Final Report of the International Observers tothe Abyei Area Community Referendum

November 2013

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Contents

Foreword ...................................................................................................3Executive Summary .................................................................................4Overview of Observation Mission ......................................................5Background ..........................................................................................7Referendum Management ......................................................................10Voter Registration ...............................................................................12Preparations for Polling ......................................................................16

The Voter RegistryDistribution of Sensitive Materials

Polling .................................................................................................19Counting .................................................................................................25Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................29

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Foreword

The Abyei Area Community Referendum has been judged as “unilateral”, even “illegal”1 by manywho were not present during the process and have little idea of what actually took place in AbyeiArea. Too many condemnations have been hasty. It would have been better, in our opinion, if thosewho condemned the referendum had first enquired as to the conditions and procedures under whichand by it was carried out. The African Union (AU) should make a judgement as to what extent theNgok Dinka successfully implemented its own proposal on the basis of evidence, rather than issuingan a priori statement.

We hope that this report can provide the much-needed evidence that is required in reachingdecisions as to how to react to the Abyei Area Community Referendum, and that those actors whohave made hasty judgements will revise their opinion in the light of it. We note the currentuncertainty regarding the way forward and hope that if any referendum is held in Abyei Area in thefuture, lessons will be learnt from the Abyei Area Community Referendum and from this report,that will strengthen any future process.

We, like the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), hope to see peace, security andstability promoted in the region,2 but believe that ignoring, misrepresenting or failing to properlyacknowledge the Abyei Area Community Referendum will aggravate the situation on the groundand create a barrier to the resolution of the final status of Abyei. We appeal to all to judge the AbyeiArea Community Referendum on the evidence and revise current positions in the light of thatevidence. Humility and the willingness to revise opinions is the first requirement of an evidence-based approach.

Hannah Cross and Tim FlatmanNovember 2013

1 African Union, “Press Release: The African Union Strongly Condemns the Holding of a Unilateral ‘Referendum’ inAbyei,” October 28, 2013.

2 African Union Peace and Security Council, “405th Meeting Press Statement,” November 6, 2013.

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Executive Summary

The declaration made by the Ngok Dinka general conference which established the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum Commission (AACRC) invited international observers to witness thereferendum.3 Although foreign journalists also enjoyed a high level of access and civil societyorganisations and opposition political parties in South Sudan acted as external observers, we werethe only international observers who responded to the invitation.

There was a high level of transparency in the Abyei Area Community Referendum. The referendumwas peaceful and credible. Structures functioned well and incorporated local knowledge andexpertise. All voters eligible under the African Union High Implementation Panel (AUHIP)proposal4 commended by the AUPSC and other international institutions and governments hadopportunity to register and vote, and no eligible voter was prevented from doing so. We would liketo commend the AACRC for a comprehensive and thorough process well-executed. We are satisfiedthat the results of the Abyei Area Community Referendum accurately represent the genuineexpression of the will of the electorate.

While there were minor irregularities deriving from the short timetable and lack of time availablefor voter education and staff training, the integrity and credibility of the process was notcompromised. This was an extraordinary achievement given the logistical challenges theCommission faced. We had some concerns about assisted voting and lack of attention to secrecy byboth voters and staff in a small number of centres, but this was the exception and not the norm.Where it did take place, we are satisfied voters were given a genuine choice and manipulation wasnot the intent. Assistance was generally given in response to requests by voters and attempting tomitigate the problems faced by illiterate and disabled voters.

In many respects the Abyei referendum exceeded the standards met by the South Sudanesereferendum held in January 2011. We find that there are no good technical reasons to fail torecognise the Abyei referendum. Countries and institutions who recognised the results of the SouthSudanese referendum of 2011 as a genuine expression of the will of the electorate, but who fail todo so in this case, will do so for political rather than technical reasons.

3 Abyei Area Ngok Dinka People’s General Conference, “Declaration of the Ngok Dinka Community of Abyei Area to Hold Abyei Area Community Referendum,” October 18, 2013.

4 African Union High Implementation Panel, “Proposal on the Final Status of Abyei,” September 21, 2012.

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Overview of Observation Mission

Although the AACRC accredited local observersand external (i.e., external to the Ngok Dinkacommunity) observers from opposition politicalparties and civil society organisations based inSouth Sudan, we were the only internationalobservers of the Abyei Area CommunityReferendum. This was due to a lack of interestfrom organisations that traditionally observereferenda and elections. A clear invitation wasissued to international observers5 and theAACRC were ready to accredit otherinternational observers who presentedthemselves. UNISFA (United Nations InterimSecurity Force for Abyei) appeared to have theirown observation mission, but did not seekaccreditation from the AACRC. On repeatedoccasions we witnessed them making short visitslasting a few minutes to Referendum Centres inAbyei town, both during registration andpolling. (Our visits usually lasted 2 hours.)

We observed all stages ofthe referendum process:registration, preparationsfor polling day (includingproduction of the voterregistry and distribution ofsensitive materials),polling and counting. Wearrived in Agok on 20November 2013 and wereaccredited by the AACRCthe following day. Wevisited 11 of 29 localreferendum centres: 8during registration and 8during polling, andwitnessed two counts fromstart to finish. We note thatthe Carter Centre visited a similar percentage ofcentres during the 2011 referendum on the self-determination of Southern Sudan.6

5 Abyei Area Ngok Dinka People’s General Conference, “Declaration of the Ngok Dinka Community of Abyei Area to Hold Abyei Area Community Referendum.”

6 The Carter Centre, Observing the 2011 Referendum on the Self-determination of Southern Sudan: Final Report (The Carter Centre, 2011), 7.

The international observers were Tim Flatman,a regular visitor to Abyei working voluntarilyand directly with local churches to support thedisplaced Ngok Dinka and returnees north ofthe river Kiir, and Hannah Cross, his fiancee,who was visiting Abyei for the first time. Timhas been an election agent on numerousoccasions in the UK and is familiar with allaspects of electoral procedures. His experienceand contacts in Abyei helped in identifyingwhich locations would be most useful to visit,and enabled the verification of importantinformation (for example, checking the numbersof registered voters in rural population centresagainst the expectations of those involved inassisting returns to those areas or providinghumanitarian support). Hannah provided auseful counter-perspective as one new to AbyeiArea.

We would like to thank the AACRC for theirco-operation and assistance, which far exceeded

reasonableexpectations. Despitethe time pressuresand resourceconstraints theyfaced, members ofthe Commissionoperated an opendoor policy and wewere able to ask andreceive answers toour questions at alltimes. Observers and(South Sudanese andforeign) journalistswere hosted in theAACRC compound,located in the former

Ministry of Finance building in Abyei Town,near the hospital site. We were thereforeimmediately aware of new developments andable to monitor vehicles leaving and returningwith sensitive materials.

We enjoyed continuous walk-in access to thedata centre at the AACRC compound and wereable to observe and ask questions of staff at alllevels and at all times. This is particularly

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International Observer speaking to staff at Referendum Centre

important to note, given the obstructioninternational observers faced when trying toaccess the data centre in Juba during the 2011referendum on the self-determination ofSouthern Sudan.7 We were even provided withsoft copies of the sections of the voter list werequested, in spreadsheet format, so that wecould run our own checks on it.

Despite the lack of vehicles available to theAACRC and the logistical difficulties thispresented, the AACRC altered their own plans tofacilitate transport to centres we wished to visit,rather than the centres they hope we would visit,during both registration and polling. AACRCalso facilitated the transport of journalists. As faras we are aware, the only complaint made byany journalist throughout the entire processrelated to having to wait a morning for transportto northernmost polling centres. We do not findthis complaint reasonable. The AACRC had noduty to facilitate transport for journalists. Thedelay was caused by a lack of available vehiclesand the need to use some vehicles to transportballot boxes from a secure overnight location toreferendum centres so that voting could begin ontime. Four centres were within walking distancefrom the compound, and could be visitedwithout the need for assistance from theAACRC.

We find that both the AACRC and staff at localreferendum centres exhibited a high level oftransparency. Journalists had freedom to film theinner workings of the AACRC and referendumcentres. On occasion they oversteppedboundaries by attempting to film ordinary votersmarking their ballot, so that the voter and his orher choice could be identified from the photos orfilm footage. Sometimes referendum staffwarned them against these practices, but onother occasions they appeared to be intimidatedby foreign journalists and said nothing. Whiletransparency is crucial, it has limits and shouldnot compromise the secrecy of the ballot. We aresatisfied that this happened on a small number ofoccasions only. However, journalists should beaware that regulations apply to them as much asto staff at referendum centres.

