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The Future ofDiplomacyHAN S J. MORGENTHAU

FOUR TASKS OF DIPLOMACY

... Diplomacy lis) an element of national power. The importance of díplornacy forthe preservatíon of intemational peace is but a particular aspect of that generalfunction. For a diplomacy that ends in war has faíled in its primary objective: thepromotion of the national interest by peaceful means. This has always been so andis particularly so in view of the destructive potentialities of total war.

Taken in its wídest meaning, cornprisíng the whole range of foreign policy, thetask of díplornacy is fourfold: (1) Díplornacymust determine its objectives in thelight of the power actually and potentially avaílable for the pursuit of these objec-tives. (2) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the poweractually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives, (3) Diplomacymust determine to what extent these dífferent objectives are compatible wíth eachother. (4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit ofits objectives.Failure in any one of these tasks may jeopardize the success of foreign policy andwith it the peace of the world.

A nation that sets itself goals which it has not the power to attain may have to faeethe risk of war on two COlU1tS.Such a nation is likely to díssípate its strength and not tobe strong enough at all P0ÍlltSof fríctíon to deter a hostile nation from challenging itbeyond endurance. The faílure of its foreign policy may force the nation to retraee itssteps and to redefine its objectíves in view of its actual strength. Yet it is more likelythat, under the pressure of an ínflamed public opinión, such a nation wi.llgo forwardon the road toward an unattainable goal, strain all its resources to achieve it, andfinally, confounchng the national interest wíth that goal, seek in war the solution to aproblem that cannot be solved by peaceful means.

A nation will also invite war if its díplornacy wrongly assesses the objectives ofother nations and the power at their disposal .... A nation that mistakes a policy ofimperialism for a policy of the status quo will be unprepared to meet the threat toits 0"'11existence which the other nation's policy entaíls. Its weakness will inviteattack and may make war inevitable. A nation that mistakes a policy of the statusquo for a policy of imperialisrn wi.llevoke through its clisproportionate reaction thevery danger of war which it is hying to avoid. For as A mistakes B's policy for impe-rialism, so B might mistake A:s defensive reaction for imperialism. Thus bothnations, each intent upon forestalling imaginary aggression from the other side,

From Polittcs AlllOlIg Nations, 5th edition by Hans J. Morgenthau, copyright © 1972 by Alfred A. Knopf,a division of Random House, J ne. Used by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, a dívísíon 01'Bandom House, Ine.

104

MORGENTHAU / THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY 1

wi.llrush to arms. Similarly, the confusion of one type of imperialisrn with anothermay call for disproportionate reaction and thus evoke the risk of war.

As for the assessment of the power of other nations, either to overrate or tounderrate it may be equally fatal to the cause of peace. By overrating the power ofB, A may prefer to yield to B's demands untíl, finally, A is forced to fight for its veryexistence under the most unfavorable condítions, By underrating the power of B,A may become overconRdent in its assumed superíority A may advance demandsand impose condítíons upon B whích the latter is supposedly too weak to resist.U nsuspecting B's actual power of resistance, A may be faced with the altemative ofeither retreating and conceding defeat or of advancing and risking war.

A nation that seeks to pursue an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy cannotcease cornparíng its own objectives and the objectives of other nations in the light oftheir compatibility. If they are compatible, no problem alises. If they are not compati-ble, nation A must determine whether its objectives are so vital to itself that they mustbe pursued despite that incompatibility with the objectives of B. If it is found that A:svital interests can be safeguarded without the attainment of these objectives, theyougbt to be abandoned. On the other hand, if A finds that these objectives are essen-tial for its vital interests, A must then ask itself whether B's objectíves, incompatiblewíth its OWl1,are essential for B's vital interests. If the answer seems to be in the nega-tive, A must try to índuce B to abandon its objectives, offeIing B equívalents not vitalto A. In other words, through diplornatíc bargaining, the give and talceof compromise,a way must be sought by whích the ínterests of A and B can be reconciled.

