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1991 7: 103Second Language ResearchV.J. Cook

The poverty-of-the-stimulus argument and multicompetence  

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The poverty-of-the-stimulus argumentand multicompetenceV.J. Cook University of Essex

Address for correspondence: V.J. Cook, Department of Language and Linguistics, Universityof Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester C04 3SQ.

This paper examines the consequences of the fact that human minds mayknow more than one language for the poverty-of-the-stimulus argumentthat speakers know more than they could have learnt. Qualifications to theargument are necessary because not all L2 learners attain the same compe-tence as L1 speakers; types of evidence are potentially available that canbe ruled out for the Ll. The way in which L2 learning has been concep-tualized in terms of access to UG and of a black box metaphor makesthe L2 grammar seem separate from the L1 grammar rather than one over-all system contained within a single mind. What is needed is the idea of

’multicompetence’ - the compound state of a mind with two grammars.Multicompetence is the norm for the human race in that most minds know morethan one language. Hence the logical problem of language acquisition is howthe mind acquires a grammar with one or more settings for each parameter,rather than the special case of a mind that knows only one language. This hasimplications for all uses of the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument, not just inL2 learning.

One of the bases for the Universal Grammar (UG) position is thepoverty-of-the-stimulus argument: if someone knows an aspect oflanguage that is unlearnable from the environment, then it must bebuilt-in to the mind. The aim of the present paper is to examine theconsequences for this argument of the fact that most human mindsactually know more than one language. It first attempts to clarify theramifications of the present form of the argument by distinguishingbetween ’narrow’ and ’broad’ versions. It then argues from this foun-dation that the argument undervalues minds that know more thanone language; it goes beyond the current UG position to suggest thatlinguistic theory needs to see ’multicompetence’ as a vital and normalpart of language knowledge.

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I The narrow poverty-of-the-stimulus argument

A preliminary point is that the poverty-of-the-stimulus argumentthroughout refers to the central ’core’ aspects of grammar that areclosely related to UG rather than to the ’peripheral’ aspects that areless related; it does not have to account for anything outside thisnarrow area. The normal form of the argument has four steps. Tocarry out the first step, Step A, means demonstrating that a singlenative speaker knows a particular piece of linguistic knowledge:

Step A. a native speaker knows X

This version concerning a single individual will be called herethe ’narrow’ argument. A standard example of such knowledge isthe principle of structure-dependency (Cook, 1988; Chomsky, 1986,1988). Languages that have syntactic movement permit questions suchas:

1) Is Sam the cat that is black?

but forbid sentences such as:

2) *Is Sam is the cat that black?

Movement within the sentence depends, not on the word as such, buton its role in the structure of the sentence. Step A could be used forany syntactic point that a native speaker knows that is relevant to the’core’ grammar of the language.The next step is to show that the language evidence available to the

speaker could not have led to him or her acquiring the syntactic pointin question:

Step B. X could not have been acquired from forms of evidence plausiblyavailable

Such evidence can be positive in the form of language thechild actually encounters. The child indeed hears sentences thatare structure-dependent. The problem is, however, if the child neverhears structure-independent sentences, why does the adult imme-diately reject them the first time he or she hears them? Positiveevidence alone could never lead to this knowledge of what cannot besaid in language (see Cook, 1988, for amplification of this point).The other type of evidence is negative - demonstration of what

does not occur, either directly by adults correcting the child orindirectly by being absent from what the child hears. However, thechild is not corrected for saying *’Is Sam is the cat that black?’ simplybecause he or she never produces sentences that might cause an adultto say ’No you shouldn’t say *&dquo;Is Sam is the cat that black?&dquo;, you

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should say &dquo;Is Sam the cat that is black?&dquo;’. Direct negative evidencedoes not occur for the appropriate structures.

