TRANSFORMATION TRANSFORMED: THE ^ WAR ON TERROR' AND THE .MODERNISATION OF THE BRITISH MILITARY

' By

SAMUEL LYON

B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of O x f o r d , 2005

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR- THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

i n

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

( P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e )

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

August 2006

© Samuel Lyon, 2006 •

11

A B S T R A C T

This thesis assesses the transformation of the British Military from the mid-1990s up until the

current day. It addresses how the end of the Cold War brought a change in what was demanded of

the British Armed Forces, and that since then, those Forces have adapted to that changed demand,

altering their structure, tactics and equipment in order to deal with these new tasks and to exploit

technological changes. Yet, as this thesis explores, transformation has not proceeded at a uniform

pace, with the British experiencing several stages of transformative progress, and some of regress.

Starting with the Strategic Defence Review of 1998, this thesis traces the overall picture of

transformation in the United Kingdom, looking at how it is managed, why it occurred, and where

it is going. In particular though, it focuses on the stops and starts in the transformative process,

and connects these primarily to the consequences of the Blair Government's most important

decision of all its time in power - being America's closest ally after the terror attacks of

September 11th 2001. Following these commitments, Britain committed to an even greater

transformation of its military, set out in the Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter in 2002.

The involvement of British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, as the closest and most significant

allies of the United States, drove transformation through co-operation with the much more

transformed American Forces, and also had the support of greatly increased funding from the

Treasury, enabling leaps in equipment technology. Those same commitments have placed a

strain on transformation, however, as the requirement on troops has become that of occupation,

rather than advanced warfighting. Thus we see the tale of transformation as one greatly impacted

by Britain's involvement in the American-led 'War on Terror'.

iii

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

ABSTRACT ii

T A B L E OF CONTENTS Hi

LIST OF FIGURES ; v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi

DEDICATION vii

INTRODUCTION 1

Introductory Context 2

Research Questions and Hypotheses 4

Methodology 4

CHAPTER ONE - Literature Review 5

Britain's Military Post-Cold War 5

The Revolution in Military Affairs and the US Military 8

Technological Change and Strategic Planning 11

Bureaucratic Management 14

CHAPTER TWO - The Strategic Defence Review 17

Prelude to the 1997 General Election 17

Process Behind the SDR 22

Transformational Moves in the SDR 23

Assessment of the Policy-Making Process 29

Conclusion 36

CHAPTER THREE - Transformation Transformed 39

US Moves Towards Transformation 39

iv

Further Development of Planning Moves in the U K 42

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter 43

Funding the SDR-NC 48

US Moves Post-9/11 49

British and US Military Co-operation 50

Blue Force Tracker - A Case Study 52

Transformational Implications of the Insurgency 53

Financial Implications 57

Conclusion 58

CHAPTER FOUR - Conclusion 62

Further Study 64

BIBLIOGRAPHY . .' 66

APPENDIX ONE - Glossary of Terms 70

APPENDIX TWO - MoD Bureaucracy 72

L I S T O F F I G U R E S

Figure 1 4

v i

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

My thanks go out to Colin Campbell, who introduced me to this field, and who has been a mentor this year. Thanks also go to Brian Job, who stepped in to help out when it was needed. Finally, there are my friends and colleagues here: Rodolfo, Andrea, James, Nathan, Jamie, Tim and Robert, all of whom stepped in to help and to keep me sane. Last but certainly not least, my parents, my sister Nina, and Susan. Thank you all.

DEDICATION

To Fang.

1

I N T R O D U C T I O N

T h e a i m o f t h i s t h e s i s is t o a s s e s s t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y . T h e e n d

o f t h e C o l d W a r b r o u g h t a c h a n g e i n w h a t w a s d e m a n d e d o f t h e B r i t i s h A r m e d

F o r c e s . S i n c e t h a t p o i n t , t h o s e F o r c e s h a v e a d a p t e d t o t h a t c h a n g e d d e m a n d , a l t e r i n g

t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , t a c t i c s a n d e q u i p m e n t i n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h t h e s e n e w t a s k s a n d t o

e x p l o i t t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e s . T h i s is a s i m p l i s t i c a c c o u n t o f a n e x c e e d i n g l y c o m p l e x

p r o c e s s , h o w e v e r . F i r s t l y , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n h a s n o t f i n i s h e d y e t . T h e A m e r i c a n m i l i t a r y ,

u n d e r g o i n g s i m i l a r c h a n g e s , e x p e c t s n e v e r to b e f u l l y f i n i s h e d w i t h t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i v e

a g e n d a 1 - a s m u c h a s a n y t h i n g , t h e p r o c e s s o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i s a n e n d i n i t s e l f , r a t h e r

t h a n m e r e l y a m e a n s . A b o v e a l l , t r a n s f o r m a t i o n h a s n o t p r o c e e d e d at a u n i f o r m p a c e ,

w i t h t h e B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c i n g s e v e r a l s t a g e s o f t r a n s f o r m a t i v e p r o g r e s s , a n d s o m e o f

r e g r e s s . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l t r a c e t h e o v e r a l l p i c t u r e o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e U K , l o o k i n g

at h o w it is m a n a g e d , w h y it o c c u r r e d , a n d w h e r e it is g o i n g . In p a r t i c u l a r t h o u g h , it

w i l l f o c u s o n t h e s e s t o p s a n d s t a r t s , a n d i n v e s t i g a t e s h o w t r a n s f o r m a t i o n c a m e t o

r e f l e c t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e B l a i r G o v e r n m e n t ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n o f a l l its

t i m e i n p o w e r - b e i n g A m e r i c a ' s c l o s e s t a l l y a f t e r t h e t e r r o r a t t a c k s o f S e p t e m b e r 11 th

2 0 0 1 .

W i t h i n a y e a r o f t h e N e w L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t c o m i n g i n t o p o w e r i n 1 9 9 7 , t h e

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f B r i t i s h d e f e n c e w a s u n d e r w a y . T h e p r o c e s s se t o u t t o d e t e r m i n e , a s

o n e o b s e r v e r o f t h e f i e l d p u t s it, h o w a n o r g a n i s a t i o n l i k e t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y " s h o u l d

United States Department of Defense, "Elements of Defense Transformation" (2004)

2

undertake and manage change"2. What emerged was the Strategic Defence Review

(SDR), which set Britain on a new path to expeditionary warfare with more flexible

capabilities, and which is discussed in Chapter 2. Four years later, the government

brought out an additional 'chapter' to the SDR, which embraced network-centric

warfare and the technology of transformation. It is the period in between the two,

though, that is most important. In fact, just one day changed the dynamic of

transformation in the UK - September 11th 2001 - and Chapter 3 addresses how the

American and British responses to that event resulted in this shift. Before that, there is

a brief section setting up the strategic context prior to the first transformative moves,

and then a review of the relevant literature fields.

Introductory Context

Before going on to look at the literature in the fields relating to British transformation,

it is necessary briefly to address Britain's strategic position, as from this so much of

its defence policy is drawn. Britain sits, both literally and metaphorically, between

Europe and the United States. That position has meant that the United Kingdom has

been torn between the two for centuries. The Cold War offered a brief period during

which these two strategic spheres merged for Britain - the defence considerations of

the United States were to keep Western Europe from the control of the Soviet forces

on its borders, and similarly the Europeans desired to protect themselves from the

communist threat. While these joint goals faced some rough periods (such as the

departure of the French from the NATO military planning structure in 1966, or

protests about the deployment of American nuclear forces), the overall result was one

2 Andrew M . Dorman, "Transformation and the United Kingdom" JFQ: Join! Force Quarterly , no. 37 (2005): pg. 27.

3

w h e r e b y B r i t a i n ' s d e s i r e s t o r e a s s u r e t h e A m e r i c a n s o f t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t t o

c o n t r i b u t i n g t o d e f e n c e m a t c h e d t h e p e r c e i v e d n e e d t o b e a p l a y e r i n c o n t i n e n t a l

d e f e n c e a s w e l l . It r a p i d l y b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d n o t c o n s i d e r i t s e l f a n

i n d e p e n d e n t p l a y e r i n a n y m a j o r c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e S o v i e t s , a n d w h o l e - h e a r t e d

i n v o l v e m e n t i n N A T O p r o v i d e d t h e s u p p o r t o f a n a l l i a n c e s t r u c t u r e , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e

v a s t m u s c l e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

W h e n t h e C o l d W a r e n d e d , E u r o p e a n p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d p r i o r i t i e s h a d c h a n g e d . D o z e n s

o f n e w s t a t e s h a d e m e r g e d f r o m t h e r u i n s o f t h e S o v i e t B l o c , a n d t h e i r i n s t a b i l i t y h a d

c a u s e d o n e w o r l d w a r a l r e a d y i n t h e c e n t u r y . R u s s i a w a s b y n o m e a n s f u l l y

d e m i l i t a r i s e d , n o r p o l i t i c a l l y c o n g e n i a l t o w a r d s t h e W e s t . E a s t a n d W e s t G e r m a n y

w e r e r e - u n i t i n g , f o r m i n g t h e p o w e r f u l a n d p o t e n t i a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g G e r m a n s t a t e o n c e

m o r e . B o t h t h e B r i t i s h a n d t h e F r e n c h w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y w o r r i e d b y t h e p r o s p e c t o f t h e

r e u n i f i e d G e r m a n y , b u t d e a l t w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n i n v e r y d i f f e r e n t w a y s . T h e F r e n c h

c h o s e t o b i n d h e r w i t h a m o r e f e d e r a l E u r o p e a n U n i o n . T h e B r i t i s h , l e d b y t h e

E u r o s k e p t i c C o n s e r v a t i v e s , s h e e r e d a w a y f r o m s u c h a r o u t e , w h i c h w o u l d h a v e

d e m a n d e d at t h e v e r y l e a s t o p e n l y e m b r a c i n g t h e W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n U n i o n . I n s t e a d ,

t h e B r i t i s h c h o s e t o e n l i s t t h e h e l p o f N A T O , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t o

b r i n g G e r m a n y i n t o a s t r u c t u r e d e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e s e a p p r o a c h e s a c h i e v e d t h e i r g o a l -

t h e r e n e w e d G e r m a n y d i d n o t p o s e a g r e a t t h r e a t t o t h e U K o r E u r o p e . B r i t a i n h a d

m a d e its a l l e g i a n c e k n o w n h o w e v e r , a n d w a s n o w d i s t a n c e d f r o m E u r o p e ' s c o r e

i n s t i t u t i o n s , f o c u s i n g i n s t e a d o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r i ts s t r a t e g i c a n d m i l i t a r y

b e a r i n g s 3 . T r a n s f o r m a t i o n w o u l d b e n e f i t f r o m t h i s b o n d . S t r a t e g i c a l l y , t h i s is w h e r e

3 Andrew M . Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era" Defense Analysis 17, no. 2 (2001): 187-202. ; Michael Clarke, "Security Challenges" jn About Turn, Forward March with Europe : New* Directions

4

w e f i n d o u r s e l v e s at t h e s t a r t o f t h i s t h e s i s . B r i t a i n is c a s t i n g a b o u t f o r a n e w set o f

t a s k s / o r h e r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , a n d i n t h i s s e a r c h s h e is p r i m a r i l y l o o k i n g t o w a r d s t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s .

R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n s a n d H y p o t h e s e s

I n a v e r y g e n e r a l s e n s e , t h e r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n h e r e is " H o w d i d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o c c u r

i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m ? " B r e a k i n g t h i s b r o a d e r q u e s t i o n a p a r t , t w o c o r e p o i n t s

e m e r g e . F i r s t l y , t h e r e i s t h e n e e d t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w a n d w h y t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n

p r o c e s s s t a r t e d , a n d t h i s i s d e a l t w i t h i n C h a p t e r T w o . F o l l o w i n g o n f r o m t h a t i s t h e

n e e d t o a d d r e s s w h y t r a n s f o r m a t i o n c h a n g e d s o m a r k e d l y f r o m t h e c o u r s e o n w h i c h it

w a s h e a d i n g . T h e h y p o t h e s i s o f t h i s t h e s i s , b r i e f l y m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , is t h a t a s t h e

B r i t i s h a n d A m e r i c a n r e s p o n s e t o S e p t e m b e r 1 1 t h w a s m i l i t a r y , t h e c a m p a i g n

r e q u i r e m e n t s s t r u c t u r e d h o w t h a t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t e d , t h e r e b y a f f e c t i n g i ts

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .

M e t h o d o l o g y

A l o n g s i d e t h e s t u d y o f g o v e r n m e n t d o c u m e n t s , a c a d e m i c l i t e r a t u r e a n d s o f o r t h , at t h e

c o r e pf t h e r e s e a r c h m e t h o d i n t h i s w o r k is a se t o f i n t e r v i e w s , u n d e r t a k e n at f i r s t b y

C o l i n C a m p b e l l , a n d t h e n m y s e l f . T h e s e w e r e w i t h t h i r t e e n s e n i o r c i v i l i a n a n d

m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s i n t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n c e ( M o D ) , a n d a c a d e m i c s i n v o l v e d i n t h e

p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . T h e i n t e r v i e w s w e r e u n d e r t a k e n o n t h e c o n d i t i o n o f s t r i c t

a n o n y m i t y , a n d t h u s u n a t t r i b u t e d q u o t e s e x i s t at p o i n t s d u r i n g t h i s t h e s i s .

for Defence and Security Policy (London; Concord, M A : IPPR/Rivers Oram Press; Paul and Company, 1996), 13-27.

5

C H A P T E R O N E - Literature Review

Britain's Military Post-Cold War

Smith and Uttley point out that the overwhelming focus on the Soviet threat had had

an impact beyond the selection criteria for Britain's selection of her allies - in

addition, "the 45-year Cold War had made planning assumptions, to a remarkably

degree, extraordinarily stable"4. Not only had this particular threat now disappeared,

but the whole idea that Britain would have to primarily orient itself towards fighting a

massive war to prevent the dominance of Europe was defunct5, and the country found

itself in the same position as many other Western European states - with armed forces

"trained extensively for a war that did not take place"6. This resulted in both

opportunity and threat. The British government could finally make choices over the

status of British Forces, as the country's very existence would not be in peril. One

aspect of this would be exploiting the 'peace dividend', whereby a cut in the costly

Forces budget could yield resources for other, needy policy programmes.

Nevertheless, the world had not turned peaceful in the blink of an eye, and the Forces

could not be dangerously weakened.

Despite the future offering numerous options for British defence policy, and requiring

some form of reaction, assessments of the political response to these events broadly

suggest governmental languor in this regard. Greenwood points out that political will

4 Mike Smith and Matthew Uttley, "Military Power in a Multipolar World" in The Changing Face of Military Power : Joint Warfare in the Expeditionary Era (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002), pg. 2. 5 Lawrence Freedman, The Politics of British Defenc. 1979-98. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, 1999), 259. 6 Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish, "The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit" International Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002): pg. 777.

