariff: US$55 cents / 70 cents
NMT: expanded network in Bogotá (240 km), network under development in Santiago (foreseen: 70km)
Impact of change depends on starting point : very strong in Bogotá(before Transmilenio there was permanent deterioration and few corrective actions),
probably, less strong in Santiago
Time savings, very important in Bogotá, less in Santiago, except for those who can benefit from subway extensions
In Santiago, technical aspects (under the responsibility of a state agency, SECTRA) preceded strong political support (from President Lagos), in
Bogotá, political decision (from Mayor Peñalosa) preceded exceptionally competent planning and design effort