Step B involves showing that none of the types of posi-tive and negative evidence are plausible so far as this particularaspect of linguistic competence is concerned. The child could notlearn structure-dependency from either positive or negative evidence(Cook, 1988). The step depends on an occurrence requirement forevidence; evidence must not just be available to the child in principle:it must actually occur. While in principle negative evidence mightcompensate for the inadequacies of the positive evidence, in practiceit is not observed to occur. However useful correction might be inprinciple, parents rarely correct their child’s syntax in relevant ways.

This leads to the conclusion that none of these forms of evidenceare sufficient:

Step C. X is not learnt

The aspect of language knowledge in question is not learnt. That isto say, structure dependency is not derivable from actually occurringevidence in the environment. Though present in the mind, it did notcome from language evidence from outside and hence cannot strictlybe called ’learnt’.

Consequently this knowledge must be built-in to the human mind:

Step D. X is built-in to the mind

Steps C and D are distinct because logical explanations could exist forthings which are known but not learnt other than the innate struc-ture of the mind, for instance, memories of previous existence, mor-phic resonance, telepathy, or a literal interpretation of the Tower ofBabel, to take a selection ranging from Plato to Sheldrake. We willassume, however, that the proper explanation for linguists to exploreis innateness.The central point to the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument is that

the environment underspecifies the kinds of grammar that peopleknow; language knowledge is too complicated to be learnt. In oneway the argument resembles the theological proof of the exis-tence of God from the complexity or beauty of the world. In anotherit is like techniques of molecular phylogeny that reconstruct earlyspecies by working backwards from the protein structure of presentday creatures. Used in another way the argument is held to explainhow language learning is possible in a real time span. Restrictingthe choices for the learner cuts down on the number of gram-mars that need to be tried: ’the system of UG is so designed thatgiven appropriate evidence only a single candidate language is madeavailable’ (Chomsky, 1986: 83).

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The argument can be transferred more or less intact to L2 learningwith the caveat that sources of evidence may also include L 1 know-

ledge. If an L2 learner knows things which are not in the evidenceencountered, the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument applies to L2learning. Indeed an L2 learner may know structure-dependency incircumstances when it is not required in the L 1. Otsu and Naoi, citedin White (1989), showed that Japanese learners of English possessedstructure-dependency though it is not required for syntactic move-ment in Japanese, even if needed elsewhere, e.g., for LF-movement,that is to say movement in the Logical Form component necessary forsemantic interpretation (Cook, 1988, p. 146). If the syntactic point isnot learnable in the first language, there is no reason why it magicallybecomes learnable in the second, unless there is a crucial differencein the types of evidence available to the learner. It should be stressedthat the argument in L2 is as much a logical argument as it is inthe L 1. It does not depend upon data about learners acquiring anL2 any more than the L 1 argument depends upon data from childrenlearning an L 1, even if research such as that by Crain and Nakayama(1983) in the L 1, or by Otsu and Naoi in the L2 provides interest-ing confirmation. It is the existence of something in the speaker’sknowledge of the language that matters. Developmental issues areirrelevant to the logical problem of language acquisition. Indeed, oneof the major problems with the UG position is deciding what evidenceother than the speaker’s intuition can be valid (Cook, 1991a).

II The broad poverty-of-the-stimulus argument

Mostly, however, the basic poverty-of-the-stimulus argument is notpresented solely in terms of individuals but is generalised to all humanbeings. This will be called the ’broad’ version of the argument. Thesingle native speaker referred to in Step A is tacitly assumed to repre-sent all native speakers. Though, psychologically speaking, languageis learnt by individuals, all native speakers of a language possess moreor less the same linguistic competence. Thus Step A is perhaps moreappropriately worded as:

Step A : native speakers know X

All native speakers know structure-dependency. In principle a singleperson who did not might be sufficient to demolish the claim. It is stillultimately the individual that matters, despite the broadening of theargument. The argument never depends on statistics, whether basedon large numbers of people or large numbers of languages. Its topicis individual competence. Nevertheless it is what human beings havein common that is important.