Fínally, íf the incompatible objectives of A and B should prove to be vital toeither side, a way might still be sought in whích the vital interests of A and B mightbe redefined, reconciled, and their objectives thus made compatible with eachother. Here, however-even provided that both sides pursue intelligent andpeaceful policies-A and B are moving dangerously close to the brink of war.

It is the final task of an illtelligent díplomacy, intent upon preservíng peace, tochoose the appropriate means for pursuing its objectives. The means at the dís-posal of diplomacy are three. persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. Nodíplomacy relying only upon the threat of force can claim to be both illtelligent andpeaceful. o diplomacy that would stake everything on persuasion and compro-mise deserves to be called illtelligent. Rarely, if ever, in the conduct of the foreignpolicy of a great power is there justificatíon for using only one method to the exclu-sion of the others. Generally, the diplomatío representative of a great power, inorder to be able to serve both the interests of rus country and the interests ofpeace, must at the same time use persuasion, hold out the advantages of a compro-mise, and impress the other side with the military strength of rus country,

The art of diplomacy consists in putting the Iight emphasis at any particularmoment on each of these three means at its dísposal. A díplomacy that has beensuccessfully díscharged in its other functions may well fail in advancing the nationalinterest and preserving peace if it stresses persuasion when the give and take ofcompromise is prímaríly required by the circumstances of the case. A díplornacythat puts most of its eggs in the basket of compromise when the military might ofthe nation should be predominantly dísplayed, or stresses military might when thepolitical situation calls for persuasion and compromise, wíll Iíkewíse faíl....

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106 ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Promise of Diplomacy: Its Nine Rules!

Diplomacy could revive if it would part wíth [the] vices, which in recent years havewell-nigh destroyed its usefulness, and if it would restore the techniques whichhave controlled the mutual relations of nations since time immemorial. By doingso, however, díplomacy would realize only one of the preconcütions for the preser-vation of peace. The contribution of a revived díplornacy to the cause of peacewould depend upon the methods and purposes of its use ....

We have already formulated the four main tasks wíth which a foreign policymust cope successfully in order to be able to promote the national interest and pre-serve peace. It remains for us now to reformulate those tasks in the light of the spe-cial problems wíth whích contemporary world politics confront diplomacy. ...

The main reason for [the] threatening aspect of contemporary world politics[líes] in the character of modem war, whích has changed profoundly under theimpact of nationalistic universalismo and modem technology. The effects of mod-ern technology cannot be undone. The only variable that remains subject to delíb-erate manipulation is the new moral force of nationalistic universalism, Theattempt to reverse the trend toward war through the techníques of a revived díplo-macy must start wíth thís phenomenon. That means, in negative terms, that arevived diplomacy will have a chance to preselve peace only when it is not used asthe instrument of a political religion aiming at universal dominion.

Four Fundamental Rules

Diplomacy Must Be Dioested. of the Crusacling Spiri: This is the first of themies that cüplomacy can neglect only at the risk of war. In the words of WilliamG raham Su mner:

If you want war, nourísh a e1octrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to whichmen ever are subject, because doctrines get ínside of a mans own reason and betray himagainst himself. Cívilised men have done their fiereest fighting for e1octrines. The recen-quest of the Holy Sepulcher, "the balance of power," "no universal dominion," "tradefollows the flag," "he who holels the lanel will holel tbe sea," "the throne anel the altar," therevolution, the faith-these are the things for which men have given their lives. . .. owwhen any e1octri.neanives at that e1egree of authoríty, the name of it i.sa club which anye1emagogue may swing over you at any time and apropos of anything. In order lodescribe a doctrine, we must have recourse to theologícal language. A doctrine is anarticle of faith. It is somethíng which you are bound lo believe, not because you havesome rational grounds for believing it i.strue, but because you belong to such and such aehurch or denomination .... A polícy in a state we can understand, for instanee, it wasthe polícy of the United States at the end of the eighteenth century to get the freenavigation of the M ississíppí to its mouth, even at the expense of war with Spain. Thatpoliey hael reason anel justice in it; it was founded in our interests; it had positive formand definite seope. A doctríne is an abstract príncíple, it is neeessarily absolute in its

• [Edítors' Note: Bythis terrn Professor Morgenthau refers to the injectionof ideologyinto ínternationalpolitícs ancl to each nations claim that its own ethica! code would serve as the basis of intemationa!conduct for all nations.]

