The Two Canadas

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The Two CanadasAuthor(s): Jeffrey SimpsonSource: Foreign Policy, No. 81 (Winter, 1990-1991), pp. 71-86Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148809 .

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THE TWO CANADAS

by Jeffrey Simpson

Twenty-five years ago, a royal commission

investigating relations between English- and

French-speaking Canadians warned that "Can- ada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is

passing through the greatest crisis in its his-

tory." Those provocative words were intended to shock Canadians into examining themselves, their country, and the relations between the two

founding peoples of Canada. Above all, they were written to awaken English-speaking Cana- dians to the new realities of an assertive, dy- namic Quebec of the 1960s, a province throw-

ing off its church-dominated and rural past, no

longer content with its status within the Cana- dian confederation.

Today, despite myriad institutional and policy changes over the past two and a half decades

designed to smooth relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians, the commission's words still aptly describe Canadian real-

ity. Canada is now "passing through the greatest crisis in its history" in the aftermath of the June 1990 collapse of a constitutional accord desired by the French-speaking province of Quebec, but resisted, if the polls were correct, by a majority of English-speaking Canadians. The combined objections of two provinces and Canada's aboriginal communities ultimately defeated the pact.

The failure of the so-called Meech Lake accord (named after a small lake near Ottawa where the agreement was negotiated in 1987), and especially the bitter debate outside Quebec, has pushed support for Quebec independence, or at least increased sovereignty, to its highest levels ever. It has forced some Canadians to contemplate that at best their country faces radical changes, and at worst a split into two separate states.

JEFFREY SIMPSON is the national afairs columnist of the Globe and Mail, Canada's national newspaper. He is the author of four nonfiction books, the latest of which is Spoils of Power (1988).

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Just as the royal commission of 1965 found

many Canadians unaware of the linguistic and cultural tensions gnawing at their country, so

today many Canadians-and certainly a majority of the English-speaking ones-have not fully grasped how and why the Meech Lake trauma left Canada so badly shaken. And if many Canadians themselves cannot yet comprehend what has happened to their country, imagine the difficulty for most Americans, who view Canada as a peaceful, solid, sensible northern

neighbor whose standard of living, reputation for compromise, and social peace would make it an unlikely candidate for political dismember- ment.

Matters are complicated because almost none of the traditional indices of discontent were or are present in the national crisis. The

country's-including Quebec's-standard of

living remains high. The political leadership is

representative of all regions of the country; indeed, Quebec is slightly over-represented in the Conservative party government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, himself a Quebecker. No policies of the national government are considered so iniquitous or injurious in Quebec that the province should leave the country on their account. The country's national institutions are obliged by law to offer services in both French and English; and in an unparalleled pedagogical experiment, nearly a quarter of a million English-speaking schoolchildren are en- rolled in French language-immersion programs in which all courses (except for English, of course) are taught in French.

And yet the threat to Canadian unity has never been more severe than in the aftermath of the collapse of Meech Lake. It is a crisis more insidious and subtle-and therefore more

deeply rooted-than others Canada has faced in its often troubled history. It is a crisis of the heart and mind, a clash over symbols, a struggle for recognition and rights by newly empowered groups. It is a crisis that envenoms further what the French observer Andr6 Siegfried, a kind of de Tocqueville for Canada, called in 1907 the "fears and jealousies" between English- and French-speaking Canadians. It is a crisis of confidence about whether Canada, after 123 years as a federal state, is still worth the effort.

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Meech Lake Demands The Meech Lake accord was both cause and

victim of these "fears and jealousies." To French-

speaking Quebeckers, the accord symbolized the

willingness of the rest of Canada to respect their

province's distinctiveness. To a majority of

English-speaking Canadians, Meech Lake represented yet another demand for concessions from a province perpetually unhappy within Canada. Meech Lake was described in Quebec, with good reason, as a set of minimalist demands for secur-

ing that province's place within Canada. Else- where, many English-speaking Canadians viewed it as a set of maximalist demands that would recognize Quebec as a "distinct society" within Canada and therefore would inexorably lead to a special status for the province.

