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Title: Bahrain: The Role of the Military Author: William Johannes Wesselhoeft Date: March 26, 2013 Institution name/journal where submitted: Boston University
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The military approach: Bahrain’s al-Khalifa family has maintained its governmental power in times of civic unrest due to its use of military. Bahrain: the role of the military.
“The class that bears the lance or holds the musket regularly forces its rule upon the class that handles the spade or pushes the shuttle.” Gaetano Mosc
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Abstract This paper discusses the use of military in response to Bahraini protest movements in
2011 and 2012 The evidence used are specific events which occurred involving the military and
or protestors. I discuss the military’s role in Bahraini stability, as well as the stability factor of
latent conflict. I hypothesize that use of the military cemented regime control during the
uprisings, and concluded much the same. I found that Bahrain’s military is likely an internal
stabilizing presence, and that martial law was another military factor in managing recent unrest
in Bahrain.
Military involvement in government stability: theory
Shifts in balance of power can be attributed to a number of things; and one among those
is military might. Military advantage in a situation; the ability to dominate through violence, I’d
argue can essentially determine the outcome of a dispute. Because military force is such a basic
and recurring theme to shifts in balance in power in history (although it may not explain all of
them) I will proceed with an overview of the military as a determinant of revolutionary outcome.
By looking at a history of successful revolutions, one might determine that a strong
enough opposition force was the key factor. In many cases, military control by the government
was not strong enough to resist the rebel impetus for change, and in the end, a failure to quell a
revolution by the military led to its success. Cases both modern and historical would indicate that
the military played a role in the outcome of a revolution.
There is a lot of theory on the emergence of revolution. Starting with the first generation
of thought in the 19th century which focused on social psychology, to the second generation of
thought which focused on a disequilibrium as the cause of revolution, proceeding to the third
generation which capitalized on Marx’s class conflict ideas and finally leading to the current
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fourth generation which focuses on contentious politics such as strikes, demonstrations, riots and
terrorism.12 It seems that the schools of thought have narrowed in a consistent manner, with the
least descriptive theories as the oldest and the most descriptive as the newest. The fourth
generation of thinking is most pertinent to my own theoretical framework, and I will employ it in
the context of military influence on regime stability. Jack A. Goldstone in his “Toward a fourth
generation of Revolutionary theory,” states that: “Rather than try to develop a list of the
“causes” of revolutions, it may be more fruitful for the fourth generation of revolutionary theory
to treat revolutions as emergent phenomena, and to start by focusing on factors that cement
regime stability. Weakness in those factors then opens the way for revolutionary leadership,
ideology, and identification, along with structural factors such as international pressure and
elite conflicts, to create revolutions.”
The specific I will choose from Goldstone’s statement is “factors that cement regime
stability; weakness in those factors opens the way for revolutionary leadership.” As a corollary
to this thought, the weakness of regime stability could be influenced by the weakness in its
structural factors, for example the military. Thus, the stability of a regime could be strengthened
by the military as well. Here I will assert the opinion of western news agencies (including al
Jazeera in its video Bahrain: shouting in the dark), that Bahrain has repressed a revolution
through use of military force, among other things such as media suppression and counter
propaganda, and the overall destruction of the revolutionary movement by destroying the
symbolic site of revolution (Pearl Roundabout), arrests of public voices of the movement, and
diversion of responsibility for unrest to the outside entity of Iran (with its alleged interest to
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution 2 Tilly, Charles. The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986., Tarrow, Sidney. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
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destabilize the Sunni rule in Bahrain).3 This strategic and systematic deconstruction of
revolutionary force has thus far been effective in quelling any regime change. This information is
undoubtedly biased, as upon reviewing state news reports from the Bahraini News Agency, it is
clear that the government presents its explanation for events as well. I am led to interest in this
conflict because there are conflicting rationales behind actions presented by news agencies, and
yet they report the same events (albeit with differing rationales, as stated). Because military
involvement in publicized and accounted for on both sides of the bias spectrum, and because
militaries are theoretically thought be a stabilizing or destabilizing force in a regime, I seek to
investigate the military’s role in the Bahraini uprisings.
