THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH COURT...
Transcript of THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE HIGH COURT...
Page 1 of 19
THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CV 2014 -02841
CV 2014 – 02842
(Consolidated Claims)
CV 2014 - 02841
Between
Ricardo Jack
Claimant
And
The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
Defendant
AND
CV 2014 - 02842
Between
Peter Griffith
Claimant
And
The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
Defendant
Before the Honourable Mr Justice Ronnie Boodoosingh
Page 2 of 19
Appearances:
Mr Cedric Neptune and Mr Kayode Saunders for the Claimants
Ms Keisha Prosper, Ms Ronelle Hinds, Ms Sasha Sukhram, Mr Brent James, Ms Sunita Roberts
and Ms Janine Joseph for the Defendants
Dated: 20 July 2016
JUDGMENT
1. In the early morning of 26 August 2012 Tevin Alexander was found dead at the side of
the road at Cedar Hill, Claxton Bay. The police began an investigation. Both claimants
were arrested. They were each held for two and a half days. They were released. No
charges were brought against them. Someone else was charged. That person is before
the court for murder. These two claimants sued the State for false imprisonment. Their
claims were consolidated.
Law
2. The police must have reasonable and probable cause to arrest someone. Section 3(4) of
the Criminal Law Act Ch. 10:04 states:
“Where a police officer, with reasonable cause suspects that an arrestable offence
has been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom he, with
reasonable cause, suspects to be guilty of the offence.”
3. Murder is an arrestable offence. In Nigel Lashley v The Attorney General of Trinidad
and Tobago, Civil Appeal No. 267 of 2011, delivered 25 July 2013, Narine JA said this:
“14. It is well settled that the onus is on the police to establish reasonable and
probable cause for the arrest: Dallison v. Caffery (1964) 2 All ER 610 at 619 D per
Diplock LJ. The test for reasonable and probable cause has a subjective as well as an
objective element. The arresting officer must have an honest belief or suspicion that
Page 3 of 19
the suspect had committed an offence, and this belief or suspicion must be based on
the existence of objective circumstances, which can reasonably justify the belief or
suspicion. A police officer need not have evidence amounting to a prima facie case.
Hearsay information including information from other officers may be sufficient to
create reasonable grounds for arrest as long as that information is within the
knowledge of the arresting officer: O’Hara v. Chief Constable (1977) 2 WLR 1;
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th ed.) para. 13-53. The lawfulness of the arrest is to
be judged at the time of the arrest.”
4. Further, in Ramsingh v the Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago [2012] UKPC
16 Lord Clarke said:
“8. The relevant principles are not significantly in dispute and may be summarised as
follows:
i) The detention of a person is prima facie tortious and an infringement
of section 4(a) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago.
ii) It is for the arrestor to justify the arrest.
iii) A police officer may arrest a person if, with reasonable cause, he
suspects that the person concerned has committed an arrestable
offence.
iv) Thus the officer must subjectively suspect that that person has
committed such an offence.
v) The officer’s belief must have been on reasonable grounds or, as
some of the cases put it, there must have been reasonable and
probable cause to make the arrest.
vi) Any continued detention after arrest must also be justified by the
detainer.
9. These principles are established by a series of cases, both in England and in the
Caribbean. See in particular Dallison v Caffery [1964] 2 All ER 610, per Lord
Denning MR at 617 and per Diplock LJ, in a well-known passage at 619; and
Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] 1 All ER 1054 per Lord Diplock at 1059. See
also two decisions in Trinidad and Tobago which make it clear that the lawfulness of
continued detention raises different questions from those relevant to the arrest: Mauge
v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago HCA No 2524 of 1997 and
Mungaroo v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago HCA Nos S-1130 and
1131 of 1998.
Page 4 of 19
10. The position after arrest in England is now to be found in Part IV of the Police
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”): see section 34. Section 37(2) provides
that, where a person is arrested without a warrant and the custody officer does not
have sufficient evidence to charge him, the person arrested must be released either
with or without bail “unless the custody officer has reasonable grounds for believing
that his detention without being charged is necessary to secure or preserve evidence
relating to an offence for which he is under arrest or to obtain such evidence by
questioning him.”
