Torts Magic Notes

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008

PRELIMINARY MATTERS: *Those in SMALL CAPS (and underlined) were highlighted by Sir Casis during the class. If none are found, just refer to those in bold letters and those in the Notes. Good luck classmates! –torts magic notes team

VI. PERSONS LIABLE

A. The TortfeasorArt. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

C L A S S N O T E S

There can be more than one tortfeasor and they are called JOINT TORTFEASORS

Are you suppose to sue all of them? NO because you can get relief from one of them.

Do they have to act in concert? NO

Worcester v. OcampoFebruary 27, 1912

FACTS: Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et al, as the owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily newspaper “El Renacimiento” (Spanish version) and “Muling Pagsilang” (tagalong version). Worcester alleged that the defendants have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the newspapers for a long time and they published an editorial entitled “Birds of Prey” with the malicious intent of injuring Worcester, both as a private person and as a

government official as the editorial obviously referred to him.

Worcester alleged that he was likened to “birds of prey” in the following manner: “Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.”

TC: In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for the P60k total damages.

ISSUE: WON the defendants’ individual properties can be made jointly and severally liable for the damages under the civil and commercial codes,

HELD: Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved.

The present action is a tort.

Universal doctrine: each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors.

If several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the TORT IS IN ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL.

It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal act- e.g. assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law, they are all principals.

Under common law, he who aided or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.

General Rule: Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.

Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.

Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies any claim which might exist against the others. The release of one of the joint tortfeasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all.

The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and which are not, even if they are charged jointly and severally.

Art. 2184*. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. *this was drafted with Chapman v. Underwood in mind.

C L A S S N O T E S

Sir highlighted that “Tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual” – so no need to sue all of the tortfeasors!

Chapman v. UnderwoodMarch 28, 1914

FACTS: J.H. Chapman was trying to board a “San Marcelino” car trough the rear platform when he was struck by Mr. James Underwoord’s automobile, which was at that time driven by his chauffer.

Underwood’s driver was guilty of negligence because he was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side when he ran over Chapman. Chapman, was not obliged for his own protection to observe whether a car was coming upon him from where he was because according to the law, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the car.

TC: In favor of Underwood

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ISSUE: WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.

HELD: No. TC affirmed. The interval between unlawful act and the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge Underwood with the negligence of the driver. The driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. 1903 (now 2180) for whose acts Underwood would be responsible.

This rule applies even if the owner of the vehicle was present at the time of the accident, unless THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRIVER ARE CONTINUED FOR SUCH A LENGTH OF TIME AS TO GIVE THE OWNER A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AND TO DIRECT HIS DRIVER TO DESIST THEREFROM.

When will the owner be liable?- An owner who sits in his vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of his negligent acts, after he had A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THEM AND TO DIRECT THAT THE DRIVER CEASE THEREFROM, BECOMES HIMSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ACTS.

When will the owner be NOT liable?-if the driver by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the vehicle, present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, etiher civilly or criminally, therefor.

The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s act his own.

RULE: Underwood is not liable for his driver’s act even if he was inside the car at the time of the accident (unless he let the negligence continue for a long time without correcting it) because the driver is not listed in 1903 (now 2180) as one of the persons whose acts Underwood would be responsible for.

Caedo v. Yu Khe ThaiDecember 18, 1968

FACTS: Marcial Caedo, with his family, was driving his Mercury car on EDSA. On the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Rafael Bernardo. They were both traveling at moderate speeds and the headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac was a carretela. Bernardo testified that he saw the carretela only when it was already only 8 meters away from him (This is the 1st

sign of negligence because the carretela was lighted-hence should’ve given him sufficient warning). But Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping, tried to overtake the carretela by veering to the left. The car’s right rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and collided with the Mercury.

Caedo in the meantime, slowed down, and thought that the Cadillac would wait behind the carretela. He tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right but was unsuccessful.

TC: Bernardo and Thai jointly and severally liable for damages

ISSUE: WON Yu Khe Thai, as the owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with his driver.

HELD: No. TC modified. Thai not solidarily liable with Bernardo.

Art. 2184 applies: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under Art. 2184, if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. –This rule is not new, although formulated as a law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman v. Underwood.

Basis of master’s liability in civil law: NOT respondeat superior but paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately, the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by

him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.

Bernardo was a pretty good driver and had no record. No negligence for having employed him may be imputed to Thai. The only negligence that can be imputed to Bernardo was when he tried to overtake the carretela instead of stopping or waiting-and this cannot be imputed to Thai because there were no signs for him to be in any special state of alert. He could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly.

Test of imputed negligence under 2184: -to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanic of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before they can own a motor vehicle.

Test of negligence within the meaning of 2184: -his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.

RULE: negligence must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstance of the accident, i.e. in his failure to detain the driver form pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.

NOTES: Art. 2184 is based on Chapman. Unless the owner could’ve prevented the negligence, or he was negligent in selection and supervision, he cannot be held liable.

Art. 2184: owner can be held solidarily liable with the driver only if the owner is IN the car.

Court’s test: 1. senses of owner 2. circumstances

C L A S S N O T E S

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008The standard set in this case is still REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY.

Difference between respondeat superior vs. paterfamiliasRespondeat superior: acts under orders (1 negligent – the one who gave the orders)Paterfamilias: acts under guidance (2 negligent – both the owner and the driver)TEST of imputed negligence: SUBJECTIVE*not all owners are learned/professional drivers – that’s why they hire drivers for them!

VICARIOUS LIABILITY: found in Article 2180 (but use the term “tortfeasors” instead of “one”-a tortfeasor would be liable not only for his own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom he is responsible

Take note of difference between NCC and FC: under the NCC: the father, and in cases of his death

or incapacity, the mother, will be responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company

under the FC: parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

Portions of 2180—modified by FC Does RA9344 affect the liability of parents and

guardians? NO Basis of liability of parents and minor children:

PARENTAL AUTHORITY How does the FC affect 2180? Is the person below

21 still liable? For those above 15 but below 18 who acted with

discernment—basis to use is 2180

B. Vicarious Liability aka Imputed Negligence

C L A S S N O T E

In this section, a person is held liable for acts not his own but because of the existence of a relationship.

Presidential Decree No. 603December 10, 1974

THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODEChapter 4-Liabilities Of Parents

Art. 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code.

Family Code

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )

Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the

child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a)

Revised Penal CodeTitle Five-Civil Liability

Chapter One-Person Civilly Liable for FeloniesArt. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be

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http://www.chanrobles.com/childandyouthwelfarecodeofthephilippines.htm#Presidential%20Decree%20No.%20603%23Presidential%20Decree%20No.%20603

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

RA 9344Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006

April 23, 2006

Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal responsibility- A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected

to an intervention program pursuant to Sec. 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case such child will be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The Exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Civil Code

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their

pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)


Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

C L A S S N O T E

Basis: parental authority Are the parents still liable for if above 18 but

below 21? Yes. Legal basis: PD 603

1. Parents (see table after cases)

Exconde v. CapunoJune 29, 1957

FACTS: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School, was instructed by the city school’s supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo City. From the school, the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that the steering wheel is at the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2 passengers died.

Delfin Capuno, the father, was not with Dante at the time of the accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend a parade. He only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it.

Criminal case: TC: Dante was convicted for Double homicide

through reckless imprudence. CA: affirmed

Civil case: against Delfin and Dante Capuno (reserved by Sabina Exconde, mother of one of the deceased):

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TC: Convicted ONLY Dante to pay the damages.CA: certified to SC

ISSUE: WON Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son for damages.

HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Delfin and Dante are jointly and severally liable for the damages.

Art. 19031 applies: “The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those persons for whom another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

XxxFinally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

1. School is NOT liable Art. 1903 (now 2180) about teachers applies only to institutions of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Balintawak Elementary School is an academic institution, hence neither the teacher nor the head can be held liable. Even if Dante was on the jeep pursuant to the city school’ supervisor’s instruction, neither the head of the school nor the city school’s supervisor could be held liable because Dante was not a student of an institution of arts and trades.

2. Delfin, as the father IS liable. He failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage.

12180 now: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or

omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages

caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages

caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, or the mother as the case may be is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them. This parental authority imposes upon the parents the duty to support and instruct them in proportion to their means and gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation.

How to avoid liability: prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage,

DISSENT: Reyes He wants TC affirmed (relieving Delfin of liability): There is no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic institutions.The phrase “teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades” does not qualify “teachers” but only “heads of establishments.”

If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody.

Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

Hence, Delfin should not be made liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would.

He rebutted the presumption of negligence under 1903 when he proved that he entrusted custody of Dante to the school authorities.

RULES:Majority:Liability of teachers or directors are limited to institutions of arts and trades.

Dissent:1. Art. 1903 interpretation too limited. Teacher, master, or in the absence of, school authorities should be liable for the negligence.

2. Once the parent entrusts custody to the school authorities, presumption is rebutted and burden of proof is shifted to claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable.

NOTES: This case is cited as basis of liability arising from parental authority.

Salen and Salbanera v. BalceApril 27, 1960.

FACTS: Carlos Salen (single) died due to wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, 18, single and living with Jose Balce, his father. Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay Carlos’ heirs indemnity. But Gumersindo was insolvent, hence Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (Salens), the parents (and heirs) of Carlos, demanded from Jose to pay but he refused. Hence the suit.

TC: dismissed. Sustained Jose’s theory that the civil liability of Gumersindo arises from his criminal liability and therefore must be determined under the RPC, and not under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which only applies to obligations arising form QDs. There is no law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a minor of 18 years.

ISSUE: WON Jose Balce can be held SUBSIDIARILY liable to pay the indemnity his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case against him (the son).

HELD: Yes. Jose Balce is ordered to pay the indemnity. TC reversed.

As a rule, the civil liability arising form a crime shall be governed by the RPC. But since the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of parents for a minor over 15, who acts with discernment, resort should be made to the general law which is the Civil Code. And Art. 2180 is the law that applies.

To hold that Art. 2180 applies only to QDs will result in an absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes, the father or mother may be held subsidiarily liable, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. The void that apparently exists in the RPC is subserved by 2180 of

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008the Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent SC decisions: Exconde v. Capuno-where the father was held solidarily liable for the crime his son committed.

Araneta v. Arreglado-(where Arreglado fired at Araneta because he resented the remarks Araneta made about his leaving Ateneo and enrolling in La Salle. The court convicted Arreglado but suspended his sentence because he was only 14.) The court held the father, the mother and the son to pay the Aranetas damages.

C L A S S N O T E

In this case, the liability of father was deemed to be subsidiary.

Fuellas v. CadanoOctober 31, 1961

FACTS: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, both 13, were classmates at St. Mary’s High School. While Pepito was studying, Rico took a classmate’s pencil and put it in Pepito’s pocket. When the classmate asked Rico for the pencil, it was Pepito who returned it. This angered Rico, thus he held Pepito by the neck and pushed him to the floor. A teacher broke up the fight and sent them home.

Pepito has just gone down from the school house when he was met by a still angry Rico. A classmate asked them to shake hands but instead of shaking Pepito’s extended hand, Rico held him by the neck, put him off-balance which caused Pepito to land on his right side, breaking his arm. Rico just got up and ran away.

Up to the last day of the hearing of the case, Pepito’s forearm was seen to be shorter than his left and cannot be fully used.

2 separate actions were instituted: 1. Criminal case against Rico for Serious

Physical Injuries 2. Civil case for damages against Agapito

Fuellas, Rico’s father.

Criminal case:

TC: Rico guilty. Civil liability to be determined in the civil case

Civil case: TC: Agapito liable under 2180 for medicine, MD, ED and atty’s fees. CA: Reduced MD

ISSUE: WON Agapito Fuellas, Rico’s father is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Agapito is liable for damages. CA affirmed1. Agapito contends that he cannot be liable under 2180 in connection with 2176 there being no “fault or negligence” but deliberate intent to cause injury.

SC: Jurisprudence proves him wrong. Araneta v. Arreglado-(the Arreglados-father, mother and son were held liable for damages) civil law liability under 2180 is not respondeat superior but pater familias, which bases the liability of the father ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his minor son, and that if an injury is caused by the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law presumes that there was negligence on the part of his father.

Exconde v. Capuno-(the father was held solidarily liable with his son for damages) The civil liability of the father is a necessary consequence of the parental authority he exercises. Only defense is proof of diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage.

Manresa: Children and wards do not have the capacity to govern themselves so parents and guardians have the duty to exercise special vigilance. If they fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused.

2. Agapito claims that he could only be liable if the action was based on the subsidiary liability of the parents under the RPC. And since Rico acted with discernment, the provisions do not cover the case.SC: Case law is against him again. Salen and Salbarena v. Balce- (where father was made to pay the indemnity his 18 year old son was sentenced to pay because his son was insolvent) Since the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of a minor

over 9 but under 15 who acted with discernment, resort should be made to the general law which is the Civil Code, specifically 2180.

3. CA decided the case based on the evidence submitted by both parties, independently of the criminal case. Responsibility for fault or negligence under 2176 (upon which this action is instituted) is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the RPC, hence, any discussion of Rico’s criminal intent is of no moment.

C L A S S N O T E S

In this case, parental liability was primary.

Gutierrez v. GutierrezSeptember 23, 1931

Note: The injured and the accused have the same surname.

FACTS: The car, owned by Mr. and Mrs. Gutierrez and driven by Bonifacio Gutierrez, 18 years old, with his mother and 7 other members of the family, EXCLUDING Mr. Gutierrez, the father, collided with a passenger truck while attempting to pass each other. As a result, Narciso Gutierrez, a passenger, suffered a fractured leg.

ISSUES: 1. WON Manuel Gutierrez, the father is liable for damages (yes)

2. WON the truck owner and driver are liable for damages. (yes)

HELD: Manuel Gutierrez, the owner and the driver of the truck are jointly and severally liable for damages.

1. Anent Manuel Gutierrez’s liability:The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008 Bonifacio was an incompetent driver, was speeding and lost his head when he approached the bridge and the truck.

Based on these facts, and pursuant to 1903 (now 2180) the father alone, and not the minor or the mother, would be held liable for the damages caused by the minor.In the US, it is uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner’s family than the child driving it. The theory of this law is that running of the machine by the child to carry the other members of the family is within the scope of the owner’s business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.

2. Anent the owner’s and driver’s liability:Basis: contract. The position of the truck, the speed and lack of care employed by the driver make them both liable.

Question: Under 1903, only if the father is dead, incapacitated or absent will the mother be held liable. If this case were decided now, with the FC, what would be the effect?

Rodriguez-Luna v. IACFebruary 28, 1985

FACTS: Roberto Luna, driving a go-kart and Luis dela Rosa, driving a Toyota collided in the go-kart practice area in Greenhills. Roberto died. At that time, Luis was only 13 and had no driver’s license. The heirs of Roberto (will be referred to as the Lunas) sued for damages.

TC: Jose dela Rosa (father) and Luis dela Rosa are jointly and severally liable.

1st CA: affirmed in toto

2nd CA: reduced unearned earnings award

The dela Rosas failed to pay because they had no cash. The writ of execution yielded only a nominal amount. Present status of Luis: married with 2 kids, living with uncle in Madrid, earnings hardly enough to support his family, has no assets of his own.

ISSUE: Whether the father, Jose, should be made primarily or subsidiarily liable for the liability of his son Luis.

HELD: Primary liability. Jose is liable for his son’s liability. 2nd CA set aside. 1st CA reinstated with the modification that the atty’s fees will earn interest.

Dela Rosas invoke Elcano v. Hill to support their calim for subsidiary liability only. In Elcano, it was held that Art. 2180 applied to Atty. Hill despite the emancipation by marriage of his son, but since his son attained age, as a matter of equity, Atty. Hill’s liability had become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

SC: Unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because it will not serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Plus, he does not have nay property and his earnings are insufficient to support his family.

Other issues:1. CA’s reduction of life expectancy: SC said go-kart not dangerous.

2. CA’s reduction of net annual income of Roberto due to increasing annual personal expenses: SC said if personal expenses increase, it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his gross income would also increase.

3. SC granted award of atty’s fees plus interest from date of TC’s decision.

NOTES: technically, the son should pay because he is of age already

Libi v. IACSeptember 18, 1992

FACTS: Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2 years when Julie broke it off due to Wendell’s sadistic

and irresponsible nature. A month after their break-up, Julie and Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the father of Wendell. There were 2 versions of the story:

Libis: another man shot the 2Gotiong: Wendell shot Julie and then

committed suicide.

The Gotiongs (julie’s parents) fiuled for damages against the Livis under Art. 2180.

TC: dismissed for insufficiency of evidence

IAC: Set aside TC and found the Libis subsidiarily liable.

ISSUE: WON Art. 2180 was correctly applied to hold the Libis liable.

HELD: Yes. Libis are primarily liable CA affirmed.

The Libis were grossly negligent from preventing Wendell from having access to the key to the safety deposit box where the gun was stored. Diligence required is that of instruction and supervision of the kid.

BUT, liability is not subsidiary, it is PRIMARY

Rule on parent’s liability is correct but characterization of their nature must be given a second look (coz SC held in some cases that the liability of parents is subsidiary).

If the liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.

But if the liability is direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

Hence, the liability of parents for QDs of their minor kids as contemplated in 2180 is PRIMARY and not subsidiary.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008In fact, applying 2194 (solidary liability of join tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child.

The liability of parents for felonies is likewise PRIMARY & not subsidiary. Art. 101, RPC says so.For both QDs and crimes, the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both the RPC and CC that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of the insolvency of the parents. Arts. 21822, CC and 1013, RPC support this.

RULES: 1. For civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority or control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY

-Premised on Art. 101, RPC with respect to damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under, or 9-15 but without discernment

-Premised on Art. 2180, CC for kids 9-15 with discernment, or 15-21 (now 18)

2. Liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THE MINOR.

Under 2180, the liability shall be effected against the father, and in case of his death or incapacity the mother-which rule was amplified by the Youth and Welfare Code.

BUT, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender.

2 Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor

or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a

guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

3 Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

xxx

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal

guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall

respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with

the civil law.

3. For civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in accordance with 2180 and 2182, as so modified.

NOTES: This case cleared up the issue on whether the parent’s liability is primary or subsidiary.

C L A S S N O T E S

What is the basis of the doctrine that liability of parents is primary and not solidary? Why?

o 2 legal bases: 101 RPC and 2182 CC Why?-provisions provide for such defense—

liability of parents is primary According to the Court, the reliance on Fuellas

v. Cadano was NOT correct because the liability in fuellas was PRIMARY (syllabus can be wrong kasi)

Why primary liability? 1. law provides a defense; 2. property of minor only liable when parents are insolvent

Tamargo v. CAJune 3, 1992

FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Adelberto’s natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his natural parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has already been filed by the Rapisura spouses. This petition was granted after the shooting of Jennifer. The Tamargos filed:

1. criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence but Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.

2. civil complaint against the Bundocs, the natural parents of Adelberto.

The Bundocs claimed that the Rapisuras should be held liable instead, that they are indispensable parties

because parental authority had already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

TC: dismissed the complaint. The Bundocs are not indispensable parties to the action.

CA: dismissed petition. Tamargos lost their right to appeal.

ISSUE: Who are the indispensable parties? The Bundocs or the Rapisuras?

HELD: The natural parents, the Bundocs, are the indispensable parties. CA reversed and set aside, complaint reinstated and case remanded.

When Adelberto shot Jennifer, parental authority was still lodged in the Bundocs, his natural parents. Hence, they who had actual custody of Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

Ratio: The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on QD, under 2176 against him. On the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.

The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of “imputed negligence,” where a person is not only liable for the torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.

Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents—their parental authority—which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained in Cangco v. Manila Raildroad:

With respect to extra contractual obligations arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, the legislature has elected to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or on the contrary, for

8

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.

The legislature which adopted our civil code elected to limit extra contractual liability—with certain well-defined exceptions—to cases in which moral culpabilityu can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one’s own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one’s own agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person liable for their conduct.

Basis of civil liability imposed on parents for torts of their minor kids living with them: PARENTAL AUTHORITY vested by the civil code.

In other words, parental liability is anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. Parental dereliction is only a PRESUMPTION which can be overturned under 2180 by proof of all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.

Art 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code: responsibility for child under parental authority

Art. 221, FC: child (tortfeasor) must be in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable

Anent the retroactivity of parental authority to the time of filing of the petition for adoption:

Retroactive effect may perhaps be given where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the child.

Here, no presumption of parental dereliction on the Rapisuras could have arisen since Adelberto was not in

fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

RULE: Parents must have actual or physical custody over the minor to be held liable.

NOTES: Only benefits retroact to the time of filing of the petition for adoption, not parental authority

Parental Authority: Control and supervision over children. Hence, no PA, no parental liability.

Case Action for…

Who held liable

Basis for liability

Exconde vs. Capuno(BSP asked by school head to go to the parade)

Civil action for damages (father and son impleaded)

TC: only son liableSC: Pa and son jointly and severally liable-not the school because not a school of arts and trades

A1903 (now 2180): FATHER liable for acts of MINOR SON-civil liability is a necessary consequence of parental authority they exercise over their MINOR children

Salen and Salbanera vs. Balce(son above 15 but below 18 killed 18 yr old)

Criminal case with civil liability arising from it

SC: Father liable subsidiarily -child above 15, below 18

A101 RPC incomplete so resort to A2180 of NCC (apply Exclusio Unus, Exclucio Ulterus) – MINOR son LIVING in their company

Fuellas vs. Cadano(stole pencil and had the nerve to be mad by breaking classmate’s arm!)

Criminal action vs. Rico for Serious Physical InjuriesCivil action vs Agapito (the father) only

SC: Pa liable A2176 an A2180 (not based on RPC)-even if son caused injuries with deliberate intent (and not merely negligence)-note: not subsidiary liable as mentioned under Libi vs. IAC

Guitierrez vs. Guitierrez(bus collision,

Civil action vs. Manuel Guitierrez (the father) only (+ bus

SC: The father, bus driver and owner jointly and severally

A2180, common law, master and servant (not paterfamilias)

family except pa in the car driven by minor)

driver and owner)

liable –ma not liable even if present during time of incident

Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC(go-cart vs. Toyota)

Civil action vs. pa and son

SC: Pa made primarily liable for the injury caused by son (son already of age, said to be insolvent but in Madrid!)

A2180, strict law-don’t apply Elcano v. Hill where court allowed only subsidiary liability because it will not serve ends of justice

Libi vs. IAC(Suicide or homicide?)

Civil action vs. parents

SC: Libis are primarily and directly liable

Art 221, FC; Art 2180, NCC; Art 101, RPCWhy primarily liable:1. If liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. 2. The liability of parents for felonies is likewise Primary and not subsidiary under A101 of RPC: minor only liable if parents are insolvent (A101 par3)

Tamargo vs. CA(adopted child still with parents at time of

Criminal complaint Civil complaint vs. Natural parents of child

SC: Bundocs (natural parents) are indispensable parties-the adopting parents had

Art. 2176, parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008incident) no actual

custody yetthe discharge of duties accompanying such authority, doctrine of vicarious liability as explained in CANGCO VS. MANILA RAILROAD

*IMPORTANT: PARENTS MUST HAVE ACTUAL OR PHYSICAL CUSTODY OVER THE MINOR TO BE HELD LIABLE

2. GuardiansFamily Code

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1)The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 2144;

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

4 Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority

shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by

the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall

exercise the authority. (355a)

C L A S S N O T E

What is a foundling? A baby deserted by unknown parents. (e.g. those left at the doorstep)

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.



The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.



3. Teachers and Heads of InstitutionsFamily Code

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.



The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.


