Living in Limbo:The Boat Refugees of Hong Kong and Macao

May 1986

This paper was prepared for the U.S. Committee for Refugees by Allen K. Jones,a consultant to USCR. It is based in part on his visit to Hong Kong's refugeecamps in February 1986.

0 1986 American Council for Nationalities Service.

Today, more than 9,000 refugees in Hong Kong and Macao endure frustration,

anxiety, and little hcpe, facing few prospects of ever being able to begin new

lives elsewhere. Since 1975, boat people have arrived in Bonq Kong fleeing

war and oppression in their home country, Vietnam. More than 100,000 refugees

have come to Bong Kong, most passing through to resettle in countries such as

the United States. But today, those left behind--some existing in camps for

more than six years-have little or no hope of resettlement either in Hong

Kong or a third country, or of returning home.

Of the first asylum countries in the region, the Crown Colony of Hong Kong

presently harbors the largest number of Vietnamese boat people. Yet the

resettlement rate is lowest there. Hong Kong also has many of the longest-

staying refugees. These conditions and others serve to create a serious

refugee problem that calls for urgent international attention and action.

The Bong Kong government itself recently agreed to resettle permanently

250 of the boat refugees, as part of a United Kingdom-initiated effort to

encourage more countries to take refugees now in Bong Kong. Yet, that appears

an exception to a lonc-stated rule, for Bong Kong has repeatedly made it clear

that it is unwilling to resettle more refugees, saying it has assimilated as

many as it can. Meanwhile, the refugees wait and hope. As time passes,

social problems, including poor mental health, drug abuse, and diminished

readjustment capacities, increase--not surprisingly, given the refugees'

circumstances of lengthy stays, an inhospitable living environment, and dim

prospects for resettlement.

It is time for the international community to address the needs of these

"left-over" refugees. A solution to their predicament must be found that

allows them to begin again, with the dignity they deserve as human beings.

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Finally, the Eong Kong refugees should not be viewed in isolation, for

Hong Kong's problem is really a regional dilemma with which other first asylum

countries--Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines--are

also burdened. Therefore, the most appropriate response must be a regional

one which--after addressing the first priority, the refugees' welfare--meets

the needs and constraints of the countries involved.

Hong Kong's History-A Dynamic, Crowded Colony

In the popular mind, Hong Kong is a dazzling mecca for shoppers, a pic-

turesque, mountainous island dominated by skyscrapers just off the southeast

coast of mainland China. It is one of the world's major cities, with a popu-

lation of 5.5 million crowded onto Hong Kong island and the Kowloon peninsula.

Hong Kong, a British colonial territory of only 400 square miles, is one of

the most densely populated places in the world--5,012 persons per square mile,

compared with 230 in the United Kingdom and 22 in the United States.

Hong Kong became a British colony in the nineteenth century,1

but it will revert to Chinese control in 1997. As a colony, Hong Kong is

ruled by a Crown-appointed governor who is assisted by Executive and

Legislative Councils for domestic affairs; Britain controls the colony's

foreign policy. Before legislation can become law, it must have the

governor's assent. Until 1985, the only elected element of Hong Kong's

government was the Urban Council. Today, citizens also participate in voting

for members of the Legislative Council. Despite this recent broadening of the

political process, Hong Kong remains a nondemocratic polity, with authority

concentrated in the hands of a few. This reality is a part of everyday life

in Hong Kong, including the government's policy towards refugees.

Despite the strictures of colonial government, Hong Kong used its free

port status to develop a dynamic economy based on trade and commerce. In

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recent years, the colony has diversified its economy to include a strong

industrial base featurinq production of clothing, textiles, photographic, and

electrical eauipment.

1975-1979: The First Boat Refugees

The first Vietnamese boat refuqees arrived in Hong Kong in May 1975, fol-

lowing Saigon's fall to communist forces. They numbered 3,743 and came aboard

a commercial vessel, the Clara Maersk. Virtually all were Vietnamese who

either had close U.S. ties or strong anti-communist sentiments.