6

o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e gove rnmen t o f the t ime d id not stretch far t owards r ad i ca l l y

c h a n g i n g de fence p o l i c y in the face o f geopo l i t i ca l shi f ts , sugges t ing instead an

att i tude that w h i l e it " m i g h t be necessary to adjust fo rce leve ls or al ter the fo rce

structure as t ime goes b y . . . f o r the bus iness o f ' d e f e n d i n g our fu tu re ' the s ize and

shape o f the A r m e d F o r c e s , the i r equ ipmen t and d e p l o y m e n t are essent ia l l y as they

shou ld b e " 7 . W h i l e some min is te rs recogn i sed the n e w secur i ty env i ronmen t , the f e w

p o l i c y changes under taken in the face o f the changed strategic p ic tu re B r i t a i n n o w

faced were by and large cos t -cu t t ing measures , w i thou t ex tens ive re fo rmu la t i ons o f

p o l i c y 8 . T h e expe r ience o f the last fu l l de fence r e v i e w , he ld in 1981 by Secre tary o f

State fo r D e f e n c e J o h n N o t t , w a s not a p leasant one . U p o n the presentat ion o f the

r e v i e w , w h i c h suggested in par t i cu la r cuts to the sur face f leet, the C o n s e r v a t i v e Par ty

w a s sp l i t in terna l ly ove r a n u m b e r o f issues, and the reservat ions o f the de fence

es tab l i shment caused great embar rassment to the party os tens ib l y so c l o s e l y a l l i ed

w i t h that august b o d y 9 .

In f i ve years up to 1995 therefore , the A r m e d F o r c e s had to dea l w i t h a ser ies o f

m i n i m a l i s t q u a s i - r e v i e w s , te rmed ' e x e r c i s e ' or ' s t udy ' to a v o i d the tens ions o f the

dreaded fu l l ' r e v i e w ' . T h e s e started w i t h ' O p t i o n s fo r C h a n g e ' in 1 9 9 0 - 1 1 °, then

m o v e d on to three-stage 'S ta temen t on the D e f e n c e Es t ima tes 1 9 9 3 ' " , and then on

7 David Greenwood, "Roles, Missions and Resources" in About Turn, Forward March with Europe :' New Directions for Defence and Security Policy (London; Concord, M A : IPPR/Rivers Oram Press; Paul and Company, 1996), pg. 32. 8 Clarke, "Security Challenges" 13-27. ;-Dorman. "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era" 187-202. ; Colin Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review" Internationa! Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998): 823-845. 9 Ibid. 1 0 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Options for Change (London: The Stationary Office, 1991)

1 1 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates (London: The Stationary Office, 1993)

7

a g a i n t o ' F r o n t L i n e F i r s t : T h e D e f e n c e C o s t s S t u d y ' i n 1 9 9 4 1 2 . T h e s e s t u d i e s d i d n o t

s e r i o u s l y a t t e m p t t o a d d r e s s w h a t t a s k s t h e F o r c e s w e r e t o u n d e r t a k e i n t h e f u t u r e -

i n s t e a d , t h e f o c u s w a s o n " t r i m m i n g t h e t a i l w i t h o u t b l u n t i n g t h e t e e t h " 1 3 . T h e

C o n s e r v a t i v e G o v e r n m e n t w a s f a c i n g s e v e r e b u d g e t a r y p r e s s u r e s - t h e e c o n o m y w a s

i n a r e c e s s i o n , a n d t h e r e w e r e s t r i c t s e l f - i m p o s e d s p e n d i n g l i m i t s 1 4 . T h e d e f e n c e

b u d g e t w a s c u t c o n s i s t e n t l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e e a r l y p o s t - C o l d W a r p e r i o d , a n d g o t t o t h e

s t a g e t h a t b y 1 9 9 6 , t h e D e f e n c e C o m m i t t e e o f t h e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s w o u l d n o t

r e c o m m e n d t h e a n n u a l d e f e n c e e s t i m a t e s t o t h e H o u s e 1 5 , a n i n c r e d i b l y e m b a r r a s s i n g

r e s u l t f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t . D o r m a n 1 6 s i m i l a r l y p l a c e s m u c h o f t h e b l a m e f o r t h e

C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n a c t i v i t y o v e r d e f e n c e p o l i c y o n p o l i t i c a l w i l l ,

e m p h a s i s i n g t h e f r a c t i o u s d y n a m i c s w i t h i n t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y r e g a r d i n g E u r o p e a n

m a t t e r s . A s t h e E u r o p e a n t h e a t r e h a d c o m e t o s t r u c t u r e B r i t i s h d e f e n c e p o l i c y o v e r t h e

C o l d W a r , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s w e r e s o c a t a s t r o p h i c a l l y r i v e n o v e r t h e

f u t u r e o f E u r o p e p r o d u c e d a p o l i c y v a c u u m .

T h e f i n a n c i a l a u s t e r i t y o f t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s p o s t - C o l d W a r w e r e n o t

u n i q u e i n r e c e n t B r i t i s h h i s t o r y . E v e n d u r i n g t h e C o l d W a r , g e o - p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s w e r e

n o t t h e o n l y d r i v e r s t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n b y p o l i c y - m a k e r s . A s F r e e d m a n p o i n t e d

o u t i n 1 9 8 3 , " t h e h i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h d e f e n c e p o l i c y is o f a n a t t e m p t t o r e c o n c i l e t h e

1 2 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: The Stationary Office, 1994)

1 3 Ibid. Pg. 45. 1 4 Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era." pp. 191-2. 1 5 Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 823-845. 1 6 Dorman, "Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution of British Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," 187-202.

8

m i s m a t c h b e t w e e n r e s o u r c e s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s " 1 7 , a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h a t o f t e n o f f e r e d

v e r y l i t t l e g e n e r o s i t y i n t h e w a y o f m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e , a n d c e r t a i n l y r e s t r i c t e d t h e

a b i l i t i e s o f t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y t o m a k e d r a m a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l a d v a n c e s . D u r i n g

t h e l a t e r s t a g e s o f t h e C o l d W a r , t h i s d y n a m i c w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y a c u t e . D i s c u s s i o n s

s h o u l d n o t g o t o e x c e s s i v e l e n g t h s i n t h e i r c o m p a r i s o n , s a y , o f t h e n u m b e r s o f s h i p s i n

t h e R o y a l N a v y i n 1 9 4 5 v e r s u s t h e n u m b e r s t o d a y , a s s i g n i f i c a n t q u a l i t a t i v e l e a p s

h a v e c e r t a i n l y b e e n m a d e . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e f a c t r e m a i n s t h a t f i n a n c i a l p r e s s u r e s l e d

t h e B r i t i s h A r m e d F o r c e s t o a f a l l i n c a p a b i l i t i e s r e l a t i v e t o t h o s e o f o t h e r n a t i o n s 1 8 .

W i t h t h e f a l l o f t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t , t h e r e e x i s t e d e v e n l e s s r a t i o n a l e t o f u n d d e f e n c e , a n d

t h e r a p i d c u t s i n s p e n d i n g f o l l o w e d .

A c r o s s t h e c r i t i c i s m s o f C o n s e r v a t i v e d e f e n c e p o l i c y i n t h e m i d - 1 9 9 0 s , o n e t h e m e

s t a n d s o u t - r e a p i n g t h e b e n e f i t s o f t h e ' p e a c e d i v i d e n d ' w i t h o u t r e a s s e s s i n g r o l e s w a s

i n s u f f i c i e n t . T h e c o n t i n u e d d e p l o y m e n t o f f o r c e s o n t h e b a s i s o f f i x e d t h r e a t s w a s

e n t i r e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e . B r i t a i n n e e d e d a n a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e F o r c e s , w h i c h w o u l d a l l o w

t h e m t o d e v e l o p r e s p o n s e s t o t h e v a s t l y e x p a n d e d r e q u i r e m e n t s o n t h e i r s k i l l s .

T h e R e v o l u t i o n i n M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s a n d t h e U S M i l i t a r y

In c o n t r a s t t o t h e l i m i t e d m o v e s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t , l i t e r a t u r e o f t h e t i m e o f f e r s

n u m e r o u s s u g g e s t i o n s f o r h o w t o a d a p t t o t h e n e w r e q u i r e m e n t s o n t h e A r m e d F o r c e s .

C e r t a i n l y , t h e g r e a t c o i n c i d e n c e o f t h e t i m e f o r a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l i s e d n a t i o n s '

m i l i t a r i e s w a s t h a t o f t h e a d v e n t o f a d v a n c e d t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e s o u r c e s j u s t a s d r a m a t i c

' 1 7 Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," pg. 81. This chapter originally appeared as 'British Defence Policy After the Falklands', in John Baylis (ed.) Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy (Macmillan, 1983) pp. 62-75 1 8 John Baylis, "'Greenvvoodery' and British Defence Policy," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 62, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 443-457. ; Greenwood, "Roles, Missions and Resources," 31-48.

9

n e w m i l i t a r y r o l e s e m e r g e d . T h e ' R e v o l u t i o n i n M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s ' ( R M A ) t h a t h a d

s t a r t e d i n t h e f i n a l y e a r s o f t h e C o l d W a r n o w d e v e l o p e d a l o n g s i d e t h e p h e n o m e n a l

g r o w t h i n ' c i v i l i a n ' t e c h n o l o g i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e f i e l d o f I n f o r m a t i o n T e c h n o l o g y

( I T ) w i t h i n n o v a t i o n s s u c h a s n e t w o r k i n g a n d i n c r e a s e d p r o c e s s i n g p o w e r 1 9 . T h e

R M A t h e r e f o r e c a m e t o r e f e r t o " t h e s t r a t e g i c c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e m a r r i a g e o f

s y s t e m s t h a t c o l l e c t , p r o c e s s a n d c o m m u n i c a t e i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h o s e t h a t a p p l y

m i l i t a r y f o r c e " 2 0 , a s y n t h e s i s o f n e w t h i n k i n g o n t h e c o n d u c t o f w a r f a r e , a n d n e w

o p t i o n s f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .

O n e m u s t e m p h a s i s e t h e d i f f e r e n t r e l e v a n c e t h i s c o n c e p t h e l d ( a n d s t i l l h o l d s ) f o r t h e

B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y , c o m p a r e d t o t h e A m e r i c a n s . W h i l e s o m e o b s e r v e r s 2 1 w e r e

q u e s t i o n i n g j u s t h o w r a d i c a l t h e R M A w a s i n its i m p a c t o n U S f o r c e s , t h e r e w a s l i t t l e

d o u b t t h a t t h e c o u n t r y c o u l d u n d e r t a k e s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d it s o d e s i r e . A s

F r e e d m a n p o i n t s o u t t h o u g h , B r i t a i n ' s c a p a c i t y t o s w i t c h t o a h i g h - t e c h , i n f o r m a t i o n -

c e n t r i c a n d n e t w o r k - c e n t r i c m i l i t a r y i s n o t h i n g c l o s e t o t h a t o f its a l l y - " o n l y t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s t h e e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e m i l i t a r y i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t o b e g i n to

f o l l o w t h i s p a t h " 2 2 . A s e c o n d c r i t i q u e o f t h e f o c u s o n t e c h n o l o g y , a n d I T i n p a r t i c u l a r ,

is t h a t t h e e x a m p l e d r a w n o n b y e a r l y a d v o c a t e s o f t h e R M A , t h e G u l f W a r o f 1 9 9 0 - 1 ,

w a s a c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r , f o u g h t w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s , o n a b i g f l a t , o p e n d e s e r t .

T h e s i t u a t i o n t h e r e f o r e p l a y e d i n t o t h e s t r e n g t h s o f t h e R M A c o n c e p t , b u t o f f e r e d n o

1 9 Smith and Uttley, "Military Power in a Multipolar World," 1-14. ; Edward N . Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (Jul/Aug 1996): 33-44 ; Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A . Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 1996): 20-36. ; Eliot A . Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (Mar/Apr 1996): 37-54.

2 0 Lawrence Freedman, "Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs," in The Changing Face of Military Power : Joint Warfare in the Expeditionary Era (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002), pg. 111. 2 1 Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," 37-54. 2 2 Freedman, "Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs," pg. 112.

10

c h a l l e n g e s t o it w e a k n e s s e s , n a m e l y t h a t " t h e m o r e it b e c o m e s n e c e s s a r y t o o p e r a t e i n

c o n f i n e d s p a c e s i n a n d a r o u n d p o p u l a t e d a r e a s a n d a g a i n s t t h e b a c k d r o p o f o f t e n

h i g h l y i n t r i c a t e p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t s , t h e l e s s u s e f u l [ R M A ] c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l b e c o m e " 2 3 .

T h e r e w e r e , a c c o r d i n g l y , c o n c e r n s b o t h a b o u t t h e e f f i c a c y o f t h e d o c t r i n e , a n d t h e

e c o n o m i c s o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , s u c h t h a t t h e s t a t u s o f R M A i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m

w a s u n c e r t a i n , a n d c e r t a i n l y n o t a n e s t a b l i s h e d a s p e c t o f m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . S i m i l a r

c r i t i q u e s w i l l r e - e m e r g e l a t e r i n t h i s s t u d y .

T h e t e r m ' R M A ' is n o t a s w i d e l y u s e d a s it w a s d u r i n g t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f t h e

G u l f W a r . I n s t e a d , t h e c o n c e p t i o n h a s m o r p h e d i n t o o n e o f ' t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ' a s

d e s c r i b i n g a b r o a d e r v i s i o n o f a m o d e r n m i l i t a r y . T h e I T i n f l u e n c e s t i l l r e m a i n s , a n d it

s t i l l f o r m s a f o c a l p o i n t f o r t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i v e a g e n d a

s u g g e s t e d b y t h e o r i s t s o f m i l i t a r y p o l i c y n o w f o l l o w s t h e l i n e s o f t h e c r i t i q u e o f f e r e d

b y C o h e n 2 4 o f e a r l i e r R M A c o n c e p t i o n s - it is m u c h l e s s w i l l i n g t o v i e w i n f o r m a t i o n

s y s t e m s a s a p a n a c e a o f f e r i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o p r o s e c u t e w a r f r o m h u n d r e d s o f m i l e s

a w a y . I n s t e a d , t h i s m o d e r n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is s t r u c t u r a l / o r g a n i s a t i o n a l ( e n c o u r a g i n g

c l o s e r c o - o p e r a t i o n a m o n g s t t h e m i l i t a r y b r a n c h e s ) a n d c o n c e p t u a l ( a c t i v e l y

e n v i s i o n i n g t h e f u t u r e m i l i t a r y r o l e s ) , a s w e l l a s u s i n g t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s t o

f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y a b i l i t i e s . A s w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , t h e s h i f t o f f o c u s a w a y f r o m t h e

f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e - i n t e n s i v e t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s , t o w a r d s t h e l e s s m a t e r i a l

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , h a s i m p r o v e d t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r c o u n t r i e s o t h e r t h a n t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s , w i t h i ts o v e r w h e l m i n g r e s o u r c e a d v a n t a g e , t o i n t u r n u n d e r g o m i l i t a r y

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t o s o m e d e g r e e .

2 3 Ibid. pg. 119. 2 4 Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," 37-54.

