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The Netherlands: Setting the Precedent for an Improved Global Drug Control

Regime

Bianca Osian

IRG 378HB Departmental Honors in International Relations and Global Studies

The University of Texas

May 2015

—————[ ]————— Dr. Michael Anderson

Department of International Relations and Global Studies Supervising Professor

—————[ ]————— Dr. Michael Mosser

Department of European Studies Second Reader

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The Netherlands: Setting the Precedent for an Improved Global Drug Control

Regime

Bianca Leigh Osian, B.A

The University of Texas at Austin, 2015

Supervisor: Michael Anderson

Since the turn of the 21st century, global drug trafficking and consumption levels have

risen tremendously as a byproduct of global processes. It is now up to the international

community to form a modern global drug control regime that will coordinate solutions to these

detrimental issues. Although nations around the world have already come together on several

occasions throughout the 20th century to address these issues from a prohibitionist standpoint,

they achieved limited success. Accordingly, regional governments were prompted to derive their

own strategies to handle drug trafficking and abuse within their respective borders. However, as

these regional approaches have proven to be narrow and ineffective under this prohibitionist

framework, a global conversation has reemerged that contemplates the feasibility of establishing

an improved global drug control strategy that bears harm-reductionist measures. I argue that the

European Union (EU) is to lead this international effort as it has absorbed many elements of the

successful harm-reductionist Dutch strategy at the regional level. While there is considerable

debate on whether the EU is capable of mobilizing international infrastructure to coincide with

these kinds of policies, what is known for certain is that a consolidated global regime is

necessary in order to tackle both drug supply and demand in a more holistic fashion.

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Table of Contents…….……………………………………………#3

Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………...……….…#4

Chapter 2: Overview of Drug Policy……………………………..#11

Chapter 3: Case Study…………….………………………....…...#34

Chapter 4: Analytical Discussion……………………….…...…...#44

Bibliography……………………………………………....…..….#60

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Since the turn of the 21st century, global drug trafficking and consumption levels have

risen tremendously as a byproduct of global processes1. Now, more than ever, traffickers are able

to permeate borders as commercial and travel restrictions have been lifted. Additionally, younger

generations are beginning to participate in more recreational drug use, as the media has been a

force that has altered perceptions on the harms of certain illicit drugs. As a result, the anti-drug

norms that once characterized prohibition have begun to erode. As drug consumption and

trafficking continue to persist and pose serious security and health problems to many nations, the

international community is to take action in achieving more extensive international cooperation

in order to figure out global solutions to these problems.

However, the need for a global movement to control international drug trafficking and

abuse is not contemporary rhetoric. Although new agencies have recently been created to launch

work plans and political declarations on mitigating the global drug problem, these types of

efforts are not the first of their kind2. At the turn of the 20th century, countries around the world

assembled to control the trafficking and non-medical use of opium—a substance that had gained

immense popularity worldwide 3 . Then, following the conclusion of World War II, the

international community came together once again, under the directive of the United Nations

(UN), to address the drug trade that was transforming into a transnational ordeal4. Thus, talk of a

global drug control regime was relevant over one hundred years ago.

1 Bryan Stevenson, “Drug Policy, Criminal Justice and Mass Imprisonment” (Geneva, 2011), 8. 2 Some recent agencies include the UNODC, the Global Commission on Drug Policy, and the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matter (ASOD). 3 Paul Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market” in Global Habit The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Brookings Institution, 1996), 16. 4 Ibid., 20.

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This regime harnessed drug prohibition, as it was a widely accepted policy by the

international community. Influenced by the United States (US), government officials of different

regional entities believed that their utilization of strict penal measures and substantial law

enforcement would help crack down on drug trafficking criminals and suppress individual

consumption5.

Yet, as the regime progressed, the feasibility of an international system became far less

practical due to certain hindrances, which led to an upsurge in regionally oriented drug policies.

In the process, some regions became more focused on establishing public security by targeting

drug traffickers, while others were more concerned with enhancing public health by curtailing

drug abuse. As regional strategies have achieved only limited success in reducing the supply and

demand sides of the issue, officials are assessing the need and feasibility of launching an

improved international regime.

In this capstone I argue that the modern global drug regime is to take a new approach. It

is to be led by the European Union (EU) and incorporate measures of harm-reduction to improve

public health and security within the borders of all signatory nations. The EU has arisen to this

global leadership position in recent years as it has absorbed many elements of the successful

Dutch strategy at the regional level. Thus, at the core of this capstone lies an illustration of how

the Netherlands, a small country with unique policies, has been foundational to changing drug

control ideas both in Europe and on an international level.

For centuries, the Netherlands has served as a passageway for international goods to enter

into Europe due to its geographical positioning and cosmopolitan atmosphere. Among the

extensive list of products that have traversed across its borders are those that have inflicted great

5 Harry Levine, “Global Drug Prohibition: Its Uses and Crises” in The International Journal of Drug Policy (2003), 147.

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harm on the European community, such as illicit drugs. In effect, the Netherlands has become a

de facto haven for more than a proportional share of drug trafficking operations due to the nature

of its orientation6. Although it is a relatively small country within the European region, it hosts

over a hundred active criminal organizations that are of both foreign and local origin7. These

organizations have trafficked a variety of drugs that have reached the Dutch population and

beyond. To contain and ameliorate this situation in the 20th century, the Dutch government

created a unique threefold strategy that pertains to the treatment of drug traffickers and abusers:

(1) the strict prosecution of those who traffic hard drugs, (2) the utilization of harm-reduction

tactics for those who abuse hard drugs, (3) and toleration of those who traffic and abuse soft

drugs8. Thus, the Dutch drug model fluctuates based on the specific drug and the nature of the

offence.

With regard to the first prong of this strategy, the Dutch government utilizes the majority

of its criminal resources on those who traffic hard drugs9. It invests a lot of money on

surveillance initiatives set out to detect criminal organizations involved in both hard and soft

drug trafficking. These kinds of initiatives, which follow the stipulations set out by the United

Nations Single Convention, have been considerably successful as the government has been able

to seize large quantities of drugs for several decades10.

However, the Netherlands differs from the international standard in the way that it

addresses the abuse of hard drugs. Under the international standard, the use of hard drugs is

discouraged through the implementation of strict criminal law. Conversely, under the Dutch 6 Dutch Minister of Justice; Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport; and Secretary of State for the Interior, “Drugs Policy in the Netherlands: Continuity and Change” (Netherlands: 1995), 10. 7 Organizations of foreign origin tend to traffic “hard” drugs while those of Dutch descent primarily traffic “soft” drugs. This distinction between “hard” and “soft” drugs will be made in a later chapter. 8 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Information and Communication Division, “FAQ DRUGS: A guide to Dutch policy” (2008), 5. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 36.

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system, those who abuse hard drugs are regarded as patients rather than criminals; they are

encouraged to undergo medical treatment rather than serve a prison sentence11. Referred to as a

“harm-reduction” approach, this second element of the Dutch strategy aims to limit the risks

associated with these drugs, and strives to integrate drug users back into society12. Consequently,

the Dutch government has invested in superior medical care, drug prevention measures, and

outpatient facilities, which don’t guarantee the total abstinence of all addicts, but aim to improve

their well-being13.

Regarding the third element of this strategy, the Netherlands practices an “administrative

policy of tolerance” in which the government accepts deviations from the written law in order to

concentrate its efforts on the first and second parts of its drug policy14. Accordingly, officials

tend to turn a blind eye when it comes to altercations with soft drugs so that they can concentrate

their efforts and resources on the substances that have created the most problems for society.

****

In this capstone, I will portray this remarkable story of how a small country with unique

policies has been able to percolate through an entire regional body and tip the scales in its

method of controlling drug trafficking and abuse. Although some European nations have viewed

the Netherlands rather idiosyncratically—as a drug haven that stands apart from the remainder of

the EU—others have seen its wider impact. They have witnessed the Netherlands influence not

only the EU over the past three decades, but also other regional units across the globe. On that

11 Ibid., 21. 12 “Harm-reduction” will be further explained in a subsequent chapter. 13 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands,” comp. Benjamin Dolin (2001). 14 Freek Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” in Discovering the Dutch (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 251.

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account, I argue that the Netherlands has been foundational to changing drug control ideas both

in Europe and on an international level.

This notion will be supported through several chapters. The subsequent chapter, Chapter

Two, will provide background information on the original global drug control system that

emerged in the 20th century. It will discuss how this international regime emerged to deal with

concerning drug trends, which were brought about by globalization. Led by the US, this regime

was prohibitionist in nature and can be categorized into three distinctive phases. This chapter

will briefly discuss the foundational phase of the system that spanned from the turn of the 20th

century until the 1960s, which aimed to control legal drugs. Then, it will discuss the next stage of

the international system, which aimed to control illegal drugs between the 1960s and 2000 by

means of three UN-level conventions. The third phase of this progression—which the

international community is currently grappling with now—will be the focus of subsequent

chapters. Thus, this chapter will focus on the second phase, but will make brief mention of the

first in order to understand the context of the second. It will also outline the problems of the

regime in order to transition to a discussion on the manifestation of regional drug prohibition

during the 20th century. I will provide evidence that demonstrates how under this overarching

framework, some regions focused their resources on the supply-side of the international drug

market while others focused them on the demand-side, according to their respective priorities

and concerns. I will then present official endorsements and critiques of prohibition to

demonstrate the global debate on whether or not these regions should abandon this framework

altogether and replace it with an alternative approach. Ultimately, this chapter will depict how

certain regions approached the drug problem during the 20th century, which will later shed light

on the strategy produced by the EU and on the necessity for an improved global regime.

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Chapter Three will provide a case study on the Dutch approach to drugs within a

European context. It will indicate how the government controls both the supply and demand of

drugs through harm-reductionist measures. Additionally, through the incorporation of statistics

and interviews, it will underscore how Dutch policies have been successful in minimizing harm

to users and maintaining public order within the Netherlands. Ultimately, this section serves to

demonstrate how the Dutch example, which has already impacted the wider European region,

will influence the international order of drug control.

Chapter Four will provide an analysis of how the Dutch policies have affected the

international community. It will first examine international attitudes and perceptions of the

Dutch policies and demonstrate how they have changed in more recent times. It will then move

into a discussion of how some European countries have altered their policies to coincide with

those of the Netherlands. It will also suggest that as global consumption and trafficking trends

have risen since the new millennium, the EU—having its basis in Dutch drug policies—is to lead

the new global drug control regime. While some officials have criticized its ability to assume this

kind of position, others have seen its wider impact on other regional bodies, namely ASEAN and

the US. Nevertheless, whether the EU rises to this leadership position or not, I will conclude by

stating that an improved global regime is necessary to face the challenges posed by the illicit

drug market of the 21st century.

Overall, the broader purpose of this capstone is to demonstrate how the Netherlands has

been significant to the global drug effort. Although it is a considerably small country in

comparison to the rest of the EU, it has been able to change Europe in a remarkable way. Before,

the US was able to dictate its approach to drug policy because of its size and incredible influence

at the international level. Now, I argue that the EU—having absorbed many facets of the Dutch

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approach to drugs—is in the position to mobilize international infrastructure to coincide with its

drug control policies, and take the lead in changing the international drug control regime.