Following this large initial influx, the numbers dropped, but refugees

continued to come during the following years, attracted in part by the

colony's liberal, open-door refugee policy. By the end of 1978, Hong Kong had

provided refuge to 11,544 persons. Of these, 6,150 (53 percent) were

resettled in third countries, most (76 percent) in the United States.

1979-1982: A Shift in Sentiment

In 1979, tensions related to the border war between China and Vietnam

produced thousands of new refugees from Vietnam. Hundreds of thousands of

Vietnamese were persecuted and expelled--many, ethnic Chinese. Suddenly, Hong

Kong was faced with providing refuge for dramatically higher numbers--in just

the first seven months of 1979 more than 66,000 refugees reached the colony's

shores. In July 1979, during a meeting of resettlement countries in Geneva,

they confronted the Hong Kong crisis. As a result, the participants agreed to

receive refugees either on a first asylum or resettlement basis. In the

ensuing months, internal conditions in Vietnam, as well as other factors

involving other states in the region, caused the rate of new arrivals in first

asylum countries to fall sharply.2 Nonetheless, over the period through

1982, the numbers of new arrivals remained significant throughout the region.

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Despite the large numbers, Hong Kong welcomed the refugees. They were

placed in camps while they awaited processing for resettlement in Hong Konq

and third countries. The Hong Kong government, along with the office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNECR) and voluntary agencies,

provided the refugees assistance. The government also allowed them to work; a

number took unskilled or semi-skilled jobs in factories which helped to occupy

their time as well as provide them money. Because of its generous response,

Hong -Kong soon became a favored destination of boat people. Its benevolence

contrasted with the policies of some of the other countries in the region,

which at times had refused entry to refugees or turned their boats back to sea.

Most of the refugees from Vietnam (73 percent) entering Hong Kong in 1979

were ethnic Chinese. They found acceptance and sympathy among the island's

population, which is almost all ethnic Chinese. But in 1980, the ethnic

composition of the refugees from Vietnam changed; most were ethnic Viet-

namese. This group represents almost all arrivals (98 percent) since 1980,

according to Hong Kong authorities. Moreover, substantial numbers have come

from former North Vietnam--38 percent in 1985, 28 percent in 1984, and 47

percent in 1983.

Reasons for ethnic Vietnamese fleeing Vietnam, including the north, stem-

med not only from differences over communism but also from more specific

causes, such as forced labor, employment bans, prohibitive taxation of coop-

erative members, and conscription. An additional reason was religious persecu-

tion. Buddhists and Roman Catholics have been discriminated against in cases

that are well known and well established. Less known are examples of persecu-

tion of Protestants, often because of their "imperialist" U.S. ties. Accord-

ing to a 1985 State Department study, Protestant churches in Vietnam have

received treatment as harsh as the Catholic churches and Protestants should be

regarded as likely to suffer persecution.

-6-

Although there is no consensus, some refugee officials believe that approx-

imately half of the people who now flee Vietnam do so initially for economic

reasons, but there is wide agreement that once people leave Vietnam, they can-

not return. The Hong Kong government has attempted for more than two years to

get the Vietnam government to take back eight refugees who have chosen

voluntarily to return, but these efforts have been met with silence from Hanoi.

In 1980, with the change in refugee composition, public sentiment in Hong

Kong shifted away from the refugees, in part because of the deep, historical

animosities between Chinese and Vietnamese. Another factor contributing to

growing unease over the refugees' presence was concern about overcrowding in

the colony. Notwithstanding the small percentage of the colony's total

population the refugees constituted, Hong Kong had resettled approximately

14,500 refugees since 1975. Yet, more recently, some both inside as well as

outside government began to ask, 'How many more and for how long?"

1982 to 1986: Humane Deterrence, Closed Camps

In 1982, to discourage new refugee arrivals and to reduce increasing

domestic political pressures, the Hong Kong government instituted a policy of

"closed" camps. Under this policy, new refugee arrivals are kept in camps

they can not leave until resettlement arrangements have been made. Unlike

their peers in the open camps, closed camp refugees may not hold jobs outside

the camp and are subject to a high level of discipline and control. Also, to

dissuade relatives from following, notes describing the closed camps aie put

in the refugees' letters home.

