THE RECRUITMENT OFDIRECTORS OF THE LARGESTDUTCH FIRMS:A SPECIAL CASE?

,,,r,

J. bronkers ~~', I' ~ I

ABSTRACTIII''~'~

i ~i ' '~Elite colleges and universities exist in most modern societies and have often been ~ ~;'shown to play a significant role in the recruitment of elites. Yet such colleges and i ~ I

universities do not e~cist in the Netherlands. This raises the possibility of alternative imodes of recruitment of elites in the Netherlands. Through an analysis of the ~I, ii Í

careers of directors of the largest Dutch firms, it is found that education plays only 9 ; ! ;, ~ ~a small role in the recruitment of such elites. Other mechanisms, especially pro- if I ~'.motion within firms and along religious and/or political lines, seem more important. ICI ~'I ~One possible explanation of absence of elite education is the institutionalized '~I ~ Íi ' ibalance between several confessional—polirical groups, which prevents the rise of I'i~j,a hierazchy of confessional and public universities and offers other possibilities for ~ I'!recruitment of Dutch elites. A second possible explanation is the strong international ~ ;', ~. ,orientation of Dutch industry and trade, combined with the virtual absence of ~'i inationalized firms, which makes strong links with Dutch culture less important. ,

~! I~I I~ ,

Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, volume 4, pages 197-216. ~''; 'Copyright D 1985 by J~ Press Inc. ~ ~I~ ~AU rights of reproduction in any form reserved. IIIISBN: 0-89232-331-0

I~ ~Í;

197 ~ ~~'I~~~.II ~

Í'

198 J. DRONKERS

INTRODUCTION

j ~I This article reports on a study of the importance of education in the recruitmentÍ ! of directors of the largest Dutch firms. The recruitment of the Dutch directors

1' 7 !' ;' who occupy "peak" positions within the managerial and economic hierarchy~~ ' ~ can be interesting for sevèral reasons. First, the Netherlands is among the richest~ ' nations of the world and is the home base of several well-known multi-nationals

~ ~ (Philips, Unilever, Shell, etc.). Export of agrarian and industrial commodities{' ~ and of services and money has always been one of the main pillars of the Dutch

I~ ' i economy. This prominent economic position is maintained without a large in-~ ! ternal mazket monopolized by Dutch firms. This situation coincides with a strongly

~ i ~ developed Welfare-State, which some students and politicians tend to see as a

i; Í~ i contradiction to a strong economy. The quality of the Dutch products and services~ ! I and therefore of the men and women who have to produce and sell them, are

' , ~ of decisive importance for economic survival. Other narions, facing the samesituation, may be able to learn from the Dutch example.

~ Second, the Netherlands is a relatively stable bourgeois society witha ho-i ~ mogeneous culture since its establishment at the end of the sixteenth century.ii

There has been no important nobility, gentry or peasantry (such as in Germany,Great Britain, Sweden or France), whose power could challenge or modify the

~ ' ! ~ ~! power and culture of the Dutch bourgeoisie (first merchants and bankers, laterI ' iii i industrialists). There is no strongly organized working class with ananti-bour-

~~ geois sub-culture of its own. The main socialist movement has always been a

R ~, '~~ ;~ refornust one and a regular member ofcenter-left coalitions since 1945. A distinct'. '~ ! characteristic of Dutch society is its religious plurality as a consequence of its

~ ' I ; position on the front between the Catholics and Protestants during the religious~~ wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the relative religious tolerance~' of the ruling Protestant merchants during the following centuries and the insti-li tutionalized balance between several religious—political groups, organized in so-

' ' ~ called "Pillazs" during the nineteenth and twenrieth century. Four "Pillars" or;;!' ' institutionalized religious-political segments exist in Dutch society: Catholic,

II'~ Calvinist, Liberal and Socialist. These blocks live side by side, as disrinctlyseparate subcultural communities, each with its own political and social insti-tutions and with interaction and communication across bloc boundaries kept toa minimum (see for further information: Goudsblom (1967), Lijphart (1975) and

i ~ ~ van Schepdelen (1984)). The Dutch case can thus show some characteristics ofan elite-recruitment which has not been disturbed by revolutions, long lasring

~! occupations by foreign powers, civil war or other upheavals, i.e., elite-recruit-•, ~ ment in a "fnal" phase.

Third, it has been demonstrated several times (bronkers and De Jong, 1979)I that educational credentials have an important influence on the occupational

S

itrs

Yst~s:shi-ya;s•e~e

.e:rr-

;t:s~sei-

The Recruitment of Directors o~ the Largest Dutch Firms 199

attainment and mobility of the Dutch population as a whole. However, there areno elite colleges and universities in the Netherlands as in most modern societies(USA, Great Britain, France, Soviet Union). There is no Dutch institutionalizedequivalent, formal nor informal, of the NY-league, Oxbridge, the GrandesEcoles and the Universities of. Moscow or Leningrad. All thirteen Dutch uni-versities have the same student-staff ratios, nearly the same material budget, thesame rules for appointment of scientific and nonscienrific staff, etc. Of course,there are differences between faculties within these universities but these areinformal, temporal and (most important) can not become institutionalized toallow one to rise above the others. The equality of Dutch universities can beshown in many ways. Most telling is the use of anation-wide lottery for admissionto desired• studies, such as medicine, rather than locally-based selection proce-dures. Moreover, outside these universities there are no institutions for learningand research which are substitutes for the elite-university.Much the same thing holds for secondary education. Private schools, which

are more selective or demand higher fees than comparable public schools, donot exist in the Netherlands. Nearly all secondary schools are state-granted andobey the same nation-wide rules. Dutch secondary education is still a categorialsystem with an elaborated hierarchy of school-types (from lower vocational upto gymnasium) but without insritutionalized differences between schools withinthese school-types. There are no formal or informal equivalents of British publicschools like Eton, Harrow or Clarendon, of USA private schools like Groton,St. Pauls or St. Marks, of French private schools like 1'Ecole des Roches or LesGrands Lycées. The emigration of Dutch youth to foreign elite schools anduniversities is srill too small to be unportant.Many sociologists, such as Mills (1956), Domhoff (1967), Bourdieu and De

Saint Martin (1978), however, have stressed the important role of elite educarionfor the recruitment of elites and for the educational systems as a whole. Thisinvites several questions concerning the possible alternative roles of non-eliteschools in elite recruitment and the absence of elite colleges and universities inthe Netherlands and some other European countries.