And to the incidence of uprisings I attribute the use of military force as a major
contributor. As Barry Rubin stated in a 2001 article about Arabian Gulf governments, “They
have also built militaries that can successfully maintain internal order.”4 This attribution of the
military being the determinant of the internal order in Gulf countries would suggest that internal
order in Bahrain is also attributable to a successfully built military. A factor that cements regime
stability is the military’s consent; history has seen that without it there may be a coup attempt.
Beyond that it seems that basic theories of politics which refer to equilibrium in the state in
regards to the internal balance of power between factions5 would cohere with military as being a
determinant of who is in power, and who is in power determining how the military acts. In
revolution, a military may overthrow a regime, and during the repression of revolution the
military may aid in quelling uprising. As a side note, I do not state that military is the only
3 http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-‐05-‐13/bahrain-‐pearl-‐revolution-‐monarchy/54939728/1 “Bahraini rulers "truly believe" that Iran, a majority Shiite nation, is behind the unrest, Rubin says. Iran has made claims to sovereignty over Bahrain and insulted its Sunni Muslim rulers.” 4 The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics – Barry Rubin, MERIA Journal, vol. 5 , no. 1 – march 2001 http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue1/jv5n1a4.html 5 I am referring to the second generation of revolutionary theoretical thought
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cementing factor in regime stability, rather that it can be a significant contributor to the balance
of power between ruler and subject.
Military control in Bahrain: theory
To reiterate the words of Barry Rubin:
“[Gulf governments] have also built militaries that can successfully maintain internal order.”
The persistence of Gulf monarchies would attest that monarchies are successful in
keeping their position as political hegemons in their countries to some extent. In fact, the two
most powerful positions in Bahrain’s military are the Supreme Commander and Commander in
Chief; titles both held by members of the country’s ruling family.6 The Arab Spring has shown
Libya use its military to fight rebels who were ultimately successful, and part of Egypt’s military
dissent to facilitate a similar overthrow. Meanwhile, stability has seemed apparent in Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf States, which have experienced less turmoil from 2010 to present with
uprisings. Bahrain seems to be somewhere between Egypt and Saudi Arabia in terms of stability,
because protests and violence are present and well-publicized, but the Bahraini military has
remained unified and in support of the al Khalifa monarchy. This leads me to my inquiry, where
I would like to consider the power of the unified Bahraini military in the maintenance of stability
in Bahrain. I hypothesize that:
H1: military action cemented regime control by Bahrain’s monarchical government
during Bahrain’s uprisings.
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Khalifa_family
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Charles Tilly identified “the leading elite’s loss of control over the military instrument as
a decisive revolutionary factor.”7 It seems that the theory following the same stream of thought,
that military in Tilly’s idea was influential in revolutionary situation, conversely applies to
Bahrain, that the leading elite’s continued control over the military is a decisive revolutionary
factor, and could therefore explain a government grip on power despite the incidence of a
revolution. Bahrain’s8 grip on power being facilitated by military action is concurrent with the
interests of the maintenance of its regime is a deciding factor in the outcome of revolutionary
uprisings, and therefore what could mean the monarchy’s loss of power.
A monarchy as an authoritarian regime has been found to spend a proportionally larger
amount of money than democratic regimes, coherent with an idea proposed by Immanuel Kant.
In monarchical Gulf States this would seem to be consistent.9 “liberal states tend to devote
proportionally less to their militaries than do autocratic states.10” Increased military spending
by a government would infer that the government values the military more. Compare the German
government, which I identify as relatively liberal and democratic, in comparison to the Saudi
government, which I identify as conservative and monarchical. It may be further promoted that
the Saudi Government values its military more than the German government, due to the Saudi 7 Tilly, European Revolution 8 Here, and in the future, when I refer to Bahrain’s grip, hold or maintenance of power, I mean the current monarchical government 9 Saudi military spending 10.4% USA 4.5% Bahraini 3.7% Germany 1.4%, World Bank; note the USA is self-‐declared liberal, yet maintains a (slightly) proportionally larger military than Bahrain, perhaps due to the USA’s aggressive foreign policy; thus the USA could be considered a somewhat-‐anomaly in this context, due to a far more aggressive and militarily involved foreign policy than the other mentioned countries; overall World Bank data shows significantly higher overall % GDP spending in Gulf monarchies (often around 6.5% higher) than in leading EU democracies such as France, England and Germany. 10 Reduced military spending, according to Kant, will promote both peace and prosperity. First, by spending less on their militaries, republican states will advance peace by avoiding conflict spirals. Second, Kant argues that leaders can better safeguard political rights and provide more resources for education and other social goods by devoting less to military spending. For Kant and subsequent liberals, these considerations will lead democratic states to devote less to their militaries than authoritarian states. Fordham, B. O. and Walker, T. C. (2005), Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?. International Studies Quarterly, 49: 141–157. doi: 10.1111/j.0020-‐8833.2005.00338.x
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government spending nearly nine times the proportional amount of its gross domestic product on
military annually. When we compare Bahrain’s and Germany’s military spending per year, it is
apparent that Bahrain spends over two and a half times the proportional GDP that Germany does.