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CHAPTER TWO

Overview of Drug Policy

For thousands of years drugs have fascinated mankind. Civilizations that date as far back

as 5000 BC were known to have been involved with the trade and consumption of all types of

drugs15. The Sumerians, an ancient urban society who inhabited the Mesopotamian Fertile

Crescent and the Lake Dwellers of Switzerland, a pre-historic lake civilization, were documented

to have ingested traces of opium through consumption of poppy seeds. These ancient inhabitants,

along with many others, ate these seeds for a variety of purposes. For instance, the Sumerians

regularly intoxicated themselves with opium for the purpose of experiencing uninhibited joy

while the Lake Dwellers did so with the intention of entering into an inescapable state of

euphoria in which they could conduct internal reflections16. Other groups, including those in the

New World (North and South America) were accepting of opium, tobacco, hallucinogens, as

well as alcohol to assuage their physical and mental pain. As stated in the Babylonian Talmud,

which dates back to 450 A.D, “Wine is at the head of all medicines; where wine is lacking, drugs

are necessary”17. But aside from religious and medical purposes, drugs were also accepted for

personal, ceremonial, and ritual celebrations. For instance, many Native Americans would ingest

tobacco frequently and consume alcohol for seasonal celebrations18. Thus, whether they were

used for pleasure, to induce spiritual reflection, to alleviate pain, or for celebration, drugs were

culturally and philosophically accepted substances in pre-modern societies.

15 “Timeline of Events in the History of Drugs,” INPUD’s International Diaries Blog (2012). 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Joseph Westermeyer, “Cultural Factors in the Control, Prevention, and Treatment of Illicit Drug Use,” in Drug Policy and Human Nature: Psychological Perspectives on the Prevention, Management, and Treatment of Illicit Drug Abuse (New York: Plenum Press, 1996), 106.

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In more modern times—specifically, since the turn of the 20th century—this framework

of acceptance faded as the risks associated with the growing drug market were becoming more

prominent. As globalization propelled advancements in technology, trade, transportation, and

tourism worldwide, it became easier for psychoactive substances to be produced in remote

places, distributed to a variety of markets, and sold at affordable prices to consumers19.

Consequently, as more people began to gain access to these illicit drugs, demand grew for them,

which encouraged drug producers and traffickers to continue on with their operations20. This

dangerous cycle caused governments around the world to grow apprehensive. As they witnessed

local drug trade transform into a global enterprise, government authorities became increasingly

concerned that it would jeopardize the prosperity and stability of their communities. They

assessed that the presence of drug traffickers would be a total detriment to their nations’

economic and political development as economically, suppliers might bribe local businesses to

get involved in their operations, and politically, they would try to expand their network of

influence through public corruption21. Moreover, they were worried that an upsurge of new

synthetic drugs would jeopardize the public health and well-being of their citizens22.

Thus, as governments began to recognize the risks associated with the supply and

demand sides of the drug market, they took efforts to coordinate action. In these meetings,

numerous strategies were considered for controlling the drug trade; yet, one in particular that

19 Martin McKee and Lucy Reynolds, “Organised crime and the efforts to combat it: a concern for public health” in Globalization and Health (2010), 9. 20 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 23. For more information, see "Prescription and Illicit Drug Abuse," NIHSeniorHealth, July 2014. 21 Paul Stares, “Market Dynamics and the Challenge of Control” in Global Habit The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Brookings Institution, 1996), 48. 22 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 27.

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came to the forefront early on was the prohibitionist strategy, which was led most forcefully by

the United States23.

Prohibitionist Approach

Historically, the US has been the primary leader of this paradigm since the Neo-

Puritanical Enlightenment period. At the time, state governments believed that those who upheld

Puritan values such as self-control and temperance contributed to the functionality of society

whereas those who defied these notions were pariahs24. Accordingly, governments believed that

they needed to inhibit the actions of those who disregarded societal norms through strict penal

measures25.

As American society moved into the Progressive Era, the government took the lead in

trying to improve the quality of life for people across different socioeconomic classes. In the

process, illicit drugs became identified as substances that needed to be avoided at all costs26.

Soon after, officials around the world—liberals, conservatives, capitalists, fascists, communists,

socialists, populists, etc.—caught on to this notion as drugs were believed to encourage violent

behavior and criminal activity in society, as well as cause detriment to the drug-user’s health27.

Thus, within a matter of years, global prohibition was launched. This paradigm intensified as the

US gained influence over the international community under the authority of the UN, and made

drug prohibition one of its top priorities following World War II28.

23 Levine, “Global Drug Prohibition: Its Uses and Crises,” 146. 24 Ed D’Angelo, “The Moral Culture of Drug Prohibition” in The Humanist (Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, 1994). 25 John Donohue III, Benjamin Ewing, and David Pelopquin, “Rethinking America’s Illegal Drug Policy” in Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 219. 26 Anthony Gregory, “Drugs, Liberty, and the Right” in History News Network Blog (2005). 27 Office of National Drug Control Policy, "National Drug Control Strategy: 2014” (2014), 15. 28 Harry Levine, “The Secret of World-Wide Drug Prohibition,” Centre for Drug Research, University of Amsterdam (2001).

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Taking signal from the US’s legislative expression, international officials jointly

supported drug prohibition for decades, as they wanted to protect their societies from the threats

and harms of the international drug trade. They also provided their support for this approach as

they were willing to scale up on anti-drug resources, such as additional police and military

power, which would enable them to conduct non-drug-related surveillance operations and

military raids29. Consequently, on a global level, more criminal resources were established to

mitigate offenders involved on the supply-side of the drug trade and to suppress individual

demand for the substances. For instance, more prisons were built, more drug police were hired,

anti-drug military forces were expanded, and more government sponsored anti-drug messages

were funded, which were all meant to instill a level of public safety and public health for

society30. The overarching tactic of prohibition was to deter public and private behaviors that

were deemed as “unacceptable” to society through strict penal measures; however,

implementation varied with respect to the supply and demand sides of this policy.

In this next section, I will provide background on the historical efforts taken by the

international community in forming the prohibitionist global drug control strategy. I will

categorize global efforts into three successive phases: (1) the attempt to control licit drugs—

those that are legally prescribed to patients to address their health conditions—with prohibitionist

controls, which occurred from 1900-1960s, (2) the attempt to control illicit drugs—those that

lack medical or scientific purpose—with prohibitionist controls from 1960s-2000, (3) and the

attempt to control illicit drugs through harm-reductionist means, which has been an ongoing

effort since the new millennium. This section will focus on the second phase, but will make brief

mention of the first in order to understand the context of the second. The final phase of this

29 Levine, “Global Drug Prohibition: Its Uses and Crises,” 147. 30 Ibid., 148.

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progression—of which the international community is currently grappling with now—will be the

focus of a later section.

Phase One

In order to speak of the global drug control regime that arose during the 1960s, one must

be cognizant of its foundations. At the start of the 20th century, a series of conventions and

treaties called for the participation of the international community to control “licit” or legal

drugs—those that were deemed as indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering, but were to

be used strictly for medical and scientific purposes31. In creating the stipulations for this kind of

regulation, the regime utilized prohibitive language as it was believed that substances that “alter

the mental state of those who consume them are undesirable for society, and as such, their

consumption, trafficking, production, and possession must be avoided, minimized or, ideally,

eliminated”32.

Thus, some conventions that were held during this first phase, such as the International

Opium Commission, which met in Shanghai in 1909, and the International Opium Convention

that occurred at The Hague in 1912, took on a prohibitive tone. For instance, signatories such as

the US demanded that they would not sign any agreement that did not “fulfill the conditions

necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming narcotics drug traffic”33. This language

implies that the US had no tolerance for alternative forms of regulation aside from suppression. It

also demonstrates how members of these early conventions were concerned with implementing

supply-reduction methods first, as they believed that a shortage in supply would lead to the

31 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 15. 32 Renata Segura and Sabrina Stein, “The Global Drug Policy Debate: Experiences from the Americas and Europe” (2013), 10. 33 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 17.

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eventual dissipation of demand. Overall, the initial stage of the global regime was chiefly

preoccupied with controlling the supply of this legal grouping of drugs, which demonstrates that

it was narrowly focused. This phase was also criticized for being slow moving because while it

placed emphasis on the penalization of licit drugs used for specific medical and scientific

purposes, an entire market of illicit drugs was slowly being cultivated such that by the conclusion

of World War II, the illicit drug trade became a more serious international concern34.

Phase Two

As the illicit drug market was beginning to takeoff in the mid-20th century, the next phase

became focused on promoting the “health and welfare of mankind”35. The UN, which became

operational during this period, was crucial to this phase as it assumed the functions of the former

League of Nations and adopted its former drug control apparatuses. Under its authority, several

international agencies were formed to suppress the production, distribution, and use of licit and

illicit substances except for medical and scientific purposes.

Accordingly, three major treaties were devised under the supervision of the UN that

successively became more prohibitive in nature as they responded to heightening trends of

production and trafficking of virtually all types of illicit drugs. They emphasized criminalization,

policing, laws, and legal sanctions36. As a result, signatories of the three conventions were to

criminalize the production, sale, and ingestion of most psychoactive substances including

cannabis, cocaine, and opiates.

34 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 15. 35 David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, “Fifty Years of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs: A Reinterpretation” in Transnational Institute (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011), 1. 36 Harry Levine and Craig Reinarman, “Alcohol Prohibition and Drug Prohibition,” Centre of Drug Research, University of Amsterdam (2004).

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UN Single Convention on Narcotics

The first significant initiative of the second phase of the global drug regime was the UN

Single Convention on Narcotics, which was held in New York in 196137. At this conference, 73

nations met together as they believed that drug-related issues were above the interests of

individual states. The main purpose of this convention was to develop one unified treaty that

could serve the needs and interests of all its signatories. Participants hoped that the end product

of this convention would be an all-encompassing treaty that would serve as the primary guideline

for managing drug trafficking and abuse within their respective states. While the convention

devised a series of drafts over several years, the final product contained only modest

compromises necessary to reflect divergent interests and attitudes38.

The Single Convention treaty did not ignore early developments made on controlling

these drug-related issues. Rather, it consolidated previous notions and added new measures to

reflect changing circumstance39. Thus, it bore semblance to previous treaties as it continued to

prioritize measures taken to control the supply-side of drugs, which was viewed as top

importance to the international community for decades. Yet, to address the increasing intricacies

associated with drug trafficking, drug schedule classifications were broadened from two to fours

categories, and manufacturing quotas were created to diminish the production of narcotics such

as cannabis, cocaine, and opioids40. Moreover, it established the International Narcotics Control

Board, which was an amalgamation of prior drug control apparatuses used during Phase One,

and called for drug trafficking to be treated as an international crime under Article 3641.

37 For a copy of the treaty, see <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf>. 38 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, “Fifty Years of the 1961 Single Convention,” 7. 39 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 21. 40 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, “Fifty Years of the 1961 Single Convention,” 10. 41 Ibid., 9. “Subject to its constitutional limitations, each Party shall adopt such measures as will ensure that cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and

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Under this convention, the international community dove into action. It established

border controls, intercepted shipments between drug-producing regions and consumer markets,

and made more arrests of those involved in trafficking networks. However, as new types of drugs

were being developed, trafficked, and consumed for non-medical or non-scientific purposes,

signatories began to recognize the need to control the demand for these drugs as well. Although

the treaty makes brief mention of the measures to be taken against drug abuse in Article 38, it

hardly elaborates on the issue42. This is because at the time, the international community

believed that addressing the risks of drug use was not worthy of international deliberation.