As Clayton and Tomlinson put it in their Law of Human Rights, 2nd edition (2009), at
para 10.56, the police must justify detention on a minute by minute basis.
11. Although PACE does not directly apply in Trinidad and Tobago, section 37(2)
reflects the correct approach at common law. Thus in the instant case the person who
decided to continue the appellant’s detention pending the obtaining of a report upon
the medical state of the victim must have had reasonable grounds for believing that
the appellant’s detention without being charged was necessary pending the securing
of that evidence.”
5. In Trevor Williamson v The Attorney General [2014] UKPC 29 Lord Kerr, in respect
of the idea of detaining for questioning, stated:
“19. Mr Beharrylal conceded that Mr Williamson had been arrested at his home on 28
July 2004. The Board considers that this concession was correctly made. In the first
place in his witness statement, Mr Williamson himself said that he had been arrested.
Secondly, Constable Caldeira gave evidence that he went with other officers to Mr
Williamson’s home to “make the arrest”, although a short time later he said that Mr
Williamson was not in fact arrested but was “detained for questioning”. It is, of
course, the position that there is no power to “detain for questioning”. The power to
arrest is contained in section 3(4) of the Criminal Law Act, chapter 10:04 which
provides that where “a police officer, with reasonable cause, suspects that an
arrestable offence has been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom
he, with reasonable cause suspects to be guilty of the offence.” There is no statutory
power to detain solely for the purpose of questioning.
20. It is clear that, however Constable Caldeira chose to describe it, Mr Williamson’s
detention and his being taken into custody amounted to an arrest. The plain fact of the
matter is that Mr Williamson was detained and was under compulsion to come to the
police station and he knew the reasons that this was required of him. That was, as Mr
Beharrylal accepted, sufficient to constitute a valid arrest. As Viscount Simon put it
in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, 587-588, “The requirement that the person
arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if
Page 5 of 19
the circumstances are such that he must know the general nature of the alleged
offence for which he is detained … a person is … required to submit to restraints on
his freedom if he knows in substance the reason why it is claimed that this restraint
should be imposed.”
6. The court must consider what was in the officer’s mind. His suspicions can be based on
what he is told or information given to him anonymously. In O’Hara v Chief Constable
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1996] NI 8 the headnote reads in part:
“Whether such information provided reasonable grounds for the officer’s suspicion
depended on its source and context, viewed in the light of the whole surrounding
circumstances.”
7. In Cummings and Others v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police [2003] EWCA
1844 Latham LJ noted:
41. In my view, there is nothing in principle which prevents opportunity from
amounting to reasonable grounds for suspicion. Indeed in some circumstances
opportunity may be sufficient to found a conviction. That would be the case where
the prosecution can prove that no one else had the opportunity to commit the offence.
The question in the present case is whether opportunity is sufficient to be reasonable
grounds for suspecting six people when the likelihood is that it was only one or
perhaps two of those six who were responsible. Again there can be nothing in
principle wrong with arresting more than one person even if the crime can only have
been committed by one person: see Hussein. Where a small number of people can be
clearly identified as the only ones capable of having committed the offence, I see no
reason why that cannot afford reasonable grounds for suspecting each of them of
having committed that offence, in the absence of any information which could or
should enable the police to reduce the number further.
8. In Fayed v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2004] EWCA 1579 it was noted
by Auld LJ:
“82...In any event, cases such as these, where the subject's loss of liberty is known to
be for a relatively short period for the purpose of an interview to which he was, in any
event, prepared to submit, and which may or may not lead to him being charged, do
Page 6 of 19
not seem a logical or proportionate basis for narrowing the Wednesbury
reasonableness test for exercise of the power to arrest - certainly not so as to
substitute for it a test of necessity. However, that is not to dismiss the possibility that
Wednesbury-plus reasonableness in this context might approach the test of necessity
where the intrusion on a person's liberty is of an egregious and/or public a nature and
/or for such length of time and/or accompanied with harsh treatment.
[83] With those observations in mind it may be helpful for me to set out a number of,
mostly unoriginal, propositions that I derive from the authorities:
1) In determining all Castorina questions the state of mind is that of the arresting
officer, subjective as to the first question, the fact of his suspicion, and objective as to
the second and third questions, whether he had reasonable grounds for it and whether
he exercised his discretionary power of arrest Wednesbury reasonably.