This article, which is a predecessor of a lazge study by Beekenkamp (seeBeekenkamp and bronkers, 1980), wIll try to give some preliminary. answersto these questions on the role of education in Dutch elite recruitment. We willhave to limit ourselves to only one segment of the Dutch elite, viz. directors oflarge Dutch firms, due to the scarcity of data on the Dutch elites. A distinctcharacteristic of nearly all Dutch elites is their invisibility and their low-keyedpublic profile. They do not live in or buy "chateaux" or manors in the country-side; they are not raised to peerage; they have few well-known private andexclusive clubs for their own social life; they do not strive to be listed in the(noneJcistent) "Who's Who" or lists of the rich or famous; and they do notpublish (auto)biographies. As a consequence little is known of the Dutch elite.The few studies of Dutch elites focus almost entirely on interconnecrions bgitween

the economic elites (Helmets, Mokken, Plijter and Stokman, 1975; Fennemaand Schijf, 1979; Fennema, 1982; Stokman, et al., 1985). The only study onthe recruitment of directors of Dutch firms was done by Vinke (1961), a studentof the founding-father of Dutch mobility reseazch Van Heek. During the prep-aration-phase of the already menrioned study of Beekenkamp, we found theoriginal data of a survey, organized by a processional organization of directorsamong its members. We obtained pernussion to reanalyse these data.The aim of this article is first to describe the several dimensions which char-

acterize differences among the directors of the lazgest Dutch firrns. We hopethat this can show us something of the importance of education and of alternativerecruitment—mechanisms for different types of directors. Second, we elaborateon the importance of education in relation to other mechanisms of elite recruit-ment. On the basis of our results we discuss possible explanations for the absenceof Dutch elite education.

DUTCH DIRECTORS

The data

T'he Nederlands Centrum van Directeuren en Commissarissen (Dutch Centrefor Directors) NCD and its advisor Dr. Th.L. Stok gave us the data from asurvey of its members in 1967-68 on the life- and work-style of directors. TheNCD was established in 1953 as a form of personal cooperation of leaders offirms who aze faced with similar commercial and managerial problems. It is hazdto determine the representativeness of NCD—members of all Dutch directors orthe degree to which all directors of the holdings of the largest firms are NCD—members. Stok (1968:7) concluded from a comparison between these data andthose of Vinke (1961) that the average NCD—director of 1968 was younger,better educated, less religious—organized and less family-oriented than all Dutchdirectors at the end of the 1950's. It is our impression that NCD—members aremore~duectors of the subsidiary companies than of the pazent companies. Stoksent a written inquiry with over 120 precoded questions to the 1520 NCD—members in 1967. Seventy percent (1137) responded to the questionnaire. Stokconcludèd that the response was representative for all NCD—members. We re-moved 7 persons with inadequate data and 88 deputy-directors. Finally we se-lected only those directors who led firms with an annual turnover in 1967 of 50million guilders (14 million U.S. dollars) or more. This sample of 173 directorscan be regarded roughly as directors of the largest firms, corresponding to thosewhich are normally studied by researchers such as Bourdieu and De Saint-Martin(1978), Domhoff (1967), Mills (1956) and Stokman, Ziegler and Scott (1985).We selected variables from this study which could be used as indicators of

the characteristics of the involved firms, the cazeers of the directors, and their

1 !!L i~wi »........

individual chaelites. Theref~scarce. The nposition of a

fully only bycharacteristic;

and their firmrelevant onlyThis means tllarge firms tc(Bourdieu an

Table i shthese variableDutch societ}divided into idivisions aretwofold: relitthe Catholic:middle, lowéticularly in ttand the LoweDemocrats (]party-systemhad two, onefive parties ohave been ttend of the ntheir coaliticthe Netherlacasting coopwelfare rostmore indirecLiberals, "\olics and "~party emergeresulted frorolics and PrThe teleg

E§pecially ihigh proporis a high prof gravityAmsterdam

v~Rs

:nnemaudy onstudente prep-md theréctors

h chaz-e hopernative3boraterecruit-ibsence

Centrefrom ars. Theders ofis hard:tors orNCD—ata andHunger,. Dutchpers ares. StokNCD—~. StokWe re-we se-7 of 50rectors~ thoseMartin1985)..tors of~.d their

The Recruitment of Directors of the Largest Dutch Firms 201

individual characteristics. As already stated, we do not know much about Dutchelites. Therefore, clear grounds for including or excluding specific variables arescarce. The main notion guiding the selection of variables was that the socialposition of a director and its relations to other positions can not be describedfully only by the features of his firm and branch or only by the individualcharacteristics of the individual duector. The individual features of the directorsand their firms are therefore dealt with as relational characteristics, which becomerelevant only in the relations between the mutually competing firms and branches.This means that one has to analyze individual characteristics of the directors oflarge firms together and in relation to the features of their firms and branches(Bourdieu and De Saint-Martin [1978]).

