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The use of rational, emotional, and combinationappeals to respond to rejected requestsDanette E. Ifert a & Leeza Bearden ba Assistant professor in the Department of Communication & Dramatic Arts , West VirginiaWesleyan College , Buckhannon, WV, 26201b Doctoral student at the University of Oklahoma , Norman, OK, 73019Published online: 06 Jun 2009.

To cite this article: Danette E. Ifert & Leeza Bearden (1997) The use of rational, emotional, and combination appeals torespond to rejected requests, Communication Research Reports, 14:1, 65-73, DOI: 10.1080/08824099709388646

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The Use of Rational, Emotional, and CombinationAppeals to Respond to Rejected Requests

Danette E. Ifert Leeza BeardenWest Virginia Wesleyan College University of Oklahoma

This study examines persons' use of three types of appeals: rational,emotional, and combination, to respond to rejected interpersonal requests. Resultssuggest that persons use more rational than either emotional or combinationappeals. When the specific obstacle in the refusal message is taken into account,however, this difference is present only when requesters are highly unable tocomply.

The fundamental role of rational and emotional appeals in the persuasion process hasbeen recognized at least since Aristotle (Hyde & Smith, 1993). Limited attention has beenpaid, however, to how persons use rational and emotional appeals in interpersonalinfluence situations, particularly after refusals of an initial request. This study examinesthe use of specific appeals in response to refusals of requests.

Responses to RefusalsThere are at least three types of appeals which persons can use to respond to requests

and refusals: rational, emotional, and combination. Rational appeals are typically definedas a claim accompanied by explanation or support (e.g. Cody, Canary, & Smith, 1994).When a student is asking an instructor to change a grade, an example of a rational appealmight be, "You gave me no points for showing formulas, but here's where the formulas

Danette E. Ifert (Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1994) is an assistant professor in the Departmentof Communication & Dramatic Arts at West Virginia Wesleyan College, Buckhannon, WV 26201and Leeza Bearden (M.A. Texas Tech University, 1995) is a doctoral student at the University ofOklahoma, Norman, OK 73019.

An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the EasternCommunication Association, New York, NY.

COMMUNICATION RESEARCH REPORTS, Volume 14, Number 1, pages 65-73

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appear in my paper." Although the instructor might disagree with the student's perceptionof what constitutes an acceptable answer, the student's response is a claim with evidencesupporting the claim. Rationality is a popular strategy to achieve influence goals (Canary,Cody, & Marston, 1987; Cody, Greene, Marston, CHair, Baaske, & Schneider, 1986) andthose using such appeals are rated favorably (Cody et al., 1994; Falbo, 1977).

Emotionally based appeals have been largely disregarded by those investigatinginterpersonal influence (Reardon, 1991) and may be defined as appeals consisting of anassertion without supporting evidence or explanation. Using the same scenario as above,an example of an emotional appeal might be, "I've gotta get a good grade in this class." Nojustification appears in the appeal. The few who have addressed emotional appeals in theinterpersonal influence literature tend to see emotional appeals as atypical (Cody,McLaughlin, & Jordan, 1980) and/or undesirable (Rule & Bisanz, 1987) strategy choices.

While rational and emotional appeals may be used separately or in tandem,combination appeals incorporate elements of both. Combination appeals follow the/orm ofrational appeals but contain evidence irrelevant to the issue being argued. An examplewould be, "I won't be able to graduate if you don't change my grade and my entire familyis already coming." Here, the appeal appears to follow the rational form of a claimsupported by evidence; Dearin's (1989) analysis of the work of Chaim Perelman notedPerelman's recognition that the appearance of logic can be a powerful persuasive tool.Walton (1992) suggested that irrelevant arguments appeal to emotion because they seekjudgment based upon factors not germane to the situation. The example above is acombination appeal, then, because it follows the form of supporting explanation found inrational arguments but the evidence provided is aimed at the emotions.

Several researchers (Byers, 1988; Ifert & Roloff, 1996a; Roloff & Janiszewski, 1989) havegiven evidence that requesters may respond to refusals with further persuasion attempts.These researchers, however, have not examined the content of persuasive statements forrational, emotional, or combination appeals.

Given that prior research (e.g. Cody, McLaughlin, & Schneider, 1981; Ifert & Long,1990) found that rational appeals occur frequently in initial requests and are evaluatedpositively, it would seem that rational strategies would occur more frequently in repeatedrequests than negatively evaluated (Rule & Bisanz, 1987) emotionally based appeals.Rational appeals should be more prevalent than combination appeals because there is anemotional component to such arguments; this emotional component, following the logic ofRule and Bisanz (1987), should render combination appeals more negative than rationalappeals.