2) It is for the police to establish the first two Castorina requirements, namely that an
arresting officer suspected that the claimant had committed an arrestable offence and
that he had reasonable grounds for his submission - Holgate Mohammed, per Lord
Diplock at 441F-H, and Plange, per Parker LJ.
3) If the police establish those requirements, the arrest is lawful unless the claimant
can establish on Wednesbury principles that the arresting officer's exercise or non-
exercise of his power of arrest was unreasonable, the third Castorina question -
Holgate-Mohammed, per Lord Diplock at 446A-D; Plange, per Parker LJ; and
Cumming, per Latham LJ at para. 26.
4) The requirement of Wednesbury reasonableness, given the burden on the claimant
to establish that the arresting officer's exercise or non-exercise of discretion to arrest
him was unlawful, may, depending on the circumstances of each case, be modified
where appropriate by the human rights jurisprudence to some of which I have
referred, so as to narrow, where appropriate, the traditionally generous ambit of
Wednesbury discretion - Cumming, per Latham LJ at para 26....
5) It is a legitimate, but not on that account necessarily Wednesbury reasonable use of
the power, to arrest in order to interview and/or to seek further evidence - s 37(2) and,
Holgate-Mohammed, per Lord Diplock at 445E-G.
6) It may be Wednesbury reasonable to use the s 24(6) power of arrest as a means of
exercising some control over a suspect with a view to securing a confession or other
information where there is a need to bring matters to a head speedily, for example to
Page 7 of 19
preserve evidence or to prevent the further commission of crime - see eg Cumming,
per Latham LJ at para 44.
The Evidence of Ricardo Jack
9. Jack gave evidence and called his mother as a witness. He said he was arrested around
11.30 am on Sunday 26 August 2012 at Homicide Office San Fernando and then at the
Couva Police Station. He was released on Tuesday 28 August at 11.30 pm. Before the
incident he had not been convicted of any offence.
10. He said Tevin was his cousin. He had gone to a party with some friends and Tevin on 25
August 2012 at Side Bar, Claxton Bay. Sometime in the morning Tevin was found dead.
About 3.25 am Jack got some information and went up to the Cedar Hill Road, a short
distance away. He saw an ambulance. He did not see any police officers at that time. He
stayed there a while. Then a friend dropped him off at his aunt’s place in San Fernando.
At the time he lived in Claxton Bay. About 10.30 am his mother called him and told him
the police were looking for him. He went up to the Homicide Office about 11.30 am. He
told them who he was. Two police officers told him they were investigating Tevin’s
death. He was not cautioned and told of his rights. He told the police he was not
involved in the death of Tevin. Sergeant Halls interviewed him between 1.00 and 3.00
pm. He did not get the chance to speak to a lawyer before the interview. He told the
police he was liming with Tevin but he did not know how he died. The police told him
they wanted the clothes he was wearing. He was taken to his home and they took one of
his boxer shorts. They also swabbed him. He was then taken to the Couva Police
Station. There he was placed in a dirty cell, smelling of urine and faeces. He slept on the
concrete floor. He was not allowed to bathe or brush his teeth. There were cockroaches.
He felt humiliated and embarrassed and has suffered stress, and disgrace. On 27 August
his attorney came and spoke to him about 8.15 pm. He was released on 28 August. The
only interview he gave was on Sunday from 1:00 pm to 3:00 pm.
11. His mother Barbara Toby-Cummings gave evidence that her sister in law contacted her
and told her the police were looking for her son Ricardo Jack. This was Sunday morning.
She called him. After 30 hours had passed and he was in custody she was worried. She
contacted an attorney to visit him. She paid the attorney $2,500.00 for his visit to the
police station.
Page 8 of 19
Cross Examination
12. Jack said he willingly went to the police station when his mother called him and told him
the police were looking for him. He said he willingly gave the statement and
accompanied the police to his house. He said he was told he was a suspect. Curiously it
was put to him that he was not under arrest at homicide office that Sunday morning. If he
was not under arrest, then the question arises why was he detained?