Mercado v. CA, et alMay 30, 1960

FACTS: Augusto, 9 years old, lent his pitogo to Benedicto who lent it to Renato. When Augusto tried to retrieve his pitogo, Manuel Jr, thinking it was Benedicto’s, interfered and told Augusto not to get it from Renato as Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the pitogo. Augusto resented this remark and aggressively poushed him. A fight ensued and Augusto wounded Manuel Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

The doctor who testified did not declare the amount he collected as fees and Manuel Jr. was not hospitalized.

TC: dismissed the complaint filed by Manuel Jr. and his fatherCA: Ordered Ciriaco Mercado (the father) to pay for the medical expenses and MD, but no MD for the parents.

ISSUE: WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible (instead of the father) since the fight happened during recess time in school (Lourdes Catholic School).

HELD: No. The pupils were not in the “custody” of the school. CA Reversed as to MD but affirmed the award of medical expenses.

This was answered in Exconde v. Capuno through Justice Bautista: “we find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. But this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.”

Custody (memorize!): “SO LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN THEIR CUSTODY ”- CONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE PUPIL LIVES AND BOARDS WITH THE TEACHER, SUCH THAT THE CONTROL DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE ON THE PUPIL SUPERSEDES THOSE OF THE PARENTS . In these circumstances the control or the influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.

Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. The pupils go to school during school hours and go back home to their parents after.The situated contemplated in the last par. of art. 2180 (I think he meant 2nd to the last par) does not apply, nor does par 25 which makes the father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children.

Hence, the claim of Mercado that responsibility should pass to the school, must be held to be without merit.

Anent the MD:Only possible circumstance in which MD may be granted is if a felony or QD has been committed.

1. no criminal action for physical injuries has been presented

2. even if this is a QD within the meaning of Art. - Art. 2219, par 26, the facts show that Augusto’s act was

5 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages

caused by the minor children who live in their company.

6Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

occasioned by the fact that Manuel Jr. tired to intervene or interfere with Augusto’s attempt to recover his pitogo. Hence, the proximate cause of Manuel Jr’s injury is his own fault or negligence for having interfered.

Hence, no MD coz the cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to exist.

RULE: 1. exconde v. capuno doctrine7: academic institutions

not included in Art. 21802. exconde v. capuno doctrine: responsibility passes

from parents to teachers or heads of ONLY institutions of arts and trades

3. Lourdes is not liable because they don’t retain custody (custody=living with the teachers or heads) of their pupils.

4. Ciriaco Mercado is not responsible even under Art. 2180 par. 2-probably because Manuel Jr. did not die nor was he incapacitated.

5. No moral damages because cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to exist.

6. Augusto was only 9 and was not shown to act with discernment

7. Even if there was a QD on Augusto’s part, the proximate cause of the injury was Manuel Jr’s own act of interference.

DOCTRINE: what Art. 2180 means by “custody”

Palisoc v. BrillantesOctober 4, 1971

FACTS: Dominador Palisoc, 16 years old and Virgilio Daffon, of age, were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. During recess, while working on a machine, Daffon made a remark that Palisoc was like a foreman because he was merely watching them. Irked, Palisoc bitch-slapped Daffon. In retaliation, Daffon gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, followed by fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc tried to retreat, but Daffon followed him. They exchanged fist blows until Palsioc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. He fainted and never regained consciousness. The autopsy report said he died of

7 Although later cases say this is a mere obiter because the issue was won the father had civil

liability

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008broken ribs and hemorrhage on the brain caused “probably by strong fist blows.”

TC: Daffon liable for QD under 2176. Absolved the following because 2180 is not applicable: It applied Mercado v. CA’s definition of “custody”1. Brillantes-member of the board of directors of MTI2. Valenton, president of MTI3. Quibulue, instructor of the class.

ISSUE: WON the other defendants (board member, president and instructor) should be held solidarily liable with Daffon

HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue are solidarily liable for damages.

Under 2180, the president and instructor are liable solidarily for damages. Brillantes is not liable because he is a mere member of the board (he could have been liable if not for the incorporation of the school, making a corporation the owner of the school and not him anymore). The school cannot be held liable as it was not impleaded as a party defendant.

The TC based its decision on Mercado v. CA, which in turn was based on a dictum in Exconde v. Capuno. The case here was instituted directly against the defendants (as against the cited cases where the father was the defendant). The parents here are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the incident. MTI is unquestionably a non-academic school.

1. “custody” The TC erred in absolving the defendants on the ground that they can only be held liable if they “lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-school officials.”

The phrase “so long as (the students) remain in their custody” means THE PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS TIME. (MEMORIZE)

NOTHING IN THE LAW REQUIRES THAT FOR SUCH LIABILITY TO ATTACH, THE PUPIL-TORTFEASOR MUST LIVE AND BOARD IN THE SCHOOL.

2. Rationale of the liabilityThe rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.”

3. Governing Principle in law of torts In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students’ activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

4. Mercado overturned. Reyes’ dissent rules! Adheres to Reyes’ dissent in Exconde: If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody.

Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there is no authority, there can be no responsibility.

Hence, the president and instructor must be held solidarily liable unless they prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage-which they failed to do.

Dissent: MakalintalWants Mercado sustained. It’s unfair to hold teachers and/or administrative heads responsible for tortuous acts of their students considering the high number of

enrollment. It would demand responsibility without the commensurate authority.Moreover, since the responsibility stems from loco parentis, then it follows that

1. custody= live in company (like for parents and guardians) and

2. responsibility limited to minors only (like for parents and guardians)

Concurring: ReyesConcurs with majority but dissents with the dissent. Makalintal’s interpretation not in accord with the law.1. Only the guardians and parents are exempt once

the child reaches majority2. The authority and custodial supervision (of the

teachers and heads) over the pupil exists regardless of the pupil’s age.

RULE: 1. Mercado doctrine abandoned/overturned

2. Wants to overturn Exconde (to include academic institutions in the scope of 2180) but has no chance because MTI is anon-academic institution.

3. Definition of “custody”= the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. (MEMORIZE)

Amadora v. CAApril 15, 1988

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, 17 yrs old, was shot by his classmate Pablito Daffon, 3 days before his high school graduation, while he was at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recolectos either to finish a Physics experiment or to submit a Physics report. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The Amadoras sued for damages against the School (Colegio), the dean of boys and, the physics teacher and Daffon.

TC: defendants are liable for damages

CA: All the defendants were absolved. Colegio is not a school of arts and trades and Daffon was not in custody since the semester already ended.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008ISSUE: Interpretation of Art. 2180

HELD: Petition denied. None are liable.

The SC summarized 3 cases which have been decided in connection with 2180:

Exconde-school not liable because it is not a school of arts and trades

-Reyes’ dissent-rule was imposed on teachers in general and heads OF establishments of arts and trades.

Mercado-reiterated Exconde. School not liable because it is not an establishment of arts and trades

-Defined “custody” as living and boarding with the teacher

Palisoc- Set aside/abandoned the doctrines in Exconde and Mercado.

-Defined “custody” to mean that the protective and supervisory custody of the school and its heads and teachers over the students are in force so long as they remain in school including recess time.

-in a footnote, Tehankee (the ponente) said that he agreed with Reyes in his Exconde dissent to include academic schools but had no chance because the school involed is a non-academic one. Amadora is the case!

1. Art. 2180 applies to both academic and non-academic schools

Reddendo Singula Singulis8

a. if academic- teacher is liable for the pupils and students (General Rule)

b. if non-academic- head is liable for the apprentices (Exception)

*But same vigilance is required! Reason for disparity: historically the heads of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of an academic school.9

There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a non-academic school insofar as torts

8 Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object or let each

be put in its proper place, i.e. the words should be taken distributively

9 This disparity no longer exist in view of the increase in enrollment. But that’s a task for the

legislature.

committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school he is teaching.

2. Art. 2180 applies so long as the student is under the control and custody and within the school premises, regardless of whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended (Duration of Responsibility)

(MEMORIZE STANDARD): “CUSTODY” IS NOT CO- TERMINOUS WITH THE SEMESTER. AS LONG AS IT CAN BE SHOWN THAT THE STUDENT IS IN THE SCHOOL PREMISES IN PURSUANCE OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT OBJECTIVE, IN THE EXERCISE OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT RIGHT, AND EVEN IN THE ENJOYMENT OF A LEGITIMATE STUDENT PRIVILEGE, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES OVER THE STUDENT CONTINUES. Even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere in the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Art. 2180.

“Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.

3. Liability imposed not on the school itself It should be noted that the liability imposed is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers and heads under the general principle of respondeat superior, it may exculpate itself by proof of exercise of diligence of bonus paterfamilias.—defense which is also available to the teacher or the head.

4. Pupil not required to be a minor to hold teacher liable

Unlike the parent who will be liable only for his minor child, the teacher is answerable for torts of his students regardless of the student’s age.Hence:1. Alfredo Amadora was still in the school’s “custody” when the incident happened

2. rector, high school principal and dean of boys NOT liable because none of them were the teacher-in charge (they only exercised a general authority and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher-in-charge) Dean of boys not liable although he earlier confiscated a gun because it was not shown that the gun he confiscated and the gun that was used in the shooting were the same.

3. Physics teacher not liable because there was no showing that he was negligent in his duties. His absence cannot be taken against him as he was not required to report to school that day.

4. Colegio not liable because 2180 does not apply to school but only to its teachers and heads.

CONCURRING & DISSENTING: Melencio-Herrera-“teacher” in 2180 should not be limited to the “teacher-in-charge”-the school may be held responsible under 2180 as the employer of the teachers and heads

CONCURRING: Gutierrez, Jr.-reiterates the need for an amendment due to the non-existent disparity between teachers of academic schools and heads of arts and trades

RULE: 1. Custody definition 2. application of 2180 to both academic and non-academic schools 3. teachers is to pupils and students as heads is to apprentices 4. school not directly liable under 2180 par 7.

NOTES: dangerous definition of “custody” because it is so broad (even if just walking around school enjoying its ambience and atmosphere)

C L A S S N O T E

facts: in Academic school, by student of the school, after sem ends

13


A2180 applies to both ACADEMIC and NONACADEMIC schools

Academic: teacher-in-charge:: Institute of Arts and Trades: Heads

Custody does not connote INFLUENCE exerted on the child and the DISCIPLINE instilled in him as a result of such influence

pupil is not required to be a minor for the teacher to be liable! (A2180 doesn’t require minority)

Applicability to academic institutions WAS an issue prior to this case—see Exconde

Despite the broadness of the definition of custody, NO ONE was held liable in Amadora!

Pasco v. CFI of Bulacan, Branch VApril 25, 1988

FACTS: Reynaldo Pasco was mauled by a group of Muslim students and stabbed by Abdul while walking inside the Araneta University (Araneta). Pasco had just finished his classes and the Muslim group were also students of Araneta. Pasco, assisted by his father sued Abdul and Araneta for damages.

TC: dismissed case against Araneta

ISSUE: WON Art. 2180 is applicable to academic institutions.

HELD: petition dismissed. Wrong issue.

There is no need to discuss the applicability of 2180 to educational institutions for the issue is actually whether or not, under 2180, the school or the university ITSELF (as distinguished form teachers or heads) is liable.

Answer to that issue: NO! the provision speaks only of TEACHERS or HEADS.

DISSENT: Sarmiento

Par 510 of 2180 may be construed as the basis of liability of the school as the employer for the failure of its teachers or heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents.

Melencio-HerreraJoins Sarmiento in his dissent. School may exculpate itself by proving diligence of a good father of a family.

QUESTION: Would the school be held liable after the Family Code? ANSWER: Yes! School can be held liable under 218, FC11

C L A S S N O T E

facts: by students, w/n school premises, against ACADEMIC school

A2180 doesn’t include Academic schools (this is the case where the court researcher was not aware of the ruling in Amadora vs. CA)

Don’t sue school based on 2180 (7)

Ylarde vs. AquinoJuly 29, 1988

FACTS: Edgardo Aquino, a teacher in Gabaldon Primary School gathered his male students aged 10-11 to clean-up the remnants of WWII. They had to dig a hole to bury the concrete blocks. He left while the work was unfinished and the kids, jumped in the pit. One of the kids jumped on the concrete block causing it to fall in the pit and pinning Ylarde who was not able to get out of the in time. Ylarde sustained injuries which caused his death 3 days later. The Ylardes (mom and dad) sued Aquino and Soriano, the principal for damages.

TC: dismissed the complaint.

10 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers

acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any

business or industry.

11

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution

engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child

while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether

inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

1. digging was part of work education2. Aquino exercised utmost diligence3. Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless

imprudence.CA: Affirmed TC

ISSUE: WON both Aquino and Soriano may be held liable.

HELD: Aquino is liable for indemnity, ED and MD under 2176 (art. The petition is based on) and may be held liable under 2180. Soriano, as a head of an academic school, cannot be held liable. CA reversed and set aside.

1. Soriano cannot be held liablea. He is a Head of an academic school and

not of a school of arts and trades (in line with Amadora)b. He did not order the digging

2. Ylarde may be held liable under 2180 as the teacher-in-charge

He was negligent in his supervision and he failed to take the necessary precautions. BUT, the Ylardes based their petition on 2176.

3. Aquino is liable for damages under 2176 (Q: WON the act or omission of Aquino amounting to fault or negligence has a direct causal connection to Ylarde’s death)

a. 5 negligent acts of Aquino i. he should’ve used adult laborers and

not 10 year olds ii. he required the kids to remain inside the

pit, knowing that a huge block was just nearby iii. the stone was obviously at the brink of

falling, yet he require the kids to level the soil around the excavation iv. he left the kids

v. he left the kids near an attractive nuisance

b. the negligent act of Aquino in leaving the kids in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of Ylarde.

It was but natural for kids to play around c. digging was not part of work education/

d. a truly careful and cautious person would’ve acted in all contrast to the way Aquino did.

14

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-20084. Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience,

The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.

C L A S S N O T E

facts: students, teachers and principal impleaded

Applied Amadora doctrine: (teacher:ACAD::heads:Establishments of arts and trade)

Salvos v. IACOctober 5, 1988

FACTS: Jimmy Abon, was a student of the BCF and an employee of AFP (as an armorer for the BCF-ROTC unit) with work premises inside the BCF. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a commerce student of BCF with an unlicensed gun from the ROTC armory, at the BCF parking lot at around 8pm. He was convicted of Homicide. Napoleon’s heirs (Castros) sued for damages impleading Abon, The ROTC Commandant, B. Salvosa-president and chairman of BCF board, J. Salvosa-the EVP of BCF, the dean and BCF.

TC: Solidary liability of Abon, B. Salvosa and BCF Absolved other defendants

IAC: Affirmed but modified award

ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under 2180.

HELD: No. Abon was not in the custody of BCF at the time of the incident. IAC Reversed in so far as it holds Salvosa and BCF solidarily liable with Abon.

1. Rationale for liability Reiterated Palisoc: The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.”

2. Abon was not in the “custody” of BCF when he shot Napoleon DEFINITION OF “CUSTODY” (MEMORIZE!)-- THE PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS TIME.

Qualifying “custody” In line with Palisoc, RECESS IS A TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT EMBRACED IN THE CONCEPT OF “AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL.” IT IS A SITUATION WHERE THE STUDENT STILL REMAINS WITHIN THE CALL OF HIS MENTOR AND IS NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE SCHOOL PREMISES OR THE AREA WITHIN WHICH THE SCHOOL ACTIVITY IS CONDUCTED. RECESS BY ITS NATURE DOES NOT INCLUDE DISMISSAL. Plus, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute “attending school” or being in the “protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as contemplated in the law. Abon cannot be considered to have been in “attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon. Plus, he was supposed to be working when the incident happened.

RULE: Defines “recess” Qualified Custody

NOTE: Salvosa mitigates the effects of Amadora-but this was not cited in Salvosa.

C L A S S N O T E

School: ACAD + Institute of Arts and Trade time: dismissal, where: in parking lot of school,

against who: student of University of Baguio Memorize: recess and custody Amadora: legitimate student objective…Victim

is own student

Salvosa: applied Palisoc, definition of custody…Victim is student of another school

Ponente forgot Amadora—decided 6 months earlier. So to reconcile both cases: If victim is a student of school—Amadora; If victim is NOT a student of school-Salvosa

St. Francis High School vs. CAFebruary 25, 1991

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, 13, and a freshman at St. Francis High School, drowned during a school picnic while trying to save a female teacher. The Castillos sued the school, the principal and the 6 teachers who were at the picnic for damages.

TC: Held the 6 teachers solidarily liable for AD & MD Absolved the school and the principal

Both appealed

CA: Modified TC. Held the school, the principal and 4 teachers solidarily liable for AD, MD and ED.

ISSUE: WON 2180 is applicable.

HELD: No. CA set aside. No one is guilty under 2180. No MD coz case does not fall under any of the grounds for MD and they are not guilty of negligence.

1. None of them are guilty of either their own negligence or of the negligence of those under them

2. School not liable under 2180 TO BE HELD LIABLE UNDER 2180, THE ACT OR OMISSION MUST HAVE OCCURRED WHILE AN EMPLOYEE WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS ASSIGNED TASKS. The picnic was not a sanctioned school activity nor an extra-curricular activity.

3. The Principal is not liable under 2180 Mere knowledge of the picnic is not enough He did not consent to the picnic

4. Teachers are not negligent hence not liable a. instructors and scout masters who had

knowledge in 1st aid and swimming were invited

15


b. life savers were broughtc. they did all that is humanly possible to

save Ferdinand

DISSENT: Padilla1. teachers were negligent. a. They failed to observe the proper diligence BEFORE THE INCIDENT (water was deep, only oral instructions were given)b. The supposed life guards were not there! They were having a drinking spree

2. Principal was negligentHe knew of the activity and he did not take the appropriate measures to ensure the safety of his students.

3. School is liable under 2180 par. 5 The negligence of an employee in causing injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment. Activity was stamped with school authority. Many of the teachers were present, and the activity was organized by the teachers for the students.

RULE: Liability only for failure to perform assigned tasks NOTES: Authority in saying that diligence should be BEFORE and not after the FACT

PSBA vs. CAFebruary 4, 1992

FACTS: Carlos Bautista was stabbed to death by outsiders within PSBA’s premises. The Bautistas sued PSBA and its corporate officers for damages. PSBA and its officers filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that 2180, as per jurisprudence, does not include academic institutions.

TC: MTD denied

CA: Affirmed TC coz 2180 applies to all kinds of educational institutions.

ISSUE: WON PSBA can be held liable under 2180

HELD: No. But case is remanded to determine if PSBA failed to discharge its obligations under its contract with Bautista

CA correct in denying MTD but on the wrong grounds.

1. Art. 2180 doe not apply because offender was not a student of PSBA

Under 2180, the offender should be a pupil of the school. In this case, it was established that the offenders were not PSBA students.

2. PSBA may be held liable based on breach of contract

When a student enrolls, there is an established contract between him and the school, resulting in a bilateral obligation---therefore, this is not based on a QD which arises when parties are not bound by any contract. Although a QD may still arise even when there is a contract, if the act which breaches the contract is done in BF & be violative of Art. 21.

In this case though, PSBA’s negligence would only be relevant in the existence of a contract. PSBA’s negligence cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Art. 21.

RULE: Art. 2180 applies only if the offender was a student of the school

C L A S S N O T E

A2180 applies to schools only if student liable but if student a victim, BOC

Soliman, Jr. v. TuazonMay 18, 1992

FACTS: Maximo Soliman Jr, a student of the Republic Central Colleges, was shot by Jimmy Solomon, a security guard assigned to the school. Solomon was employed by RL Security Agency. Soliman sued Solomon, RCC and the RL for damages. RCC filed a MTD on the following grounds:1. RCC not the employer of Solomon

2. Art. 2180 n/a because Solomon was not a student of RCC

TC: granted MTD

ISSUE: WON the RCC may be held liable under 2180

HELD: No. Because Solomon was not an employee of RCC and neither was he a student. But, under the case of PSBA, RCC may be held liable under the a contract. Case remanded to determine if there was a breach of contract.

1. Art. 2180, par 5 12 does not apply RCC was not the employer of Solomon. RCC was only a client of RL-the employer of Solomon, hence RCC had no hand in the selection and supervision process.

2. Arts. 2180 par. 7, 13 349, 350, & 352 14 does not apply Solomon was not a student of RCC. Hence, school had no substitute parental authority over him.3. PSBA applies RCC may be held liable under the implied contract between RCC and Soliman. Under this contract, the school has an implicit obligation to provide students with an atmosphere conducive to learning.

12 The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are

employed or on the occasion of their functions.

13 Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages

caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

14 Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority:

(2) Teachers and professors;

xxx

(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;

Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over

the conduct of the child.

Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student, are fixed by

government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal

punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of

the heart and mind of the pupil or student.

16


C L A S S N O T E S

A2180 not applicable to nonstudents, to non-employees

This case should have used the provisions from the Family Code.

St. Mary’s Academy v. CarpitanosFebruary 6, 2002

FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the incoming school year. This involved visitation of schools. Sherwin Carpitanos, who was part of the campaigning group rode the jeep, along with other HS students. The jeep was owned by Villanueva and was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student. They were on their way to an elementary school when the jeep turned turtle due to James’ reckless driving. Sherwin sustained injuries which caused his death. The Carpitanos sued St. Mary’s, James, the Daniels (parents of James) and Villanueva.

TC: 1. St. Mary’s is liable for damages under 218 & 21915, FC2. The Daniels were held subsidiarily liable in the event of St. Mary’s insolvency. 3. James was absolved due to his minority. 4. Villanueva was likewise absolved.

CA: Affirmed but reduced AD.

15 Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution

engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child

while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the

premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be

principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the

unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute

parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is

proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions

of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

ISSUE: WON St Mary’s is liable

HELD: No. CA reversed and set aside. Case remanded for determination of liability of defendants excluding St. Mary’s.

1. St. Mary’s is not liable The special parental authority under 218, FC applies to:1. the school, its administrators and teachers2. the individual, entity or institution engaged in child

care This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions, and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under 219, FC, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.

But, for St. Mary’s to be held liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered a s negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.

a. The proximate cause of the accident was not the negligence nor the reckless driving of James, but the mechanical defect of the jeep. The steering wheel guide was detached while the jeep was running.

b. There’s no evidence that St. Mary’s allowed the minor James to drive the jeep. It was the grandson of Villanueva, who had control and possession of the jeep who allowed James to drive.

2. Parents are Primarily liable Whether the accident was due to James negligence or the mechanical failure, the parents must be held primarily liable.

St. Mary’s negligence was only a remote cause, and either the Daniels’ negligence or the mechanical failure was the intervening cause.

3. Villanueva, as the registered owner of the jeep is liable for damages Overwhelming evidence that the accident was due to the detachment of the steering wheel guide. NOTES: applied FC-this seems to imply strict liability but SC here allowed defense of diligence.

C L A S S N O T E

school liable if Proximate Cause of the injury is their negligence

special parental authority applies as long as the activity was approved by an office of the school

FC NCCWho liable A218: school, its

administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child…have special parental authority and responsibility…to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution

A2180, par7: teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades*In St. Francis Case, activity should be inside school premises

For damages caused by

Minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custodyA219: unemancipated minor

Their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody

Liability Principally and solidarily liable – schoolsSubsidiarily liable – parents, judicial

Primarily and directly

17


guardians, persons exercising substitute parental authority

Important to note that: Under the FC, no distinction is made WONSchool is ACADEMIC or NONACADEMICIncident happened WITHIN OR OUTSIDE school premises. 2180 not limited to minors and liability of

teacher is only when academic and not arts and trades

Summary of cases:1. Exconde: Primary liability of parent

2180 applies only to arts and trades

2. Salen: subsidiary liability of parent

3. Fuellas: primary liability of parent (did not categorically state that parent is subsidiarily liable)

4. Rodriguez-Luna: primary liability of parent

5. Libi: Primary liability of parent-CLEARED UP ISSUE ON PRIMARY OR SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY

6. Mercado: Custody=living and boarding with teacher or head

7. Palisoc: custody-protective and supervisory custody. Does not have to live or board with teacher or head Overturned Mercado. No chance to Overturn Exconde.