HI: Persons will respond to refused requests by using more rationalthan emotional or combination appeals.

The Influence of Obstacles on ResponsesOne factor which may influence the appeals used to respond to refusals is the type of

obstacle encountered in the refusal. Prior research (Ifert & Roloff, 1996a) found that theobstacle present in refusals influenced a requester's desire to persist and to enact specificlinguistic cues. Ifert and Roloff (1996b) found three dimensions which may underlieobstacles: willingness-unwillingness, ability-inability, and focus on requester-focus awayfrom requester; these dimensions are derived, in part, from the attributional work of

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Weiner (1972,1980). The purpose of these dimensions is to assist in classifying obstacles tocompliance; thus, they are used here as a basis for assessing how persons respond toparticular types of obstacle messages.

The first dimension, willingness-unwillingness, reflects the degree to which a refuserexpresses motivation to comply (Francik & Clark, 1985; Jacobs & Jackson, 1981). A refuserfailing to comply after rational reasons are given for compliance should be less able topreserve a positive self-image (Brown & Levinson, 1987). After all, no external barriers existwhich prevent compliance. Emotional appeals, on the other hand, may provide noadditional motivation to assist, as the refuser may dismiss such appeals as insufficientgrounds for compliance. Combination appeals may also be less useful than rational ones inovercoming unwillingness, as irrelevant information fails to confront and, thus, toovercome, the obstacle preventing compliance.

H2: Requesters who perceive that obstacles are high in unwillingnesswill respond to refusals with more rational appeals thanemotional or combination appeals.

A second dimension underlying obstacles is ability-inability, wherein a refuserexpresses possession or lack of necessary resources to assist (Francik & Clark, 1985; Jacobs& Jackson, 1981). When an obstacle high in inability is present, the refuser lacks resourcesneeded to comply. Since such refusals state clearly the barrier, the requester should focuson bringing about the conditions necessary to fulfill the request. Rationally based appealsfocused on procuring requisite resources should be more successful in removing theobstacle than emotional or combination appeals because appealing to emotions is unlikelyto produce the resources needed.

H3: Requesters who perceive that obstacles are high in inability willrespond to refusals with more rational appeals than emotional orcombination appeals.

Focus toward requester-focus away from requester assesses whether the obstaclestated is due to the requester or whether it is directed at external sources. If a requesterbelieves that an obstacle is directed at him or herself, it may be perceived as an affront topositive face (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Such a threat to face wants may result in a negativeresponse designed to threaten the face needs of the refuser. Given that prior research (e.g.Rule & Bisanz, 1987) classifies emotional appeal as a negative strategy, it seems thatemotional appeals may constitute such negative responses and may therefore occur morefrequently than rational or combination appeals.

H4: Requesters who perceive that obstacles are focused highly towardthe requester will respond to refusals with more emotionalappeals than rational or combination appeals.

METHODSample

Participants were recruited from introductory communication classes at a medium

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sized southwestern university. One hundred forty eight students (78 males and 69 females)volunteered to participate. One student did not indicate sex. Respondents ranged in agefrom 18 to 52 years (M = 21.6, Mdn = 21.0).

ProceduresParticipants were given a questionnaire packet containing several items. First,

respondents were asked to imagine themselves in one of two request scenarios: convincinga professor to change a low grade or persuading a campus security officer not to issue aparking ticket. These scenarios were selected for their relevance to the respondentpopulation (Cody et al., 1994). Following the request scenario, participants were given ahypothetical statement the professor or security officer might use to refuse the request andwere then asked to write out exactly what they would say in response. Participants ratedthe refusal statement on Likert-type scales designed to operationalize the obstacledimensions. Respondents repeated these procedures for the second scenario; participantsreceived a different refusal statement for each scenario. Following completion of thequestionnaires, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

VariablesThirteen obstacle statements were generated by the authors to represent a wide range

of refusals and to exemplify the three dimensions; the thirteen statements appear in Table1. In the main study, the number of respondents encountering each obstacle statementranged from 17 to 23.

TABLE 1Hypothetical Refusal Statements

1. "The 'No Parking' sign is clearly visible."2. "Students always have an excuse."3. "You broke the law."4. "I don't want to ignore the violation."5. "I can't do that for you."6. "The law says I have to ticket you."7. "That wouldn't be fair to other people who park illegally."8. "That wouldn't be fair to other people in the class."9. "If you were having problems with the assignment, you should have come to me earlier."10. "You didn't fulfill the assignment guidelines."11. "I don't want to change the grade."12. "The grading criteria say I have to do this."13. "It's my job to enforce the rules."