11

A p p l y i n g t h i s t o t h e e x a m p l e o f t h e U S , o n e s e e s t h a t w i t h t h e e n d o f t h e C o l d W a r ,

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m e d F o r c e s w e r e a l s o l o o k i n g f o r t h e i r n e w r o l e . M u c h h a p p e n e d

i n t h e i n t e r i m p e r i o d - t h e s a m e c h a n g e d s t r a t e g i c l a n d s c a p e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h w e r e

h a v i n g t o d e a l w i t h p o s e d at l e a s t a s b i g a c h a l l e n g e f o r t h e A m e r i c a n s . T h e y h a d

c o m m i t t e d m a n y b i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s t o w a r d s e q u i p p i n g t h e i r f o r c e s , a n d t h o s e o f t h e i r

a l l i e s , t o d e a l w i t h t h e p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t s o f c o m m u n i s t f o r c e s , a n d w o u l d n o w h a v e t o

c o p e w i t h t h a t t a s k d i s a p p e a r i n g , a n d m a n y n e w , u n c o n v e n t i o n a l , d e m a n d s p l a c e d o n

t h e m , t h r o u g h t h e i r p o s i t i o n a s t h e w o r l d ' s o n l y s u p e r - o r h y p e r - p o w e r . J u s t a s i n

B r i t a i n , a w i d e - s p r e a d s u g g e s t i o n w a s t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d m o v e a w a y f r o m

w h a t K u g l e r c a l l s " s p e c i f i c c a n o n i c a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s " 2 5 , n a m e l y t h e d o c t r i n a l f o c u s o n

f i x e d t h r e a t s , a n d i n s t e a d m o v e t o w a r d s p l a n n i n g b a s e d o n ' g e n e r i c m i s s i o n s ' , o r , a s

t h e y h a v e c o m e t o b e c a l l e d , c a p a b i l i t i e s - b a s e d p l a n s .

P r e s s u r e e m e r g e d f o r t h e m i l i t a r y t o e x p l o i t t h e n e w o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h i s t e c h n o l o g y

o f f e r e d 2 6 . T h e N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e P a n e l , c o n v e n e d t o c o m m e n t o n t h e Q u a d r e n n i a l

D e f e n c e R e v i e w p r o c e s s a n d f i n d i n g s i n 1 9 9 7 , s a i d i n t h e i r r e p o r t t h a t " [ w ] e a r e o n

t h e c u s p o f a m i l i t a r y r e v o l u t i o n s t i m u l a t e d b y r a p i d a d v a n c e s i n i n f o r m a t i o n a n d

i n f o r m a t i o n - r e l a t e d t e c h n o l o g i e s " 2 7 . A l o n g w i t h t h a t p r e s s u r e t o u s e t e c h n o l o g i c a l

a d v a n c e s c a m e t h e w a r n i n g t h a t t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s w o u l d p r o b a b l y h a v e t o

c h a n g e a l o n g s i d e t h e m , as " m u c h o f t h e U S n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e

2 5 Richard L . Kugler et al., Toward a Dangerous World: U.S. National Security Strategy for the Coming Turbulence, (Santa Monica, C A : Rand,-1995), 305. ; Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defense Planning for the Late 1990s : Beyond the Desert Storm Framework. (Washington, D . C : Brookings Institution, 1995), 150.

2 6 William E. Odom, America's Military Revolution : Strategy and Structure After the Cold War. (Washington, D . C ; Lanham, M D : American University Press: Distributed by arrangement with National Book Network, 1993), 186. ; Harry G. Summers, The New World Strategy : A Military Policy for America's Future, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 270.

2 7 United States National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense : National Security in the 21st Century, (Arlington, V A : National Defense Panel, 1997), pg. 10.

12

w a s c r e a t e d f o r t h e t e c h n o l o g y o f t h e m i d - 2 0 t h c e n t u r y ' " , a n d t h a t " o n l y s u s t a i n e d

v i s i o n a n d l e a d e r s h i p c a n a c h i e v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e s r e q u i r e d t o

b r i n g [ t h e s e ] i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t o l i n e w i t h 2 1 s t c e n t u r y m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y " 2 8 .

T e c h n o l o g i c a l C h a n g e a n d S t r a t e g i c P l a n n i n g

E x p l o i t i n g t h i s k i n d o f t e c h n o l o g y w o u l d s i g n i f i c a n t l y c h a n g e h o w t h e m i l i t a r y

f o u g h t . S o m e m a n a g e m e n t l i t e r a t u r e s t r e s s e s t h e n e e d f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n s t o b e w a r y , a s

w e l l a s p r o a c t i v e , i n d e a l i n g w i t h c h a n g e s i n t h e i r t e c h n o l o g i c a l f i e l d . C h r i s t e n s e n

p u t s f o r w a r d t w o m e c h a n i s m s o f i n n o v a t i v e c h a n g e 2 9 . H e i m p l i e s t h a t i m p r o v e m e n t s

i n t e c h n o l o g y m a y n o t t a k e p l a c e i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l f a s h i o n , w h a t h e t e r m s

" s u s t a i n i n g i n n o v a t i o n " , a s e c u l a r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a t h w i t h a " m e a s u r a b l e t r a j e c t o r y o f

i m p r o v e m e n t " 3 0 . I n s t e a d , t h e c h a n g e i n q u e s t i o n m a y t a k e a f o r m s i m i l a r t o t h a t s e e n

i n h a r d - d i s k d r i v e a r c h i t e c t u r e t h r o u g h o u t t h e 1 9 7 0 s a n d 1 9 8 0 s , t e r m e d " d i s r u p t i v e

i n n o v a t i o n s " . T e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e s , i n t h i s c a s e t h e s h r i n k i n g o f t h e d r i v e ' s

d i a m e t e r , m a y a p p e a r at f i r s t t o d o l e s s t h a n e s t a b l i s h e d t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d at a g r e a t e r

c o s t , a n d t h e r e f o r e " o f f e r a d i f f e r e n t p a c k a g e o f a t t r i b u t e s [at f i r s t ] v a l u e d o n l y i n

e m e r g i n g m a r k e t s r e m o t e f r o m , a n d u n i m p o r t a n t t o , t h e m a i n s t r e a m " 3 1 . I f t h e p a c e o f

i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e t e c h n o l o g y is g r e a t e r t h a n w h a t t h e m a r k e t is a s k i n g o f

e s t a b l i s h e d f o r c e s , t h e n t h e n e w e r t e c h n o l o g y w i l l e v e n t u a l l y c a t c h u p , a n d s u r p a s s ,

w h a t i s a l r e a d y b e i n g u s e d , e v e n a f t e r h a v i n g b e e n d i s m i s s e d a s a n o p t i o n i n i t i a l l y .

A b o v e a l l e l s e , w h a t i s r e q u i r e d o f o r g a n i s a t i o n s f a c i n g p o t e n t i a l d i s r u p t i o n at t h e

2 8 Odom, "America's Military Revolution : Strategy and Structure After the Cold War," pg. 65. 2 9 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma : The Revolutionary National Bestseller that Changed the Way we do Business, 1st Harper Business ed. (New York: Harper Business, 2000), 286. 3 0 Ibid., pg. 9. 3 1 Ibid., pg. 16.

13

h a n d s o f i n n o v a t i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s is a w i l l i n g n e s s t o l e a r n a n d a d a p t t o s i g n a l s a n d

e x p e r i e n c e s 3 2 . U s e r s o f t e c h n o l o g y n e e d t o b e a l e r t t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r o c e s s e s t h e y

h a v e u s e d b e f o r e m a y n o t b e t h e b e s t w a y o f h a n d l i n g t h i n g s i n t h e f u t u r e . M i l i t a r y

t e c h n o l o g y i n n o v a t i o n s u n d e r t h i s r e a s o n i n g m a y n o t s i m p l y m a k e a t a n k b e t t e r a t

b e i n g a m a i n b a t t l e t a n k , s h o o t i n g f u r t h e r , m o r e a c c u r a t e l y , h a v i n g s t r o n g e r a r m o u r o r

s o f o r t h . I n s t e a d , b a t t l e f i e l d d o m i n a n c e m a y b e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h i m m o b i l i s i n g t h e

o p p o n e n t , o u t f l a n k i n g t h e m , d i s a b l i n g t h e m , m a k i n g t h e t a n k d i s a p p e a r f r o m t h e

e n e m y ' s s i g h t a n d s o f o r t h , b u t t h i s c o u l d o n l y b e d i s c o v e r e d t h r o u g h t r y i n g o u t t h e

n e w , a n d d e a l i n g c o n s t r u c t i v e l y w i t h t h e u n f o r e s e e n . A s w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d i n g r e a t e r

d e t a i l l a t e r o n , t h i s a d a p t i v e m i n d s e t i s o n e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h A r m e d F o r c e s a r e a c t i v e l y

t r y i n g t o i n s t i l i n t h e u p c o m i n g g e n e r a t i o n o f m i d - r a n g e o f f i c e r s , t o e n s u r e t h e

u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s p r e s e n t t o e x p l o i t a n y t e c h n o l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f a d i s r u p t i v e

n a t u r e t o t h e f u l l e s t .

C o n n e c t e d t o t h e a b i l i t y t o d e a l t h e i m p a c t o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n is t h e n e e d t o

p l a n e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e f u t u r e i n a b r o a d e r s e n s e . S t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g , t h e " d i s c i p l i n e d

e f f o r t t o p r o d u c e f u n d a m e n t a l d e c i s i o n s a n d a c t i o n s t h a t s h a p e a n d g u i d e w h a t a n

o r g a n i s a t i o n ( o r o t h e r e n t i t y ) i s , w h a t it d o e s , a n d w h y it d o e s i t " 3 j , i s t h e t e r m f o r t h i s

p r o c e s s . N o t t o b e c o n f u s e d w i t h s t a b l e l o n g - t e r m p l a n n i n g , t h e s t r a t e g i c a p p r o a c h i s

q u e s t i o n i n g , l o o k i n g t o f i n d t h e d e s t i n a t i o n a s w e l l a s t h e r o u t e t o g e t t h e r e , e n t a i l i n g

" t h e a n a l y s i s o f i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t s . . . t o m a x i m i s e t h e u t i l i z a t i o n o f

3 1 Ibid., pp. 240-1. 3 3 John M . Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations : A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organization Achievement, 1 st ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988), pg. 5.

14

r e s o u r c e s i n r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t i v e s " 3 4 . It is b y d e f i n i t i o n a n a d a p t i v e p r o c e s s 3 5 , a n d t h a t

it " g i v e s o r g a n i s a t i o n s a f r a m e w o r k f o r d e v e l o p i n g a b i l i t i e s f o r a n t i c i p a t i n g a n d

c o p i n g w i t h c h a n g e " is w h a t B r a c k e r 3 6 s u g g e s t s m a k e s it s o i m p o r t a n t , B r y s o n

s u g g e s t s t h a t a l l p l a n n e r s i n p u b l i c a g e n c i e s s h o u l d b e f a m i l i a r w i t h s t r a t e g i c

p l a n n i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n p e r i o d s w h e n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t s i n w h i c h t h o s e o r g a n i s a t i o n s

f i n d t h e m s e l v e s a r e c h a n g i n g s o r a p i d l y 3 7 , a n d f u r t h e r m o r e t h a t c a r e s h o u l d b e t a k e n

t o e n s u r e t h o s e w h o a r e u n d e r t a k i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g s p a n t h e d i v i d e b e t w e e n

t h e a g e n c y ' s p o l i t i c a l a n d ' t e c h n i c a l ' o r p r a c t i c a l r o l e s 3 8 .

T e c h n o l o g y a p p r o a c h i n g ' b y s t e a l t h ' p o s e s a s e v e r e p r o b l e m f o r t h o s e a t t e m p t i n g a

v i s i o n i n g o f t h e f u t u r e , a s p a r t o f a s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . I f t h e i n n o v a t i o n i n

q u e s t i o n is a d i s r u p t i v e o n e , t h e n it t a k e s a b o v e - a v e r a g e f o r e s i g h t t o s p o t its f u t u r e

a p p l i c a t i o n s a n d t h e n e e d f o r i n v e s t m e n t . T h i s p o w e r o f u n d e r m i n i n g t h e

e s t a b l i s h m e n t i s o n e o f g r e a t r e l e v a n c e t o t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f m i l i t a r i e s f o r t w o

r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , w i t h t h e m a n y b i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s o r p o u n d s s p e n t o n e q u i p p i n g

f o r c e s , a n d t h e i n e v i t a b l e l a g b e t w e e n o r d e r i n g a n d f i r s t - u s e , t e c h n o l o g i c a l d i s r u p t i o n

i s a v e r y r e a l r i s k . F a r m o r e i m p o r t a n t , h o w e v e r , i s t h e t h r e a t d i s r u p t i v e t e c h n o l o g i e s

p o s e t o t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e t r o o p s , t h r e a t s f o r w h i c h u n p l a n n e d t r o o p s a r e

u n p r e p a r e d a n d v u l n e r a b l e . T h e t a l e o f t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is a t a l e o f h o w m i l i t a r y

o r g a n i s a t i o n s d e a l w i t h t h i s d i l e m m a .

3 4 Jeffrey Bracker, "The Historical Development of the Strategic Management Concept," Academy of Management Review 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1980): pg. 221 emphasis in the original. 3 5 Michael Barzelay and Colin Campbell, Preparing for the Future : Strategic Planning in the U.S. Air Force, (Washington, D . C : Brookings Institution Press, 2003), pg. 6. 3 6 Bracker, "The Historical Development of the Strategic Management Concept," pg. 221. 3 7 Bryson, "Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations : A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organization Achievement," pg. 43. 3 8 Ibid., pg. 44.

B u r e a u c r a t i c M a n a g e m e n t

15

F i n a l l y , as t rans fo rmat ion in B r i t a i n is b e i n g m a n a g e d by the bureaucracy o f the M o D

in par t icu lar , a l o n g w i t h other W h i t e h a l l e lements more b road l y , it is necessary to dea l

w i t h some o f the l i terature f r o m this f i e l d o f s tudy. T h e ' W e s t m i n s t e r m o d e l ' 3 9 ,

w h e r e b y c i v i l servants are cons ide red impar t ia l adv isers and managers o f p o l i c y m a d e

by e lec ted po l i t i c i ans , is the t rad i t iona l concep t i on o f the B r i t i s h bu reauc racy .

Tha t che r cha l l enged th is sys tem d u r i n g her years in power , b r i n g i n g in changes such

as the N e w P u b l i c M a n a g e m e n t scheme that at tempted to shake up the inst i tu t ions,

b r i n g i n g p o l i c y more secure ly under the p o l i t i c i a n s ' centra l con t ro l .

H o w success fu l th is p r o g r a m m e was is unc lear . K a v a n a g h and R i c h a r d s suggest that

the " p a t h o l o g y o f depar tmenta l g o v e r n m e n t " 4 0 rema ins , desp i te the re fo rms , and

C a m p b e l l and W i l s o n suggest that s k e p t i c i s m o f p o l i c y in i t ia t i ves rema ins ingra ined

in the c i v i l s e r v i c e 4 1 . W h a t is sa l ient fo r the issue here is that B l a i r m i r ro red m u c h o f

the m indse t o f T h a t c h e r rega rd ing po l i t i ca l -bu reauc ra t i c re la t ions . H e too be l i eved

that re fo rm was requ i red in order to m a k e the c i v i l se rv ice more r e s p o n s i v e 4 2 .

It w a s into this env i r onmen t o f par t ia l re fo rm that the N e w L a b o u r gove rnmen t

brought its concep t o f j o i n e d - u p gove rnmen t ( J U G ) , the ma jo r in i t ia t ive p roposed to

3 y Colin Campbell and Graham K . Wilson, The End of Whitehall: Death of a Paradigm? (Oxford; Cambridge, Mass., U S A : Blackwell, 1995), 342. 4 0 D. Kavanagh and D. Richards, "Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government," Parliamentary Affairs 54, no. 1 (January 1 2001): pg. 3. 4 1 Campbell and Wilson, "The End of Whitehall : Death of a Paradigm?".342. ; R. A . W. Rhodes, "New Labour's Civ i l Service: Summing-Up Joining-Up," Political Quarterly 71, no. 2 (Apr-Jun 2000): 151.