Table 1 shows the final variables which were selected for analysis. Some ofthese variables can only make sense to the reader if he or she is familiaz withDutch society. As noted in the introduction, Dutch society has been traditionallydivided into four different and rather closed segments or pillazs (` ̀zuilen"). Thedivisions are based on religious and class cleavages. The religious cleavage istwofold: religious versus nonreligious people and, within the religious stratum,the Catholics versus the Calvinists. The class cleavage is in terms of upper-middle, lower-middle, and lower class. The two cleavages partly intersect, paz-ticularly in the nonreligious stratum, where antagonism exists between the upperand the lower "classes," in Dutch politics labeled Liberals (VVD) and Social-Democrats (PvdA) respectively. The social pillarization is reflected in the Dutchparty-system. Each of the groupings had iCs own leading political party. Calvinistshad two, one more upper-class (CHIT), the other more lower class (ARP). Thefive parties of the four blocks dominated the political scene. The religious partieshave been the most important members of each coalition-government since theend of the nineteenth century, choosing in turn liberals or social-democrats astheir coalition—partners. These religious parties are by the "Pillar" structure ofthe Netherlands connected with religious-oriented trade-unions, papers, broad-casting cooperations, schools, universities, employers' organizations, health andwelfare institutions, etc. The most widely read Dutch weeklies are also (butmore indirectly) connected with this "pillar" structure: "Haagse Post" with theLiberals, "Vrij Nederland" with the Calvinists, "Nieuwe Linie" with the Cath-olics and "De Groene" with the Social-Democrats. During the 1960s a newparty emerged, which can be described asleft-liberal (D'66). Its temporal successresulted from growing secularization, especially among younger, educated Cath-olics and Protestants.The religious groups are not equally distributed over the Dutch provinces.

Especially in the Southern provinces of North-Brabant and Limburg there is ahigh proportion of Catholics, while in the Western and Northern provinces thereis a high proportion of nonreligious persons. The social and economic centresof gravity are still the two provinces of Holland, grouped azound the capital,Amsterdam, the seat of the government, Den Haag, and Europe's largest port,

Table 1.

Characteristics of the 173 NCD

-Dir

ecto

rs who led Firms wit

h an

Ann

ual Tu

rnov

er of

50 Mil

lion

Gu i

lders or

More in 1 967

A. Fum Chazacteristics

Indu

stry

Bran

chIndustry

Trade

and Trade

Insurance

Serv

ices

Ba

nkin

gTotal

-31

1931

8

9

2100%

(17:

Province of Main

Geld

erla

nd/

North-BrabanU

Groningen/Fries-

Offi

ceNo

rth-Ho

llan

dSouth-Ho

llan

dUt

rech

tOverijssel

Limburg/Zeeland

land

/Dre

ntTotal

38

27

712

13

4

' .

101%

(16.

Size of Firm

ó

(Per

sonn

el)

50

50-100

100-

200

200-

400

400-

600

600-

1000

>1000

Total

N

12

310

12

1755 100%a

(17'.

Rela

tion

to

Othe

r Fi

rms

Independent

Part

of Co

ncer

nTotal

59

41100%

(17'.

B. Ca

zeer

Fea

ture

s

Father's

Lower or

Educ

atio

n,Occupafional

Unsk

ille

d Skilled

Lowe

rCi

vIl

Exec

utiv

e

Leve

lWorker

Workman

Shop

keep

erEmployee

Serv

ant

Cadr

e Professional

Dire

ctor

Total

3

813

219

10

15%a

31%

101%

(16:

,~r^

Cazeer

gay_

rise

n fr

om the

self-

entr

ance

fro

m ou

tsid

e at

a hig

h level

founded

succ

essi

on

low ra

nks

Total

A~

~~

1 100%

(1

Level

Worker

Workman

Shop

keep

er

Employee

Servant

Cadre

Professional

Duector

Total

3

g 13

2

19

10

15%

31%

101%

(165)

fami

ly-

risen from the

entrance from outside at a high level

self

-Cazeer

succ

essi

onlow ran

ksfounded

Total

16

46

37

1100%

(172)

University degree

Lower secondary

High

er sec-

Education

Primary school

ed.

onda

ry ed.

Economy

Engineer

Others

Total

16

43

25

13

10

98%

(171)

Owne

rstu

pDirector/

Director/co-owner

Director/owner

position

non-owner

(less than 50%)

(more than 50%)

Total

85

13

2100%

(172)

ó

Taxable income

W

of director

} 20.000,-

f 35

.000

,-f 50.000,-

f 75.000,-

> f 100

.000

,-position

f 35

.000

,-f 50.000,-

f 75

.000

,-f 100.000,-

Total

1~

526

24

44

100%

(171)

Number of di

rec-

torates in oth

er

fums

None

One

Two

Thre

eFour or more

Total

38

21

14

622

101%

(170)

Number of com-

mittee member-

ships wi

thin

spec

iali

tyNone

One

Two

Thre

eFour or more

Total

27

20

23

13

18

101%

(173)

Table 1.

(cont.)

Char

acte

rist

ics of the 173 NCD-Directors who led

Fir

ms with an Annual Turnover of

50 Mil

lion

Guilders or

More in 1967

C.

Capa

citi

es

Reli

gion

Political

sympathy

memb

ersh

ip of

N

political pa

rty

0

Use of:

French language

German lan

guag

eEn

glis

h la

ngua

ge

Read for

eign

jour

nals

Most rea

d Dutch

weeklies

Catholic

Prot

esta

ntHumanism

Nothing

Total

1945

234

100%

(172

)

Conservafive

Catholic

Social-Demo-

Liberal

Protestant

Left-Liberal

(KVP)

crat (PvdA)

(VVD)

(CHU)

(D'6

6)

Other

Total

81

719

5

599%

(166)

yes

noTotal

42

58

100%

(171

)

Flue

ntReasonable

Mode

rate

Poor

None

Total

1333

34

182

100%

(173

)49

42

81

1101%

(173

)61

34

32

—100%

(173

)

Busi

ness

Week

Economist

Newsweek

Read

ers Digest

Time

Zuricher Woche

None

Total

514

69

29

1 36

100%a

(156

)

Elsevier

De Groene

Haagse Pos

tNieuwe Linie

Vrij Ned

erla

nd

None

Total

37

58

25

42

99%

(168

)

1V1UJL ICQU LLLU:Il

weeklies

Elsevier

De Groene

Haagse Pos

t Nieuwe Linie

Vrij Nederland

None

TOL31

37

5

8

2

5

42

99%

(168)

Number of com-

mittee member-

ships outside hi

ssp

ecia

lity

None

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

More

Total

32

18

21

9

8

2

11

101%

(171)

Time spent on

buying activities

per week

> 20 h.