Rather, it expected individuals to be responsible for avoiding drug use on their own accord43.

A few years after the Single Convention treaty went into affect, governments realized that

there were numerous deficiencies and inconsistencies with its content. For instance, despite the

treaty being the product of a multilateral effort, it did not require that all provisions be enforced

by the international system equally. Rather, each party had a lot of flexibility in the application

of certain offences and penalties (especially with regard to demand-related issues such as abuse

and possession), as these topics were considered nonessential during the convention. Thus, some

states applied strong provisions while others opted out of punitive measures altogether, which

caused a lot of disunity among the signatories44.

More friction emerged among the international regime with regards to drug

classifications. As the Single Convention was responsible for expanding the schedule system

from two to four schedules, many signatories disagreed with the categorizations that came into exportation of drugs…shall be punishable offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.” Single Convention Treaty, art. 36, sec. 1. 42 “Parties shall give special attention to and take all practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs…promote the training of personnel in the treatment, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of abusers of drugs”. Single Convention Treaty, art. 38, sec. 1 and 2. 43 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, "Fifty Years of the 1961 Single Convention,” 6. 44 Ibid., 9.

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place45. Some Parties felt that the schedules were irrational, i.e. cannabis was written to be

included with the strictest schedule in Article 2.1, “subject to all measures of control applicable

to drugs under this Convention,” alongside heroin. This measure received a lot of backlash from

the international community as cannabis was growing in popularity in many areas among young

adults, and its health effects were perceived to be much less harmful than those of other

substances46.

Parties like the US grew frustrated with the multilateral agreement as they felt that it was

too modest in its controls. By the time of its implementation, President Nixon had already

declared a “War on Drugs”, which he had hoped would set a repressive precedent around the

world47. Under his administration, he insisted that the US call for the Protocol Amending the

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1972 to assert more negative controls and adjust

existing provisions to respond to rising drug trafficking trends.48 Yet in this amendment, drug

treatment and rehabilitation were still not enforced on an international level. Instead, they were

provisions that were left up to the discretion of regional governments, which highlighted the

need for change in this realm49.

As the international regime under the Single Convention did not have a cohesive grip

over certain control provisions, it had limited success in controlling illicit drug trafficking and

abuse. Thus, responsibility to control illicit drugs slowly shifted toward regional and national

authorities as delineated in the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988

Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances50. Nevertheless,

45 For a list of schedules, see <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index146601EN.html>. 46 Ibid., 10. 47 Levine, “The Secret of World-Wide Drug Prohibition”. 48 Adolf Lande, “Commentary on the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,” United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 1972). 49 Ibid. 50 Stares, “The Rise of the Global Drug Market,” 26.

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the Single Convention, despite its unwholesome approach, is considered to be at the core of the

international drug control regime.

1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances

The second convention that was fundamental to the global drug control regime during

this phase was the Convention on Psychotropic Substances51. As the global drug trade was

undergoing massive expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, and new synthetic drugs were emerging,

this treaty aimed to establish tighter restrictions and controls to address these changing trends52.

While the focus of this convention was still centered on supply-side issues (drug abuse was only

briefly mentioned), control measures were implemented in a different form.

As mentioned in Article 22, section 2, member nations were to assume responsibility for

introducing domestic legislation that restricts the sale and consumption of synthetic drugs. Yet,

while Parties were allowed to make their respective penal decisions, they had to adhere to the

prohibitionist framework as was written in the original international treaty. Thus, they continued

to value retributive policies over those that encouraged treatment.

1988 Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances

The United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances met in Vienna from November 25 to December 20,

198853. This conference was formed as a response to increasing drug trafficking trends around

the world. Members aimed to devise strict penal measures to be carried out against drug

traffickers and called for amplified participation from international law enforcement bodies to

51 For a copy of the treaty, see <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971_en.pdf>. 52 Ibid., 27. 53 For a copy of the treaty, see <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf>.

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suppress illicit markets. This international treaty differs from the previous two as it specifically

mentions provisions to be taken in order to eliminate illicit demand for narcotic drugs in Article

1454. Although it fixates on penal stipulations as the previous two treaties did, it introduces a new

tone that displays regard for individual well-being.

Problems with the Global Regime

The global drug control regime, which began at the start of the 20th century, formed as a

response to rising international trends of illicit drug use and trafficking. As many nations around

the world were worried about the dangers and harms that illicit drugs would cause for their

societies and people, they banded together to control these issues through a series of international

conventions at the UN level. Although these conventions fostered preliminary conversations

among leading global powers, the regime is said to have produced limited results in controlling

drug trafficking and consumption.

One reason for this assertion is that the international conventions were very one-sided.

They were exceedingly preoccupied with developing supply-reduction measures, and thus, gave

seldom attention to demand-reduction55. Only in the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Trafficking

in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances was there an attempt to control demand for illicit

substances, but it was still very preliminary. Thus, the three treaties failed to detail extensive

healthcare or treatment measures that could have benefitted drug users tremendously 56 .

Consequently, this negligence induced increased incidences of drug overdose, addiction, and

54 “Parties shall adopt appropriate measures aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance, with a view to reducing human suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit traffic.” Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, Art. 14, sec. 4. 55 David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, “Regime Change: Re-visiting the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” in the International Journal of Drug Policy (2011), 4. 56 Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, “Drug Policy Reform in Practice: Experiences with Alternatives in Europe and the US" in Transnational Institute (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2009), 3.

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disease that develop in relation to drug dependence, such as HIV and Hepatitis57. Moreover, the

global regime has been criticized for being economically unsustainable. As prohibition-oriented

measures utilize extensive criminal resources—expanded prisons facilities, courts, law

enforcement personnel, and maintenance staff—the associated costs are extremely high, which

has placed a large economic strain on the international community58. Furthermore, the global

regime has been denigrated for its constant amendment and adjustment of treaties. Although

these actions reflect the changing levels of international trafficking and consumption, they have

led to a variety of inconsistencies among the three treaties, which has caused confusion for the

international community59.

To summarize, the three treaties, which were the basis of Phase Two of the international

regime, became more prohibitive in tone from one to the next such that the task of reducing illicit

drugs was only achievable through penal measures. Additionally, as these treaties fell susceptible

to certain shortcomings, individual regional governments assumed responsibility for handling

drug-related issues. However, as regions were unable to experiment with new policy measures,

as they were signatories to either one or more of the original international treaties, they had to

continue adhering to prohibitionist stipulations.

Regional Approaches

Historically under this framework, the US region has focused on supply-side issues while

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted a demand-side focus. Within

this context, the former region has imposed strict penal measures on those involved in trafficking

to prevent drug supply from entering its borders while the latter has tended to focus its criminal

57 Stares, “The Future of the Global Drug Market,” 101. 58 Antoine Canet and Teo Doremus, “Drug Legalization and Prohibition Pros and Cons,” 6. 59 Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma, "Fifty Years of the 1961 Single Convention,” 16.

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resources on those who abuse drugs to discourage individual consumption. This next section will

grapple with these two approaches followed by the western and eastern worlds. In doing so, it

will assess how affective the prohibitionist framework itself has been in curbing the problem and

contemplate whether these regions should abandon this framework altogether in place of an

alternative approach. Ultimately, this section will portray how some regions became more

concerned with managing the supply-side of the international drug market while others chose to

focus on the demand-side60.

Supply-Reduction Strategy

The goal of supply-reduction under the prohibitionist framework is to prevent substances

from entering national borders so that ordinary citizens are unable to gain access to them61.

Although this approach encompasses several processes including the eradication of illicit crop

production, processing, and harvesting, I will solely focus on the interdiction (interception and

prevention) of drug traffickers.

Following the conclusion of World War II and with the onset of globalization, drug

trafficking operations were heightened due to improvements in communication technology.

These advancements improved opportunities for criminals to smuggle drugs across international

boundaries: they enabled cooperative arrangements to form between drug rings located in

different regions, allowing them to exploit comparative advantages and expand into new

markets62. This greater interconnection between drug traffickers was not only a result of

60 The supply side of drugs refers to the synthesis, processing, growing, harvesting, and trafficking of chemical compounds. The demand side of drugs entails their acquisition from suppliers, their transport, and consumption. While both of these terms are packaged with crucial elements, the focus of this essay is restricted to the topics of drug trafficking and consumption. Thus, when referencing the “supply side” of drugs, I am solely speaking of the act of trafficking drugs; and, when referencing the “demand side” of drugs, I am speaking of drug consumption. 61 Stares, “Market Dynamics and the Challenge of Control,” 69. 62 Ibid., 67.

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improved communication methods, but also of enhanced modes of transportation. As trafficking

entails the actual transport of supply from trafficker to trafficker, or, trafficker to receiver,

developments and growth in private and commercial transportation systems have been

fundamental in heightening interactions among those involved on the supply-side of the

operation63. As a result of these improvements in communication and transportation, authorities

have found it more difficult to intercept drugs at their diversified sources and mitigate the

dangers that drug trafficking poses on societies.

With a surplus of product, economically compulsive suppliers are incentivized to

disregard the well-being of innocent people and sell their product in ways that will earn them

highest profit margins64. For instance, suppliers may fraudulently market contaminated products

to wholesalers, despite their perceived harms to consumers, in order to earn themselves profits.

Moreover, suppliers, dealers, and gang members of different drug cartels may engage in street

fights to secure access to different “turfs” and trafficking routes that bear the largest number of

high-paying customers65, which would disrupt civil society and turn neighborhoods and entire

hubs into combat zones66. As suppliers come to dominate these areas that lack effective law

enforcement, they dismantle the political, financial, and security institutions that were formerly

in place. Consequently, these transit areas have been characterized by their drug-related crime

and systematic violence67.

To mitigate these harms, certain entities have taken a supply-reduction approach under

the prohibitionist framework. This method entails the suppression of drug trafficking channels

63 Ibid., 55. 64 Paul Goldstein, "The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework" in Journal of Drug Issues (1985), 146. 65 Ibid., 148. 66 “Drug Related Crime Biggest Threat to Public Safety in the Americas, Warns UN,” UN News Centre (New York: United Nations Publications, 2008). 67 Segura and Stein, “The Global Drug Policy Debate: Experiences from the Americas and Europe,” 5.

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and networks through the destruction of processing laboratories, the disruption of smuggling

routes, and the arrest of drug traffickers. It also requires the infliction of strict correctional

measures on those involved with these networks, as they are to be held accountable for breaching

public safety 68.

Despite the impracticalities that resulted from a global drug control regime centered on

prohibition, US officials continued to sustain this outlook and concentrate on supply-reduction

initiatives within its own borders as it viewed illicit drug trafficking and its associated dangers to

be some of the greatest threats to the nation’s public security69. As mentioned before, President

Richard Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” in 1971, in which he dramatically increased the scope

of drug control resources and introduced mandatory prison sentences. President Ronald Reagan

continued in the same direction as during his administration, new regulations dealing with drug

offenders were introduced in Congress and state legislatures, which rapidly increased the federal

prison population. His presidency was characterized by an escalation in incarceration rates for

those who committed “non-violent drug law offenses”70. Similarly, President George W. Bush

made efforts to establish this framework by escalating the number of military personnel who

were to manage domestic drug law enforcement71. Overall, since the latter half of the 20th

century, the US government has invested billions of dollar in initiatives that were intended to

address the supply-side of the problem.