7 Ibid., 14, 20.

The commission and its staff recognised theimportance of transparency to ensure thereferendum complied with internationalstandards as far as was possible. However, astronger motivation was the desire for the worldto see the Ngok make their decision as to thefinal status of Abyei Area. Commissionmembers, staff at referendum centres and voterswe spoke to viewed the process as theimplementation of the African Union HighImplementation Panel proposal for areferendum in October 2013. They welcomed usand journalists alike as those who would testifyas to the conduct of the referendum and presentconclusions to the international community.This in itself displayed a high level ofconfidence in the integrity of their process. Staffwere willing to take the risk that observerswould witness some practices inconsistent withinternational norms, on the assumption that wewould also see that the results were a genuinereflection of the will of the eligible electorate(i.e., eligible under the AUHIP proposal). Thisassumption was, in the end, borne out in reality.

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Voter registration at Wunruok

Background

Abyei has a long, and contested, history. TheAbyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) gavesome details of this history in its reportpresented in 2005.8 Accounts of recent historyare available elsewhere. An attempt will not bemade to present a full history of Abyei here, butmerely to situate the Abyei Area CommunityReferendum in its context.

Abyei was transferred to Southern Kordofan bythe colonial authorities in 1905 foradministrative reasons. In the early 1950s, aclear majority of chiefdoms urged theParamount Chief of the day, Deng Majok, topersuade the authorities to reverse the decision.However, action was not taken until it was toolate, and on the independence of Sudan, in1956, Abyei remained in Northern Sudan.

Relations between neighbouring Ngok Dinkaand Misseriya communities deteriorated duringand after the 1955-72 civil war. In the AddisAbaba Agreement of 1972 a referendum on theself-determination of Abyei Area was promised.This promise was never implemented.

The Abyei Protocol, part of the ComprehensivePeace Agreement signed in 2005, againpromised a referendum. The target community

8 Abyei Boundaries Commission, Abyei Boundaries Commission Report, July 14, 2005.

for the referendum was the Ngok Dinka, butother permanent residents of Abyei Area wouldalso be able to vote. The boundaries of AbyeiArea were defined by the ABC in 2005, but theGovernment of Sudan rejected its conclusions.Abyei Area was attacked and many Ngok Dinkatemporarily displaced in May 2008.

The Governments of Sudan and Southern Sudanagreed to submit to the verdict of the PermanentCourt of Arbitration at the Hague, which furtherdelimited the boundaries of Abyei Area anddefined the area clearly as the territory of the 9Ngok Dinka chiefdoms.9 The Government ofSudan first accepted, then rejected, theseconclusions.

A referendum did not take place as promised inJanuary 2011. Before the separation of SouthSudan on 9 July 2011, the Sudanese ArmedForces -including Misseriya militiasincorporated into it- destroyed much of Abyeitown and displaced the Ngok Dinka populationin May 2011. A series of agreements followed.When the Governments of Sudan and SouthSudan proved unable to reach agreement on aprocess to resolve the final status of Abyei, aproposal was presented by Thabo Mbeki.10 Theproposal was accepted by the Government of theRepublic of South Sudan but rejected by theGovernment of Sudan. The proposal has beenrecognised by the African Union Peace andSecurity Council (AUPSC) as the only “fair,equitable and workable”11 solution for AbyeiArea, but has not yet been implemented by it.

Thabo Mbeki's proposal promised a referendumin October 2013 and offered further clarificationas to voter eligibility. Again, the Ngok Dinkawere identified as the target community. TheMisseriya, as seasonal nomads, were not eligibleto vote. However, the proposal offered a seriesof protections so that those sections of Misseriyawho traditionally migrate into and throughAbyei Area, would be able to continue to do so,

9 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: AbyeiArbitration: Final Award Rendered,” July 22, 2009.

10 African Union High Implementation Panel, “Proposal on the Final Status of Abyei.”

11 African Union Peace and Security Council, “339th Meeting Communique,” October 24, 2012.

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Destruction of classrooms at Abyei Catholic Church following 2011 attacks

whatever the result of the referendum.

The proposal received widespread support fromthe AUPSC, AU Heads of State, the UnitedNations Security Council (UNSC) and variousnational governments, including the US, UKand Norway. The Government of South Sudanencouraged the Ngok Dinka to return to AbyeiArea in preparation for a vote, even givingNgok Dinka in government posts paid leave toreturn for the referendum.12 The Vice-President,James Wani Igga, attended a protest in NewYork at which the Ngok Dinka threatened toimplement the AUHIP proposal themselves ifthe AUPSC did not, and promised that theGovernment of the Republic of South Sudan(RSS) would never let the Ngok Dinka down.However, as the end of October drew near, theGovernment of South Sudan was silent on theissue of a unilateral referendum. TheInformation Minister hinted that RSS would notsupport a referendum organised by the NgokDinka, but the President and Vice-Presidenthave not commented, and the response of RSSremains unclear to date.13 It is still possible thatRSS may recognise the results of thereferendum if the AUPSC does not act toimplement a referendum.

The Ngok Dinka were not prepared to letOctober 2013 pass without a referendum. Oneof the observers, Tim Flatman, was present inAgok and Abyei town in the build-up to theNgok Dinka General Conference held on 18October 2013, including the time before formerSudan and South Sudan cabinet ministers DrLuka Biong Deng and Deng Alor arrived inAbyei. During this period, most senior leadersin Abyei preferred to respond to the AfricanUnion's failure to implement their proposal bymaking a declaration, signed by the 9traditional chiefs of the Ngok Dinka, resolvingthe status of Abyei themselves. However, themajority of intellectuals and peasants who hadreturned to Abyei preferred a referendum, on

12 Sudan Tribune, “Juba Grants Abyei Citizens Leave for Referendum Voter Registration,” September 5, 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article47925.

13 Sudan Tribune, “S. Sudan Silent over Abyei Vote Outcome,” October 31, 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48642.

the grounds that they had been promised areferendum and it would show more clearly thewill of the whole community.

At the Ngok Dinka General Conference held on18 October 2013, two options were discussed: adeclaration by the 9 chiefdoms or a people'sreferendum. Strong grassroots backing for thesecond option strengthened the hand of theminority of leaders who preferred a unilateralreferendum and this became the declared option.The conference also set up the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum Commission, atechnical body tasked with overseeing andimplementing the referendum, and adopted rulesand regulations governing the conduct of thereferendum.

Although the Ngok Dinka saw the referendum asimplementation of the AUHIP proposal in thelight of the AUPSC's failure to do the same, theirdecision was widely condemned. RSS withdrewits backing, though its current position is, asabove, ambiguous. Misseriya leaders close to theGovernment of Sudan and living in Khartoumthreatened violence. Youth groups threatened tocarry out their own referendum. Neither threathas materialised at the time of writing. AMisseriya referendum is unlikely, since it couldnot realistically be held in Abyei Area, wouldneed to be held with different eligibility criteriato the AUHIP proposal, and would be unlikely tomeet the same high standards as the Ngok Dinkareferendum. In any case, the Misseriyacommunity is divided and Misseriya youth havesince withdrawn this threat.14 The Chairperson ofthe AU commission, Nkosazana Diamini Zuma,declared the referendum illegal,15 withoutsubstantiating her allegations.

While the purpose of this report is not to makepolitical judgements, and every effort has beenmade to present a factual account above, it isimportant to lay out the basis on which we, asobservers, participated in the referendum. Webelieve that, according to international law,every community has the right to self-

14 Sudan Tribune, “Misseriya Youth Back down on Counter-referendum in Abyei,” November 3, 2013, www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48679.

15 African Union, “Press Release.”

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determination and that this right existsindependently of any other agreements whichhave been reached between Sudan and SouthSudan on Abyei. The African Union have everyright to refuse to recognise the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum as implementation oftheir own proposal. However, this does not initself make the process illegal. The process hasnot, to our knowledge, broken any national orinternational laws and cannot therefore beillegal. Furthermore, agreements signedbetween two parties – Sudan and South Sudan– do not negate the rights of a third party – theNgok Dinka – to self-expression or even self-determination.

In our view, the results of this referendum, ifcarried out to high technical standards (as wejudge it has been), can legitimately berecognised as binding by any nationalgovernment or international institution.However, the referendum does not in itselfprevent the African Union from carrying out afurther referendum. Since the AUHIP proposalrecognises the same eligible electorate as theAbyei Area Community Referendum did, and ifany AU referendum meets the same highstandards as this referendum did, the results arelikely to be identical. If an AU referendum iscarried out then it will be especially importantto learn lessons (both positive and negative)from the conduct of this referendum, since mostaspects of the process will be the same.