Because the German and Bahraini governments are the deciders of expenditures, and therefore
the Bundestag and the al-Khalifa family, it would be rational to extrapolate that the al Khalifa
family’s government places proportionately higher value in its military by spending more on it
than the German Bundestag allocates. Bahrain’s political identity as liberal compared to Saudi
Arabia11, but conservative compared to Germany is consistent with their military spending in the
aspect of proportional GDP as coherent with ideology from Kant. If we move forward with the
argument that the Bahraini Monarchy sustains more proportional military than the German
Bundestag does, we can discuss what factors may cause that.
The role of the military is obviously dependent on the state’s needs. In the United States
of America’s case, we see political needs for foreign influence and propagation of democracy
culminate in an according military, and we can see evidence of that in its major deployment to
Afghanistan. In Germany’s case, where military policy seems comparatively less aggressive, we
see deployment into the same conflict region, yet in much smaller numbers.12 Bahrain’s absence
of deployment on any foreign soil may indicate that it has a purpose at home. By keeping the
military home, a sense of stability via repression may be induced; the conspicuous presence of
military forces could be felt by citizens as a factor of domination or tension. Bahrain spends
proportionally much more (2.3% more of GDP) on its defense budget than less-aggressive
Germany which has foreign deployments, and only slightly less (0.7% of GDP) than very
11 Bahrain has a semi elected congress, Saudi Arabia does not. They both have Kings. 12 http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf International Security Assistance Force USA 90,000 Germany 4,701
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aggressive USA which has foreign deployments. It could be extrapolated that military defense
spending is not for foreign deployments, but for domestic reasons. This leads to the next step in
my argument, that the role of the national military plays a greater role in domestic stability in
Bahrain than probably in the USA and most likely in Germany.
Because Bahrain has no apparent need for a military with offensive capability, it would
be reasonable to assume that Bahrain’s military is primarily defensive. Additionally, the name of
Bahrain’s military is the Bahrain Defence Force. A prominent threat to Bahraini sovereignty has
traditionally been Iran, due to a divide in religious sect (Sunni versus Shia) of the ruling parties
of each country.13 However, due to: the influence that Saudi Arabia enjoys over Bahrain14, with
its comparatively huge military, the influence that the USA enjoys over the entire region with its
stationing of the United States Navy Fifth fleet in Bahrain15, and the overall political isolation
which Iran experiences from Sunni Middle eastern nations (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahrain
Sunni in rulership), and political pariahdom from Western nations (USA, EU countries) due to
conflict of interest with alleged nuclear weapons production,16 a real threat to the territorial
integrity of Bahrain could be thought to be quite unrealistic, due the nature of the balance of
power which I have just outlined.17 Perhaps then, the role that the military plays is to pronounce
13 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain was found to be Iranian funded; 2012 Kharrazi former Iranian ambassador in Paris, said that it was easy for Iran to occupy Bahrain. “If Iran wanted, it could take control of Bahrain in a few hours by using its rapid reaction forces,” he said, quoted by the Iranian agency.” http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/iran-‐threats-‐on-‐bahrain-‐condemned-‐1.1037118 14 Additionally, the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are both Sunni and so share some common cultural ground in this respect 15 http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/ 16 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html Iran's Nuclear Program (Nuclear Talks, 2012) 17 Although there has been more than one alleged coup attempt by Iranians in the Bahraini government, Iran may see Bahrain as a strategic position, yet I reiterate, due to the current balance of power in the region, an Iranian military invasion would likely be self-‐destructive (USA 5th fleet, Saudi Arabia, GCC, UN).
