Towards(Secure(and(Dependable(...

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Towards Secure and Dependable So2wareDefined Networks Diego Kreutz , Fernando M. V. Ramos, Paulo Veríssimo LaSIGE/FCUL, University of Lisbon

Transcript of Towards(Secure(and(Dependable(...

Page 1: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Towards  Secure  and  Dependable  So2ware-­‐Defined  Networks  

Diego  Kreutz,  Fernando  M.  V.  Ramos,  Paulo  Veríssimo  LaSIGE/FCUL,  University  of  Lisbon  

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SDN  in  short  1.   Decoupling  control  

and  data  plane  

2.   Logical  centraliza?on  of  network  control  

3.   Programming  the  network  

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 Excellent,  now  we  can  program  the  network!  

Applications (control logic)

Network OS (programming abstractions, data distribution, low level controls, etc.)

App1 App2 App3 … AppN

Global Network View

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 Wait,  now  others  can  program  the  network!  

Applications (control logic)

Network OS (programming abstractions, data distribution, low level controls, etc.)

App1 App2 App3 … AppN

Global Network View

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Outline  

Main  threat  vectors  in  SDNs  

Security  &  Dependability  by  design  

Final  remarks  

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Outline  

Main  threat  vectors  in  SDNs  

Security  &  Dependability  by  design  

Final  remarks  

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Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  SDN  

Controller  

SDN  device  

1  

Not  specific  to  SDNs,  but  can  be  a  door  for  augmented  DoS  aNacks.  

Possible  solu*ons:  IDS  +  rate  bounds  for  control  plane  requests  

Threat  vectors  map  

Threat  vector  1  forged  or  faked  traffic  

flows  

Page 8: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  SDN  

Controller  

2   SDN  device  

Not  specific  to  SDNs,  but  now  the  impact  is  potenMally  augmented.  

Possible  solu*ons:  so2ware  aNestaMon  with  autonomic  trust  management  

Threat  vectors  map  

Threat  vector  2  exploiMng  vulnerabiliMes  in  forwarding  devices  

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Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  

3  

SDN  Controller  

SDN  device  

Specific  to  SDNs:  communicaMon  with  logically  centralized  controllers  can  be  explored.  

Possible  solu*ons:  threshold  cryptography  across  controller  replicas  

Threat  vectors  map  

Threat  vector  3  aNacking  control  communicaMons  

Page 10: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  

4  

SDN  Controller  

SDN  device  

Specific  to  SDNs,  controlling  the  controller  may  compromise  the  enMre  network.  

Possible  solu*ons:  replicaMon  +  diversity  +  recovery  

Threat  vectors  map  

Threat  vector  4  exploiMng  vulnerabiliMes  

in  controllers  

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Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  

5  

SDN  Controller  

SDN  device  

Specific  to  SDNs,  malicious  applicaMons  can  now  be  easily  developed  and  deployed  on  controllers.  

Possible  solu*ons:  so2ware  aNestaMon,  security  domains  

Threat  vectors  map  

Threat  vector  5  lack  of  trust  between  the  

controller  and  apps  

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Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  

6  

SDN  Controller  

SDN  device  

Not  specific  to  SDNs,  but  now  the  impact  is  potenMally  augmented.  

Possible  solu*ons:  double  credenMal  verificaMon  

Threat  vectors  map  

Threat  vector  6  exploiMng  vulnerabiliMes  

in  admin  staMons  

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Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

7  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  SDN  

Controller  

SDN  device  

Threat  vector  7  lack  of  trusted  resources  

for  forensics  and  remediaMon  

Not  specific  to  SDNs,  but  it  is  sMll  criMcal  to  assure  fast  recovery  and  diagnosis  when  faults  happen.  

Possible  solu*ons:  immutable  and  secure  logging,  secure  and  reliable  snapshots  

Threat  vectors  map  

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Data Plane!

Control & Mana

gement!

7  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

SDN  device  

Admin  StaMon  

6  5  

4  

3  

SDN  Controller  

2   SDN  device  

1  

Seven  main  threat  vectors  Ø  1  and  3:  communicaMons  Ø  2,  4,  5,  6:  elements  Ø  7:  communicaMons  and  elements  

Threat  vectors  map  

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Outline  

Main  threat  vectors  in  SDNs  

Security  &  Dependability  by  design  

Final  remarks  

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Sec&Dep  tools  to  consider  •  ReplicaMon  

– Dynamic  device  associaMon  –  Self-­‐healing  mechanisms  for  perpetual  operaMon  

•  Diversity  

– Avoid  shared,  common  vulnerabiliMes  

•  (Autonomic)  trust  –  between  controllers  and  devices  –  between  applicaMons  and  controller  so2ware  

vulnerable  systems  

exploiMng  a  vulnerability  

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•  Security  domains  – kernel  mode  vs  user  mode  

 •  Fast  and  reliable  so2ware  update  and  patching  

Sec&Dep  tools  to  consider  

(e.g.,  HotSwap)  

(e.g.,  FortNOX)  

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DESIGN  OF  A  SEC&DEP  SDN  CONTROL  PLATFORM  v0.1  

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Controller A

App A

One  single  centralized  controller  

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Controller B

App A

Controller C

App A

Controller A

App A

Mul?ple  instances  of  a  centralized  controller  

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Controller B

App A

Controller C

App A

Controller A

App A

Master-­‐slave  controllers  

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Controller B

App A

Controller C

App A

Controller A

App A

Master-­‐slave  controllers  (what  if  B  fails?)  

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Controller B

App A

Controller C

App A

Controller A

App A

East/Westbound API (data distribution service)

Master-­‐slave  controllers  (adding  a  consistency  layer)  

Page 24: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Controller B

App A

Controller C

App A

Controller A

App A

East/Westbound API (data distribution service)

Mul?ple  ac?ve  controllers  

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Controller B Controller C Controller A

One  single  app  instance  (App  B)  can  now  configure  the  whole  network  

East/Westbound API (data distribution service)

App A App A App A App B

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Controller B Controller C Controller A

One  single  app  instance  (App  B)  can  now  configure  the  whole  network  

East/Westbound API (data distribution service)

App A App A App A App B

Northbound API Northbound API Northbound API

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App A

Controller A Controller B Controller C

Increasing  the  robustness  of  the  system  by  adding  diversity  

East/Westbound API (data distribution service)

App A App A App B

Northbound API Northbound API Northbound API

Page 28: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Controller B

App A

Controller C

App A

Controller A

App A App B

Common Northbound API

Diversity  of  controllers  requires  a  common  Northbound  API  

East/Westbound API (data distribution service)

Page 29: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Outline  

Main  threat  vectors  in  SDNs  

Security  &  Dependability  by  design  

Final  remarks  

Page 30: Towards(Secure(and(Dependable( So2ware3Defined(Networksconferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2013/slides/hotsdn/16.pdfExcellent,now we(can(program(the(network!( Applications (control logic)

Our  main  message  •  SDN:  a  fascinaMng  dilemma  

– evolu?on  of  networking      versus    

–  increasing  the  threat  surface  

Security & Dependability should be built by design.