Transition and Village Stability Operations

March 2012

Classification: Unclassified

2

Outline

•A Historical Perspective

• Implications for Transition

UNCLASSIFIED

3

Historical Themes

• Constant struggle between the center and periphery

• Most efforts to create stability from only the top-down have failed – and have triggered rural rebellions

– Amanullah Khan– Communist era

• Stability has generally required working from the “bottom up” and the “top down”

– Top-down efforts to establish security, legitimacy, governance in urban areas

– Bottom-up efforts to establish security, legitimacy, governance in rural areas, especially Pashtun areas

UNCLASSIFIED

4

Low

Pakistan

Wana

Miramshah

Chitral

Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901)

Bagram

Kokayty

Shindand

Abdur Rahman Khan

July 1880 Battle of Maiwand

July-Aug 1881Revolts in Kandahar,which were crushed

1891-93Wars in Hazarajat 1886-88

Wars against Ghilzai

1895-96Wars in Kafiristan

• Abdur Rahman Khan used force to centralize state power by co-opting and coercing Pashtun tribes

• Reduced autonomy of three groups Eastern Pashtun tribes Non-Sunni ethnic groups

• Crushed resistance with aid of British, who helped finance national army

UNCLASSIFIED

5

Low

Pakistan

Wana

Miramshah

Chitral

Amanullah (1919-29)

Bagram

Kokayty

ShindandAmanullah

1925Khowst Rebellion

1928Shinwari Revolt

1929Overthrow of

Amanullah

UNCLASSIFIED

• Amanullah attempted to establish order in rural areas from the top-down

• Began third Anglo-Afghan war• Many of his Western reforms were met with

rebellion in rural areas Established rural tax reform Curtailed polygamy, child marriage Enacted universal military conscription Abolished the veil

• But Pashtun areas revolted

6

Low

Pakistan

Wana

Miramshah

Chitral

Musahiban Dynasty (1929-1978)

Bagram

Kokayty

Shindand

Nadir Shah Zahir Shah

1945-46Safi Rebellion (Konar)

1959Kandahar Rebellion

1975Islamist Uprising in Panjshir

Daoud Khan

UNCLASSIFIED

• Established balance between top-down and bottom-up Eliminated rural taxation and raised

revenue through trade tariffs, foreign aid, large companies

Exempted key tribes from military conscription, and Ministry of Tribal Affairs tended to tribal needs

Established increasingly powerful national army and police force

“Since the people so designate me so, I accept. I will not be the king but the servant of the tribes and the country.”

– King Nadir Shah (1929)

7 Low

Pakistan

Wana

Miramshah

Chitral

Soviet Invasion (December 1979)

Kokayty

Shindand

Termez

Kushka

Jalalabad

Gardez

Chaman

365th and 66th Motor-Rifle Divisions

201st Motor-Rifle Division occupies NE Afghanistan

360th Motor Rifle Division secures Kabul after airborne assault

Special forces and paratroopers from the 105th and 106th Airborne Division

seize Kabul

Bagram

UNCLASSIFIED

8

Low

Pakistan

Wana

Miramshah

Chitral

Communist Era (1978-1992)

Bagram

Kokayty

Shindand

• PDPA launched a sweeping series of rural economic and social programs

• Goal was to increase central government power in rural areas Tried to break down qawms Enacted rural taxes, social reforms Allied with “Godless” Soviet Union

• Eventually turned to large, offensive urban and rural militias

• But rural population revolted, with help from Pakistan, United States, Saudis

Jalalabad

Mohammad Taraki

Hafizulla Amin

Babrak Karmal

Najibullah Ahmadzai

UNCLASSIFIED

9

Low

Afghan Civil War (1989-1992)

KABUL

JALALABAD

April - June 1990Afghan army clears

mujahedeen entrenchments at

Paghman

April 1991 Mujahedeen forces take Khost after 11

year siege

April 1992Kandahar falls to the

Mujahedeen

April 1992Helmand falls to the Mujahedeen

April 1992Kunduz falls to the Mujahedeen

April 1992Jalalabad falls to the

Mujahedeen

• Government abolished national army in 1992• Supported rural and urban militias

Sepayan-i Enqelab (Soldiers of the revolution) Hauza-i Amniyati (District security) Geru-i Defa-i Khodi (Self-defense groups)

• Government supported large, offensive militias under individual commanders Militias exceeded size of national forces Government lost preponderance of power

UNCLASSIFIED

10

Low

Pakistan

Beginning of Taliban Era (1994)

Chaman

October 12, 1994 – Taliban take Spin Boldak

Spin Boldak

KandaharNovember

1994

Charasyab

Bagram

Taliban tears down checkpoints around Kandahar that extort money from travelers, and dismantles criminal networks