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military strength internally; which shows the people that Bahrain has a relatively strong military;
there is no other obvious purpose which I have been able to extrapolate.
If we assume the purpose of the military in Bahrain is predominantly to pronounce
military strength internally, rather than to wage war in foreign countries, or to defend from
invasions, then it could indicate that there are domestic stability issues which are being addressed
by relatively high military presence. In the same way that a high number security forces are
deployed into Afghani regions with high amounts of military conflict18, Bahraini military may be
playing a logically similar role by unengagedly combatting latent conflict in their own country.
In a sense, perhaps Bahraini security forces are playing the role of counter force in a country
with a lot of latent conflict. It could be proposed that the balance of power between ruler and
subject in Bahrain was in relative equilibrium before the uprisings; a fragile balance between
repressive security and repressed will for political change could be put forth by this argument.
The idea of latent conflict manifests here in this idea of fragile equilibrium in terms of stability.
An example of latent conflict in Bahrain will now be outlined.
"The Battle of Karbala' still rages between the two sides in the present and in the future.
It is being held within the soul, at home and in all areas of life and society. People will remain
divided and they are either in the Hussain camp or in the Yazid camp. So choose your camp." —
'Ashura' banner in Manama, 200619 Because there remains a sectarian divide between the Sunni
ruling royal family (al-Khalifas) and the Shia majority, there seems to be a cultural platform for
latent conflict. In fact when pro-democracy protests broke out in 2011, at least some Sunni
supporters of the royal family rallied and pronounced their common ground with the ruling
18 127,000 total according to NATO 19 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala, http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.de/2011/07/dialogue-‐and-‐statistics.html
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family.20 One indication of instability could be attributed to the consistent divide in Bahrain
between the estimated 65% Shia majority and 35%21 Sunni minority who hold the most powerful
positions in government. As earlier stated, the al Khalifas hold the top two most powerful
positions in the military, along with the Kingship and nearly all relatively significant posts below
the Kingship as well.22
On the contrary to sectarianism being the root of latent conflict which military would be
charged with suppressing, is video footage collected by al Jazeera news agency showed
protestors holding signs which read, “Sunni + Shia = Bahrain,” and “Sunnis are Shias are
brothers, they cannot be sold.”23 The narrator also commented that the government had been
trying to make this out as a sectarian conflict, rather than a united struggle for democracy. This
may lead one to believe that Sunnis and Shias are divided in religious sect, but not to an extent
that would breed conflict.
With this information taken into account, it becomes less clear whether this conflict is
sectarian or pro-democratic, as the protestors confront military security. After reviewing my
research, I decided that this conflict was a combination of the two, however also that the
variables of sectarianism and pro-democracy were not mutually exclusive, rather they were
coherent.24 The overall cause for revolution seemed to be a lack of democratic rights on behalf of
20 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18voices.html 21 This is an estimate; government figures present 49% Shia to 51% Sunni among Muslims in Bahrain, while international estimates are closer to 70% Shia and 30% Sunni. The government report has been called suspicious, due to its 1% difference which shows Sunni majority and therefore Sunni legitimacy in government, as well as historic censuses which show significantly higher Shia percentage. See http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18voices.html for more information on government censuses and then a critique. 22 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Khalifa_family 23 Al Jazeera video production, “Bahrain: shouting in the dark.” 24 One piece of evidence for a combination sectarian and pro-‐democracy movement was in the al Jazeera video footage that showed the ID cards of wounded security officers in a hospital; they were all Sunnis and many
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the population of Bahrain- revolutionaries call for fair elections and freedom.25 Secondarily,
there was absence of Shia representation in the most powerful forces of government, and thus
revolutionaries demanded that the King step down from political power, to allow more
democratic participation.26 Because this conflict is characterized by pro-democracy slogans in
addition to sectarian statements, and the military’s job is seemingly to promote stability
internally, this seems to be a larger conflict between ruler and subject rather than Sunni and Shia
alone.