Ngok Dinka leaders, while considering theresults of the Abyei Area CommunityReferendum binding and lobbying forrecognition of the results, appear to be open tothe possibility of the AU carrying out its ownprocess, and view the two processes ascomplementary. It is at least theoreticallypossible that some governments and institutionswill recognise the results of the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum, whereas others willurge the AUPSC to implement a referendumbefore recognising its results.

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Woman awaiting WFP food distribution at Mulmul

Referendum Management

On our arrival in Abyei town we wereintroduced to the Chairperson and anothermember of the AACRC and immediatelyaccredited as international observers. In thisfirst meeting with members of the AACRC wewere given a copy of the rules and regulationsgoverning the conduct of the referendum,guidelines given to each Referendum Centre,and a list of ReferendumCentres.

We were highly impressedwith the rules andregulations, acomprehensive 36-pagedocument covering allaspects of the referendumprocess. In some respects,these rules were morestringent than UK electorallaw. (We are not able to speak with authorityabout electoral law in other nations.)

We note that the rules and regulations wereadopted on 18th October 2013, in advance of thestart of the campaign period. This comparesfavourably to the 2011 referendum allowing forthe self-determination of South Sudanese, whenrules and regulations were adopted well into thecampaign period. As far as we could tell, therules and regulations, and the guidelines, weredistributed to all Referendum Committees andHeads of Referendum Centres. At many of theReferendum Centres we visited, we saw staffrefer to the rules and regulations.

The rules and regulations clearly specified thatthe AACRC should be financially,administratively and technically independent ofthe Abyei Area High Committee (AAHC). Wefound that, although not all external journalistsunderstood this distinction, the AACRC madegreat efforts to preserve it. Meetings of theAACRC and the AAHC were entirely distinct.The AACRC operated as a purely technicalbody and did not take part in political decisionsor preparations for the celebrations organisedby the AAHC. The AAHC did not interfere in

the workings of the AACRC and visits toReferendum Centres made by the Commissionand the High Committee occurred at differenttimes using different vehicles.

The rules and regulations mandated AACRC toset up Referendum Committees at County level,appointing a Head and members of theCommittees. Committees would appoint theHead and members of Referendum Centres andbe responsible for the conduct of the referendum

process within their County.Committees had a highdegree of autonomy. Theywere able to set up sub-centres to ensure a sufficientnumber of ReferendumCentres were located in allpopulation centres. In Mijak,a sub-centre was set upbecause of local concerns thatthe population was dispersed

over a large area. In Agok, several sub-centreswere set up since a substantial population wasconcentrated in a small area, and there wereconcerns that a single centre would not be ableto cope with large numbers registering. Wheresubcentres were set up, both the new centre andthe main centre were adequately staffed. We didnot find any examples where recommendationsby the Referendum Committees were notaccepted by the AACRC. Structures allowedlocal knowledge and expertise to be drawn on,and ensured the eligible electorate had a highlevel of access to Referendum Centres duringboth registration and polling.

We found that Referendum Committees werefunctioning well in all the counties we visited.Members of the Committees circulated betweenthe Centres during the day while registration andpolling took place, checking that procedureswere being followed by local staff. Staff at theCentres clearly understood the structures set upunder the rules and regulations when wequestioned them, and deferred to theReferendum Committees as appropriate. TheCommittees proved an important structure forlogistical reasons. They collected registrationlists from the centres and brought them tocentral locations where AACRC members and

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We were highly impressedwith the rules andregulations...In somerespects, these rules weremore stringent than UKelectoral law.

staff could collect them, and received sensitivematerials, making distribution and collection ofresources possible in a large area with accessproblems. (Some roads were still waterlogged,as the referendum took place soon after anextended rainy season.)

Chiefs and elders also appeared to understandtheir role well. They acted as identifiers, readyto establish the identity of any voter whoseeligibility was in doubt. Some were alsomembers of Referendum Committees. Theydeferred to Heads of Referendum Committeesas appropriate even though many had a higherlevel of authority within wider society.

AACRC members and staff also circulatedbetween the centres. We witnessed themresolve problems in some centres and were ableto report problems to them at other centres,which were immediately resolved.

We are satisfied that the structures envisagedunder the rules and regulations wereimplemented and functioned well. In general,the rules and regulations were followed strictly.Where they were not, this was usually aconsequence of a condensed timetable. Forexample, the three-day period for appeals andobjections could not be accommodated withinthe timetable. However, this was not an issue asno appeals or objections were made.

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Elders, Referendum Committee, and Centre members at a sub-centre in Mijak

Voter Registration

Voter registration started on 20th October 2013.However, the short time-frame between thedecision to hold a referendum, made on 18th

October 2013, and the start of the process,resulted in delays. Most Referendum Centreswere not opened until 21st October. As far as weare aware, Agok, the centre with the highestnumber of potential voters, was the only centreto open on 20th October. Leu centre opened on22nd October, but was the only example wefound of registrations starting so late. Inaddition, some centres did not open on timeevery day. For example, Wunruok did not openuntil 11am on the 21st and 9.45am on the 22nd. Alack of cars to transport staff to the Centre wascited when staff were questioned as to whyCentres had opened late. Voters seemed happyto wait for staff to arrive and we do not thinkanyone failed to register because opening hourswere not strictly adhered to.

Agok was the only location where a lowproportion of the eligible electorate registered.On the last two days of registration very fewpeople were registered and when questioned,registrars, Heads of Referendum Centres andReferendum Committees, told us they believedalmost everyone from the cluster of villagescovered by the Referendum Centres in questionhad already registered. Although it would havebeen ideal for all Referendum Centres to haveopened on the 20th, we find that the delay inopening Referendum Centres did not affect theability of the eligible electorate to register orthe total numbers registered.

Discussions with members of AbyeiAdministration and members of the Church whohave been assisting returnees in rural areassuggest that the numbers registered in alllocations represent a high proportion of over-18swho have returned, except in Agok.

A variety of reasons were given by Commissionand Committee members for the low proportionof voters registered in Agok. One member of theCommittee covering Abyei town suggested thatpeople in Agok may not have been as aware ofthe referendum as people in Abyei town or thevillages where returnees had settled. It is truethat there was little time for voter education ormobilisation ahead of the registration period,and that traditional networks, a vital source ofinformation, are not as strong in Agok wherepeople from all 9 Ngok Chiefdoms aretemporarily resident. However, mobilisationcampaigns were conducted during theregistration period, and the sub-centres in Anietmarket were clearly visible to all. A series ofdemonstrations were held in Agok in the build-up to the vote and word of mouth spreads fast.

A Commission member suggested that theinterest in Agok was not as high as in Abyeitown. She noted while the numbers registered inAgok were proportionately low, the Commissioncould not force residents to register and vote. Itis likely that those motivated to return to Abyeitown had a higher level of interest in the votethan those resident in Agok. Nonetheless, noreason offered satisfactorily explains the lownumbers of voters registered in Agok. We are,however, satisfied that Ngok and otherpermanent residents of Agok had opportunity toregister and to vote. There were more sub-centres in Agok than in any other area, and thesecentres were open for a longer period.

Late on the 24th October the AACRC made adecision to extend the period for registrations fora further day. For most Centres, this was entirelyunnecessary. Officials, elders and others presentat the Referendum Centres we visited told usthey believed everyone who would register hadalready done so. In only one Centre we visitedwas concern expressed that there may be

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Registration in Wunruok

residents who had not yet registered. ThisCentre was Akechnhial, where the Head of theReferendum Centre stated he believed thatsome elderly voters who had difficulty comingto the Centre by foot had not yet arrived. Hehad requested extra time to register voters andwas waiting for advice from the AACRC as towhether he could register voters on the 25th. Wewere impressed by the level of knowledge thisshowed about the local population andrecommend that if a further referendum is heldby any institution, structures are set up whichcan accommodate local knowledge in the sameway as the Abyei Area Community Referendumdid.

In our view, the low volume of registrations inAgok was the main reason for extendingregistrations for a further day. The officialreason given was a large number of eligiblereturnees arrived in Agok on the 24th and theAACRC did not want them to bedisenfranchised after they had made the journeyto Abyei Area to vote in the referendum. TheChairperson of the AACRC told us that allCentres would remain open on the 25th in casesome of these returnees travelled onimmediately to their villages, even though hefelt the only Centre where there would be alarge number of voters registered on the 25th

would be Agok. We are not sure whether everyCentre did open. At Centre number 4, Mulmul,staff seemed reluctant and unprepared to openfor a further day. This Centre did not open until1.50pm on the 25th, and only a handful of votersregistered that day. Registration was alsocomplicated at this Centre by a WFP fooddistribution taking place on the same day. Manypeople assumed that the registrars wererepresenting WFP, not the AACRC.