The Evidence of Peter Griffith
13. Griffith is a 30 year old security guard. He was a customs clerk at the time of his arrest.
He had never been arrested or charged with any offence before. He was held from 10.30
am on Sunday 26 August 2012 to 11:30 pm on Tuesday 28 August 2012. He went to the
party with the deceased and friends at Side Bar, Claxton Bay on the night of 25 August.
In the early morning he found out the deceased was dead. He went up the road to Cedar
Hill and saw the deceased on the ground dead. He saw an ambulance. He did not know
how he had died. He was home sleeping about 10:30 am. Police came. He was asked his
name. The police asked for his clothes. He gave it to them. One of the officers said they
were investigating Tevin’s death. He was arrested. His hands and the back of his ears
were swabbed. They arrested him. He told them he was not involved in the death of
Tevin. He was not cautioned nor told of his rights. He was taken to Mon Repos Police
Station. He was placed in a dirty cell. He was told he was on inquiries and was a murder
suspect. He repeatedly told the officers he was not involved in the death of Tevin and did
not know how he died. He was interviewed by officers of the Homicide Bureau on
Monday 27 August 2012 between 3:00 pm to 6:00 pm by Officer Hosein. His mother
was present. No lawyer visited him. He spoke to no lawyer before his interview. On 28
August Mr Neptune visited him at the police station about 8.05 pm. He was told his
father paid $2,500.00 for him to visit.
14. Griffith said he was released about 11:30 pm when the police told him he was free to go.
He had to sleep on the concrete floor. Before the interview he was allowed to bathe. He
felt humiliated, embarrassed and disgraced.
Page 9 of 19
15. His mother Joan Griffith gave evidence. She confirmed the police came on Sunday
morning. They asked for his clothes. She saw them swab him. She did not hear them
tell him of his rights or caution him. They took him away. She took something for him
to eat that day. She got a call on Monday 27 August he would be interviewed and to
attend the interview. She went at 2:45 pm and was present for the interview. She
contacted his father the next day and they got Mr Neptune to visit him.
Cross Examination
16. Griffith said that night he was not aware the police had found blood in the white AD
wagon. He did not know Antonio, Tevin’s brother, was charged for his murder. He said
Antonio was with them that night. He said he did not touch Tevin when he saw him in
blood. Others had. They could have walked from where they were to where the gun shot
was fired. He accepted he was with Tevin shortly before he was killed.
Defendant’s Evidence
17. The evidence for the defendant consisted of Assistant Superintendent Sharon Cooper,
Sergeant Ashley Mongroo and PC Nishad Hosein.
18. Superintendent Cooper stated she was an Acting Inspector at Homicide on 26 August
2012. She received a call from a junior officer about the murder of Tevin Alexander.
She went on the scene. She spoke to the senior officer there, Corporal Mongroo. Her
role was supervisory. While there a man came up to her. He had come out of a vehicle.
He did not want to give his name. He told her the deceased was liming with some men
from the area. He gave her information about a white AD Wagon. The man gave some
names including one Linton Barclay. He provided information of where the vehicle
could be located. They then went to Valley Road Extension Diamond Road, Claxton Bay
where they saw the AD wagon. She saw blood on the hood of an AD wagon. A man
came out. It was Barclay. He said he was the driver of the vehicle. He gave her keys.
She opened it. She saw blood on the floor and panel door. She was told that one Ryan
Toby was one of the men liming with Tevin. She got information about where he lived.
That morning they visited Peter Griffith’s home. He was taken to Mon Repos Police
Station.
Page 10 of 19
19. Ashley Mongroo was on duty when a report was received. He went to the scene at Cedar
Hill. Inspector Cooper gave him information obtained from the informant. He went in
search of the AD Wagon. He saw blood on it. He met the owner, Barclay. He met Ryan
Toby. He got information that both Griffith and Jack were with the deceased a short time
before his death. They went to Griffith’s home a little later in the day. Griffith was told
that he was with Tevin before his death. Mongroo told him of his rights but did not
caution him. They got his clothing he was wearing the day before. He gave evidence,
which was puzzling, that Griffith was not cautioned because “police officers are not
required to caution persons in the absence of evidence against them”. Griffith was told of
his constitutional rights by PC Hosein.