These measures have enabled drug enforcement agencies to escalate penalties, have

introduced public surveillance technology, and have allow officials to coordinate data on violent

and criminal activity at both the federal and state levels. Recently, the Obama Administration in

68 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Counternarcotics Policy Overview: Global Trends and Strategies,” Brookings’s Partnership for the Americas Commission (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), 14. 69 “Levine, “Global Drug Prohibition: Its Uses and Crises,” 146. 70 Drug Policy Alliance, “A Brief History of the Drug War,” Drug Policy Alliance, accessed May 3, 2015. 71 Ibid.

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its 2013 budget requested $25.6 billion in federal spending on the drug war. Of that, $15 billion

would go to law enforcement, interdiction, and international efforts72. These expenditures have

facilitated the incarceration of more people for drug-related crimes such that between 2000 and

2010 the number of people in federal prisons for drug offenses spiked from 74,276 to 97,47273.

An example of a federal level program that was created to help prevent criminal behavior is the

National Criminal History Improvement Program, which coordinates information about the

advancements of high-level drug traffickers in US borders among the various branches of

government74. Programs such as these have been crucial to the US because by developing more

accurate and reliable data, agencies such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy, a

component of the Executive Office of the President, are able to implement clearer laws that

outline legal and illegal behaviors related to drug trafficking. They also permit them to set clearer

punishment measures that aim to diminish drug supply within US borders75. Similarly, individual

states within the US have taken costly steps to diminish drug supply within their boundaries.

Data collection programs such as the State Justice Statistics Program have been created to

improve criminal record keeping and produce statistics that will help promote public safety and

minimize disruptions to society 76. Therefore, within all levels of the US government, various

agencies and institutional bodies have developed programs intended to improve the infrastructure

needed to control drug supply and tackle drug-related safety issues within US borders.

72 Matt Sledge, “The Drug War And Mass Incarceration By The Numbers” in The Huffington Post (New York: 2013). 73 Ibid. 74 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “National Criminal History Improvement Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington DC: 2014). 75 Office of National Drug Control Policy, "National Drug Control Strategy: 2014,” 35. 76 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “State Justice Statistics Program,” Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington DC: 2014).

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Demand-Reduction Strategy

Demand-reduction strategies under the prohibitionist framework aim to deter behaviors

through anti-drug media campaigns and penal measures. The former intends to spread messages

of individual responsibility for health and economic success, respect for police, resisting peer-

group pressure, the value of God or a higher power in recovering from drug abuse, or other like-

minded values77. The latter aims to foster compliance with the laws that prohibit the freedom to

sell, acquire, possess, and consume certain psychoactive substances for reasons that do not bear

medical or scientific purpose78. Although demand-reduction strategies target all of these facets,

this section will solely focus on illicit drug consumption. Ultimately, these two measures try to

mitigate demand through the promotion of individual responsibility79.

Over the past few decades, the demand for illicit drugs has heightened as a result of

global processes80. As new media and communication platforms have circulated reports of drug

developments, record-breaking drug seizures, and celebrity overdoses, they have captured

societal attention and propagated global awareness for certain drug fads around the world81.

Consequently, individuals—particularly young adolescents—have been tempted to explore the

sensation of these high-profile substances. As a result, the potential for users to fall victim to

overdose or addiction has been elevated82. Yet, consumption of illicit drugs is not only

detrimental to an individual user’s health, but is also costly for society because of its sweeping

77 Levine, “The Secret of World-Wide Drug Prohibition”. 78 Stares, “Market Dynamics and the Challenge of Control,” 73. 79 Levine, “The Secret of World-Wide Drug Prohibition”. 80 As a disclaimer, I am generalizing about drug consumption patterns on the whole as they vary across communities, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic levels. 81 Stares, “Market Dynamics and the Challenge of Control,” 60. 82 Overdose occurs when individuals cannot metabolize drugs fast enough to avoided unintended side effects. Addiction occurs when individuals find it difficult to break their drug habits, and thus engage in compulsive drug seeking and use, despite the harmful consequences.

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health and social consequences83. These costs may relate to human and financial resources lost

due to abuse in the workplace and health care costs associated with diseases that develop in

relation to drug dependence. Thus, some regions around the world have taken initiative to

suppress drug consumption, as it is viewed as both a private and public nuisance.

This approach to the drug problem has been taken up by various nations in Asia,

specifically those in Southeast Asia. As far back as 1972, when the ASEAN Experts Group

Meeting on the Prevention and Control of Drug Abuse was held to foster cooperation on drug

control, member nations took a very rigid perspective to controlling substance demand that

called for the incarceration of nearly all drug-related incidents, and, at times imposed the death

penalty on criminals who committed narcotic-related offenses 84 . However, these drastic

measures didn’t produce the results that ASEAN officials were expecting. In 2012, 65% of the

incarcerated population in Thailand was drug offenders; however, many of them had committed

only minor drug offenses. These offenders, many of which were deprived of probation, merely

took up vital prison space that could have otherwise been set-aside for those who had committed

greater offenses85. Over the course of a few decades, it became evident that this punitive

approach to curbing drug abuse not only imposed enormous economic costs on taxpayers, as

they had to cover the costs of rising prison populations, but also depleted criminal justice

resources that could have otherwise been allocated toward serious criminals. Moreover, many

public officials began to catch on to the notion that the sole reliance on criminal justice systems

was insufficient, as it discouraged addicts from seeking adequate treatment that they desperately

needed.

83 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “Drugs and Crime Facts,” Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington DC: 2014), 52. 84 Pratap Parameswaran, “Combating and Preventing Drug and Substance Abuse,” The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2010). 85 Tom Fawthrop, “The New War on Drugs: ASEAN Style” in The Diplomat (2012).

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Debate on Drug Prohibition

Since the turn of the 21st century, a debate has unfolded that contemplates the

effectiveness of prohibition as a regional drug control strategy86. Some grant favor to this

strategy and support the continuance of strict penal measures to reduce drug supply and demand.

Others, however, believe that regional prohibition has been narrow and insufficient in achieving

its aims. This latter group posits that regions are to abandon prohibition altogether in place of an

alternative approach. The following section will present this debate.

Pro Prohibition

In the current day, policy makers and officials such as Antonio Maria Costa, executive

director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in 2008, favor tough punitive measures as they

continue to perceive drug trafficking to be “the biggest threat to public safety in the Americas”87.

He believes this to be so because trafficking not only ushers in the most harmful drugs into US

borders, but also because it is has been connected to numerous criminal infractions over the

years. For instance, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics report entitled “Drug Use and

Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004”, 18% of federal inmates committed crimes such

as rape, robbery, and property offense in order to obtain money for drugs, and this statistic has

been rising ever since88. Moreover, the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that in 2006, 5.3% of the 15,087 homicides in which

circumstances were known were narcotics-related89. Therefore, Costa along with other advocates

of this framework would press that the US should continue enhancing and reforming its punitive

86 Levine, “Global Drug Prohibition: its Uses and Crises,” 145. 87 “Drug Related Crime Biggest Threat,” UN News Centre. 88 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “Drugs and Crime Facts,” 5. 89 Ibid., 6.

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measures as eradication and indictment programs are necessary to reduce violence perpetrated

from drug trafficking90. Specifically, he would enforce that the DEA, US Customs Service, US

Border Patrol, and US Coast Guard should continue being active as they have made a number of

successful drug seizures over the years. For instance, as reported in the Bureau of Justice

Statistics’ “Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online”, in 2008 the DEA program for

eradicating domestic marijuana resulted in the destruction of 8 million plants in 20,120 plots,

8,296 arrests, 5,305 weapons seized, and assets seized valued at $66 million91. Moreover,

between 1980-1997, murder rates related to drug distribution fell by over 25%, and teen drug use

reduced by more than a third as drug incarceration rates rose over fourfold92. Thus, these efforts

have clearly reduced at least some of the problems that drug trafficking imposes on society.

Con Prohibition

However, prohibition as a drug control strategy has been heavily contested by a variety of

subjects, including those in the American political arena. For instance, President Bill Clinton

stated that the mechanisms used by the prohibitionist framework to control both illicit drug

supply and demand induce great economic strain on society93. On average, American taxpayers

expend nearly 51 billion dollars per year on drug-related arrests and prison facilities at the state

and local levels94. As a result, prisons have become overcrowded with people who don’t

necessarily need to follow correctional measures and are stretched far beyond capacity. In 2006

alone, 40 out of 50 states were at 90 percent capacity or more, with 23 of those states operating

90 Canet and Doremus, “Drug Legalization and Prohibition Pros and Cons,” 13. 91 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, “Drugs and Crime Facts,” 21. 92 Robert Peterson, "Has the War on Drugs Reduced Crime?” in Moyers on Addiction Blog (1998). 93 Drug Policy Alliance, “A Brief History of the Drug War”. 94 Sledge, “The Drug War And Mass Incarceration By The Numbers”.

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at over 100 percent capacity95. As this statistic illustrates, US prisons have been inundated with

people who are guilty of only minor offences, such as the possession of very small quantities of

drugs, instead of those who have committed violent crimes like rape, assault, and robbery96. To

compensate for this overload, prisons have had to employ more maintenance staff and provide

more basic resources to inmates, which have also drained federal and state budgets97. Thus,

contenders of drug prohibition argue that it is a system that subjects those who commit minor

infractions to arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment, which ultimately is an economic burden on

society.

Aside from economic considerations, challengers of the prohibitionist approach have

criticized its actual success in reducing illicit drug supply and demand. With regard to supply-

reduction, they argue that intercepting shipments and disabling trafficking organizations won’t

impede criminal behaviors, as traffickers will continue to develop and improve inconspicuous

routes and techniques with the advent of new technology98. This has been evident as violent

traffickers still endanger life in US cities even decades after the initial launch of drug

prohibition99. Thus, many positioned on this side of the debate, including proponents of the Drug

Policy Alliance100 and the American Civil Liberties Union, would agree that when setting its

next legislative agenda, the US must look for alternative models to handling drug trafficking as,

its previous strategies have neither delivered economically efficient nor effective results101.

95 “People Sentenced For Drug Offenses in the US Correctional System,” in Drug War Facts, ed. Douglas McVay, Common Sense for Drug Policy, accessed May 3, 2015. 96 “End the War on Drugs,” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (GuideStar USA). 97 “Against Drug Prohibition,” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (GuideStar USA). 98 The White House, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” (Washington DC: 2011), 24. 99 For more information, see <http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/drug_trafficking.shtml>. 100 The Drug Policy Alliance is the US’s leading organization that promotes drug policies grounded in science, compassion, health, and human rights. 101 “Against Drug Prohibition,” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation.

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With regard to demand-reduction, some politicians, health professionals, scientists, and

lawyers criticize drug prohibition as they argue that it has been responsible for the spread of

certain fatal diseases such as HIV/AIDS102. As prohibition strictly forbid the possession of drug

paraphernalia, users were encouraged to share needles with one another, which may have

contributed to the spread of the disease. Additionally, they criticize that under this framework,

funds have been misallocated toward law enforcement concerns rather than drug education and

treatment programs, which would have benefitted users tremendously103. As a result, they have

not been able to resolve their drug-related habits and activities. Thus, while inmates take up

room in correctional facilities, they are withheld from crucial treatment programs that would

have otherwise equipped them to cure their addictions and reintegrate back into their families

and communities104.