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This has consequences for Step B ’X could not have been acquiredfrom forms of evidence plausibly available’. Children encounter manyvariations of situation and input. Nevertheless all of them achievegrammatical competence. Hence, even if it were in principle possibleto acquire some piece of linguistic knowledge from some unusual typeof evidence, this is not good enough; it has to be shown to happen toall learners. Again a single learner who knew some aspect of languagewithout having encountered this particular evidence type would beenough to undermine it. It is not sufficient to show that such evidencehas in fact occurred in one or more situations - it is irrelevant whethera generation of linguists have been saying to their children ’You mustuse structure dependency’. Such evidence has to be shown to be notonly logically possible and actually occurring, but also available to allchildren. This has been called elsewhere the uniformity requirement(Cook, 1988). If language acquisition happens everywhere, it cannotbe explained by appealing to a local or idiosyncratic property foundonly in rare or specialised situations. Many potentially promising fea-tures of the environment, such as specialised interaction with parents,modified input, and parental correction, can be ruled out as sourcesof evidence because they are not true for all learners in all cultures.As all L 1 children acquire the grammar, to be ’plausible’ such evidencemust be shown to be available to all children not just one. So Step B’therefore modifies the argument by the addition of ’to all children’:

Step B’. X could not have been acquired from forms of evidence plausiblyavailable to all children.

The main motivation for broadening the argument is thereforeto include many people. The narrow argument could be gainsaidby citing a single child or culture in which some type of evidenceoccurred, say parental correction; Tony at 33 Railways Cuttings, EastCheam, knows structure-dependency because his mother explained itto him. The broad argument maintains that, since all children acquirecompetence, whatever evidence is necessary to do so must be avail-able to all of them, essentially cutting the possibilities down to positiveevidence.

In practice the transition from the narrow form of the argument,which applies to a single individual, to the broad form, which appliesto everyone, has been made without acknowledgement. Chomsky(1981) starts discussing the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument on page8 in terms of ’the child’ and by page 9 has switched to ’children’. Thisis the explanation then for the stylistic inelegance of ’him or her’ sofar in the present paper; for once, the problem of gender in writtenEnglish cannot be resolved by the expedient of making the sentencesplural since the singular/plural distinction overlaps the narrow/broad

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distinction. The uniformity requirement is seen as a commonplaceproof of Step B, while in fact it only applies to a broad version ofthe argument involving more than one learner, i.e., to B’. The broadargument in a sense includes some aspects of development in that itbases itself on an inspection of some of the actual conditions oflearning, however cursory this may be.

Certain problems arise when the broad version of the argumentis extended to L2 learning. The broad L argument assumes that alladults attain the same grammatical competence. The step from thenarrow to the broad versions is not too dangerous as one child canfairly represent all children. But one of the few things agreed uponabout L2 learning is that learners reach very different levels of L2knowledge. Some manage a small part of the language, others sub-stantially more, few as much as in the L 1. The final steady-stateknowledge of L is called Ss; to show the difference of terminalknowledge of L2, this can be distinguished as St. Ss is effectively thesame in all adults - all native speakers share roughly the same gram-matical competence. It is usually believed that St varies from one L2learner to another, and that it is mostly far from the equivalent Ssin a native speaker, though much of the evidence for this is fromareas other than core grammar, as discussed in White (1989). If thefinal competence varies, the broad poverty-of-the-stimulus argumentis changed. Step A’ native speakers know X cannot be convertedinto L2 learners know X because all learners do not achieve thesame competence. It might be that only those L2 learners should beconsidered that reach a state of St equivalent to their Ll Ss, i.e.,so-called balanced bilinguals. But these only represent a small fractionof L2 users and indeed study of advanced learners shows that theystill have subtle differences from native speakers (Coppetiers, 1987).While it is possible to base the L 1 argument on the fact that all childrenacquire the same competence, the force of the broad argument isdiminished when it depends upon a small and untypical group oflearners. This obviously does not affect the validity of Step A of thenarrow argument a native speaker knows X in L2 learning; it may bepossible to find particular individuals who know something in the L2which they have not learnt from the environment.Why should L2 learners have different S,s? One possibility is that

