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Outline1. General Background2. Research Questions3. Conceptual Framework4. Methodology5. Summary of Research Findings6. Recommendations

General Background•

Abyei is resourceful (Renewable & non-renewable), but contested area that situates across the Sudan and South Sudan border.

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Abyei Vs 9 Ngok Dinka chiefdom & Abyei Vs Humr Misseriya Abyei’s transfer from South to North in 1905

an area of nearly 10,500 Km2

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• GoS and SPLM/A signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

• The Abyei Protocol is one of the six protocols.

– The territory Abyei is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred from Bahr el Ghazal to Kordofan by the British colonial authorities in 1905.

– Residents of Abyei would cast a separate ballot, simultaneously with the referendum in South Sudan, to decide whether Abyei is to remain in the North or join the South Sudan.

– ABC, PCA and AUHIP proposal

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1st Research Question

• What are the political, historical and legal grounds for the Sudan and South Sudan claim to own/ control Abyei and its resources? This question poses:

• Why the Abyei Protocol, the PCA decision and the AUHIP proposal have not been fully implemented?

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2nd

Research Question

• How do the Humr Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka perceive the conflict in Abyei? This question poses:

• Why the Government of Sudan encouraged the Humr Misseriya community to settle in and look at Abyei as their own?

• Why the TCRM is not workable in the Abyei case?

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Political Economy Approach towards the Abyei Conflict

• Political economy scholars have discussed multifaceted political and economic factors that drive and prolong conflicts.

• To be able to fit into the present study, however, the dominant conception of the political economy of conflicts need to be broadened to introduce how it works in the context of conflicts over an actively contested territories such as the case between Sudan and South Sudan over Abyei.

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• Formulation of a broader conceptual framework borrowing from relevant concepts and ideas from existing works on the political economy of conflicts to use it as a lens. This approach is supported by Joseph A. Maxwell.

• Natural resource conflicts,» Scarcity and abundance» Territorial conflict

• Land as a source of conflict• Land conflict from pastoralists versus farmers’ perspective

• Oil as a source of conflict

•Political Dimension towards the Abyei Conflict» Political manipulation in conflict situation» Colonial legacy as a source of conflict» The conception of Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms» The conception of trust/distrust from conflict perspective

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METHODOLOGY

Qualitative Case Study Methods

Interview(N20+M20+O15)

Archives & Secondary

sources

Observation

Data interpretation,

Analysis & discussion

FGD(N2(6)+M2(6)

)

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Summary of Research Findings

Ownership of Abyei from Historical Perspective

• Historically, Abyei is a homeland of the Ngok Dinka and seasonally used by Humr Misseriya for grazing cattle.

• Abyei area was first settled by Ngok Dinka in 1710.

• Muglad by Humr Misseriya between1765 and 1775.

• Historical justifications– Pre colonial: Mahdist time– Colonial period– Post colonial period

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From Natural Resources Conflict Perspective

• Abyei area is economically important for both governments and both communities (Renewable and nonrenewable natural resources).

A. Humr Misseriya Pastoralist-----Pasture

• Rejection/lack of implementation to Abyei protocol, PCA and the AUHIP proposal (Referendum).

• They have experienced extensive harassment since 2005 (grazing

time and area restrictions, requirements to disarm, and request to pay taxes).

• This concern and claim is also shared by the GoS.

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B. The GoS, Humr Misseriya elites & GoSS

• To control the existing & potential lucrative oil resources in the area & safeguard the refinery & pipeline that passes through that area.

• The GoS & Humr Misseriya elites have been mobilizing the Humr Misseriya people to claim the land through which the regime can use Abyei’s oil as a compensation for the loss of more than 75 percent of the oil because of the cessation of South Sudan in 2011.

• The sign of government’s interest towards the Abyei oil is interest for partition.

• Diffra oilfield is still under the control of the GoS (4000-5000 barrel a day).

• GoSS (Abyei political elites)is also interested in the existing and potential lucrative oil resources of Abyei.

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The Political Dimension of the Abyei’s Conflict

• The r/s b/n the GoS & the Humr Misseriya is one of the most dynamic political games in Sudan.

• GoS Promise: Humr Misseriya were encouraged to look to Abyei as “their” area for grazing & development.

• They believed the CPA was negotiated against their interests (politically and economically marginalized).

• They felt that they were betrayed by the NCP-led govt they fought for during the second Sudanese civil war.

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• Numbers of Humr Misseriya who have been joining SPLM-N & JEM is growing from time to time.

• Serious security threat from the rebel groups in the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Darfur areas, especially after the establishment of the SRF alliance, which brings four most active armed opposition groups together.

• To mitigate such resentment, the GoS developed a plan to work with & use Humr & other sections of Misseriya tribe to ensure control of South Kordofan & Blue Nile states.

• Working for loyalty of the Misseriya for constituency to the ruling NCP (a bargaining card for its political agenda).

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• Ensuring Misseriya support to avert serious consequences on the continuity of the regime on power. (Symbolically/compensation for the loss of the whole South Sudan).

• Thus, the GoS rejects the AUHIP proposal as the principles of the proposal are not in line with the political & economic needs of the government.

• The Ngok Dinka’s attachment with Abyei is also beyond its natural resources (strongly associated with socio-cultural and political identities).

• There are key officials from the Ngok Dinka of Abyei who are in strategic leadership structure of the GoSS.

• They also want to use it for future political constituency in the country’s national election.

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Infeasibility of TCRMs in Addressing the Abyei Conflict

• The role of TCRMs Before mid-1960s (cattle rustling, disagreement of grazing areas, minor crimes, no strong quest for secession, the interference from the GoS wasn’t that much worst).

• After mid1960s, their role became very weak (political and economic motives), which is beyond the capacity & scope of the TCRMs.

• They are not publicized & supported by the two governments; rather politicized in a way to create deep enmity.

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High level of Distrust • High level of distrust b/n the conflicting parties. History &

hostage to politics & manipulation.

• CPA/ Abyei Protocol/ PCA/AUHIP proposal affirms for grazing & water in Abyei & beyond (deep frustration to enter to Abyei b/c of past & present experience-based fear.

• The bad r/p b/n the two governments may continue to directly bear on their travel to Abyei & beyond.

• Suspicion on the GoSS that may after some years decide to make agricultural scheme along Abyei line.

• The GoSS can raise the question of sovereignty & territorial integrity.

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Strategies and Behaviors

Encouraging for Referendum (Political mobilization)

Encouraging for Settlement (29 villages)A. To ensure sufficient Misseriya become eligible to vote (sway the referendum results in their favor

B. To facilitate a de facto partition of Abyei Area

Encouraging for use of force • Militia training camps (5000 Humr Misseriya people in the PDF).• Equipped with motorbikes and sophisticated machineguns.

Impact: Destruction Human casualties Displacement

High level of distrust

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1.Abyei protocol and other Successive agreements/ proposals are not implemented because of political and economic reasons.2. Misseriya settlement in northern part of Abyei is increasingly intensified and supported by the GOS b/c of Political and economic reasons.

2. Intermingling of state-society relations has polarized distrust and Politicized TCRMs.

Conclusions

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1. Referendum….AUHIP… African solution for African problems

2. Pastoralists Concerns…Special treaty for soft border…. inclusive committee…after

referendum

3. Security Concerns…UNISFA… Disarmament.. local governance system

4. External Pressure. Regional/Sub-regional and international pressure

5. Joint Development Projects6. Political Commitment

Recommendations

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THANK YOU

April 22, 2015