Welcoming Remarks

The Year of Critical Decisions

Prof. Alex MintzDean

Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy

IDC HerzliyaJanuary 31, 2010

In preparing these welcoming remarks,

I glanced through a file in my office called The

First Herzliya Conference.

It includes documents and correspondence

between Prof. Reichman, Prof. Uzi Arad, and

the founding Dean of the Lauder School of

Government, the late, Professor Ehud

Sprinzak.

Memories…

What impressed me most was that according to

documents in the file, this trio already envisioned

ten years ago what is actually happening

TODAY at the Herzliya Conference:

A leading international conference dealing with

such dimensions of national resilience as

security, military, economic, political, strategic,

social and ethical.

• The IDC has made a remarkable progress since

the days of the first Herzliya Conference.

• We have here seven schools, 5500 students,

including more than 1200 from 74 countries.

• The IDC is also unique in its vision, direction,

philosophy, quality, and the way it is managed

so successfully.

The IDC

•At the Lauder School of Government we offer a new

program for the diplomatic corps stationed in Israel.

Distinguished IDC professors teach in this program.

• We also offer an MA in Diplomacy and Conflict

Analysis, Public Policy, and Counter Terrorism

Studies with students coming to us from Stanford,

Berkeley, UCLA, Columbia, NYU, Oxford and

Cambridge.

Lauder School of Government

The Herzliya Conference is an exciting event for

the IDC and the Lauder School.

It seems that the uniqueness of the 10th Herzliya

conference is that it takes place during what I

call, the YEAR OF CRITICAL DECISIONS for

Israel.

The Year of the Critical Decisions

• Whether to proceed with the peace process?

with whom? at what pace?

• Critical decisions regarding the Iranian

project: how long to wait for the world to

impose substantial sanctions? whether to

attack or refrain from attacking? What to

do about this treat?

Decisions

Economic PeaceDecisions on promoting joint projects with

the Palestinians that PM Netanyahu

enthusiastically advocated.

• Critical decisions on domestic issues

such as

the rising crime rates and violence.

• Decisions in the area of education

Decisions that simply can not wait.

Decisions in the domestic arena

As a scholar of Decision Making in government

and foreign and security policy, I am aware of

the fact that alternatives and policy options such

as:

Do Nothing (e.g. on peace with Syria)

Postpone a Decision

Decision not to decide

Are also viable options

Decision Making

But only and as long as one assesses

seriously and systematically the price of not

making progress.

Such systematic policy assessment should

be done by a number of independent

professional, and a-political bodies.

Cost-Benefit of Doing Nothing

One can not ignore what is called in the academic

literature: The Paradox of Power.

More power does not necessarily translate to more

resilience or influence.

At a certain point, according to this principle, things

may go the other way around – a boomerang effect,

whereas more power can lead to decline in influence

and resilience.

The Paradox of Power

This is what happened to Israel in the first

war in Lebanon and to the Americans in

Iraq. When some actors which have always

been hostile combine forces with those who

were neutral or friendly.

A result of the formation of a coalition of

opposing groups working together against

the main power.

Explaining The Paradox of Power

We are facing such a reversal and a

breaking point currently:

Turkey is reaching closer to Iran

Syria is reaching closer to Turkey and to

Iran

Lebanon towards Syria.

Exactly as the Paradox of Power predicts.

Breaking point

From this point on, the process only

intensifies and becomes irreversible .

This is due to the incentives the players on

the other side have to combine forces against

the actor with the most power.

Thus, assessing whether Doing Nothing on

the Syrian front is preferable to moving

forward on a courageous peace process with

the Syrians .

A process that will only intensify

Unfortunately, the coalitionary system in

Israel does not allow a careful evaluation of

policy options, especially those concerning

the peace process.

This system is narrowing considerably the

number and type of options that a Prime

Minister in Israel can even consider,

regardless of the party in power.

The Electoral System in Israel and

its Consequences

This is a structural, political,

governmental problem which has

wide range implications on what the

government wants to accomplish not

only in the domestic arena, but also in

foreign and defense policy.

A Structural Problem that Affects Domestic and Foreign Policy

The paradox is that all realize

that such a political system

weakens national resilience, but

do nothing to change it.

A Paradox

It is inconceivable that decisions,

even those who have majority

public support, are not being

taken, due to coalitionary and

political structure.

We ought to change the system.

Domestic, coalitionary obstacles to national and foreign policy making

In a symposium on What the Prime

Minister should do in the First 100

Days, conducted here several months

ago, a team that I chaired of

distinguished experts made several

recommendations that are still valid

and highly relevant:

Key Recommendations

Key Recommendations (cont.)Enter a peace process with Syria –which is

easier to accomplish versus with the

Palestinians as there are no veto players

such

as the Hamas on the Palestinian side or the

objections of West Bank settlers.

Head of IDF’s Military Intelligence also

made such a supportive assessment.

Key Recommendations (cont.)One also needs to pay attention to what

Syria’s Assad declared as two options:

peace process or resistance.

An assessment of geo-strategic trends in the

region shows that time is not on the side of

Israel.

Embarking on a peace process will

accelerate positive regional processes, and

reduce the pressure on Israel, at a relatively

acceptable cost.

Cost-Benefit

I dare to predict that if Do Nothing on

the peace process will be Israel’s policy

priority, Israel will face a vicious,

coordinated military attack by its

enemies in a few years.

Cost-Benefit

Iran represents a real threat to Israel.

There is a need to establish in the Prime

Minister’s office an administrative unit to

deal with all aspects of Iranian threat:

legal, economic, financial, political, public

diplomacy, military and security.

A lot needs to be done and should be done.

IRAN