The Hong Kong government policy of closed camps has been strongly

criticized, perhaps most persistently by media and refugee groups in Britain,

as morally indefensible. A closer look at the situation may be helpful in

understanding what led the Hong Kong government to adopt this policy. First,

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Hong Kong's government is a colonial one--not democratically elected--which

can adopt tough policies with seemingly little worry about public reaction.

In fact, the government does worry about public pressures and is responsive to

them: but in other ways, it does behave in a manner characteristic of a

colonial government. For example, its strict, no-nonsense administration

requires all residents to carry ID cards.

Domestic political pressures actually were a factor in the government's

decision to initiate its closed camp policy. Not qnly did resident Chinese

dislike Hong Kong's providing asylum to Vietnamese, but they became resentful

when their city found a place for refugees from Vietnam while turning back

Chinese fleeing mainland China, regardless of why they fled. Every day,

Chinese attempt to escape the People's Republic of China.(PRC), including some

who have close family ties with legal Hong Kong residents.3 And every day,

the Hong Kong government deports some, usually at three o'clock in the

afternoon at the frontier post in the New Territories. These factors

contributed to an increasingly untenable political position for the Hong Kong

government, which decided to act to discourage new refugee arrivals from

Vietnam by opting for 'humane deterrence' through a closed camp policy.

Reduction in refugee admissions by traditional countries of resettlement

such as the United States--despite the continuing arrival of new refugees in

Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian countries of first asylum--were another

significant factor in the government's decision. It appeared Hong Kong would

soon face the prospect of a growing number of refugees who would never leave.

Thus, it was to respond to these various concerns that the government adopted

its closed.camp policy.

Hong Kong authorities claim the policy has had its desired effect. They

point to the decline in arrival figures in the years since 1982. In 1981,

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8,470 arrived in Hong Kong; in 1982, 7,836. In 1983, the figure had dropped

to 3,651; to 2,230 in 1984, and down to 1,112 in 1985. Others dispute that

claim, pointing out that Hong Kong is not alone in the region in witnessing

the decline: all first asylum countries have experienced fewer boat arrivals

during the same period.

In 1985, a new development occurred involving Hong Kong arrivals. For

years, all boats arriving in the vicinity normally stopped in Hong Kong. In

1985, that pattern changed. Several instances have been noted of boats

initially stopping, but then continuing on to unknown destinations.

What accounts for this change? Did the harbor police, under instructions

or not, harass or act to scare away the refugees? Does 'the grapevine* serve

to intimidate refugees considering a haven in Hong Kong? Were other factors

to blame? An explanation for this phenomenon is not presently available;

suffice it to say that a new--unsettling--pattern of refugee movement appeared

in 1985 with refugee boats bypassing Hong Kong.

It must also be said that an atmosphere of unreceptiveness toward the boat

refugees appears to remain strong in Hong Kong. A paragraph from a recent

editorial in a major Hong Kong newspaper, the China Morning Post, speaks for

that attitude. Speaking of commercial ships that choose to avoid refugee

boats rather than deal with the possibility of being asked for assistance, it

said, "The wide berth that most ship's captains now give to refugee boats is

indicative of the increasing indifference of the seafaring community. We

cannot condemn them for callousness, even though human lives are at stake, for

shipping firms are wrestling with far bigger problems over their own survival,

than worrying about the fate of a boatload of unwanted refugees."

It is in this precarious environment that Hong Kong's boat refugees remain.

The possibility of pushbacks out to sea cannot be brushed aside lightly when

an atmosphere exists in which such an editorial can appear. In fact, some

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authorities say the Hong Kong government attempted a formal program of repat-

riation to Vietnam several years ago, but officials in London halted the plan.

