The Social Organization of Migration: An Analysis of the Uprooting and Flight

of Vietnamese Refugees

BY REBECCA ALLEN* and HARRY H. HILLER*

It has long been recognized that migration has both its voluntary and involuntary aspects (Petersen, 1970). Predisposing factors and conditions in the sending society can be contrasted with attracting features and perceptions of conditions at possible destinations through what is recognized as push-pull models of migration (Stein, 1978; Jansen, 1970; George, 1970; Kunz, 1983). A focus on government policies and ideologies, lack of food or personal freedom, or changes in elites suggest involuntary or propelling stimuli which produce the desire to relocate. But analysts such as Akerman (1978:289), Taylor (1 969 :22), Lind (1 969) and McGee (1 978) have all criticized the push-pull model and have noted that migration always involves a decision-making process that is far from mechanistic.

The potential migrant must filter information and assess the situation before determining whether migration is an appropriate course of action. For example, Lee (1 969) has drawn specific attention to the role of intervening obstacles such as distance, immigration laws, and the transportation of personal effects which force the would-be migrant to calculate the risks of departure in the light of perceptions of current conditions. Akerman (1 978 :30 1) has also noted that personal perceptions have an important role in mediating cause-effect factors. As a correction to simplistic patterns of push-pull, migration then must be viewed as a blend of both the consequences of structural and objective factors (involuntary) and personal decision and choice (voluntary).

One form of migration that presumably lacks voluntaristic aspects is that of refugee migration. The refugee by definition is fleeing from something and seeking refuge. Refugee migration, therefore, is considered involuntary. As the 1951 United Nations Convention and its 1967 Protocol makes clear, it is the fear that the migrant has about returning to the country of hidher nationality that identifies the person as a refugee.

The state ofbeing a refugee, then, suggests fear, panic, confusion, and disorganization as a consequence of the need to escape in any way possible.

* University of Calgary, Canada.

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The Process of Dissociation

The emphasis on the involuntary aspects of refugee migration has understated the extent to which becoming a refugee is volitional and socially purposive behaviour. Clearly a refugee condition is related to government actions within a world system (Zolberg, 1978 :279), but many people live under conditions of oppression or deprivation and do not become refugees. The question is, what leads someone to become a refugee?

Conclusions about how one becomes a refugee are critical to understanding the refugee experience. If one stands with Kunz (1 973: 130) and concludes that the refugee is reluctant to move and lacks positive motivations to settle elsewhere, there is little emphasis on the creativeness of becoming a refugee. On the other hand, if one agrees with Hansen (1 98 1 : 194) that refugees are people who choose to leave (though under duress) and who are successful at doing so, refugee flight is more likely to be deliberate and rational rather than blind panic and inevitable behaviour.

The focus on the determinants or causes of migration may not be clearly understood because little attention has been given to the actual process of becoming a refugee. Instead, an examination of precipitating factors is usually followed by studies of the resettlement process (Finnan, 1981 ; Skinner, 1980; Montero, 1979a; Stein, 1979; Liu, 1979; Haines et af. , 1981). The trauma of the flight is usually taken for granted (e.g. Nicassio, 1983) and emigration stress is discussed in relation to problems of adjustment and assimilation (Chan and Lam, 1983; Lanphier, 1983; Starr and Roberts, 1982). What is missing is a more careful analysis of how refugee flight is initiated and sustained. This perspective suggests that the refugee experience can be divided into three phases: pre-flight, flight, and post-flight. It is the objective of this paper to examine the social development and organization of refugee migration in the pre-flight period in order to discover the dynamics of the process of dissociation. In this way it is hoped that structural or milieu factors can be more intimately linked with the migrants’ personal decision to flee.

The Boat People: Refugees from Vietnam

Between 1975 and 1979, more than 1.5 million people are known to have fled from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to seek asylum in other countries (Congressional Research Services, 1979: 134). Some fled by land into Thailand and China, while others took to the sea in small craft, modified fishing junks, or seagoing freighters. The majority of the boat refugees came from Vietnam and are referred to as ‘boat people’ (Grant, 1979). Due to the corruption and abysmal conditions of people in this form of escape, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) arranged with the Vietnamese government a more orderly departure of persons in 1979, but the flight of refugees by boat continued (Sobel, 1979:30). By June 1979, the flow ofboat refugees reached more than 60,000 pe.ople per month.