Meech Lake thus crystallized a debate between two fundamentally incompatible views of Canadian federalism that Canadian politicians of

every stripe had frequently attempted to fudge: the view in Quebec that the province deserved

special recognition and particular powers because of its French-speaking identity; and the view elsewhere that all provinces must be con-

stitutionally equal. The debate also demonstrated that the old idea of Canada as an ongoing arrangement between two large groups no longer reflected adequately the entire Canadian reality. This outdated idea left behind both multicultural Canadians, who now represent nearly a third of the population, and Canada's aboriginal peoples, who felt excluded from the debate. And the debate further demonstrated that an accommodation among political elites, often made behind closed doors, no longer satisfied interest groups and individual citizens who felt empowered by a written charter of rights and freedoms. The 1982

charter, which has added distinctly American attitudes toward authority to the Canadian political culture, has emboldened private citizens and interest groups to seek court remedies in the pursuit of rights rather than relying on partici- pation in political parties with all their messy compromises. In the charter era, elite accommodation, which lies at the heart of federal- provincial negotiations, is seen as exclusive, se- cretive, and fundamentally undemocratic.

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At one level, the debate was carried on with

customary enthusiasm by constitutionalists, law-

yers, academics, and government officials expe- rienced in a legal lexicon after a generation of intermittent constitutional debates. At the level of the general public, the debate centered on

symbols, impressions, biases, hopes, and aspira- tions. A poll by the Globe and Mail of Toronto and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation taken four months before the collapse of Meech Lake showed that 71 per cent of respondents knew little or nothing about the accord, yet a similar number professed strong or very strong views about it. A poll by the same organizations just after the accord's demise showed that, de-

spite months of media saturation, 62 per cent still knew little or nothing about the accord but a similar number had strong or very strong views about it. So despite a widespread basic ignorance about the contents of Meech Lake, Canadians saw fit to pour out their grievances and frustra- tions about each other. Some of these grievances related to Meech Lake; others did not.

Meech Lake had its political roots in a 1984

campaign speech given by Mulroney, then the

opposition leader. He promised to bring Que- beckers into the Canadian constitution with "honor and enthusiasm," a reference to the constitutional changes of 1982 that gave Canada a charter of rights and freedoms. Those changes were approved by the federal government of then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the nine

English-speaking provinces. Quebec refused to

approve the changes. At the time it was governed by the Parti Quebecois, which had lost a 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association but remained committed to an independent Quebec.

A mixture of statesmanship and partisan con- siderations led Mulroney to his 1984 promise. He correctly sensed that in the wake of the

bruising referendum fight, the majority of Que- beckers wanted a respite from constitutional debates. For more than 20 years before the referendum, Quebeckers had been debating their role in Canada; the referendum seemed to clinch their adherence to federalism. Mulroney per- ceived that if certain modest constitutional changes were made, moderate French-Canadian nationalists, including many who had cam- paigned for sovereignty-association, could be

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reconciled to federalism for a very long time.

Mulroney also had to consider his Conserva- tive party's dismal history in Quebec, long a fiefdom of the Liberal party. By promising to offer Quebec constitutional changes, he made the Conservatives the preferred party for almost all French-Canadian nationalists. His overwhelm-

ing majority, in Quebec and all of Canada, confirmed for the prime minister the desirability of constitutional changes.

When the Parti Quebecois was defeated in the 1985 provincial election, the federalist Liberal

government of Premier Robert Bourassa imme-

diately began developing and circulating to other

provinces a series of proposed constitutional

changes. These changes became the heart of the Meech Lake accord as the other provincial premiers delayed debate on additional constitutional issues.

To a majority of English- speaking Canadians, Meech Lake represented yet another demand for concessions from a province perpetually unhappy within Canada.

Quebec presented five basic demands. First, the constitution should recognize Quebec as a "distinct society" within Canada with suitable

recognition for the English-speaking minority in that province and the French-speaking minorities elsewhere in Canada. Second, Quebec should be given a veto over constitutional changes affecting federal institutions such as the Senate, the Su- preme Court, and the House of Commons. Third, Quebec should be given additional powers over immigration in recognition of the province's low birthrate and its challenge of retaining a French-speaking character in North America. Fourth, provinces should be allowed to opt out of federal spending programs in areas of provincial jurisdiction, provided they establish a com- parable program that meets "national objectives." Finally, provinces should be given a role in nominating members of the Supreme Court- where already three of the nine justices must by

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law be from Quebec and thus trained in the civil code rather than the common law.

With a few adjustments required to secure the approval of other provinces, Meech Lake was duly signed by the prime minister and the ten

provincial premiers in the early spring of 1987. Under the 1982 constitutional changes, amend- ments to the constitution must be ratified within three years of action by the first legislature. When Quebec's National Assembly became the first legislature to approve Meech Lake on June 23, 1987, the three-year time clock began ticking.