1986--The Current Dilemma

As of May 1, 1986, there were 8,7494 refugees in Hong Kong awaiting

resettlement overseas. Of this total, 62 percent have already spent more than

three years in Hong Kong camps, and 17 percent have remained more than six

years. According to latest information, only 7 percent of the total caseload

have firm acceptances for resettlement. Another 35 percent are pending a

decision by a resettlement country. The remainder--58 percent--are cases5

which are not currently being processed, but may be described as dormant.

There are two open camps in Hong Kong--the Kai Tak and Jubilee Transit

Centers. (See map) These camps house most of those refugees who arrived

before July 1982. As of April 1, 1986, Kai Tak held 2,055 and Jubilee,

2,146--a total of 4,201.

Jubilee Camp is a former housing block built before World War II for

British army.personnel and their families. Designed initially for a maximum

of 500 people, the structure today holds more than two thousand refugees. The

building has been condemned at least once by Hong Kong housing authorities as

lacking minimum health and safety standards, yet its use as a facility contin-

ues. Conditions are clearly overcrowded and intolerable by Western standards

--large families occupy small rooms with tiers of bunk-like arrangements. Yet,

somehow the refugees cope. Recently, a New York-based voluntary agency, the

International Rescue Committee (IRC), replaced Caritas-Hong Kong in admin-

istering the camp after some criticism regarding the latter's camp manage-

ment. Already some improvements are evident: a team of refugees and contract

labor has taken responsibility for trash removal, about which there had been

freauent complaints earlier.

Health, education, and social welfare facilities exist for the refugees in

the camp. The health clinic is staffed by a resident nurse and two volun-

teers. A doctor with the Hong Kong Medical Service also pays reqular calls.

On a USCR visit to the clinic in February, few serious health or medical cases

were encountered; patients that do require advanced care are promptly trans-

ported to hospitals, according to the clinic staff. Only eight patients were

hospitalized in January. The usual complaints were present, including a

number of children's cases of common childhood disorders.

Four areas present concern, however. First, there were--in February

1986--ten cases of tuberculosis, a highly contagious disease in. its active

stages, which causes some alarm because of the camp's highly congested

conditions. Second, 220 cases--more than 10 'percent of the camp popula-

tion--reported head lice in January, a statistic that speaks for itself.

Third, the clinic staff reported that recently gastric disorders were becoming

a fairly frequent complaint among Young men. They linked these cases with

increased anxieties and depression among young males, indicating a growing

ment.Al.health problem.in the camp.

The fourth area, sometimes closely linked to the third, is illicit drug

6use. . Estimates vary widely on the number of camp drug users. A Hong Kong

government official asserted there were 88 "hard" cases, that the government

knew exactly. who they were, and was keeping a close watch on them. A private

agency official estimated there were 100 to 120 cases. In any event--irrespec-

tive of what the true number is--the drug problem appears limited to Jubilee.

Plans are underway to merge the two camps this summer into one in Kai

Tak. This reorganization, which would close the Jubilee site, offers a timely

opportunity to concentrate UNHCR and other resources for the effective

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alleviation of the problems that plague the open camps. These problems

reflect the urgency of the situation, which, in the view of some refugee

officials, would be best relieved by increased resettlement opportunities.

There are three main closed camps: Chi Ma Wan, Bei Ling Chau, and

Bowring. (See map) Vietnamese from southern and central Vietnam are located

in Chi Ma Wan, and those from the north are in Bei Ling Chau. Earlier, Bei

Ling Chau had a mix of refugees from the north and south, but this led in 1983

to an outbreak of rioting between the two groups in the camp and resulted in

their being separated into the two camps.

With their high barbed wire fences to prevent escape, the closed camps

resemble prisons. Other conditions in the camp are prison-like, too;

residents are allowed only minimal freedom. At the outset, personal

belongings are taken from them, personal cleanliness is supervised, and at

times results in cutting of hair to prevent lice. Women in particular find

this treatment deeply insulting, but camp authorities argue it is necessary

for health reasons.

These procedures were followed when the camps first opened, but some have

been relaxed since, partly as a result of unfavorable publicity such as that

contained in a 1983 British TV documentary of Chi Ma Wan camp, commissioned by

UNHCR. The authorities are also now considering taking down the barbed wire

at some camps.