8. Amadora: 2180 applies to all schools. Overturned Exconde -Academic school-teacher-pupil -Arts & trades-head-apprentice

Broad definition of custody

9. Pasco: 2180 applies to teachers or heads not to school itself.

10. Ylarde: head of an academic school not liable.

11. Salvosa: defines “recess”; qualifies custody (mitigates amadora’s effects)

12. St. Francis: 2180 applies to school sanctioned activities and in the failure to perform assigned tasks.

13. PSBA: offender must be a student of the school; not an outsider for 2180 to apply. But may invoke contractual obligation

14. Soliman: No substitute parental authority over security guard who was neither an employee nor a student

15. St. Mary’s; Who may be liable under special parental authority.

4. Owners and Managers of Establishments*Rationale of employers being liable: policy consideration—allocating risks

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Phil-American Forwarders, Inc

March 25, 1975

FACTS: Fernando Pineda, driver of a Philippine American Forwarders freight truck hit a Philippine Rabbit Bus along a national highway. The bus driver suffered injuries and the bus was unusable for 79 days resulting in loss of income. Balingit, as the manager of PAF and Pineda were sued based on a QD. (Balingit’s defense was that he was not the employer of Pineda)

TC: Dismissed complaint against Balingit as he is not the “manger” contemplated under 2180.

ISSUE: WON Balingit is liable under 2180. (WON employers/owners/managers of an establishment/enterprise includes managers of corporations)

HELD: No.

1. Balingit is not the “manager” contemplated in 2180The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused

by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

The terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise” DOES NOT INCLUDE THE MANAGER OF A CORPORATION.

THE TERM MANAGER (DIRECTOR IN SPANISH VERSION) IS USED IN THE SENSE OF EMPLOYER WHICH IS NOT EQUAL TO A MANAGER OF A CORPORATION WHO IS ALSO AN EMPLOYEE (DEPENDIENTE) OF THE CORPORATION.

2. PAF is a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from that of Balingit (this was not alleged in the complaint). The argument that PAF is a mere business conduit of the Balingit spouses implies the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. Since this was not raised in the lower court, it cannot be countenanced in this appeal.

5. EmployersNOTES: JURIS TANTUM (REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION) WHY?-coz hard for victim to prove that employer was not negligent (similar to res ipsa), hence employer should prove diligences as a defenseWHY OWNER?-deeper prockets

Philtranco v. CAJune 1997

FACTS: A Philtranco bus, driven by Manhilig was being pushed and jumpstarted along a perpendicular street. It started suddenly and ran over Acuesta, a biker. The driver didn’t stop, but was forced to by a cop who saw the accident and boarded the bus.

Acuesta’s heirs sued Manhilig and Philtranco for QD. Philtranco argues it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, saying Manhilig had an excellent record and exercised the diligence of a very cautious person. ISSUE: WON Philtranco may be held liable for the act of Manhilig

HELD: YES. The action is an action for damages for QD under Art 2176 and 2180. The Court has considered the liability of a registered owner of a public

18

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008service vehicle for damages arising from tortuous acts of the driver as primary, direct and joint and several or solidary with the driver (Art 2194)16. The employer’s only recourse is to recover what it has paid from the employee who committed the fault or negligence (Art 2181)17.

C L A S S N O T E

Employers liable because of paterfamilias

Castilex v. VasquezDecember 1999

FACTS: Abad, a production manager of Castilex, was driving his company-issued vehicle after office hours. He hit Vasquez, who had a student’s permit, and on a motorcycle. Abad brought him to the hospital, but he died anyway.

The criminal case did not prosper for failure to prosecute. The civil case for damages was filed by Vasquez’s parents. TC and Ca ruled for Vasquezs.CA held the liability of Cadtilex was “vicarious not solidary contrary to TC’s ruling.

ISSUE 1: WON CA erred in applying par 5 and not par 4 of Art 2180

HELD: NO. SC ruled that the 5th par merely says being engaged in a business is not necessary for the paragraph to apply. The Court made distinctions between the 2 paragraphs.

4th par 5th parOwners and managers Employers, in general,

WON engaged in a business or industry

16 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

(n)

17 Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may

recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)

Covers negligent acts or employees committed either in the service of the branches or on occasion of their functions

Encompasses negligent acts of employees as long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned tasks

NOTE: Sir says this case has the implication that par 4 is superfluous because par 5 encompasses everything.

ISSUE 2: WON Castilex has the burden of proving that Abad was not working within the scope of his assigned tasks

HELD: NO. The plaintiffs have the burden. He who alleges must prove.

ISSUE 3: WON Abad was working within the scope of his assigned tasks, making Castilex liable

HELD: NO. The fact that Abad was a manager and driving a company-issued vehicle is not sufficient to charge Castilex with liability. He was working beyond office hours and was coming from a place where he had snacks. The Court cited principles in American Jurisprudence even if the relationship is Respondeat superior18 not Pater familias..

Operation of Employer’s Motor Vehicle in Going to and From MealsThe employer is liable if the vehicle is used to reduce his time-off and devote more time to the performance of is duties.

Operation of Employer’s Vehicle in Going to and From WorkThe employer is liable if he derives some special benefit such as more time for the performance of duties or that such duties require the employee to circulate in a general area for work. The latter is called the “special errand” or “roving commission” rule.

Use of Employer’s Vehicle Outside Regular Working HoursThe employer is liable if he derives some incidental benefit. The employer is not liable when the vehicle is

18 The act of the agent is the act of the principal.

used for a personal benefit and returned to where it is normally kept. Note: This seems to contradict with Valenzuela v CA. Sir says there is no contradiction. The place where the employee is coming from is material.

NOTES: IMPLICATION: 4th par covered by 5th par, hence 4th paragraph is useless

5th par-an expansion of the 4th par in both employer coverage and acts included

cf Valenzuela-why different results? –coz in Valenzuela, Abad came from a different place.

C L A S S N O T E S

Castilex sold furniture (relevance: on “engaged in a business or industry” under A2180, par5)

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR: CONCLUSIVE FAULT/NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE

PATERFAMILIAS: PRESUMPTION JURIS TANTUM (REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION)

What’s the rule if we combine 2180 (4) and (5) as regards the liability of employer for the acts or omissions of employees? Requisites to hold the employer liable for torts under 2180:1. ER-EE relationship2. Employee must be acting within the scope

of his assigned task American Jurisprudence: 3 situations (General

Rule: Employer NOT liable; Exception: Employer LIABLE when he derives special business benefit)1. GOING TO AND FROM MEALS

General rule: ER is not liable.Exception: Benefit to the ER

2. GOING TO AND FROM WORKGeneral rule: ER not liable

3. OUTSIDE REGULAR WORKING HOURS

Filamer v. IACAugust 1992

FACTS: Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer. Having a driver’s license, he requested Masa, driver and son of school president, to let him drive them home where Funtecha also lives. Masa yielded and on

19

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008the way they hit a pedestrian, Kapunan, because Funtecha swerved right to avoid a fast-moving truck. It appears that Agustin Masa, school president, knew of the license.

ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable

HELD: YES. The clause “within the scope of their by assigned tasks” for the purpose of raising the presumption of liability of an employer includes ANY ACT DONE BY THE EMPLOYEE, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE INTERESTS OF THE EMPLOYER OR FOR THE ACCOUNT OF THE EMPLOYER AT THE TIME OF THE INFLICTION OF THE INJURY. THAT IS APPLICABLE EVEN IF THE EMPLOYEE DERIVES SOME BENEFIT FROM THE ACT. In this case, Funtecha drove the jeep not for his enjoyment but for the service of Filamer. The fact that he was not the school driver is insignificant. Besides, Filamer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family.

Presumptive liability of employer (when employee is driving a company vehicle) is determined by answering this Q: WON the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master’s business.

Supervision includes: 1. formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employers; and

2. the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees.

NOTE: Sir thinks this is a dangerous doctrine because even if the activity is far removed from the business/institution, the employer may be held liable if it is in furtherance of the latter’s interests.

Q: is there an ER-EE relationship between the school and the student working part-time in the school?

C L A S S N O T E

Labor Code provision that there is an ER-EE relationship is not applicable

NPC v. CAAugust 1998

FACTS: A dump truck driven by Ilumba and owned by NPC collided with a Toyota Tamaraw, resulting in the death of 3 persons in the Tamaraw and injuries to 17 passengers. PHESCO supplied Ilumba as a driver to NPC. NPC and PHESCO are pointing fingers, each claiming Ilumba is the employee of the other.

ISSUE: Who is the employer of Ilumba, and therefore, liable with him

HELD: NPC. PHESCO is a labor-only contractor because it does not carry on an independent business and does not have substantial capital. It is merely an agent of NPC. The Civil Code and NOT the Labor Code applies to determine NPC’s liability because the action here is based on the recovery of damages as a result of QD. The Labor Code applies only to liability caused by non-compliance with substantive labor standards on working conditions, etc.

Requisites to hold the employer liable for torts under 2180:

1. there must exist an ER-EE relationship2. employee must be acting within the

scope of his assigned task

NOTE: In Filamer, Labor Code provisions do not apply even n the determination of an employer-employee relationship. Sir says there is a policy considerations. The Court tries to utilize doctrine to support their cause.

C L A S S N O T E S

par4 and 5 of 2180, NCC applies! LC not strictly applied, just used to determine the existence of EER

LRT v. NavidadFebruary 2003

FACTS: Nicanor was drunk when he entered the LRT station after buying a token. He got into a fistfight with Escartin, a security guard and he fell unto the tracks. The train hit him and he died instantly. Nicanor’s widow and children sued Escartin, Roman (the train driver), LRTA, Metro Transit and Prudent (security agency). LRTA and Roman filed counterclaims and Prudent denied liability, averring it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

ISSUE: WON LRTA is liable

HELD: YES. The presumption of liability was overcome. Common carriers, by the nature of its business and reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence. This duty is not only during the course of the trip but for as long as the passengers are within the premises and where they ought to be in pursuance of the contract of carriage.

PROVISIONS OF LAW RENDER A COMMON CARRIER LIABLE FOR DEATH AND INJURY OF PASSENGERS :· Through negligence or willful acts of its

employees· On account of willful acts or negligence of

other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented the act or omission

In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, it may hire its own employees or avail of the services of a contractor. In either case, the carrier is not relieved of its responsibility under the contract of carriage.

Employer’s liability under 2180: 1. establish 1st employee’s fault or negligence2. presumption juris tantum that employer failed

to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in selection and supervision

3. PRIMARY LIABILITY-but can be negated by due diligence in selection and supervision

McKee v. IACJuly 1992

FACTS: A head-on collision between a cargo truck driven by Galang and a Ford Escort driven by Jose Kho, resulting in the death of 3 and injuries to 3 others, all passengers of the Ford. The accident was caused by 2 boys who darted into the street causing Kho, driver of the Ford, to swerve into the truck’s lane.

ISSUE: WON the employer of Galang is liable

HELD: YES. There is a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. The only defense is due

20

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008diligence of a good father of a family. They did not interpose nor prove this defense.Note: Why is there a presumption? Sir says it is because it is difficult to prove the employer did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.

C L A S S N O T E S

presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee

liability: primary, direct and solidaryValenzuela v. CA

February 1996

FACTS: Valenzuela had a flat tire and had to park her midnight blue Mitsubishi lancer on the side of the road. While standing on the left rear side of the car, watching someone changed her tire, she was bumped by Li (allegedly drunk). The car of the latter was registered to Alexander Commercial. She had lost her left leg (only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of her body) and had to be fitted with a prosthetic leg.

ISSUE: WON Alexander was liable

HELD: YES. The relationship between Li and Alexander is Pater familias not Respondeat superior,, in which the ultimate liability falls upon the employer. In this case, the Court averred the privilege of using a company car serves 2 purposes:

1. Image of success2. Practical and utilitarian reasons (to reach

clients conveniently)

Thus, the use of the car principally serves the business the private purposes and the goodwill of the company and only incidentally the private purposes of the employee who uses the car. Li, an Asst. Mngr of the company, uses the car to facilitate meetings with clients. At the time of the accident, he came from a co-employee’s place in BF Homes Pque. The presumption is they came from a company function or discussed work-related matters.

C L A S S N O T E S

not liable simply because of company car but because of bonus pater familias standard in

A2180 – did not prove diligence and under 2nd instance discussed in Castilex

juris tantum presumption (rebuttable) vs. juris et jure (conclusive)

cf with Castilex: compare the place where Abad and Li came from along with the nature of Li’s job which required him to have a car.

This case is more of a roving commision Valenzuela case says that A2180 was

modified by FC. take note of discussion on practice of

companies in issuing company cars

6. State-not liable for acts of its officers, agents and employees (unless special agent; and except when state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations)

C L A S S N O T E

Very useful provision in our day and age

Merritt v. GovernmentMarch 1916

FACTS: Plaintiff Merritt suffered severe injuries as his motorcycle collided with a PGH ambulance due to the negligence of the latter’s vehicle’s driver. The Government passed an Act authorizing Merritt to sue the Government.

ISSUE: WON the State is liable for damages

HELD: NO. Though the State waived its immunity from suit, it did not concede liability to Merritt. The State is not liable for torts, except when it acts through a special agent. In this case, the driver is not a special agent within the contemplation of the law. Although the accident was caused by a government employee, the State did not undertake to guarantee to third persons the acts of all its employees for that would subject the State to countless suits, which is subversive to public interest. The State is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of the acts performed by its employees pertaining to their office because neither fault nor negligence can be

presumed on the part of the State in the organization of branches of public service and appointment of its agents.

C L A S S N O T E S

This case defined actually defined special agent (although sir didn’t seem to remember): receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special officer

So in this case the chauffeur still was acting within his duty as a driver when he hit Merritt

Merritt was one of the best constructors of wooden buildings at that time!

Rosete v. Auditor GeneralAugust 1948

FACTS: Employees of the Emergency Control Administration had gasoline stored in their warehouse. Such storage was contrary to a Manila ordinance. Frayno negligently lit a cigarette 5 meters from a gas drum. Rosete’s building were damaged.

ISSUE: WON the Government should pay damages

HELD: NO. There is no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers was not done by any special agent, because the officers of the said institution did not act as special agents within the contemplation of Art 1903 in storing gasoline in the warehouse. In a case for damages, the responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through A SPECIAL AGENT DULY EMPOWERED BY DEFINITE ORDER OR COMMISSION TO PERFORM AN ACT OR CHARGED WITH A DEFINITE PURPOSE WHICH GIVES RISE TO THE CLAIM NOT WHERE THE CLAIM IS BASED ON ACTS OR OMISSIONS IMPUTABLE TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE OR TECHNICAL OFFICE WHO CAN BE HELD TO THE PROPER RESPONSIBILITY IN A MANNER LAID DOWN BY THE LAW ON CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY .

RULE:OFFICIALS: comprises all officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public officers

21

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008SPECIAL AGENTS: all others who are acting by commission of the government, whether individual or juridical bodies.

C L A S S N O T E

Differentiated special agent from officials The case used Merritt’s definition of special

agent Perfecto dissented, saying ECA special agent,

as opposed to ordinary government officials who were also agents

Mendoza v. De LeonFebruary 1916

FACTS: This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of Villasis,Pangasinan. The council revoked a lease for an exclusive ferry privilege, which was awarded to Mendoza and gave it to someone else.

ISSUE: WON the individual members of the council are liable

HELD: YES. There is no justifiable reason for revoking the lease awarded to Mendoza. The municipality has 2 functions: governmental and proprietary/corporate. The award of the lease was a proprietary function. In such a case, the tortfeasors may be sued in capacities such as those in private corporations. Respondeat superior applies.

C L A S S N O T E S

when state acts in their proprietary function, they can be sued…individual members of municipal council can be sued

Does A2180 apply to municipalities? Yes delegation of powers

Fontanilla v. MaliamanFebruary 1991

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration was created for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating and administering all national irrigation systems of the

Philippines. NIA’s driver caused the death of Fontanilla due to the fault and/or negligence. His parets fled a suit for damages.

ISSUE: WON NIA is liable

HELD: YES. NIA’s functions are basically proprietary and incidentally governmental. RA 3601 and PD 552 provide that NIA is a body corporate invested with a corporate personality and distinct from the government. So, it may be sued. At the time, the driver was an agent. Where a private individual is commissioned to do a special task, he may be considered a special agent within the contemplation of the provision.

C L A S S N O T E S

added special agent: aside from special commission, COMMISSION HAS TO BE FOREIGN FROM ITS FUNCTIONS (but this was already in the definition given in Merritt so ewan ko kay sir kung ano bago dito!)

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n)

City of Manila v. TeoticoJanuary 1968

FACTS: Teotico was waiting a jeepney. As he was about to board one, he fell into an uncovered and unlighted manhole/catchbasin. He hit his head on the rim, broke his glasses and the pieces of which pierced his eyelid. He also got contusions and abrasions on other parts of his body. He filed a suit for damages against the City of Manila, mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.

ISSUE: Which applies: Sec 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) or the Civil Code

HELD: CIVIL CODE. It applies because it is ore specific. Whereas SEC 4 RA 409 REFERS TO LIABILITY ARISING FROM NEGLIGENCE, IN GENERAL, ART 2189 GOVERNS LIABILITY DUE TO “DEFECTIVE STREETS”, IN

PARTICULAR. Manila’s assertion that it did not own the street is of no moment. The fact that it is under their control or supervision is enough to make them liable.

C L A S S N O T E S

comment ni sir: charter is supposed to be more specific since it only applies to city of manila but civil code is more specific in determining liability for defective streets…

You can argue either way. Court always makes someone liable. It’s all about allocating risks.

C. Others 1. Proprietor of Buildings

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;

(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;

(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure;

(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

C L A S S N O T E S

*under Lease Contract: the lessor is responsible for necessary repairs!

2. Employees

22


C L A S S N O T E S

A2176 to make fellow employee liable Sir: take note of 1723 (interesting provision)

Araneta v. JoyaMay 1974

FACTS: De Joya, general manager, proposed to Ace Management to send Taylor to the US for further studies. De Joya sent Taylor despite the Board’s disapproval. Travel expenses and salaries were paid to Taylor from company funds (signed by Vicente and Luis Araneta). Araneta discovered the arrangement and sued De Joya.

ISSUE: WON De Joya is liable

HELD: YES. Vicente and Luis were informed about Taylor’s trip and gave their approval. All three’s acts made them liable for the unauthorized disbursement of company funds. They were joint tortfeasors and have solidary liability under Art 2194. Araneta’s defense of good faith falls on its face when he didn’t testify to prove it. He remained passive and even approved the payroll thrice. The existence of a contract between parties is not a bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and consequent recovery of damages.

C L A S S N O T E S

Relevance: A2176 in this case was used to show a liability of a fellow employee

3. Engineer/ArchitectArt. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the

construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

De Leon 455-456Liability of engineer or architect/contractor for collapse of building constructed:1. Liability of engineer or architect.-The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications shall be liable for damages, if:

a. The collapse took place within 15 years from the completion of the structure

b. it took place by reason of a defect in the plans and specifications, or due to defects in the ground; and

c. the action for damages is brought within 10 years following the collapse

2. Liability of contractor.-ifa. the edifice falls within the same periodb. the collapse took place on account of

defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract; and

c. the action for damages is brought within 10 years following the collapse

3. Solidary liability-In case the engineer or the architect supervised or directed the construction, he shall be solidarily liable (see Arts. 120719, 121620) with the contractor.

19 Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the

same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each

one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary

liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the

obligation requires solidarity. (1137a)

20 Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of

them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those

which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully

collected. (1144a)

Art. 1723 speaks of a building that should collapse or edifice that falls, hence, it does not apply to minor defects.

A 3rd person suffering damage as a result of any defect in the construction may proceed, against the engineer or architect or contractor.

4. Effect of acceptance of work- Gen. Rule in a contract for a piece of work is that acceptance of the work by the employer relieves the contractor of liability for any defect in the work.21 But mere acceptance of the building after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action arising from any defect in the construction.

VII. TORTS W/ INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

A. Violation of Civil and Political Rights

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain

a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property

without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private

property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

21 Art. 1719. Acceptance of the work by the employer relieves the contractor of liability for any

defect in the work, unless:

(1) The defect is hidden and the employer is not, by his special knowledge, expected to

recognize the same; or

(2) The employer expressly reserves his rights against the contractor by reason of the defect. (n)

23


(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

C L A S S N O T E S

Art. 32 is the basis for a civil action for violation of civil liberties.

Special rule: Judges are not covered unless done in excess of jurisdiction.

Take note: Art. 32 says DIRECTLY or INDIRECTLY

Private persons may be sued under this!

Lim v. Ponce de LeonAugust 1975

FACTS: Jikil Taha sold Timbangcaya a motor launch. Taha forcibly took the launch back so Timbangcaya filed a complaint. Fiscal Ponce de Leon filed an info against Taha. After discovering where the launch was, Ponce ordered Provincial Commander of Palawan Maddela to impound the vehicle even though it had already been sold to a third party, Lim. After initial hesitation, Maddela seized the launch so Lim filed this case.

ISSUE: WON Ponce de Leon may seize the launch without warrant

HELD: NO. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by the Constitution. There is no law which authorizes the fiscal to seize the corpus delicti of the crime. Only judges may issue warrants for seizure not fiscals. Ponce de Leon claimed there was no time to get a warrant, but records show there was ample time. He next claims good faith, but this does not matter because ART 32 DOES NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF GOOD FAITH/BAD FAITH. IT IS ENOUGH THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. (ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION)

C L A S S N O T E S

Who can contest? Only the parties whose rights have been impaired

Why is good faith not a defense? It will be contrary to purpose of the law.

Subordinate officer not liable illogical because Court already said that good faith is not a defense.

Provincial commander NOT LIABLE because of chain of command – Subordinate, just follow orders – but GF not needed

Aberca v. VerApril 1988

FACTS: Task Force Makabansa, intelligence units of the AFP, conducted pre-emptive strikes against “known communist-terrorist underground houses”. It conducted raids with defective search warrants where personal items were confiscated, people were arrested without warrant and interrogated without proper procedures. The violations of the plaintiffs’ rights were geared towards obtaining evidence to incriminate them. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the writ of habeas corpus was suspended and that they were only performing their official duties.

ISSUE: WON the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus bars the civil action for damages.

HELD: NO. The suspension does not destroy the right or cause of action for illegal arrest and other violations of constitutional rights. What is merely suspended is the right to seek release through the writ as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. ART 32 RENDERS THE DEFENDANTS LIABLE, INCLUDING THEIR SUPERIORS, AS THE PROVISION INCLUDES NOT ONLY THOSE DIRECTLY BUT ALSO INDIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE. The invocation of state immunity is misplaced because there is no blanket license to transgress upon rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.

C L A S S N O T E

May superiors be liable? Yes, because they are indirectly responsible

Writ’s effect: suspension immaterial Respondeat superior: liable because

INDIRECTLY responsible (A32)

MHP Garments v. CASeptember 1994

FACTS: MHP was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official uniforms and supplies of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. They were informed that Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales were selling BSP uniforms without authority. They sought the aid of the Philippine Constabulary. Constabulary men and De Guzman, representative of MHP, went to the stalls,

24

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008seized the goods and caused a commotion, all without warrant.

ISSUE: WON MHP and De Guzman may be held liable

HELD: YES. The Constitution protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. The evidence presented did not justify the treatment of the respondents. MHP was indirectly involved. They instigated the raid which was conducted with the active participation of De Guzman. The proper method would have been to report the matter and secure a warrant.

C L A S S N O T E

Take note: even private persons who participate can be held liable under Article 32

1 Sangco 228-255 (1993)

- Code Commission: The creation of an absolutely separate and independent civil action for the violation of civil liverties is essential to the effective maintenance of democracy,for these reasons:

(1) In most case, the threat to freedom originates from abuse of power by government officials and peace officers.