Additionally, these stakeholders would agree that drug prohibition has been largely

ineffective in controlling supply and demand because of its delayed and narrowed approach. As

prohibition focuses on retribution, it merely employs reactive measures to the problem. Although

it preemptively scales up on law enforcement resources, it administers punitive measures on

subjects only after specific incidents have occurred105. With regard to the supply- and demand-

sides of the issue, it enforces punishments against traffickers and abusers, but doesn’t offer

programs or assistance that would deter their behaviors in the first place106.

Thus, contenders of this framework aim to repeal criminal prohibition and create a

reasonable regulatory system that will ultimately lead to a healthier, freer, and less crime-ridden

102 Ibid. 103 “America's New Drug Policy Landscape,” Pew Research Center (2014). 104 Lohman Yew, “Effective Treatment Measures For Prisoners and Drug Addicts to Facilitate Their Reintegration into Society” in 108th International Seminar Participants' Papers, 305. 105 “Against Drug Prohibition,” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. 106 Alcibiades Bilzerian, “Over-Incarceration In America” in The Bilzerian Report (2011).

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society107. In order to accomplish this vision, they assert that federal and state resources should

focus on “effective treatment and education programs aimed at addressing the harms and causes

of drug misuse”108 and should scale back on punitive ones. They believe that it is ultimately

these kinds of programs that will improve public health and security within a community.

Aside from considerations regarding regional prohibition, another conversation has

surfaced as the US and ASEAN’s regional strategies have encountered several problems. This

one contemplates the practicality and sustainability of regional drug control strategies altogether.

Even though the US invests vast expenditures to incarcerate drug trafficking groups, others (with

improved capabilities) quickly replace them109. Thus, it has been recognized that attention cannot

solely be placed on eliminating those who are associated with supplying drugs to society. There

also needs to be an emphasis on demand-reduction, as it is the only way that suppliers will

gradually phase out of business110. But, taking efforts to reduce consumption patterns is difficult

if supply is still prevalent. Thus, demand-reduction strategies must ultimately aim to de-

incentivize people from acquiring and consuming supply in the first place. They can do so by

incorporating prevention programs for those who are headed toward addiction111. Yet, this is not

to say that all regional strategies have been ineffective. Rather, those that have been crafted from

an alternative framework, like the EU’s strategy, have enjoyed their own successes in mitigating

drug-related problems and crimes.

107 “Against Drug Prohibition,” American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. 108 Drug Policy Alliance, “Supply and Demand,” The Drug Policy Alliance, accessed May 3, 2015. 109 Ibid. 110 Paul Stares, “Responding to the Challenge” in Global Habit The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Brookings Institution, 1996), 105. 111 Drug Policy Alliance, “Supply and Demand”.

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CHAPTER THREE

Case Study

Europe

As individual regions took control in handling drug-related issues amidst the weakening

global regime, none acted quite the same as the European region did. As discussed in the

previous chapter, the US took on a prohibitionist stance and focused its efforts on supply-

reduction. Similarly, ASEAN employed a prohibitionist framework, but focused its resources on

demand-reduction efforts. However, Europe, a region that lies between both of these regions, has

managed to target both sides of the international drug trade, and, has done so through a harm-

reductionist approach. Led by the Dutch model, European drug policies have exhibited much

success in minimizing harm to users and maintaining public order.

Yet, before the Netherlands was able to wield its influence over Europe, the EU had

made certain broad developments that addressed the drug problem from the international

prohibitionist standpoint. Aside from scaling up its law enforcement resources, including the

establishment of Europol, it set standards and provisions within its foundational treaties that

referenced the illicit drug trade. For instance, the Treaty of European Union itself alludes to the

treatment of unlawful drug trafficking, as it was viewed as a criminal problem in most countries,

but does not call for unilateral enforcement112. Thus, with considerable room for interpretation,

member nations took to developing their own respective policy agendas for controlling illicit

112 Tim Boekhout van Solinge, “Drugs and Decision-Making in the European Union” (Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt Publishers, 2002), 31.

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drugs within their borders113. While some nations such as Sweden and France continued to

follow the international standard of prohibition, others, such as the Netherlands, explored an

entirely new approach.

The Netherlands

This section will focus on the Netherlands, as it is a country that has broken away from

the previous global framework and has fostered an unusual relationship with the law. Unlike the

US and ASEAN, which are regions that have focused their efforts on either reducing the supply-

side or demand-side of the international drug market, the Netherlands strives to control both

through harm-reductionist measures. In this case analysis, I will focus on the Netherlands and

explain how the Dutch approach to drugs has developed over time. I will also portray its

successes in minimizing harm to users and maintaining public order. I assert that a synthesis of

this information will underscore the importance of the Dutch example and the implications that it

has for the rest of the world. Ultimately, this section serves to demonstrate how the Dutch drug

policy will serve as a template for an improved global drug control strategy.

Foundation for the Dutch Approach to Drugs

The Dutch approach to drugs is less concerned with ideological considerations and more

focused on liberal policies or “beleids” for pragmatic reasons114. This approach stems from the

1950s, when the Netherlands experienced a cultural revolution that encouraged individual

113 Steve Anderson, "European Drug Policy: The Cases of Portugal, Germany, and The Netherlands" in EIU Political Science Review (2012), 1. 114 Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” 243.

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entrepreneurship and individual creativity115. At the time, the state was to allow individuals to

establish their own personal life-styles and go easy on the enforcement of laws that limited

opportunities for self-fulfillment. It was to practice an “administrative policy of tolerance” where

administrators were to accept deviations from the letter of the law116.

Easing Up of Prohibition with Respect to Consumption

During the mid-20th century, drug trafficking and consumption trends were soaring

worldwide and within the country’s borders, which prompted the most left-wing government in

Dutch history, the Den Uyl coalition government, to devise a solution to the problems.

Specifically, massive shipments of heroin, cocaine, and other illicit drugs were arriving in the

Netherlands’ ports, which caused the greatest concern for authorities117. Not only did these

substances lead to more health-related incidences, but also led to more drug-related crimes. To

target and eliminate drugs of this caliber, the government set out to create a new strategy under

the Amended 1976 Netherlands Opium Act118 that distinguished between hard119 (schedule I)

and soft120 (schedule II) drugs as well as trafficking and consumption behaviors. Thus, penalties

for drug-related offenses depended on the type of drug involved and the action being taken.

Correspondingly, some drugs and action types were subjected to non-prosecution under the

Dutch Public Prosecution Service, which not only brought an end to the world trend of “zero-

115 Wijnand Mijnhardt, “A Tradition of Tolerance,” in Discovering the Dutch (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 118. 116 Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” 243. 117 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands”. 118 The first Opium Act was formed in 1919, and a new one came into force in 1928. 119 This classification of drugs, which includes substances such as heroin, cocaine, and amphetamines, was perceived to be the most damaging to an individual’s health and public security. 120 This classification of drugs includes substances such as cannabis and mushrooms, which pose fewer risks to the human body and society.

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tolerance” with respect to soft drugs, but also underscored the circumstances in which

prosecution was to be upheld121.

Thus, the first element of the strategy was to call for the strict prosecution of those who

produced, trafficked, and distributed hard drugs. Systematic involvement in these realms was to

be penalized with stiff prison sentences, as the Dutch aimed to minimize public crime122. For

instance, currently under Dutch penal law, large-scale traffickers of hard drugs are sentenced to a

minimum of twelve years of prison. However, those who use small amounts of hard drugs for

personal use are not subjected to criminal punishments123. The Dutch have also scaled up on

confiscation resources that target the supply-side of the problem. For instance, the National

Crime Squad dismantled 42 synthetic drugs production locations in 2012. Additionally, it seized

10 tons of cocaine, 2.4 million ecstasy tablets, and 750 kg of heroin in the same year124.

However, as supply has not been completely eliminated within the Netherlands’ borders, the

Dutch government has continued to improve upon its strategy with regard to specific problem

drugs. For instance, in 2001, it aimed to increase law enforcement resources to tackle the

trafficking of ecstasy,125 and in 2002, it focused its efforts on cocaine126. By implementing non-

prosecution stipulations into law, the Dutch have been able to specify criminal actions that are

punishable by law, and allocate resources toward the investigation and prosecution of trafficking

operations.

The second part of this strategy was to employ harm-reduction tactics on those who were

drug abusers and addicts. The government instituted this measure to avoid marginalization of 121 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands”. 122 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Information and Communication Division, “FAQ DRUGS,” 10. 123 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands”. 124 “Country Overview: Netherlands,” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (Washington DC: GPO, 2014). 125 For more information, see 2001 White Paper, “A combined effort to combat ecstasy”. 126 For more information, see 2002 “Plan to combat drug trafficking at Schiphol airport”.

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addicts from society and to prevent potential addicts from falling ill to this fate127. Under this

framework, treatment, prevention, and education policies were implemented to address the

adverse health risks associated with illicit drugs. In the current day, harm-reduction continues to

play a pivotal role in the Dutch strategy and has been modified by the “Letter outlining the new

Dutch policy” published in 2009 and the “Drug policy letter” of 2011. These initiatives have

helped increase resources that protect public health128.

While both soft and hard drugs pose harms to individuals, the Dutch have created

specific treatment programs that are to address addicts of hard drugs, as they tend to suffer from

the highest health risks. Specifically, thirteen addiction care centers have been created that offer

methadone treatments to opiate addicts and needle exchange programs to prevent the spread of

diseases like HIV129. Additionally, these facilities offer psychosocial interventions as a form of

treatment, which incorporate motivational interviewing, relapse prevention techniques, and

cognitive-behavioral therapies130. These treatment measures have been widely received as in

2012, nearly 3,000 clients entered treatment for cocaine addiction while over 1,000 entered for

opioids. Behavioral intervention facilities have also been created in line with the 2004 Placement

in an Institution for Prolific Offenders stipulation to improve the criminal behaviors of those who

abuse hard drugs and safeguard society from their offences. Also, outpatient care facilities have

been created to provide outreach services to patients including counseling and daytime shelters

to take problematic drug users off the streets131.

127 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Information and Communication Division, “FAQ DRUGS,” 5. 128 “Country Overview: Netherlands,” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 129 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands”. 130 “Country Overview: Netherlands,” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 131 Ibid.

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Additionally, the Dutch have funded healthcare initiatives that are aimed at preventing

drug abuse and addiction in the first place. For instance, the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and

Sport has installed youth counseling centers and clinics among other resources that offer services

to those who are suffering or headed toward addiction132. They also have authorized the

establishment of on-site testing centers where people can have any type of drug tested for

impurities without being prosecuted133.

Furthermore, incorporated in this harm-reduction approach are initiatives that are

intended to help educate the population about the dangers of all drugs134. Specifically, the Dutch

government encourages schools to educate the youth on the negative effects of drugs at a young

age. For instance, the Healthy School and Drugs Program is the leading program in the

Netherlands that has created campaigns to help the youth develop “the skills they need to resist

peer pressure and make their own choices”135. Programs such as these are intended to motivate

people to avoid high-risk substances and engage in safe behaviors.

The third prong of this strategy was aimed at the toleration of those who traffic and abuse

soft drugs136. Attitudes of toleration have evolved over time as recreational cannabis had been

steadily normalized in many parts of the world since the 1960s. Moreover, researchers around

the world have discovered it to not be medically harmful or pose immediate threats to society137.