20. On Mongroo’s return to Mon Repos Police Station he was told by Sergeant Halls that
Halls had interviewed Jack. He went with Jack to his home. This was around 4.10 pm
when they left. Mongroo met Jack’s grandmother there. He asked the grandmother for
Jack’s clothes. She said she had burnt it. This raised an “aura of suspicion” in his mind.
He also retrieved a pair of blood stained boxer shorts. He told the grandmother that Jack
would be detained at the Couva Police Station.
21. On 27 August 2012 Mongroo reported for duty. He detailed officers to take statements
from other persons who were detained at various stations. He conducted an interview
with Ryan Toby between 11:45 am to 6:00 pm. He saw from the records that PC Hosein
had interviewed Griffith between 3:00 pm and 6:00 pm.
22. The next day the post mortem report was done. He went to Claxton Bay to confirm
information given by the detainees in their statements. He compiled a file. He was told
by Superintendent Harry that the claimants were released on 28 August 2012.
23. Nishad Hosein, a police constable at the Homicide Bureau, also gave evidence. He
confirmed what Copper and Mongroo said. He said he told Griffith of his rights at his
home. They took him with them. They later proceeded to Jack’s residence. He was not
at home. At Mon Repos, Sergeant Hall told them Jack was with Tevin shortly before his
death. They decided to go for his clothes. He said at this time “Jack was still a civilian
assisting us with our investigations”. The grandmother at his home told them she had
burnt the clothes. He found this suspicious.
Page 11 of 19
24. On 27 August 2012 Hosein reported for duty. He went to Gasparillo Police Station on
orderly duty. He returned with a detainee. He went to Mon Repos. He told Griffith of
his intention to record a statement. Hosein told Griffith he could have a legal adviser or a
relative or friend present. Griffith elected to have his mother be present. Hosein made
the arrangements. He also arranged for Griffith to have a bath. He recorded the
statement between 3:00 pm and 6:00 pm. In that statement Griffith indicated he was
liming with Ryan Toby and he was with the deceased a short time before his death. On
28 August Hosein was on sentry duty at Homicide.
Cross examination
25. Assistant Superintendent Cooper said certain persons were arrested including Peter
Griffith. She said she had information about him. She did not have evidence against
him. She did not give instructions to arrest him. She said she had received the
information. She saw no need for her to personally tell him the information. She,
however, was not aware of how Jack came into custody.
26. Officer Hosein said he went with the other police officers to Jack’s home. He said Jack
could have left homicide if he wanted, but he did not tell him so. He said Corporal
Mongroo had spoken to Jack’s grandmother, Dorian Toby. He, Hosein, did not speak to
her. He said Mongroo told him certain things after speaking to the grandmother. He,
Hosein, then arrested him. But he was not arrested because he was a suspect. He said
they had reasonable cause that “he had information to assist”. This was based on credible
information. He did not ask the grandmother why she had burnt the clothes or whether
Jack had told her to do so. He considers now that would have been relevant. He said
Jack was a “person of interest”. He accepted that the station diary had Jack described as
a suspect. He then said Jack could not have left if he wanted to. There were other
persons the police were getting information from. He said his only credible information
was that the grandmother had burnt the clothes. He said they arrested several persons.
He was aware Jack came in voluntarily. He said Inspector Cooper instructed him to
arrest Jack. Inspector Cooper also instructed him to arrest Griffith. He had conducted no
inquiries before he arrested Griffith. He said he told Griffith of his rights.
27. Alarmingly, Hosein said he would not agree that there is a need for a proper investigation
before an arrest. He said there was not sufficient evidence to charge them. He had not
Page 12 of 19
read Jack’s statement until after he was released. Hosein said he had no evidence to
arrest them but he had information. He said evidence would have made them a suspect.