4 2 Graham K . Wilson and Anthony Barker, "Bureaucrats and Politicians in Britain," Governance 16, no. 3 (2003): 349-372.

16

r e f o r m g o v e r n a n c e i n t h e U K 4 3 . A c c o r d i n g t o P o l l i t t , i t h a d f o u r m a i n g o a l s : c o ­

o r d i n a t i n g p o l i c i e s t o p r e v e n t g o a l s f r o m c l a s h i n g ; m o r e e f f i c i e n t u s e o f r e s o u r c e s ;

i m p r o v i n g t h e f l o w o f i d e a s a m o n g s t s t a k e h o l d e r s i n a p o l i c y f i e l d ; p r o d u c i n g a m o r e

s e a m l e s s se t o f s e r v i c e s f o r t h o s e u s i n g t h e m . 4 4 T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t r a d d l e s J U G - t h e

w h i t e p a p e r o n w h i c h t h e J U G r e f o r m s w e r e b a s e d w a s r e l e a s e d i n M a r c h 1 9 9 9 ,

a l m o s t a y e a r a f t e r t h e d o c u m e n t t h a t k i c k - s t a r t e d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t h e U K , t h e '

S t r a t e g i c D e f e n c e R e v i e w . A s w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , a s p e c t s o f B r i t i s h

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f o r e s h a d o w s o m e o f t h e m o v e s m a d e r e g a r d i n g J U G , a n d f i t i n t o t h i s

b r o a d e r d e b a t e . In f a c t , t h e s u g g e s t i o n s m a d e h e r e a r e n e w , i n t h a t t h e s t u d i e s i n t h i s

a r e a t e n d t o a v o i d t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n c e , c o n c e n t r a t i n g i n s t e a d o n ' d o m e s t i c '

d e p a r t m e n t s 4 5 . T h u s , u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e B l a i r r e f o r m s c a n p u t a s p e c t s o f

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l j o i n t e r y a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c m a n a g e m e n t , i n t o b e t t e r

c o n t e x t , a n d t h e s t u d y c a n i n t u r n e x p a n d o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f J U G .

T h i s c h a p t e r o f f e r e d a r o u n d - u p o f t h e f i e l d s o f l i t e r a t u r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s

d i s c u s s e d i n t h e r e s t o f t h i s w o r k . W e n o w t u r n t o a l o o k a t t h e G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n o f

1 9 9 7 . It w a s o u t o f t h i s t h a t e m e r g e d , s o m e h o w , a t r a n s f o r m a t i v e a g e n d a f o r t h e

B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y .

4 3 Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet Office, Modernising Government Cm 4310, Great Britain, Cabinet Office, 1999)

4 4 Christopher Pollitt, "Joined-Up Government: A Survey," Political Studies Review 1, no. 1 (2003): 34-49. 4 5 Kavanagh and Richards, "Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government," 1-18.

17

C H A P T E R TWO - The Strategic Defence Review

H a v i n g e x a m i n e d t h e d e b a t e s a s t h e y e x i s t e d i n b o t h B r i t a i n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o n

t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c h a n g e i n m i l i t a r y p o l i c y i n b o t h t h o s e c o u n t r i e s , a n d t h e m a n n e r

i n w h i c h it w a s s u g g e s t e d t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t a k e p l a c e , it is n o w a p p r o p r i a t e t o t u r n

t o d e s c r i b i n g , d i s c u s s i n g , a n d b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e o f

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g . T h e p r o c e s s t o o k p l a c e l a r g e l y u n d e r t h e

m o m e n t u m o f t h e S t r a t e g i c D e f e n c e R e v i e w ( S D R ) , r e l e a s e d i n 1 9 9 8 . T h e f o l l o w i n g

s e c t i o n s l o o k at t h e r u n - u p t o t h i s r e v i e w , t h e p r o c e s s b e h i n d it, a n d t h e n m o v e o n t o

l o o k at t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s i t h a d f o r t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y .

P r e l u d e t o t h e 1 9 9 7 G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n

A s d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r , B r i t i s h d e f e n c e p o l i c y h a d b e e n b r o a d l y c r i t i c i s e d i n t h e e a r l y

1 9 9 0 s a s o f f e r i n g n o s e n s e o f d i r e c t i o n t o t h e t r o o p s , a n d m e r e l y a s t e a d y set o f c u t s i n

m a n p o w e r , e q u i p m e n t a n d f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s . T h e L a b o u r P a r t y h a d t r a d i t i o n a l l y

f a c e d d e f e n c e i s s u e s at a s p e c t a c u l a r d i s a d v a n t a g e 4 6 . I n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s m a r k e d a l l

d i s c u s s i o n s o v e r d e f e n c e p o l i c y , d i v i s i o n s w h i c h s p r a n g f r o m t w o s o u r c e s . T h e f i r s t

w a s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t . S o m e w i t h i n t h e p a r t y f u n d a m e n t a l l y

o p p o s e d B r i t a i n ' s h a v i n g a n y n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w h a t s o e v e r , a n d a d v o c a t e d u n i l a t e r a l

d i s a r m a m e n t a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e . T h i s s t a n c e w a s o p p o s e d w i t h i n t h e p a r t y b y t h o s e

w h o e i t h e r a d v o c a t e d d i s a r m a m e n t b u t o n l y a s p a r t o f a j o i n t p r o c e s s w i t h t h e o t h e r

n u c l e a r p o w e r s , a n d t h o s e w h o w i s h e d t o m a i n t a i n B r i t a i n ' s n u c l e a r m i l i t a r y

4 6 Dan Keohane, The Labour Party's Defence Policy since 1945, (Leicester; New York: Leicester University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1993), 174. ; Greenwood, "Roles, Missions and Resources," 31-48.

18

capab i l i t i es . T h e second cause o f d i v i s i o n was somewha t more fundamen ta l . Ra ther

than f o c u s i n g j us t o n the nuc lear issue, it took p lace be tween those w h o fel t that

cons ide rab le de fence s p e n d i n g was requ i red to counter the Sov ie t threat, and those

w h o took a more pac i f i s t l ine, p re fe r r ing to spend the l im i ted gove rnmen t resources

o n t rad i t iona l L a b o u r cons ide ra t ions , such as p u b l i c serv ices and we l fa re .

W h a t e v e r the s p e c i f i c cause o f the con ten t ion , th is d i v i s i o n w a s c lea r to the p u b l i c ,

su r f ac i ng a n n u a l l y at the L a b o u r Par ty con fe rence . T h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s made great p lay

o f it, pa r t i cu la r l y in G e n e r a l E l e c t i o n s 4 7 , r e i n f o r c i ng in the e lec to ra te 's m i n d that

L a b o u r w a s ' w e a k ' on de fence . W h i l s t not the o n l y aspect o f L a b o u r p o l i c y that c o u l d

be p i l l o r i e d at e lec t ion t ime th roughout the 1980s, d i v i s i o n s ove r de fence s tood out

ever mo re as L a b o u r p o l i c y in other areas s tead i ly c a m e to be ha rmon i sed by leaders

such as N e i l K i n n o c k and J o h n S m i t h . W i t h the fa l l o f the Sov ie t U n i o n , the B r i t i sh

nuc lea r deterrent became more redundant , as the coun t ry d i d not face an e n e m y w i t h

m a n y thousand o f nuc lea r w e a p o n s o f their o w n any m o r e . Neve r the less , w i thou t the

nuc lea r issue to spur debate w i t h i n the par ty , the de fence p o l i c y stable for L a b o u r

l o o k e d re la t i ve l y emp ty . C r i t i c i s m had been made o f the C o n s e r v a t i v e s fo r not

engag ing B r i t i s h fo rces more w i d e l y in suppor t i ng p e a c e k e e p i n g ro les , or p reven t ing

e thn ic c l e a n s i n g in such spots as R w a n d a , or B o s n i a , but L a b o u r o f fe red no th ing in

the w a y o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e , we l l - p repa red p rescr ip t ion fo r the d e p l o y m e n t o f B r i t i s h

fo rces , as the commen ta to r s d i s cussed in the p rev ious chap te r a d v i s e d . Ra ther than

p resent ing a deta i led p l an , the ob jec t i ve o f the new genera t ion o f L a b o u r leadersh ip

Keohane, "The Labour Party's Defence Policy since 1945," pg. 126. ; Andrew M. Dorman, Defence Under Thatcher, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002), 219.

1 9

" h a d s i m p l y b e e n t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e [ d e f e n c e ] i s s u e as a C o n s e r v a t i v e a d v a n t a g e " 4 8 . (

In t h i s e n d e a v o u r t h e y w e r e a m p l y a s s i s t e d b y t h e d e f e n c e c u t s u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e

C o n s e r v a t i v e s , a l o n g w i t h t h e a p p a r e n t l a c k o f a n y c l e a r s t r a t e g i c p l a n f o r t h e p o s t -

C o l d W a r w o r l d . T h e r e w a s i n f a c t n o w a d i v i s i o n i n t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t a s

t o w h a t t a s k s B r i t a i n ' s f o r c e s s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d t o u n d e r t a k e . F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y

M i c h a e l A n c r a m s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r c e s c o u l d b e c o m m i t t e d m o r e w i d e l y , t o s u p p o r t a n

e x p a n d e d set o f s t r a t e g i c t a s k s . D e f e n c e S e c r e t a r y R i f k i n d h o w e v e r t o o k t h e s t a n c e

t h a t m i l i t a r y f o r c e s s h o u l d b e u s e d s p a r i n g l y , a n d f o r t h e t a s k s f o r w h i c h t h e y h a d

o r i g i n a l l y b e e n t r a i n e d 4 9 . T h e T o r i e s ' a w a r e n e s s o f t h i s d i s p a r i t y p l a y e d i n t o t h e h a n d s

o f a L a b o u r P a r t y v u l n e r a b l e t o c h a l l e n g e s o f t h e i r r e c o r d o n d e f e n c e m a t t e r s .

B e a r i n g i n m i n d t h e h i s t o r i c a l w e a k n e s s o f L a b o u r a n d t h e s t r u g g l e s o f t h e

C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t , a s t u d y o f t h e p a r t i e s ' m a n i f e s t o s f o r t h e e l e c t i o n s h o w s

h o w l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l r e l e v a n c e t h e p a r t i e s p l a c e d o n d e f e n c e m a t t e r s f o r t h e c o m i n g

c a m p a i g n . I n t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e M a n i f e s t o , d e f e n c e i s s u e s t a k e u p j u s t o n e s h o r t

s e c t i o n o u t o f d o z e n s , a n d o f f e r o n l y a p l e d g e n o t t o u n d e r t a k e a d e f e n c e r e v i e w , a s

t h i s w o u l d " r a i s e f e a r a n d u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e f u t u r e " 5 0 . T h e i r a p p r o a c h w a s , q u i t e

l i t e r a l l y , a s m a l l - c c o n s e r v a t i v e o n e , n o t w a n t i n g t o p u t t h e A r m e d F o r c e s t h r o u g h a

p e r i o d o f r a d i c a l e v a l u a t i o n r e g a r d i n g m i s s i o n s , s t r u c t u r e o r e q u i p m e n t , m a i n t a i n i n g

t h e s t e a d y , l i m i t e d c h a n g e s t h a t h a d b e e n p u t f o r w a r d i n t h e m i n i - r e v i e w s i n t h e e a r l y

1 9 9 0 s - e f f e c t i v e l y t h e y w o u l d s t i c k w i t h a s e c u l a r p a t h o f p o l i c y d e v e l o p m e n t .

4 8 Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," pg. 96. 4 9 Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 823-845. 5 0 "British Conservative Party: Manifesto for 1997 General Election," [cited 2006]. Available from http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con97.htm.

20

In turn, the position of the Labour Party going into the 1997 General Election was

simple: "we will conduct a strategic defence and security review to reassess our

essential security interests and defence needs"51. In effect therefore, Labour policy

was to have no policy yet. They did follow this statement with some detail on what

they expected to end up included in the review, in particular that the review would

"consider how the roles, missions and capabilities of our armed forces should be

adjusted to meet the new strategic realities"52 - effectively setting up a strategic

planning process by the Ministry of Defence and the Services. An important addition

to this section was that the Review would be "foreign policy led". This phraseology

suggests by implication that it would not be "Treasury led" 5 3 , or in other words a

simple cover for more 'efficiency' and cuts reminiscent of the previous Tory years.

The short segment of the manifesto covering defence thus yielded a two-pronged

policy proposal, that "avoid[ed] controversial stances while hinting at something

radical to come" 5 4.

The most important aspect of the Labour proposal in terms of the strategic planning

considered in this study is the fact that this proposal had the potential to open up

defence policy for new ideas. With only limited restrictions - foreign policy leading

for example - and a mandate to cover all the main aspects of military activity - roles,

missions and capabilities - the proposed review was potentially incredibly broad-

ranging and significant. Nevertheless, it was only potential to fit this, because the

5 1 "Labour Party Manifesto, General Election of 1997," [cited 2006]. Available from http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab97.htm. 5 2 Ibid. 5 3 Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 823-845. 5 4 Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," pg. 97.

21

extent of the review was so weakly circumscribed in the manifesto - it was

advocating a process, but without giving an understanding of how far that process

would go, and also whether the results of that process would be fully enshrined in

policy.

In the run-up to the General Election of 1997, the Conservatives were hopelessly at

sea in so many areas of governance. In fact, it can be seen as a clear demonstration of

the distractions of the governing deficiencies of their own party, including in the

defence sphere55, that the Conservatives did not highlight the unwillingness of the

Labour Party to define their stance on defence policy before the election, even though

their own record was not particularly strong itself56. Certainly, defence was not the

big issue during this election that it had been in the two general elections in the 1980s

(1982 post-Falklands and 1987, which Freedman termed the "two nuclear

elections"57) - it was eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and voters did not

care very much about matters of force deployment. Mclnnes points out that this was

in fact quite an ironic state of affairs, as the British Armed Forces were at the time of

the election engaged in a greater variety of missions than at any point since the 1960s,

yet still defence matters hardly registered58. Due to this defence apathy there was little

pressure from the electorate for Labour to clarify and expand upon their proposal for a

strategic defence plan. Instead, the post-Cold War 'peace' the electorate saw made it

the best time for the party to get under the radar a mere framework proposal,

effectively having no defence policy. This was certainly in their own interest, as the

5 5 Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 823-845. 5 6 Keohane, "The Labour Party's Defence Policy since 1945," pp. 143-4. 5 7 Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," Ch. 9. 5 8 Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," pg. 828.

22

party was still seen by its own managers as being politically weak. Despite the

leaders' more moderate positions on defence matters, "defence could only lose

Labour votes, regardless of any weaknesses in the Conservative record"59.

Process behind the SDR

Thus it was that when Labour won the 1997 election so overwhelmingly, they faced

with living up to their pledge for a full strategic review of an area of policy from

which they had been shying away in every election for the past twenty years. George

Robertson, the Secretary of State for Defence, publicly launched the SDR on the 28th

May 1997, stating that it would "provide Britain's Armed Forces with a new sense of

clarity, coherence and consensus"60, and that Britain would learn from the US

example of the Quadrennial Defence Review61 that had just been released that month.