Sleeping quarters are cramped, with very little space--a compartment with

6X4 floor space--allotted to a family. These compartments, made from

industrial shelving, are arranged in two-tiered rows with a corridor between

them. Such conditions allow for virtually no privacy and little security for

personal possessions.

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At Chi Ma Wan closed ca:p, each refugee family--often five or more people--lives in a six-by-four foot cubicle.

Allen K. Jones

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The Hong Kong government bears overall responsibility for these camps,

which are administered by the Correctional Services Department (CSD). In

addition, voluntary agencies assist in providing social services for the

refugees in the camps--the Salvation Army in Chi Ma Wan, World Relief in Hei

Ling Chau, and Save the Children (U.K.) in Bowring.

Part of the criticism directed at the Hong Kong government has been

targeted at the CSD. Questions were raised about the appropriateness of using

this department--which runs prisons--as the agency to administer the refugee

camps. Forced to hire new staff for the closed camps, CSD has been criticized

for being insensitive to the refugees' needs and treating them as common

criminals. Recently, the government acknowledged the department's short-

comings and is taking steps to improve the situation by further training of

staff to cope properly with the particular circumstances of the refugees.

Providing Assistance to Boat Refugees--Agencies Involved

Refugee assistance is provided through the cooperative efforts of the Hong

Kong government, the UNECR, and voluntary agencies.

The Hong Kong government plays a leading role, not just in formulating

policy, but in providing logistics and resources for the care of the

refugees. The government agency with responsibility for day-to-day

administration of the refugee program is the Refugees Division in the Security

Branch of the Government Secretariat. In addition to administration, the

division helps shape policy on refugee affairs and carries out liaison with

the Correctional Services Department and other concerned departments (i.e.

Harbor Police, etc.), as well as with other agencies outside government, such

as the UNHCR, diplomatic missions, and the voluntary agencies. Since 1979,

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the Hong Kong government says it has spent US $64 million of its own funds on

the refugees.

UNHCR provides relief assistance for all refugees in Hong Kong. It also

contributes to medical and employment projects in the open camps. In 1984,

UNHCR obligated $3.9 million for the refugees, most of which ($2.6 million)

was spent for food in the closed centers. It supplies the refugees with basic

personal items, including clothing and footwear for the cold months, and bears

the cost of utilities at all the camps. UNBCR has spent a total of $40

million on refugees in Hong Kong since assistance began in 1979.

Voluntary agencies administer social welfare and educational programs for

refugees in the closed centers. These programs are subsidized by the Hong

Kong government, except the one in Bowring, which is financed by the UNHCR.

Voluntary agencies operate the open centers as noted above, using their own

funds, as well as support from such organizations as the UNHCR.

Some observers have criticized certain of the church-supported agencies as

having ulterior motives in assisting the refugees. For instance, the

Britain-based Refugee Action News recently alleged that two of the agencies

*claim the main focus of their work is social service, but documentary

7evidence reveals that their primary motive is to convert people.* Sources

in Hong Kong, however, dismissed these charges, saying they were misleading

and had originated with an unreliable source whose services had been

terminated by at least two different agencies in Hong Kong.

The Possibility of Resettlement: Diminishing Prospects

Since 1975, the leading resettlement countries have been the United

States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Other countries that have

taken at least 1,000 refugees each include West Germany, France, and Denmark.

(See table) In 1985, 4,022 refugees were resettled from Hong Kong and Macao

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(compared to 3,804 in 1984). The three major resettlment countries accounted

for more than 90 percent of departures: 43 percent to the United States, 33

percent to Canada, and 14 percent to Australia.

Between 1975 and December 1985, the United States resettled a total of

61,842 boat refugees from Hong Kong, 58 percent of the total (106,907). Most

of that figure were resettled from 1979 until 1982; since July of that year

when the United States sharply reduced its intake, only 5,318 (fewer than 10

percent) have been resettled in the United States.