10-20 h.

5-10 h.

2-5 h.

< 2 h.

Tota

l

4

7

8

16

65

100%

(173)

Appe

ndix

to Table I

The cat

egor

y ̀ri

sen from ranks' of

the

vaziable "cazeer" is am

bigi

ous.

A duector, stazted in the

fir

m of his family at a ]ow rank (

e.g. the

Dutch family -concern C&A, owned by th

e faznily

Brenninckmeijer) ca

n have chosen this precoded answer. The same can hol

d for a graduate from university wit

h a go

od family background, who became a di

rect

or flu

ough

internal promotion.

Sixt

een pe

rcen

t of the

51

directors whose fathers wece also directors, said th

ey ros

e form the

low rank; 2 per

cent

said they founded their fir

ms the

msel

ves,

39~

Yo said they were

attracted

from outside at a hi

gh lev

el and 43 percent said th

ey succeeded their fat

her or

rel

ativ

e. For those directors with university degrees and whose fathers wer

e al

so directors, th

ese percentages

are 14%, 0%, 48

3'o and 38%. Thus

it is not quite cleaz if "rising from th

e low ranks" means the

same thing to

all directors.

A fau

lt in th

e inquiry may be ca

used

the

omi

ssio

n of an important protestant political party (ARP). Those dir

ecto

rs who felt sympathy for thi

s pa

rty are cl

assi

fied

as ̀

other" in table 1.

Seven (78%) of th

e ni

ne dir

ecto

rs who cho

se this ca

tego

ry were pr

otes

tant

s. The percentage was 45 percent for the

who

le pop

ulat

ion.

The category "e

duca

tion

or civil servant" of the vaziable "fathers' occupation" is somewhat amb

iguo

us, because th

e precise le

vel of Uris occupation is unknown (e.g., pr

imar

y school

teac

her,

university professor, counter-clerk or permanent under-secretary).

206 J. DRONKERS ti _ - The Recruitmer

Rotterdam. The size of public or nationalized entreprises in the Netherlands is ~'fit research on fi:~ -

very small compared to those in the United Kingdom or France, even in the `;~= more subtle n

Thatcher and pre-Mitterand phase. A national plan-system, promoting acloser -- To analyze

cooperation between the industry and the administration, does not e~cist in the - - a form of Pri

Netherlands. Dutch industry and trade also has a strong international orientationmultiple-disci

and dependence on foreign markets. The Dutch language is only used in the `'~ scales. PRIN(

Netherlands and the Northern part of Belgium. Knowledge of the surrounding by means of ~

languages is vital for any contact with other countries, inside or outside Europe. - as well and t

The French, German and English languages are therefore taught in nearly everyeach variable

type of secondary education. ~ terval) in orde

Women's participation in the Dutch labour force is very low for several specific - of the analy~

historical reasons (late industrialization; non-participation in the first World Warprincipal con

and a short active participation in the second; domination by religious politicalvariables wei

parties; large families). There were no female directors among the NCD-members f.. directorates,

in 1967. ~ memberships

Some more technical remarks on the variables are in the Appendix to Tableas ordinal. F

1, all relevant f

kers, 1983) ~

or only firm-

Differences among Dutch DirectorsTable 2 st

firm- and di

An analysis of the systematic differences between the careers and capacities ofeach variably

Dutch directors and their firms can tell us something about the possible oppo-formed varia

sitions which exist within this group and which may be linked with different ~ "explained

recruitment-mechanisms. The possible deviation of Dutch society prevents an The interpre

early generalization of foreign results.loading of 1

We focus in this article on those directors who have successfully obtained aAnalyses. T

top position within their firms. For practical reasons, we cannot trace those who ~ levels of the

have (consciously or unconsciously) aspired to become top directors. It goesused solutio

without saying that directors of the largest Dutch firms have higher educational ~ The eigenvà

levels, incomes, etc. than the average Dutchman. These well-known global ~ of variables

differences between directors of large firms and the average Dutchman are,The first

however, not conclusive evidence of the unportance of education as a recruit-outside thei

ment-mechanism of Dutch elites. These differences might be explained by the ' self-founder

higher social backgrounds of the directors, without any special role of education.Features liki

The focus of this article on elites does not mean that cleavages within the ~ large firms,

elite are the most important divisions in Dutch society. The importance of aversity-edu~

division depends on the studied population. For instance, the most important i be describe

opposition among all NCD directors is that between small and large firms, whichThe sect

dwarfs any of the divisions among the directors of large firms. This oppositionnization" c

between small and large firms in its turn can be overshadowed by divisionsside one fi

within a nation at large, e.g., manual vs nonmanual workers. On the other hand,province o1

RONKERS The Recruitment of Directors of the Lnrgest Dutch Firtns 207

herlands is research on finer divisions within sub-populations can throw more light on the

Sven in the more subfle mechanisms and conflicts.

ng a closer To analyze these differences, we used a method called "PRINCALS." It is

,acist in the a form of Principal Components Analysis which is combined with a nominal,

orientation multiple-discrete scaling, It does not require that all variables be interval level

ised in the scales. PRINCALS, which is an acronym for PRINC ipal Components analysis

urrounding by means of Alternating Least Squares, can handle ordinal and nominal variables

de Europe. as well and treats them as multiple nominal. This program (Gift, 1983) gives

early every each variable its own adequate level of measurement (nominal, ordinal or in-terval) in order to compute the optimal order and distance between all categories

;ral specific of the analyzed variables in view of their total variance and to construct the

World War principal components of dimensions between these transformed variables. All

us political variables were treated as nominal, except firm size, taxable income, number of

J-members directorates, use of French, German or English languages, number of committee-

2 memberships within and outside speciality, and ownership, which were treated

ix to Table as ordinal. Here, we shall present the results of the PRINCALS analysis with

all relevant features of the directors and their firms together. Elsewhere (Dron-

kers, 1983) we have found that separate analyses of only duector-characteristics

ar only firm-characteristics lead to comparable results.