28. Ashley Mongroo said Griffith was not a suspect but a “person of interest”. He said no
one gave instructions to arrest him. He then said the claimants were suspected of having
committed an arrestable offence. He said Toby, Wright, Barclay and Griffith were
arrested. He said Jack was not under arrest before they went to his home. He said you
cannot arrest any person if you think he had information that can assist with
investigation. Something more than that, would be needed. He said he had information,
not evidence, to detain them for the two days. He did not ask the grandmother why she
had burnt the clothes or if Jack had told her to do so. He said Antonio confessed to
having a firearm and that he shot deceased. As a result of this confession Jack was no
longer a person of interest. He had no evidence to hold him. He had them in custody
because the police could have kept them in custody. He repeated that the claimants were
“persons of interest”. He defined a person of interest at the Homicide Bureau as one
where “we have reliable information to show that person may have been involved in a
homicide”.
The Statements Given by Griffith and Jack to the Police
29. The statement recorded from Griffith showed that he had been with Tevin that night. At
some point a white wagon had pulled up. He saw Tevin talking to the driver for a while.
Then Tevin got in to the wagon. About 20 minutes after, he heard a gunshot. A man in a
passing Corolla told them something had happened further up the road. They went up
and saw that Tevin was shot. Ricardo Jack was holding him to see if he was alive and
telling him Tevin, get up. They were all crying.
30. Jack’s statement said they were all liming before. Tevin was with his brother Antonio,
liming also. There was a scuffle at the bar and people started to run out. He left with
Peter Griffith and others. They were walking, including Tevin. A vehicle picked him up.
He couldn’t remember who went in the vehicle with him but others did. He dropped out
and was walking into where he lived. Somebody said Tevin dead. He started to cry and
ran up the road. He saw Tevin. He held him. He got blood on his clothes from doing
this. He said he had heard Tevin used to have firearms, but he never saw him with any.
Page 13 of 19
31. Both statements were therefore exculpatory. They admitted to being with Tevin earlier
but were not present when he was shot. They both admitted to going up and seeing him.
Jack said he touched the body and got blood on his clothes. Griffith did not touch Tevin.
32. Also to be noted is that neither of these statements were caution statements. They were
flat statements with no indication that the claimants were being interviewed as suspects,
that they were cautioned, or told of their constitutional rights.
Issues
33. The two main issues were:
(1) Was there reasonable and probable cause for the arrest of each claimant?
(2) If there was reasonable and probable cause, was each detention too long in the
circumstances?
Findings
34. My first observation on the evidence is that the police in this matter were completely
confused about what was the status of these claimants. The claimants were described as
“suspects”, as “persons of interest”, as “not suspects”. The police officers were
contradictory about if the claimants were under arrest or not. At times it was expressed
that they were free to leave. At other times it was said they were not. It was said Jack
was arrested, but not as a suspect. Even the State attorney at one stage appeared to be
unsure since it was put to Jack he was not under arrest on the Sunday morning.
35. I find as a fact that howsoever the police described the claimants, as in the Williamson
case above, they were both arrested on Sunday 26 August 2012 in the morning. Jack was
arrested when he went to the police station voluntarily. Griffith was arrested at his home.
Page 14 of 19
36. Howsoever described, they were both suspects. If they were not, then the police would
have acted in a completely arbitrary manner in denying the claimants their liberty.
37. Having accepted they had been arrested, the first task is to decide if there was reasonable
and probable cause for their arrest.
38. Applying the Cummings case, opportunity to commit a crime can in an appropriate case
be a sufficient reason to arrest. It all depends on the context.
39. In this case the offence was murder. The both claimants were in the company of Tevin
within half hour of his death. There were a limited number of persons in that category.
They both fell into the category of half a dozen or fewer persons. True, their explanation
was that he had left them. But having received credible information which led to the
vehicle in which Tevin was in, and having also received credible information about who
was among the last with him, it would have been reasonable in my view to have arrested
the claimants as suspects, from which arrest they could then be questioned under caution.
Notwithstanding the obvious flip flopping and confusion by the police officers it is clear
that they considered both claimants to be suspects.
40. Furthermore, in respect of Jack, they had interviewed him shortly after his arrest. When
he was taken to his home, one suspicious fact came to light. It was that Jack’s
grandmother had burnt his clothes. This must have excited in the minds of the arrestors
cause for suspicion. And how would the grandmother have known or thought to burn it?
One explanation is that it may have had some incriminating evidence on it. Another
explanation could be it was done in panic. It may have been done with Jack’s knowledge,
or not. But this would have to be carefully considered and tested first.