In the early stages of this flight, as the Vietnam War drew to a close in 1975, evacuation took place among those Vietnamese with close ties to the Americans (Grant, 1979; Liu, 1979; Kelly, 1977). By 1978 and 1979, it is estimated that 65 per cent of those who left came from Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese community, which was feeling the pressure of government policies due to the deteriorating relationship between China and Vietnam (Wurfel, 1980:109). The precariousness and disaster of refugee flight depicted by the media drew worldwide attention to this rather massive migration.

Methodology

In order to understand the dynamics of dissociation, the focus for this study became the perceptions and experiences of the refugees themselves in order ‘to define the world from

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the perspective of those studied' (Shaffir et al., 1980:6). Seventy Indochinese refugees residing in a western Canadian city were interviewed over an 18 month period using a snowball sampling technique. Interviews were initially unstructured, but as the data gathering process became more complete, the interviews became more focused. About 50 per cent ofthe interviews were conducted in Cantonese, 25 per cent in Vietnamese through an interpreter, and 25 per cent in English. Interviews were frequently lengthy and data were stored in field notes. The final sample was comprised of one-third ethnic Chinese from the North, one-third ethnic Chinese from the South, and one-third ethnic Vietnamese from the South.

The initial exodus of refugees from Vietnam in 1975 occurred after the collapse of the Saigon government. While we might argue that there was more anticipation of possible departure among those Vietnamese with American ties and South Vietnamese government sympathy than is usually acknowledged (c.f. Montero, 1979b), it has been argued by Kelly (1 977 : 1-2) that this wave of migration was spontaneous and, although taking the form of an evacuation, still was composed of refugees in the classic sense. Somewhat in contrast to this initial exodus was the boat exodus from 1977-1979 consisting primarily of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam who were not sympathetic to the Communist regime but who were also the victims ofanti-Chinese feelings in Vietnam due to the antagonism between Vietnam and China. These persons are also classified as refugees and, though the elements of spontaneity and panic may not have been acute, the urgency and clantestine nature of the departure was significant. Thus our sample is of a later wave of refugee migration than Kelly's and provides an interesting contrast to her findings.

Nguyen and Henkin (1982) have noted that the initial wave of refugees were the elite of South Vietnamese society evacuated under the auspices ofthe American military, whereas subsequent leavers were less well-educated and accustomed to hardships. The reflection and action involved in planning for departure demonstrated personal decision-making and strategy for coping with a restrictive local opportunity structure similar to that described by Mendonsa (1982) in his study of Portuguese international migrants. While the emphasis on rational choice theory in application to ethnic collectiveness has not been without its controversies (Hechter, Friedman, and Applebaum, 1982; Adam, 1984), the perspective emerging from this data shows how planning and strategy is part of the refugee experience for these boat people.

Analysis of the data suggests that the period prior to migration consists ofthree separate processes: the social development ofa refugee situation; the social development ofa flight perspective; and the development of a social organization for flight.

The Social Development of a Refugee Situation I .

It is highly unlikely that persons will consider fleeing from their homes unless acute social unrest is present. Therefore, a feeling of dissatisfaction or distress in the midst of stressful conditions must emerge in what we call a refugee situation. A refugee situation is a mix of structural factors, their objective impact on people, and the subjective negative assessment of the changing conditions by the persons so affected. The key idea is that of disruption of normal patterns, reversal of expectations, or, in a word, change, leads to the growing conviction of intolerable conditions.

Among the boat people refugees, a process of social victimization occurred. Initially it was intergroup conflict and socio-political revolution which altered existing social arrangements. The socio-political revolution was primarily that of the Communist takeover of North Vietnam and eventually also South Vietnam. The consequence of this event was that it was perceived to lead to significant changes.

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‘Nobody expected the government to collapse so suddenly. It was a big shock when it happened. The new government changed everything; everything was turned upside down. Parents had to relate to their children differently, people had to eat different food, work at different jobs. Everything had to be done according to communist principles.’