Despite the short time-frame between thedecision to hold a referendum and the openingof registration centres, we found that all theReferendum Centres we visited had adequatestaff and all the materials they required forregistration. Most Committees decided to holdregistrations, with less need for privacy thanpolling, outside the buildings used as Centres,to improve visibility. (This was in accordancewith Article 34 (1) of the rules and regulations.)

Registrars were competent and literate. Most hadcompleted secondary education, and a few hadbeen involved in the South Sudanese referendumin 2011.

Chiefs or elders were present at all Centres,although not always continuously, to resolve anydisputes about eligibility. On one occasion, atWunruok, we witnessed an elder correctregistrars who had recorded the birthplace ofthree voters as their current residence. Thiscleared up confusion as to why three votersapparently residing in Maker Abior wouldregister in Wunruok. The knowledge of chiefsand elders was instrumental in ensuring theaccuracy of the voter registry. While they did notmonitor the registration of every name, andsome chiefs were more involved in checking theregister than others, whenever there was anapparent discrepancy (as above), they were ableto clarify matters. If any further referendum isheld in Abyei Area, their involvement will becrucial.

No-one was prevented from registering at anyCentre on the grounds that they were ineligible,although a number of new returnees atAwolnhom were advised that it would be betterto register at their final destination, since theycould only vote at the Centre they registered at,and would have to return to Awolnhom if theyintended to vote there. We found that there wasno confusion over eligibility criteria at anyCentre. All staff had a clear understanding ofwho was eligible and who was not. No doubtthis is partly due to the controversy overeligibility criteria at an international level. Staff

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Elder points to banner at Referendum Centre number 1

were aware of the eligibility criteria set out inthe AUHIP proposal, and believed themselvesto be implementing that proposal. No-one wasprevented from registering. However, it appearsthat all voters were Ngok and there were novoters who were eligible by virtue of havingpermanent abode in Abyei but who were notNgok.

Information taken from and recorded aboutvoters at the registration stage included theirname, age, sex, chiefdom, occupation, level ofeducation, payam and residence. While thisseemed at first an excessive level ofinformation, it became clear that thisinformation was indeed necessary onproduction of the voter registry. Many votershave the same names in Abyei. In cases wherethe father is the same but the mother isdifferent, more than a few Ngok have the sameage and the same names. Taking otherinformation enabled staff at the data centre tocheck that identical names were not duplicaterecords and that voters had not attempted toregister twice in different Referendum Centres.

The AACRC had intended to give thoseregistering cards with their polling number on.Unfortunately they were unable to secure thetechnology to produce the cards within theshort timeframe. The Commission Chairpersontold us that the Commission intended to make

the voter register, which would include pollingnumbers, available a day before polling began,so that voters could check their name wasincluded, appeal to a special Referendum Courtif it was not, and take note of their pollingnumber so as to make finding their name easieron the day. The cards were never intended as aproof of identity, and like polling cards in theUK, it was never envisaged that the cards would

be required when voting. While itmay have been preferable to givevoters some kind of token whenregistering, we find that theinability to produce cards did notdamage the referendum process.

We found queues of up to 15 atReferendum Centres on the 22nd

and the 23rd. Queues hardlyexisted at all on the 23rd, 24th and25th. Staff made efforts to makesure queues were orderly. ID wasrarely checked, except to verifynames, at Centres where residentswere settled and known. Morequestions were asked of thosearriving from Juba andregistering at Referendum Centre

number 1 (Abyei Town Centre), the busiestcentre. In most areas, all those registered werefrom one chiefdom, or two chiefdoms if theboundaries of chiefdoms split across the clusterof villages attributed to a particular pollingstation (e.g. Wunruok, which included areaspertaining to Bongo and Abior chiefdoms).However, in Abyei Town Centre, Mulmul, Agok,and Awolnhom, all areas where returneescongregated, those registered included Ngokfrom all 9 chiefdoms.

Decisions to open sub-centres, in Mijak andAgok, were made during the registration stage.This meant that voters voted at the same centresthey registered at. This led to less confusion thanduring the 2011 South Sudanese referendum,where the use of mobile centres in rural areasmeant that some voters arrived at the locationthey had registered to find there was no pollingstation there.

We witnessed few irregularities during the

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Chairperson of the AACRC, Monyluak Alor Kuol, registering

registration period. In our opinion, there wasone minor breach of Article 7 of the rules andregulations. This was at Marial Aleu, where aYouth For Referendum banner had been erectednext to the area where voters where beingregistered. The slogan on the banner read: “Thepeople of Dinka Ngok want to return to SouthSudan. October 2013”. We explained our viewthat the banner displayed a clear preference asto the options offered by the referendum andshould not be located in a vicinity where itwould be associated with officials who shouldbe neutral and impartial. The next time wevisited this Referendum Centre, the banner hadbeen moved a considerable distance from theReferendum Centre and we had no furtherconcerns about its location. The issue ofcampaigning near polling stations is one thatoften crops up during UK elections, in theexperience of one of the observers. Judgementsas to what is permissible is largely subjective.However, extra vigilance should be maintainedwhere there is already a widespread assumptionthat there will be a large majority for one optionin a referendum.

When we visited Referendum Centres duringthe registration period, we asked local officialswhether they had any concerns relating to thepolling period. The only concern was raised atMijak, where the Head of the ReferendumCentre said he was worried about security, andwhether the ballot box could be prevented fromthose who had taken too much wine. He said hehad asked the AACRC to provide furthersecurity. This was particularly a concern atearly stages when AACRC's plan was to havesomeone sleeping over at each ReferendumCentre protecting the ballot box. Due toconcerns about security, the ballot boxes weretaken by the AACRC each night and stored at asecure location, revealed only to a select few,and returned in the morning. While thisprevented logistical difficulties, andoccasionally ballot boxes were returned afterpolling should have started, it alleviated theonly concern that was raised with us by localofficials relating to the polling period.

We found that staff were highly motivated anddedicated to ensuring as many eligible voters aspossible registered. On the 24th, which was to bethe last day of registration, registrars at MalualAleu expressed willingness to stay open for afew extra hours if necessary, to ensure that no-one was disenfranchised.

Overall there were few problems duringregistration. We are satisfied that all thoseeligible under the AUHIP proposal who wishedto register had the opportunity to do so, and thatofficials fulfilled their obligations under therules and regulations diligently.

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We found that staff were highlymotivated and dedicated toensuring as many eligible voters aspossible registered. On the 24th,which was to be the last day ofregistration, registrars at MalualAleu expressed willingness to stayopen for a few extra hours ifnecessary, to ensure that no-onewas disenfranchised.

Preparations for Polling

The Voter Registry

Early on the AACRC recognised thatproduction of the voter registry would be one ofthe greatest challenges they faced, a challengeexacerbated by the condensed timetable. TheAACRC prepared for this by collectingregistration lists from Referendum Centres nearto the AACRC compound, during their ownsupervisory visits, or when facilitating visits toour choice of Centres, before the close ofregistrations. Work began on the voter registryfrom the evening of the 22nd onwards.

The AACRC hoped to transfer all names fromregistration lists onto spreadsheets and reordernames in alphabetical order. Once onespreadsheet had been created per ReferendumCentre, and checked against the original list, thespreadsheets would be combined and checkedfor duplicate names as a way of checking votershad not attempted to register in differentcentres. In reality this abuse was only a riskwhere, as in Abyei town, there were a numberof Referendum Centres within walking distanceof each other. Mulmul and Abyeithony are 20minutes' walk away from Referendum Centrenumber 1 in opposite directions; Wunruok isapproximately 90 minutes' walk.

Polling numbers would then be added. Heads ofReferendum Centres would be provided with acopy of a typed list of voters registered at theirCentre, and a copy of the original list as abackup. This practice proved important, as atone Referendum Centre a voter's name couldnot be found on the typed list, but waseventually found on the original list. Evidentlythe name had been missed in the process oftransferring names onto the voter registry.

Even though the AACRC took measures to startproduction of the voter registry beforeregistration closed, and brought in extra laptopsand staff to work on the registry, the process ofproducing the registry and doing the necessarychecks took longer than they had anticipated.This was not helped by the decision to extend

registration for a further day.

In the circumstances, it was a brave decision bythe AACRC to allow observers walk-in access tothe data centre to observe production of the list,and ask questions of staff. We were able toascertain when lists for various Centres werecompleted. Most lists were not completed andverified until the evening of the 26th October.Data for one Referendum Centre was misplacedand had to be retyped later that evening. For aminority of localities, lists were not typed at all.Registration lists were numbered by page, andpolling numbers were a combination of the pagenumber of the list and voter number (1-15) onthat page. This created additional problems forthese Centres during polling as names were notin alphabetical order and were therefore harderto find. However, the vast majority ofReferendum Centres had typed and original listsavailable for the start of polling on the 27th

October.