(2) The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt often prevented the appropriate punishment.

(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal code trampling upon the freedoms named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale of penal law.- A violation of any of the individual rights and liberties enumerated in Art. 32 may or may not constitute a criminal offense.- If act constitutes a criminal offense, the victim may opt between a civil action under Art. 100 of the RPC and an independent civil action under Art. 32.- If act is not a criminal offense, the civil action to enforce liability for damages is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code according to Art. 1162 thereof, and the Rules on Civil Procedure.- The right to institute an independent civil action under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is a substantive right intended as an exception to and held as an amendment of the general rule in Sec. 1 of Rule

107 of the 1940 Rules of Court ( Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the 1964 Revised rules of Court) - These independent actions should not be deemed instituted with the criminal action and the right to institute them should not be made subject to their prior reservation.

B. Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

-the nature of civil action for damages which Art. 33 allows to be instituted is ex delicto. –criminal in nature, hence not negligence.

Revised Penal CodeTitle Thirteen-CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

Chapter One-LIBELSection 1— Definitions, forms, and punishment of this crime.{{{

Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

(1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

(2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other

act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to present such publication for a compensation. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of the family of the latter or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration.

Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of from 20 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor or manager or a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned.

Art. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Art. 359. Slander by deed. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

25


Marcia v CAJanuary 27, 1983

FACTS: Victory Liner bus driven by Paje collided with a jeep driven by Marcia. Marcia died and 2 other were seriously injured. An info for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. Heirs of Marcia reserved the right to file a civil action separately and later did. CA acquitted Paje stating that the case was a pure accident. Heirs of Marcia instituted this separate civil action for damages. Trial court dismissed.

ISSUE: Won the acquittal of the accused serves as a bar to the civil action for damages

HELD: The charge against Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

C L A S S N O T E

Reckless Imprudence is not included in Art. 33 no independent civil action

Article 33 construed strictly

Madeja v Caro December 1983

FACTS: A criminal action was filed against Dr. Japzon for the death of Madeja after an appendectomy. Pending the criminal case, his widow filed a civil action for damages, alleging gross negligence, but this was dismissed.

ISSUE: WON Judge Caro erred in dismissing the civil action

HELD: YES. Under the Rules of Court and Art 33, a separate civil action may be instituted. The civil action is ex-delicto and aimed to allow the offended party to enforce his rights in a private action. Physical injuries is used in the generic sense, meaning bodily injury not the crime in the RPC. To be liable under Art 33, the

damage should arise from a crime. This case also says Corpus v Paje, saying reckess imprudence is not included in Art 33, is not authoritative. Note: Madeja v Caro is a division case. It cannot overturn an en banc decision.

Arafiles v. Phil. JournalistsMarch 2004

FACTS: Despuig filed a complaint against Arafiles for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. She executed a sworn statement to that effect witnessed by Morales. The latter interviewed the former and wrote an article about the incident. Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, his editor and the president of the publisher, saying his reputation was ruined by the story.

ISSUE: WON the accused were liable for damages

HELD: NO. In actions for libel, the published work must be examined and viewed as a whole. It depends on the scope, spirit and motive of the piece. It must be read in the sense readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. Morales could have used better words, but he did state that his story was based on the account of Despuig at the station.

Note: According to Sir, the point of this case is that one may file a criminal complaint and a civil one in one court and both could proceed independently of each other.*Crim case and civil case (for the same act) may proceed independently of each other

C L A S S N O T E

Art 33 does not affect in any way the criminal action.

1. Defamation

MVRS v. IslamicJanuary 2003

FACTS: An issue of Bulgar wrote an article stating that Muslims don’t eat pigs because they treat them as Gods. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines and individual Muslims filed a complaint for damages,

alleging the story was a product of sheer ignorance but with the intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage Muslims of the world.

ISSUE: WON MVRS may be held liable

HELD: NO. The libel suit will not prosper because IT DID NOT IDENTIFY SPECIFICALLY NOR REFER TO ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS TO BE THE SUBJECT OF THE PUBLICATION. They cannot be held liable just because the words were insulting or offensive. According to Puno, there are prerequisites to recovery:

1. published statement2. which is defamatory3. of and concerning the plaintiff

If the article refers to a group, for a member to have a cause of action, he must prove that the article particularly pertains to him.

NOTE: cf Worcester

C L A S S N O T E S

important: definition of defamation, what is the relation to libel and slander (big circle): Definition of defamation broader than slander/libel

you have to prove specific damage to you and that there was an intent to damage or hurt you.

2. Fraud

Salta v. VeyraSeptember 1982

FACTS: Salta was an employee of PNB. As a manager, he indiscriminately granted some loans in a manner characterized by negligence fraud, manifest partiality and upon securities not commensurate to the loan. The criminal case was dismissed, but 2 civil cases were filed. Salta filed motions to dismiss based on the acquittal. Judge de Veyra denied one MTD, but Judge Purisima granted the other. Acquittal was based on insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: WON the MTD should be granted

26

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008HELD: NO. THE ACQUITTAL IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WILL NOT BE AN OBSTACLE FOR THE CIVIL CASE TO PROSPER UNLESS THERE IS A FINDING IN THE CRIMINAL CASE THAT EVEN CIVILLY THE ACCUSED IS NOT LIABLE. There is no such finding in this case. Art 33 applies, there being an allegation of fraud and negligence.

C L A S S N O T E S

fraud here is not simply estafa. Swindling is just a specie of an offense committed by means of fraud.

Prudential Bank v. IACDecember 1992

FACTS: Philippine Rayon enetered into a contract with Nissho for the importation of textile machineries under a 5-year deferred-payment plan. Rayon applied for a commercial letter of credit with Prudential in favor of Nissho. A trust receipt was signed in favor of Prudential. The letter of credit and trust receipt remained unpaid. The machinery was sold and the proceeds kept. Prudential filed an action for damages against Rayon and its president.

ISSUE: WON Rayon is liable

HELD: YES. There is a fiduciary relationship between Rayon and Prudential. Rayon sold the machinery without turning over the proceeds to Prudential as agreed upon so it violated the agreement. Rayon wilfully and fraudulently misapplied or converted the money for their own use.There is no obstacle for the filing of a separate complaint for damages even if there is already a criminal complaint for violation of Sec 3 of the Trust Receipts Law. Sec 13 of the same law considers the violation as Estafa. ESTAFA COMES UNDER FRAUD AND SO AN ACTION UNDER ART. 33 MAY BE BROUGHT.

C L A S S N O T E S

violation of a trust receipt is a violation under Article 33

Since there is FRAUD, can file independent and distinct civil action based on Article 33

3. Physical Injuries

Capuno v. PepsiApril 1965

FACTS: A Pepsi delivery truck driven by Elordi collided with a private car driven by Capuno. Capuno and his passengers, Buan spouses, died. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. While the case was pending, the estate and heirs of the Buan spouses filed a separate complaint for damages against Pepsi and Elordi. The parties in the latter case compromised so the case was dismissed. Later, Capuno heirs filed a similar complaint.

ISSUE: WON the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations

HELD: YES. THE CASE FOR RECOVERY UNDER QD MUST BE INSTITUTED WITHIN 4 YEARS FROM THE ACCRUAL OF THE RIGHT OF ACTION. Contrary to the Capuno’s assertion, the prescription period was not interrupted by the filing of the criminal action inasmuch as they never waived nor reserved to file the civil action separately.

Anent Art. 33, The Court said that it included bodily injury resulting in death.

C L A S S N O T E

This case demonstrates a literal reading of A33 The action filed was based on A31 and A33 ON A33: civil action for damages could have

been commenced by Capunos immediately upon death of Cipriano Capuno

Corpus v. PajeJuly 1969

FACTS: Victory Liner bus driven by Paje collided with a jeep driven by Marcia. Marcia died and 2 other were seriously injured. An info for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Paje. Heirs of Maria reserved the right to file a civil action separately and later did.

ISSUE: WON the acquittal of Paje in the criminal case bars the civil action

HELD: YES. The acquittal was based on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged did not exist and the collision was pure accident. CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE, THAT IS RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, IS NOT ONE OF THE 3 CRIMES MENTIONED IN ART 33 WHICH AUTHORIZES THE INSTITUTION OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION.

C L A S S N O T E S

Law punishes the negligent act. Action has also already prescribed. According to Sangco, reckless imprudence is

included in A365. Rule: RI not included in Art. 33 hence the effect:

NO independent civil action—Art. 100 will apply with respect to civil liability

In Criminal negligence, act punished negligent/careless act, not the result

Dulay v. CAApril 1995

FACTS: Torzuela, a security guard, shot Atty. Dulay while he was on duty at the “Big Bang sa Alabang” due to some altercation. Dulay’s widow filed an action for damages against Torzuela, Superguard and Safeguard (both companies believed to be Torzuela’s employers).

ISSUE: WON an independent civil action may proceed

HELD: YES. The act of the Dulays of instituting a separate civil action under Art 33 is allowed. The term physical injuries has been held (in Madeja vs. Caro) to include consummated, attempted and frustrated homicide. SC, looking at Art 111 of the ROC, said that the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party (Civil action deemed instituted):

1. waives the civil action2. reserves the right to institute it separately 3. institutes it prior to the criminal action

This case differs from Marcia v CA, in that, here, the crime is homicide not reckless imprudence so a separate civil action may be filed.

27


Madeja v. CaroDecember 1983

FACTS: A criminal action was filed against Dr. Japzon for the death of Madeja after an appendectomy. Pending the criminal case, his widow filed a civil action for damages, alleging gross negligence, but this was dismissed. (reasoned that Instant civil action may be instituted ONLY AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT in criminal action)

ISSUE: WON Judge Caro erred in dismissing the civil action

HELD: YES. Under the Rules of Court and Art 33, a separate civil action may be instituted. The civil action is ex-delicto and aimed to allow the offended party to enforce his rights in a private action. PHYSICAL INJURIES IS USED IN THE GENERIC SENSE, MEANING BODILY INJURY NOT THE CRIME IN THE RPC. TO BE LIABLE UNDER ART 33, THE DAMAGE SHOULD ARISE FROM A CRIME. This case also says Corpus v Paje, saying reckess imprudence is not included in Art 33, is not authoritative because no sufficient number of votes). Note: Madeja v Caro is a division case. It cannot overturn an en banc decision.

C L A S S N O T E S

Art. 33: ex-delicto acts acts should constitute a crime.

In Corpus v Paje, only 9 justices took part, 4 of which merely concurred with the result. However, based on the Constitution, a division case cannot overturn an en banc decision.

Sir does not think that “physical injuries” should be limited to the crime with the same name.

2 things to remember about A33, CC:1. Physical injury refers to bodily injury and is

not the same as physical injury as defined in the RPC.

2. Civil action is ex-delicto

1 Sangco 255-282 (1993)

- According to the Code Commission, this article “creates an independent civil action in case of defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. This separate

civil action is similar to the action in Tort for libel or slander, deceit, and assault and battery under American law.”- Meaning and scope of physical injuries: Like that provided in Art. 32, the independent civil action contemplated in Art. 33 is for damages caused by defamation, fraud or physical injuries which may or may not constitute criminal offenses.- On Corpus and Marcia: This is an apparent misconception of the independent civil action contemplated in Art. 33 and of reckless imprudence being the crime itself and not its results. “Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability.” (People v Feller)- Where the physical injuries results from a negligent act or omission, the injured party will have three causes of action to choose from and bring a civil action for, namely: (1) a civil action for damages resulting from reckless imprudence under Art. 100 in relation to Art. 365 of the RPC; (2) a civil action for physical injuries arising from a quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; (3) a civil action for physical injuries under Art. 33, also of the Civil Code.

C. Neglect of Duty

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

1 Sangco 334-335 (1993)

The basic function of government is the protection of life and property and it is also the main justification for the existence and maintenance of its police force. For this, members of the force are directly and personally liable for damages caused by their refusal or failure to render this basic service.

Since policemen are usually insolvent, the law secures payment by holding the City or municipality subsidiarily

liable. This is clearly an exception to its non-suability as a political subdivision of the State. This is analogous but not identical to that provided in Art 102 and 103 of the RPC because the conviction of the defendant policemen is absolutely immaterial and irrelevant to the city’s or municipality’s liability.

The direct and personal liability for nonfeasance contained in Art 27 is general and does not constitute a criminal act nor provide for subsidiary liability of the locality. Art 34 specifically applies only to members of the police force of the city or municipality.

Key elements of a civil action for damages under Art 34:1. The defendant is a member of the city or

municipality police force.2. The plaintiff either sought police assistance

or protection against danger to his life or property, or defendant was aware of plaintiff’s need for such assistance or protection, but the latter refused or failed to render the same.

3. As a consequence of such refusal or failure to render assistance or protection, the plaintiff suffered damages.

4. The civil action for damages may be instituted independently of the institution or pendency of any criminal proceedings arising from the same dereliction and regardless of the result thereof, and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.

D. Action for Damages where no independent civil action is provided

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

catch all provision what’s punished in 365, RPC is the negligence

and the resulting damage Take note of this—not a very often used

provision

1 Sangco 335-338 (1993)

- In all cases not covered by Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code or by a special law, any person who believes that he is the victim of a criminal offense- but the judge or the prosecuting attorney finds no reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the latter refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings- may bring a civil action for damages under Art. 35.- Implicit are the ff propositions of fact and law:1. Aggrieved part has opted not only to recover his damages in a civil action therefore under Art. 100 of the RPC, but also to institute such civil action ahead of and separately from the criminal action to enforce defendant’s criminal liability2. Aggrieved party believes that the act or omission which cause the injury constitutes a criminal offense3. Civil Code or any special law does not grant him the right to institute a civil action for damages independently of the criminal action4. He is granted the right to institute such civil action for damages WON the criminal action upon which it is based is filed; prosecute it to final judgment, and prove the same by a preponderance of evidence, if no criminal action is filed during its pendency.5. If the criminal action is filed during its pendency, such civil action shall be suspended until final judgment in the criminal case, which may or may not affect it, is rendered. It may also be consolidated with the criminal action. because it is based on civil liability arising from a criminal offense6. Where no criminal action is instituted because a prima facie case cannot be established, plaintiff may file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. there is a bond because of the high probability that the suit may be malicious

7. Where a criminal action is subsequently instituted, presumably no indemnity bond may be sought or required since there is no apparent justification for it.- Distinguished from Art. 30: Under Art. 30, plaintiff is not required to file an indemnity bond because there is no possibility that it was maliciously instituted. But this must be further qualified. Under Art. 35, there is no need to file an indemnity bond where a crime has indubitably been committed or such a criminal action is subsequently instituted. - An aggrieved party need not be the victim of a criminal or punishable act or omission to be entitled to damages. So long as the act or omission complained of, WON it is punishable, is alleged and shown to be the proximate cause of the damage or injury he sustained, he is entitled to bring a civil action therefor and obtain a judgment on the basis thereof.

VIII. INTENTIONAL TORTS

Art. 19 - principle of abuse of rightsArt. 20 - general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not essentially provide for their own sanctionArt. 21 - deals with acts contra bonus mores Casis: real catch-all; covers everything

A. Abuse Of Rights

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honest and good faith.

Velayo, etc. v. Shell Co. of the Phils, et al.October 31, 1956

FACTS: CALI informed its principal creditors that it was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operations. The creditors agreed to form a committee that would take charge of the distribution of assets. Fitzgerald, an employee of Shell, was appointed a member of the committee. After the committee met, Shell made a transfer of credit against CALI to American Shell Oil Company. American Shell Oil filed a complaint against

CALI and a writ of attachment was issued on CALI’s C-54 plane.

ISSUE: WON Shell can be held for damages. YES

HELD: Even though Arts. 19, 21, and 23 only came into effect after the incident, they are still applicable. Shell had no vested right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI or of its creditors. Shell’s act of taking advantage of his knowledge of the plane showed bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors.

Standards:1. A- to act with justice2. G- to give everyone his due3. O -to observe honesty and GF

C L A S S N O T E S

A19 is a mere declaration of principle which provides for the standard of conduct.

A21 implements A19 by providing for a consequence which is not found in A19.

A19’s “lofty” ideal is to “VOUCHSAFE ADEQUATE LEGAL REMEDY FOR THAT UNTOLD NUMBERS OF MORAL WRONGS WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HUMAN FORESIGHT TO PROVIDE FOR SPECIALLY IN THE STATUTES” CATCH ALL

What constitutes the abuse of right? Not the transfer of credit per se but Mr. Fitzgerald was already appointed as 1 of the members in the working committee tasked to determine the division of assets. The working committee was formed specifically for the creditors to not sue CALI

The court used A2253 and A2254, NCC to rule upon the issue

Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CAOctober 8, 1998

FACTS: Morada was employed by Saudi Arabian Airlines as a flight attendant. Her two co-workers tried to rape her. She filed a case against them. However, she was pressured to drop the case while her employer’s Chief Legal Officer stood by. She then attended a hearing, after being assured by her employer that it was routinary. She was shocked when she was sentenced to be imprisoned for adultery, going

29

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008to disco, and socializing with male crew, in violation of Islamic laws, and was sentenced to be lashed. He employer refused to help her.

ISSUE: Morada had cause of action. YES

HELD: Article 19 merely declares a principle of law and Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Philippine Law applied because it is where Saudi Arabian deceived Morada. According to her, she honestly believed that her employer would act with justice and give her what is due. Instead, her employer failed to protect her.

C L A S S N O T E S

In the context of international law, this case is actually wrong: If the concept of Lex Loci delicti commisi would be followed, the place where most of the crimes was committed would determine what law should be applied. In this case, most of the violation of rights were committed in SAUDI!

BUT COURT HELD THAT RP LAWS SHOULD BE APPLIED: no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience shown by either parties if RP + Saudi already submitted to the jurisdiction of QC RTC

This case demonstrates the broad application of A19 and A21.

A 19, 20, 21 are not conflicts of law provisions but were applied in a conflicts of law case.

Globe Mackay v. CAAugust 25, 1989

FACTS: Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay as a purchasing agent. He uncovered certain fraudulent transactions. However, Hendry, an EVP, accused him of being a crook and a swindler. Tobias was charged with estafa. The cases against him were dismissed. Despite this, Tobias was fired. Hendry then sent a letter to Tobias’ potential employer alleging his dishonesty. Tobias filed an action for damages against Hendry and Globe.

ISSUE: WON Tobias was entitled to damages. YES

HELD: There is no rigid test to determine when Art. 19 has been violated; this is to be determined upon

the unique circumstances of each case. Upon the facts of the present case, it is clear that the petitioners abused the right that they invoke – right to dismiss an employee. Although an employer who suspects an employee to be dishonest may dismiss the latter, the employer may not do so in an abusive manner.

RULE: Q of WON the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Art. 20 or 21 or other applicable provisions, depends on the circumstances of each case.

C L A S S N O T E S

Right to dismiss should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised: there was name-calling, threats, “You Filipinos cannot be trusted!”

A19: Principle of abuse of rights; set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in performance of one’s duties……to act with justice…to give everyone his due…to observe honesty and good faith

Albenson v. CAJanuary 11, 1993

FACTS: Guaranteed issued Albenson a check as payment for the mild steel plates it ordered. The check bounced. Albenson found out that the check belonged to Eugenio Baltao. It filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Eugenio S. Baltao. However, it appears that the respondent had a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III. The elder Baltao then filed a suit for damages against Albenson.

ISSUE: WON Albenson was liable for damages. NO

HELD: When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms of Article 19 and results in damage to another, a LEGAL WRONG is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are:

1. There is a legal right or duty

2. Which is exercised in bad faith3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring

another.

In this case, Albenson’s complaint was a sincere attempt to find the best possible means to collect the money due to them. The law does not impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

Arts. 19-21-expand the scope of our law on civil wrongs

Common element under 19 and 21: act must be intentional

C L A S S N O T E

Question: Why did this case enumerate the elements of an abuse of right under Art. 19 when there is supposedly no “hard and fast rule?”

Art 19 and 21- intentional acts; Art 20- intentional or negligent acts (does not distinguish)

Albenson claims that MP should have been filed, not a civil case based on A19

Baltao did not clarify that there were 3 of them

Amonoy v. GutierrezFebruary 15, 2001

FACTS: The lot on which the Gutierrez spouses built their house was bought by Amonoy in an auction sale. Amonoy was granted an order for the demolition of the house. However, a temporary restraining order was granted enjoining the demolition. The SC then made the TRO permanent. However, by the time the decision was rendered, the house was already destroyed. The Gutierrez spouses then filed a suit for damages.

ISSUE: WON Amonoy was liable for damages. YES

HELD: Even though Amonoy’s actions were legally justified at the start, their continuation even after the TRO was issued amounted to an abuse of his right. The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. Amonoy’s acts

30

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that was suspended.

C L A S S N O T E S

Rule: Action which was originally legal can become illegal if exercised abusively.

The legal principle applied in this case is damnum absque injuria.

What we have here is an illegal act. There was no more right for him to abuse! This is not a case of abuse of right.

A19 presupposes an existing right; What Amonoy did was contempt of court

Problem: relied upon Testimony solely of Guitierrez (when it is self-serving)

UE v. JaderFebruary 17, 2000

FACTS: Jader was a law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the regular exam for Practice Court I so he was given an incomplete grade. He took the removals but he was given a grade of five. Jader attended the graduation and prepared for the bar. He later learned of his deficiency. Jader sued UE for damages. UE’s defense was that Jader should have verified grade!

ISSUE: WON UE was liable for damages. YES

HELD: UE had the contractual obligation to inform its students as to whether or not all the requirements for the conferment of a degree have been met. It also showed bad faith in belatedly informing Jader of the result of his removals, particularly when he was already preparing for the bar.

ABSENCE OF GOOD FAITH MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED FOR A SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION BY THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN A SUIT FOR ABUSE OF RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.

On Art. 19:-intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral

wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.-the ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society-A person should be protected only when he acts with providence and in GF, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse

NOTES: -does not adhere strictly to the 3 elements -seems to say that Art. 19 can be committed via

negligence- abuse of duty is not a right

C L A S S N O T E S

“Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.”

Petitioner (university) cannot just give out its students grades at any time…

Can you sue professor for not giving grades on time? No. Should be the school.

Garciano v. CAAugust 10, 1992

FACTS: Garciano, a teacher at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute was granted an indefinite leave of absence to go to Austria. She was later sent a letter informing that Fr. Wiertz’s, the school’s founder, decided to terminate her services (BUT ONLY Board of Directors has the power to terminate her services). The Board of Directors reinstated her. The ICI faculty has reacted “acidly” her reinstatement. Garciano then filed a complaint for damages.

ISSUE: WON respondents were liable for damages. NOHELD: Whatever loss Garciano may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. (Volenti non fit injuria). Garciano failed to report back in time, indefinite LOA, refused to sign written employment contact, did not report for work. Her claim for moral damages under Art 21 also fails. The provision, being based on equity, it may only be invoked by someone who comes to court with clean hands. In this case, Garciano was also at fault. She did not comply with the order to return to work.

C L A S S N O T E

Respondents did not physically prevent her from working

Teachers were simply exercising Right to speech, right to dissent from board’s decision

Board ordered her to report to work!

Barons Marketing Corp. v. CAFebruary 9, 1998

FACTS: Phelps Dodge appointed Barons as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables. Barons purchased items on credit, which it sold to MERALCO. Barons asked if it can pay its outstanding account in monthly installments but Phelps declined. Phelps filed a complaint to recover the amount. In its answer, Barons admitted purchasing the items but denied the amount. It also stated that it suffered injury to its reputation. (damages as result of “creditor’s abuse”; HOW ABUSE? Rejection, considering relationship of the parties)

ISSUE: WON Barons was entitled to damages. NO

HELD: Phelps had legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons’ offer and instituting the action for collection. A person who, in exercising his rights, does not act in an abusive manner is not deemed to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy as to violate Article 21. In this case, it is plain to see that it’s a mere exercise of rights, and not an abuse thereof.