This state of latent conflict, whether one perceives it as dominantly pro-democratic
(between ruler and subject) or dominantly sectarian, requires a significant amount of repression
to maintain. Jack A. Goldstone posited that fourth generation revolution theorists should look at
how a regime cements its stability, and the regime of Bahrain may have cemented its stability
through a strong military presence. In conflict theory put forth by Jeong, conflicts have an
escalation phase which is followed by a flashpoint, which leads to incident.27 It could be posited
then, that the Arab Spring revolts in Tunisia and Egypt were the “spark that caused the fire,” in
Bahrain. It is an assumption of mine that the Bahrain protests were not random; rather they were
provoked and encouraged.28 Thus, perhaps a greater military role (as it represented the now
dethroned rulers of Libya and Egypt) not only repressed the urge for political demonstration, but
therefore also provoked further demonstration. Military security could have further invoked
protest, as their presence presented a clear opposition to the protesters’ pro-democratic
demonstrations. recruited from outside of Bahrain. An interviewee stated that Shias were often unemployed because they were discriminated against in employment for police and military jobs, though I found no statistical evidence for this. It should be noted that there are allegations against al Jazeera for taking a biased stance on the revolution. 25 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201132982742988712.html 26 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/18/bahrain-‐mourners-‐call-‐downnfall-‐monarchy 27 “Spark that causes explosion when sufficient explosive gas is provided,” Jeong ch 5 28 Provoked by military presence, encouraged by Arab Spring
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Evidence & Discussion
I will now aim to look at evidence to support the theory that I have outlined that military
force has been used in Bahrain, and that it has been used by its government to cement internal
stability. The following evidence is taken from the BBC, which is admittedly not a perfect
source. However, it has built a good reputation over its longevity and I would argue that the
organization aims to present factual material and aims for conscientious honesty in its
presentation. Because BBC is a news agency among many others, and the reports have shown to
present similar facts in different fashions, I will attempt to overlook all suggestive wording in the
reports and instead evaluate the events which took place.29 For example evidence piece one (The
evidence which I choose to look at is a “Bahrain Profile - BBC,” where I choose to look at a
timeline, where a chronology of key events is written.30):
The Selected Reports
(BBC) In response to protests in Manama in February 2011, the government instituted an
aggressive military crackdown, where several protesters died. (I will interpret in factual terms,
29 I justify this as an accurate source because of the commonality in the fact-‐ladenness of reports which were evident across news agencies; I compared primarily the BBC and the Bahraini News Agency (BNA, state owned, which may infer that its reports are accompanied by a pro-‐government). 30 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-‐middle-‐east-‐14541322 The events which I choose as evidence have also been reported by other major new agencies such as the Telegraph, al Jazeera and even the Bahrain News Agency (the state news, however it reports some events with different reasoning, citing the destruction of pearl roundabout, e.g., as a facelift for better traffic flow through the area. Out of the government's keenness to optimize services and improve the infrastructure, work to facelift the GCC Roundabout and boost flow of traffic in this vital area of the capital has started today. (picture of destroyed monument) http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/450175. Compare this report to the BBC report, which reports the Focal point of demonstrations -‐ the Pearl monument -‐ is demolished. (On the BBC timeline). My goal is to overlook the bias of the rationale which different news reports present, and rather instead of that I look at the actions and determine their rationale using my research.
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disregarding implicit wording): (Interpretation) Protests occurred in Manama in February 2011.
The military was involved in them. Some protesters died31.
The fact is that protests occurred at Pearl Roundabout and the military was deployed to
contain them. The rationale or justification of military deployment can be skewed and
manipulated, however I look at the basic government response. Instead of allowing the protests
to move on, professional soldiers were deployed. I am not inciting that military deployment to
protest sites is abnormal, however it indicates that the government was threatened by the protests
to an extent, and that in order to keep the under control, the government decided on military
action.