We were concerned that effectively the voterregistry was not published until polling started.It was not made available to the public as therules and regulations demanded. Voters shouldhave been able to object if their own name wasmissing or other names included who they didnot believe should have been included. The careand attention given by AACRC staff toproduction of the voter registry resulted in noinstances of voters complaining that their namewas missing, save the one example already giventhat was resolved. Pressure to declare the resultsbefore the end of October meant that it was notviewed as an option to delay voting by anotherday to allow a day for voters to raise objections.

There was a suggestion by the AACRC thatchiefs would go through the registry as anadditional check before it was published.However, we did not see any evidence of thisand do not believe it took place. We did seeAACRC staff making a series of checks toensure spellings were correct, names had notbeen missed off or included twice, and anyduplicate names were different people.

We requested a soft copy of the lists for the fourAbyei town Referendum Centres, where we

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believed the risk of multiple registration washighest. This was provided to us on the sameday we asked for it, and before the eventualpublication of the list. We ran our own checksfor duplicate names. We found a number ofduplicate names. Many had the same ages.However, other details (level of education,occupation, chiefdom etc.) were different. Weaccept the explanation offered as to why votersmay have the same names and ages (thesimilarity of Ngok names and the possibilitythat some duplicate names were the names ofthe same father and a different mother).

It is not impossible that some voters registeredat more than one Referendum Centre and gaveslightly different information as to level ofeducation, occupation, etc. at each Centre.However, the risks of attempting to do so werehigh. Voters did not know in advance whatkinds of checks the AACRC would run. Votersattempting to give the wrong chiefdom mayhave been found out by chiefs and elderspresent at the Referendum Centres duringregistration, who would know their lineage. Onthe day, voters' fingers were inked after voting.No staff reported and no observer witnessed avoter whose finger had already been inkedattempting to vote. Many centres had 100% ornearly 100% turnout. This in itself suggests thatmultiple registrations did not take place. In anycase, Ngok voters knew that the final result waslikely to be a landslide for South Sudan, andthat any practice which undermined the votewould undermine the credibility of thoseresults. We therefore find both that multipleregistrations were rare or non-existent, and thatthe referendum processincluded various checksduring registration,compilation of the voterregistry, and polling, thatmitigated strongly againstmultiple voting.

While there wereproblems with theproduction of the voterregistry, and we remaincritical of the failure tomake the voter registry

available to the public, we believe that theintegrity of the voter registry was high, andcommend the AACRC on maintaining

exemplary standards of transparency despite theproblems they faced. The AACRC did the bestjob possible given the limited technologyavailable for a self-organised communityreferendum. If another referendum is carried outin the future, we would like to see more timebuilt in to the timetable between the end ofregistration and the start of polling, and moreeffort made to ensure that the voter registry isdisplayed in a public place in advance of thestart of voting.

Distribution of Sensitive Materials

No sensitive materials were distributed toReferendum Centres before the morning of 27th

October, the first day of polling. Heads ofReferendum Committees collected ballot boxes,knives, ballots, indelible ink, stamps, canvasposters and string from the AACRC compoundtogether with the typed and original voter listson the evening of 26th October. They were takento secure locations in each county overnight, and

to Referendum Centres onthe morning of 27th

October. This processprovided adequate securityand guarantees againstmanipulation, but lack ofvehicles meant that pollingstarted late in a minority ofReferendum Centres on the27th.

Ballot boxes were sealedusing improvised measuresby Commission members

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...we believe that the integrity of thevoter registry was high, andcommend the AACRC onmaintaining exemplary standards oftransparency despite the problemsthey faced.

A sealed ballot box

before Heads of Referendum Committees werepermitted to take them. The boxes – plasticstorage boxes – were taped so that they couldnot be opened and AACRC stamps were placedover the tape and the boxes themselves. Ourview was that this did not guarantee that theboxes could not be tampered with, as tape couldbe removed and replaced, but the boxes weretaped in such a way that large amounts of tapewould have to be removed, and the risk ofleaving evidence of tampering would be high.We found this a good improvised measure andnote that we saw no evidence that boxes hadbeen tampered with during polling orimmediately prior to counting.

Unfortunately, the canvas posters designed tobe displayed outside polling stations had beenwrongly printed, and displayed a confusingballot design that was not identical to the actualprinted ballots. This may have causedconfusion to a small minority of voters,although this was mitigated by explanationsgiven by staff during the polling process. Thiswas an unfortunate but relatively minormistake.

We would like to commend the AACRC forconsistently adhering to best practice indistributing sensitive materials, despite thelogistical challenges faced. The attention paidto this aspect, especially at the same time astrying to compile the voter registry, reflectsextremely well on the integrity of thereferendum process and compares favourably topractices reported during the 2011 SouthSudanese referendum. It was also an indicationof its thoroughness and organisation.

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Sealing and stamping ballot boxes

Polling

Polling hours varied at different ReferendumCentres. We were told by staff in variouscentres that they opened at 8, 8.30 and 9am.Logistical difficulties in delivering ballot boxeseach day meant that some Referendum Centresdid not open until mid-morning. For example,Dungop opened at 10.30am on 27th October.UNISFA, who continued to pay short visits tothe four centres in Abyei town, told us thatWunruok had opened at 10am on the same day.Voters waited patiently until ReferendumCentres opened. As many Referendum Centreshad a turnout of or approaching 100%, we donot think slight variations in opening hoursprevented registered voters from voting. Somecentres were reported to have closed early as100% of registered voters had already voted.The practice of keeping ballot boxes in a securelocation overnight and delivering them toReferendum Centres each morning was in ourview preferable to the initial plan whereby oneperson would sleep with the ballot box at eachReferendum Centre. We had been concernedthat the initial plan placed too much trust in asingle person at each Centre, and that a singleperson would not be able to protect the ballotbox if there was a security incident.

Basic procedures were similar at all of theReferendum Centres we visited. Names werechecked against and marked off on the voterregistry. Voters were then given a ballot paper,which was stamped. Voters were then directedto an area where they could mark their ballotpaper and were encouraged to fold it and place

it in the ballot box. At most Centres, theseprocedures were split into three separate areasinside the Referendum Centre. At some Centres,the first and second stages were combined.

At all Centres we visited, with the exception ofDungop, voting took place inside the Centre(usually a primary school). At Dungop, returneeswere sleeping in every room of the Centre andso this was not appropriate. At Akechnhial, acentre we were particularly impressed by, thefirst stage took place outside, and staff were onthe door to ensure voters could only enter thebuilding once their name had been marked off.This meant there was more space inside theCentre and it was easier to maintain order andguarantee voter privacy.

The index finger of voters was inked to showthey had voted. This was usually done at the endof the process, but was sometimes done at thesecond stage. On a few occasions we saw votersattempt to leave without having their fingerinked, or progress directly to the second stage onentering the Referendum Centre, but this wasalways spotted and rectified by ReferendumCentre members. We preferred it when the indexfinger was inked at the end of the process. Somevoters had difficult carrying and marking theirpaper with the thumb of their right hand coveredin ink to vote, and the index finger of their otherhand already inked. This increased thelikelihood of ballots being spoilt by accidentallygetting ink in both boxes. At Malual Aleu, staffrealised that this was a problem and amendedtheir practice, explaining to us what they weredoing and why.

In most Centres, officials had access to bothtyped and original voter lists. They were able toidentify and mark off voters quickly andefficiently. Where Centres only had originallists, there were often long queues as staff had toread through the entire list to find each name.Because of this, only 10 voters had voted atMalual Aleu by the time we arrived at 1.50pmon the first day of voting. Malual Aleu andAwonohlm allowed large queues to build up,then called out names from the list who wouldcome up to vote if they were present. This was agood improvised solution which enabled all

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Examining the voter registry

registered voters to vote by close of polls.(However, Awonohlm actually had the typedlist, so we remain unsure why staff used thismethod at this Centre.) The AACRC hadprioritised producing typed lists for theReferendum Centres where larger numbers ofvoters had registered, so that those Centres thatneeded quicker throughput were able to processvoters more speedily.

Chiefs and elders were continuously present ateach Centre we visited during polling toidentify voters in case of any dispute overidentity. No disputes arose that we were awareof.