MORGENTHAU / THE FUTURE OF DIPlOMACY 107

scope and abstruse in its terms, it is metaphysical assertion. lt is never true, because it isabsolute, and the afTairsof men are alI conditioned and relative .... Now to turn back topolítícs, just think what an abomination in statecraft an abstract doctrine must be. Anypolítícían or editor can, at any moment, pul a new extension on it. Tbe people acquieseein the doctríne and applaud it beca use they bear the polítícíans and editors repeat it, andthe polítícíans and editors repeat it because they think it i.spopular. So it grows .... ltmay mean anything or nothíng, at any moment, and no one knows how it will be. Youaccede to it now, wíthin the vague limits of what you suppose it to be; therefore, you wíllhave to accede to it tomorrow when the same name is made to cover something whíchyou never have heard or thougbt of. If you alIow a polítícal catehword to go on and grow,you will awaken some e1ayto find it standing over you, the arbiter of )'our destiny, againstwhích you are powerless, as men are powerless against delusions .... Wbat can be morecontrary to sound statesmanshíp and common sense than to put forth an abstraet asser-tion whieh has no definíte relation to any interest of ours now at stake, but which has in itany number of possibilities of producing complieations whích we cannot foresee, butwhich are sure to be embarrassing when they aIise!2·

The Wars of Religion have shown that the attempt to impose one's own reli-gíon as the only true one upon the rest of the world is as futile as it is costly. A cen-tury of almost unprecedented bloodshed, devastation, and barbarization wasneeded to convince the contestants that the two religions could Iíve together inmutual toleration. The two political religions of our time have taken the place ofthe two great Christian denominations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.Will the political religions of our time need the lesson of the Thirty Years' War, orwill they rid themselves in time of the universalistic aspirations that inevitably issuein inconclusive war?

Upon the answer to that question depends tbe cause of peace. For only if it isanswered in tbe affumative can a moral consensus, emerging from shared convictionsand common values, develop-a moral consensus withín whích a peace-preservingdíplomacy wilI have a chance to grow. Only then will diplomacy have a chance to facethe concrete polítícal problems that requíre peaceful solution. If the objectives offoreign policy are not to be defined in tenns of a world-embraci.ng political relígíon,how are they to be defined? Thís is a fundamental problem to be solved once tbecrusading aspirations of nationalistic universalism have been díscarded,

The Objectioes of Foreign Policy Must Be Definedín Tenns of the NationalInterest and Must Be Supported with Aclequate Power This is the second ruleof a peace-preserving cüplomacy. The national interest of a peace-Ioving nation canonly be ~efined 111 tel:ms of na~onal security, and national security must be definedas íntegríty of the national temtory and of its institutions. National security, then, isthe irreducible minimum that cüplomacy must defend wíth adequate power wíth-out comprormsa, But diplamacy must ever be alive to the radical transformationthat national securíty has undergone under the impact of the nuclear age. Until theadvent of that age, a nation could use its diplomacy to purchase its security at theexpens~ of another nation. Taday, short of a radical ehange in the atomic balance ofpower 111 favor of a particular nation, diplomacy, in order to make one nationsecure fr<lm nuclear destruction, must make thern all secure, With the national

108 ANARCHY ANO ITS CONSEQUENCES

interest defined in such restrictive and transcendent terms, diplomacy mustobserve the third of its rules.

Diplomacy Must Look at the Polítical Scene from the Point ofView of OtherNations "1 othing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and thetotal want of con ideration of what others will naturally hope or fear."3What are thenational interests of other nations in terrns of national security and are they compat-ible with one's own? The definitíon of the national interest in terrns of national secu-rity is easier, and the interests of the two opposing nations are more likely to becompatible in a bípolar system than in any other system of the balance of power.The bípolar system, as we have seen, is more unsafe from the point of view ofpeace than any other, when both blocs are in competitive contact throughout theworld and the ambítíon of both is fired by the crusading zeal of a universal mission."... Víciníty, or neamess of situation, constitutes nations natural enerníes."?