Note. Statements 2 and 5 were used in both experimental scenarios. Statements 1 through 7 and 13 were usedin the ticketing scenario and statements 8 through 12 were used in the grade change scenario.

A pilot study was used to ascertain that the obstacle statements represented a varietyof points along the three dimensions. Forty four persons from the same population as

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respondents in the main study elected to participate. Those volunteering to participaterated each of the thirteen obstacle statements on three seven-point Likert-type scales (onefor each dimension). Following completion of the questionnaire, respondents werethanked for their participation and debriefed.

For the willingness-unwillingness dimension, mean scores for individual obstaclestatements ranged from 3.54 to 6.22 while mean scores on the ability-inability dimensionsranged from 3.48 to 5.28. Mean scores on the focus on-focus away from requester dimensionranged from 2.85 to 5.48. The results of the pilot study suggest that the statements representa variety of points on the dimensional continua and the statements were therefore used asstimulus material in the main study.

Each of the three obstacle dimensions discussed previously was measured using sevenpoint Likert-type scales. The endpoint given a value of seven represented the highest levelsof unwillingness, inability, and focus toward the requester. Table 2 contains the meanratings on each dimension for the thirteen obstacle statements used in this study.

TABLE 2Mean Dimensional Ratings for Obstacle Statements

Statement1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Unwillingness5.09

(1.165.08

(1.37)6.07

(1.04)4.65

(1-47)5.43

(1.45)5.21

(1.17)5.27

(1.11)5.26

(1.32)4.48

(1.21)5.44

(1.16)5.98

(1.31)5.50

(1.36)5.68

(1.35)

Inability3.37

(1.25)4.14

(1.58)4.61

(1.70)3.70

(1.60)4.39

(1.82)4.13

(1.84)4.29

(1.70)3.00

(1.41)3.43

(1.38)3.65

(1.87)3.24

(1.79)4.29

(1.84)3.89

(1.20)

Focus on Requester4.67

(1.54)4.49

(1.43)3.96

(2.25)4.75

(1.64)4.41

(1.77)4.90

(1.88)5.41

(1.35)4.80

(1.57)3.21

(1.55)3.24

(1.20)3.88

(1.77)5.21

(1.51)4.68

(1.62)

Note. Ratings are from the main study (N = 148). Ratings were made on Likert-type scales ranging from 1(high willingness, high ability, high focus away from the requester) to 7 (high unwillingness, highinability, high focus toward the requester). Standard deviations appear in parentheses below ratings.

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Participants' written responses to the obstacle statements were classified as one of fourtypes by two coders working independently. Rational appeals were defined as claims andsupporting evidence relevant to the issue. This definition is similar to that of Cody et al.(1994). Emotional appeals were defined as assertions with no supporting evidence.Combination appeals were units containing supporting evidence irrelevant to the requestsituation. Units not fitting these categories were coded as miscellaneous; less than fivepercent of all units were in this category. Coders did not judge the strength of the evidencepresented but coded arguments as rational if any relevant evidence accompanied the claimand as a combination if the evidence was irrelevant to the request in the scenario.

Cohen'sKappa was used to determine intercoder reliability. For rational appeals,K«ppa= .95 and for emotional appeals, Kappa = .82. For combination appeals, Kappa = 1.00. Thesevalues were judged to represent good reliability.

RESULTSTo test hypotheses two through four, operationalizing high levels of unwillingness,

inability, and focus on the requester was required. The two obstacle statements for eachscenario with the highest mean levels of unwillingness, inability, and focus on the requesterwere selected to represent the high group. Using this method, the statements numbered 3,11,12, and 13 in Table 1 were used to represent high unwillingness while statements 3,5,and 12 represented high inability. A high degree of focus on the requester was exemplifiedby statements 6,7,8, and 12. Obstacles in the high unwillingness, inability, and focus on therequester groups were rated significantly higher on those dimensions than the otherobstacle statements.1

Hypothesis TestsThe first hypothesis predicted that rational appeals would be used more frequently in

response to rejection than either emotional or combination appeals. The mean number ofrational appeals used (M = 0.97, SD = 0.87) was greater than the mean number of emotionalappeals (M = 0.56, SD = 0.67, t(287) = 6.05, p < .05). Likewise, rational appeals were usedmore frequently than combination appeals (M = 0.22, SD = 0.50, f(287) = 12.27, p < .05). Thefirst hypothesis is therefore supported.

Since the test of hypothesis one found that rational appeals occurred more frequentlythan other types of responses, tests of hypotheses two, three, and four utilized the pro-portion of rational, emotional, or combination responses present. This was done to controlfor the alternative explanation that rational appeals occur more frequently overall, so theywould occur more frequently within each of the obstacle groups addressed by hypothesestwo through four.