access to UG is unavailable or limited, as discussed below, and so L2learners are forced back onto other ways of learning. Another isthat the type of evidence has more effect on L2 learning than on L 1learning, i.e., Step B’ has to be qualified. In classroom learning theteacher’s job is precisely to manipulate language evidence to get abetter effect in the students in whatever way they think appropriate.Step B’ in Ll learning depends upon the uniformity requirement that

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some form of evidence is available to all learners and hence rules outevidence types that are unavailable. Not so in the L2 classroom, wherealmost any conceivable type of evidence has been used. Some learnershave been hypnotised, some have studied in their sleep, some have hadcertain grammatical rules explained to them, some have had the worldof meaning reduced to a set of coloured sticks, some have sat in groupsand bared their souls, others have sat in language laboratories repeat-ing after the tape. The idea of plausible evidence having to be avail-able ’to all children’ is not true of L2 learning. The argument cannotdepend upon the availability of evidence to all learners since learners’Sts and situations vary dramatically. Because St is variable in L2 lear-ners, the question is, not whether correction actually occurs - clearlyit does in some circumstances - but whether it is effective; doesthe presence of correction in the classroom lead to success in thestudent?Many L2 learners also encounter a further type of negative evi-

dence, which I have called explanatory evidence (Cook, 1985); theyare given explanations of the language system which they consciouslyunderstand. This is not available in L 1 acquisition so far as is known,and certainly does not meet the uniformity requirement of being avail-able to all learners. It may be obvious, as Chomsky has pointedout, that teachers do not have the linguistic knowledge to give ade-quate explanations: ’one does not learn the grammatical structure ofa second language through ’explanation and instruction’, beyond themost elementary rudiments, for the simple reason that no one hasenough explicit knowledge about this structure to provide explanationand instruction’ (Chomsky, 1972: 174-5). But what if they did? Whyshouldn’t a teacher who has studied linguistics explain, say bind-ing theory? If L2 learning is susceptible to different types of evi-dence, there is no reason for excluding explanatory evidence simplybecause it has not actually occurred yet. At Essex University, forinstance, all modern language students have to take linguistics and acourse in the linguistic description of the language, because they arebelieved to help them speak the language. Perhaps teaching a fullgovernment/binding account of a foreign language might be a highlyeffective language teaching technique.

Let us sum up this section. The narrow argument still applies to L2learning in that, if we can show an individual knows an L2 fact thatwas unlearnable, it must be built-in. But the broad argument is dif-ficult to use because of the variability of the final state St andthe variety of evidence that the classroom can potentially provide. Theuniformity requirement cannot be met, nor can the restrictions onplausible forms of evidence. A workable version of the argument insuitably watered-down form might then be:

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Step A&dquo;. some non-native speakers know XStep B&dquo;. X could not have been acquired from forms of evidence

crc/M~//~ aw//o~/c ~o ~o~c ~pM~/’~Step

actually available to those speakersStep C&dquo;. X is not learnt by those speakersStep D. X is built-in to the mind

One crucial implication is that research into the actual evi-dence available to specific L2 learners is much more important.The L broad argument depends upon plausible evidence availableto all learners and this may be established quite easily; obviouslymost children do not encounter explanatory evidence. The broad L2argument needs greater justification from research that correlates theactual evidence available to learners with the state of their Sts.