Art. 19 prescribes a primordial limitation on all rights by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof.

Citing Tolentino:Test of Abuse of Right: modern jurisprudence does not permit an act although lawful is anti-social.

An abuse of right exists when it is exercised for the ONLY PURPOSE of prejudicing or injuring another

31

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008 Acts which without legitimate purpose cause damage to another violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose is an abuse which will give rise to liability.

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it has established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be NO INTENTION TO INJURE ANOTHER.

C L A S S N O T E

Violate concept of social solidarity BF not proven (that Phelps just wanted to

directly deal with Meralco); Rejection of offer of payment is not an abuse of right

BPI v. CA

FACTS: Atty. Marasigan’s credit card was denied at Café Adriatico after he failed to pay his outstanding balance. One of his guests had to pay the bill. He sued BPI for damages claiming that he had an agreement with BPI and that he sent a check to BPI to cover the balance and future bills in exchange for non-suspension of his credit card.

TC: in favor of Marasigan. BPI abused its right to suspend or cancel the card because it did not mention to Marasigan that his card will be suspended despite several communciations.CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: WON BPI abused its right to suspend the card.

HELD: No. 1. The terms and conditions of the contract were clear=automatic suspension for failure to pay outstanding balance after 30 days from original bill. =automatic cancellation after 60 days

2. Marasigan was not able to comply with their agreement. He issued a postdated check. Settled doctrine: check is not a substitute for money.

3. Elements of Art. 19: 1. there is a legal right or duty 2. which is exercised in bad faith 3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

BF (on BPI’s part) was not proven. GF presumed. BPI did not capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card. It gave Marasigan a chance to settle his account. There is no need for BPI to notify Marasigan of the suspension or cancellation. Their contract provides for automatic suspension or cancellation.

The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of the law.

C L A S S N O T E

There was no arbitrariness on the part of BPI. Damnum absque injuria; there was damage

but no injury (Custodio vs. CA)

B. Acts Contra MoresArt. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

C L A S S N O T E

Art. 21 is the actual catch-all provision according to Sangco.

1. Elements

Ruiz v. Secretary of National DefenseDecember 28, 1963

FACTS: A contract was executed between Allied Technologies and the Republic of the Philippines to build the Veterans Memorial Hospital. The construction of the hospital was terminated. Ruiz and Herrera, together with Panlillo, were the architects of the building but only Panlillo was recognized. Ruiz and Herrera citing Article 21, sued to be recognized as the architects of the hospital.

ISSUE: WON Article 21 was applicable. NO

HELD: Article 21 contemplates a situation where a person has a legal right and such right is violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. It presupposes losses or injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation. A judicial declaration of professional prestige is unnecessary because a brilliant professional is respected even without a court declaration.

Art. 21-“injury” refers not only to any indeterminate right or property, but also to honor or credit. [as cited in Tolentino]

Albenson v. CA, supra.

FACTS: Baltao case.ISSUE: WON there was a violation of Article 21.

HELD: No. The question of whether or not there was abuse of rights, resulting in damages under Article 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law depends on the circumstances of each case.

The elements of Article 21 are:1. There is an act which is legal2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom,

public order, or public policy3. And it is done with intent to injure

2. Examplesa. Breach of Promise to Marry,

Seduction, and Sexual Assault

C L A S S N O T E S

Who is Agonciila? Unmarried woman of chaste character

32


Seduction of Agoncilla- actionable under A 21, crime if under 18 years old, moral wrong

No seduction if promise came after Agoncilla became pregnant

Wassmer v. VelezDecember 26, 1964

FACTS: Wassmer and Velez were about to get married. However, two days before the wedding, Velez wrote a note stating that they would have to postpone the wedding because his mother was opposed to it. A day before the wedding, he wired Wassmer a note saying that he would return soon. He never showed up again. Wassmer sued for damages.

ISSUE: WON Velez can be held liable for damages.

HELD: YES. This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is PALPABLY AND UNJUSTIFIABLY CONTRARY TO GOOD CUSTOMS for which Velez must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

Tanjanco v. CADecember 17, 1966

FACTS: Tanjanco, courted the Santos, both being of adult age. In consideration of Tanjanco's promise of marriage, Santos consented to sexual intercourse. Tanjanco succeeded in having carnal access with Santos until Dec. 1959. As a result, Santos got pregnant. To avoid embarrassment, Santos resigned from her job. Santos then sued Tanjanco for damages.

ISSUE: WON Tanjanco was liable for damages. NO

HELD: To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. In this case, Santos was of age. Also, she maintained sexual relations with each other for one

year. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.

C L A S S N O T E S

Issue of deceit: Deceit can come in many forms and can result in attraction (so there is no moral seduction.)

Critique of Tanjanco: “Seduction” in this case only covers the initial sexual contact.

Rule in Buenaventura: For seduction to be actionable, there must be deception and the woman must have yielded because of the inducement.

There is no seduction when there is mutual desire and the opportunity was merely afforded to the woman.

Code commission damages for seduction CA misapplied the example. Seduction: 1. inducement by deceit, 2. yield

because of that Sir: as if seduction can be ratified if court takes into consideration time and frequency and subsequent sexual acts

Baksh v. CAFebruary 19, 1993

FACTS: Baksh, an Iranian, courted Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. When Baksh visited her home, Gonzales’ parents allowed them to sleep together. Baksh then forced her to live with him. He beat her. Gonzales later found out that Baksh was already married. Gonzales sued for damages.

ISSUE: WON Baksh was liable for damages. YES

HELD: If a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a ploy to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21. This is not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation that followed. It is essential that

such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In this case, Gonzales was a victim of moral seduction.

On Art. 21: designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statue of torts.

C L A S S N O T E S

Judicial notice that the cherished possession of every single Filipina is her virginity

If the man never intended to marry the woman BUT STILL promised to marry her, it would be equivalent to inducement and he would be liable under A21

Bunag, Jr. v. CAJuly 10, 1992

FACTS: Bunag brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where he raped her. He then brought her to his grandmother’s house where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days. Bunag and Cirilo then filed for a marriage license. Bunag then withdrew his application. Cirilo filed for a complaint for damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE: WON Bunag was liable for damages. YES

HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219. Correlatively, under Article 21, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages.

In this case, Bunag’s actions constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008RULE: Generally, a breach of promise to marry is NOT PER SE actionable EXCEPT WHERE PLAINTIFF HAS ACTUALLY INCURRED EXPENSES FOR THE WEDDING AND THE NECESSARY INCIDENTS THEREOF

C L A S S N O T E

Compare this case with Tanjanco In this case, Bunag just wanted to marry Cirilo

to ESCAPE LIABILITY (so promise to marry BUT NO INTENT TO MARRY so actionable)

Constantino v. MendezMay 14, 1992

FACTS: Constantino and Mendez met at Tony’s Restaurant, where she was a waitress. Mendez professed his love during their first date. Through a promise of marriage, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Constantino. Mendez then confessed that he was married. Despite this, they had repeated sexual contact. Constantino got pregnant. She then sued for recognition of her unborn child and damages for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE: WON Mendez was liable for damages. NO

HELD: Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages should only be awarded if sexual intercourse is NOT A PRODUCT OF VOLUNTARINESS AND MUTUAL DESIRE . In this case, Constantino was already 28 years old. More importantly, she admitted that SHE WAS ATTRACTED TO MENDEZ . Their repeated sexual intercourse indicates that passion, and not the alleged promise of marriage, was the moving force that made her submit herself to Mendez.

C L A S S N O T E

This case is similar to say Tanjanco. Even if there is deceit but the deceit resulted in

attraction of the woman to the man, then there will be no more seduction.

Quimiguing v. IcaoJuly 31, 1970

FACTS: Quimiguing and Icao, a married man, were neighbors. Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Quimiguing several times through force and intimidation. She became pregnant. Quimiguing sued for damages and support.

ISSUE: WON Quimiguing had cause of action. YES

HELD: Independently of the right to support the child she was carrying, Quimiguing herself had a cause of action for damages. A victim of rape may recover moral damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. It is also supported by Article 2219.

C L A S S N O T E

Sexual assault = rape There was a criminal action for rape in this

case

Pe v. PeMay 30, 1962

FACTS: Alfonso Pe, a married man and a collateral relative, frequented Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Alfonso and Lolita then fell in love. Lolita's parents heard about the affair (exchange of notes, “trysts” in different barrios) so they refused to let them see each other. Lolita left the house and disappeared. Lolita’s relatives filed an action for damages.

ISSUE: WON Alfonso was liable for damages. YES

HELD: Alfonso, a married man, seduced Lolita through trickery to the extent that she fell in love with him. Alfonso committed an INJURY TO LOLITA'S FAMILY IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS AND PUBLIC POLICY AS CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 21 of the new Civil Code.

C L A S S N O T E

The lower court presented a more romantic version of the love story

Both Alfonso and Lolita were of age

b. Malicious Prosecution

Que v. IACJanuary 13, 1989

FACTS: Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas because of the checks the latter issued as payment for canvass strollers were dishonored. Nicolas allegedly did not continue payment because of the defective canvass strollers which he never returned to Que. The charge was dismissed in the fiscal level. Nicolas filed a complaint for malicious prosecution.

ISSUE: WON Que was guilty of malicious prosecution. NO.

HELD: Neither of them is GUILTY OF MALICE . To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was:

1. Prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person

2. Initiated deliberately by the defendant3. Knowing that his charges were false and

groundless.The presence of probable cause signifies as a

legal consequence the absence of malice. ONE CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR MALICIOUSLY INSTITUTING A PROSECUTION WHERE HE ACTED WITH PROBABLE CAUSE.

General Rule: one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with Probable Cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause.

If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal sense.

To constitute MP, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for MP.

C L A S S N O T E

Dismissal of the case does not automatically give rise to a cause of action for malicious prosecution

If there is probable cause, there is no malice

Drilon v. CAApril 20, 2001

FACTS: A letter complaint sent to Drilon resulted in an order to investigate several individuals, including Adaza, for their participation in the failed Dec. ’89 coup. The preliminary investigation stated that there was probable cause to hold respondents for the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. Adaza filed a complaint for damages against Drilon for malicious prosecution.

ISSUE: WON Drilon et al was guilty of malicious prosecution. NO.

HELD: There is no malicious prosecution in this case because the presence of probable cause signifies the absence of malice.

*MEMORIZE! MALICIOUS PROSECUTION: AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES BROUGHT BY ONE AGAINST WHOM A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, CIVIL SUIT, OR OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDING HAS BEEN INSTITUTED MALICIOUSLY AND WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE, AFTER THE TERMINATION OF SUCH PROSECUTION, SUIT OR OTHER PROCEEDING IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT THEREIN. THE GIST OF THE ACTION OF THE PULLING OF LEGAL PROCESS IN FORCE, REGULARLY, FOR THE MERE PURPOSE OF VEXATION OR INJURY.

TO CONSTITUTE MP, THERE MUST BE PROOF THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS PROMPTED BY A SINISTER DESIGN TO VEX AND HUMILIATE A PERSON, AND THAT IT WAS INITIATED DELIBERATELY BY THE DEFENDANT KNOWING THAT HIS CHARGES WERE FALSE AND GROUNDLESS. CONCEDEDLY, THE MERE ACT OF SUBMITTING A CASE TO THE AUTHORITIES FOR PROSECUTION DOES NOT MAKE ONE LIABLE FOR MP.

3 ELEMENTS OF MP:1. THE FACT OF THE PROSECUTION AND THE FURTHER

FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS HIMSELF THE PROSECUTOR AND THAT THE ACTION FINALLY TERMINATED WITH AN ACQUITTAL.

2. THAT IN BRINGING THE ACTION, THE PROSECUTOR ACTED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE

3. THAT THE PROSECUTOR WAS ACTUATED OR IMPELLED BY A LEGAL MALICE THAT IS BY IMPROPER OR SINISTER MOTIVE

Once cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. WHY? coz it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.

A suit for MP will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause.

C L A S S N O T E S

Reminder: memorize the definition of malicious prosecution.

There is no malicious prosecution because none of the three elements were present (not terminated with an acquittal, Drilon acted with probable cause as found in PI, no sinister motive could be imputed).

If there is probable cause, there is no malice. Take note of the statutory basis of malicious

prosecution. Hernandez case ruling:

- If doubtful or difficult question of law is applied – the law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith- This is not applicable if the doctrine is clear enough.

Globe Mackay v. CA, supra

FACTS: Tobias was alleged to be the #1 suspect for the fraudulent transactions he allegedly uncovered. He was illegally dismissed and Hendry filed 6 criminal

complaints against him although the findings of the Police Chief Document Examiner absolved him from guilt. All the complaints were dismissed in the fiscal level.

ISSUE: WON there was malicious prosecution. YES

HELD: The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant acted in bad faith. (Even if still in the fiscal level, if acted with BF then liable for damages)

However, in this case, there was a malicious intent as shown by the facts:

1. The complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case (2 of which were refilled with Judge Advocate General’s office of the AFP to subject Tobias to military courts),

2. The threat of further suits by Hendry (that they’ll be willing to file hundreds of suits against him just to find him liable)

3. The filing of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias

4. The eventual dismissal of the cases

C L A S S N O T E

Competent proof of bad faith in filing the suit is essential.

Cited Manila Gas definition of Malicious prosecution

Albenson v. CA, supra

FACTS: the 3 Baltao case where funds for check was demanded by the company from the father Baltao…

ISSUE: WON there was malicious prosecution. NO

HELD: The MERE ACT SUBMITTING a case to the authorities for prosecution (only fiscal level) DOES NOT MAKE ONE LIABLE FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

The elements of malicious prosecution are:

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1. The fact that the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal

2. That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause

3. The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.

C L A S S N O T E

Gross negligence can prove bad faith. Bad faith = gross negligence. No gross

negligence in this case. It was an innocent mistake.

Cited Manila Gas definition of malicious prosecution and Que for probable cause

Manila Gas v. CAOctober 30, 1980

FACTS: Manila Gas installed additional appliances and gas service connections in Ongsip’s compound. Since no gas consumption was registered in the meter, Manila Gas issued instructions to change the gas meter. Coronal then went to the compound and changed the meter without informing Ongsip. Coronal returned in the afternoon and took pictures. When Ongsip asked about it, he was told to just go to the office. In the office, he was told of the existence of a jumper and was threatened with deportation. A complaint for qualified theft was filed against Ongsip but it was later dismissed. Ongsip then filed a complaint for damages

ISSUE: WON there was malicious prosecution. YES

HELD: To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. THE MERE ACT OF SUBMITTING A CASE TO THE AUTHORITIES FOR PROSECUTION DOES NOT MAKE ONE LIABLE FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. However, in this case, the circumstances of the case showed that there was malicious intent in the filing of the complaint for qualified theft.

C L A S S N O T E

Dismissal of qualified theft case in fiscal level only still possible to file MP.

If the case only reached fiscal level…GEN RULE: no MPEXCEPTION: if BF, with Malicious intent

c. Public Humiliation

Patricio v. LevisteApril 26, 1989

FACTS: Leviste smashed a beer bottle on the table causing his hand to bleed. He then approached Patricio, a Catholic priest, and slapped him. Patricio filed a complaint for slander by deed which was dismissed. He then filed for damages.

ISSUE: WON Leviste was liable for damages. YES.

HELD: Article 2219 applies. The act of slapping was contrary to morals and good customs and caused Patricio mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation.

On Moral Damages: The fact that no AD or CD was proven before the TC, does not adversely affect the petitioner’s right to recover MD.

MD may be awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the CC (Arts. 19-36), without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of has caused any physical injury upon the complainant.

THE REASON UNDERLYING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES UNDER ART. 21, IS TO COMPENSATE THE INJURED PARTY FOR THE MORAL INJURY CAUSED UPON HIS PERSON. (from report of the code)

C L A S S N O T E

Art 21 applies to even a slap in the face

Grand Union v. EspinoDecember 28, 1979

FACTS: Jose Espino forgot to pay for a cylindrical rat tail file when he left Grand Union Supermarket. He was approached by the guard and made to file an incident report. Espino offered to pay for the file but instead, his money was taken as an incentive to the guards for apprehending pilferers. A lot of people witnessed the incident. ISSUE: WON Espino can claim damages. YES.

HELD: Espino was falsely accused of shoplifting. Defendants willfully caused loss or injury to the plaintiff in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy making them amenable to damages under Arts. 19 and 21 in relation to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.

It is against morals, GC, and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. (Art. 26). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and GF (Art. 19).

PURPOSE OF MD: ESSENTIALLY INDEMNITY OR REPARATION, BOTH PUNISHMENT OR CORRECTION

NOT INTENDED TO ENRICH A COMPLAINANT AT THE EXPENSE OF A DEFENDANT; THEY ARE AWARDED ONLY TO ENABLE THE INJURED PARTY TO OBTAIN MEANS, DIVERSION OR AMUSEMENTS THAT WILL SERVE TO ALLEVIATE THE MORAL SUFFERING HE HAS UNDERGONE, BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT’S CULPABLE ACTION. IN OTHER WORDS: THE AWARD OF MD IS AIMED AT RESTORATION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE, OF THE SPIRITUAL STATUS QUO ANTE, AND IT MUST BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.

PURPOSE OF ED OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES: IMPOSED BY WAY OF EXAMPLE OR CORRECTION FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD, IN ADDITION TO THE MORAL, TEMPERATE, LIQUIDATED OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES (ART. 2229). CANNOT BE RECOVERED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT; THE COURT WILL DECIDE WON THEY COULD BE ADJUDICATED. CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE AWARDED FOR WANTON ACTS, THAT THEY ARE PENAL IN CHARACTER GRANTED NOT BY WAY OF COMPENSATION BUT AS A PUNISHMENT TO THE OFFENDER AND AS A WARNING TO OTHERS AS A SORT OF DETERRENT.

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Carpio vs. ValmonteSeptember 9, 2004

FACTS: Valmonte, a wedding coordinator, was publicly accused by the bride’s aunt, Carpio, of stealing her jewelry. She was searched and questioned by the guard and the police. Carpio refused to apologize so Valmonte filed a suit for damages.

ISSUE: WON Valmonte should be awarded damages. YES

HELD: Carpio willfully caused Valmonte injury in a manner contrary to morals and good customs. Although Carpio had the right to know the identity of the thief, she should not have openly accused Valmonte without further proof.

Moral damages are awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff.

Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.

Arts. 20 & 21 provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages.

MD not awarded to penalize defendant or to enrich complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant’s culpable action.

In any case, award of MD must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.

C L A S S N O T E

Manner of attacking without any amount of proof- contrary to morals and good customs.

d. Unjustified Dismissal

Quisaba v. Sta. InezAugust 30, 1974

FACTS: Quisaba, an internal auditor of Sta. Ines, was ordered by Robert Hyde, the VP, to purchase logs for the company’s plant. Quisaba refused because it wasn’t part of his job. As a result, he was demoted. Quisaba filed a complaint for damages, termination pay, and attorney’s fees. Sta. Ines said that the NLRC had jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the regular courts had jurisdiction. YES

HELD: Quisaba’s complaint was grounded not on his dismissal but rather ON THE MANNER OF HIS DISMISSAL AND ITS CONSEQUENT EFFECTS. IF THE DISMISSAL WAS DONE ANTI-SOCIALLY OR OPPRESSIVELY, THEN THE RESPONDENTS VIOLATED ARTICLE 1701 , which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and Article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

C L A S S N O T E

Standard of dismissal laid down in this case: dismissal was done “anti-socially or oppressively.”

Medina v. Castro-BartolomeSeptember 11, 1982

FACTS: Cosme de Aboitiz, President and CEO of Pepsi, shouted and cursed at the plaintiffs in front of their subordinate employees. The petitioners filed a case of oral defamation against de Aboitiz. It was dismissed since the jurisdiction of claims was transferred from the CFI to the Labor Arbiters.

ISSUE: WON the Labor Code applies. NO

HELD: The plaintiffs did not allege any unfair labor practice. It was an action for damages for tortious

acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code.

IX. OTHER TORTS

A. Dereliction of DutyArt. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

C L A S S N O T E

Elements: (1) material or moral loss(2) public servant’s refusal or neglect to perform duty(3) without just cause

Amaro v. SumaguitJuly 31, 1962

FACTS: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot near the city government building. The following day, he along with his father and witnesses, went to the Chief of Police to seek assistance but were not rendered assistance. The city attorney was about to file an information for illegal discharge of firearms against the assailant. However, the Chief of Police started to harass the Amaros, coercing them to sign an affidavit absolving the police officers of any liability. The Amaros then filed a suit for damages.

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ISSUE: WON the Amaros’ action under Article 21 and/or 27 would prosper. YES

HELD: The Amaros’ claim for relief was based on the Chief of Police’s refusal to give assistance, which was his duty to do as an officer of the law. What is required under Art. 27 is that the refusal must be without just cause.

B. Unfair CompetitionArt. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to aright of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

C L A S S N O T E

Unfair competition: designed to place your products in a better light.

Should be in the context of giving advantage to one party (eg. derogatory commercials)

C. Violation of Human DignityArt. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbor and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

St. Louis v. CANovember 14, 1984

FACTS: St. Louis Realty caused to be published an ad depicting the Arcadio Family in front of Dr. Aramil’s residence, making it appear that the house was owned by the Arcadios. Aramil protested. Plaintiff stopped

publication, but did not rectify. Aramil extra judicially demanded damages. This is when St Louis Realty published a new ad showing the Arcadios in their real home. Aramil filed complaint for damages claiming mental anguish and reduction in income. TC awarded actual and moral damages. CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON acts and omissions of the firm fall under Art. 26

HELD: Yes. St. Louis Realty was grossly negligent in mixing up the residences. It never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. Persons who know Dr. Aramil were confused by the distorted lingering impression that he was renting his residence. His private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

Damages fixed by TC are sanctioned by Arts. 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Art. 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Art. 26.

C L A S S N O T E

This is an action for damages for wrongful advertisement shows that Art 26 is very broad.

Concepcion v. CAJanuary 31, 2000

FACTS: Florence Concepcion, lessor of the Nicolas spouses, joined Nestor Nicolas’ business venture by contributing capital. Rodrigo, Florence’s brother-in-law, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. As a result, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment. He could not face his neighbors anymore. Florence also backed out of the venture, so that the business declined. Nestor’s wife started to doubt his fidelity and even threatened to leave him. The spouses filed a civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. ISSUE: WON spouses can recover damages

HELD: Yes. Examples mentioned in Art. 2219 and 26 are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages

therefore are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity. Under Art. 2217, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

*Philosophy behind Art. 26: THE TOUCHSTONE OF EVERY SYSTEM OF LAW, OF THE CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION OF EVERY COUNTRY IS HOW FAR IT DIGNIFIES MAN. THUS, UNDER THIS ARTICLE, THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARE AMPLY PERFECTED AND DAMAGES ARE PROVIDED FOR VIOLATIONS OF A PERSON’S DIGNITY, PERSONALITY, PRIVACY AND PEACE OF MIND.

Human personality must be exalted. Sacredness of human personality is the concomitant consideration of every plan for Human Amelioration.

X. DAMAGES

C L A S S N O T E

Damages is not limited to quasi-delicts (also includes contracts, quasi-contracts and delicts).

I. Definition and ConceptArt. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.

Art. 2197. Damages may be: (1) Actual or compensatory; (2) Moral; (3) Nominal; (4) Temperate or moderate; (5) Liquidated; or (6) Exemplary or corrective.