The second hypothesis predicted that when obstacles high in unwillingness wereencountered, more rational appeals would be used than other appeals. Proportionallymore rational appeals (M = 0.36, SD - 0.39) were used than combination appeals (M = 0.09,SD = 0.20, f (70) = 4.63,p < .05). The proportion of rational appeals did not differ significantlyfrom the proportion of emotional appeals (M = 0.28, SD = 0.33, t(70) = 1.12, p > .05) used.There is partial support for the second hypothesis.

The third hypothesis predicted that rational appeals would occur more often thanemotional or combination appeals when high inability obstacles were present. Resultssupport this hypothesis. Rational appeals (M = 0.41, SD = 0.36) were used more frequently

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than both emotional (M = 0.21, SD = 0.29, t(75) = 3.30,p < .05) and combination (M= 0.07, SD= 0.19, t(75) = 6.71, p < .05) appeals.

The fourth hypothesis predicted that persons would respond with more emotionalthan combination or rational appeals when obstacles focused highly on the requester.Emotional appeals (M = 0.28, SD = 0.34) were used significantly more than combinationappeals (M = 0.10, SD = 0.24, f (77) = 3.33, p < .05). The use of emotional and rational (M =0.37, SD = 0.38) appeals did not differ significantly (t(77) = 1.35, p > .05). Thus, there ispartial support for hypothesis four.

DISCUSSIONAlthough the results of the present analysis are mixed, they lend insight into how

persons respond to refused requests. Individuals utilize more rational than eitheremotional or combination appeals (HI). The specific obstacle encountered in a refusalseems to play a role in how people respond, as individuals respond to high unwillingnessobstacles with more rational (H2) than combination appeals. When obstacles high ininability are present, persons use more rational than either emotional or combinationappeals (H3). Finally, when obstacles highly focused on the requester are faced, moreemotional (H4) appeals are used than combination appeals.

Overall, this study is important because it shows that the type of obstacle stated in arefusal influences the type of response. Although rational appeals are most commonoverall, within two of the three obstacle types tested, they are not used with significantlygreater frequency than emotional appeals. These findings thus support an interactiveapproach to understanding request interactions which focuses on how the messages of oneinteractant directly influence the message of another. This study also adds to the previousliterature on interpersonal influence by addressing persons' use of both rational andemotional appeals. Since persons indicate that they utilize emotional appeals, it isimportant for scholars to give consideration to such appeals. This information is also usefulto those engaged in compliance interactions because requesters can exert influence over theresponses they might receive by stating specific types of obstacles and they may be betterable to plan responses to emotional, rational, or combination appeals because they canpredict which type of appeal might be used by an interaction partner. Additional researchin this area is merited in order further to elucidate the conditions under which individualsenact rational, emotional, and combination appeals.

One limitation is that only two experimental scenarios were used to generateresponses. Although these scenarios were chosen for their relevance to respondents andare similar to situations described in Cody et al. (1994), research should utilize additionalscenarios to extend the generalizability of these results.

Another issue that needs to be addressed by continuing research is the obstaclesclassified as high in unwillingness, inability, and focus on the requester. Few obstacles inthese groups had means above 6.0, so these obstacles do not seem to represent extremelyhigh levels of the three dimensions. The obstacles used to operationalize the high ends ofthese dimensions were, however, judged to be significantly higher by respondents than theother obstacles and appear to represent a range of willingness, ability, and focus on therequester. It could be that persons simply do not see obstacles as extreme. This possibilityis supported by the consistency between means found in the main study and the pilot test.Further research should assess whether persons perceive any obstacles as extreme or

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whether such obstacles are expected to occur in discourse.In addition to the areas mentioned above, future research should investigate how

successful rational, emotional, and combination appeals are in persuasive discourse. Itwould seem that individuals use the appeals they believe are most persuasive but researchshould examine whether those who hear the appeals find them as persuasive as those whocreate the appeals.

NOTES1 Respondents rated the statements in the high unwillingness group (M = 5.81,

SD = 1.28) significantly higher in unwillingness than the other obstaclestatements (M = 5.15, SD = 1.31, t(289) = 3.69, p < .05). Statements in the highinability group (M = 4.40, SD = 1.78) represented greater inability than otherobstacle statements (M = 3.70, SD = 1.61, t(290) = 3.15, p < .05). Similarly,statements in the high focus on requester group (M = 5.06, SD = 1.59) were judgedto focus more on the requester than other obstacles (M = 4.19, SD = 1.69, t(290) =4.03, p < .05).

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