Yet once they have defined their national interests in terms of national secu-rity, they can draw back from their outlying positions, located close to, or withín,the sphere of nationa! security of the other side, and retreat into theír respectivespheres, each self-contained within its orbit. Those outlying positions add notlúngto national security; they are but Iiabilities, positions that cannot be held in case ofwar. Each bloc will be the more secure the wíder it makes the distance that sepa-rates both spheres of nationa! security. Each side can draw a line far dístant fromeach other, making it understood that to touch or even to approach it means war.What then about the interjacent spaces, stretching between the two Iines ofdemarcation? Here the Iourth rule of diplomacy applies.

Nations Must Be Willing to Compromise on All Issues that Are Not Vital toTheni

All govemment, indeed evely human beneflt and enjoyment, every virtue and evelyprudent act, is Iounded on compromíse and barter. We balance inconveníences, wegive and take,we remit some rights, that we mayenjoy others, and we ehoose rather tobe happy eitizens than subtle disputants. As we must gíve awaysome naturalliberties,for the advantagesto be derived from the commuuion and Iellowshípof a great empire,But, in al! faír dealings, the tl1ingbought must bear some proportíon to the purehasepaid. None \ViIIbarter a\Vaythe immediate jewel of his soul.!

Here diplomacy meets its most difficult task. For mínds not beclouded by thecrusading zea! of a politícal religion and capable of viewing the national interests ofboth sicles wíth objectívity, the delimitation of these vital interests should not provetoo difficult. Compromise on secondary issues is a different matter. Here the task isnot to separate and define interests that by their very nature airead)' tend towardseparatíon and definttíon, but to keep in ba!ance interests that touch each other atmany points ancl may be intertwinecl beyoncl the possibility of separation. lt is animmense task to allow the other sicle a certain influence in those interjacent spaceswithout allowing them to be absorbed into the orbit of the other sicle. lt is harclly aless immense task to keep the other síde's influence as small as possible in theregions close to one's own security zone without absorbing those regions into one'sown orbít, For the performance of these tasks, no formula stands ready for

MORGENTHAU / THE FUTURE OF DlPLOMACY 109

automatic application. It is only through a continuous process of adaptatíon,supported both by firmness and self-restraint, that compromíse on secondaryissues can be made to work. lt is, however, possible to indica te a priori whatapproaches will facilita te or hamper the success of policies of comprorníse.

First of all, it is worth noting to what extent the success of cornpromíse-s-thatís, compliance with the fourth rule-depends upon compliance with the otherthree rules, whích in tum are similarly interdependent. As the compliance with thesecond rule depends upon the realization of the first, so the third rule must awaitits realization from compliance with the second. A nation can only take a rationa!view of its nationa! interests after it has parted company with the crusacling spirit ofa polítical creed. A nation is able to consider the nationa! interests of the other sidewith objectivity only after it has become secure in what it considers its own nationa!interests. Compromise on any issue, however minor, is impossible so long as bothsídes are not secure in their national interests. Thus nations cannot hope to complywith the fourth rule if they are not willing to comply with the other three. Bothmorality and expediency require compliance with these four fundamental mies ..

Compliance makes compromise possíble, but it does not assure its success. Togive compromíse, rnade possible through compliance wíth the first three mies, achance to succeed, five other mies rnust be observed.

Five Prerequisites ofCompromise

Give up the Shadow ofWorthless Rights [or the Substance of Real AdvantageA diplomacy that thinks in legalistic and propagandistic terms is particularly temptedto insist upon the letter of the law,as it interprets the law, and to lose sight of the con-sequences such insistence may have for its own nation and for humaníty Since thereare rights to be defended, this kind of díplomacy thinks that the issue cannot be com-promísed. Yet the choice that confronts the diplomar is not between legality and ille-gality, but between politica! wisdom ancl politica! folly, "The question with me," saídEdmund Burke, "is not whether you have a right to render your people miserable,but whether it is not your interest to make them happy. It is not what a lawyer tellsme 1may do, but what humanity, reason and justice tell me 1ought to do.?"