People v. Ballesteros

FACTS: Murder, through gunshot wounds, question amt of damages awarded

*DAMAGES may be defined as THE PECUNIARY COMPENSATION, RECOMPENSE, OR SATISFACTION FOR AN INJURY SUSTAINED, OR AS OTHERWISE EXPRESSED, THE PECUNIARY CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE LAW IMPOSES FOR

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008THE BREACH OF SOME DUTY OR THE VIOLATION OF SOME RIGHT.

Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock, and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission.

C L A S S N O T E S

Important for the definition of damages For actual damages, the party making claim

must present best evidence.

Custodio v. CA

FACTS: built Adobe fence on the right of way

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. INJURY is the ILLEGAL INVASION OF A LEGAL RIGHT ; DAMAGE is the LOSS, HURT, OR HARM WHICH RESULTS FROM THE INJURY ; and DAMAGES are the RECOMPENSE OR COMPENSATION AWARDED FOR THE DAMAGES SUFFERED .

C L A S S N O T E S

Important for the distinction between damage, injury and damages

Mere fact that plaintiffs suffer damage doesn’t mean that there’s right of action

To warrant recovery of damages:-Legal right on the part of plaintiff-Injury caused to plaintiff

II. Kinds of Damages A. Actual or compensatoryArt. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,

is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain.

Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury; (2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

C L A S S N O T E S

It is expressly provided for in Art. 2199 that there should be proof of pecuniary damages for AD or CD

Take note of what indemnity is included in Art. 2200

Art. 2205 provides for the kinds of AD which the plaintiff may recover

Algarra v. Sandejas

FACTS: Plaintiff Algarra received personal injuries from a collision with the defendant Saldejas’ automobile due to the negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car. Plaintiff sold the products of a distillery as a commission agent and had about twenty regular customers, who purchased his wares in small quantities, necessitating regular and frequent deliveries. Being unable to attend to their wants during their wants during the two months he was incapacitated due to the accident, his regular customers turned their trade to other competing agents.

HELD: Under both the Spanish Civil Code and American law of damages, actual damages for a negligent act or omission are confined to those which “were foreseen or might have been foreseen” or those

which were “the natural and probable consequences” or “the direct and immediate consequences” of the act or omission.

In this jurisdiction, the author of a negligent act or omission which causes damage to another is obliged to repair the damage done. No distinction is made between damage caused maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere negligence in so far as civil liability is concerned. Nor is the defendant required to do more than repair the damage done or to put the plaintiff in the same position that he would have been in had the damage not been inflicted.

This is practically equivalent to compensatory or actual damages as those terms are used in American law.

*THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES IS TO REPAIR THE WRONG THAT HAS BEEN DONE, TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INJURY INFLICTED, AND NOT TO IMPOSE PENALTY.

Pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, are not elements of actual or compensatory damages in this jurisdiction. Aside from this exception, the measure of damages in this country and in the US is arrived at by the same evidence.

Loss of profits of an established business which was yielding fairly steady returns at the time of its interruption by defendant’s wrongful act is not so speculative or contingent that a court of justice may refuse to allow the plaintiff any damages at all.

1. Kinds

PNOC v. CA

FACTS: The M/V Ma. Efigenia XV, owned by respondent Ma. Efigenia Fishing Corp. collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault and thus the respondent filed an action for damages against Luzon Stevedoring and the Petroparcel’s captain. During the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC acquired the Petroparcel and was substituted in place of Luzon Stevedoring in the complaint.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008HELD: ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE THOSE AWARDED IN SATISFACTION OF, OR IN RECOMPENSE FOR LOSS OR INJURY SUSTAINED. THEY PROCEED FROM A SENSE OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND ARE DESIGNED TO REPAIR THE WRONG THAT HAS BEEN DONE, TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INJURY INFLICTED AND NOT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY.

In actions based on QD-AD include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.

2 kinds of AD or CD:1. The loss of what a person already possesses

(daño emergente)2. the failure to receive as a benefit that which

would have pertained to him (lucro cesante)

On Nominal Damages: When awarded: in the absence of competent proof on the AD suffered-entitled to ND, which the law says is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.

-awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law and QDs, or in every case where property right has been invaded.

ND are damages in NAME only and NOT IN FACT. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.

The amount to be awarded as ND shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained considering the concept and purpose of such damages.

C L A S S N O T E S

The basic rule in recovering AD: it is sufficient that damages are capable of proof in order to recover (AD)

There should be a record to serve as proof presented before the Court

There are cases which say that providing a list of expenses is not enough—there has to be

receipts, etc.—PROOF SHOULD BE VERY FACTUAL

Proof required: reasonable certainty upon competent proof

Two (2) kinds of AD or CD:1. Dano emergente-actual2. Lucro cesante-loss of profit

Integrated Packing v. CA

Petitioner Integrated Packing Corporation (IPC) and respondent Fil-Anchor Paper entered into an agreement whereby Fil-Anchor bound itself to deliver 3,450 reams of printing paper to IPC, to be paid within 30 to 90 days from delivery. Later, IPC entered into a contract with the Philippine Appliance Corporation (Philacor) to print three volumes of “Philacor Cultural Books.”

However, IPC encountered problems paying Fil-Anchor and became heavily indebted to the latter. This led to Fil-Anchor suspending deliveries of paper to IPC. Thus, out of the agreed upon 3,450 reams, only 1097 were delivered., despite demand by IPC for Fil-Anchor to deliver the balance.

Meanwhile, IPC entered into an additional printing contract with Philacor. Unfortunately, IPC failed to fully comply with its contract for the printing of Philacor’s books and thus Philacor demanded compensation for delay and damage suffered.

Because IPC also not able to fully settle it’s indebtedness to Fil-Anchor, the latter filed a collection suit against it. In its counterclaim, IPC alleged that because Fil-Anchor was only able to deliver 1097 reams of paper it was unable to fulfill its contract with Philacor and thus failed to realize expected profits.

Indemnification for damages comprehends not only the loss suffered, that is to say actual damages (damnum emergens), but also profits which the obligee failed to obtain (lucrum cessans).

C L A S S N O T E S

The Court here gave the two kinds CD—dano emergente and lucro cesante

Problem with the evidence presented—mere estimates

Court disallowed mere estimates because they are highly speculative and manifestly hypothetical

CD here was strictly construed

2. ExtentArt. 2201, CC - In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2202, CC - In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

C L A S S N O T E S Art. 2201 lays down the distinction between

good faith and bad faith (in bad faith—whatever damage happens)

Last sentence of Art. 2202 problematic—some cases use forseeability as an element of QD

Forseeability:In elements: may be requiredIn damages: not required

Reasonable certainty required: allege specific facts, Present best evidence

Quantum of evidence required: preponderance of evidence

3. Certainty-possible that the exact value (peso) is not known.

PNOC v. CA

FACTS: Collision of 2 vessels

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Certainty: to enable an injured party to recover AD or CD, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.

Burden of Proof: on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.

Evidence Required: He must establish his evidence by PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.

Damages are not presumed: damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever CD or AD are borne.

C L A S S N O T E S

Problem here with preponderance of evidence is that it became COMPARATIVE—all things being equal, the person who has more pieces of evidence wins

What should be the basis: admissibility issue aside: number and quality of evidence presented and this is what makes it preponderant

you should also prove your allegations though not necessarily beyond reasonable doubt

DBP v. CA

Lydia Cuba was the grantee of a fishpond lease agreement with the government, the rights to which she assigned to DBP as security for loans the latter extended to her. After Cuba failed to meet the terms of payment on the loans, the DBP, without foreclosure proceedings of any kind, appropriated Cuba’s leasehold rights over the fishpond.

Subsequently, DBP executed a deed of conditional sale in favor of Cuba over the same fishpond. However, Cuba once again was unable to meet the amortizations stipulated which led to DBP rescinding the deed of conditional sale and taking possession of not only the fishpond but also a house Cuba had built next to it as

well, along with all the personal belongings, machineries, equipment, and tools therein, which subsequently, it was claimed, went missing.

DBP allegedly also prevented Cuba and her representatives from feeding the fish already in the fishpond which led to their loss.

As to the losses Cuba allegedly suffered when DBP took possession of the fishpond, the court said: Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. It must point to specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

C L A S S N O T E S

DBP’s acquisition of the leasehold rights wasn’t valid

Problem with AD here: Court said AD was speculative because actual ocular inspection was done after the filing of the complaint and that they should have made an inventory

Sir: Just because certain damages were found out after the filing of the compliant doesn’t make the damages speculative. Besides who in the provinces makes an inventory of bangus, etc.

This case shows that you should be ready with documents

Fuentes, Jr. v. CA

Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit dance when Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. put his arm on the former’s shoulder saying “Before, I saw you with long hair but now you have a short hair,” whereupon Fuentes stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife and fled.

Subsequently, Fuentes was convicted of murder. During the trail, Malaspina’s sister testified that she incurred expensed of P8,300 in connection with his

death and the trial court awarded this amount as actual damages.

However, the Supreme Court held that the trial court was in error to have awarded the P8,300 as actual damages on the basis of mere testimony of the victim’s sister, without any tangible document to support such claim.

In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.

Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim.

C L A S S N O T E S

This case demonstrates how important the quality of your evidence is (i.e. testimony for damages by someone who is an interested party is weak)

Talisay-Silay v. AssosiacionAugust 15, 1995

FACTS: On the 15th of February, 1966, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. (TSMC) and the Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc. (TSICA) instituted an action for damages against defendants Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. (AATSI), First Farmers Milling Co., Inc. (FFMCI), Dominador Agravante and other individual sugar planters. And Ramon Nolan in his personal and official capacity as administrator of the Sugar Quota administration, alleging an illegal transfer of sugar quota allotment or production allowance from TSMC to FFMCI.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008In short, what happened was that instead of having the sugar forming their export quota milled by TSMC as they had always done in the past, the defendants had their sugar milled at FFMCI instead, in violation of Section 4 of RA 1825, “An Act to Provide for the Allocation, Re-allocation and administration of Absolute Quota on Sugar,” which provides certain requirements that need to be met before a sugar planter’s sugar quota allotment can be transferred from one mill to another.

This started nearly thirty years of litigation between the parties. In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that the transfer of their export sugar quota by AATSI and certain individual planters from TSMC to FFMCI was illegal and invalid and found the defendants liable to the plaintiffs for damages.

TC: 15.4 MCA: reduced it to 1M

ISSUE: WON the extent of the unrealized profits suffered by the plaintiffs were proven with the certainty required by law.

HELD: Yes. The rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred to as ganancias frustradas or lucrum cessans, are not granted on the basis of mere speculation, conjecture or surmise but rather by reference to some reasonably definite standard such as market value, established experience or direct inference from known circumstances.

Uncertainty as to whether or not a claimant suffered unrealized profits at all, i.e. uncertainty as to the very fact of injury, will, of course, preclude recovery of this species of damages. Where, however, it is reasonably certain that injury consisting of the failure to realize otherwise reasonably expected profits had been incurred, uncertainty as to the precise amount of such unrealized profits will not prevent recovery or the award of damages. The problem then would be ascertainment.

In the instant case, plaintiff’s computations as to the amount of unrealized profit were based on fairly definite standards utilized by the governmental agency having relevant administrative jurisdiction over the subject matter and accounting standards widely employed in the world of business and commerce.

Combined with credible testimony, these provide sufficient basis for a reasonable estimate of the unrealized net income or profit sustained by plaintiffs.

C L A S S N O T E S

Financias Postradas?oLost profitsoStandard required by the Court for this: accounting standards, pricing of Sugar Quota Administration

When a property is damaged and you claim AD, PNOC case provides for guidelines on how to determine value of property (at what point do you count)

Court here said: value AT TIME OF LOSS. If this takes into account profits=FMV

Bottom line if FMV-but this can be construed in a # of ways

Why FMV: Assessed value is lower (that’s why this is being used as basis for tax)

The company in PNOC did different—it took into account inflation

4. Damage to property

PNOC v. CA

Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement.

In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattel s, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements.

In the instant case, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to the items and equipment lost show similar items and

equipment with corresponding prices approximately ten years after the collision.

NOTES: Rule: amount at the time of the loss. cf Gatchalian v. Delim (where the girl was given 15k for plastic surgery)

C L A S S N O T E S

o PNOC gives guidance as to how actual damages are computed:

1. Price (fair market value) at the time of loss, not what the price is at the time of the ruling

2. In PNOC, inflation was taken into account.

3. If fair market value already includes the possible contracts, then that is the value to be used.

5. Personal Injury and Death

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

C L A S S N O T E S

Art. 2206 provides for earning capacity which is NOT equal to actual income

Ramos v. CADecember 29, 1999

FACTS: under a coma because of wrongful intubation

TC: 8k per month from time when moved from hospital to the time of trial (the 8k was an estimate of the expenses incurred and proven before time of trial)

CA: reversed, Ramos pay for hospital bills

HELD:

Amount of AD recoverable in suits arising from negligence: should at least reflect THE CORRECT MINIMUM COST OF PROPER CARE (SA CASE OPTIMAL CARE FOR THEIR LOVED ONE IN A FACILITY WHICH GENERALLY SPECIALIZES IN SUCH CARE) , not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy (but the CC presents us with difficulties)

Well-settled rule: that AD which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. (problem – NATURE of AD: only award for AD proven up to the time of trial)

Continuing injury: if the amount of damages has not yet been completely liquidated because the resulting injury is “continuing,” then the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately correspond to the injury caused should be one which compensates for the pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of the trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which

could not, from the nature of the case be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing (There is no incompatibility when both AD and TD are provided for).

C L A S S N O T E S

· According to the Court, the standard is the correct minimum cost of proper care and not what they actually spent in order not to prejudice those who are poor

· SC is limited to 8k/month because of the NATURE OF AD: must be proven

· Ramos case is important because AC is not just those up to the time of trial but also those certain to be suffered

· Lesson here: dramatize plight of your client· If opposition: minimize plight of victim

Gatchalian v. DelimOctober 21, 1991

FACTS: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, a minibus owned by the Delim spouses, respondents in this case. She was allegedly on her way to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher’s job.

Later, while the bus was running along the highway, a snapping sound was suddenly heard and shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.

Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured and were promptly taken to a hospital for medical treatment.

The aforementioned events led Gatchalian to file an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in her complaint that her injuries had left her with a conspicuous white scar on her forehead, generating mental suffering and feeling of inferiority on her part.

She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment.

ISSUE: WON the Delims are liable for the cost of plastic surgery to remove the scar on Gatchalian’s forehead.

HELD: Yes. A PERSON IS ENTITLED TO THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF HIS OR HER BODY; IF THAT INTEGRITY IS VIOLATED OR DIMINISHED, ACTUAL INJURY IS SUFFERED FOR WHICH ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE DUE AND ASSESSABLE. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was in before the mishap.

A SCAR, ESPECIALLY ONE ON THE FACE OF A WOMAN, RESULTING FROM THE INFLICTION OF INJURY UPON HER, IS A VIOLATION OF BODILY INTEGRITY, GIVING RISE TO A LEGITIMATE CLAIM FOR RESTORATION TO HER CONDITION ANTE.

C L A S S N O T E S

· This case is always cited to support that plastic surgery can be the subject of AD.

· Nature of action here: breach of contract of common carrier

· Sir: is there a health risk if you have a scar? So purely aesthetic?

· What was the proof offered for the scar?· Expert testimony: alleged cost of 5-10k· Yet SC granted 15k based on a presumption

that plastic surgery would cost more after several years (SO AD became speculative AND NOT PROVEN).

· Sir: technology makes things cheaper but SC here gave a presumption

· Most intriguing is the language of the Court—the longer the scar has been, the more difficult it is to remove

· Gatchalian ruling is OK but the reasoning is funny

· This is still law so women can take advantage of this

· The case also cited Araneta vs. Areglado where a young boy sued for costs of surgery for removal of his scar on his face which caused a degenerative process and inferiority

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complex to the boy. Therefore since in this case it was just a boy, it was easier to remove the scar. In Reynalda’s case, she was older so SC ASSUMED that removing scar would be harder

· Skewed in favor of the beautiful· Relevance nung “snapping sound” accdg to

sir: baka naman may turtle kaya nag-turn turtle ung bus!

People v. MangahasJuly 28, 1999

FACTS: The accused Rufino Mangahas and the late Rufino Gestala were drinking at a store near the latter’s house when an altercation between the two, allegedly over the sale of a handgun, ensued and ending with Gestala’s death from three gunshot wounds.

During the trial, an aunt of the victim was presented and testified mainly on the expenses their family incurred as a result of the death of the victim.

After trial, Mangahas was found guilty sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

P14, 950 was also awarded for funeral and burial expenses as well as P28, 890 for food during the vigil, 9th day, 40th day, and 1st year anniversaries of the death of the victim.

ISSUE: WON the award of damages for funeral, burial, and food expenses was proper.

HELD: Not entirely. Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipt and which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim.

Thus, the Court cannot take account of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date of the slaying of the victim; those incurred after a CONSIDERABLE LAPSE OF TIME FROM THE BURIAL and which do not have any relation to the death, wake or burial of the victim; or those incurred for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining of the tomb.

C L A S S N O T E S

SC-removed from AC what it thought was extravagant

Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Heirs of Andres Malecdan

December 27, 2002

FACTS: While Andres Malecdan, a 75 year-old farmer, was crossing the National Highway on his way home from the form, a Dalin Liner bus stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as Malecdan was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory Liner bypassed the Dalin bus and in doing so hit the old man and his carabao, eventually killing both of them.

The trial court found both the driver and Victory Liner, Inc. guilty of gross negligence and awarded, among others, actual damages amounting to P88, 339.

ISSUE: WON the award of P88, 339 in actual damages is proper.

HELD: No, it is not. To justify an award for actual damages, there should be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim.

The Court cannot take into account receipts showing expenses incurred some time after the burial of the victim, such as expenses relating to the 9 th day, 40th day and 1st year death anniversaries.

In the instant case, the trial court awarded P88, 339 as actual damages. While these are duly supported by receipts, these included the amount of P5, 90, the cost of one pig, which had been butchered for the 9th day death anniversary. This item cannot be allowed,

PRIMARY Responsibility of employers: for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties, therefore the injured party may recover from the employers DIRECTLY, regardless of the solvency of their employees.

On Exemplary Damages: imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent

against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.

C L A S S N O T E S

The Court cherry-picked! Specifically deleted an item which was too extravagant.

5. Attorney’s FeesArt. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it

just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

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C L A S S N O T E S

· Attorney’s fees are in the form of damages (nasa title on damages)

· Also in the form of AD· MEMORIZE THIS ARTICLE!· You can’t recover outside the listing of 2008

unless there is a stipulation· AS regards the gen rule and exception, sir said

it can be BOTH· Why may one recover attorney’s fees under

those listed? –person is forced to protect his interest and for “at least double judicial costs”, the person must have done something really bad AND be liable for a greater degree

· Why ED only? Why not for other damages as well?

· What is the rationale for the enumeration? “A person is free to litigate.” (Except 2208)

Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate CourtJanuary 31, 1989

FACTS: Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero. The Philippine American General Assurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as bondsman for Guerrero.

In view of Guerrero’s failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, through his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both Guerrero and PHILAMGEN.

The trial court found for Dr. Casasola and aside from awards of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, ordered PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120, 000.

PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due course because it was supposedly filed out of time. The trial court thereafter issued a writ of execution.

A petition was filed before the IAC to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal. However, the petition was dismissed and so the case was elevated to

the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children.

After Casasola’s death, Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney’s fees alleging that there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to the said fees and allegedly confirmed by his widow in writing.

The trial court granted the motion despite opposition thereto hence the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the attorney’s fees being claimed are the same attorney’s fees contemplated in article 2208 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. What is being claimed here as attorney’s fees is different from attorney’s fees as an item of damages provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney’s fees by execution.

Here, the petitioner’s claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Attorney’s fees referred to by Quirante not the same as attorney’s fees in 2208

· What the difference?—Atty’s fees in 2208 are a form of AD and hence need to be proven. This is not something that goes to the attorney but to the litigant

7. InterestArt. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.

Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.

Art. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.

Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.

Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonably certainty.

Crismina Garments v. CAMarch 9, 1999

1. Rules on InterestIn Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court gave the following guidelines for the application of the proper interest rates:

With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.

Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.

No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.

Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially but

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained).

The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be xxx the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. CA, we also ruled that the monetary award shall earn interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the finality of the judgment until its satisfaction, regardless of whether or not the case involves a loan or forbearance of money. The interim period is deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Rule:1. stipulation; if none:2. loan or forbearance-12%3. not loan or forbearance-6%

Forbearance of money: contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due or payable.

C L A S S N O T E S

· 12% from CB Circular 416-for loan and forbearance of money; as opposed to 6% which was imposed by A2209

· Forbearance of money: basically a loan, a credit but loan has a specific legal definition under the Civil Code

· Memorize rules laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA

· Take note of complications like compounding of interest

· When would interest accrue? From time of judicial demand

8. Mitigation of LiabilityDoctrine of Avoidable Consequences: -if the plaintiff does not try to reduce damages, he might not be able to recover -plaintiff must try to avoid further damage

Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:

(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;

(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;

(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;

(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;

(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

C L A S S N O T E S

· 2203 is known as the Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences which is different from the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence

· DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES, the party has to minimize the damages; in CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, the damages to be paid would be diminished if you contributed to the damage incurred!

· There is an obligation on the part of the party suffering to mitigate the loss.

Cerrano v. Tan ChucoAugust 1, 1918

FACTS: The defendant Tan Chuco, who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to the plaintiff Vivencio Cerrano at a monthly rental of P70. There was no express agreement as regards the duration of the contract, the rent being payable at the end of each month.

Some time during the month of May, 1916, the defendant notified the plaintiff that the following month it would be necessary to send the casco off for repairs. Plaintiff then informed defendant that he would like to rent the casco again after the repairs had been completed, to which the defendant indicated that he was willing but that the rent would be increased to P80.

About one week before the end of the repair period the defendant sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng and Co. Santos, the man who had been employed by the plaintiff as the patron of the casco went to the office of Siy Cong Bieng and was hired by the latter in the same capacity.

Upon the arrival of the casco in Manila, however, the plaintiff claiming that he was entitled to the possession of the casco under his contract with the defendant induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners.

After trial, the lower court found defendant liable to the plaintiff for damages resulting from breach of contract.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff’s right is limited to the recovery of the difference between the contract price at which the casco was hired by him and such higher rate

46

Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008as he might have been compelled to pay for the hire of a similar casco in the open market.

HELD: No. *DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES : IT IS A WELL-RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT DAMAGES RESULTING FROM AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREACH OF A CONTRACT ARE NOT RECOVERABLE. IT IS THE DUTY OF ONE INJURED BY THE ACT OF ANOTHER TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES AS PRUDENT MEN USUALLY TAKE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES TO REDUCE THE DAMAGE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

Burden of Proof: rests on the defendant that the PLAINTIFF MIGHT HAVE (COULD HAVE) REDUCED THE DAMAGE .

In the instant case the defendant made no effort whatsoever to show that any other similar cascos were in fact available to the plaintiff, or the price he would have been able to obtain the use of one.

In the absence of evidence it will not be presumed that plaintiff could have secured another casco at the same price had he looked for one.

C L A S S N O T E S

· What’s the connection of this case with the Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences?· Defendant says that liability is mitigated because plaintiff could have found another casco at the same price· SC-no mitigation of liability

· Damage = profit which he would have made had the contract been performed

· CASCO: a barge· PATRON: the captain of the barge

B. Moral 1. ConceptArt. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be

recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

C L A S S N O T E S

If the professor allowed you to stand for three (3) hours, you can’t claim moral damages because there was an intervening cause—your inability to answer the questions

Kierulf v. CAMarch 13, 1997

FACTS: One of Pantranco’s buses was traveling along EDSA when the driver lost control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island, ending up on the wrong side of the road.

The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven Porfirio Legaspi, causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to both Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf, wife of Victor Kierulf, owner of the pickup and employer of Legaspi.