At the time of Meech Lake's negotiation and for some time thereafter, the accord scarcely touched the nation's consciousness. In Quebec, Meech Lake was considered dry, necessary business in harmony with the prevailing political climate favoring accommodation of Quebec within Canada. Elsewhere, Meech Lake was little understood or noticed. But the prime minister and premiers, the so-called First Ministers, had agreed that the entire Meech Lake accord must be ratified by all governments. This re-

quirement of unanimous consent, coupled with the three-year time period for ratification, provided the straightjacket from which Meech Lake would not be able to break free.

The first blow against Meech Lake was deliv- ered by the father of the 1982 constitutional

changes, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. In a series of scathing public criticisms, he tore into the accord, claiming it would eventually grant Quebec special status, feed the demands of French-Canadian nationalists, and ultimately dismember Canada. For three decades, as teacher and politician, Trudeau had scorned French-Canadian nationalism as a trap for im- prisoning the French language and culture within Quebec. Federalism, he always argued, offered nationwide breathing space for the French language and culture in Canada. During his years in office the federal government began operating in French and English and funding dramatically increased for French minorities across Canada. Although three years removed from active politics, his criticisms resonated across English-speaking Canada and especially within his own Liberal party.

Subsequent provincial elections in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland brought to

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power premiers who had not signed the original Meech Lake accord. These new premiers de- manded changes, in some cases wholesale

changes, before they would seek legislative ratification. Attempts were made for a year to find a solution to the impasse through public debate and federal provincial meetings culminating in a marathon six-day, closed-door meeting in June 1990. Quebec's Bourassa, supported by the federal government and the six other premiers who had signed Meech Lake, insisted no changes were possible; the three recalcitrant premiers continued to demand them, though the premier of New Brunswick eventually switched sides. But in the end, Meech Lake collapsed in a heap of recriminations.

If Quebec does decide to leave Canada, there will be bitterness, even shock, in the rest of Canada.

Meech Lake failed in large part because it was loaded down with grievances and perceptions unrelated to its actual content. Nothing was more damaging in English-speaking Canada than a decision by the Quebec government in Decem- ber 1988 to ban outdoor signs with advertising in both English and French.

Quebec's language legislation, passed under the Parti Quebecois, required that only French

appear on public signs in the province. This section of the law was appealed on the grounds that it impaired freedom of expression. Two Quebec courts and the Supreme Court of Can- ada struck down the legislation. However, the Supreme Court hinted that a law that gave French a predominant position on outdoor signs, with another language less-prominently dis- played, was acceptable.

In the United States, such a ruling by the Supreme Court would be implemented automat- ically. But the 1982 Canadian constitutional changes incorporated a clause that allows provincial legislatures to override court rulings for a period of five years. Bourassa, worried about an upsurge of nationalist sentiment, invoked this "notwithstanding clause" and offered the

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English-speaking minority the meager solace of

displaying their language only inside public buildings-and even there in a subordinate position.

The premier's decision brought about the

resignation of three respected English-speaking cabinet ministers and set off a storm of protest around Canada. The decision provided fresh ammunition for anti-French elements in English- speaking Canada; but, more important, it dis-

couraged moderate English-speaking Canadians who felt betrayed by Quebec's unwillingness to abide by the Supreme Court's ruling. To them, the decision signaled Quebec's apparent indifference to attitudes elsewhere in Canada, an indifference that hardened attitudes against what Quebec was seeking: the Meech Lake accord.

A number of small Ontario municipalities and two medium-sized cities-Sault Ste. Marie and Thunder Bay-passed resolutions declaring their jurisdictions unilingual. These measures were ostensibly directed at attempts to provide additional services to French-speaking minorities, but their underlying purpose was to send a message to all politicians that citizens were tired of compromising with French Canada.

With Meech Lake the focus of Canadian at- tention, old grievances toward Quebec were aroused. In Manitoba, citizens bitterly recalled a decision of the Mulroney government to grant an aircraft maintenance contract to a Montreal com- pany, despite a less costly and technically supe- rior bid from a Winnipeg firm. In Newfound- land, citizens remembered a reprehensible hydroelectric deal by which Hydro Quebec took power from the rivers of Labrador for a pittance, then resold it at a huge profit to the United States. Meech Lake reminded English-speaking Canadians that Quebec always seemed to be

demanding, and often receiving, special consid- eration in the decisions of successive federal governments dependent upon that province's political support for reelection.