The process was to be as inclusive as possible (Robertson said he did not want it to be

Labour's defence review, but Britain's), attempting to draw the knowledge and

opinions of many sections of society connected with defence issues. Representatives

of the defence industry, journalism, trade unions and academia were brought onto an

'expert panel' to give advice to the review62. On top of this, consultation was made

with other government departments, with Parliament, with the general public, and

even with allied countries, particularly the US.

The core of the review, however, remained those most closely affected by the

5 9 Ibid.: pg. 828. 6 0 Ministry of Defence Press Release, "Britain's Defence: Securing our Future Together," (1997) 6 1 United States Department of Defense., Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, United States

.Department of Defense, 1997) 6 2 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review : Supporting Essays. (London: The Stationary Office, 1998), Essay 1, Annex B . ; Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," 259. Freedman was a memberof the panel.

23

changes: the Ministry of Defence's civilian and military personnel, and the Armed

Forces in general. They were not going to be excluded from the policy-making

process, as had been the case in some of the cost-driven reviews of the past few years.

Instead, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Second Permanent Secretary (the

deputies to the military and civilian heads of the MoD respectively) headed a process

that drew on a vast number of working groups and committees comprised primarily of

active members of the Forces and civilian personnel from the M o D 6 3 . These groups

studied all the major areas relating to defence policy - planning assumptions, size,

shape and structure of forces, logistic support, organisations and basing being a

sample - and their findings were brought together with the contributions of the

outside actors listed above.

Thus the SDR process was both narrow and broad. It was focused with respect to

allowing members of the forces a direct input to the policy-making process, but also

ensured that the Review would meet its target of containing defence policy within the

considerations of foreign policy, all the while drawing on the advice of those without

a direct institutional stake in the outcome.

Transformational Moves in the-SDR

Having described the political motivation behind the move to undertake the SDR, the

process of doing so, and how it fitted the strategic planning framework, we now turn

to look at what transformational moves were advocated in the document, and why

they were put there. The SDR recognised that some transformation of the Forces had

taken place following the end of the Cold War under the previous governments.

6 3 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review : Supporting Essays," Essay 1.

24

Nevertheless, the planning had revealed that this process was "incomplete...and that a

more radical approach was needed in many areas"64. On the launch of the review

process, Robertson said that he intended for policy of an apparently radical nature:

It may mean change, perhaps discomforting those who yearn for the

cosy status quo, but 1 am determined that we should have the flexible,

mobile, hi-tech armed forces we will need to face the 21st century.65

The following section will describe exactly what transformational policy was

suggested in the SDR, and the subsequent one will assess the drivers behind these

developments.

The role of technological advances was highlighted in the potential for

transformational power, with Robertson suggesting it could offer "radically new ways

for our Armed Forces to operate"66, with the major role proposed for the technological

transformation of British Forces that of "improvements in intelligence gathering,

command and control and precision weapons"67. At the same time, it was

acknowledged that technology posed as a threat to national security, particularly

through attacks on computer systems. The severity of this latter claim was widely

disputed, with Freedman suggesting to the Defence Select Committee that in fact the

more developed countries had a marked advantage in terms of information technology

6 4 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, (London: The Stationary Office, 1998), Sect. 203.

6 5 George Robertson, "Why We Still Need Strong Armed Forces; the British People Reject Isolationism and are Committed to our Global Role, Says George Robertson," The Independent (London), 30 July 1997, p. 15. Lexis-Nexis, 6 6 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Intro-10. 6 7 Ibid., 33. ; Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review : Supporting Essays," Essay 6.

2 5

security .

When considering these two responses to technology, it is instructive to appreciate the

wariness to advanced technologies that this juxtaposition of threats and opportunities

manifests. This theme of hesitation is one that resonates throughout much of the

following discussion of British transformative moves, particularly when compared to

the attitude of those in the transformation process in the United States, where a full

section in the earlier QDR had been enthusiastically devoted to 'harnessing' the

technological advances offered by the R M A technologies69. Evidence of just how

skeptical the British were about the potential of these technologies was given by

Mclnnes in his testimony to the Defence Select Committee7 0, with a description of the

contrast between the reception for R M A concepts in the US, where enthusiasm

prevailed, and the UK, where the response was excessive (according to Mclnnes)

skepticism, and lack of interest. The area where technology was flagged by the British

as of use for the future was in the areas of information gathering and use. These were

primarily focused the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance

capabilities (1STAR) and the command, control and communications capabilities

( C 3 ) 7 1 . These were not so much the expensive single-use weapons proposed by the

R M A , but instead reusable 'force multipliers', that would make the existing forces

work more effectively and not necessarily cost so much more to operate. Such

capabilities obviously fit the ever-present tension between budgets and British

6 8 Select Committee On Defence, United Kingdom Parliament, Eighth Report: The Strategic Defence Review, (London: The Stationary Office, 1998) 6 9 United States Department of Defense., "Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review," Sect. 7. 7 0 Select Committee On Defence, United Kingdom Parliament, "Eighth Report: The Strategic Defence Review," Qus. 294-300. 7 1 Great Britain,' Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Sects. 81-2.

26

defence policy cited earlier in Freedman, and their role in this specific case will be

assessed in greater detail below.

What clearly appealed far more to the British planners than transformational

technology was the merit of a joint approach to military matter. The overwhelming

theme of the SDR is 'jointery', a theme present at a number of levels. Some relate to

the process by which the review had been undertaken, and are discussed in the section

assessing the policy-making process below. The 'jointery' proposed specifically for

the forces was widespread. In his introduction to the SDR, Defence Secretary

Robertson pointed out that the policy set out in the document would modernise and

reshape the British Armed forces. The core manner in which these dual goals would

come about was to be the increased use of 'joint' approaches72, as demonstrated by

the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) and Joint Force 2000 combining the Royal

Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy Harrier jets.

The reason for this focus was that the strategic visioning process had suggested that

future operations would necessarily be undertaken by all three services working

together73. As early as 1996, before the Labour Government had come into power,

initial moves were made to create a Permanent Joint Headquarters, which served to

direct all British forces when on active duty in theatre. The SDR drew on this

experience, but took the principle much further. Now the full chain of military

operations would shift towards being prepared for joint undertakings - troops,

command and control systems, intelligence gathering, and logistics supply.

7 2 Ibid., Intro.-4 & 5. 7 3 Ibid., Sect. 79.

27

Training was to be shifted to joint exercises, under the control of the Chief of Joint

Operations. The development of future doctrine was also shifted to a joint setting,

namely the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC, now the Developments,

Concepts and Doctrine Centre, DCDC), as it was deemed "essential" that the long

term strategic visioning were to be "a truly Joint Service" one 7 4. This would meant

that jointery would become ever more integral to the Forces' thinking, as they would

be approaching matters through techniques and tactics developed through a joint

framework. It was a development about which the Chief of the Defence Staff at the

time, General Sir Charles Guthrie, enthused:

The Joint Doctrine development centre, I think could be very

important. Up until recently the single services have really had a

bottom up approach to the doctrine, they have all had their [own]

doctrine centre and people studying the doctrine concepts. They have

been very much in stove pipes and that I do not think is the right way

of doing it. What I think you have to do is to have something on top to

say what defence wants as a whole, work out that doctrine and then the

stove pipes work to that and so are not so independent, we can pull

things together. It is going to do that. I think it will look also at the

development, the way we are going, far ahead. This Defence Review is

[planning through to] 2015, it could be even looking further ahead, to

work out the kind of forces we need, the kind of weapons we need,

unless we can get that right jointly we are not going to get it right over

Ibid., Sect. 173.

28

a very short t ime. n

The head of the Forces considered the JDCC to be the initiator of a philosophy of

jointery in the services, and also the location for institutionalised strategic planning

for the future Forces, thereby making it the centre of much of the transformational

moves Britain's military would make in the future.

The institutional position of Chief of Joint Operations was given a further boost by its

designation as a 'Top Level Budget' (TLB) holder in its own'right. This meant that it

would have a wide degree of financial independence, with budgetary authority and

responsibility for its various commands passed to the post holder. As with any

bureaucracy, the ability to determine one's own spending, to direct resources as far as

possible within the limits set externally, is of great significance to one's institutional

status. As a means of comparison, the other TLBs in the MoD were the four

operational commands (Army, Air Force, Navy, Northern Ireland), the three Service

personnel commands, the Whitehall Ministry institution itself, Logistics Command

and Defence Procurement. Joint Operations now held the same independent budgetary

status as these others.

As a case-study of one facet of the move towards greater jointery, the JRRFs are the

most important of the joint institutions proposed by the SDR. A "pool of powerful and

versatile units from all three services, which would be available for operations at short

notice"7 6, they were the embodiment of the strategic and doctrinal concept British

defence policy now had at its core. Not intended for any one specific threat response

7 5 Select Committee On Defence, United Kingdom Parliament, "Eighth Report: The Strategic Defence Review," Qu. 1744. 7 6 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Sect. 92.

29

or task, the versatility the SDR spoke of was the key to their many potential uses. This

connects it to the very central understanding of capabilities-based planning, namely

that it recognises that any of a wide variety of operational demands may be placed on

forces, and that forces need to be able to deal with any and all of them. The JRRFs as

self-contained units were intended to do precisely this, rather than being held in a

fixed force-orientation based on a single threat or commitment. The more complex

post-Cold War world made for a much more difficult planning task, as many more

roles were foreseen for British forces, and this ensured the more troops could do, and

the quicker they could do them, the better.

Assessment of the policy-making process

Upon its commissioning, there were a number of pessimistic voices who claimed that

the forthcoming SDR would not go to the lengths of visioning that Robertson had

suggested. A Labour left-winger and an "MoD veteran" were both quoted in one

newspaper commentary of the time 7 7 as suggesting a swift conservative result was

already prepared for the SDR. If this were indeed the case when the review process

started, such a pre-prepared outcome was swiftly jettisoned, as the review process

stretched ever longer. Originally intended to take some six months and be finished by

the end of the year, it was finally printed in July of 1998, some fourteen months after

its launch. It may well have been that the widespread consultation did not play any

significant influence in the final reckoning, and cynicism is often the default position

to take regarding such consultatory processes78. Nevertheless, the SDR, both process

7 7 Stephen Castle, "Robertson Keeps His Powder Dry; Nothing Rash, Nothing Radical - the New Defence Secretary Seeks a Consensus," The Independent (London), 1 June 1997, p. 17. Lexis-Nexis, 7 8 Mclnnes, "Labour's Strategic Defence Review," 823-845.

3 0

and document, was widely praised, with one interviewee terming it "probably the best

defence review we've had in Britain", and the Defence Select Committee praised it as

"a positive advance in formulating a defence policy...for the new millennium" 7 9.

In this regard, the commitment to hold the review had "almost the opposite effect"80

from that intended during the election, namely keeping the defence issue under wraps.

As one interviewee put it, starting the review was like opening up Pandora's Box, and

Labour had to deal with everything that came out of it. What Labour could have done

to tame the review was to either limit its purview, or limit the number of participants

and interests consulted. Instead, the review was allowed, within certain framing

principles, to develop in a self-directed fashion. In this respect, there was a degree of

intellectual honesty to the whole proceeding, and there is little doubt, looking at the

comments given to the Select Committee panel by a number of senior military

officials, that the SDR process was recognised as such by these members of the

institution Labour had been at loggerheads with for so long. Blair certainly wanted to

impress the military 8 1, or at least impress upon them his sincerity on defence matters,

making this very much a core area for the 'New' aspect of New Labour's personality

to shine through. There were therefore considerable political gains to be had out of a

review that dealt with defence issues in a manner that showed the Labour Party had

turned the corner on defence and could now offer the country sensible policy in this

area - policy that had a distinctive Labour imprint on it, but policy that made sure to

hold the wishes and needs of the military in the very highest regard as well. It may

7 9 Select Committee On Defence, United Kingdom Parliament, "Eighth Report: The Strategic Defence Review," Sect. 406. 8 0 Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," pg. 97. 8 1 John Kampfner, Blair's Wars, (London: Free Press, 2003), 367.

31

have been a planning process that was backed into as much unintentionally as

intentionally. Still, what was undertaken certainly fits the definition stated by

Bryson 8 2 of strategic planning, and of the process advocated by Barzelay and

Campbell 8 3 for military organisations to consider their future roles and structures

some distance into the future, with the goal for the SDR being to vision Britain's

strategic situation up to 2015.

Despite the planning, some aspects of future policy were left undetermined. One area

in. which this can be clearly seen is that of the role advanced technology was planned

to play in the future Forces. As discussed above, the transformational agenda in the

SDR eschewed the majority of the temptations of high-tech equipment, and the

primary reason for this wariness is the extreme budgetary constraint behind which the

whole procedure was undertaken. Looking at point 33 of the SDR exposes this

difficulty, a difficulty about which the Review makes no bones:

How much should we invest in improving 'enabling technologies' at

the expense of weapon numbers? How can our equipment plans keep

up with the pace of change? How do we and our Allies retain

interoperability with US forces given the radical changes they

envisage? And will technological changes also require radical changes

in the way our forces are organised and fight? 8 4

There is clearly a fundamental worry expressed here about the pace of change, and the

8 2 Bryson, "Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations : A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organization Achievement," 311. 8 3 Barzelay and Campbell, "Preparing for the Future : Strategic Planning in the U.S. Air Force," 274. 8 4 Great Britain,Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Sect. 33.

32

impact this will have on an organisation in the shape of the British Armed Forces that

has always been deeply conservative. Underlying it, however, is the more

materialistic fear of the costs of embarking on the path of transformation.

As the quotation above demonstrates, the impact of American transformation is

already putting pressure on the U K to decide where it goes, what it buys and so forth.

How to face this dilemma is a recurring theme in British debates, and is one that will

come into even starker focus in the next chapter, when we deal with the partnership

Britain develops with the US after September the 11 th 2001, which requires British

forces to act in ever-closer co-ordination with their American counterparts. This

passage shows that there was an early understanding that transformational moves

requiring RMA-style next-generation technology would place a financial burden on

defence planning at which, the Exchequer would balk. It had taken a large amount of

political capital for Robertson to gain an undertaking from Chancellor of the

Exchequer Gordon Brown that defence spending would be held constant for a three-

85 *

year period , including going over Brown's head to wring concessions directly from

Blair. If advocates of broader transformation were to advance their case, consideration

of the costs of the mechanisms required would have to be carefully taken, or political

willingness to spend the money would have to change. As will be seen in the

following chapter, this latter case of affairs is exactly what came about.

Consideration of the resource trap did not only affect the discussion over

technological transformation. The shift towards jointery was also assisted by the fact

that combining individual services' centres for the development of doctrine, or turning

8 5 Freedman, "The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98," Also from interviews.

3 3

the Navy and R A F Harrier squadrons into the Joint Force 2000, cut down on multiple,

redundant institutions86 saving money as well as fulfilling the prevailing military

doctrine. As one interviewee stated it, "the budgetary pressures...[have] led people to

say with the one tank out there to be killed, we don't need to be able to kill it

from...an aircraft, a helicopter, a tank, an artillery piece, a guided missile; they don't

all need to be there". Jointery as envisioned in the SDR merged capabilities together

and enabled savings to be made, but did not go as far as to abolish the separate service

identities and skill sets, which the review had intentionally made inviolate.