Some feared being drafted into the army or being sent to re-education camps while others in the South who had been associated with the former government or with the Americans were fearful of how they would be treated. Those who formerly held political and economic power experienced discouraging status dislocation and those among the lower classes who had alignments that were opposed to the new regime became more discontent with the socio-political upheavals.

Since the Chinese in Vietnam were such a large proportion of this wave of refugees, it is clear that there must have been considerable tension between the ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese. Interviewees frequently used the term Pei Hoa which means a discriminatory campaign against the Chinese as the cause of their discontent. As one refugee put it:

‘Why did we leave Vietnam? We didn’t leave voluntarily. Since China taught Vietnam a lesson, the Vietnamese government no longer wanted us to stay. They said that we would be spying for China. We left because of the Vietnamese government’s Pei Hoa policy.’

A similar view was related by an interviewee from the North: ‘Anti-Chinese feelings always existed in Vietnam. The Chinese and Vietnamese have always exchanged words of insults. The Vietnamese have always been envious of the Chinese higher standard of living. The Vietnamese call the Chinese thieves because they read about China’s invasion of Vietnam in their history books. The Chinese call the Vietnamese Annarnites. The term infuriates the Vietnamese because it reminds them of their period of slavery to the French ... But, things never came to a head. The development in 1977 was different. I worked in the cultural sphere and therefore was early alerted of the increasing hostility towards the Chinese. Eventually, the hostility turned into an anti-Chinese campaign. For the Chinese, it signalled the end of their days in Vietnam.’

This intergroup tension affected ethnic Chinese in both North and South Vietnam. The impact was particularly felt by persons in mixed marriages (Vietnamese and Chinese).

Victimization also occurred through the changes brought on by war and the social disorganization brought on by political instability. The effects ofwar on dwellings, foliage, and a precarious economy produced residential and employment instability and fears of mortality. Interviewees reported loss of jobs, confiscation of small businesses, imtations about the need for moving permits from one district to another, loss of homes andlor possessions, freezes on bank deposits, restricted opportunities for higher education or government employment, and negative effects due to corruption and bribery of officials.

Perhaps most critical of all was the lack of food. ‘In North Vietnam, the food situation had not been good. People never had enough to live on. We lack many things. For example, paper was rationed. If you wanted to eat well, you’d have to use your ingenuity. But in 1977 and 1978, there was just not much food at all.’

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An interviewee from the South noted that the food shortage had produced considerable unhappiness.

‘Rice was rationed and the rationing system was so unreliable. When people did get some, it was never enough to feed the family. The rice was also of a very poor quality. Often half of it was sand.’

People with large families particularly found food shortages difficult. There are several important points about these factors. First, as perceived by these

refugees, they were not chronic conditions but disruptions of normal patterns and reversals of hopes and expectations.’) Second, a selective victimization process occurred so that not all ofthe population was affected so adversely. Deprivation or the perception of deprivation created an unhappiness that we have referred to as a refugee situation. In short, a refugee situation is created when structural chailges in a society are negatively evaluated by those most affected (i.e. victim groups) due to shifts or disruptions to their habitual places in that society.

II . The Social Development of a Flight Perspective

A flight perspective does not automatically flow from a refugee situation, but the two are obviously intertwined. The term flight perspective describes the developmental phase intervening a refugee situation and actual flight. It is an intermediate condition in heightening and intensifying the identification of flight as an appropriate, feasible, and logical course of action.

The flight perspective is acquired largely through social interaction. The socialization of discontent or restlessness*) noted in our earlier discussion contributes to the active consideration of uprooting and flight as behaviour modelled by others or considered jointly with others. The emergence of a flight perspective means desertion of one’s homeland is seriously entertained as normative and necessary behaviour rather than as a deviant act. It is the dissatisfaction with the refugee situation that leads to the discovery and conclusion that remedial action is appropriate.

One way of coping with changing conditions may be to merely accept the change - at least publicly with little open resistance.

‘Well, by and large, people accepted the changes, at least on the surface. Many knew it was pointless to argue with the government which had power over the people. Most saw no option.’