Table 2 shows the three main dimensions found with PRINCALS among 20

firm- and duector characteristics of 173 directors. The discrimination-level of

apaciries of each variable (given in parentheses) is the squared correlation between the trans-

sible oppo- formed variable and the total score of the dimension. It can be seen as the

th different "explained variance" of the transformed variable on the relevant dimension.

prevents an The interpretation of the discrimination-level is comparable with the component-

loading of linear techniques such as Principal Component Analyses or Factor-

obtained a Analyses. The eigenvalue of each dimension is the mean of the discrimination-

those who levels of the analyzed variable. It is an indication of the homogeneity of the

ars. It goes used solution. Discrimination level and eigenvalues can vary between 0 and 1.

educarional The eigenvalues of each of the tluee dimensions are higher than 1/m (m =number

own global ~ of variables used in the analyses = 20).

chman are The first dimension has on its low side no committee-memberships within or

is a recruit outside their specialities, small firms, low taxable incomes, the trade-branche,

fined by the I~ self-founded firms and only lower general or vocational secondary education.

i education. }` Features like many committee-memberships within or outside their specialities,

within the I~ lar e firms hi h taxable incomes bankin branche famil succession and uni-g ~ g ~ g- ~ Y

~rtance of a _ ' versity-education, are on the high side of this first dunension. It can therefare

.t important be described as a "new, rising firm versus old, established firm" dimension.

~~firms, which The second dimension can be characterized as a "de ree of reli ious or ag g g~`opposition nization" or as the o osition between the clericals and the lait On the clericalPP Y•

~y divisions ~' side one finds features like Catholic-party sympathy, the main-office in the

other hand, province of North-Brabant, Limburg or Zeeland, Roman-Catholic religion, reader

208 J. DRONKERS

Table 2 Three dimensions, found with PRINCALS among 20 firm and directorcharacteristics of the 173 directors of the largest Dutch firms: the main variables(with discrimination levels above .15) and their categories (vector score of eachcategory in pazentheses).

First dimension: New, rising firm versus old, established frrm(eigenvalue .10)

1. Number of committee memberships outside his speciality (.43):none (-.73); one (-.18); two (.OS); tóree (.54); four, five or more (1.06).

2. Size fi[m (personnel) (.33):

less than 50 (-2.47); 50-100, 100-200, 200-400 (-.81); 400-600 (-.55); 600-1000 (-.28); morethan 1000 (.46).

3. Taxable income of director position (.23):f 20.000 - f 35.000 (-1.36); f 35.000 - f 50.000 (-1.13);f 50.000 - f 75.000, f 75.000 - f 100.000 (-31); more than f 100.000 (.50).

4. Branch (.21):

trade (-.92);insurance(-.02);industry and hade(.15);services( .18);industry(.32); banking(.81).

5. Relation to other fvms (.21):

part of concern (-.55); independent (.38).6. Cazeer (.19):

self-founded (-2.16); risen from the low ranks (-.22); entrance from outside at a high level(-.04);family succession (.83).

7. Education (.18):

lower general or vocational secondary education (-1.31); primary school (-.30); higher generalor vocational secondary education (-.17); university degree, economy (.16); university degree,engineer (.27); other university degrees (.63).

8. Number of committee memberships with speciality (.15):none (-.53); one, two, three (.06); four, five or more (.66)

9. Number of directorates in other firms (.15):none (-.40); one, two (-.02); three or more (.58).

10. Time spent on buying by the week (.IS):more than 20 hours (-1.09); 10-20 hours (-.82); 5-10 hours (-.30); 2-5 hours (-.23); less than2 hours (.25).

Second dimension: degree of religious organizatioir(eigenvalue.09)1. Political sympathy (.38):

Catholic (1.90); Left-Liberal; (.54); Conservative-Protestant (.40); rest (-.25); Conservative-Liberal (-.31); Social-Democrat (-.89).

2. Province of main office (.35):

North-Brabant, Limburg, Zeeland (1.53); South-Holland (-.12);North-Holland (-.14); Gelder-land, Overijssel (-.23); Utrecht (-.66); Groningen, Friesland, Drente (-.69).

3. Religion (.28):

Catholic (1.06); Nothing (-.14); Protestant (-.29); Humanism (-.99).4. Most read Dutch weeklies (.28):

Nieuwe Linie (3.11); Elsevier (.17); Vrij Nederland (-.02); none (-.20); Haagse Post (-.20);De Groene (-.51).

The Recruitme

Table 2 (conduector charvariables (wi

of each cater

5. Fathers' o

shopkeepcworker (.~

.64).

6. Cazeer (.:risen fron

7. Branche

industry xC-.54).

8. Ownershidirector/r

Third dime~isic

(eigenvalue.l0

1. English 1

poor (2.~

2. French 1.

none (4.:

3: German

none (4.

4. Fducatic

Primary

versity d

economy

5. Read fo

Businessweek (-

6. Fathers'lower m

lower e

.40).

7. Politicá

Social-ILiberal

of the NietiThe laity ~office in tlself-foundThe thv

tation." Cmoderateunskilled

)RONKERS

ind directorin vaziables:ore of each

The Recruitment of Directors of the Largest Dutch Firms 209

Table 2 (tont.) Three dimensions, found with PRINCALS among 20 firm anddirector characteristics of the 173 directors of the largest Dutch firms: the mainvariables (with discrimination levels above .15) and their categories (vector scoreof each category in parentheses).

5. Fathers' occupation (.24):shopkeeper (.94); lower employee (.66); educarion or civil servant (.42); lower or unskilledworker (.40); skilled workman (-.03); executive cadre (-.21); professions (-.33); director (-.64).

6. Cazeer (.20):

(-.28); more risen from the low ranks (.20); entrance from outside at a high level (.18); family succession(-.76); self-founded (-2.61).