As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries which required major surgery and prolonged treatment by specialists.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found for Legaspi and the Kierulfs.

The spouses Kierulf, however, averred that the disfigurement of Lucila’s physical appearance due to the accident could not but affect their marital right of consortium and asked that the moral damages awarded be increased from P100, 000 to one million pesos, not only for Lucila, but also for her husband.

They also averred that the social and financial standing of Lucila should also be considered in fixing the award of moral damages.

ISSUE: WON an increase in the amount awarded as moral damages is warranted given the circumstances.

HELD: The Court increased the moral damages awarded but ruled against awarding moral damages

based on loss of consortium or considerations of social and financial standing.

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, it is nevertheless essential that THE CLAIMANT SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR DAMAGES AND ITS CAUSAL CONNECTION TO THE DEFENDANT’S ACTS.

In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded.

In Cocoland Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom."

*MORAL DAMAGES ARE AWARDED TO ENABLE THE INJURED PARTY TO OBTAIN MEANS, DIVERSIONS OR AMUSEMENTS THAT WILL SERVE TO ALLEVIATE THE MORAL SUFFERING HE/SHE HAS UNDERGONE, BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT'S CULPABLE ACTION.

ITS AWARD IS AIMED AT RESTORATION, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, OF THE SPIRITUAL STATUS QUO ANTE ; THUS, IT MUST BE PROPORTIONATE TO THE SUFFERING INFLICTED. SINCE EACH CASE MUST BE GOVERNED BY ITS OWN PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST RULE IN DETERMINING THE PROPER AMOUNT.

The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge.

Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008In the instant petition, a California case, Rodriguez v. Bethlehem was cited as authority for the claim of damages based on loss of marital consortium.

The Court noted that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common law view first enunciated in the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not recover for the loss of her husband's services by the act of a third party.

Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss.

The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.

However, Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, was not supported by the evidence on record.

His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse.

The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given her.

The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.

Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to

undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident.

RULES:When social & financial standing may be considered in awarding MD: only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender’s knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.

On Exemplary Damages: -designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right—it is based entirely on the discretion of the court. Requirements before ED may be awarded:

1. by way of example or correction in addition to CD

2. claimant must 1st establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages; &

3. the wrongful act must be accompanied by BF, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

On Moral Damages: -MD, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant at the expense of the defendant. -awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversity or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. There is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Rodriguez case-different from what happened to Lucila (there was nothing wrong with possible performance. “Equipment was not damaged.”)

· Sir: what kind of evidence will you present without embarrassing yourself to prove loss of consortium?

· This case can be used in the future—even if reason is only lack of visual stimulation

· Another factor to determine amount of moral damages: social and financial standing (but wouldn’t it be discriminating since you only award damages to those who are rich?)

· Epilogue by ponente: there should be:· Factual basis of mental anguish, etc.· Causal connection between factual basis and defendant’s wrongful act or omission

Visayan Sawmill Co. Inc. v. CAMarch 3, 1993

FACTS: Plaintiff RJH Trading. and defendant Visayan Sawmill Co. entered into a sale involving scrap iron located at the stockyard of defendant corporation subject to the condition of plaintiff opening a letter of credit in the amount of P250, 000 in favor of defendant on or before May 15, 1983.

On may 17, 1983, plaintiff’s employees started to gather scrap iron at the defendant’s premises until May 30 when defendant allegedly directed plaintiff’s employees to desist from pursuing the work. Defendant alleged that it sent a telegram to plaintiff canceling the sale because of the failure of the latter to obtain a letter of credit in its favor.

On May 24, plaintiff informed defendant that a letter of credit had been opened with BPI but that the transmittal of the same was delayed. On May 26, defendants received a letter of advice from BPI informing them that a letter of credit had been opened in their favor.

On July 19, the plaintiff sent a series of telegrams to the defendant demanding that the latter comply with the deed of sale. However, the defendant informed them that they were unwilling to continue with the sale due to

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008failure by the plaintiffs to comply with the essential preconditions of the contract.

The plaintiff filed a petition for preliminary attachment but it was returned unserved because the scrap iron as well as other pieces of machinery could no longer be found on the defendant’s premises.

ISSUE: WON the moral damages awarded in favor of RJH trading were proper.

HELD: No. The Court noted the palpably excessive and unconscionable moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court to the private respondent despite a clear absence of any legal and factual basis therefore.

In contracts, MORAL DAMAGES MAY BE RECOVERED IF DEFENDANTS ACTED FRAUDULENTLY AND IN BAD FAITH , while EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY ONLY BE AWARDED IF DEFENDANTS ACTED IN A WANTON, FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS, OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT MANNER .

Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action.

Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.

C L A S S N O T E S

What to prove in breach of contract:· Defendants acted fraudulently and in bad faith· Purpose of MD reiterated in this case

*SC held that Visayan Sawmill DID NOT HAVE ANY OBLIGATION to sell because RJH breached agreement on 3 counts (did not comply with suspensive conditions)

2. Proof and Proximate Cause

Compania Maritima v. Allied Free Workers UnionMay 24, 1977

FACTS: The Compania Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the Union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the company’s vessels at Iligan City. It was stipulated that the management could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render proper service. The contract itself could be renewed by agreement of the parties.

The Union found out later that the contract was to be oppressive and unduly favorable to the company.

This was because while he shippers and consignees paid the Union only for the arrastre work, claiming that the company was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring services, the company itself also refused to pay for the stevedoring services because the contract explicitly provided that the compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring would be paid by the shippers and consignees.

Thus the Union was only compensated for arrastre work performed and not for stevedoring. This led to a labor dispute and a strike by the workers of the Union.

During the litigation, the company claimed actual and moral damages resulting from the strike. The court, however, found that their claim for actual damages was baseless.

ISSUE: WON the company is entitled to moral damages.

HELD: No. Considering that the company’s claim for moral damages was BASED ON THE SAME FACTS ON WHICH IT PREDICATED ITS CLAIM FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES, WHICH WAS FOUND TO BE GROUNDLESS (NO SALES INVOICES PRESENTED, JUST SELF-SERVING TESTIMONIES; THE “INDEPENDENT AUDITOR” HIRED WAS ACTUALLY A FRIEND OF THE BRANCH MANAGER…) , it follows that the

company, a juridical person, is not entitled to moral damages.

Also, the COMPANY DID NOT PLEAD AND PROVE moral damages. It MERELY CLAIMED MORAL DAMAGES in the prayer of its complaint. This was not held to be sufficient.

RULE: In order to recover MD, one must plead and prove

C L A S S N O T E S

Nature of contract was for arrastre and stevedoring services

· ARRASTRE: hauling of cargo, handling of cargo on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle

· STEVEDORING: handling of cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship’s tackle and the holds of the vessel

Miranda-Ribaya v. BautistaJanuary 28, 1980

FACTS: Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was in the pawnshop business and in the business of buying and selling jewelry. Sometime in 1968, she was informed by one of her agents that a wealthy logger by the name of Marino Bautista was interested in buying some of her jewelry.

Accompanied by her agent, she visited Bautista in his Greenhills home and was impressed by the size of his residence. She subsequently sold him several pieces of jewelry paid for with postdated checks issued by Bautista.

When the maturity of the checks given in payment arrived, all of them were dishonored for the reason that the accounts of Bautista were closed. Much to chagrin, Miranda-Ribaya later discovered that most of the jewelry she had sold to Bautista had been pledged to various pawnshops.

She was, however, able to confront Bautista and obtain, with great difficulty, the pawnshop tickets for the jewelry she had sold him which she used, at her own expense,

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008to redeem the same from the pawnshops where they had been pledged.

ISSUE: WON Miranda-Ribaya is entitled to an award of moral damages.

HELD: Yes. The Court differentiated the instant case from Francisco v. GSIS because in Francisco, therein Plaintiff failed to take the witness stand and defendant’s breach of contract was held to be not malicious and fraudulent.

In the instant case, the petitioner took the witness stand and established by uncontradicted testimony that due to defendant’s deceitful and malevolent acts of defraudation she had suffered extreme anguish and could not sleep for three months.

The Court did not share the appellate court’s narrow view that petitioner’s failure to use in her testimony the precise legal terms or “sacramental phrases” of “mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, or moral shock” and the like justified the denial of the claim for damages.

It was held to be sufficient that these exact terms were pleaded in the complaint and evidence was adduced amply supporting the same.

RULE: FAILURE TO MENTION IN TESTIMONY THE SACRAMENTAL PHRASES IS NOT ENOUGH TO DENY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.

Del Rosario v. CAJanuary 29, 1997

FACTS: Impressed by the defendant’s advertising, the spouses Del Rosario purchased a quantity of the defendant Metal Forming Corporation’s Banawe roofing shingles for use in their house.

However, during a storm, portions of the roof were blown away by strong winds which also led to the interior of the house being damaged as well.

ISSUE: WON the Del Rosario spouses are entitled to moral damages.

HELD: Yes. It was found that MFC DID IN TRUTH ACT WITH BAD FAITH, IN FLAGRANT BREACH OF ITS EXPRESS WARRANTIES MADE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND IN WANTON DISREGARD OF THE RIGHTS OF THE DEL ROSARIOS WHO RELIED ON THOSE WARRANTIES , is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs.

The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a period of about a month, they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger."

*IT IS ESSENTIAL IN THE AWARD OF DAMAGES THAT THE CLAIMANT MUST HAVE SATISFACTORILY PROVEN DURING THE TRIAL THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE DAMAGES AND ITS CAUSAL CONNECTION TO DEFENDANT'S ACTS. THIS IS SO BECAUSE MORAL DAMAGES THOUGH INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION, ARE IN THE CATEGORY OF AN AWARD DESIGNED TO COMPENSATE THE CLAIMANT FOR ACTUAL INJURY SUFFERED AND NOT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY ON THE WRONGDOER AND ARE ALLOWABLE ONLY WHEN SPECIFICALLY PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT.

Raagas v. TrayaFebruary 27, 1968

FACTS: Defendant Bienvenido Carciller, while “recklessly” driving a truck owned by his co-defendant Octavio Traya, ran over the three year old son of plaintiff spouses Melquiades and Adela Raagas, causing the child’s instantaneous death.

The lower court rendered a judgment on the pleadings condemning the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs, among others, the sum of P2, 000 for moral damages.

ISSUE: WON moral damages were properly awarded despite there being a judgment on the pleadings.

HELD: The court reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, it is, nevertheless, ESSENTIAL THAT THE CLAIMANT SATISFACTORILY PROVE

THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE DAMAGE AND ITS CAUSAL CONNECTION TO DEFENDANT’S ACTS.

C L A S S N O T E S

· What’s wrong with Judgment on the pleadings in the granting of MD? the rule on AC as regards proving cannot be done with a judgment on the pleadings

· Judgment on the pleadings-primary submission only (nothing to support)

Enervida v. De La TorreJanuary 28, 1974

FACTS: Petitioner Roque Enervida filed a complaint against the defendant-spouses Lauro and Rosa de la Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father Ciriaco Enervida over a parcel of land covered by a homestead patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years. He further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase the said parcel for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father.

Defendants filed their answer stating, among other things, that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as his father was still alive and it was not true that he was the only son of Ciriaco Enervida and that the sale did not take place within the prohibited period.

Ruling in favor of the defendant, the Court found the plaintiff’s civil action to be entirely unfounded.

ISSUE: WON the defendant spouses are entitled to moral damages by reason of the unfounded civil action filed against them.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that:

“with respect to moral damages, we are inclined to agree with petitioner that these damages are not recoverable herein, notwithstanding the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that his complaint against respondents were clearly unfounded or unreasonable.

It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages, may be recovered (Art. 2219).

A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages.

It is true that Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to those enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended" a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art. 2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in Art. 2219.

Besides, Art. 2219 Specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries", as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309, par. 9, Art. 2219 and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary IN ORDER THAT MORAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED, THE AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the CLAIMANT SATISFACTORILY PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE DAMAGE (ART. 2217) AND ITS CAUSAL RELATION TO DEFENDANT'S ACTS.

This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondent were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no

definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist of.

Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplary damages.”

RULE: Unfounded suit-not a basis of MD for it is not part of 2219

C L A S S N O T E S

· Motion for summary judgment (there’s no more controversy if it’s summary judgment)

· Here MD was not awarded not because of proof but because unfounded suits do not warrant MD

People v. BugayongDecember 2, 1998

FACTS: Rodelio Bugayong alias “Boy” was convicted of raping and committing acts of lasciviousness against Arlene Cauan, his eleven year old stepdaughter.

ISSUE: WON the victim is entitled to moral damages.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that Bugayong should also be ordered to pay the victim the additional amount of P50, 000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, the Court ruled that moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Courts deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as had heretofore been the practice.

C L A S S N O T E S

For Rape, Seduction, Abduction, Acts of Las-civiousness and Physical injuries: NO NEED to prove MD. Damage automatically comes from being a victim of such crimes and it is as-sumed that the victim suffered mentally, emo-tionally...

P50k awarded as indemnity ex delicto + P50k as MD

3. Cases where allowed (MEMORIZE!)

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious

acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,

27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

Art. 2220, CC - Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Francisco v. GSISMarch 30, 1963

FACTS: Plaintiff Trinidad Francisco in consideration of a loan, mortgaged in favor of the defendant GSIS a parcel of land known as the Vic-Mari Compound in Quezon City, payable within 10 years in monthly installments.

Some time later, the GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on the ground that up to that date the plaintiff was in arrears on her monthly installments. The GSIS was itself the buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008The plaintiff’s father, Atty. Vicente Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the defendant corporation, Rodolfo Andal, proposing to partially pay off his daughter’s indebtedness, and to cover the balance, to allow the GSIS to manage the property and collect the installments due on the unpaid houses and lots thereon until the debt was fully paid.

In exchange, the foreclosure on the property would be set aside. GSIS appeared amenable to the proposal and the various sums therein were paid by the plaintiff and her father to the defendant.

This continued until the GSIS sent the plaintiff and her father three letters asking for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according to the GSIS, the one-year period of redemption had expired.

This led to litigation as to the nature of the agreement in which the plaintiff eventually prevailed.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff is entitled to moral damages by reason of defendant’s breach of contract.

HELD: No.There was no error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on account of plaintiff’s FAILURE TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND and TESTIFY TO HER SOCIAL HUMILIATION, WOUNDED FEELINGS, ETC ., as the decision holds, but primarily because a BREACH OF CONTRACT LIKE THAT PF THE DEFENDANT’S, NOT BEING MALICIOUS OR FRAUDULENT, DOES NOT WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.

Expertravel and Tours, Inc. v. CAJune 25, 1999

FACTS: Expertravel issued to respondent Ricardo Lo (Ricky Lo! Showbiz!) four round-trip plane tickets to Hong Kong, together with hotel accommodations and transfers for a total cost of P39, 677.20.

Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a complaint for recovery of the amount.

Respondent Lo answered that his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid. The account had been remitted to Expertravel through its then

Chairperson Ma. Rocio de Vega who was theretofore authorized to deal with the respondent’s clients.

The trial court found for the respondent and held that the amount claimed by Expertravel had already been paid.

ISSUE: WON damages can be recovered by reason of a clearly unfounded suit.

HELD: Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees (Enervida vs. Dela Torre), such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. *Rationale for the rule : THE LAW COULD NOT HAVE MEANT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY ON THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE. THE ANGUISH SUFFERED BY A PERSON FOR HAVING BEEN MADE A DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL SUIT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE USUAL WORRY AND ANXIETY SUFFERED BY ANYONE WHO IS HALED TO COURT, A SITUATION THAT CANNOT BY ITSELF BE A COGENT REASON FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.

If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.

Nature of MD: not punitive, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person.

Amount of MD: though incapable of pecuniary estimation, must be PROPORTIONAL TO AND IN APPROXIMATION OF THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.

*REQUISITES OF MD :1. THERE MUST BE AN INJURY , WHETHER PHYSICAL,

MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL

2. THERE MUST BE A CULPABLE ACT OR OMISSION FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED

3. THE WRONGFUL ACT OR OMISSION IS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY

4. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IS PREDICATED ON ANY OF THE CASES STATED IN ART. 2219 (CASIS: PENDING ISSUE)

When MD allowed: must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission, the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.

1. Under Culpa contractual or breach of contract: when the defendant acted in:

a. BF; orb. was guilty of gross negligence

(amounting to BF); orc. in wanton disregard of his contractual

obligation; & exceptionally:

d. when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of torts resulting in physical injuries (PI).

special rule:e. in Art. 1746 in relation to Art. 2206:

when death results from a breach of carriage

2. in Culpa Aquiliana or QD:

a. when an act or omission causes Pb. where the defendant is guilty of an

intentional tort (casis: Arts. 19, 20, 21, 26-huma relations torts) -also applies to contracts when breached by tort

3. In Culpa Criminal: when accused is found guilty of

a. PIb. Lascivious actsc. Adultery or concubinaged. Illegal detentione. Illegal arrestf. Illegal search; org. Defamation

4. Malicious Prosecution5. The term “analogous causes” in Art. 2219,

following the ejusdem generis rule must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.

a. Unfounded Suits

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Unfounded suits

Malicious prosecution


Mijares v. CA

FACTS: Metro Manila Drug supplied pharmaceutical products to the Mijares spouses’ drugstore and to the Ospital ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative Drugstore, which is also operated by Editha Mijares, as an officer of the Co-op. The Co-op was dissolved and ceased operations in 1986, and its space was leased out to Solomon Silverio who also put up a drugstore. MMD made deliveries to Silverio’s store for almost a year, amounting to 32K. Silverio issued a check, for partial payment under the account name of his store, which was dishonored. MMD filed a complaint to collect from Editha, despite having been informed that they no longer did business in Ospital. Court found suit to be unfounded.

ISSUE: WON Moral damages should be awarded to the Mijares spouses.

HELD: No. Mijares spouses FAILED TO SHOW THAT MMD WAS MOTIVATED BY BAD FAITH WHEN IT INSTITUTED THE ACTION FOR COLLECTION . It is merely an unfounded suit not Malicious Prosecution.

*ELEMENTS OF MP: (1) MALICE; (2) ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

DOCTRINE: Moral Damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or without malice or bad faith.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Court applied same elements for MP and unfounded suits

· Sir: this should not have been the case because it lumps together the two (2) kinds of action

· The enumeration of the elements was probably a mistake because malicious prosecution is not equivalent to unfounded suits.

J. Marketing Corp. v. Sia, Jr .

FACTS: J Marketing discovered that a motorcycle was missing from its bodega. Motorcycle was traced to Sia. “J’s” representative examined the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle and found them tampered. Upon confrontation, Sia refused to return the motorcycle and dared the representative to file a case in court. “J” filed a complaint for replevin against Sia. RTC and CA dismissed the complaint and awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of Sia.

ISSUE: WON the award of Moral Damages is proper.

HELD: No. A PERSON’S RIGHT TO LITIGATE SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED BY HOLDING HIM LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE BELIEVES HE HAS A RIGHTFUL CLAIM AGAINST ANOTHER, ALTHOUGH FOUND TO BE ERRONEOUS . “J” filed the complaint based on Sia’s own challenge for them to sue him, so “J” could not be deemed to have done so with bad faith.

DOCTRINE: The adverse result of an action does not make a complainant subject to pay moral damages. No damages can be charged on those who may exercise their right to litigate in good faith, even if done erroneously.

Cometa v. CA

FACTS: SITI (Cometa: president) extended loans to GIDC (Guevara: president), which the latter failed to pay. SITI foreclosed the mortgages and was the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. Cometa filed a falsification case against Guevara which was dismissed by the prosecutor for lack of probable cause. DOJ Secretary reversed prosecutor’s finding but the RTC eventually dismissed the case. Guevara filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Cometa.

ISSUE: WON the case for malicious prosecution states a cause of action and warrants a full blown trial on the merits.

HELD: Yes. All the requirements for a valid cause of action were present.

DOCTRINE: What must be alleged in a complaint for malicious prosecution so that there is a valid cause of action: (1) defendant himself instigated the prosecution; (2) prosecution terminated in the plaintiff’s acquittal; (3) prosecutor acted without probable cause; (4) the prosecutor was actuated by malice.

NOTE: SC did not equate mp with an unfounded suit

C L A S S N O T E S

· Lesson here as opposed to earlier discussion to sue as many as you can: don’t implead people without any reason or a suit will also be filed against you

· MP was filed against SITI and Cometa, not unfounded suit

Industrial Insurance Company v. Bondad

FACTS: A 3-automobile collision involving a bus, a jeep, and a car. The bus bumped the jeep that was parked at the shoulder to fix a tire and the bus went on to hit the car. The owner of the car (Morales) and the insurance company filed a complaint for damages against the bus company, its driver, and the jeep’s driver and owner (Ligorio and Pablo Bondad). The Bondads denied any responsibility or liability to IIC and Morales. TC and CA: exculpated the Bondads. Ordered IIC to pay them moral damages for recklessly and baselessly impleading them in spite of the clear language in the Traffic Investigation report that they were not responsible in any way for the accident.

ISSUE: WON the award of Moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees was proper.

HELD: Yes. The award of Moral Damages is justified. IIC was RECKLESS WHEN IT IMPLEADED THE BONDADS IN SPITE OF CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE NOT LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE TO MORALES’ CAR. IIC ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN IT COMPELLED THE BONDADS TO TRAVEL FROM LAGUNA TO MAKATI TO LITIGATE AN UNFOUNDED CLAIM. The effects of this was that Ligorio could not work, and Pablo became sick and even suffered a mild stroke.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008DOCTRINE: Requirements to sustain an award of moral damages: (1) Claimant suffered injury; (2) Injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Art. 2219 or 2220 (CC); (3) Necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill-will. It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, etc. as a result of the other party’s acts.

C L A S S N O T E S

Purpose of requirements: to temper the filing of suits in order to get damages.

Sue someone who could readily be impleaded (based on legal basis)

i. Labor Cases

Triple Eight Integrated Services v. NLRC

FACTS: Erlinda Osdana was recruited by Triple 8 as a food server in Saudi Arabia. Bad working conditions made her ill and she had to be confined in a hospital. She was transferred several times, but she again became ill and required 2 surgeries. After this, she was no longer given any assignments even if she was willing and able to do light work. She was dismissed from work and not given any separation pay. Triple 8 refused to help her, so she filed an illegal dismissal case. LA and NLRC both ruled in her favor and awarded her damages.

ISSUE: WON the award of moral and exemplary damages was justified.

HELD: Yes. The award of damages was proper.

DOCTRINE: Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

C L A S S N O T E S

Moral damages are not just awarded because of violations of the Labor Code.

The case focused more on how Osdana was treated when she worked in Saudi Arabia.

ii. Criminal Taking Of Life

People v. Pirame

FACTS: Pirame, et al were found guilty of murdering Pedro Torrenueva.

ISSUE: WON the award of moral and exemplary damages were justified.

HELD: No. Torrenueva’s widow DID NOT TESTIFY ON HAVING SUFFERED ANY MENTAL ANGUISH OR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FROM THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND . The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance precludes the award of exemplary damages.

DOCTRINE: Proof of suffering must be attested to justify the award of moral damages.

NOTE: cf Arcona v. CA

Carlos Arcona y Moban v. CA

FACTS: Carlos Arcona was convicted of homicide and was ordered to pay 10K as moral damages. He appealed claiming self-defense.

ISSUE: WON the award of moral damages was correct.