Never Put Yourselj in a Posit'ion [ron» Which You Cannot Retreat ,\;VithoutLosing Face and [rom Which You Cannot Advance Without Grave Bisks Theviolation of thís rule often results from disregard for the preceding one. A díplo-macy that confouncls the shadow oflegal right wíth the actuality of politica! advan-tage is likely to find itself in a position where it may have a lega! ríght, but nopolitical business, to be. In other words, a nation may identify itself with a positíon,which it may or may not have a right to hold, regardless of the political conse-quences. And agaín cornpromise becomes a difficult matter. A nation cannotretreat from that position without incurring a serious loss of prestige. It cannotadvance from that position without exposing itself to political rísks, perhaps eventhe risk of war, That heeclless rush into untenable positions and, more partícularly,the stubbom refusal to extricate oneself from thern in time is the earmark ofincompetent diplomacy. lts c1assicexamples are the policy of Napoleon III on the

110 ANARCHY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

eve of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the policies of Austria and Germanyon the eve of the First World War. These examples also show how closely the risk ofwar is allied with the violation of this rule.

Neoer Allow a Weak Ally to Make Decisions [or You Strong nations that areoblivious to the preceding rules are particularly susceptible to violating thís one.They lose their freedom of action by identil)ri.ng their O\Vnnational interests corn-pletely with those of the weak ally. Seeure in the support of its powerful friend, theweak ally ean ehoose the objectives and methods of its foreign poliey to suit itself.The powerful nation then finds that it must support interests not its own and that itis unable to eompromise on issues that are vital not to itself, but only to its ally.

The classie example of the violation of this rule is to be found in the way inwhich Turkey foreed the hand of Great Britain and Franee on the eve of theCrimean War in 1853. The Coneert ofEurope had virtually agreed upon a compro-mise settling the conllict between Russia and Turkey, when Turkey, knowing thatthe Western powers woule! support it in a war wíth Russia, die! its best to provokethat war and thus involved Great Britain and France in it against theír wíll. ThusTurkey went far in deciding the issue of war and peace for Great Britain andFrance aceording to its own national interests. Great Britain and France had toaccept that decision even though their national interests díd not require war wíthRussia and they had almost succeeded in preventing its outbreak. They had surren-dered their freedom of action to a weak alIy,whích used its control over their poli-cies for its own purposes.

The Armed Forces Are the 1nstrument oi Foreign Policy, Not Its MasterNo successful and no peaceful foreign polícy is possible without observance of thísrule, No nation can pllrsue a polícy of compromise with the military determiningthe ends and means of foreign policy. The armed forces are instruments of war;foreign policy is an instrument of peace. It is true that the ultimate objeetives ofthe conduct of war and of the conduct of foreign polícy are identical: Both servethe national interest. Both, however, differ fundamentalIy in their immediateobjectíve, in the means they employ, ane! in the modes of thought they bring tobear upon their respective tasks.

The objective of war is simple and uneonditional: to break the will of theenemy. Its methods are equally simple and unconditional: to bIing the greatestamount of violence to bear upon the most vulnerable spot in the enemy's armor.Consequently, the military leader must thínk in absolute terms. He lives in thepresent and in the immediate future. The sole question before hím is how to winvictories as cheaply ancl quickly as possible and how to avoíd defeat.

The objective of foreign policy is relative and conditional: to bend, not to break,the will of the other side as far as necessary in order to safeguard one's own vitalinterests without hurting those of the other side. The methods of foreign poliey arerelatíve ancl conditional: not to advance by destroying the obstacles in one's wa)', butto retreat before thern, to circumvent thern, to maneuver around thern, to softenancl dissolve thern slowly by means of persuasion, negotiation, and pressure, In con-sequence, the mind of the diplomat is complieated and subtle. It sees the issue in

MORGENTHAU / THE FUTURE OF DIPLOMACY 111

hand as a moment in history, and beyond the victory of tomorrow it anticipates theincalculable possibilities of the future. In the words of Bolingbroke:

Here let me only say,that the gloryof taking towns, and winning battles, is to be meas-ured by the utility tbat results from those víctoríes.Victoriesthat bring honour to thearms, maybring shame to the councils,of a nation.Towina battle, to take a town,is tbegloryof a general, and of an army.... But the glowof a nation is to proportion tbe endsshe proposes, to her interest and her strength, the means she employs to the ends sheproposes, and tbe vigourshe exerts to both.?