7. Branche (.18):industry and trade (.51); industry (.10); insurance (-.40); services (-.51); banking (-.52); trade

~, C-.54).8. Ownership-position duector (.17):

(.32); banking director/no owner (.17); duector/co-owner (-.85); duector-owner (-.1.67).

Third dimension: degree of international orientation(eigenvalue.l0)1. English language (.47):

~t a high level poor (2.92); moderate (2.40); reasonable (.23); fluent (-36).2. French language (.45):

none (4.29); poor (.49); moderate (.07); reasonable (-.30); fluent (-.67).

higher general 3. German language (.35):

~ersity degree, none (4.45); poor (4.45); moderate (.93); reasonable (.06); fluent (-31).4. Education (.26):

Primary education (4.00); lower general or vocational secondary education (.31); other uni-versity degrees (.26); higher general or vocational secondary education (11); university degee,economy (-.32); university degree, engineer (-.48).

5. Read foreign journals (.20):Business Week (1.10); Time (.22); Readers Digest (.22); none (-.17); Economist (-32); News-

.23); less than tiveek (-.53); Zuricher Woche (-1.38).6. FaWers' occupation (.19):

lower or unskilled workman (1.22); professions (.46); shopkeeper (.44); skilled workman (.43);lower employee (.11); executive cadre (-.30); educafion or civil servant (-.33); duector (-.40).

7. Political sympathy (.17):

Conservaflve- ` Social-Democrat (1.69); Catholic (.89); Rest (.73); Conservative Protestant (.12); Conservative-Liberal (-.18); Left-Liberal (-.77).

i

-.14); Geldei- of the Nieuwe Linie and shopkeeper or clerical employer as fathers' occupations.The laity pole has characteristics like Social-Democratic sympathy, the main-office in the Northern provinces, humanistic affiliation, readers of De Groene,self-founded firms orfamily-succession and a (partial) ownership by the director.

Posr (-.20); The third dimension can be interpreted as a "degree of international orien-tation." On the low side one finds little or no English, no French, no, poor ormoderate German, only primary education, reader of Business Week, lowerunskilled worker as fathers' occupation and Social-Democrat sympathy. T'he

Div ). L1~v1V1~L',1CJ 1ltc i w. »..••••.•

:~-

other side is chazacterized by fluent French, University education (economy), director has

reader of Newsweek and Zuricher Woche and aleft-liberal sympathy.. more or less

These three dimensions (new versus old; degree of religious organization; operarionaliz~

degree of international orientation) can be seen as the tentative best description ~ hïs speciality

of the latent or manifest oppositions within the field of power of directors of of highly est

large Dutch firms. These oppositions give us information on different fractions ~ tionalized thi

within this elite and—depending on the content of the oppositions-ten the re- E of resources,

cruitment of these different fractions. ~ in the analys`.

Within these three dimensions different recruitment-mechanisms can be dis- by organized

tinguished. The main recruitment mechanism within the first dimension "new, life.rising firm versus old established firm," is the type of career and educational Directors ~

level. The older, more established firms have directars who entered the firm bination of z

from outside at a high level or who succeeded a family member. They have ~ z any resource

mosfly a nonvocational university-degree and many social contacts within and _ possession o

outside their speciality. The main recruitment mechanism within the second _ a director. T

dimension "degree of religious organization" is the pillar or segment to which a post of dire

one belongs by birth. The main recruitment mechanism within the third dimension strong educe

"degree of international orientation" is education. Especially an economics and The impo:

an engineering university degree (both rather vocational oriented compared with analyzed by

other university-degrees) are important. Note the difference in the order of uni- of directors

versity degrees on the first and the third dimensions. The category "other uni- those with

versity degrees" contains mainly lawyers, which is a general education. between the

A general conclusion is that there are some systematic differences between had only a

the cazeers and capacities of Dutch directors and their firms, which are connected s small differ

with different recruitment-mechanisms. Education (especially the opposition be- in the Indus

tween university and non-university education) is not an unimportant mechanism, level. The i

but aclear-cut hierazchy among university degrees does not exist. 1 ~ Table 3.

Education as an Avenue into the Dutch EliteResources

Resources are important as a means of becoming a member of an economicelite. Education can be seen as one of these resources. We distinguish five types

Combinationseducational ca

of resources of Dutch duectars to obtain or maintain their positions (or "capitals" ~ combinationas Bourdieu would call them metaphorically). The best known type is financial, i ocher combin:that is, the degree of financial power of a director in his firm. Our tentative 'i ucarional capi

operationalization of the possession of financial resources in this study is the Combination~whole or partial ownership of his firm by the director. Other combin

capital; tv =The second type is the so-called cultural resources, which refer to the degree only educatic

in which a director has incorporated the several symbolic elements of the dom- only religioninapt culture into his own personal style. We have operationalized these culture only cultural

resources, considering the results of the third dimension, as fluently speaking No capital

the French language.Tonal

A third type is the so-called social resources, - i.e., the degree to which a

20NKER5 The Recruitment of Directors of the Largest Dutch Firms 211

economy), director has at his disposal the actual or potential expedients connected with amore or less institutionalized permanent network of relations. Our tentative

;anization; operationalization of this type is four or more committee-memberships outside3escription his speciality. A fourth type is educational resources, which refer to the numberhectors of of highly esteemed diplomas, which can reflect his abilities. We have opera-it fractions tionalized this as "university degree. " Finally, we introduced a new, fifth type-on the re= of resources, religious resources. The e~stence of these resources can be seen

in the analysis in the second dimension (Table 2) and in the general domination:an be dis- by organized religious groups or "pillars" of Dutch political, social and culturalion "new, life.ducational Directors can possess more than one resource. Table 3 summarizes the com-d the firm binarion of resources. It is striking that 13 percent of directors do not possesThey have any resources and that 40 percent posses only one resource. This means that thewithin and possession of these resources is not a necessary condition to become or to stayhe second a director. Table 3 also shows that educational resources are not necessary for.t to which a post of director of a large Dutch firm. Half óf the directors (50%) do not havedimension strong educational resources,. such as a university degree.comics and The importance of educational resources among the other resources was alsopared with analyzed by studying the differences between the personal and structural featuresSer of uni- ; of directors who possessed two types of resources (but no university degree) and`other uni- ~ those with a university degree and only one other resource. The differencesion. ; between these types of directors were minimal. We also compared directors whos between ~ had only a university degree with those with only one other resource. Someconnected ~ small differences were found. Directors with only a university degree workedosition be- ~ in the industrial branch, in the largest firms and entered more often at a higheriechanism, ~ level. The next comparisons were between duectars without any resources and