Voters queued patiently and appeared to be ingood spirits even where, as in Malual Aleu andAwonohlm, they were waiting for a few hours.The only time we saw problems in the queuewas at Referendum Centre number 1, whichhad long queues on the first few days as 7,640people had registered there. The AACRCensured there were plenty of staff present bothinside and outside the Centre and they wereable to resolve any disputes that arose quicklyand peacefully. Most Centres gave disabledvoters and women with young children priorityin the queue.

There were minor differences in the way staffinterpreted the rules and regulations at differentCentres. For example, while all Centres markedoff voters on the lists they had been given byputting a tick next to their name, Dungop alsoasked voters to put their fingerprint next to their

name, Awonohlm wrote down the names ofvoters who had voted on a separate list, andMalual Aleu wrote out receipts which votersthen took to the second stage and handed in.These procedures did no harm, and provided anadditional means of verifying who had voted ifany disputes later arose. However, they wouldhave been impossible to replicate at Centres withmore than 2,000 voters registered.

We witnessed staff turn people away on a small

number of occasions and at different centres. Oneach and every occasion, this was justified anddone in accordance with the rules andregulations. At Mulmul and AbyeithonyReferendum Centres, both within 20 minuteswalk of Referendum Centre number 1, peopletired of queueing at Centre number 1 tried tovote. Staff patiently explained that they mustvote at the Centre they registered at. Again atMulmul, one man arrived to find his name wasnot on the list. After further discussions, itemerged he had been away from Abyei duringthe registration period and had asked a friend toregister his name on his behalf. This was notpermitted and he had therefore not beenregistered. Although this was unfortunate, staffapplied the rules and regulations correctly.

At the second stage, a ballot paper was stampedand given to each voter. At the better Centres,detailed guidance was given as to how to vote atthis stage. Staff explained which option wasSouth Sudan and which was Sudan, how to vote(by placing a tick or their thumbprint inside theoval which represented their preference), how tofold the paper and where to put it. At the Centresthat gave detailed guidance at this stage, votersrequired less assistance at the final stage and wehad fewer concerns about lack of secrecy andassisted voting. We were particularly impressed

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Orderly queuing at Awonohlm Referendum Centre

We were particularly impressedby the guidance given at CentreNo. 1. Guidance was consistent,impartial and appropriate to theneeds of each voter.

by the guidance given at Centre No. 1.Guidance was consistent, impartial andappropriate to the needs of each voter. When adeaf and dumb voter arrived, staff explainedwhich option was which by pointing andgesturing northwards and southwards. Thevoter evidently understood and was able to casthis ballot without assistance at the final stage.While Abyei Town Centre and Mulmul wereexemplary in this respect, we are satisfied thatboth options were explained and voters given areal choice at all Centres.

At the final stage, voters marked their ballotpaper, folded it and placed it in the ballot box.Most Centres had a closed off area wherevoters could mark their ballot paper in privacy.Several had curtains attached to writingbenches or the ceiling. There was an effortmade at all Centres we visited, barring Dungop,to ensure that only one voter was present in thisarea at once, or two voters where there wasclearly space for both to cast their votes inprivacy. In Centre number 1, there was nocurtain on the 27th, but the ballot box was farenough away from the other stages to ensuresecrecy. Staff had decided to add a curtain by

the time of our repeat visit on the 29th.

Voters often had difficulty in folding their ballotpapers. Many tried to post their ballot paperwithout folding it. Staff tried to encourage votersto fold their ballot paper lengthways so that inkdid not transfer from one oval to another, andvotes were not spoilt. In most Centres, staffmanaged to communicate and demonstrate thisusing hand signals. However, staff in a smallnumber of centres became frustrated and tookthe ballot paper from voters, folded it, and gaveit back to them to post into the ballot box. Somestaff told us that voters needed help as they didnot understand how to fold the ballot papers.However, many voters also had difficultyplacing their ballot papers in the ballot box. Staffmanaged to demonstrate this without touchingthe ballot paper and we believe it would alsohave been possible for staff to demonstrate howto fold the ballot paper without touching itthemselves. Again, we note that where detailedguidance was given at the second stage, therewas a reduced need for assistance at the finalstage.

At Dungop, staff were so adamant that ballotpapers should be folded lengthways that theytook ballot papers from voters and folded thepapers themselves whenever they tried to foldthem the other way. Bizarrely, this was the caseeven when voters used a biro to tick theirpreference and there was no chance of marksbeing transferred from one oval to another. Wesuspect that they had been told the proper way offolding ballot papers during their training, andwere determined to ensure exact procedureswere followed. In future, those training staffneed to ensure that they understand the reasonsfor certain procedures, and the principles that liebehind them. The condensed timetable meantthere was little time for staff training. It wouldhave been better if more time had been devotedto staff training, including supervised dry runs inthe presence of AACRC members.

The balance between appropriate assistance andsecrecy was hard to achieve and some Centreswere better than others in this regard. We notethat most of those who took part in the poll, bothvoters and staff, had never voted before, since no

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Authentication of ballots at Centre number 1

elections have been held in Abyei since the1970s. Some voters clearly needed a high levelof assistance. We observed one voter try to voteby placing his thumbprint on the sample balloton the wall, despite having just been handed aballot paper. When a frustrated member of stafftold him this was not how to vote, anddemonstrated by putting his own thumb on thebench near the voter's ballot paper, the voterresponded by also pressing his inked thumb onto the bench. In this context, a longer campaignperiod before registration started would havebeen ideal, so that more extensive votereducation could have been conducted.

Voters and, in some cases, staff attached littlevalue to secrecy. In many cases we witnessedvoters try to show their ballot papers to staff tocheck that they had voted for their intendedoption. In most cases staff declined to look andsimply explained the options and how to voteagain. Again, we would like to commend thestaff at Akechnhial who followed both the letterand spirit of the rules and regulations whenfacing this dilemma. In general, staffunderstood the importance of secrecy and madeefforts to ensure that neither they nor other

voters could see how individual voters voted.There were notable exceptions to thisgenerality.

At Referendum Centre number 1, a number ofearly voters displayed their marked ballot paperclearly to other voters, staff and journalists, atthe start of voting on the 27th. All these voterswere politicians associated with the HighCommittee, and it was clear that they wantedpeople to know how they voted. When ordinaryvoters started to vote, journalists left and voterprivacy was established. However, there wereoccasions where journalists filmed or

photographed voters marking their ballot. AtReferendum Centre number 1, one journalistwas prevented from doing this by staff. AtMulmul, journalists were initially preventedfrom photographing voters marking their ballotpapers, but when they complained, restrictionswere relaxed. We believe that staff were worriedthat journalists would report a lack oftransparency to the international community ifthey restricted them in any way. Journalistsrarely ventured outside the town and we judgethat this was not an issue at other Centres, orindeed for a significant number of voters.However, clearer guidance should be given tojournalists, and staff training should include howto deal with journalists. Journalists also have aresponsibility to adhere to professional ethicsthemselves.

Our concerns about lack of secrecy relate almostentirely to two Referendum Centres: MalualAleu and Dungop. When we arrived at MalualAleu, we found that voters were casting theirballot in the presence of a staff member at thesecond stage, who was giving clear direction.However, a Commission member travelling withus immediately identified the problem andensured that all subsequent votes were cast nextto the ballot box, behind a curtain, at the finalstage. This improvement was made without anyintervention by us. Because of the problemsMalual Aleu faced with their voter list on thefirst day, only 11 votes of a total of 1,081, werecast before the Commission member intervened.

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In general, staff understood theimportance of secrecy and madeefforts to ensure that neitherthey nor other voters could seehow individual voters voted.

Staff at Malual Aleu, clearly able to view voters marking ballots, before AACRC intervened

Unfortunately, there were also two members ofstaff sat behind the curtain, assisting voters andable to see how most voters were voting. Weasked staff to ensure they adhered to the rulesand regulations by sitting further away from thearea where voters voted, and refraining fromhandling ballot papers once they had beengiven to voters. Staff followed our advice tosome extent, but were frustrated when votersasked for and expected their assistance,including in marking their ballot papers. At alater stage, Commission members arrived tomake one of their regular supervisory visits. Weexplained the problems to them and theyensured that better guidance was given to votersat an earlier stage, and that staff sat furtheraway from the area where voters marked theirballots. In total, around thirty voters voted atMalual Aleu before the Commissionresolved problems there to oursatisfaction. We witnessed a furthertwenty voters voting in satisfactoryconditions before we left theReferendum Centre. When wereturned, correct procedures werestill being followed. We haveconfidence this continued to be thecase, since the count at this Centrerecorded 5 spoilt ballot papers.Under the conditions we firstwitnessed at Malual Aleu, it wouldhave been impossible for any voterto spoil their ballot paper!