(Interpretation) Saudi Arabian troops were deployed into Bahrain by the Gulf
Cooperative Council (GCC) after diplomatic talks, taking positions of security concern and not
in direct interaction with protestors. Authorities called martial law. The site of the original
protests was destroyed (Pearl Roundabout) by government hired construction vehicles.32
Saudi interest is quite implicit here. There are a number of speculations of why Saudi
Arabia offered soldiers to Bahrain during a time which coincided with significant civil unrest. A
popular speculation is that Saudi Arabia does not want to see the repercussions of Arab Spring
instability in its own country, as Bahrain perhaps has.33 Bahrain’s acceptance of Saudi troops on
31 BNA news gives similar reports, yet does not draw them together to put forth that the government is repressing protests; rather non-‐interaffiliated reasons are given. Further, a report was not found on their website which described the deployment of military, rather instead was found an article about Bahraini soldiers being called off of the streets by the Crown Prince. http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/447611 32 Original: (BBC) 2011 March -‐ Saudi troops are called in following further unrest. Authorities declare martial law and clamp down hard on pro-‐democracy activists. Protests continue, despite ban on demonstrations. Focal point of demonstrations -‐ the Pearl monument -‐ is demolished. http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/450088 -‐ Peninsula Shield deployment. Pearl Roundabout -‐ <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/450175>. 33 Bahraini protests are contemporaneous with civil unrest for democratic values that have occurred in countries across the Arab world.
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their soil could implicate that the Bahraini and Saudi government share a common stability
motive. Further, they both have Sunni monarchies, which could explain a sympathetic response
from Saudi Arabia to Bahrain during GCC emergency meetings. The Peninsula Shield Force, as
the multinational defense force which is funded by the GCC and based in Saudi Arabia. It is
intended to deter, and respond to, military aggression against any of the GCC member countries:
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.34
Martial law was called by the King, implying a relative state of security emergency.
Whether it was necessary or not is up to debate, however the fact is that martial law was called,
giving security forces the legislative power to overrule ordinary law in their task of security. This
invocation of martial law gave the military more power in quelling unrest and did indeed result
in more deaths and injuries. If we assume that the regime felt threatened in response to protests
which called for regime change, then we can link a response in the form of military deployment
and also further strengthening of military force in the interest of the government’s interest to
manage protests in the case of the Peninsular Shield’s deployment.
35(Interpretation) Abdulhadi al-Khawaja was charged under martial law with plotting
against the state and sentenced to life in prison.
The use of martial law to detain a suspect who allegedly plotted against the state could
indicate that the military is dealing with more charges than just one to contain anti-governmental
behavior. It may be that the declaration of martial law is an implicit result of deploying military
34 This is a Wikipedia citation, and there is no official peninsular shield website available; for this reason that official declaration of the peninsular shield’s usage is somewhat ambiguous, however an agreed upon usage is given. 35 Original (BBC) In June 2012 opposition activist Abdulhadi al-‐Khawaja was jailed for life by a military court with allegations for “plotting against the state.” It should be noted that the BNA reports that he is safe and receiving good health care, but none of the BNA’s report describe what he is charged with, rather that he is simply being “kept safe” http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/advance_search?name=Abdulhadi+al-‐Khawaja+&tid=0&type=1
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to manage civilian unrest. Taking legislative power out of the hands of the citizenry thereby
strengthens the military ability to influence a revolutionary uprising and because it has been an
actor on the government’s behalf, has strengthened the government position related to the
protestor position on the uprising. By strengthening the government and thereby weakening the
protestor through the declaration of martial law, which increases the influence of military on the
situation, it becomes lucid that the military has become a strong actor on the revolution in
situations of protests and jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Ongoing protests being contemporaneous with military deployment and martial law may
imply a cause and effect relationship between protestors’ political agenda and the way the
government responded with military force and military jurisdiction. From this, it may be
extrapolated that the al-Khalifa government has dealt with protests using its military, and that
because the military is in the hands of the al-Khalifas alone (not the protestors or citizenry), the
use of military force on the protestors was lacking in legitimacy, because the protestors and al-
Khalifas have different political agendas. That said, is an absolute monarchy legitimate? This is
open to academic discussion and is highly relevant to context. I would argue that the action of an
external state in military deployment shows a weakness of the Bahraini government, as its
maintenance then could be reliant on external support.