Table 3. The Combinations of Financial, Cultural, Social, Educational andReligious Resources Among the 173 Directors.

economic

flVe tj~eS

sResources Percent

Combinations of four or five resources (only one combination without

'`CaPltalS"educafional capital; N = 1) 6%Combination of social, educafional and religious resources 7

financial, Other combinations of three resources (only one combinafion without ed-r tentative I _ ucational capital; N = 1) g

udy is the Combination of educafional and religious resources 14Other combinations of two resources (5 combinations without educational

the degreecapital; N = 15) 13 'Only educafional resources 12

F the dOm- Only religious resources 233SC CllItllIO - Only cultural, social or financial resources 5

SPeaking No capital 13

101%

O WhlCtl aTotal (173)

~~„

Table 4. Directors Whose Fathers Were Also Directors, Compared With Di-rectors Whose Fathers Were Skilled Or Unskilled Workers, Lower EmployeeOr Executive Cadres In Relation To Their Career And Education

Father director Father tivorker, employee or cadre

university universityCáreer Type degree no university degree no university

Fanuly succession 45% 333'0 25% —Risen from the low ranks 10 21 50 69%Entrance at a high level 45 42 25 31Self-founded — 4 — —

to~t 100.0 1000 100 loo~o(31) (24) í$) (29)

those with only a university degree. No significant differences between thesetwo groups were found. Also, between directors with only religious resourcesand those with religious and educational resources there were only a few sig-nificant differences: age (the latter younger), membership of political parties (thelatter less often) and commitee-memberships within speciality (the latter fewer).

These analyses suggest that in the Netherlands educational resources are onlyrelevant for obtaining directorships in combinarion with other resources and thatthe independent effect of a university degree as opposed to other resources seemsto be small.The relative importance of education as an independent avenue into the Dutch

economic elite can also be seen among directors of modest social origins. Table4 compares directors whose fathers were also directors with those whose fatherswere workers, lower employees or executive cadres. Only 8 of the 37 sons ofmodest social origins (22%) had a university degree and half of those achievedtheir position by rising through the ranks. Fully 65 percent of all directors frommodest origins rose through the ranks. In contrast, 31 of 55 sons of directors(56%) had a university degree; of those only 10 percent rose through the ranks.Contrary to what one might expect from studies in other countries, a universitydegree apparently did not increase the chances of entering the firm at a highlevel; within both sorts of social origins, roughly the same percentages of sonswith and without university degrees entered at high levels. Within both sorts oforigins, however, sons having a university degree were somewhat more likelythan those without this to have succeeded a family member and less likely tohave moved up through the ranks. It appears, then, that educational success isnot the most obvious avenue for Dutch sons of modest social origins to becomea director of a lazge firm. The route af moving up through the ranks seems tobe more common. There are indications that in France (Bourdieu and De Saint-Martin, 1978), educational success (especially in elite schools) rather than rising

through the ra

sons from mop

T:

The analysis

the Dutch ecostressed the iinisms, especi~

to be more prThere are

explanation hportant religiCatholics, Litprevented theuniversities. .the stability chierarchies o1versities was(and universi(and universiorigin of thesince the encversities stillof universitieother more iof religious gsurveyable amembers fogsociety. Onerecruitmentthese pillarssociety (reflfthe rise of elA second

internationalmarkets andof this outwentation") inot as impomore politic

or the Unite

ZONKERS

i

~ The Recruitment of Directors af the Largest Dutch Firms 213i

t With Di- ~ through the ranks is the more obvious avenue to the economic elite, even forEmployee i sons from modest origins.

~yee or cadre THE ABSENCE OF ELITE EDUCATION

v universitytI The analysis suggests that education has only a small role in the recruitment of~ the Dutch economic elite, in contrast with the findings of many sociologists who

69% stressed the importance of elite-education for such recruitment. Other mecha-31 nisms, especially internal promotion within firms and along religious lines, seem— to be more prominent.

There aze several possible causes of this Dutch deviation. The first possibleloo~o(29) explanation has to do with the institutionalized balance between the most im-

portant religious-polirical groups (Orthodox and Liberal Protestants, RomanCatholics, Liberals, Social-Democrats) since the turn of the century. This balance

veen these prevented the rise of a hierarchy between the Dutch confessional and publicresources universities. Any formal or informal hierarchy threatens this balance and thusa few sig- the stability of the Dutch society, which is too small to maintain three or moreparties (the hierarchies of elite-universities or colleges. A hierarchy among the public uni-ter fewer). versifies was prevented by.the politically enforced rule that confessional schools:s are only (and universities) would receive the same level of state grants as public schoolses and that (and universities). The battle on this rule, laid down in several laws, was therces seems origin of the religious-political parties, which have dominated each government

since the end of the last century. This equality of public and confessional uni-the Dutch versifies still has a strong political impact, as one can see in the present reducing

;ins. Table of universities' expenses. This "pillar" shucture of Dutch society also providedose fathers other more informal possibilities of recruitment of elites within each "pillar"37 sons of of religious groups. Each pillar was, because of the small size of the Netherlands,e achieved surveyable and had an aim of self-maintenance through recruiting their bestctors from ~ members for important positions within their pillar or other sectors of Dutchf directors society. One nation-wide hierazchy of universities was not necessary for thisthe ranks. recruitment within the pillars and would be seen as threatening the influence ofuniversity these pillars. Summarizing this first argument, the "pillar" structure of Dutchat a high society (reflected by the second dimension "religious organization") prevented