• Taliban began insurgency• Developed a bottom-up strategy

Co-opted tribes, sub-tribes, clans, militia commanders

Coerced those that couldn’t be co-opted

• But their effort to impose a top-down, foreign Deobandi ideology was biggest weakness (most talibs trained in Pakistan)

• Pakistan government provides support

UNCLASSIFIED

11

Low

Pakistan

Taliban Controlled Most of Country by 2000

Chaman

Spin Boldak

Charasyab

Bagram

September 5 – Taliban take Taloqan

Taloqan

Most significant resistance led by Ahmed Shah Massoud in Panjshir Valley

UNCLASSIFIED

12

History of Local Forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Case Dates Objective EffectivenessAbdur Rahman

Khan1880-1901

Establish order with help of tribal forces

Effective in creating law and order

Musahiban dynasty 1929-1978Establish order with help of arbakai, chalweshtai, and others

Effective since forces were small, defensive, run by jirgas

Pakistan (Kashmir I) 1947-1948Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars

Ineffective since Waziris were used for offensive purposes

Pakistan (Kashmir II)

1965Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars

Ineffective since tribes were used for offensive purposes

Anti-Soviet war 1979-1989Defeat Soviet and Afghan armies with local forces

Effective in triggering Soviet withdrawal; had local support

Najibullah and Rabbani

1986-1996Establish order using urban and rural militias

Ineffective since militias were large, offensive, run by warlords

Operation Enduring Freedom

2001-2002Overthrow Taliban using local forces

Effective in defeating Taliban regime

Afghan National Auxiliary Police

2006-2008Establish order with help of local auxiliaries

Ineffective since forces were not integrated into local jirgas

Pakistan (FATA and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa)2008-

Establish order following Pakistan army and Frontier Corps operations

Partly effective, but lack of quick reaction force led to insurgent targeting

UNCLASSIFIED

13

History of Local Forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Case Dates Objective EffectivenessAbdur Rahman

Khan1880-1901

Establish order with help of tribal forces

Effective in creating law and order

Musahiban dynasty 1929-1978Establish order with help of arbakai, chalweshtai, and others

Effective since forces were small, defensive, run by jirgas

Pakistan (Kashmir I) 1947-1948Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars

Ineffective since Waziris were used for offensive purposes

Pakistan (Kashmir II)

1965Seize Kashmir with help of tribal lashkars

Ineffective since tribes were used for offensive purposes

Anti-Soviet war 1979-1989Defeat Soviet and Afghan armies with local forces

Effective in triggering Soviet withdrawal; had local support

Najibullah and Rabbani

1986-1996Establish order using urban and rural militias

Ineffective since militias were large, offensive, run by warlords

Operation Enduring Freedom

2001-2002Overthrow Taliban using local forces

Effective in defeating Taliban regime

Afghan National Auxiliary Police

2006-2008Establish order with help of local auxiliaries

Ineffective since forces were not integrated into local jirgas

Pakistan (FATA and Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa)2008-

Establish order following Pakistan army and Frontier Corps operations

Partly effective, but lack of quick reaction force led to insurgent targeting

UNCLASSIFIED

14

Village Stability Operations

UNCLASSIFIED

15

Afghan Local Police Sites StatusLocal Defense Forces: December 2009UNCLASSIFIED

16

11

5

16

8

6

4

314 1 2

7

1312

9

10

15

17

Afghan Loc..al Police Sites Status7734

43 33

2

18

19

66

21

22

23

29 35

24

26

28

27

3637

38

39

40

41

42

43

4445

46

47

48

49 50

51

52

5354

55

56

57

58

5960

61

62

63

In-Processed Sites Sites Validated Pending Validation Pending Tashkils ALP HQ

70

74

65 67

71

68

64

73

72

69

7775

20

30 31

32 33

34

76

25

Afghan Local Police: March 2012UNCLASSIFIED

17

Outline

•A Historical Perspective

• Implications for Transition

UNCLASSIFIED

18

SOF Will Likely Become More ImportantDuring – and After – Transition

Unconventional WarForeign Internal Defense

Counterterrorism

UNCLASSIFIED

19

Balancing Top Down and Bottom Up

Kabul

Provincial /Urban Centers

District Centers

Villages

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Transition = Helping Afghans Stand Up for Themselves

20

Not Just About Security

DevelopmentGovernance Security

UNCLASSIFIED

21

I. Governance Lessons

UNCLASSIFIED

A critical requirement is compiling information on government officials, tribes, clans, entrepreneurs, religious leaders, and other influential individuals.

This requires significant community engagement.