There is nevertheless a worry about the actual economic effects of increasing the joint

focus of the forces. Hartley points out that bargaining for new platforms by services

under a joint system have many of the characteristics of oligopoly and monopoly

behaviour, as no alternative is offered to the 'customer', or government. This is

certainly of concern when the intention of jointery is to do precisely the opposite, and

create economic benefits for procurement. It is probably too early to tell whether the

actual effects of jointery have been to increase economic costs or not. Regardless of

their impact, cost considerations certainly did structure many of the decisions made

8 7

on future policy in the SDR. This was something that had been feared in advance ,

and the designation of the SDR as 'foreign policy' rather than Treasury driven both

reflects this worry, but also belies the inevitable influence of limited budgets on

military strategic planning.

Edmonds, "Defence Management and the Impact of'Jointery'," 151-176. ; Keith Hartley, "The Changing Face of Military Power," in The Changing Face of Military Power : Joint Warfare in the Expeditionary Era (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002), 201-215. 8 7 "The Defence Review. New Labour's Model Army," The Economist (London), 27 September 1997, p. 61. Lexis-Nexis,

34

As described in some detail above, the SDR policy-making process was a joint one,

building on close work between branches of the bureaucracy, interested parties, and

the three services. They were trying to prevent bureaucratic competition and turf-war

intransigence from affecting policy goals. As such, the Foreign Office and the newly-

formed Department for International Development (DfID) both played central roles in

the development of new policy for the Ministry of Defence that the SDR represented.

This then represents one more level of jointery, beyond the definition more commonly

used for the connection between the various service branches within the military. It

has potentially revolutionary impact for the organisation, equipping and performance

of British forces. The involvement of these other institutions at the planning stage

means that the forces are affected in the nascent state, and grow up with doctrine,

equipment and structure that are all at least in part focused on operations of this new

kind. The clearest example of the impact of these other departments on military policy

is the introduction of the defence mission in the SDR called "Defence Diplomacy" 8 8,

which explicitly placed the Armed Forces in the position of dealing with 'conflict

prevention'. This task had previously been the remit of the diplomatic corps, with the

Forces moving in only i f the non-military groups' attempts failed. Now, the initiation

of planning for the use of military forces meant that interdepartmental jointery would

play its role in shaping how those forces would look in the future.

This second tier of jointery - involving other departments in planning the future

military - was the significant contribution New Labour made to the development of

Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Chs. 48-50.; Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review : Supporting Essays," Essay 4.

35

the joint philosophy in the MoD and the Forces. As Edmonds 8 9 points out, most of the

moves towards increasing the inter-service connections in both operations and

doctrine were part of a long, evolutionary process in that direction, brought on by a

series of changes in management style and financial resources. In contrast, the move

to place defence policy at the mercy of foreign and development policy was a new

attempt to "conceptualize something...that crossed departmental barriers in

Whitehall" 9 0, putting a distinctive spin on the concept of jointery and fostering change

at a more radical pace than the inter-service developments. With the review initiated

from a foreign-policy driven perspective, it reflected a core mindset of the New

Labour government, that would soon evolve into the 'joined-up government'

programme.

The decision to move towards a foreign policy-led defence policy brought forward the

need to develop a capabilities-based planning concept in the Forces. If foreign policy

were to lead, then defence resources would have to be flexible to follow, as it would

not be able to pick its own commitments and prepare for them in advance. The actions

of another branch of the government would structure the actions of the MoD, and

therefore the MoD would have to be ready for more potential tasks, at shorter notice

than previously. By knowing their various capabilities, the Forces could then apply

those to whatever situations emerged for them to deal with. Adaptability would have

been required in any case, following the disappearance of the one overwhelming

threat for which fixed plans could be made, but expanding the set of tasks by giving

8 9 Martin Edmonds, "Defence Management and the Impact of 'Jointery'," in The Changing Face of Military Power : Joint Warfare in the Expeditionary Era (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002), 151-176.

v90 Michael Clarke, "French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 76, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 725-739.

3 6

other departments a say in troop usage was certainly a significant spur to the

development of the versatility emphasised in capabilities-based planning.

Conclusion

After a long period of uncertainty and only partial attempts at elucidating defence

policy for the changed strategic and technological environment, the Strategic Defence

Review of 1997-8 offered a means of change. Originally intended as a way for the

Labour Party to deflect long-seated criticisms of its defence policy, the question for

the promised defence review was whether it would fulfil the promises made of it.

What had been a diversion away from one of the most unreported and minor electoral

issues could have gone one of two ways - it could become a manifesto promise

largely ignored and unfulfilled, or the review could set out to achieve the grand goals

proposed in Labour's electoral materials.

In terms of the process behind its production, the report certainly took the second of

these two options - in fact, it expanded beyond even what its strongest political

advocate, George Robertson, had intended, thereby truly deserving the Pandora's Box

label. The substance of the review advocated the transformation of the British military

, partially drawing on work the previous Conservative governments had put in place,

but also establishing a new, more radical programme. Moves towards jointery

straddled this same divide, with some amalgamations (Joint Force 2000 for example)

being very much in the same line as earlier developments. On the other hand, the

entwining of defence policy with the goals of the Foreign Office, and more

instructively still even the new DfID, resulted in a defence policy now joined in an

alternative fashion, to planning goals and skill requirements outside the usual military

37

9! sphere. "Modernising Government" , the white paper on which the joined-up

government thinking was based, was still a year from release, but we can see its

reflection in the inter-departmental moves of SDR. Elements of all of Pollitt's four

pillars of JUG are visible here. Firstly there was the intention of preventing a clash

between development and military goals through the pursuit of "an integrated external

92

policy" through which interests are pursued using all the instruments at the

government's disposal, including the diplomatic, developmental and military

branches. Secondly, as ever, cost and efficiency considerations were omnipresent.

Furthermore, instituting 'defence diplomacy' was a move towards "improving the 93

flow of good ideas...amongst stakeholders" by drawing on military expertise, and

finally there was the drive to make defence diplomacy more seamless through

'properly l inking' 9 4 the MoD and the Forces to other government resources and

departments. The SDR was very much a forebear to the joined-up government

concept.

Considerations of cost continued to be a primary policy driver in the SDR. Much of

the jointery programme took as a further motivation the fact that multiple occurrences

of the same capabilities would be phased out as a result. Nevertheless, at the same

time as financial pressure drove transformation forward, it held it back in others.

Already the future capabilities of the Americans, drawing on the R M A , were

predicted to take a radical shift to include expensive high-technology in areas of both

weaponry and C3 command and control functions. The British budgetary situation

9 1 Prime Minister and Minister for the Cabinet Office, "Modernising Government Cm 4310," , 9 2 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Sect. 10. 9 3 Pollitt, "Joined-Up Government: A Survey," pg. 35. 9 4 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," sect. 48.

38

ensured that this programme could not be embraced with anything like the enthusiasm

of their allies across the Atlantic. The repercussions from this did not only manifest

themselves in the future abilities of the British Forces to act individually. The SDR

connected the British to the Americans in any major conflict, probably to the extent of

placing U K troops under US command. If this did happen, maximum compatibility

would be required, a compatibility threatened by Britain's inability to pay for the

appropriate equipment.

Transformation of a technological, an organisational, and a doctrinal nature all came

out of the SDR. The process itself is instructive of how defence policy was opening

up under Labour to numerous outside influences. The drivers of transformation,

however, were primarily those of finances and management practices that Edmonds

describes, and also the political will of a Labour leadership determined to change the

party's image on defence matters. The following chapter deals with the dramatic shift

in the transformational dynamic that occurred in the aftermath of the events of

September 11 t h 2001, an attack on Britain's primary ally that precipitated a rapid

increase in the deployment of 'transformed' military forces by both the US and the

U K .

39

C H A P T E R T H R E E - Transforming Transformation

US moves towards transformation

At this stage, it is appropriate to study in greater detail the progress in military

transformation that took place in the United States during this period. As is mentioned

already, the QDR set out clear intentions as to the advances the US military should

make for the modern era. In doing so, the QDR drew on the Joint Vision 2010

document95 released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in July of 1996, which set out the

broad framework of what would come to be the transformational agenda. The

understanding of Joint Vision 2010 was that dominance in the future strategic

environment would be achieved through the combination of joint forces with cutting-

edge technology. In a degree of similarity to the British case, the reduction of

redundancies for economy's sake was a prime motivation for this shift to 'jointness':

Simply to retain our effectiveness with less redundancy [in the face of

budget cuts], we will need to wring every ounce of capability from

every available source. That outcome can only be accomplished

through a more seamless integration of Service capabilities. To achieve

this integration while conducting military operations we must be fully

joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.96

Despite this preparation for an era of shrinking finances, the comparison with Britain

9 5 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington, D . C : Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 34.

9 6 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

40

is not complete. The Joint Chiefs could still draw on an astonishing amount of

funding for the technology for the new era of warfare. Long-range precision strike

weaponry, stealth abilities, unmanned vehicles, and systems for widespread

information provision to forces were all advocated as future goals for these joint

forces. In addition, there was not the same wariness that characterised the later British

foray into the same concepts - according to the Joint Chiefs, technology was a

positive addition to American military capabilities.

This document then became a primary building block of the QDR the following year.

The QDR shied away from expressing a separate doctrine of jointness, or even

expanding on its meaning, referring attention instead to Joint Force 2010 for details.

What the QDR did express in some greater detail were the potential technological

transformations the US should develop. Section VII offers an impressive array of

options by which the R M A could be harnessed to the service of the future generation

of military technology - stealth and precision strike abilities in the new generation of

strike aircraft (the F22 and Joint Strike Fighter), the development of long range

precision strike weaponry and unmanned vehicles, and the embrace of C4ISR

(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance) networking technology. The National Defense Panel's assessment of

the QDR, required as part of the review process under law, looked even further ahead

and further emphasised the transformative aspects of the future defence policy 9 7. It

also urged perseverance in the creation of joint programmes, citing the combination of

expeditionary force usage and thrift that appealed to the British around the same time.

9 7 United States National Defense Panel, "Transforming Defense : National Security in the 21st Century," 94.

41

The transformative agenda espoused in 1997's QDR received a boost with the

election of George W. Bush in 2000. Donald Rumsfeld, the incoming Secretary of

Defense, immediately set out to push rapid transformation as the primary goal for the

military, even over the objections of his staff as to the pace of this change. In contrast

to the United Kingdom, the political appointees made leaders of departments are often

policy experts in that field, and Rumsfeld was no exception. In the Ford

administration he had been the youngest Defence Secretary in history, and under Bush

he became the oldest. Over that period he had developed an experience in defence

matters far outstretching that of his British counterparts, who tended towards shorter

terms determined by the vagaries of parliamentary electoral considerations and

cabinet reshuffling. He would encourage the establishment of a very different

military, and make it a primary goal of defence policy, rather than an addendum

pursued according to the military's own, organic timetable.

Despite Rumsfeld's pro-transformation mindset, implementation of radical changes

was not immediate. Another defence review was required by statute in order to set out

the strategic plan of the new administration. In preparation for it, Rumsfeld

established a number of study groups to investigate the needs for defence policy. The

one dedicated to transformation reported in July 2001, and the results were widely

reported as eschewing any radically transformational agenda, retaining the bulk of the

'legacy' systems, such as three separate fighter aircraft development programmes, and

retaining the huge, lumbering Crusader howitzer, weighing in at some 80 tons, rather

than moving to the lighter, flexible and easily deployable forces hoped for by the

transformationally minded. Rumsfeld's agenda had come up against forces in the US

military who still had as their primary concern the emergence of a 'near-peer

42

competitor', a power that could challenge the US in global influence, with the

potential to take the Americans on in full-scale operations. The main contender for

this crown was the People's Republic of China, although some suspicious glances

were still cast at Russia 9 8. This political-bureaucratic dynamic, which structured what

transformation was for, what a transformed military would look like, and what it

would cost changed dramatically with the events of September the 11th, 2001. The

terrorist strikes completely changed the considerations of policy-makers in both

Britain and the United States. The following section brings the British developments

up to date at this point, and then we turn to the impact of what would be termed 'the

War on Terror' on military transformation.

Further Development of Planning Moves in the U K

The Strategic Defence Review was a significant step towards transforming the British

military 9 9. By openly embracing the jointery developments between service branches,

the policy advanced a more efficient system of defence. Yet it was not the end of the

moves towards transformation. Rather, the demands the SDR made with regards to

overall strategic planning in the MoD gave added impetus to a range of new

bureaucratic planning management structures, which continued the transformative

momentum.

Further moves towards transforming the planning processes of the MoD came in with

Sir Kevin Tebbitt when he took over the position of Permanent Secretary in 1998. He

had played a lead role in the formulation of the first chapter of the SDR, placing

9 8 Thomas P. M . Barnett, Blueprint for Action : A Future Worth Creating, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2003), pg. 7. 9 9 Dorman, "Transformation and the United Kingdom," 27-32.

43

defence policy in the foreign policy context, recognising that there existed complex

new requirements on the Armed Forces, and requiring that they be able to deal with

these changed strategic circumstances. His appointment connected the lead

management structures in the MoD with the goal to modernise defence policy. What

emerged was a set of high-level committees, boards and groups that ensured jointery

began and ended at the top, in the bureaucracy as well as the f ield 1 0 0 .

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter

As their main response to the terrorist attacks, the British government released 'The

Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter' (SDR-NC) 1 0 1 in July of 2002. Clearly not

all of the defence policy set out in 1998 needed to be reassessed in light of the new

situation and requirements on the Forces. International terrorism was now a more

obvious threat to the 'homeland' than previously suspected - the original SDR

contended that the only serious threat to the U K mainland in the post-Cold War

geopolitical situation was domestic terrorism 1 0 2, itself much weakened the signing of

the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Nevertheless, the strategic situation had not, in

the eyes of the British at least, changed across the board - a new threat had emerged,

or an old threat had been upgraded in severity, but it did not require a re-tasking of the

entire British Armed Forces 1 0 3. Much of the SDR could therefore stand, without even

being considered in the context of terrorism. What the SDR-NC would do was form a

part of the government's moves to 'eliminate terrorism as a force in international

1 0 0 See Appendix Two for a chart demonstrating these bureaucratic structures 1 0 1 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, (London: The Stationary Office, 2002) 1 0 2 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review," Sect. 3, 23. 1 0 3 This point was strongly made by a number of interviewees

44

affairs' 1 0 4. By the time the SDR-NC was published, the British military had already

engaged the Taliban forces and al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan, as part of the

American-led actions there in October and November 2001. Through the SDR-NC,

established policy was being adapted in order to catch up with the time pressures of

international events.