Thus, by imposing only minor punishments on those who traffic soft drugs (maximum six years

imprisonment for cannabis), and not prosecuting those who use soft drugs, Dutch officials have

132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ana Hilde and Dennis McCarty, “Dutch Drug Policy,” 17. 135 M. Malmberg, “Effectiveness of the Universal Prevention Program 'Healthy School and Drugs': Study Protocol of a Randomized Clustered Trial” in BMC Public Health (2010). 136 Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” 244. 137 The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Information and Communication Division, “FAQ DRUGS,” 7. Researchers from the Institute of Medicine in the US have concluded that there is “no persuasive evidence that the pharmacological properties of drugs, specifically cannabis, can provoke the switch to hard drugs”.

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been able to concentrate their law enforcement resources primarily on those who engage with

hard drug substances that pose the greatest dangers to society138. As the Dutch understand that

people are going to use drugs if they wish despite the government’s approval, they have gone

about regulating soft drugs through controlled environments. For instance, cannabis is sold in

“coffee shops,” hallucinogenic mushrooms are sold in “smart shops,” and seeds and equipment

for growing marijuana are distributed in “grow shops”. While each establishment fosters an open

culture of soft drug use through its own regulations, I will solely focus on the strict regulation

standards that must be upheld within coffee shops139.

Coffee Shops

The criterion to be followed by coffee shops was classified by the abbreviation ‘AHOJ-

G’, which stands for the five provisions that they all must follow in the Netherlands140. The letter

“A” in the abbreviation stands for the Dutch word ‘affichering’, which translates to ‘advertising’

in English. This specification prohibits the advertisement of coffee shops and cannabis products

across different mediums such as newspapers, magazines, and television commercials.

Moreover, this provision requires that coffee shops use discretion when designing their window

displays; they are not to overtly indicate that they sell cannabis within the premises. The next

letter in the abbreviation is “H”, which stands for ‘hard drugs’. Coffee shops must strictly adhere

to the sale of soft drugs such as cannabis, as mixing soft and hard drugs could lead to dangerous

138 Ibid., 6. A common misconception is that the Netherlands has legalized the trafficking and consumption of soft drugs. It is important to note that consumption of soft drugs is still not legalized, but rather, has been controlled and decriminalized. While the practice is permissive, the law in the books continues to reflect moral condemnation. Inevitably, the Netherlands has become an “alternative cannabis regime” as it has entered into de facto decriminalization where marijuana is allowed in practice (possession of up to 30 grams), but not necessarily by the letter of the law. 139 Joost Breeksema and Jean-Paul Grund, “Coffee Shops and Compromise: Separated Illicit Drug Markets in the Netherlands” in Global Drug Policy Program (New York: Open Society Foundation, 2013), 3. 140 Hans Van der Veen, “Regulation in Spite of Prohibition: The Control of Cannabis Distribution in Amsterdam,” Project Muse, 136.

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outcomes. Next in the abbreviation is the letter “O”, which stands for the Dutch word “overlast”.

This letter suggests that public disturbances are forbidden in this kind of establishment. That is,

no one is to act in such a way that will make others feel uncomfortable or unwelcomed within the

coffee shop environment. The fourth provision stems from the Dutch word ‘jongeren’, which

prohibits children under the age of eighteen from entering coffee shops or buying cannabis

product. This provision was set to prevent children from engaging with drugs of any kind.

Finally, the last letter of the abbreviation is “G”, which stands for ‘grote hoeveelheden’. This

specification prohibits the sale of large quantities of cannabis to individual customers, partly to

prevent tourists from buying cannabis for export. As a result, the legal maximum amount for

individual possession switched from thirty grams to five grams per customer in 1995141.

With the establishment of these regulation provisions via the Opium Act, coffee shops

spread rapidly across the Netherlands in the next decade, expanding from backstreet locations to

those that were central to the city142. However, different municipalities were able to apply

different rules. As stipulated in the “Damocles Bill”, the mayor, the chief of police, and the chief

public prosecutor were all authorized to decide whether or not to allow coffee shops within their

jurisdiction, and if so, how many143.

Success of Dutch Drug Policies

This new coffee shop culture received praise for fostering an environment of minimal

crime and few drug addicts. As coffee shops increased in popularity, researchers put great effort

into measuring the outcomes of such a radical change in policy. For instance, they conducted

141 Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” 245. 142 Robert MacCoun and Peter Reuter, “Evaluating Alternative Cannabis Regimes” in the British Journal of Psychiatry (2001), 123. 143 Van der Veen, “Regulation in Spite of Prohibition,” 136.

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experiments that tested whether cannabis was a gateway drug or not, as people believed that the

frequent use of cannabis could lead to recurrent use of harder drugs with more potential for

addiction and injury144. However, researchers debunked this notion with experiments that

demonstrated how the number of people addicted to hard drugs was low145. Moreover, other

statistics denoted how the Dutch have had similar or even greater success than other nations in

curbing drug abuse among its population.

For instance, according to the National Prevalence Survey of 2005, only 5.4% of the

Dutch population between the ages of 15-64 used cannabis as compared to the EU-average of

6.8%146. More recently, according to the EMCDDA’s 2013 “EU Drug Markets Report”147, the

prevalence of cannabis among people within this age range was 7% in the Netherlands as

compared with 8.4% in France and 2.6% in Sweden148. According to the 2008 National

Household Survey on Drug Use and Health, only 23% of Dutch citizens ranging between the

ages of 15 and 64 have used cannabis at some point in their lives as compared with 40% in the

United States149. The Dutch have also been successful in minimizing hard drug abuse among

their population. Recorded in the 2002 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, lifetime

prevalence of heroin in 2001 was 0.4% in the Netherlands as compared to 1.4% in the US150.

More generally, hard drug users per thousand inhabitants in 1998 were 2.5 in the Netherlands as

compared to 7.2 in Luxembourg, 6.4 in Italy, and 5.6 in the United Kingdom151. These statistics

not only indicate lower soft drug consumption rates in the Netherlands as compared to other EU

144 MacCoun and Reuter, “Evaluating Alternative Cannabis Regimes,” 126. 145 Ibid. 146 Hilde and McCarty, “Dutch Drug Policy,” 38. 147 “EU Drug Markets Report: A Strategic Analysis,” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (Lisbon: 2013). 148 “European Union Data and Policies — An Overview,” in Drug War Facts, ed. Douglas McVay, Common Sense for Drug Policy, accessed May 3, 2015. 149 Hilde and McCarty, “Dutch Drug Policy,” 41. 150 Ibid., 42. 151 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands”.

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member nations, the EU average, and the US, but also show that it has fewer opiate addicts.

Moreover, Dutch policies have yielded lower crime rates associated with drugs within the

Netherlands. For example, in 2012 the drug-related homicide rate per 100,000 was 4.7 in the US

as compared to 0.9 in the Netherlands152. Thus, the Dutch strategy has been effective in

minimizing drug abuse at all levels, which has helped instill a certain level of public health and

security within the Netherlands’ borders.

To summarize, the Dutch disregard infractions with only minor ramifications, such as

soft drug abuse, in order to focus on high-risk issues like the production and trade of hard

drugs153. Of course, this kind of approach leaves a lot of grey area in the law, which is to be

determined by pragmatism on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in certain circumstances, those

who distribute only small amounts of hard drugs can be penalized with fines or ignored if they

weren’t previously convicted. Additionally, drug use, although not typically a criminal offense,

can sometimes be prosecuted if it disturbs public order154. Yet, in true Dutch fashion, all three

elements of this strategy have room for interpretation and improvement by Dutch authorities.

Given the successes that the Dutch strategy has enjoyed since its original implementation,

surrounding EU nations have become more optimistic about ending prohibition and shifting

towards a more controlled soft drug policy. As exemplified by the Netherlands, this strategy

would enable them to direct criminal resources toward curbing the supply-side of hard drugs, and

would allow policy measures to focus on harm-reduction with regards to drug abuse.

152 “Netherlands Drug Control Data and Policies” in Drug War Facts, ed. Douglas McVay (Common Sense for Drug Policy, Accessed May 3, 2015). 153 Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” 245. 154 “Netherlands Drug Control Data and Policies,” in Drug War Facts.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Analytical Discussion

Perceptions on Dutch Policies

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Dutch drug policies were crafted to allow for the

allotment of resources toward the control of hard drugs. Accordingly, soft drugs were to be

controlled in government-regulated environments such as coffee shops, and users of these

substances were not to be prosecuted. Ultimately, this strategy has been successful, as it has

minimized expensive and intrusive enforcement, disproportionate sentencing, and a substantial

illicit drug market155. Moreover, it has activated norms that minimize disturbances throughout

the Netherlands156. Yet, while this drug control strategy has received praise from domestic and

international communities, it has also encountered backlash.

In more recent times, people have become skeptical of the Dutch approach to drugs. With

harsh limits on production, retailers currently face the “back door problem” in which they cannot

buy enough marijuana to meet their demand because of government regulation157. As a result,

almost all marijuana sold in Dutch coffee shops is grown and distributed illegally, and Dutch

policymakers have yet to legalize its production. This is an on-going contradiction, as coffee

shops are allowed to buy and sell cannabis within the legally tolerated limits, but suppliers are

not allowed to grow, import, or sell it to the coffee shops. They therefore take to illegal methods

to procure their product, which overall increases the risk that consumers face. With the absence

of state-controlled growing and professional testing, it does not take long before cannabis of

155 MacCoun and Reuter, “Evaluating Alternative Cannabis Regimes,” 126. 156 One of which includes refraining from smoking in public spaces and near schools. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Information and Communication Division, “FAQ DRUGS,” 16. 157 Breeksema and Grund, “Coffee Shops and Compromise,” 12.

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potent quality gets produced158. Moreover, the “back door problem” has encouraged coffee shop

owners to connect with dangerous drug dealers from other regions, such as Central and Latin

America, in order to acquire supply to sell to their customers159.

Additionally, the Dutch drug strategy has received criticism from city officials of various

border provinces for having encouraged drug-tourism among their populations. City officials

criticize that this has led to increased crime rates and public disturbances. According to the

Mayor of Maastricht (a city that lies near the Netherlands-Belgian border), “1.6 million foreign

‘drug tourists’ visit the city’s 13 licensed coffee shops every year and create an unacceptable

nuisance such that they bring filth, noise, and crime to the city”160. This grievance led to the

establishment of the “weed pass” law. The logic behind this law was to restrict the accessibility

of cannabis to foreigners, hence its early implementation in southern districts where French and

Belgian citizens were coming across the border to use marijuana legally 161. It was believed that

this sort of policy measure would not only curb rowdy behavior in the various border cities, but

would also limit drug-tourism related incidents162. Yet, it had a contradictory effect, as it actually

encouraged underground drug activities in those cities. As a result, the Dutch abandoned the

application of this policy.

Nevertheless, despite these shifting attitudes, the Netherlands has wielded incredible

influence over the EU with regard to its drug control methods. Dutch policy makers have

introduced new methods that deviate from drug prohibition as they have seen how

decriminalizing drugs takes away their mystique and allows them to be better regulated, using

158 Bruinsma, “Law in Action,” 247. 159 Van der Veen, “Regulation in Spite of Prohibition,” 137. 160 Cecilia Rodriguez, “Marijuana For Tourists, Discord for the Netherlands,” Forbes (2013). 161 The Associated Press, “The Netherlands: Cafes Protest Marijuana Sales Policy” in The New York Times (New York: 2012). 162 Beau Kilmer, Franz Trautmann, and Paul Turnbull, “Dutch Cannabis Policy: Experts’ Views” in Further Insights into Aspects of the Illicit EU Drugs Market (2013), 442.