To surrender the conduct of foreign affaírs to the military, then, is to destroythe possíbílíty of compromise and thus surrender the cause of peace. The militarymind knows how to opérate between the absolutes of victory a.nd defeat. It knowsnothíng of that patie.nt intricate and subtle maneuvering of diplomacy, whose mainpurpose is to avoíd the absolutes of victory and defeat and meet the other side onthe middle ground of negotiated compromise. A foreign policy conducted by mili-taly men according to the rules of the military art can only end in war, for "what weprepare for is what we shall get."8

For nations conscious of the potentialities of modern war, peace must be thegoal of theír foreign policies. Foreign policy must be conducted in sueh a way as tomake the preservation of peace possible and not make the out break of warinevitable. In a society of sovereign nations, military force is a necessaly instru-ment of foreign policy. Yet the instrument of foreign polícy should not become themaster of foreign policy. As war is fought in arder to make peace possible, foreignpolicy should be conducted in order to make peace permanent. For the perfor-mance of both tasks, the subordination of the rnilitary under the civilian authoritieswhích are eonstitutionally responsible for the conduct of foreign affaírs is an indis-pensable prerequisite.

The Govemment 1s the Leader oi Public Opinion, Not Its Slave Thoseresponsible for the conduct of foreign policy will not be able to cornply with theforegoing principIes of diplomacy if they do not keep this principie constantly inmind. As has been pointed out above in greater detail, the rational requirernents ofgood foreign policy cannot from the outset count upon the support of a publícopinion whose preferences are emotional rather than rational. Thís is bound to beparticularly true of a foreign policy whose goal is compromise, and whích, there-fore, must concede some of the objectives of the other síde and give up some of itsown. Especially when foreign policy is condueted under conditions of democratiecontrol and is inspired by the crusading zeal of a political religion, statesmen arealways tempted to sacrifice the requirements of good foreign policy to the applauseof the masses. On the other band, the statesmen who would defend the integrity ofthese requirements against even the slightest contamination with popular passionwould seal his OW11doom as a politicalleader and, with it, the doom of hís foreignpolícy, for he would lose the popular support whích put and keeps him in power.

The statesman, then, is allowecl neíther to surrender to popular passions nordisregard thern. He must strike a prudent balanee between aclapting himself to

112 p ANARCHY ANO lTS CONSEQUENCES

them and marshaling thern to the support of his policies. In one word, he mustlead. He must perfonn that highest feat of statesmanship: tlimming his sails to thewinds of popula.r passion while using them to ca.ny the shíp to the port of good for-eign políey, on however roundabout and zigzag a course.

CONCLUSION

The road to intemational peace whích we have outlined cannot compete in inspira-tional qualítíes wíth the simple and fascinating fonnulae that for a century and ahalfhave fired the imagination of a war-wea.ty world. There is something spectacu-lar in the radial simplícity of a formula that with one sweep seems to díspose of theproblem of war once and for all. This has been the promise of such solutions as freetrade a.rbitration dísarmament collective security, universal socialism, inter-natio;lal governm~nt, and the w~rld state. There is nothing spectacular, fascínat-ing, or inspiring, at least for the people at large, in the business of diplomacy.

We have made the point, however, that these solutions, insofar as they deal withthe real problem and not merely with some of its symptoms, presuppose the exis-tence of an integrated international society, whích actually does not exist. To bringinto existence such an international society and keep it in being, the accommodatingtechniques of diplomacy are required. As the integration of domes tic society and itspeace develop from the unspectacular and almost unnoticed day-by-day operationsof the techniques of accommodation and change, so the ultimate ideal of inter-nationallife-that is, to transcend itself in a supranational society-must await itsrealization from the techniques of persuasion, negotiation, and pressure, whích arethe tradítíonal instruments of díplomaey

The reader who has folJowed us to thís point may well ask: But has not díplo-macy failed in preventing war in the past? To that legitimate question two answerscan be given.