The implications of open resistance (e.g. re-education, relocation) were too severe to directly challenge the system. Another way to handle dissatisfaction was to seek to temporarily alter conditions through illegal means such as bribery (e.g. to avoid military service), falsifying documents to circumvent rationing, regulations, or even to leave the country, or earning a living through the black market (Keller, 1975:6). However, illegal activity was hardly a secure lifestyle and surface acceptance of conditions seldom stilled inner feelings of unhappiness.

The possibility of leaving the country became a consideration as both a means of self-preservation and a means of rebuilding from current deprivation.

‘Leaving our own country was a difficult thing to do but as our country was struck by calamity, there was no point in staying. We could never recover what was destroyed. But we thought we could regain what we had in a new land.’

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Through interaction with others, most potential refugees discovered migration as an action which others had already followed.

‘Though I knew that there were people escaping from the country, I myself did not think about leaving at all. Towards the end of 1977, I began to notice that a lot of my friends had gone. I also noticed a lot of empty premises in the main street. Then I thought perhaps I too should consider leaving.’

The development ofa flight perspective meant that leaving the country was discussed as a possible solution. Seldom was the decision to migrate a single decision at a specific moment (cf. Akerman, 1978 :30 1 ; Taylor, 1969 : 132) but was a consequence of exploring the alternatives with either family or friends.

‘I cannot remember how it first came up, but it was my brother who first brought up the idea. He said that the situation in Vietnam didn’t look good and things would not end well. He said that he heard that many people were fleeing the country, but added it was such a dangerous thing to do. Every time he came to visit he talked about the situation and that we should consider leaving.’

One interviewee indicated that there were groups organizing to leave at the hospital where she worked. She declined the invitation to join them but kept her family informed of the progress these groups were making. One respondent who had been a fisherman stated that he first seriously considered leaving when someone from Saigon offered to buy his boat.

The idea of leaving developed naturally in the course of conversations about the bad conditions in Vietnam. As they were discussing the idea, people were also establishing contacts with others who also shared the same perspective. Many persons knew of people who had already left or who had relatives who were either living abroad or who had been abroad for education or on business. Knowledge of a destination perceived to be better, enhanced the consideration of departure as a logical resolution. When the government changed its policy to encourage emigration of Chinese in 1978, departure became an even more open topic ofdiscussion for people ofthis ethnic group. The possibility ofsanctioned departure, however, became more complex due to the lack of transportation which increased the demand for more unofficial departures.

Turner and Killian (1972:57) have suggested that events in themselves seldom trigger the transition from normal to collective behaviour. On the contrary, people collectively attempt to redefine the situation and to determine appropriate acts. In the case of these refugees, departure became a paradoxical ‘unavoidable possibility’ for those most strongly victimized by political/economic upheaval. Flight then is not an automatic response to structural conditions or what we have termed a refugee situation. The perception that there is little hope for change in current conditions requires the active discussion and consideration of flight as a means to ameliorate perceptions of hopelessness.

I I I . The Social Organization for Flight

Rationality may appear antithetical to customary conceptions of refugee behaviour because of the emotional and abrupt nature of fleeing. While refugee behaviour may involve fear and panic, the necessity to overcome intervening obstacles (Lee, 1969) suggests that some type of rational action that goes beyond the single decision to leave must be involved.

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Once flight is seriously contemplated, the first requirement is transportation. The most typical means of acquiring transport was to buy a place in someone else’s boat, to buy a boat of one’s own and sell places in it, or clubbing together with a group to buy a boat. Information regarding the availability of boats or boat places were passed by word of mouth.

‘It was in 1978 when we really started to look for a boat. We had talked about leaving Vietnam a lot and we heard that some people were building boats. We first mentioned the idea to our family and relatives, then to our close friends. Fora while, there wasn’t much news. Then, from this and that person came bits and pieces of information. We pursued some of the leads but they all ended in nothing definite. Around June 1978, a friend of the family told us about a boat in My Tho. The owner of the boat wanted 12 taels of gold for an adult place, and halfthat amount for children. The friend said that his family was going. So we said we would go too. We asked if the owner was an honest person and the friend said ‘yes’. So I asked him what kind of boat it was, and how big it was and ifit was safe, etc. The friend said he couldn’t answer all the questions as he hadn’t seen the boat himself. He later introduced me to a friend of the boat owner. That person told me about the boat and where I could go and see it. So I went to see the boat for myself before paying a deposit for 6 places.’