Since 1968, with two very brief exceptions, prime ministers have come from Quebec and their governments have boasted overwhelming strength in that province. The next election will also be between parties led by Quebeckers: Mulroney and Jean Chr~tien, the new leader of the opposition Liberal party. Some of the popu-

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lar resentment in English Canada can be ex-

plained by imagining the reaction in America if

every president since 1968 had come from the northeastern part of the country. People in the south, west, and midwest would undoubtedly claim the political deck was stacked against them.

Many English-speaking Canadians chafe at this sense that any government, regardless of political orientation, is beholden to Quebec.

What Does English Canada Want?

For nearly 30 years, English-speaking Canadi- ans struggling to understand Quebec have asked: What does Quebec want? Quebec responded with the Meech Lake demands, which were

widely popular in that province. Now the more

interesting and difficult question is, What does

English Canada want? The mutual misunderstanding that often be-

devils relations between French- and English- speaking Canadians reflects the traditional, and

quite erroneous, view in Quebec that the rest of Canada--le Canada anglais-resembles Quebec: a

relatively homogeneous bloc of people that can

easily come to a national consensus on important matters. English-speaking Canada is nothing of the sort. It features such strong regional rivalries as those between western Canada and Ontario, and between the four Atlantic provinces and Ontario. In the large urban centers, a polyglot ethnicity has become an important characteris- tic. Approximately 50 per cent of the children in the Vancouver elementary school system are of Asian descent; in Toronto white Anglo-Saxon Protestants are now a minority.

In addition to the global changes that are

buffeting people everywhere, Canadians face three concerns that have plunged English- speaking Canada into a crisis of identity-or at least a kind of existential debate-that focuses on the question, What does English Canada want? First, the Mulroney government has pursued an agenda of deficit-reduction, privatization of crown corporations, and trimming of social programs. All these policies aim to make the Cana- dian economy more competitive internationally and to reduce a federal deficit and national debt larger on a per capita basis than the American ones. This course of action has shaken many traditional English-Canadian views of appropri-

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ate state activity. Since many English Canadians have typically defined their identity through contrasts with the United States in state institutions and state-funded programs such as univer- sal medical insurance, publicly financed broad-

casting, and generous unemployment schemes, the Mulroney government's agenda has struck at that distinct character.

Second, the free-trade agreement with the United States severely divided English-speaking Canadians. In the 1988 election, the pro-free trade Conservatives won solid majorities only in Alberta and Quebec. A slim majority of English- speaking Canadians opposed free trade, many of them bitterly and passionately. They threw themselves into the fight, believing free trade would inevitably lead to the Americanization of Canada. As then leader of the Liberal party John Turner argued to Mulroney in a televised debate, free trade would inevitably erode Canadian

political sovereignty because so many economic levers would be turned over to the stronger partner in the deal. The Mulroney government's victory thus deflated English-Canadian nationalists. Some of them attributed their defeat to the overwhelming popularity of free trade in Que- bec, where the French-speaking population har- bored no fears of cultural assimilation or loss of political sovereignty. When the time came to support Quebec's Meech Lake demands, the majority of English-Canadian nationalists either refrained from debating the accord or opposed it

outright. They had typically favored a strong central government capable of resisting Ameri- can influence. Free trade seemed to deliver one blow against this conception of Canadian government by restricting future interventionist policies; Meech Lake dealt the second blow by contemplating a further decentralization of power from Ottawa to the provinces.

Third, Meech Lake once again forced English Canadians, already angered by the Mulroney government's agenda and divided by free trade, to accommodate themselves to proposed constitutional changes beneficial to a province whose chronic restlessness and indifference toward the rest of Canada made it a source of profound irritation. Moreover, some of the premises of Meech Lake-like those of free trade-struck at English Canada's self-definition. If all provinces

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are constitutionally equal, argued Meech Lake critics, then there could be no recognition of Quebec as a "distinct society." If provinces could

opt out of federal-provincial programs and establish their own, meeting only vague national

objectives, then what hope remained for new social programs binding all Canadians together? If Meech Lake passed, many English Canadians concluded, Quebec would simply use the accord to demand even more powers and gradually achieve sovereignty-association.

Formally, Meech Lake died because two provinces, Newfoundland and Manitoba, failed to

ratify it before the expiration of the three-year deadline. In Manitoba, the three party leaders in the province's minority government returned from the marathon negotiations in Ottawa with

enough commitments on other constitutional issues to grudgingly submit the accord to the

assembly for ratification. But the accord never came to a debate, let alone a vote. One

politician-Elijah Harper, the only aboriginal politician in the legislature-used procedural tac- tics to prevent debate.