Díplomacy has faíled man)' times, and it has succeeded many times, in itspeace-preserving task. It has failed sometirnes beca use nobody wanted it to suc-ceed. We have seen how different in their objectives and methods the limited warsof the past have been from the total war of our time. When war was the normalactivity of kings, the task of díplomacy was not to prevent it, but to bring it about atthe most propitious moment.

On the other hand, when nations have used diplomacy for the purpose of pre-venting war, they have often succeeded. The outstanding example of a successfulwar-preventing diplornacy in rnodem times is the Congress of Berlin of 1878. By thepeaceful means of an accommodatíng diplomacy, that Congress settled, or at leastmade susceptible of settlement, the issues that had separated Creat Brítain andRussia since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. During the better part of the nine-teenth century, the confuct between Creat Britaín and Russia over the Balkans, theDardanelJes, and the Eastern Mediterranean hung like a suspended sword over thepeace of the world. Yet, during the fift)' years followíng the Crimean War, thoughhostilities between Creat Brítain and Russia threatened to break out time andagain, they never actually did break out. The main credit Ior the preservation of

MORGENTHAU / THE FUTURE OF OIPLOMACY 113

peace must go to the techníques of an accommodating diplomacy which culminatedin the Congress of Berlín. When British Prime Minister Disraeli returned from thatCongress to London, he declared with príde that he was bríngíng home "peace ...with honor." In fact, he had brought peace for later generations, too, for a centurythere has been no war between Creat Britain and Russia.

We have, however, recognized the precariousness of peace in a society of sov-ereign natians. The continuing success of diplomacy in preserving peace depeuds,as we have seen, upon extraordinarv moral and intellectual qualities that all theleading partícipants must possess. A mistake in the evaluation of one of the ele-ments of national power, made by one or the other of the leading statesrnen, mayspell the difference between peace and war, So may '!ll accident spoiling a plan or apower calculation.

Diplomacy is the best means of preserving peace which a society of sovereignnations has to offer, but, especially under the conditions of conternporary world pol-itics and of contemporary war, it is not good enough. lt is only when nations havesurrendered to a higher authoríty the means of destroction which modern technol-ogy has put in their hands-when they have given up their sovereignty-that inter-national peace can be made as secure as domes tic peace. Diplomacy can makepeace more secure than it is today, and the world state can make peace more securethan it would be if nations were to abíde by the roles of díplomacy Yet, as there canbe no perrnanent peace without a world state, there can be no world state wíthoutthe peace-preserving and cornmuruty-buíldíng processes of diplomacy. For theworld state to be more than a dirn vision, the accommodating processes of díplo-macy, mitigating and minimizing conflícts, must be revíved. Whatever one's concep-tion of the ultimate state of intemational affairs may be, in the recognition of thatneed and in the dernand that it be met all men of good wi.ll can join.

NOTES

1. We by no means intend lo gíve here an exhaustive account of rules of diplomacy. Wepropose to discuss only those whích seem to have a special bearing upan the conternpo-nlly situation.

2. "War." Essaqs ofWilliam Graham Sumner ( ew Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,1934), Vol. I, pp. 169 fr.

3. Edrnund Burke, "Remarks on the Poliey of the Allies with Respect to France" (1793),Works, Vol. IV (Bostan: Little, Brown and Company, 1889), p. 447.

4. The Federalist, No. 6.5. Edmuncl Burke, "Speech on the Canciliation with America,"loc. cit., Vol. Il, p. 169.6. "Speech on Coneiliation wíth the Colonies" (1775), The Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. 1I

(Boston: Little, Brown ane! Company, 1865), p. 140.7. Bolingbroke's Defense of the Treaty of Utrecht (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1932), p. 95.8. William Craham Surnner,op. cit., p. 173.