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cannabis as a leading example. Through these new realizations and innovations, the Dutch have

encouraged other nations to explore alternative control systems.

How Dutch Policies Have Affected European Regional Policy

As the Netherlands’ drug policies have statistically achieved success in controlling the

supply and demand sides of the drug market, various EU member nations began to follow the

country’s lead, especially in light of the AIDS epidemic that broke out in the 1980s. As

intravenous drug use was thought to have contributed to the spread of the disease, drug abuse

slowly became categorized as a public health problem rather than a criminal justice one. Thus,

some member nations, such as Germany, began to favor harm-reductionist policies as they

allotted greater consideration to those affected by the rampant disease. These new policies

incorporated more health and prevention programs including methadone and needle exchange

programs and extended care and treatment systems to drug addicts163.

In following these policy changes amidst the AIDS epidemic frenzy, some EU officials

also shifted favor away from prohibition. Their attitudes and perceptions on certain types of

drugs came to resemble those of the Dutch. For instance, Austria and Denmark began to tolerate

the use of soft drugs, such as cannabis, throughout the 1980s and 1990s to allow attention and

resources to be directed toward hard drug users164. Since then, these countries, among others,

have favored more practical policies that have allowed soft drug users to bypass criminal

prosecution. They have authorized the possession, use, and sale of small quantities of soft drugs

to target resources on hard drug users and traffickers. Portugal, on the other hand, began to

163 Tim Boekhout van Solinge, “Dutch Drug Policy in a European Context” in Journal of Drug Issues (1999), 8. 164 Ibid., 9.

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tolerate the use of all drugs, both hard and soft, as a solution to dealing with the growing drug

problem165.

Portugal

In following the Netherland’s lead of treating drug addicts as patients and not as

criminals, Portugal decriminalized the possession and use of all drugs in 2001, but enforced laws

to prevent drug trafficking166. Only one decade later after this measure was implemented, drug

abuse of all drugs had decreased by 50 percent and HIV/AIDS rates had plummeted167. Health

experts in Portugal claim that the country’s decision to liberalize drug use has been a big success

of the country and hope that it sets an example for other societies as well. Like in the

Netherlands, by diverting money away from the black market and into treatment programs,

Portugal has had some of the lowest rates of problematic drug use across Europe. Although

Portugal’s decriminalization of all drugs may seem radical, it demonstrates how new alternatives

are slowly emerging to the forefront. Some Dutch officials and policy makers168 even believe

that complete decriminalization is the framework that the Netherlands—and more broadly the

EU—is to adopt in the near future.

165 “Anderson, "European Drug Policy: The Cases of Portugal, Germany, and The Netherlands," 7. 166 Glen Greenwald, “Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies,” Cato Institute (2009). 167 Erik Kain, “Ten Years After Decriminalization, Drug Abuse Down by Half in Portugal,” Forbes (2011). 168 One policymaker in particular who is worth mentioning is Frederik Polak. He is one of the most experienced and respected Dutch psychiatrists in the field of drug use and I had the opportunity to meet with him when I was abroad in Amsterdam in the spring of 2014. Polak worked as a psychiatrist in the drug department of the municipal health services (GGD) for thirteen years, and is also on the Board of Directors of Stichting Drugsbeleid, the Netherlands Drug Policy Foundation. He is an advocate for the decriminalization of all drugs—hard and soft—in the Netherlands, and asserts that drug prohibition is actually counterproductive to protecting the health of the general public.

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Germany

While Germany has been less reluctant to give up drug prohibition altogether, it has

adopted new harm-reduction measures according to the Dutch example. It still criminalizes drug

possession under the Narcotics Act, but has incorporated more treatment programs for drug users

into policy169. For instance, as of 2009, it has authorized the establishment of ‘consumption

rooms’ that are intended to take problematic drug users off of the streets170. These facilities have

enabled drug users to ingest illicit substances under the watch of medical professionals in order

to minimize the risks that they may cause to individuals and society. Treatment measures such

as these have already amounted to lower lifetime prevalence rates among users of soft and hard

drugs such as cannabis and cocaine, respectively. Thus, this example serves to illustrate how

Dutch policies have catalyzed other EU member nations to change their national drug control

policies accordingly.

***

Overall, many Europeans have developed new attitudes toward the illicit drug market as

they have realized that drug abuse and trafficking are issues that are nearly impossible to

eliminate. Therefore, member nations have slowly begun to embrace the Dutch example,

stemming from the local level. Although an official euro-wide drug policy of harm-reduction

does not yet exist, it has become a widely accepted approach across Europe. For example,

treaties such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, which took effect on May 1, 1999, allude to the

necessity for harm reduction measures to be implemented. Article 129, section 1 of the treaty

states, “The Community shall complement the Member States’ action in reducing drugs-related

169 “Anderson, "European Drug Policy: The Cases of Portugal, Germany, and The Netherlands," 9. 170 Ibid., 10.

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health damage, including information and prevention”171. More recently, the European Council

of Ministers adopted policies of harm-reduction in 2003, which were included in the EU Drugs

Strategy for 2005-2012 and the EU Action Plan on Drugs from 2005-2008172. Thus, as official

statements and documents are straying away from prohibitive language, EU officials are

optimistic about the region’s general shift toward a more harm-reductionist approach to drugs, as

it would further improve public health.

Phase Three

Since the turn of the 21st century, global drug trafficking and consumption levels have

risen tremendously as a byproduct of global processes173. Now, more than ever, traffickers are

able to permeate borders as commercial and travel restrictions have been lifted. Additionally,

younger generations are beginning to participate in more recreational drug use, as the media has

been a force that has altered perceptions on the harms of certain illicit drugs174. As a result, the

anti-drug norms that once characterized prohibition have begun to erode175. Thus, as drug

consumption and trafficking continue to persist and pose serious security and health problems to

many nations, the international community is to take action in achieving more extensive

international cooperation in order to figure out solutions to these problems.

Although the 20th century UN-level treaties from the initial regime are a good basis for

cooperation on criminal matters, they are very limited as they endorse prohibitionist policies (as

indicated in previous sections). Thus, the international community is to cooperate in molding

Phase Three of the regime (2000-Present) in such a way that it will minimize the growth of the

171 For a copy of the treaty, see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf >. 172 Blickman and Jelsma, “Drug Policy Reform in Practice,” 4. 173 Stevenson, “Drug Policy, Criminal Justice and Mass Imprisonment,” 8. 174 Stares, “Market Dynamics and the Challenge of Control,” 60. 175 Stares, “The Future of the Global Drug Market,” 81.

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global drug market, lessen its negative effects, and improve the welfare of citizens around the

world. In order to do so, it is to respond to changing drug trends and adopt the EU’s harm-

reductionist approach. Thus, this next section will evaluate to what extent the European Union

can serve as a leader for the new international drug control regime that is nearing on the horizon.

EU Qualified to Lead New Global Regime?

Since the new millennium, debates have circulated worldwide concerning the new form

of the international drug control regime. After assessing the problems yielded by the initial

regime, member nations have been prompted to explore and seek out alternative methods that

give special consideration to the demand-side of the problem. Many of their considerations, such

as the decriminalization of cannabis, have followed the EU’s example as the region’s general

shift toward harm-reduction has resulted in fewer drug-related deaths, less drug-related

incarceration, and less drug consumption per capita than in other regions, such as the US176.

Already, the new regime has made progress in passing certain harm-reduction resolutions such as

needle and syringe exchange programs, opioid substitution therapy, and community-based

outreach177. Thus, some global powers are hopeful that the EU’s policies will lead the new UN-

level regime.

Yet, some international leaders contend that the EU is not qualified to assume this

position as it has lacked harmony and cohesion on the drug topic178. While it is true that on the

whole, the EU has become less concerned with punitive measures since the 1990s, some nations

continue to pursue prohibitionist ideals. Besides cultural values and other subjective reasons

behind this tendency—more concretely, this deviation is said to have stemmed from the EU’s 176 Parliament of Canada, Library of Parliament, “National Drug Policy: The Netherlands”. 177 Blickman and Jelsma, “Drug Policy Reform in Practice,” 5. 178 Segura and Stein, “The Global Drug Policy Debate: Experiences from the Americas and Europe,” 4.

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negligence to disseminate systematic information across its borders. Without standardized

procedures in place, European institutions such as the European Monitoring Center for Drugs

and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)179 have had difficulty in trying to draw accurate comparisons

between states, which would have helped assess the drug situation, the dynamics of the illicit

drug market, the burden of drug-related crime and the effectiveness of supply and demand

oriented policies180. Thus, they argue that if the region itself cannot fully harmonize its approach

to the challenges posed by the international drug trade, then it is hardly able to serve as a model

for an updated world strategy. If a global policy implies collective problem solving and action,

then the EU does not lead by example.

Stakeholders who support this position substantiate their claim through the variances in

criminal law regarding the penalization of unauthorized trafficking and distribution of

psychoactive substances across the EU. For instance, according to the EMCDDA’s “Perspectives

on Drugs: Controlling New Psychoactive Substances,” in Austria, the Minister for Health must

name the substances or groups of substances in a regulation, whereas in Ireland and Romania,

naming of the substances is not required—any substance that possesses the properties defined in

the legislation is implicitly covered. Furthermore, production and transport of supply is a crime

in Austria if the supplier has intention to benefit, and the product is used for its psychoactive

effects; in Ireland, only knowledge of likely human consumption is necessary; in Romania,

neither is required. Moreover, maximum penalties for transferring supply are two years’

imprisonment in Austria, five in Ireland and eight in Romania, rising significantly in Austria and

Romania if supply causes serious injury or death. Thus, it is evident that while many member

nations are working to combat drug trafficking to some extent, discrepancies occur on how drugs

179 For more information, see <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/>. 180 Aloys Prinz, "Do European Drugs Policies Matter?” in Economic Policy (1997), 382.

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are perceived, why certain policy decisions are made on the basis of these perceptions, and how

those decisions are implemented, based on a country’s needs or circumstances181.

If the EU is to take the initiative to improve the international regime, then it is to establish

a level of cooperation among its own member nations’ policy agendas. To do this, officials urge

that the EU improves upon its ‘Action Plan’ publications to include more integrative reports that

evaluate the risks and benefits of different national responses to the drug problem, as is done at

the UN level182. These reports are to provide recommendations on drug policy reform and outline

specific mandates that are intended to offset the drug-related challenges set forth by

globalization183. They need to be time-limited and subject to modification following review of

their performance. By undergoing constant assessment, the EU will be better able to coordinate

international efforts designed to combat this problem that sees no borders184.

Additionally, if the EU is to coordinate its strategies and actions, officials are to explore

similarities and differences between different nations to determine where compatibility can be

improved within the limitations of different policies, laws, and treatment systems. In order to

accomplish this task, the EU must take an integrated and multi-sectorial approach if it is to

collect more accurate, reliable, comparable, and high-quality data185. As the Dutch policy is

coordinated between several ministries including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Security

and Justice, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the EU is to follow suit186. Already, the Economic

Surveillance Department (federal level) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (state

181 “Perspectives on Drugs: Controlling New Psychoactive Substances,” European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (Lisbon: 2013). 182 Global Commission on Drug Policy, "What We Do,” accessed May 4, 2015. The UNODC publishes three-year strategies that outline specific mandates that are to be achieved by the action-plan’s end date. 183 General Assembly, “Overwhelming Calls for Concerted, Coordinated, Innovative Strategies in Tackling Drugs, Transnational Crime, Speakers Tell Third Committee,” United Nations (2014). 184 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “UNODC Strategy 2008-2011" (New York: United Nations Publications, 2008). 185 Prinz, "Do European Drugs Policies Matter?,” 384. 186 “Country Overview: Netherlands,” European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.