In many respects, the SDR-NC was an adaptation of the same policy themes identified

in the SDR. For example, in order to counteract terrorism, it embraced much of the

same joined-up government approach manifested in the SDR, connected as it was

with humanitarian, financial, policing and diplomatic measures to address all aspects

of the problem. In part, this focus on the broad base of terrorism, and the

complimentary multiplicity of responses, came from the wide consultatory process

behind the document's preparation. From the essay accompanying the SDR-NC

detailing this process, it is clear that some external consultants encouraged more

skeptical thought on such matters as the scale of the terrorist threat on a strategic

level, the role of allies and international law in the conflict, and the extent to which

poverty and poor governance in societies inspired the threat105. Raising problems

without a solely military solution, as this consultative process did, further reinforced

the drive towards joined-up governance, at least when responding to the terrorist

threat. It is also clear from the interviews that a determination existed within the

MoD, even before this consultation, to avoid what was seen as America's myopic

concentration on a solely military response, such as through terming the campaign the

'War on Terror'. As a powerful institutional framework to reinforce this mindset, the

1 0 4 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter," pg. 4. 1 0 5 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence., The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter Supporting Essays, (London: Stationery Office, 2002), Sect. 8.

45

government established cross-departmental budgets 'to enable a more joined-up

approach' 1 0 6, ensuring that the military dealt with their conflict role in the wider issue

context. We will return to the importance of funding in greater detail later.

The SDR-NC further reinforced the earlier agenda of the SDR in the area of

expeditionary mission planning. The deployment of British troops to Afghanistan,

firstly as part of Operation Veritas (the U K contribution to the US Operation

Enduring Freedom), and then Operation Fingal (the U K contribution to the

International Security Assistance Force in Kabul) showed the salience of the

expeditionary mission principle set forth in the SDR. The SDR-NC added to this with

a more focused anti-terrorist mission, which threw out the geographical limitations

proposed in the SDR. Al-Qaeda's home base, located in Afghanistan, was on the

outside limits of where the SDR had considered British operations as taking place, but

it was conceivable that branches of this notoriously tentacular organisation would

emerge in still more distant locales. It was therefore required that the expeditionary

abilities of the forces stretch further afield, and be able to operate at short notice more

frequently: 'a coherent and effective campaign against international terrorism...may

require engagement further afield more often than perhaps we had previously

assumed' 1 0 7.

While some aspects of the SDR-NC reflected the approach and prescriptions of the

SDR, in other respects it went considerably further in pushing a transformational path

for the military. The clearest example of this is the enthusiastic adoption it makes of

1 0 6 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, "The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter," pg. 10. 1 0 7 Ibid., pg. 13.

4 6

'network-centric capabilities', which took the ISTAR ideas of the SDR-era, massively

expanded them and fully committed to them budgetarily and doctrinally. The results

are defined as "the elements required to deliver controlled and precise military effect

rapidly and reliably"1 0 8 and consist of three main elements - sensors, a network, and

strike abilities. The main 'capability' here is to be able to deal with large amounts of

information very quickly, dispatching them to the appropriate destination for

processing. It was not a cheap prospect. The SDR-NC called for an accelerated and

increased investment in the technologies for these three elements - airborne stand-off

surveillance and battlefield unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for the sensors, tactical

data-links for the networks, and Tomahawk and Storm Shadow cruise missiles for the

precision strikes, to build the kind of future force shown in Figure 1 below109.

Fig. 1

This was certainly a significant move, as it represented a stance that "gave greater

Ibid., pg. 15.

Image from Ibid., pg. 16.

47

emphasis to the ideas of the revolution in military affairs than did S D R " " 0 . The

principles of network-centric warfare meant that the heart of the R M A was now

written large on British military policy. Originally so skeptical about the safety of the

computerised networks and about the cost of the high-technology equipment, the

MoD was now embracing it as a means to defeat terrorism. The network-centric

concept was seen aS the best way of taking the (expensive) advances in technology

and fitting them into the British military system and (still limited) budget. The circle

was squared through the understanding that this capability provided a 'force

multiplier', that does not require all forces in the area to be so transformed as to be

plugged in to the network, but instead relies on a few core transformed assets to

interface with the troops 1 1 1.

While the troops were not required to be transformed in terms of the equipment they

carry (this was not a fully computerised soldier), they would need transformed

interaction abilities with the networking technologies. This would require what one

interviewee called "a generation of...mid-range officers who are transformationally

minded", so that the interaction between the technology and personnel would be

smoothly overseen by the more senior of the officers in active command of troops.

This meant that the transformative philosophy developed in bodies such as JDCC

would be needed to fully exploit transformative potential. As is demonstrated later,

experience struggled to match-up to these smooth expectations of equipment and

manpower.

1 1 0 Dorman, "Transformation and the United Kingdom," pg. 4. 1 1 1 Select Committee On Defence, United Kingdom Parliament, Sixth Report: A New Chapter to the ' Strategic Defence Review, (London: The Stationary Office, 2003)

48

Funding the SDR-NC

The SDR-NC offered a much expanded picture of technological transformation, and

therefore gave much more significant momentum to that aspect of transformation than

had the SDR. Nevertheless, what was required for the theory, or policy, to become

practice was a significant injection of funding such that the equipment and training

required for these R M A concepts to take root could be brought in. In order to do this,

the Treasury announced in its Spending Review of 2002 that the MoD budget would

increase by some 1.2% each year for the following 3 years, a total rise of £3.5 billion,

with "over £1 billion of new capital and £0.5 billion of new resources for new

network-centric capabilities and other equipment which will enable the conclusions of

the SDR New Chapter to be delivered" 1 1 2. Some were suspicious as to how far this

funding would go towards addressing the requirements of network-centric warfare,

noting that in comparison to spending across other government departments the MoD

was getting a poor deal and that "marginal" measures would likely be the result"3.

This skeptical view is by no means assured. Much of the equipment required for this

kind of warfare is relatively cheap - U A V s were by this point 'off-the-shelf

technology, as the US military had used them in a number of guises for some years,

enabling the British to avoid long, costly development phases"4. While there were

some more expensive programmes tying in with these others, the burst of funding did

provide for an advancement in the core network-centric technologies. The reaction to

9/11 opened up the Treasury's purse-strings, removing another obstacle so often the

limit on transformative advancement in the U K .

1 1 2 H M Treasury, "2002 Spending Review: Opportunity and Security for all," (2002): Sect. 12. 1 1 3 Dorman, "Transformation and the United Kingdom," pg. 4. 1 1 4 Select Committee On Defence, United Kingdom Parliament, "Sixth Report: A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review"

49

US Moves post 9/11

At the same time as this British move on transformation in reaction to terrorism was

underway, the United States had pushed forward itself in a much more committed

fashion. The QDR of 2001, while overwhelmingly the product of pre-September 11th

thinking, had been rapidly converted to a document whose message was intended to

speak to the "new order" of things in the light of the now declared 'War on Terror'" 5 .

On October 29th 2001, Rumsfeld established the Office of Force Transformation

(OFT) in the Pentagon, devoting considerable resources to the "urgent requirement for

defense transformation""6. This too was not merely a response to terrorism, but

signified the personal commitment of Rumsfeld to transformation as discussed above.

Both of these moves reflect how the transformation agenda got caught up in the

radical mission-shift that took place in light of terrorism.

From an institutional perspective, the establishment of a body like the OFT is a strong

mechanism towards furthering the goals it espouses. It was not a goal that the US

military took to with any great enthusiasm, with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard

Myers admitting that military culture created a considerable obstacle to the designs of

transformation advocates such as Rumsfeld and President Bush" 7 . In the face of such

reluctance, something like the. OFT, whose director's role was to "evaluate the

transformation efforts of the Military Departments and promote synergy by

1 1 5 United States Department of Defense., Quadrennial Defense Review Report, United States Department of Defense, 2001). The Q D R was released just 20 days after 9/11, so obviously it was overwhelmingly the product of work before that event. The preface of the Review nevertheless solely discusses the 'War on Terror'. 1 1 6 United States Department of Defense, "Elements of Defense Transformation," pg. 2. 1 1 7 Richard B. Myers, "A Word from the Chairman," JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly , no. 35 (2004): pg. 2.

5 0

recommending steps to integrate ongoing transformation activities"" 8, ensured that

transformative practices were taken up by the services. With the transformation

mission of this body tied to the 'War on Terror' through such policy documents as the

QDR, and the personal commitment of significant actors like Rumsfeld, action by the

US military against terror-connected targets became actions of a transformational

nature. The following section looks at how British Forces' connection to those of the

US had a compounded impact.

British and US military co-operation

As discussed above, the SDR-NC came out after some British units (primarily special

forces, light rapid response forces, and naval strike forces with cruise missiles) had

already operated in Afghanistan, alongside their American counterparts, in actions

against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This connection to the United States military was

developing into a transformation driver of considerable strength for the British. In

operating in close, integrated co-ordination with the Americans, British forces

required the ability to slot into the American actions. Ostensibly operations were

allied in nature, and British command retained full control over their troops' missions,

but there was little doubt as to where operational doctrine was formulated. If the

Americans were to make this a 'transformed' conflict then the British would at the

very least need to be conversant in these concepts, and the more active a role they

intended to take in the coalition, the more they would have to structure their activities

around the framework that such a conflict demanded. Thus it was that even if the

British were reluctant to embrace transformation, integrating with the Americans

would impose those principles by default. Afghanistan was the first real test case for

1 1 8 United States Department of Defense., "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," pg. 29.

51

transformation. Eighteen months later, British and American troops were once more

in action together, this time in Iraq. This action was to have at least as much impact

on the process of transformation as Afghanistan, and probably more so.

The British participation in the invasion of Iraq on the 20th March 2003, Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to the Americans, took the form of Operation TELIC, a

commitment of some 45,000 military personnel. The British moved into the southern

section of Iraq, alongside the 15th US Marine Expeditionary Unit who were operating

under British command. This was a test of the interoperability of the British and

Americans, something that the British transformational doctrine required. If

Afghanistan had been one example of British troops acting in an integrated fashion

with their American allies in the 'post 9/11' environment, then Iraq was this principle

writ far larger. Those 45,000 troops in the region formed the overwhelming bulk of

the British military. With the intention being to work alongside the Americans, and in

many instances fully integrate with them, the impact on how the British needed to

think about transformation dramatically shifted. This was no longer a theoretical

prospect or exercise, nor was it only concerning a small fraction of already well-

integrated special forces, who had dealt with their American counterparts in numerous

declared and undeclared actions. This was the vast bulk of British conventional

military force integrating with the Americans in full-scale modern warfare.

Blue Force Tracker - A Case-Study

The example of 'Blue Force Tracker' is instructive for the problems it demonstrates

with transformation pushed upon forces from outside their standard evolutionary

development path. The British 1st Armoured Division, operating the Challenger 2

52

main battle tank and Warrior fighting vehicle, was equipped with 47 Blue Force

Tracker units 1 1 9 to be placed inside each tank. An American device, leased by the

British, this sent out a signal to the military network that the vehicle in question was

friendly or 'blue'. The intention was to prevent the cases of'friendly fire' or 'blue-on-

blue' attacks that had bedevilled the coalition in the first Gulf War, and something

about which the Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, faced considerable

political pressure, leading to his assurance that a technological solution would be

found. In such a fashion, the military commitment in Iraq again kick-started

transformation, in this case because political pressure required transformative

technology to prevent the public-relations nightmare of friendly-fire casualties.

The problem with the implementation of Blue Force Tracker was that the British were

not prepared for having the boxes inside the Challengers - there was not the space in

the crowded cabin. This being the case, according to interviews the damage rate was

extraordinary - within two days a third of the units were broken. Embracing the

technological advances of the Americans, spurred on by the fears over vehicle

misidentification, did not 'fast-track' that aspect of transformation. Instead, "the

system was disregarded and the relief in place was conducted through the more

familiar use of liaison officers on the ground" 1 2 0 - it merely caused the technology to

be wasted, and left troops reverting to their previous techniques.

Transformational implications of the insurgency

While Blue Force Tracker shows that attempts to advance transformation beyond its

1 1 9 Office O f Force Transformation, " A Network-Centric Operations Case Study: US/UK. Coalition Combat Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom," (2005) 1 2 0 Ibid. Sect. 5-5.

53

'natural' rate may be unsuccessful, in another regard the Iraq War demonstrates far

more significant problems for transformation. Initially, the war was a series of

dramatic victories, showcasing the phenomenal speed of US forces and their ability to

win a modern war with a very different force structure than that of previous land

campaigns. Before the war, there had been considerable conflict reported in the

Administration and Pentagon in the US about the proper size of the invasion force -

after all, Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, had coined the eponymous doctrine

requiring 'overwhelming' force to be massed against opponents before the

commencement of combat, a doctrine he had enforced the last time American ground

troops had engaged the Iraqis during the Gulf War, and this mindset was in addition

well entrenched at the top levels of the military. Despite that initial success, the

situation in Iraq quickly complicated, for it soon became apparent that, as Milton put

it, "he who...overcomes by force, has overcome but half his foe" 1 2 1 - a flourishing

insurgency soon sprang up against the Allied occupation and the interim Iraqi

government.

The failings that emerged after the heady days of formal victory belied the message of

"mission accomplished" as declared by President Bush on May 1 s t 2003 are manifest,

and are too many to discuss here. What is relevant is how the tenuous security

situation soon required the allied troops to take on very different roles from the

'transformed' ones they had used to destroy the lumbering Iraqi forces. Dealing with

the insurgency was classic occupation warfare, with the main tactics faced being

suicide bombing and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on mined roads, all

1 2 1 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. Anna P. Baldwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Book I Line 648-9.

54

perpetrated by individuals and groups who blended seamlessly into the local

population. The required response on the part of the Allies was to commit troops to

extended deployment 'in theatre', patrolling the streets, arresting suspected militants,

engaging anyone spotted placing IEDs and so forth.

Such tasks placed different demands on troops, and different demands on those

behind the front-line, such as the planners and managers in the MoD. Instead of the

network-centric focus of fast-moving war, with its emphasis on strike ability, cutting-

edge technology and instant adaptability, the mission became one where good body

armour, foot patrols and establishing positive relations with the local people were the

requirements for success. Without this focus, troops found themselves at great risk,

and were ineffectual at quelling uprisings. Up the chain of command, this meant that

the MoD needed to look at providing these supplies to the Forces in Iraq, and to

concentrate on doctrine relating to counter-insurgency warfare, drawing on the past

lessons of Northern Ireland and Malaya, rather than developing the concept of

network-centric warfare.

As was the case in so many other aspects, the British tended to compare their

approach to that of the Americans, to see how the extent of adoption of

transformational doctrine and practices affected performance. The experience of Blue

Force Tracker had shown that when in place in large numbers across units used to

using it, the network technology enabled US formations to operate far more

effectively1 2 2, as opposed to the British attempts. When it came to the aftermath of

active combat however, the benefit of comparisons tended to go the other way, at least

1 2 2 Office O f Force Transformation, " A Network-Centric Operations Case Study: U S / U K Coalition Combat Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom"

55

in British eyes.

The British officer Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, serving in Iraq as Deputy

Commander of the Office of Security Transition in the Coalition Office for Training

and Organising Iraq's Armed Forces, stirred up a considerable storm in allied

military, political and journalistic circles , when he wrote a piece for the US journal

'Military Affairs' critiquing the American approach to the counter-insurgency

conflict. His criticisms related to how the technological, warfighting aspect of

transformation became the matrix by which the Americans (in particular the Army,

but his points apply to other units, such as the Marines, who were operating as ground

anti-insurgent forces) saw operations that clearly called for a non-transformed

approach:

The US Army has developed over time a singular focus on

conventional warfare, of a particularly swift and violent style, which

left it ill-suited to the kind of operation it encountered as soon as

conventional warfighting ceased to be the primary focus in OIF . 1 2 4

A similar point was made by another British observer of the U.S. Army's tactics,

remarking that "[ojverly relying on technology to produce solutions for warfare is a

great concern. In the end, resolving a conflict invariably centers on issues of people

and territory, tasks that demand land force deployment."1 2 5

See eg. Canadian Press, Washington Post, U S A Today, Daily Mail for January 11th 2006 1 2 4 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," Military Review 85, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2005): pg. 9. 1 2 5 Will iam H. Moore, "U.S. Army Transformation: The U.K. View," Militaiy Review 82, no. 3 (May/Jun 2002): pg. 69.