I hypothesized that the government of Bahrain had cemented internal political stability
through use of its military. My hypothesis seems to shed some truth on the importance of the
military in Bahrain in relation to politics. I will now review what I have written about in this
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paper, in order to reiterate the logical connection between that I see between military use and al-
Khalifa family’s interest.
I started by discussing schools of thought which inferred that the military was an
important stabilization factor for a regime, and especially important in monarchies where
legitimacy may be compromised. I then discussed Tilly and Goldstone’s revolutionary theories
in their relevance to the military. Data shows that military spending is higher in states with more
conservative forms of government. I brought up the issue of Bahrain and how it is purported in
the media, and committed to looking at facts reported by the media, not at implicative
statements. After that I moved into theory building, where I built upon the ideas of a few select
scholars.36 I looked at who controlled the military, and then looked at the funding and possible
purposes of Bahrain’s military by comparing them to other countries. I discussed reasons for
Bahrain having a strong military, and addressed the question of sectarianism, which led me to a
theory of latent conflict in Bahrain which was not only sectarian but also ruler-subject. Then I
asserted the “spark that ignited the gasoline” theory to Bahrain, and continued on to how
sectarian stability was relevant to the maintenance of the current government; this led me to the
possibility of military presence being a provoking factor in further sectarian and other (pro-
democratic) opposition.
After that, I presented my evidence for the military being a major actor in the
government’s interest, by looking at carefully selected news articles and then interpreting the
facts that they contain, first making sure that other news agencies (even the Bahraini News
Agency, which is state-run) reported consistently similar facts. I discussed my evidence of
military influence on the revolutionary protests in Bahrain, and then concluded that the
36 Tilly, Goldstone, Kant, Rubin
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government had quelled the protests using military force and jurisdiction, evident in the
deployment of military through cause and effect logic, and the institution of martial law and
arrest of a leading opposition member. In attendance of my hypothesis, I briefly discussed and
then concluded that a major stability factor in the al Khalifa regime is its use of the military, due
to its power over the military.
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Bibliography
I would like to note that open source information (from Wikipedia.org) was used when no other alternative could be found.
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Al Jazeera English. "Misunderstanding Bahrain's Shia Protesters" Web. 29 June 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201132982742988712.html>.
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Just a further link and an end-comment. The Bahraini revolution has so much bias in its new reports that it’s hard to decipher the actual state of the public’s opinion in this matter of revolution. Here is a link to the Bahraini Revolution’s Facebook page (named Feb.14 because that was the start date of protests: http://www.facebook.com/Bahrain.Feb14. Obviously they have their own agenda and are bias too, but I want to emphasize my deep sympathy for the promotion of human rights and the transition to democratic government, wherever it is, whenever it is. The government of Bahrain’s steps to contain the revolution may be a course of action which reduces civilian harm and deaths, and could be promoting a peaceful transition of Bahrain’s absolute monarchy to democracy instead of allowing an all-out rebellion to occur which is seen in multiple other Arab countries. My opinion supports revolutionaries in their call
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for international jurisdiction and help; I would like to state that the government’s strength in selective media coverage and tact in diplomacy has made it so that the international community does not really have a solid reason to intervene; their facts are not solid enough and unrest is perhaps not intense enough in Bahrain. All in all, I hope to see Bahrain transition to democracy in a way that is supported by the al-Khalifa family, and in a way that everyone is happy, where the monarchy retains some of its immense wealth, but also where corruption (such as the sale of a major piece of down-town Bahrain real estate was sold to the al-Khalifas for 1 Bahraini dollar) is unearthed and condemned with legal jurisdiction. Finally, the behavior of the government to seduce its citizens with $3000 to each family and promises of a boost in the economy shows that the al-Khalifas know how to play to the desires of the people while continuing their monarchical rule and conceding the least amount possible. In my opinion, a minor redistribution of wealth is a very small price to pay considering the al-Khalifas immense wealth and the protest action for their dethroning.
Linked is the Wikipedia entry about the Bahraini uprising. The fact and figures table on the right may give one a solid basic overview of the conflict. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahraini_uprising_(2011%E2%80%93present)
This work is my own, I did not plagiarize or use this for another class.
William Johannes Wesselhoeft