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level) have helped coordinate considerable agreement on general drug policy fundamentals

between national and federal actors.

Nevertheless, the EU is an example of a regional unit that has made drastic advancements

in the drug policy arena. Unlike other regions, it has overwhelmingly concerned itself with

implementing policies that address drug demand in addition to supply, i.e. the risks that different

drugs pose to users. Thus, it has adopted a regulatory approach that enforces harm-reduction.

Despite not having a cohesive EU-wide drug policy enacted into law just yet, European

politicians strive to make improvements that will empower the EU to mobilize international

bodies. Already, it has made headway at the international level as harm-reduction principles have

been endorsed by various institutions and agencies including the World Health Organization,

UNAIDS, and various other UN-sponsored agencies. Additionally, the General Assembly has

adopted a resolution under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and

Cultural Rights that requires it under international law to provide harm reduction services to

signatories187. The hope is that by 2016, an all-encompassing global drug strategy will emerge in

time for the General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem, which will coincide

with current EU drug control policies188.

The EU’s Global Impact

Already, we can see how a new global regime has begun to form under the leadership of

the European Union. Over the last few years, governments worldwide have begun to shift their

perceptions in line with the EU approach to drugs as they have realized how prohibition has

187 International Harm Reduction Association and Human Rights Watch, “International Support for Harm Reduction” comp. International Support for Harm Reduction (2009). 188 Alfonson Serrano, “Guatemala President to UN: Reform Global Drug Policy” in Aljazeera America (2013).

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actually done little to reduce the demand for illicit drugs. For instance, ASEAN member nations

and some states within the US have begun to turn toward more treatment-based initiatives.

Since the new millennium, some member nations of ASEAN have repealed some of their

tough anti-drug laws and have moved toward alternative approaches that aim to improve the

health and well-being of its people189. Warranted by rising drug trends across Southeast Asia,

member nations of ASEAN have adopted a more coherent, demand-reduction approach to drugs,

as they have recognized the harms that drugs inflict on individual users190. Thus, as part of its

new and improved drug reform vision, ASEAN hopes that by the end of 2015 it will “effectively

control illicit drugs and mitigate its negative consequences to society”191. Already, member

nations have started to work toward this vision as they have implemented treatment programs

that seek to decrease the demand for drugs by reducing existing addiction192. Through a multi-

sector healthcare solution, they seek to provide professional care, support, rehabilitation, and

alternatives to incarceration that will improve the addict’s health rather than subject him or her to

justice systems.

This new demand-oriented approach, which deviates from the conventional prohibitionist

framework, has enabled communities to reach out to people who require support, recovery-

oriented services, methadone maintenance therapy centers, and detoxification centers. For

instance, in 2011, officials in Thailand urged drug courts to temporarily waive abusers’ prison

terms to allow them to undergo these types of treatments193. Thailand and other member nations

have been able to implement and coordinate these initiatives due to the developments made at

189 Fawthrop, “The New War on Drugs: ASEAN Style”. 190 Sandeep Chawala, ed., “2008 World Drug Report” (New York: United Nations Publications, 2008). 191 Gories Mere, “ASEAN’s Response to the Prevalence of Illicit Drugs Trafficking,” The Eight Meeting of the

AIPA Fact Finding Committee, AIPA Secretariat, accessed May 3, 2015. 192 ASEAN Secretariat, “Cooperation on Drugs and Narcotics Overview,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2014). 193 "Thailand: Question Marks over New Approach to Drug-users,” IRIN News (Bangkok: 2012).

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four regional training centers: the ASEAN Training Centre for Narcotics Law Enforcement in

Bangkok, the ASEAN Training Centre for Preventive Drug Education in Manila, the ASEAN

Training Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation in Kuala Lumpur and the ASEAN Training

Centre for the Detection of Drugs in Body Fluids in Singapore194. As a consequence of the

training programs held at these facilities, hundreds of thousands of users in Thailand and

ASEAN at large have been able to overcome their drug addictions in recent years, thereby

minimizing societal demand for illicit substances195.

However, even though ASEAN has begun to reform its drug policies, it is not yet ready

to be a leading participant in the international regime. It must build on its current strategy and

incorporate further drug prevention programs and harm reduction measures that also target the

supply-end of the problem if it is truly seeking to improve the health of its citizens. Although

some prevention programs are indeed on ASEAN’s policy agenda, they have yet to be

implemented as they currently bear a “pending” status196. Nevertheless, ASEAN has recognized

the need to adopt measures that will deter individual behavior and enhance the general welfare of

society.

Similarly, despite its long prohibitionist tradition, certain states within the US have

changed their relationship with drug policy over the past three years. According to the PEW

Research Center, half or more in every demographic and partisan group in the United States says

that priority should be treatment, not prosecution197. Yet, while US perception may have shifted,

drug policy has not kept up entirely, as federal government and some individual states continue 194 ASEAN Secretariat, “Cooperation on Drugs and Narcotics Overview”. 195 "Thailand: Question Marks over New Approach to Drug-users”, IRIN News. 196 ASEAN Secretariat, “Cooperation on Drugs and Narcotics Overview”. One that has been gaining significant attention is called the Youth Empowerment Against Drug Abuse. This prevention program is meant to empower youths against drug use. It is to educate young individuals about the dangers of drugs to steer them away from drug use before they can become addicted. It will facilitate peer discussions, seminars, group activities, and youth movements geared toward enhanced participation in the prevention of drug abuse. 197 “America's New Drug Policy Landscape,” Pew Research Center.

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to allocate significant funds toward parole systems, law enforcement, courts, and data collection

programs198. However, some states, indeed, have changed their relationship with drug policy

over the past three years. Specifically, Colorado199, Oregon, Washington D.C., and Alaska have

all authorized the legal regulation of the production, distribution, and sale of marijuana for adults

21 and over200. Among other states, cannabis has been decriminalized and distributed for medical

purposes. Thus, we can see how the EU’s harm-reductionist approach to controlling the demand-

side of the drug problem has impacted other regions, namely ASEAN and the US.

Final Thoughts

Although the treaties under the prohibitionist international regime didn’t achieve much

success in the 20th century, they prompted the global community to explore and seek out

alternative models to controlling the problems several decades later. Although the community

first turned toward regional strategies, it quickly realized the difficulties associated with tackling

both the supply and demand sides of the problem from this perspective. However, the European

region spearheaded a new way of looking at drug control and has also more generally portrayed

the need for a modernized global effort to tackle these challenges that concern the entire

international community 201.

In the wake of this new regime, we must assess the likelihood of states subverting their

sovereign power to sign onto a movement that is controlled by a higher authority. In the absence

of consensus on this matter, I pose that they are likely to submit to the global order only after

careful considerations are made. First, the regime must be as representative as possible; it must

198 Peter Moskowitz, “Report Suggests US Ready to End War on Drugs,” Aljazeera America (2014). 199 Colorado has been able to offer legal retail sales of marijuana since January 2012. 200 Canet and Doremus, “Drug Legalization and Prohibition Pros and Cons,” 7. 201 Blickman and Jelsma, “Drug Policy Reform in Practice,” 2.

Osian 57

reflect each region’s interests equally and fairly if it is to gain global favor. Second, international

coordination and efficiency must be improved between member states. To accomplish this, the

new regime must take on a more integrative approach where police, customs, and judicial

authorities are all working together to track suppliers who penetrate their borders. Once this

occurs, investigations and prosecutions will be enacted more efficiently. An increase in

surveillance capabilities would help aid this process, as the information yielded would allow

government officials to better coordinate regional law enforcement capabilities in ways that

would drain fewer economic resources from citizens. Once these considerations are met, states

will be tempted to move forward with the new regime.

However, some international leaders doubt the feasibility of a new international regime.

For example, George Shultz, secretary of state under President Ronald Reagan, and Nick Clegg,

British deputy prime minister, state that nations must be skeptical of a global policy. They argue

that a “one-size-fits-all approach” may not be the proper solution, as it doesn’t consider diverse

political, social, and cultural environments. As each nation bears its own realities, it may not be

receptive to an all-encompassing approach202. Thus, like-minded officials would suggest that

states should opt out of the provisions of the existing international drug control treaties and

rather experiment with different policies on their own accord as obligatory sanctions stifle

innovation. They should develop their own “best-practice” policies that will tackle the drug

problem within their borders, whether they revolve around treatment, harm reduction,

prosecution, or prison terms203. Once this occurs, nations that bear policy similarities will

consolidate, which will gave way to “a new and effective international regime”204.

202 Matt Ferner, “End the War on Drugs, Say Nobel Prize-Winning Economists,” The Huffington Post (2014). 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid.

Osian 58

Others are worried that a global harm-reductionist regime will narrowly focus on

mitigating drug demand, and may neglect to incorporate initiatives to reduce drug supply. They

fear that criminals will be empowered to expand into new markets if adequate attention is not

given to both sides of the problem, which would fuel the problem to a much greater

magnitude205. Thus, as the feasibility of the new regime has undergone some criticism, some

doubt the need for it altogether.

Yet, as we are currently amidst the 21st century, I conclude that a modern global drug

regime is necessary to keep up with the dangers that have been elevated as a result of

globalization, regardless of the entity that leads it or the means by which it is formed. Although

each region has it own priorities and issues that are to be taken into consideration, acting in

unison through the global regime would allow the issues to be addressed with greater ease.

Moreover, it might encourage convergence in other policy areas. Some officials of the US and

ASEAN also support the need for a consolidated global strategy that tackles both drug supply

and demand head-on. For instance, William Brownfield, current Assistant US Secretary of State

for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, poses that the complex

challenges that arise from dangerous drugs “require global responses”206. Hussein Haniff of

Malaysia, speaking on behalf of ASEAN, stated that the transnational crime associated with drug

trafficking recognizes no boundaries, and “cooperation beyond ASEAN is necessary” 207 .

Additionally, global leaders such as Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), assure the prospect of global regime. Fedotov calls for a

strategy that amalgamates regional supply-reduction and demand-reduction initiatives, as the

205 The White House, “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” 25. 206 General Assembly, “Overwhelming Calls for Concerted, Coordinated, Innovative Strategies” (2014). 207 Ibid.

Osian 59

threats of transnational organized crime and illicit drug consumption require global

cooperation208.

Thus, whether it is formed through a global summit or naturally occurring consolidation,

the improved global regime needs to incorporate innovative solutions that reflect balanced and

collaborative opinions as well as local concerns 209 . As a product of transparent global

communication, this regime is to demonstrate all types of considerations such as

decriminalization, regulation, and legalization while still tackling the basics210. At its core, it

must work to control drugs from crossing borders, but also establish treatment and prevention

tactics for those who may fall victim to the harms of drugs. Thus, as drug trafficking and drug

abuse have proven to be global problems of the first magnitude, civil, state, and international

actors at all levels must engage with one another to determine alternative approaches to reducing

drug supply and demand in order to foster a safer global community211.

208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 210 Serrano, “Guatemala President to UN: Reform Global Drug Policy”. 211 Global Commission on Drug Policy, "What We Do”.

Osian 60

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