III The multicompetence model of UG

Before developing the relationships of L2 learning to the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument further, some other familiar connectionsbetween the UG theory and L2 learning to be looked at. Perhaps themajor issue that has dominated discussion is whether the L2 learnerstill has access to UG, and if so in what way. The following diagramillustrates the different possibilities:

Figure 1 Models of access to UG in L2 learning

First language acquisition starts from the zero state of knowledgeSo and ends with a final steady state of knowledge Ss. The ter-minal state of knowledge in second language acquisition St may bederived either from other mental faculties (a no-access model, i.e.,non-availability of UG), or from the UG So (a direct-access model),or from the L 1 SS (an indirect-access model) (Cook, 1988). Much dis-cussion has taken place in L2 learning research about these threepositions, ranging from Ritchie (1978) to Bley-Vroman et al. (1988).The merits of the case in favour of each of these positions is notrelevant here. All of them predicate four distinct entities - a UniversalGrammar So, an instantiation of UG in a grammar of a particular

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language Ss, non-language faculties of the mind, and a grammarof a second language St. They differ over the relationships betweenthese four objects rather than over their existence.A second general issue is the classic black box metaphor for

language acquisition. This can be redrawn in current parameter-setting terms, as seen below. L evidence goes into the black box,triggers settings for parameters, and yields an output consisting ofSs, i.e., the grammar of a particular language. The poverty-of-the-stimulus argument was originally couched in terms of this black boxmodel. What can be found in the output Ss that is not learnable fromthe input is ipso facto added by the black box and hence a built-inaspect of the Language Acquisition Device (LAD). The search forexplanatory adequacy that motivated the linguist’s choice of descrip-tion for Ss (Cook, 1974) has now become a requirement that the pos-tulated competence either must be derivable from positive evidencethat triggers parameters or must consist of built-in principles of themind or default parameter-settings.

Figure 2 The black box model of L1 acquisition

Into the black box goes the linguistic input, out pops an Ssgrammar of English - or of Japanese or of whatever language thechild encounters - which instantiates the principles of UG and hasparticular values for each parameter of variation - pro-drop, headparameter, etc.The same black box metaphor can be applied in a straightforward

manner to L2 learning.

Figure 3 The black box model of L2 acquisition

In go L2 data, out pops L2 grammar St. The L2 learning debate haschiefly concerned the role of the Ll in this, i.e., the type of access

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possible. Triggering the parameters in an L2 may be exactly the sameas triggering them in an L 1 in a direct access model, or the learnersmay have to start from the L 1 values in an indirect access model, orthey may have nothing to do with UG at all in a no-access model. But,apart from the no-access model, the end product is an L2 grammarthat instantiates the principles of UG and sets the parameters appro-priately. Putting the L and the L2 metaphors side by side showstwo products, Ss and St, coming out of similar processes from twodifferent inputs. Again there are two discrete entities: Ss and S,.

But the L and the L2 are after all known by the same person; thetwo grammars Ss and St are necessarily in one and the same mind.The mind does not split in two when it gains a second language; bilin-guals don’t have two heads. The fact that the black box model yieldstwo products Ss and S, makes them appear entirely distinct ratherthan inter-related. The mind of the L2 learner simultaneously pos-sesses two finished grammars, two instantiations of UG, competencesin the Ll and in the L2.The compound state of a mind with two grammars SS and St can

be called ’multicompetence’, contrasting with the normally accepted’monocompetence’, consisting of only S,. Ss and St are not distinctseparate products but coexist. For many people UG exists in the mindin two instantiations, Ll 1 and L2, the final state being multi-

competence. Similar arguments apply to the input. The input fordifferent Lls is heard by different children. One child hears English,the other Japanese; both learn the language they hear. The inputs areseparate and discrete. But in the case of the L2 learner, it is the sameperson who hears both the L1 and the L2 inputs, not different people;it all forms part of the total linguistic experience of the learner, acompound input. The two separate Ll and L2 diagrams should thenbe combined into one, as seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4 The combined black box model of L1 and L2 acquisition

An objection that can be anticipated to the collapsing of the twoblack box models into one is that L2 learning mostly, but not invari-ably, takes place after L 1 learning. While correct in terms of chro-nological development, neither the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument

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nor the black-box model depends on development through time butare ’instantaneous’ logical models; temporal priority between L 1 andL2 is beside the point. Similarly, the fact that the L input comesbefore the L2 input or is heard in different situations is neither herenor there: the same mind hears both. The logical argument as usualtakes no account of sequence of input. Much of the discussion of typesof input in L2 learning has dealt with the L2 learner as if the L 1input had never existed and is totally irrelevant rather than being aninevitable part of the L2 learner’s experience.