HELD: Yes. Moral damages should be increased to 50K. AS BORNE OUT BY HUMAN EXPERIENCE A VIOLENT DEATH INVARIABLY AND NECESSARILY BRINGS ABOUT EMOTIONAL PAIN AND ANGUISH ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM’S FAMILY. IT IS INHERENTLY HUMAN TO SUFFER SORROW, TORMENT, PAIN AND ANGER WHEN A LOVED ONE BECOMES THE VICTIM OF A VIOLENT OR BRUTAL KILLING. SUCH BRUTAL DEATH NOT ONLY STEALS FROM THE FAMILY OF THE DECEASED HIS LIFE, LOVE, SUPPORT AND AFFECTION BUT ALSO LEAVES THEM WITH A GNAWING FEELING THAT AN INJUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE TO THEM. For this reason, moral damage must be awarded even

in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional sufferings.

C L A S S N O T E S

This seems to be in conflict with the Pirame case.

Cruz presents a possible distinction between Arcona and Pirame: the manner of death was taken into account (violent nature of the death) which Prof. Casis does not seem to agree with.

b. Factors in Determining Amount

PNB v. CA

FACTS: Carmelo Flores, a prominent businessman in Baguio engaged in the real estate business of buying and selling house and lots, bought from PNB 2 manager’s checks worth 500k each. However, PNB later refused to honor the checks because of alleged shortage in his payment. It was found during the trial that the bank was negligent of its duties. The Supreme Court reduced the award of 1M to 100k as moral damages. Flores filed this MFR contending that the award was too small.

ISSUE: WON the award of moral damages should be increased.

HELD: Yes. SC increased the award to 200K. SC took into account the following: that despite the fact that Mr. Flores’ character and personality are irrelevant to the issues in the case, PNB, without proofs, attacked his character by alleging that he was a known gambler and big time casino player. The bank also alleged that the proceeds of the checks were used by Flores in gambling. From this it is obvious that PNB besmirched Flores’ reputation causing him undue humiliation. Flores also testified in court regarding his woes when PNB refused to honor his checks; that this had caused him his integrity and dependability as a businessman in Baguio. That because of the incident whenever he tries to make a deal people doubt his capacity to pay.

Casis Commentary: SC reduced the award, considered 1M in Moral Damages to be excessive

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008because (1) Flores did not prove that he lost the Baguio House; (2) 1M in Moral Damages is grossly disproportionate to the 100K in actual damages.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Seems to consider MD similar to AD

Fule v. CA

FACTS: Fule, a banker/jeweler bartered his 10 ha. Property for a pair of diamond earrings from Dr. Cruz under a Deed of Absolute Sale with Atty. Belarmino. Fule was able to examine the jewelry and accepted them (he had already examined them before and even made a sketch). 2 hours later, he complained that the earrings were fake. He filed a case against Cruz and Belarmino seeking the nullification of the Deed on the ground of fraud and deceit. TC & CA dismissed the complaint and ordered him to pay Cruz 300K, and Belarmino 250K as moral damages.

ISSUE: WON the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The case is analogous to malicious prosecution under Art. 2219 (8), as shown by Fule’s wanton bad faith and his filing of a malicious and unfounded case against Cruz & Belarmino. Preponderance of evidence suggests that the cause of action in this case was contrived by Fule himself.

DOCTRINE: Factors considered in determining amount: (1) Cruz & Belarmino are well-known, respected, and held in high esteem in San Pablo, a small city; (2) Both are near the twilight of their lives after maintaining and nurturing their good reputation in the community, only to be stunned with a court case; (3) Since the filing of the case, they were living under a pall of doubt which surely affected not only their earning capacity, but also besmirched their reputations; (4) The length of time the case has dragged on during which their reputations were tarnished and their names maligned.

RULE: MD does not need actual proof. Enough that displays wanton bad faith.

NOTES: Q: why ANALOGOUS TO MP only and not MP? A: can’t be MP coz no prior case that ended or was qualified as MP

C L A S S N O T E S

This is the sales case on BARTER!

PAL v. CA

FACTS: Pantejo, the City Fiscal of Surigao took a PAL flight from Manila to Surigao. Due to a typhoon, the flight to Surigao was cancelled while on a stopover in Cebu. PAL gave out cash assistance to its stranded passengers. Pantejo requested that he be billeted at a hotel at PAL’s expense because he wasn’t carrying cash, but PAL refused. He had to share a room with another passenger whom he promised to repay in Surigao. On the flight, he learned that the hotel expenses of some passengers were reimbursed. Pantejo sued PAL for damages for discriminating against him. TC awarded him actual (300K), moral (150K), and exemplary (100K) damages.


HELD: Yes. PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating against Pantejo. It was PAL’s standard policy to extend cash assistance or hotel accommodations to stranded passengers. The refund of hotel expenses was discriminatorily made since it was not made known to all its passengers.

DOCTRINE: Factors: Pantejo was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his GOVERNMENT POSITION and SOCIAL PROMINENCE, which altogether necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES DO NOT TRANSLATE INTO EXCESSIVE DAMAGES

Valenzuela v. CA

FACTS: Lourdes Valenzuela was fixing a flat tire on the roadside when she was hit by Alexander Li who was driving a company car. Her left leg was severed & she had to get a prosthetic leg. Valenzuela filed a case claiming damages: 1M (moral), 100K (exemplary), 180K

(medical expenses + loss of earnings). Li and his employer were found jointly and severally liable. TC awarded, but CA reduced moral damages to 500K.

ISSUE: WON the reduction of the award of moral damages was justified.

HELD: No. Valenzuela’s left leg was amputated. The damage done was permanent and lasting, the artificial leg would have to be adjusted to the physiologic changes her body would normally undergo through the years. The amount of damage which goes with the SUDDEN SEVERING OF A VITAL PORTION OF THE HUMAN BODY AND THE RESULTANT ANXIETY, SLEEPLESSNESS, PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURY AND MENTAL AND PHYSICAL PAIN IS INESTIMABLE. P1M in moral damages is proper.

DOCTRINE: The award should be COMMENSURATE TO THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Casis Commentary: Valenzuela must have been really beautiful.

· Permanent nature of damage Sumalpong v. CA

FACTS: Sumalpong shot twice at Ramos, but missed. They grappled for the gun, and in doing so, he bit Ramos’ arm and left ear, mutilating the latter. He was convicted of attempted homicide and was made to serve sentence and ordered to indemnify Ramos for loss of crops, hospitalization expenses and Moral Damages (5K). CA modified the award of damages, increasing Moral Damages to 10K.

ISSUE: WON the increase in the amount of Moral Damages was proper.

HELD: Yes. The CA has in many cases, increased the damages awarded by the TC, although the offended party had not appealed from said award. The SC finds the 10K award of Moral Damages justified under the circumstances. The nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured by Ramos warrants it. The incident caused the mutilation of Ramos’ ear and a permanent scar on his arm. These injuries have left indelible marks on his body and will

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008serve as a constant reminder of his traumatic experience.

DOCTRINE: The amount of moral damages awarded DEPENDS ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PHYSICAL INJURIES.

Lopez v. Pan American

FACTS: Senate President Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez reserved first class tickets with Pan-Am for him, his wife, his daughter and her husband. The tickets were issued and paid for, but on the day of the flight, they were informed that they could not be accommodated as first class passengers, because first class was already fully booked. They were constrained to take the flight as tourist passengers, “under protest.” Lopez filed a suit for damages, alleging breach of contracts in bad faith, and asked for 500K as actual and moral damages. CFI awarded 150K in moral damages.

ISSUE: WON the amount of damages was proper.

HELD: SC raised the amount to 200K, to be divided among Senator Lopez (100K), his wife (50K), his daughter (25K) and his son-in-law (25K). The Lopezes suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish as a result of Pan-Am’s breach in bad faith of their contracts. Although it is not humiliating to travel as tourist passengers, IT IS HUMILIATING TO BE COMPELLED TO DO SO . Senator Lopez was the Senate President Pro Tempore and a for Vice-President of the Philippines. Considering the prestige of his rank and position, the amount awarded is appropriate. As to the members of his family, they share his prestige and therefore, his humiliation. The damages awarded to each of them are reasonable.

NOTES: his stature demanded that he be given MD. His family too coz they shared in his prestige and humiliation.

Producer’s Bank v. CA

FACTS: The Chuas had substantial savings and current deposits with the Bacolod Branch of Producers Bank. They obtained a P2M loan, secured by a real estate mortgage. The Chuas deposited 960K, but the amount was not credited to their account because the

Branch Manager absconded with the money of the bank’s depositors. The bank dishonored checks drawn out by the Chuas on the ground of insufficient funds, despite their having over 1M in savings. The Chuas requested to see the ledgers of their account, but the bank refused. They filed an action for damages against the bank, who in turn filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. The Chuas filed a complaint for injunction and damages. The TC awarded them 2M in moral damages. CA reduced it to 500K.

ISSUE: WON the award of moral damages is proper.

HELD: SC reduced moral damages to 300K. The dishonor of the Chuas’ checks and the foreclosure initiated by the bank AFFECTED THE CREDIT STANDING AND THE BUSINESS DEALINGS OF THE CHUAS , as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse of their businesses. The damage to their REPUTATION AND SOCIAL STANDING entitles them to moral damages. The bank caused them serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation.

DOCTRINE: The financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset, it being a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any adverse reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to him.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Rule on Damages is jurisprudential: amounts do not change but basis for fixing damages are changed!

c. Who May Recover

Strebel v. Figueras, et al

FACTS: Strebel, a Mobilgas station owner sued Acting Labor Secretary Figueras, Director of Labor Jose and Assistant City Fiscal Ruperto. In one of his causes action, he cited the incident of the transfer of his son-in-law (Hernandez) from the BOI to the Bureau of Prisons. He claims that Figueras influenced the DOJ Secretary to effect such transfer and is seeking moral and actual damages.

ISSUE: Can Strebel recover damages for the inconvenient transfer of Hernandez?

HELD: No. The transfer was within the power of the DOJ Secretary. Assuming that such act amounted to any wrong, the right of action would accrue in favor of Hernandez.DOCTRINES: (1) The RIGHT OF RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING RESULTING FROM BODILY INJURIES is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another’s suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. (2) MENTAL ANGUISH is restricted to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of MENTAL SUFFERING which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another’s suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another.

NOTES: one cannot be awarded MD for the suffering one did not endure (sympathy) cf Art. 2219, last paragraph.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Cf: Lopez – wife shared in “prestige” of hubby (goes into the amount of MD)

· What about Strebel and son-in-law? Sufferering suffered by vicarious relations?

ABS-CBN v. CA

FACTS: ABS and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS was given a right of first refusal to 24 films. Viva’s agent gave ABS (through Charo Santos) a list of 36 films to choose 24 from. Santos only liked 10 (including “Maging Sino Ka Man”) and did not accept it. According to Lopez of ABS, there was a “napkin agreement” for Viva to sell 14 films for P36M. Viva’s agent denied such agreement. Deals with ABS failed, so then Viva made a deal with RBS granting the latter the exclusive right to 104 film, including the 14 films in the “napkin agreement.” RBS made print ads of the anticipated airing of “Maging Sino Ka Man.” ABS filed a complaint for specific performance w/ a prayer for injunction. Complaint was dismissed and moral

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008damages were awarded to RBS for having its reputation debased by the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: WON the award of damages to RBS was proper.

HELD: No. The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It therefore cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system.

On Actual Damages: -One is entitled to compensation for AD only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved (except as provided by law or by stipulation)

-Indemnification shall comprehend:1. value of he loss suffered2. value of the profits that the oblige failed to

obtain

In Contract and Quasi-Contracts: the damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted in GF or otherwise

In case of GF: damages recoverable are those which are the NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES of the breach of the obligation which the parties have FORESEEN or COULD HAVE REASONABLY FORESEEN at the time of the constitution of the obligation

In case of Fraud, BF, malice or wanton attitude: actor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonable attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (CF: PEOPLE VS. MANERO)

In Crimes and QDs: defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES of the act or omission complained of, whether or not such damages could have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant.

-AD may also be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff’s business standing or commercial credit.

On Atty’s fees: -in the absence of stipulation, atty’s fees may be recovered as AD or CD under any of the circumstances in Art. 2208 General Rule: atty’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not awarded everytime a party wins a suit. -The power of the court to award atty’s fees under Art. 2208 demands factual, legal & equitable justification.

On Moral Damages: Art. 2217- defines what are included in MD Art. 2219- enumerates the cases where MD may be recovered Art. 2220- provides that MD may be recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in BF

MD aimed at restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. No MD for corporations: The award of MD cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by having a nervous system.On Exemplary Damages: -imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

In criminal cases: recoverable as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstance

In QD: when defendant acted with gross negligence

In contracts and quasi-contracts: if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

NAPOCOR v. PHIBROS

FACTS: NAPOCOR issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of imported coal. PHIBRO’s bid was accepted. PHIBRO was not able to deliver, so NAPOCOR advertised again for bidding of the same products. PHIBRO participated in the bidding again, but NAPOCOR disapproved their application. PHIBRO filed an action for damages on the ground that NAPOCOR’s act of disqualifying them was tainted with malice and bad faith. Lower courts ruled in favor of PHIBRO and awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: WON PHIBRO is entitled to damages.

HELD: No. NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith in disapproving PHIBRO’s application for prequalification to bid. It merely exercised its reserved right to reject bid applicants who previously failed to perform properly.

Moral Damages not proper:(1) there was no bad faith, and (2) as a general rule, moral damages are not

awarded to corporations.

DOCTRINE: Besmirched reputation cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural person, for A CORPORATION HAS NO REPUTATION IN THE SENSE AN INDIVIDUAL DOES. It is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish.* A CORPORATION BEING AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON AND HAVING EXISTENCE ONLY IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION, HAS NO FEELINGS, NO EMOTIONS, NO SENSES; THEREFORE, IT CANNOT EXPERIENCE PHYSICAL SUFFERING AND MENTAL ANGUISH.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Code lists all kinds of suffering but MENTAL ANGUISH should be involved – open question

C. NominalArt. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded.

Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.

Ventanilla v. Centeno

FACTS: Ventanilla hired Atty. Centeno to represent him in an action for recovery with damages. Centeno screwed up the filing of appeal. Ventanilla now seeks to recover damages against Centeno. TC: awarded him P200 as nominal damages.

ISSUE: WON the TC erred in awarding only P200 instead of P2000 as nominal and other damages.

HELD: No. The damages awarded are proper. Assessment of Nominal Damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. Considering that nominal damages are not for the indemnification of loss suffered, but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded, and that the perfection of the appeal was no assurance that Ventanilla would succeed in his first action for recovery, the amount that he seeks to recover here as nominal damages is excessive.

DOCTRINE: Nominal damages are not indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded.

C L A S S N O T E S

· ND small but ok according to SC because it is not supposed to account for anything

· ND only symbollic

Robes-Francisco Realty Corp. v. CFI

FACTS: Lolita Millan bought a lot from the petitioner in May, 1962 and was able to fully pay her installments on Dec. 22, 1971. The deed of absolute sale however, was only executed in her favor in 1973. Nearly 3 years after her last payment, petitioner still has not given her

the TCT of the lot. Millan filed a complaint for specific performance. TC awarded her P20K in nominal damages.

ISSUE: WON the award of nominal damages was proper.

HELD: Yes. The right of the vendee to acquire title to the lot she bought was violated by the petitioner and this entitles her, at the very least, to nominal damages. The amount, however, should be reduced since there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

DOCTRINE: Nominal damages are recoverable where some injury has been done, the amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.

C L A S S N O T E S

· 20K award of ND by TC excessive· Penal clause issue: no penal clause because

even if without it Millan still entitled to legal interest more than 4% p.a. (could be wrong because SC seemed to equate penal clause with liquidated damages)

People v. Gopio

FACTS: Gopio raped and molested Princess Millano, a minor. He was convicted of statutory rape and ordered to indemnify the victim through damages (actual= P3727, moral= P30K)


HELD: Actual damages should be deleted as no proof was presented to show the actual amount of pecuniary loss. However, Nominal Damages (P2K) should be awarded in order that the right of the victim, violated by the accused may be vindicated or recognized. This is not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered.

*DOCTRINE: WHENEVER THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF AN ASCERTAINED LEGAL RIGHT, ALTHOUGH NO ACTUAL DAMAGES RESULTED OR NONE ARE SHOWN, THE AWARD OF NOMINAL DAMAGES IS PROPER.

Armovit v. CA

FACTS: Dr. Armovit and his family decided to spend Christmas in the Philippines and bought 3 round-trip US-Manila tickets from Northwest Airlines. On the return trip (Manila-US), they were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated because their supposed flight was already taking off and the time on their tickets was wrong. Dr. Armovit was unable to keep his appointments with his US patients, he and his family suffered anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety until they were finally able to fly back to the US. They filed an action for damages in the Manila RTC after NWA refused to give them compensatory damages for breach of contract of air-transport carriage. RTC awarded damages (Dr.: actual: P1300, moral: 500K, exemplary: 500K, nominal: 100K; Mrs.: moral: 300K, exemplary: 300K, nominal: 50K; daughter: moral: 300K, exemplary: 300K, nominal: 50K). CA modified: sustained award of actual damages, deleted moral and nominal damages.

ISSUE: WON the deletion of nominal damages was proper.

HELD: Yes. Nominal damages should not be awarded when actual damages were. Assessment of ND is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case.

*DOCTRINE: NOMINAL DAMAGES CANNOT COEXIST WITH ACTUAL DAMAGES.

C L A S S N O T E S

· Why ND can’t coexist with AD? Sir says that award of AD already presupposes invasion of right so awarding ND would lead to double recovery

Francisco v. Ferrer

FACTS: Rebecca Lo and her daughter Anette Ferrer ordered a 3-layer wedding cake from Fountainhead

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Torts Magic Notes for FINALS_revised by A2010 Prof. Casis _S.Y. 2007-2008Bakeshop. On the wedding day, at around 6pm, the cake was not there. They made a follow-up call and were assured that it was on its way, but was delayed by traffic. They were later informed that there would be no cake because the order slip got lost. Ferrer was compelled to buy a sans rival cake instead. The wedding cake arrived at 10pm, but they refused to accept it because it only had 2 layers. Francisco (owner of Fountainhead) sent a letter of apology and 5K, which was denied for being deemed inadequate. Ferrer and Lo filed a case against Francisco for breach of contract w/ damages. TC and CA awarded moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: WON moral and exemplary damages should have been awarded.

HELD: No. However, NOMINAL DAMAGES ARE PROPER. Petitioners gave lame excuses for the delay in the delivery of the cake. Their prevarication made them liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customer’s anxiety and need of the hour.

DOCTRINE: Nominal damages are recoverable where (1) a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind, or (2) where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages have been or can be shown.

D. Temperate

Sir: awarded when there is no basis for AD

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.

Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.

C L A S S N O T E S

Remember Ramos vs. CA where temperate damages were awarded for continuing injury

Pleno v. CA

FACTS: A red Ford cargo truck hit a blue Volkswagen kombi driven by Pleno, causing it to hit a cargo truck parked along the shoulder, hitting its driver who was urinating in front of it. Pleno was seriously injured and was confined for 5 months in Makati Med and had to undergo 5 surgeries. Pleno filed a complaint for damages against the owner of the red truck and its driver. CFI ruled in favor of Pleno. CA reduced the amount of damages for being excessive (Temperate: 200K – 100K, moral: 200K – 100K).ISSUE: WON the reduction of damages was proper.

HELD: No. The lower court’s award of damages are more in consonance with the factual circumstances of the case. Each item of damages is adequately supported by evidence. Temperate damages were based on the impairment of income of actual capacity (since the actual income of Pleno as president of Mayon Ceramics company was not proven).

DOCTRINE: Temperate damages may be `awarded in cases where definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, but the court is convinced that there was an injury or loss.

C L A S S N O T E S

Can AD and TD be warded at the same time? YES in Ramos vs. CA – but sir says it’s an aberration since TD is awarded when there is no basis for AD

People v. Singh

FACTS: Dalvir, et al ganged up on Surinder, killing him. Dilbag, who was cleaning his motorbike nearby, tried to stop the attack, but he too was stabbed. The accused were convicted of murder and frustrated murder. Lower courts awarded hospitalization and medical expenses,

actual damages, civil indemnity, moral damages, attorney’s fees and compensation for loss of earning capacity.

ISSUE: WON damages should be awarded.

HELD: Yes, although award for loss of earning capacity should be deleted. Such AWARDS PARTAKE OF DAMAGES WHICH MUST BE PROVEN NOT ONLY BY CREDIBLE AND SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE, BUT ALSO BY UNBIASED PROOF (S uch as income tax reports). Bare allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the DEFINITE PROOF OF PECUNIARY LOSS CANNOT BE OFFERED AND THE FACT THAT LOSS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED , appellants should pay the heirs of the victim temperate damages.

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Fact of loss established but AD cannot be proved

People v. Plazo

FACTS: Edison Plazo boxed and stabbed Romeo Fabula. Plazo was convicted of murder.

ISSUE: WON temperate damages should be awarded.

HELD: Yes. Temperate damages under Art. 2224 may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim’s family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. 15K as temperate damages was awarded.

E. LiquidatedCasis: 3rd parties are not bound by the stipulation of LD in the contract. -For LD: prove breach -For MD on top of LD: prove breach + BF

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.

Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an INDEMNITY OR A PENALTY , shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.

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C L A S S N O T E S

· LD intended as indemnity or penalty· Juris: LD vs. Penal clause

-intent behind LD penalty is deterrent-LD is measure of damage which does not matter in penalty-LD is perceived loss if other party does not comply with his obligation because AD would be difficult to determine

· But in A2227: “indemnity or penalty”

Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.

F. Exemplary or CorrectiveArt. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or

compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.

Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case

liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.

C L A S S N O T E S

ED and ND: · ND vindicates right ~ declaratory relief· ED is penalty-like

PNB v. CA

April 2, 1996

FACTS: Tan owned a parcel of land which was expropriated by the government. He filed a motion w/ the TC requesting that it issue an order for the payment of P32K as expropriation price. PNB was ordered to pay Tan the amount. PNB issued and delivered a manager’s check to Sonia Gonzaga who had a Special Power of Attorny supposedly executed by Tan in her favor. Gonzaga took the money for herself. Tan demanded payment which was refused by PNB, having already paid the amount to Tan’s “agent”. Tan file a motion with the court requiring PNB to pay. TC: ruled in favor of Tan and ordered PNB to pay the amount and exemplary damages. CA: affirmed, but deleted the award of exemplary damages.

ISSUE: WON exemplary damages should be awarded to Tan.HELD: No. Exemplary damages may be awarded if a party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. It cannot be recovered as a matter of right, but left to the discretion of the court. Although there was a breach of PNB’s obligation to Tan, there is no basis for the award of exemplary damages.

*(MEMORIZE) DOCTRINE: REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: (1) THEY MAY BE IMPOSED BY WAY OF EXAMPLE IN ADDITION TO

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES, AND ONLY AFTER THE CLAIMANT’S RIGHT TO THEM HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. (2) THEY CANNOT BE RECOVERED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, THEIR DETERMINATION DEPENDING UPON THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES THAT MAY BE AWARDED TO THE CLAIMANT. (3) THE ACT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY BAD FAITH OR DONE IN A WANTON, FRAUDULENT, OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT MANNER.

Del Rosario v. CAJanunary 29, 1997

FACTS: The sps. Del Rosario bought roofing materials from MFC, which advertised the materials as durable and sturdy. Less than 2 months after installation, portions of the roof were blown off by a typhoon. MFC replaced and repaired them free of charge because of a warranty. The Del Rosarios hired an adjuster to determine the cause of the destruction. The adjusters found that MFC did not attach the tiles properly and the project was hastily done. The Del Rosarios filed a complaint with the DTI and another with the RTC to recover damages.

ISSUE: WON the award of damages is justified.

HELD: Yes. The awards of moral and exemplary damages are justified. MFC acted in bad faith when it flagrantly breached its express warranties made to the general public.

DOCTRINE: Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.

CASIS: implies that ED is attached to MD

C L A S S N O T E S

· How did court arrive at final amount?· Compare with other cases

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