;es of sons the rise of elite-education and provided other ways of recruitment of Dutch elites.nth sorts of A second explanation of the nonexistence of elite-education is the stronglore likely international orientation of Dutch industry and trade, the dependence on foreigns likely to mazkets and the nearly complete absence of nationalized firms. A consequencesuccess is of this outwazd orientation (reflected by the third dimension "international ori-to become eistation") is that strong links with the Dutch society and state-bureaucracy ares seems to not as important for the economic elite as they can be for elites of nations withl De Saint- more political, cultural or economic power such as France, the United Kingdomthan rising or the United States. An elite-education, mainly oriented to Dutch society and

214 J. DRONKERS

culture, seems less necessary in the Dutch situation than in other countries likeFrance, given the practice of teaching three foreign languages at Dutch schools.Summarizing the second argument, the small cultural, political and economicimportánce of Dutch society itself within Europe, combined with its outwardorientarion and high level of foreign languages teaching, made concentration onDutch society and culture in elite-schools unnecessary.The deviation of the Dutch case from the important role of elite-education

should caution researchers against generalization. Often social scientists drawgeneral conclusions regarding the features of industrial orpost-industrial societieson the basis of results from a few much-studied cases (e.g., USA; Great Britain;France) without having enough information on other comparable societies. Stu-dents of developing countries in the Third World have often warned against thistendency. The Dutch case shows that this warning is true even for (post) industrialsocieties. The Dutch deviation should also warn policy-makers of smaller coun-iries not to overestimate the relevance of foreign research as compared with localresearch. Finally, the Dutch case suggests that elite-education may not be anecessary requisite of modern societies and that its existence may depend on theavailability of other resources and recruitment mechanisms in a society.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This article is a revision of an article written in the Dutch language and published in theSociologisch Tijdschrift (bronkers, 1983). An eazlier English version of this article waspresented at the Amsterdam-meeting in October 1984 of the ISA Research Committeeon Social Stratification and Mobility. It is a preparatory study of a lazger inquiry on thecareers of presidents of Dutch companies (Beekenkamp and bronkers, 1980). This largerinquiry is part of a large international project on the interconnections of European eco-nomic elites (Stokman, Ziegler and Scott, 1985). I thank [he Dutch Centre of Directorsfor the data on its members, the boazd of SISWO for its financial support and the editorand two anonymous reviewers of Research in Social Stratification and Mobility for theirsuggesrions. The full data are available on request from the author, J. bronkers, SISWO,P.O. Box 19079, 1000 GB Amsterdam, Netherlands, or at the Steinmetz Archives, theSocial Science Information—and Documentation Centre of the Royal Academy of Arts

and Sciences, Herengracht 410-412, 1017 BX Amsterdam, Netherlands.

REFERENCES

Beekenkamp, G. and J. bronkers1980 "The Dutch chief executive officers and their toeets." Paper presented at the European

Consortium for Political Research, Florence, 1980.Bourdieu, P. and P. M. de Saint-Martin

1978 "La Patronat." Ades de la Recherche en Sciences Socialer 213-82.

The Recruitmer

Domhoff, VJ. G.1967 Who F

bronkers, J.1983 "Mytl

grotebronkers, J. and

1979 "Jenc:Femmema, M.

1982 InternFennema, M. an~

1979 "AnáGifi, Albert

1983 PrinciGoudsblom, J.

1967 DutchHelmets, H. M.:

1975 GraveVan(

Lijphar[, A.1975 The f

UnivtMills, C. Wrigh

1956 The FStok, T. L.

1968 LevelStokman, F. N.

1985 Netwtries.

van Schendelen,1984 Cons

BootVinke, P.

1961 De nen d.

DRONKERS The Recruitment of Directors of the I.nrgesE Dutch Firms 215

~untries like

itch schools.

td economic

its outward

:entration on

te-education

entists draw

rial societies

treat Britain;

~cieties. Stu-

1 against this

st) industrial

maller coun-

~d with local

ay not be a

spend on the

ciety.

iblished in theus article was

~h Committeeinquiry on theJ). This largerEuropean eco-e of Directorsand the editorbiliry for theirkers, SISWO,Archives, theidemy of Arts

Domhoff, W. G.1967 Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

bronkers, J.1983 "Mythen over elites. De rol van het onderwijs bij de recrutering van directeuren van

grote bedrijven." Sociologisch Tijdschrift 9:606--46.

bronkers, J. and U. de Jong

1979 "Jencks and Fágerlind in a Dutch way." Information sur les Sciences Socialer 18:761-82.Fennema, M.

1982 International Nehvorks of Banks and Industry. Den Haag: Nijhoff.Fennema, M. and H. Schijf

1979 "Analyzing interlocking directorates: theory and methods." Social Networks 1:1-36.Gifi, Albert

1983 Principals User's Guide. Department of Data Theory. University of Leiden.Goudsblom, J.

1967 Dutch Society. New York: Random House.

Helmers, H. M., R. J. Mokken, R. C. Pflijter, and F.N. Stokman1975 Graven naaz Macht, op zoek naar de kem van de Nederlandse economie. Amsterdam:

Van Gennep.

Lijphart, A.

1975 T'he Politics of Accomodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley:i University of California Press.

Milts, C. Wright

1956 The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stok, T. L.

1968 Levens- en werkpatroon van de Nederlandse directeur. Nederlands Centrum van Directeuren.Stokman, F. N., R. Ziegler, and J. Scott (eds.),

1985 Nebvorks of Corporate Power, Incorporate Structure: Compazative Analysis of Ten Coun-tries. Oxford: Polity Press.

~ van Schendelen, M.P.C.M. (ed.)

1984 Consóciationalism, pillarization and conflict-management in the Low Countries. Meppel:Boom.

~ Vinke, P.1961 De maatschappelijke plaats en herkomst der directeuren en comissarissen van de open

en daazmee vergelijkbaze besloten naamloze vennootschappen. Leiden: Stenfert Kroese.

at the European