IV Multicompetence as the norm

So far this paper has amplified the standard UG concepts to takeaccount of L2 learning. Most researchers might well concede thatthere is some merit in the argument but see it as a special pleadingfor a particular subtype of language learning. The crucial question iswhether the implications of this line of arguing extend outside thecase of the L2 learner. The basic foundation is the decision whether

monocompetence, in which the mind knows one language, or multi-competence, in which the mind knows two, should be taken as nor-mal. It is commonly assumed that acquiring one language is the

unexceptional norm for a human being. Acquiring two is sometimesassumed to be something that is peculiar, difficult, an intellectualachievement, a problem - in other words anything but commonplace.An English person finds it remarkable that someone can use morethan one language in their everyday life. However, a person from theCameroon may use four or five languages in the course of a day, takenfrom the two official languages French and English, the four linguafrancas, or the 285 native languages. On some calculations thereare more people in the world like the Cameroonian than like theEnglishman; ’there are 3000-5000 languages in the world but onlyabout 150 countries to fit them all into’ (Harding and Riley, 1986).Taking classroom second language learning into account, the Euro-pean Commission survey on young people in Europe found that 83 %of 20-24 year-olds had studied a second language (EC Commis-sion, 1987; see Cook, 1991b, for further discussion). Knowing asecond language is a normal part of human existence for most humanbeings: it may well be unusual to possess only monocompetence.According to Illich and Sanders (1988: 52), the assumption of

monocompetence is typical of contemporary views of language:One obstacle most modern readers face when they want to study the historyof ’language’ is their belief in monolingual man. From Saussure to Chomsky’homo monolinguis’ is posited as the man who uses language - the man whospeaks.

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A quotation from Chomsky (1986: 17) can show this is a faircharacterisation of Chomskyan linguistics.

We exclude, for example, a speech community of uniform speakers, each ofwhom speaks a mixture of Russian and French (say, an idealized version ofthe nineteenth-century Russian aristocracy). The language of such a speechcommunity would not be ’pure’ in the relevant sense, because it would not

represent a single set of choices among the options permitted by UG but ratherwould include ’contradictory’ choices for certain of these options.

This quotation occurs in the context of discussion of the idealisationto the homogeneous speech community necessary for studying linguis-tics. But the abstraction to a monolingual speaker is of a different kindfrom assuming that all speakers in a community are effectively thesame; it is simplifying the average mind rather than finding an averagemind, so to speak. If most human beings are in fact multicompetent,monocompetence is a misleading representation of the human speciesrather than a convenient idealisation.

Both the narrow and broad poverty-of-the-stimulus argumentssee the mind as coming to acquire a single grammar, a single settingfor each parameter. The narrow poverty-of-the-stimulus argument isconcerned with the individual. However, if a single person is found,even a nineteenth-century Russian aristocrat, who know two gram-mars rather than one, the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument can beapplied to his or her case. It is a legitimate question to ask how thatperson acquired multicompetence.The implications for the broad argument are as important. The

norm is for a mind to possess one or more instantiations of UG ratherthan one, with one or more settings for each parameter. In termsof input, the broad poverty-of-the-stimulus argument involves theoccurrence and uniformity requirements. Not all children hear inputin two languages; therefore it is legitimate to look at the child in themonolingual environment. But it seems to be normal that a child whogets input in two languages acquires two grammars. UG theory hasdealt with cases of wolf children and others who have failed to achievenormal language by saying that it is not concerned with total depriva-tion of all language input; clearly some language input is needed toinstantiate principles, to set parameters and so on. If children arearbitrarily restricted to one language input this forms a gross form ofimpoverishment. The fact that some children receive impoverishedinput in which they hear only one language is irrelevant to the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument, which does not take such vagaries intoaccount. The typical human environment includes input in morethan one language; monolinguals are suffering from a form of lan-guage deprivation. Hence the broad poverty-of-the-stimulus argu-ment should be, not how the mind manages to acquire a single