U.S. resettlement prospects are rapidly diminishing for the Hong Kong

refugees; some officials estimate that, given current policy, the U.S. program

will wind down over the next year and a half. As of May 1, 1986, there were

1,001 cases in the U.S. processing system, of which 289 had been approved by

the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

RESETTLEMENT OF BOAT REFUGEES FROM HONG KONG1975-1985

Top 15 Countries

Destination Total Resettled Total (Percent*)

United States 61,842 57.8%Canada 17,739 16.6United Kingdom 12,313 11.5Australia 5,078 4.8W. Germany 2,400 2.2France 1,630 1.5Denmark 1,099 1.0Switzerland 628 0.5Netherlands 626 0.5Norway 574 0.5Hong Kong 505 0.4New Zealand 461 0.4Austria 424 0.3Sweden 336 0.3Spain 251 0.2

* The total number of boat refugees resettled from Hong Kong from 1975through 1985 was 106,907. This column represents the percentage of thattotal resettled by each country during the decade.

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U.S. resettlement opportunities are declining for domestic political

reasons but also because the pool of "eligible" cases has gotten smaller. The

United States does not resettle refugees from Bong Kong unless they have prior

ties to this country. Presently, fewer and fewer refugees arrive in Hong Kong

who have any U.S. connection, except for one important group. Former inmates

or escapees of re-education camps continue to turn up in Hong Kong. Many of

these refugees suffered the indignities and brutal treatment of these camps

precisely because of their U.S. ties. Therefore, the United States bears a

special responsibility to see that these unfortunate individuals receive

opportunities for resettlement.

Refugees without prior U.S. ties are not 'eligible* for U.S. resettlement

because of a State Department administrative decision which excludes those

Southeast Asian refugees in Priority six (P-6).from U.S. processing. The P-6

category is a U.S. government classification for refugees who do not have U.S.

ties. Such people are perfectly legitimate refugees who, for whatever reason

they left Vietnam, cannot return. Currently, some 3,400 of the refugees in

Hong Kong fall into that category.

Each country has its own resettlement criteria, none of which makes it

easy for boat refugees to find new homes elsewhere. Canada, unlike the United

States, has an open quota system, but family/group sponsorships play a key

role in determining, and thus limiting, eligibility. In Australia, criteria

for resettlement include a minimum of education and English speaking ability.

Macao's Ka Ho Refugee Camp

On the southern coast of Coloane island in the Portuguese territory of

Macao, about fifty miles from Hong Kong, 679 boat refugees from Vietnam live

in Ka Ho Refugee Camp. Most (90 percent) are ethnic Chinese, and many spent

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time in the southern Chinese provinces of Guangdong, Gwangxi and Yunnan before

coming to Macao. Some 95 percent of those left in the camp came from northern

Vietnam. The detour through China complicates claims for refugee status, as

technically the PRC was their country of first asylum. Furthermore, China has.

absorbed 260,000 since the 1979 war--primarily ethnic Chinese refugees from

Vietnam, most of whom (approximately 230,000) arrived at one time in 1979.

No new arrivals have been allowed to come ashore in Macau since October

1982. Apparently, an agreement exists between Macao and Hong Kong authorities

that the latter will handle cases of new arrivals. Thus, when new boat people

arrive in Macao, they are directed to keep sailing for Hong Kong. Some

reportedly have continued, heading for Taiwan and the Philippines.

UNECR and Macao government departments contribute assistance and resources

for the refugees' welfare, and Catholic Relief Services administers Ka Ho

camp. A number of refugees have jobs in Macao, while others work in the camp

engaged in such activities as making artificial flowers for commercial sale.

Refugees in Ka Ho have fewer resettlement prospects under current rules

than do those in some of the other camps, largely because of their North

Vietnamese origins. It has been some time--more than a year--since any

refugees were resettled from this camp. Some officials think that eventually

they will be absorbed into Macao. The new government in Portugal elected in

February is expected to appoint a new governor to Macao who may be more

inclined to seek a resolution to the plight of the refugees in Ka Ho camp.