A young woman from Saigon said:

‘My aunt’s family was organizing a boat to leave Vietnam. They bought a very small fishing boat. My parents asked if they would let my brother and I join them and my aunt agreed. It cost 30 taels for the two of us to go.’

Both of these experiences were repeated over and over again with minor variations in the interviews. The process involved in the organization of government-registered flights in the South is best described by a Chinese woman :

‘The rich people, most of them from Saigon, would rebuild boats for leaving. They’d buy an old boat so as to use its registration number and name. The old boat would then be rebuilt from scratch. This was usually carried out in small towns on the coast or along inland waterways. Anyone wanting to leave - that’d include most people - would try to contact the boat builders to arrange for passage - find out the amount of gold needed and the number of places available. The boat owners would have to pay the government officials - usually four taels for an adult, and two for a child. See, that’s the way the government could get the people’s gold. A date would be set. The destination was usually known. Then people would travel to the coastal town and get aboard.’

Transportation is essential for migration. In most cases, the decision on how to leave was taken with considerable caution including weighing the costs and the risks.

The second major decision was who should leave. Typically, the decision about who should go and who should stay was made by the whole family:

‘There are seven brothers and sisters in my family. The oldest brother and elder sister were living in Hong Kong. When the government permitted the

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Chinese to go, my parents said that some of us children should leave Vietnam. They said that we didn’t have money for all of us to go together. My parents only had a small glass manufacturing business ... We sat around and talked about who should go. At first we thought that the second brother and second and third sister should go. The second brother was aged 17, the second sister 2 1, and the third sister, 19. I and my youngest brother would stay with my parents. Then my parents thought that maybe only the boys should go. I said to my parents that I didn’t want to go without them; but they said that we should go ahead first and then send for them later. We thought about that plan. Then my parents thought that as I was 12 and my second brother was only 17, we wouldn’t be able to look after each other very well. So finally, it was decided that the second sister would go with me and the second brother and be responsible for looking after us, while the third sister would stay behind to look after the youngest brother and cook for the family.’

‘At the very beginning, when we talked about our plan, it was thought that we would leave together in the same boat. We tried to find a boat-group to join but failed a few times. So we changed our plan. My parents would leave with one brother and one sister. The other two brothers would leave by themselves and I and my wife and children would leave by ourselves. Then through a friend, we got introduced to a boat owner and were able to get seats for all of us. So my whole family stayed together.’

Migration was frequently a family oriented project and flight required some rational decisions about who should go and what obligations those departing had for those who remained.

The third form of negotiation and decision-making involved meeting the cost of transportation. Decisions had to be made about what price for a seat was realistic, or the ‘best’ price in view of the desire to leave, and how that money was to be raised. Cheaper, more clandestine flights could be found but they might be more risky. Should savings be used? What assets (e.g. furniture, belongings) should be sold? And what funds should be expended to pay for the passage of friends or members of the extended family were all questions that required careful thought. Even buying a share in a boat required some rational assessments about the seaworthiness of the boat and the trustworthiness of the other shareholders. Some people were enterprising enough to arrange to work for their passage on board while others learned of illicit means of gaining access to a boat.

The greatest fears reported by those interviewed were that they would be cheated by boat owners; that someone would learn of their plans and report them to the authorities who would detain or punish them ; or that a mishap would take place at sea. These factors suggested powerful reasons for being as careful and rational as possible in planning. Therefore the advice and counsel of others was continuously sought. Occasionally, bad decisions were made and through the process of rumour transmission, further advice and warnings were given to others. After as much care and caution could be exercised as possible, the element of the unpredictable still remained and respondents indicated that religious activity in temples, prayers, and appeasement ofevil spirits was a frequent part of the flight preparation.

Mechanisms of Dissociation: Taking up Roots

Once the decision to leave is made, the process of taking up roots is also planned and deliberate.