Harper, like other native Canadians, felt betrayed by Meech Lake because it did not deal with aboriginal demands, including a recognition of their inherent right to self-government. Harp- er's stance made him a hero to aboriginal Cana- dians, who reveled in their newfound sense of

political power. No matter how Canada evolves in the years ahead, the grievances of aboriginal Canadians and their demands for quasi- autonomous status within Canada have now been placed squarely on the agenda.

Looking for Answers The defeat of Meech Lake has changed Can-

ada's future. The constitutional status quo is finished, though no one knows what will take its place. Government commissions studying the future shape of Canada are already at work in Alberta, New Brunswick, and Quebec, and the federal government has launched its own nationwide consultations looking for answers.

In Quebec, the demise of Meech Lake and the resentments the pact elicited in the rest of Can- ada have given indtpendentistes an opportunity. Eight members of parliament-six Conservatives and two Liberals-resigned from their parties to

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form le Bloc Quibicois in the House of Commons, and a candidate from the new bloc trounced the old-line parties in a summer by-election in Que- bec. Public opinion surveys depict a sharp swing away from the federalist option. The Quebec government has formally withdrawn from virtu-

ally all the myriad federal-provincial meetings in the Canadian system.

A year may pass before the political battle lines are formed in Quebec. The Parti Qu6b6cois will continue to favor outright independence. The governing Liberals, who are currently revis-

ing their constitutional position, will likely de- fend the retention of limited links with the rest of Canada, especially in economic fields such as monetary policy and trade. The reaction of Quebec's business elite will be critically important. This group emerged in the 1980s as the most trusted and respected element of Quebec society, taking over that role from the bureau- crats and academics who had led the fight for

sovereignty in the 1970s. During the referendum

campaign of 1980, the overwhelming majority of business leaders in Quebec were hostile to sov-

ereignty. Many are now willing to accept whatever political option Quebec chooses. Indeed, the success of Quebec's entrepreneurial class and the development of some multinational business firms based in the province have given Quebeck- ers a confidence that they can go it alone politi- cally. Yet despite this self-confidence, polls indi- cate a majority would still prefer an economic association with the rest of Canada as a kind of security blanket.

The free-trade agreement has encouraged Quebeckers to believe they are no longer dependent upon the existing Canadian federal system for economic prosperity. Access to the U.S. market, now guaranteed by the trade agreement, offers opportunities beyond what Quebec busi- nessmen find in the rest of Canada. The agreement was admittedly signed between the United States and Canada; but Quebeckers assume that if they opt for independence, they could easily negotiate a similar deal with Washington or persuade Washington and Ottawa to extend the agreement to an independent Quebec.

The business community also understands the fiscal predicament of the federal government, which is running deficits of nearly US$25 bil-

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lion. After nearly 15 years of deficit-financing, the country's national debt consumes about one- third of every tax dollar sent to Ottawa. Under these circumstances, the federal government's ability to assuage regional discontent with mas- sive new spending is severely circumscribed, further dimming the attractiveness of the federal

system. Canada's prospects after Meech Lake are com-

plicated by the erosion of the national parties' ability to build bridges between the two major language groups and among far-flung regions. Mulroney's Conservatives retain respectable support in Quebec, where they are viewed as having tried honorably to achieve a constitutional settle- ment. But elsewhere in Canada, no government has ever been held in such low esteem. This poor rating stems partially from policies such as tax reform that have nothing to do with Meech Lake, and partially from the prime minister's opening of a Pandora's box of Quebec nationalism. Jean Chretien, the Liberal leader who opposed Meech Lake, is widely reviled as "yesterday's man" in his own province of Quebec. But in the rest of Canada, his pan-Canadian patriotism plays well, as did his attacks on the Meech Lake accord. And as le Bloc Quebbcois is grabbing nationalist votes in Quebec, a new formation called the Reform

party is making important gains in Alberta and British Columbia. The new party feeds upon traditional western Canadian grievances against the central government dominated by Ontario and Quebec. So in a country where the institutions of national integration are often weak, the decline of the national parties is a further indica- tion of the loosening bonds of nationhood.

Meech Lake failed in large part because it was loaded down with grievances and perceptions unrelated to its actual content.