41. Additionally, his clothing which was handed over had blood on it. This suggested he was
in contact with the deceased. It would have merited further investigation by way of
analysing and testing the version by whatever else the investigation revealed.
Page 15 of 19
42. I accepted that the police considered the both claimants to be suspects. The arresting
officers must have honestly believed that they had been involved in the commission of an
arrestable offence.
43. I also find that there were reasonable grounds for them so considering. Both subjectively
and objectively therefore the police officers met the test.
44. With regard to Griffith, the arrest posed a different difficulty. He was not interviewed
until 3 pm on the following day, approximately 29 hours after his arrest. A weak
explanation can be discerned from putting together the pieces from the different versions
of the police. However, in the context of this case, where all they had against Griffith
was that he was among the last seen with Tevin, greater alacrity was clearly needed in
interviewing him. This was to get any version he wished to advance and to test whatever
version he gave against what else the police knew.
45. Had Griffith been interviewed on Sunday and the police then had taken a reasonable time
to verify his explanation, there would likely have been no need to keep him until 11.30
pm on Tuesday 28 August.
46. In making the finding that they had reasonable cause, however, I am mindful that all they
had on the claimants was that they had opportunity and had been among the last to be
with the deceased. It is also clear from the questions posed to them that they had some
information about Antonio Alexander, the person eventually charged with Tevin’s
murder, because specific questions were asked of them about what kind of person
Antonio was and the nature of the relationship between him and Tevin. This suggests
that the police did have a clear lead, but they may have wanted to verify if others were
involved and if there had been participation by others as a joint enterprise or as
accessories to an arrestable offence.
47. The next matter however goes to the length of the detention. This case is different from
the Williamson case. The matter of the length of the detention has been raised in both
the pleadings and cross-examination and has been addressed in submissions. The police
have given an account of what they were engaged in, unsatisfactory though it is.
Page 16 of 19
48. The court has to look at all the circumstances to decide on the reasonableness of the
detention. From the evidence of the police officers about 4 to 6 persons were held. This
took place on the Sunday since the men lived in the same area. They apparently were
taken to different locations to avoid collusion. It would have been reasonable to expect
that by the end of Sunday statements should have been taken from the detained men. The
better part of the next day could then be reasonably spent comparing their versions and
verifying their stories. The evidence is that neither claimant was approached to give a
further statement or to clarify anything. Thus nothing arose from their statements that
required anything further to be put to them.
49. During the course of the Sunday and Monday also, the police ought reasonably have been
attempting to speak to other persons who may have had information. By the end of the
following day then, which was Monday 27, the police ought to have been in a position to
make whatever determination that they had to regarding the claimants.
50. The police have not advanced any evidence that they were actively involved in verifying
the versions given by the claimants. There was nothing further being done regarding
them. I have already indicated that in the case of Griffith they ought reasonably to have
interviewed him well before the time he was. There is no evidence that during this time
the police were engaged in gathering evidence or information on Griffith.
51. There is also no evidence from the police that the continued detention of the claimants
was necessary to preserve evidence since swabs and clothing had already been taken.
There is also nothing to suggest that it was necessary to prevent concealment of evidence
or to prevent witness intimidation or the like as contemplated by the Cummings case
above.
52. In the circumstances, I hold that any detention of the claimants beyond the night of
Monday 27 August was unreasonable and unlawful. It is to be noted that the police
always had the option of releasing the claimants and re-arresting them later on if it
became necessary or if they received further information or evidence against them. In
this case neither claimant evinced any intention to evade the police. Jack came in to the
police station voluntarily and Griffith was arrested having been sleeping at his home.
Page 17 of 19
53. They both voluntarily gave statements to the police detailing their version. They
demonstrated that they were co-operative up to that point. There is nothing to suggest
that they could not be found if released.
Damages
54. I therefore next turn to damages for their unlawful detention from the night of 27 August,
a period of 24 hours. The claimants say they were in dirty cells (separately) that smelled
of faeces and urine. First, there is no contrary evidence by the defendant of the condition
of the cells in which the claimants were kept. While police cells are not required to be
luxurious, they must meet basic acceptable standards to detain persons in. I accept that
the conditions as stated by the both claimants in their witness statements were less than
acceptable given the evidence that the cells were not cleaned and smelled filthy. Griffith
says he was allowed to bathe on the Monday. Jack said he was not. They slept on the
floor. They must have been uncomfortable.