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It was first necessary to decide to whom farewells were to be made, and at what point others were told of imminent departures. Many of these farewells were painful, but excerpts of the following two accounts reveal that departures were planned:

‘Although it was my mother’s idea that we should leave Vietnam, it was hard for her to see us go. She had not been well for weeks, and I knew it was because she couldn’t bear the thought of our leaving. She had been telling us how to protect ourselves and look after ourselves, and how we must write and let them know about our whereabouts when we left, and she spent much time sewing and concealing gold pieces in our garments. They went with us to the train station. She repeated all the things she had been telling us for weeks.’

‘Just before we left, I took the children to see my sister and my mother. They prepared a special dinner for us. We didn’t talk about the journey much. When we left, they asked the gods to give us good luck.’

The second concern was to maintain normal activities as much as possible until departure so as not to arouse the suspicion of authorities or informers. This was particularly necessary in the event that something went wrong before putting out to sea. Most people arranged for the disposal of their belongings rather than have them confiscated by the government when their departure was discovered. Momentos, kitchen utensils, photographs, and other personal items were divided among relatives and friends.

Thirdly, it was also necessary to pack for the journey including special foods (such as rice that did not need to be cooked), pharmaceutical supplies (e.g. seasick pills), and sheets of plastic as protection from sea spray and rain. Again it was interpersonal interaction and advice that fostered this kind of preparation.

Fourth, plans needed to be made to get to the point of departure or to the boat:

‘We journeyed to the coastal village where the boat was to set sail a week before we were to leave. We didn’t want to attract any attention to ourselves so we went in three groups. We all went by motorcycle.’

‘My contact person gave news that we were to sail out of Binh Dong. I journeyed to Binh Dong, which was about an hour from Saigon. The contact person told me to meet him at a certain place at night. When I got there, there were over 10 people waiting. The contact took us to a sampan. Although the sampan was motorized, we used the paddles in order to keep as quiet as possible. We went a certain distance down the river and were picked up by another sampan waiting for us. The second sampan took us to the boat. We got on the boat. There were people in it already.’ .

Getting to the point of departure was not haphazard or undertaken by chance. It required strategy and, above all, social organization to ensure that persons who had reserved a place on the boat actually got on board. While these arrangements were not bureaucratic, they were also not totally casual either as the number of persons involved required some measure of coordination of date, time, and place.

Conclusion

The act of becoming a refugee is usually not perceived to be a process of rational organization or the skilful mobilization of resources. Two interrelated tasks in the

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preflight process can be identified as that of material, social, and psychological preparation, and that of the formation of flight groups. These two tasks required active deliberation and problem solving in overcoming intervening obstacles. In this regard, it was primarily the social ties which people had which forced them to organize flight for themselves and others. It was also these social ties which provided assistance in preparing for flight. The conclusion could be drawn that people who were impacted by the same obstacles, but failed to become refugees, did not flee precisely because they deliberately chose not to or because they were not able to become part of the social organization for flight which made departure possible for so many. Conversely, the formation of flight groups meant that many more potential refugees were able to take flight than otherwise would have been the case as individuals (cf. Keller, 1975 56). This paper then suggests that a more careful distinction be made between a potential refugee and an actual refugee.

The social organization for flight was largely of an ad hoc nature, for ad hoc organizations are transitory and of an emergent nature. ‘Ad hoc’ organized responses to disaster or crisis have many precedents in the collective behaviour literature (Weller, 1972: 145 ; Barton, 1969:38). Organizational arrangements evolve as people seek to resolve their frustrations and to that extent the emergent organization is deliberate and problem-solving in nature. It is for this reason we argue that push factors do not ‘determine’ refugee behaviour but ‘motivate’ flight. Similarly the ad hoc organization does not determine flight but ‘facilitates’ it.

Using the resource mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald, 1977:1227), it is the ability of persons to collectively aggregate resources through ‘transitory teams’ that translates a refugee situation into actual flight. Migration, then, is not so much a form of behaviour (Zolberg, 1978:260) or an objective phenomenon (Kunz, 1973:127) but a socio-political and economic resource. Access to the resource of migration depends on economic factors, social ties, and entrepreneurial abilities.4 It is in this sense that the decisions made and actions taken with a view towards flight represents the deliberate efforts ofthe person to successfully flee. Rather than a haphazard response to deprivation, refugee flight can represent a creative mobilization of available resources to obtain a deeply desired end.