Little can be predicted accurately about Can- ada's future except that nothing will happen immediately. Quebec will require a year or two to sort out its political options, and the next provincial election may not occur until 1992 or 1993. The next federal election is also two or

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three years away. In the meantime, Canadian politicians will be struggling to restore a sense of common purpose to a sorely divided country.

The failure of Meech Lake represented a tragic missed opportunity for Canada to marry moderate French-Canadian nationalism to federalism. Those such as Trudeau and the accord's fiercest critic among provincial premiers, Newfound- land's Clyde Wells, were dreaming when they argued that the rejection of Meech Lake would leave Canada unshaken. Meech Lake was the most moderate constitutional proposal emanat-

ing from Quebec in a generation and a half; its defeat will ensure that Quebec never demands less. No matter how hard Wells and other Meech Lake critics insisted that their opposition to Meech Lake did not mean a rejection of Quebec by the rest of Canada, Quebeckers did not buy the argument. A solid majority of Quebeckers have now given up on the existing federal system. All that remains is for them to decide how much additional sovereignty they desire, and whether any merit exists in a much more limited

partnership with the rest of Canada. The odds are now better than even that the

forces of national disintegration are so strong that the future will bring a far looser political arrangement between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The new order will likely be either an even more decentralized federation or a European-style su-

perstructure in which two sovereign countries would delegate certain defined powers to a common parliament.

The path to one of those new arrangements, however, will be fraught with pitfalls. Framing a looser federation will involve endless haggling between the federal government and the provinces and between the English-speaking provinces and Quebec.

If Quebec does decide to leave Canada, there will be bitterness, even shock, in the rest of Canada. What remained of Canada would take a

long time to decide how to organize itself, let alone what relations it wanted with Quebec. The negotiations for dividing Canada's assets and liabilities would be nightmarishly complicated. The prospect of splitting Canada geographical- ly-the Atlantic provinces separated from the rest of Canada by an independent Quebec-is a chilling one given the short and troubled histo-

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ries of other similarly divided countries. Al-

though polls consistently show that the vast

majority of Canadians have no desire to join the United States, the long-term option might be more palatable in western parts of the country should the Canadian federation fail. In Atlantic Canada, the disintegration of the Canadian experiment would lead many to wonder whether economic security lay with New England, and, through it, with the rest of the United States. After all, the free-trade agreement has reinforced north-south economic links; and with the ab- sence of a durable political superstructure on an east-west axis, those links might reorient political thinking.

Canada, in its own modest way, has represented a noble political experiment that a country could be formed in defiance of the enormous economic and cultural pull of the United States. Apart from the French language, the differences between Canada and the United States are often difficult for Americans to fathom. But the accu- mulation of a multitude of small differences has made for a country whose distinctiveness was something of a miracle in North America.

At the core of that distinctiveness lay an accommodation between French- and English- speaking Canadians and a mixed economy in which government plays a more interventionist role in society than it does in the United States. The pressures of the global economy, with its fierce imperatives for improved competitiveness, and the free-trade deal with Washington have eroded the state's capacity to intervene; the country's huge deficit and debt leave the federal government crippled even when it wishes to act. And the Meech Lake accord shattered, probably irrevocably, the possibility of a harmonious accommodation between French- and English- speaking Canadians.

However the next few years unfold, Ameri- cans will have to revise their traditional stereo- type of Canada as a country where nothing of interest or consequence ever happens. Successive American administrations, from that of John Kennedy to George Bush, have always refused to intervene publicly or privately in Canadian debates about national unity. The three pillars of U.S. policy toward Canada, enunciated again in 1990 by Bush, are that the United States values

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its relations with Canada, it prefers a united Canada, and it will leave internal Canadian debates to Canadians. Nothing would be gained for

any American administration in the turbulent

years ahead for Canada to shift from these posi- tions until some new political arrangement emerges north of the border. Americans, after all, must live with whatever outcome emerges in Canada. They would prejudice their chances of

maintaining harmonious relations with Canada, or whatever emerges from the Canada of today, by taking sides in an essentially Canadian prob- lem. All regions of Canada wish to remain on friendly terms with the United States anyway. The American government will likely be invited

by Canadian or Quebec leaders to tilt U.S.

policy, at least rhetorically, to favor their particular aims. Americans, acting in their own inter- ests, should politely decline.

Earlier in 1990, the New Republic lamented how dull things were in Washington under

George Bush, complaining that "it's positively Canadian around here." To that remark, Cana- dians these days would say: Give us a little of that dullness.

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