UNCLASSIFIED

22

Communities Prefer Traditional InstitutionsUNCLASSIFIED

2007 2008 2009 2010 201155

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

Local shura / jirga are accessible to me

Local shura / jirga are fair and trusted

Local shura / jirga follow the local norms and values of our people

Local shura / jirga are effective at delivering justice

Local shura / jirga resolve cases timely and promptly

Pe

rce

nta

ge

Perception of Local Shura / Jirga

Asia Foundation Poll, 2011

23

Communities Prefer Traditional InstitutionsUNCLASSIFIED

Are accessible to me

Are fair and trusted

Follow the local norms and values

of our people

Are effective at delivering justice

Resolve cases timely and promptly

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90 State Court

Shura / Jirga

Per

cen

tag

e

2007 2008 2009 2010 201155

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

Local shura / jirga are accessible to me

Local shura / jirga are fair and trusted

Local shura / jirga follow the local norms and values of our people

Local shura / jirga are effective at delivering justice

Local shura / jirga resolve cases timely and promptly

Pe

rce

nta

ge

Perception of Local Shura / Jirga

State Court vs. Shura / Jirga

Asia Foundation Poll, 2011

24

II. Security Lessons

UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

Initiative comes from local communities (grass roots), small, defensive, supported by legitimate local institutions (jirgas),

ANSF retain preponderance of power

25

Ali

(Shipper)

AFGHAN INSURGENCY TEMPLATE

LOCAL FORCEAUXILIARY

UNDERGROUND

Ghulam

-47Ak-47Ak -47Ak-47Ak-47Ak-47Ak

Security Is Not Just About A Local Force:Auxiliary, Underground

UNCLASSIFIED

26

III. Economic LessonsUNCLASSIFIED

27

Small, Localized Development Projects Are Particularly Effective

• Development to reduce insurgency should be small, localized, and done with development expertise

• According to one recent study of Iraq, CERP spending appears to be violence-reducing

– $1 per/capita in CERP predicts ~6 less SIGACTS per six-month period in average sized district (275,000 pop.)

– Non-construction projects ~2× as violence reducing

• Small-scale USAID spending also appears to help– $1 per/capita in Community Stabilization Program (CSP)

predicts ~20 less SIGACTS per six-month period in average sized district (275,000 pop.)

– Community Action Program (CAP) does not appear to help, nor do larger projects

Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and MindsBe Bought?” Journal of Political Economy

UNCLASSIFIED

28

• VSO / ALP have had positive effects– Contributed to a decrease in insurgent control of

territory– Undermined insurgency’s rural support base and

limited their freedom of movement– Improved governance – including traditional, informal

systems

• But challenges remain– Insurgent intimidation, assassination, infiltration– Ethnic and tribal imbalances and tensions– Variation in quality of district, provincial governance– Some media, other perceptions of 1990s-style militias– Information operations

VSO / ALP Effects and ChallengesUNCLASSIFIED

29

Help Afghans Stand Up for ThemselvesUNCLASSIFIED

30

Leader of al Qa’ida

Egyptian

Ayman al-Zawahiri

AQ Deputy Leader

Abu Yahya al-Libi

Libyan

AL-QAIDA IN IRAQ

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Abu Du’a)

Afghan

Mullah Omar

AFGHAN TALIBAN

Hakimullah Mehsud

TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN

Pakistani Pakistani

Hafiz Saeed

LASHKAR TAYYIBA

Afghan

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Hezb Islami Gulbuddin

Yemeni

Nasir al-Wahishi

AL-QAIDA IN ARABIAN PENINSULA

AL-QAIDA IN ISLAMIC MAGHREB

Algerian

Abdelmalek Droukdal

Somali

AL-SHABAAB

Kenyan

Harun Fazul

AL-QAIDA IN EAST AFRICA

Why Are We Still In Afghanistan?Continuing Threats to the U.S. Homeland

Iraqi

Haqqani Network

Jalaluddin Haqqani

AFFILIATED GROUPS ALLIED GROUPS

Afghan

CENTRAL AL QA’IDAHassan Gul Hamza al-Ghamdi

Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi

Pakistani

ExternalOperations

Saudi

Top facilitatorfor Zawahiri

Moroccan

Media Committee

Ali ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Umar

ABDULLAHAZZAM BRIGADES

Saudi

Abu Khayr Al-Masri

IRAN DETAINEES

Egyptian

Nigerian

Abubakar Shekau

BOKO HARAM

Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohammed

UNCLASSIFIED

31

A Taliban Government in AfghanistanWould Almost Certainly Be An Al Qa’ida Ally

Faisal Shahzad: Times Square Bomb (2010)

Faisal Shahzad

Najibullah Zazi: Three Suicide Bombers in NYC Subway (2009)

September 11, 2001

UNCLASSIFIED

32

QUESTIONS?

UNCLASSIFIED