This perspective is not meant to suggest that the volitional aspect of becoming a refugee equates the refugee with any other type ofvoluntary migrant. It may be that the classic type of refugee is one who responds spontaneously with little or no forethought, planning, or organization. Yet, in reality, data presented here suggests that becoming a refugee is much more planned and socially organized than previously emphasized. Nevertheless, in spite of its volitional aspects, becoming a refugee is still planning amidst tension and crisis and coping amidst disaster, which suggests an intensity and urgency unlike other forms of migration. It is in this context that refugee flight retains both its creative and clandestine nature.

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NOTES

( I ) We are here advocating a modification to the relative deprivation theories that it is the discrepancy between people’s expectations and reality that produces collective action. With Blumer (1978) we agree that social inequities and views ofthe illegitimacy ofthe existingorder produce the unrest, but that protest can take many forms. For the potential refugee, flight represents an escape from a society whose norms and values are considered illegitimate.

All movements of collective behaviour require this early stage of social unrest, cf. Hiller,

Compare Patterson’s (1978: 106) study of migration from Cuba where access to migration is viewed as a socio-economic resource.

(2) 1975 1346-348.

(3)

45 1

L'ORGANISATION SOCIALE DE LA MIGRATION : UNE ANALYSE DU DERACINEMENT ET DE L'EXODE

DES REFUGIES VIETNAMIENS

La plupart des etudes sur les refugies sont centrees sur les facteurs qui causent soudaine- ment la migration involontaire ou des problemes d'adaptation et de reinstallation. Ce document, par Rebecca Allen et Harry H. Hiller, en faisant une distinction entre les phases par lesquelles passent les refugies avant leur fuite et celles qui la suivent, demontrent que la decision de devenir un rkfugie comprend une preparation consciencieuse et deliberee et une organisation ad hoc et n'est pas le resultat d'une panique aveugle et d'un chaos. Fond& sur une etude des refugies fuyant le Vietnam comme 'boat people' de 1977 a 1979, trois processus distincts ont Cte identifies pour la periode precbdant la migration et consideres comme determinants pour le dkracinement et la dissociation. I1 s'agit de l'evolution sociale de la situation d'un refugie, de 1'Cvolution sociale de la perspective de fuite et de l'kvolution de l'organisation sociale de cette fuite. Utilisant les tcrits sur ce sujet dans le domaine de l'attitude collective, et particulierement la thtorie de la mobilisation de ressources, la fuite du refugib est montrke comme une mobilisation creative de ressources pour atteindre le but de la migration.

LA ORGANIZACION SOCIAL DE LA MIGRACION: ANALISIS DEL DESARRAIGO Y HUIDA DE LOS REFUGIADOS VIETNAMITAS

La mayoria de 10s estudios sobre refugiados dirigen el foco de su atencion a 10s factores precipitantes que originan la migracion involuntaria, o a 10s problemas de adaptacion y reasentamiento. En cambio, el presente estudio de Rebecca Allen y Harry H . Hiller, a1 distinguir entre las etapas anteriores y posteriores a1 momento de la huida, en la expe- riencia de 10s refugiados, presenta una nueva tesis segun la cual la decision de convertirse en refugiado es fruto de una preparacion consciente y deliberada, y de una organizacion especial, mas bien que del panico ciego y del caos. Tomando como base un estudio sobre refugiados maritimos vietnamitas que huyeron de su pais en el curso del periodo 1977- 1979, 10s autores proceden a definir tres procesos distintos sobrevenidos durante el periodo previo a la migracion, atribuyendoles una importancia decisiva como causantes del desarraigo y la desintegracion social. Estos tres procesos son : el desarrollo social de una situacion de refugiado, el desarrollo social de una perspectiva de huida y el desarrollo de la organizacion social necesaria para llevarla a efecto. Fundandose en estudios publicados relativos a1 tema del comportamiento colectivo y, particularmente en 10s que tratan de la teoria de la movilizacion de. 10s recursos, se sostiene que la huida de 10s refugiados representa una movilizacion creativa de medios destinados a lograr el objetivo de la migracion.

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