55. Given especially that they both had no convictions before, this episode must have been
embarrassing for them and would have injured their feelings and reputation. They were
arrested for murder, the most serious of offences. It was in respect of a person who was a
friend. Their liberty was denied: See Terrence Calix v The Attorney General of
Trinidad and Tobago [2013] UKPC 15. I have considered the awards made in the
cases cited and in particular in Kennty Mitchell v The Attorney General CV 2007 –
3220; CV 2007 – 01952 Stephen Lewis v The Attorney General; CV 2009 – 03089
Bisham Seegobin v The Attorney General; CV 2007 – 2686 Lennon Richardson v
The Attorney General.
56. Further, they were not afforded the opportunity to have duty counsel since arrangements
were not made by the police in breach of the Legal Aid and Advice Amendment Act,
No. 3 of 2012, section 15B. This is an aggravating factor.
57. I accepted the evidence by the police officers that they were told of their rights, although
curiously they were not cautioned. This failure to caution arose in my view from lack of
understanding on the part of the police rather than malice on their part.
Page 18 of 19
58. In all the circumstances an award of $50,000.00 compensation in respect of each claimant
is appropriate. I also accepted the claimants’ evidence that $2,500.00 each was paid for
legal fees to have an attorney at law visit them. They are each entitled to this sum as
special damages. Interest will run at 3% per annum in respect of both general and special
damages from the date of the filing of the claim forms on 5 August 2014 to the date of
judgment.
59. Prescribed costs are to be paid to both claimants by the defendant to include both general
and special damages and the interest calculated up to the date of judgment.
60. There are no circumstances here to merit an award of exemplary damages nor are there to
make an award for breach of constitutional rights.
Endnote to Police Officers
61. The evidence in this case has shown that there is a great deal of confusion among some
police officers about their powers. Just as in the Williamson case where it was made
clear that the police do not have the power to detain someone for questioning without
more, I note here that police officers have no power in this jurisdiction to detain a
category of persons labelled as “persons of interest”. It is either a person is a suspect or
not. The police have the power to arrest someone without a warrant whom they
reasonably suspect to have committed an arrestable offence.
62. When persons are arrested certain formalities must follow. They must be cautioned.
They must be told of their constitutional rights. If they are a suspect for the offence of
murder the police must comply with the requirements of the Legal Aid Act in terms of
duty counsel. The police only have power to arrest persons without a warrant who are
reasonably suspected to have committed an arrestable offence or in circumstances where
statute permits. They are not entitled to detain persons as “a person of interest”, “for
questioning” or to “assist with investigations”. Those concepts, which may apply in
other jurisdictions, are not part of our law. If someone is assisting with investigations
then such assistance must be voluntary, that is, they must be free to leave and they must
be told so. The police must be straightforward with persons under their control.
Page 19 of 19
63. Further, by variously describing persons as “persons of interest” or “being detained for
questioning” or “assisting with investigations”, the police are not allowed to deny
suspects the right to communicate with duty counsel.
64. They may detain such a person for only as long as is reasonable necessary to conduct or
complete any investigations or to lay a charge. When a person is arrested the police must
proceed as diligently as possible with their investigations to ensure the period of
detention is for the least time necessary. Where, having arrested a suspect on reasonable
grounds, it becomes clear that there is insufficient evidence to lay a charge the police
must release the person immediately. As Lord Clarke noted, the police must be able to
justify detention on a minute by minute basis. There is no set time allowed (such as 2
days or 4 days) for arresting someone unless this is provided for in statute for specific
offences. A shorter period than 2 days or one day or even hours can be held to be
unlawful in the context and circumstances of a case.
65. The police are advised to read and digest the cases on this point. A good starting point
will be the Williamson and Ramsingh cases referred to above. State attorneys must
provide guidance to police officers on powers they have and do not have since there are
too many cases which have come before the court where persons have been falsely
imprisoned.
Ronnie Boodoosingh
Judge