Recommendations--A Time for Shared Responsibility

Despite some positive changes in the closed camps during the past several

months and plans that Jubilee Camp will be closed, a fundamental reality

remains for the boat people in the Hong Kong camps: their hopes and desires

to begin their lives anew in a free country become dimmer and more remote with

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each passing day. The international community has a responsibility to address

the needs and wishes of these refugees; they ought not be allowed to languish

in camps, seeing their lives pass meaninglessly and watching their children

grow to face a future empty of promise.

The government of Hong Kong faces a host of complex decisions as it

prepares for its post-1997 change in political status. Among the tests of the

humanity of a nation, perhaps the best is how it treats the disenfranchised,

the voiceless. Hong Kong must be encouraged to remember the human rights of

the refugees in its midst and to take care that their .rights to continued

protection be respected until a permanent solution can be found for them.

After many months of no movement on this issue, recently some favorable

developments have taken place. The U.K. government has agreed to take 500

more and the Hong Kong government has agreed to absorb 250 more, mostly ethnic

Chinese. The United States has determined to take as many as last

year--1,600--rather than a smaller number, as had been anticipated. Australia

has taken action--restoring the number it will take to 800 after cutting it

down to 600. Sweden has agreed to take 100, Canada is taking 50 more,

Luxembourg and New Zealand are taking 10 each. These positive moves need to

-8continue with other countries taking part.

International pressure needs to be brought to bear on Vietnam to compel

its government to change the policies which cause refugee flight. As the

country generating boat refugees, Vietnam has key role in alleviating this

problem. No matter what other countries do to solve the refugee dilemma, if

Vietnam does not cooperate, refugees will continue to flee and the resolution

of their situation will remain elusive.

The U.S. government should agree to begin resettlement of those in the P-6

category. Because there are a sizable number in this category--more than 30

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percent of the total--their resettlement would substantially relieve the

refugee burden in Hong Kong. This action alone would be the best encourage-

ment for other resettlement countries to consider taking those who remain.

The Vietnamese boat refugees in Hong Kong have lived in limbo for too

long. It is time to end their suffering and give them an opportunity to begin

new lives with dignity. The United States is an indispensable part of the

solution--if there is to be one.

Notes

1. China relinquished Hong Kong to the British in three stages: the Treatyof Nanking in 1842 ceded Hong Kong Island(32 sq. miles), which was added toin 1860 by the Kowloon Peninsula (3.75 sq. miles) under the First Conventionof Peking. The New Territories--the largest part of Hong Kong (365 sq. miles)--were acquired in 1898 under a 99-year lease.

2. Factors that account for fewer boat refugees include the following: TheOrderly Departure Program; a more effective security system preventingdeparture from Vietnam; boat shortages in Vietnam; rumors of brutal pirateattacks in the South China Sea; and awareness of lessened hospitality by firstasylum countries. See Joseph Cerquone, "Malaysia--Landing Point, Not Home,for Most Vietnamese Boat People,* Refugee Reports, Vol. IV, No. 12, June 17,1983, p. 3; Leo Dorsey, "Growth in Orderly Departure Program Brings Potentialand Problems,* Refugee Reports, Vol. V, Nos. 7 & 8, May 18, 1984, p. 2.

3. Hong Kong does have an agreement with the PRC under which Chinese from themainland are granted permanent settlement rights in Hong Kong. The number was28,034 in 1984, and 27,260 in 1985. In fact, most of the colony's populationcan be described as refugees arriving at one time or another from mainlandChina.

4. This figure takes into account births and deaths among the refugee pop-ulation: 5,002 births and 506 deaths have been reported since January 1, 1979.

5. UNHCR calls these active cases--cases for which no submissions have beenmade or which have been submitted and rejected by at least one resettlementcountry.

6. Under U.S. law, narcotics users are inadmissible to the United States evenas refugees unless they are granted a waiver by the attorney general.

7. Refugee Action News. Derby, England, Winter 1985.

8. Interview with Ken Woodhouse, Hong Kong government official, February 12,1986; South China Morning Post, February 18, 1986.