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grammar, but how it manages to acquire one or more grammars. Interms of a UG model the problem is not explaining how the mind setsa parameter from evidence; it is how it manages to acquire oneor more settings from evidence. Otherwise, as most human beingsknow two grammars, the poverty-of-the-stimulus argument woulddeal with only a minority of human beings. Monocompetence is asrelevant to language learning as the behaviour of those with oneleg is to the study of human walking. The basic claim is that thelearning of multicompetence should be seen as the essential issue,monocompetence as the aberration. The problem of languageacquisition is how one mind acquires one or more grammars frominput. Chomsky’s idealisation rules out most of the human race anddoes not cope with the perfectly normal condition of the humanmind.

Let us come back to the idea of negative evidence. The classicargument is that the acquisition of competence depends solely onpositive evidence, that is to say on the provision of actual sentencesof the language; hearing ’John ate the apple’ is enough to trigger thehead parameter (Chomsky, 1988). Or, in slightly more sophisticatedversions, negative evidence must always be supported by positiveevidence (Saleemi, 1988). One possibility is that the acquisition ofmulticompetence requires the use of negative evidence and that theremay be certain aspects of the L2, say binding, which are only accessi-ble via this route. Given our formulation, negative evidence needs tobe looked at within the total multicompetence framework. If multi-competence is the norm and negative evidence can arguably be appliedto the St element of it, then negative evidence can be seen as part ofthe whole argument rather than immediately ruled out of court. Thefact that children don’t get it may again be accidental; if they did, theymight benefit from it. The evidence types discussed under B’ must nowinclude those that are known to be beneficial to L2 learning as wellas those that occur in L learning. It is the total architecture thatcounts.

Beyond the present discussion lies the intriguing question of howthe different parts of multicompetence are related. So far it has beenassumed that there are indeed two or more discrete grammars Ss andSt, an assumption that can be termed ’separatist multicompetence’.But the two grammars may form an inter-related system. Switchingfrom speaking the LI to speaking the L2 may not be taking onegrammar off-line and replacing it with another, but weighting theparts of one overall system, i.e., ’wholistic multicompetence’. Someevidence for the inter-relationship of the separate elements (Grosjean,1989), the difference of St from Ss even in advanced L2 speakers(Coppetiers, 1987), and the effects of the L2 on the processing and

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evaluation of the L 1 (Flege, et al. , 1987; Nathan, 1987) are discussedin. Cook (in progress).

This is not the place to develop the concept of multicompetencefurther. Some of the problems left unsolved are: deciding at whichpoint of L2 development an St qualifies to be called an L2 compe-tence at all; relating multicompetence to the use of language; evaluat-ing how multicompetence relates to the question of access to UG inL2 learners; and deciding how multicompetence relates to simulta-neous rather than consecutive L2 learning. The purpose here was todraw attention to the need to incorporate multicompetence into theargumentation of UG. There may be many valid objections tothe specific points put forward here. But the general point remains:the existence of multicompetence needs to be accommodated morefully within the learnability arguments. It is unclear why this normalstate of the human mind has been put to one side in such arguments,except of course for the cultural conventions of countries and aca-demic communities that see homo monolinguis as normal, homomultilinguis as a peculiar oddity.

V References

Bley-Vroman, R.W., Felix, S., and Ioup, G.L. 1988: The accessibilityof universal grammar in adult language learning. Second LanguageResearch 4: 1-32.

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