At Dungop, one member of staff wasoften sat at the table where votersmade their mark, and another wasclearly observing from a distance.Voters who were literate and more confidentthey knew what to do voted without assistance,but in most cases a member of staff stillobserved them from a distance and occasionallyintervened if he felt they were about to dosomething wrong, like place their mark on thesymbol for South Sudan rather than in the ovalnext to the symbol. Staff here were moreconcerned about voters spoiling their ballotpapers than they were about maintaining thesecrecy of the ballots. Officials seemed to betrying to mitigate the problems faced byilliterate and disabled voters and we are

satisfied that manipulation was not the intent.Even where assistance was given, voters wereoffered a genuine choice. Voters themselvesappeared to value the assistance they were given.However, we are still concerned that voters hadless agency at Dungop than at other ReferendumCentres.

Dungop was an exception and we did notwitness similar procedures elsewhere, except atMalual Aleu where the problems were resolvedbefore 97% of ballots had been cast.Commission members and ReferendumCommittee members paid regular supervisoryvisits to Referendum Centres throughout AbyeiArea to ensure that the rules and regulationswere being followed. We expect that, as atMalual Aleu, these visits resolved problems at

Centres we were not able to visit, at an earlystage. Although the larger Referendum Centresin Abyei town were highly impressive, we alsofound that procedures were followed in ruralcentres that we visited, where there were largernumbers of illiterate and disabled voters. Wefind no evidence for a general discrepancy instandards between urban and rural ReferendumCentres.

We asked staff at Referendum Centres we visitedto give their understanding as to what kind ofassistance could be given and under what

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Appropriate assistance offered to disabled voters

circumstances. In most cases, staff had a clearunderstanding of the rules and regulations. AtAbyeithony, officials explained that “We cannotforce or even show people where to vote. It hasto be the voter's choice. If they can, they do italone, but if they are blind there is a conditionwhere we can help them.” We were particularlyimpressed with the assistance given to visuallyimpaired voters. At several Centres, we sawstaff guide them to the final stage, offer them aclear choice between the two options, wait forthem to express a preference, then explain whatthey were doing as they placed the voter's inkedthumb on the oval corresponding to theirpreferred option.

We are satisfied that adequate numbers of staffwere present at all the Referendum Centres wevisited and at all times. Staff were helpful butnot overbearing. There was a peaceful, sombreand quiet atmosphere at all Centres. A fewvoters spontaneously burst into song or startedchanting after voting, but this was notencouraged by officials. Voters were in highspirits. We enjoyed watching old ladies hobbleup to vote, cast their ballot, then gain a newlease of life and dance with joy.

Staff maintained order at all the Centres wevisited at all times, even during the initialmedia circus at Referendum Centre number 1 atthe start of voting on 27th October. While therewere minor irregularities at a small number ofCentres, and we had concerns about the balancebetween assistance and secrecy, we are satisfiedthat these concerns did not affect the integrityor credibility of the referendum process. Voterswere offered a genuine choice. Officials offeredimpartial advice. They did not direct votersinappropriately. Voters faced no intimidationfrom officials and did not appear to be affectedby Misseriya threats of violence. There was nomilitary or police presence at Referendum

Centres. We are satisfied that the entire eligibleelectorate was able to exercise their vote in freeand fair conditions.

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We are satisfied that adequate numbers of staff were present at all theReferendum Centres we visited and at all times. Staff were helpful butnot overbearing. There was a peaceful, sombre and quiet atmosphere atall Centres.

Finding Paramount Chief Bulabek Deng Kuol Arop's name during polling at Referendum Centre number 1

Counting

We witnessed two counts from start to finish, atReferendum Centre number 1, and Mulmul.These had the highest and third highestnumbers of ballots cast. We judged there was ahigher likelihood of something going wrong atthese Centres. Despitethis, the reliability andtransparency of thecounts at ReferendumCentre number 1 was,in our view, higher thanthe norm in the UK.One of the observershas attended numerous counts in the UK andhas never seen so much care and attentiongiven, nor so many checks carried out duringthe process. The count at Mulmul wasundertaken in difficult conditions, but was alsoreliable and transparent.

At both Centres, the total number of ballots wasverified before sorting. Votes were then sorted,bundled and counted.

At Referendum Centre number 1, ballots wereremoved one box at a time, counted into pilesof ten, checked, checked again, then countedback into the box. Every ten votes, thecumulative total was verbalised, agreed by allstaff present, and written down independentlyby two members of staff. This process was veryslow, but incredibly reliable and transparent.Errors were rarely made and were spotted andcorrected during the checks.

When votes had been sorted, two ballot boxesrecorded exactly the same number of votes ashad initially been counted. This confirmed thehigh quality of the verification stage. The otherballot box, the first to be counted, recorded 8more votes than had initially been counted.Staff were very concerned about thisdevelopment, although this is very common inthe UK. Bundles were recounted to check therewere exactly 100 votes in each bundle. Whenchecks twice confirmed that the initial counthad been wrong, the total number of votes inthat box was amended. We were impressed by

the stringent procedures adopted and theintegrity of officials.

During sorting, ballots were opened, displayedclearly, judged (by consensus) to be for SouthSudan, Sudan, or unclear, and put in piles. Sudanvotes and invalid votes were few and were notcounted until each box had been completed.

South Sudan votes werecollected together,checked again to makesure they were notinvalid, counted intotens and then intohundreds. The hundreds

were bundled using elastic bands, and thencounted again to check each bundle containedone hundred votes. Votes were bundled usingelastic bands. When the Centre ran out of elasticbands, officials improvised by tying bundleswith ribbon pulled from the windows of theCentre! Again, we were impressed by thediligence of officials and the number of checksbuilt into the counting procedure. As aconsequence, we have a high level of confidencein the results.

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Counting at Referendum Centre number 1

We were impressed by thestringent procedures adoptedand the integrity of officials.

During the count, the door was locked to ensureno-one interfered with the count, althoughobservers and journalists could enter and leavefreely. Commission members continued tomake supervisory visits during the count.

The only minor criticism we have of the countat Referendum Centre number 1 is regardingthe treatment of spoilt ballot papers. In general,officials erred too much on the side of cautionand rejected many votes, which, in our view,expressed a clear preference. When we wereasked directly for assistance, we refrained fromgiving a verdict on individual ballot papers, inaccordance with Article 37 (4) of the rules andregulations. We did remind staff of theprovision under Article 38 (2) that “A ballotpaper shall not be deemed invalid as long as thevoter’s choice can be reasonably ascertained.”

Any slight divergence from a tick or fingerprintfully within a single oval was treated assuspect. Queries were raised about ballotswhere voters had signed within the oval, orwhere a tick extended slightly outside an oval.Early on in the count, sensible decisions weretaken and an attempt was made to ascertain thevoter's preference. The Referendum Committeemade one of their supervisory visits duringdiscussion of one ballot, and were asked fortheir view. They told the staff at the Centre totreat it as invalid. After this, ballots weretreated as invalid on the slightest pretext. Wesaw cases of invalid votes where, in our view,the voter's preference was clear. These includedballots where the voter had ticked the symbol

instead of the oval next to the symbol, whichincluded ink smudges elsewhere on the paper,and where both the symbol and the oval hadbeen ticked.

While few ballots were affected, and there wereat most eight ballots that we felt were wronglydeclared as invalid, we take thedisenfranchisement of a single voter veryseriously. We note that no invalid ballotscontained a possible vote for Sudan. All thoseballots that contained votes for one option andwere declared invalid would, if accepted, havebeen votes for South Sudan. Other ballots weredeclared invalid because they contained nomark, because both options had been ticked orbecause the ballot had not been authenticated(stamped).

Of more concern than the tendency to err on theside of caution and disenfranchise individualvoters was the number of ballots that wereinvalid because they had not been authenticated.In most boxes there were at most a handful ofballots affected in this way. However, one boxcontained 112 ballots that were notauthenticated. Our judgement is that it is likelythat a single member of staff during a singleshift did not stamp ballot papers as he or shehanded them out. This highlights the importanceof detailed staff training before the processbegins. The disenfranchisement of so manyvoters is of deep concern. All the affected ballotsexpressed a clear option for South Sudan. If thevotes had been accepted, the decision for SouthSudan would have been even moreoverwhelming. Although we class this as aserious mistake, we do not therefore believe itaffected the integrity or credibility of the finalresults.