56

In Aylwin-Foster's view, the technological aspect of the transformational doctrine the

Office of Force Transformation pushed across all aspects of US. military practice was

being rigidly imposed at the cost of an understanding of transformation emphasising

flexibility and adaptability. These latter principles had of course been fundamental to

the early British discussions of transformation, as discussed in Chapter 2, from which

the capabilities-based planning approach emerged. If transformation was indeed

intended to the British approach to transformation had developed very much from

those principles, and Aylwin-Foster's critique of American, doctrine picks this

contradiction out clearly:

It makes much of changing the military culture, and enhancing the

strategic and operational agility and responsiveness, but is itself

uncompromisingly and ironically orientated towards warfighting in tone

and content. It leaves the distinct impression that the Transformation

project will concentrate too much on harnessing high technology to

enhance conventional warfighting capability across Defence, and too little

on the much more critical, and demanding, transformation of the human

workforce, the key to development of a genuinely adaptive entity. 1 2 6

There is little doubt that some of this attitude towards the American approach was a

reflection of British snobbishness. That was certainly the claim of many Americans,

piqued at the criticism by an ostensible ally. Yet many of the issues Aylwin-Foster

raised have been brought up by American officers themselves, and the shift in

approach of much training for US troops heading into theatre in Iraq suggests non-

1 2 6 Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," pg. 14.

57

technological lessons have been learnt, or more accurately, been re-learnt.

Financial Implications

What both the US and British militaries found additionally constricting however, was

that the non-transformational demands of forces, indeed the demands quite simply of

holding significant numbers of forces in theatre for years after the end of the

conventional conflict, pressurised budgets. The British drew on a special contingency

fund the Treasury set up for the war' 2 7 , and therefore initially other development

moves in the Forces were not financially affected by the commitments in Iraq, even if

the troops themselves had other priorities. As the deployment stretched out however,

finances started to become complicated. With the establishment of these contingency

funds, the Treasury gave more leeway than was normal to spending - urgent

requirements were generally passed straight through. The Treasury's fear was that this

would encourage non-urgent spending requests to be placed, masquerading as

operational requirements. This led to a conflation of budgets in planning circles, as

demonstrated by this comment from one interviewee dealing with Army issues: "I

think we are going to have a problem on this basis, at the moment we have been on

'operations' for so long...that we're uncertain now what our baseline is for actually

running the Army properly". Fighting a long war that requires a considerable number

of troops to remain in theatre, undertaking non-transformational tasks, means that

financial, as well as doctrinal, resources become scarcer1 2 8. The level of defence

spending in the U K has always structured what the military could do, and has formed

a core influence in this discussion here - the British were struggling to fund

1 2 7 HM Treasury, "Budget Report 2003," (2003): 1.11., Also from interviews. 1 2 8 Barnett, "Blueprint for Action : A Future Worth Creating," 440

58

transformation as it was, having to cherry-pick the aspects they could afford.

Requiring another expensive task of the Forces once more proved that the primary

limiting factor in defence policy would be money.

Conclusion

Following the SDR in 1998, while jointery was whole-heartedly embraced in British

defence policy, the technological aspect of transformation was left undecided, both

from concerns over its cost and from concerns over technological approaches to

military conflict per se. The past five years of military policy in the U K have led to a

number of changes in the progression of transformation, beyond what could have

been extrapolated from the SDR. The reasons for these changes are indirect,

stemming from the attacks of September 11th 2001. In the aftermath, the Americans

choose to prosecute the campaign against terrorism through military means, and the

British make it a matter of policy to be strong allies in this campaign. This connection

to the United States, and an improved financial situation for the military, enables a

new look at transformative technology, and the SDR-NC embraces the 'network-

centric' concepts and equipment. Initially, both major conflicts of the anti-terrorism

alliance showcase the benefits of transformational warfare based on modern

technology, speed and co-ordination, even if Blue Force Tracker demonstrates the

dangers of over-reaching. Yet when both initial phases are over, and troops have to

settle and hunker down, transformation slows. For every force there is an equal and

opposite one, and now resources - time, money, intellectual - are required for

untransformed activities, not the transformation project. Attempting to avoid this

transfer of resources, and fight the latter kind of war with the former's tactics, results

in under-manning and chaotic scenes of insurgency - such was the critique that

59

emerged from some members of the British forces. Transformation has thus been

doubly affected by 9/11 - it was advanced, and then displaced by the strategic

concerns of the day.

The classic comment of Harold MacMillan, that what drives politics is "the

opposition of events" remains just as relevant today. Still, how one reacts to those

events is not certain. As one of the interviewees put it, "[everything changes because

of 9/11, because the Americans change"™. The connection between the terror attacks

and the distortions1 3 0 of transformation is by no means a necessary one - it was of

course entirely possible for the United States to approach terrorism in a non-military

fashion, rather than declaring a 'War on Terror'. Even given this declaration, the

British government did not have to stand 'shoulder to shoulder' with the Americans at

all, or do so beyond the engagements in Afghanistan. The motivation for deploying

British Forces in the Iraq conflict and maintaining them there for a protracted

occupation is complex, has provoked considerable vitriol, and is certainly a more

extensive task than is possible here. Regardless, these decisions were made, and did

impact the transformative agenda, as detailed above.

With Britain thus determined-to fulfill whatever niches the Americans required, rather

than undertaking a multilateral approach to the post-9/11 geopolitical situation, they

became by some distance the major minor partner in the 'coalition of the willing' that

emerged. In comparison to the coalition facing Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf

War, where there were several junior partners, now only Britain could provide fully

1 2 9 My emphasis '. •

1 3 0 The term 'distortion' is not intended to be derogatory in context.

60

integrative capabilities. Thus, it was much easier for the transformative approach to

spread across specific capabilities - there was only one serious partner for the

technologies and command concepts such as Blue Force Tracker, only one external

group to bring up to speed and connect to the network. Furthermore, this is a self-

reinforcing process, because Britain, as the most transformationally minded potential

ally out there, was the particular ally the Americans were most willing to work with

and to call on proffered forces. This meant that the British got to work with the

Americans more, the integration drove transformation, which in turn encourages

further collaboration.

In order for the British to fulfill the commitments they make regarding working

alongside American military action, they need to be able to integrate into the

American way of acting, to "plug into the US more directly", as one interviewee put

it. Britain's is not an independent military force when it acts alongside the Americans

- and in being dependent on the Americans in major conflicts, it is very much

fulfilling an understanding made early in the SDR process. As an example of taking

this 'plugging into the US ' too far, however, Blue Force Tracker gives us a

demonstration of attempting 'plug and play'. The British cannot just accept

transformational equipment on the battlefield as operations are about to commence -

as one British officer comments "the U.K. must understand U.S. concepts of

operations and capabilities before it gets to the line of departure i f it is to help in an

integrated effort"1 3 1.

Having seen how transformation was given a significant boost by the post-9/11

1 3 1 Moore,''U.S. Army Transformation: The U . K . View,''pg. 68.

61

actions, and possibly even advancing too fast in the case of Blue Force Tracker, the

final lesson to learn is how transformation can be way-laid by the demands of current

fighting. As it is an on-going process, transformation requires consistent planning for

the future, and the priority shifts required to prosecute long, drawn-out and non-

transformational warfare effectively detract from that process. The impact of 9/11 has

thus been called "distorting" and "transforming" in this work because the decisions

and military commitments made in light of the changed strategic situation pushed and

pulled at the transformational dynamic that existed in the U K following the Strategic

Defence Review. The following, and final, chapter will discuss how this changing

picture has been managed by the bureaucracy in the United Kingdom, and the

Ministry of Defence in particular, before summing-up the conclusions of the thesis as

a whole.

62

C H A P T E R F O U R - Conclusion

The move towards transforming the British Armed Forces started in earnest with the

SDR. This set out for the first time a plan for the entire British military establishment

to move towards a capabilities-based warfare for the post-Cold War era. The New

Labour government backed into the SDR for electoral reasons, and did not intend for

it to be as extensive a shake-up as it turned out to be. In spite of this, and to the credit

of Robertson and Blair, they pushed ahead with the requirements that emerged from

the study, and Britain had a plan for a changed military.

Thus, the pre-9/11, post-SDR British military is transformed. It is joint, it looks

towards expeditionary work, being 'quick in, quick out', responsive and flexible. In

particular, the institutional structures are in place to ensure that this jointery pervades

the bureaucratic structure of the MoD as well as the Forces in the field. Appendix

Two gives a map of the senior bureaucratic bodies involved in strategic planning, and

an idea of how all planning goes through those joint institutions, but what should be

emphasised here is how the structures were in place to manage the change in policy

started by the SDR.

Nevertheless, the Forces are missing a core element of what we now think of as

requisite in a fully transformed force - the network centric conception, with the

technological backing, which formed the programme of the OFT in the US.

Transformation requires jointery, because it is based upon networked principles, and

networks join units. So in that respect, pre-9/11 Britain had a force that was working

63

in a transformed mindset. It just sheered away from the technological embodiment of

the grander transformed military. That came later.

It came when Britain was drawn into widespread conflict alongside the United States.

The mission to Afghanistan was expeditionary, just as the SDR had suggested future

British operations would be. What was different was the presence of the American

allies, who had at their disposal the transformational technology. With an open-ended

commitment to supporting the US, Britain soon adopted the same network-centric

concept the Americans had developed, and established that it would move to structure

its military around it.

In a concerned piece regarding the status of transformation in N A T O , Sir Ian Forbes,

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation in the Alliance mentions that

N A T O is having to get over the psychological barriers in the way of

transformation132. This thesis suggests that Britain faced just such a barrier, and

jumped it due to commitments made in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it was not a one­

way street - the Americans needed to choose Britain, and accept their help, something

they pointedly did not do with N A T O for Afghanistan. To repeat the point made

earlier, it was particularly easy for the U K to become integrated because they were the

only ones the Americans would take. Thus, the coalition could concentrate on just that

one link, and then Britain looked increasingly enticing at later stages.

The 'War on Terror' provided a significant funding boost to defence spending in both

the U K and US. The increase given by the 2002 Spending Review and then by the

Iraq War contingency fund overcame Britain's traditional hurdle of budgetary

1 3 2 Ian Forbes, "Minding the Gap," Foreign Policy , no. 141 (Mar/Apr 2004): 76-77.

.64

constraint. One thing this thesis found from its interviews in particular is that with

British troops locked into a costly occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the resource

debate was not over, and returned to complicate the distribution of funds to

transformative ends.

Further study

When looking at what has been uncovered here, the first thing is to re-emphasise that

transformation is not finished. This study can only focus on the beginning of the

process, and the distortion of the 'War on Terror'. Further study can tell us i f the

policy drivers explained above remain key through later developments. What will

change in the British military after long periods of occupation in Iraq, or pacification

work in Afghanistan? Will these commitments have a long-term impact, limiting the

drive to a lighter, expeditionary transformed force? Burnett, for example, has

suggested that the Americans are already learning a new kind of warfare, and that the

transformation around R M A principles is less central to this future.133 Is it the case

that non-transformational warfare in Iraq turns back transformation? Wil l different

skill-sets just develop alongside network-centric warfare? Or will the militaries try to

preserve their transformation, even at the cost of backing out of significant operations

in these theatres?

Some factors will probably remain the same - funding pressures are the primary

suspect in this regard. By looking in greater depth at thinking in the Treasury,

probably by expanding the set of interviews to senior officials there, a better

conception of the budgetary dynamic will emerge. Other factors may well change,

1 3 3 Barnett, "Blueprint for Action : A Future Worth Creating," 440

65

such as the potential emergence of a peer or near-peer competitor. A threat like that of

the Soviet Union before it may require a fixed, massed and threat-focused military,

rather than the light, expeditionary transformed units. What is clear from the

discussion above is how much the campaign structures the military, despite the

emphasis on a particular approach.

Finally, policy implementation remains reliant on the bureaucracy. Current

bureaucratic structures in the MoD, depicted in Appendix Two, reinforce the joint

principles at the core of British transformation: the Investment Approvals Board and

the Policy and Programmes Steering Group funnelling jointly developed concepts and

acquisitions advice up to the Defence Management Board and the MoD leadership.

Continued study of this structure will yield better understanding of how this aspect of

transformation reflects the military as a whole, not just field operations. Similarly,

further study of operations will give us more on the 'macro-jointery', the interplay

between Defence and other departments. As discussed above, the interplay between

M o D and DfID is central to the British mission in Afghanistan, and recognised as

such by both parties. Developing a better knowledge of this relationship, its structure

and institutions, will require further work than was possible here.

British defence policy changed significantly with the election of New Labour in 1998,

and shifted yet again following September 11 2001. Transformation is not finished,

though, and if we wish to have a full picture of this process, then it is incumbent upon

us to exploit these avenues of study above.

66

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70'

APPENDIX ONE - Glossary of acronyms & terms

C3 Command, Control and Communications capabilities. Again, early

acronym conception of key future military capabilities.

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Current acronym for transformed

capabilities.

D C D C Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

DfID Department for International Development. New Department created .

by Labour Government in 1997.

IED Improvised Explosive Device.

ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

capabilities. The early acronym for some of the core 'transformed'

military capabilities.

JDCC Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, became the (current) DCDC

JRRF Joint Rapid Reaction Force. New group of units planned in the SDR to

further British expeditionary abilities.

JUG Joined-Up Government. New Labour programme to deal with

complex, over-lapping policy areas.

MoD Ministry of Defence.

N A T O The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom. US code-name for campaign against

Saddam Hussein and invasion of Iraq in 2003.

OFT Office of Force Transformation, US Department of Defence

71

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review. Statutorily required defense policy paper

in the US, released every four years, detailing the new administration's

view of defense policy.

SDR The Strategic Defence Review. British Defence Policy paper released

in 1998.

SDR-NC The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter. Follow-up to the SDR

in light of 9/11, released July 2002.

TLB Top Level Budget holder. Most independent budgetary unit in the

MoD.

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

72

APPENDIX TWO - MoD Bureaucracy

Defence Council

Secretary of State's board Meets infrequently, primarily to pass business

already conducted by DMB -

Defence Management Board (DMB)

Executive Board of the Defence Council Responsible for costing the Defence programme and

Departmental planning

Policy and Programmes Steering Group (PPSG)

Provides guidance on capability and policy options in the

planning process

Defence Audit Committee (DAC)

Oversees corporate governance and provides risk management

Investments Approvals Board (IAB)

Responsible for approval of all investment projects

Information gathered from the Ministry of Defence web-site and interviews. In addition to these three planning management committees, the PPSG, DAC and IAB, are two others of less relevance to the matters dealt with here: the Chiefs of Staff Committee that provides operational advice to the Prime Minister, and the Defence Estates Committee overseeing that aspect of MoD resources.