The count at Mulmul was made under difficultcircumstances. It did not begin on time becausethere was a lack of trained officials to supervisethe counting staff at the Centre. AACRC werenot confident that the count could proceed withintegrity and so waited for staff at otherReferendum Centres to finish and travel toMulmul. This meant that the count did not startuntil 8pm and proceeded in torchlight until2.30am. Despite the unusual circumstances, we

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Invalid ballot papers

have confidence in the integrity of the count atMulmul. We appreciate the decision of theAACRC in the circumstances while noting thatcounting in such conditions is far from ideal. Ifno observers had been present to witness theprocedures followed, the credibility of thiscount would have been under question.A large plastic sheetwas brought into theCentre and spread flatacross the room. Chairsand benches wereplaced around the roomand staff equipped withtorches sat on them,directing torchlighttoward the middle ofthe room. We aresatisfied that there was sufficient light to seeexactly what was going on.

The two ballot boxes were emptied into themiddle of the room and two groups countedthem back into the boxes. Our observerwatched one of the groups carefully and wassatisfied that counting was accurate. Oneperson counted out 50 votes while the otherswatched and confirmed. One person wrotetallied 50s. The counter rotated every 50 votes.The other group counted in 10s. There werefewer staff checking the counting. When theinitial verification had been completed, the totalwas considerably higher than the total numberof voters registered at Mulmul. The staffrealised there must have been an error and thebox our observer had not watched was emptiedand recounted by the more proficient team,under observation. The total was over 300 votesunder the number of registered voters. We aresatisfied that this second count was morereliable, and resulted in a more credible total.The eventual total was revised upwards slightly,when the total number of votes bundled wasfound to be slightly higher than the second

total.

Votes were then sorted and bundled into 10s andthen 100s. No elastic bands or ribbon wasavailable, so bundles of 100s were wedge underbenches after being checked. While this solutionwas unusual, we are satisfied that it allowed for

an accurate countof sorted votesand that there wasno opportunityfor manipulationof the bundles.

Althoughdecisions onsuspect ballotswere, in our view,

more reasonable than at Voter Centre number 1,officials still tended to err on the side of caution.No ballot was accepted as valid where the markwas entirely outside the oval, even where it wasclear the voter intended to vote for South Sudan.(Again, no ballots rejected as invalid could havebeen interpreted as votes for Sudan.) There werea small number of ballots rejected because theyhad not been authenticated, but the problem wasnot nearly on the same scale as at ReferendumCentre number 1. We note that the Centreswhich were not as busy did not have the sameproblems with unauthenticated ballots as theCentres with the highest numbers of votes cast.

While the count at Mulmul was highly unusualand made in difficult circumstances, we aresatisfied in the integrity of the process and theresults. We would like to commend those staffwho had worked at other Centres from themorning of the 30th and continued working atMulmul until 2.30am; for their dedication,diligence and refusal to take short-cuts in thecounting process despite tiredness. The count atVoter Centre number 1 was, despite ourmisgivings about the treatment of a small

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The count at Voter Centre number 1was… of a high standard for anadvanced democracy. That a countduring a self-organised communityprocess met such high standards isremarkable.

the count was conducted professionally and in accordance with the higheststandards, and testifies to the solid organisation and the integrity of thereferendum process.

number of invalid votes, of a high standard foran advanced democracy. That a count during aself-organised community process met suchhigh standards is remarkable. We have noreason to believe that other counts we were notable to observe did not meet similarly highstandards.

Poor counting procedures could easily have letdown the entire referendum process and castdoubt on the results. Conversely, the count wasconducted professionally and in accordancewith the highest standards, and testifies to thesolid organisation and the integrity of thereferendum process.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

The Abyei Area Community Referendum was ahighly transparent process, carried outprofessionally in free and fair conditionsdespite difficult logistical challenges. Acomprehensive set of rules and regulations,published in advance of the start of thecampaign period, were adhered to consistently.Structures functioned well and incorporatedlocal knowledge and expertise. All voterseligible under the AUHIP proposal commendedby the AUPSC and other internationalinstitutions and governments had opportunity toregister and vote, and no eligible voter wasprevented from doing so. We are satisfied that,although the register was not published publiclyas promised, sufficient checks were in place toguarantee the integrity of the voter registry.Appropriate procedures for distribution andcare of sensitive materials were put in place andconsistently adhered to. Voters were offered aclear choice and were able to exercise thatchoice freely. Guidance was consistent andimpartial. In general, staff understood and madeefforts to preserve the secrecy of the ballot.Minor irregularities proceeding from the shorttimetable and lack of time available for votereducation and staff training did not compromisethe integrity or credibility of the process. Thecount was extremely transparent and reliableand met the standards expected of an advanceddemocracy.

In a number of respects, the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum exceeded the

standards met by the 2011 South Sudanesereferendum. For example, rules and regulationswere published in advance of the start of theprocess.16 Centres were well-situated in areaswhere local populations were concentrated andlocal referendum committees had the flexibilityto set up sub-centres, resulting in excellentaccess.17 Unlike the South Sudanese referendum,in no Referendum Centre did ballots cast exceedthe number of registered voters.18 There was noshortage of registration materials and proceduresfor packing and distributing sensitive materialswere consistently adhered to.19 There was noconfusion over voter eligibility and no-one whowas eligible to vote was prevented fromregistering.20 There was no armed securitypresence inside any Referendum Centre.21 Therewere no reports of direct intimidation.Difficulties with the compilation of voter listsdid not result in any voter being turned away.22

Observers were not obstructed from accessingthe data centre at any time.23

There are no technical reasons for refusing torecognise the results of the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum. The process methigher standards than the 2011 South Sudanesereferendum whose results were recognised bythe Government of Sudan, the UN, AU and otherinstitutions and governments. However, we areaware that the results may not be accepted forpolitical reasons, and that it is possible thatanother referendum be held at some point in thefuture.

We note that if a referendum is held in AbyeiArea in the future, the eligible electorate will bethe same as was the case in the Abyei AreaCommunity Referendum. If lessons are notlearned from this referendum, it is possible thatany process conducted under the auspices of theAU will not meet the same high standards metby the Abyei Area Community Referendum. We

16 The Carter Centre, Observing the 2011 Referendum on the Self-determination of Southern Sudan, 13.

17 Ibid., 19.18 Ibid., 3.19 Ibid., 16, 33.20 Ibid., 16–17.21 Ibid., 30.22 Ibid., 31–2.23 Ibid., 14, 20.

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Referendum results displayed at the AACRC compound

would therefore like to make a number ofrecommendations for the conduct of any futurereferendum (or, indeed, elections) in AbyeiArea.

1. Any future referendum or elections shouldinclude a longer pre-registration period, sothat extensive voter education and properstaff training can be conducted. Staff werebriefed ahead of registrations, and receivedappropriate written guidance, on-the-jobtraining and supervision. Mobilisation teamsproceeded from Abyei to the furthest parts ofAbyei Area to increase awareness of theprocess during registration. However, webelieve that more extensive voter educationwould have increased registrations in Agok andreduced the need for assistance at the finalstage of the process, making it easier topreserve the secrecy of the ballot. Staff trainingshould include dry runs where staff practicepolling day procedures in the presence ofCommission members. This could havemitigated the problems faced at Dungop,resolved the problems faced at Malual Aleubefore the start of polling rather than part-wayinto the first day, and ensured voters atReferendum Centre number 1 were notdisenfranchised by the failure to authenticateballot papers. Training should also includeguidance on what journalists can and cannotfilm.

2. Future exercises should ensure the samelevel of transparency, with observers andjournalists able to enter any ReferendumCentre and the data centre at any time.

3. Adequate time should be programmedinto the timetable, even delaying polling ifnecessary, to ensure the voter registry isavailable to the public, and there is sufficienttime for objections and appeals beforeregistration starts. Although the process wasof a sufficiently high standard that there wereno objections or appeals made during the Abyei

Area Community Referendum, we judge that ifthe Referendum is conducted by an externalbody, there is a higher likelihood that objectionsand appeals will be made. This will especially bethe case if there is an increased expectation thatthe referendum results will be recognisedexternally.

4. Any referendum conducted under theauspices of the African Union should consideradopting the same structures as the AbyeiArea Community Referendum, to ensure thatlocal knowledge and expertise isappropriated. Any future referendum shouldensure Referendum Committees are composedof Ngok Dinka (the target community for thereferendum) from each County of Abyei andhave a high level of autonomy, so that decisionsabout the location and number of polling centresare made by those who understand theconcentration and needs of local populations.The Commission should consider hiring thesame staff hired by the AACRC, who havealready been through the process once and willhave valuable insights. AACRC members couldbe involved in an advisory capacity. Chiefs andelders from the 9 Ngok Chiefdoms must have arole as identifiers and be present at ReferendumCentres if the voter registry is to have the samelevel of integrity as was the case in the AbyeiArea Community Referendum.

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Celebrations as results were announced