THE PERSONANJ) THE

COMMON GOOD

BYJACQUES MAR1TAIN

I raislaIed /,JOHN J. FITZGERAlD

UNiVERSITY OF NO FRE I)AME PRESS

I

THE PERSON AND THE COvflION GOOD

second is by far the more difficult operation, andsucceeds more rarely. Instead of the authenticperson, exhibiting the mysterious visage of theCreator, a mask appears, the austere mask of thePharisee.

It is the interior principle, namely, nature andgrace, which matters most in the education andprogress of the human being, just as it is an innerprinciple which matters most in organic growth.Our instruments are simply the aids; our art isl)Ut the servant and cooperator of this interiorprinciple. The whole function of this art is toprune and to trim—operations in which both theindividual and the person are interested—in suchwise that, within the intimacy of the human being, the gravity of individuality diminishes andthat of true personality and its generosity in—creases. Such an art, to be sure, is difficult.

The Person and Society

IN OUR treatment of the cllara(’tCriSti(’ features

of the person, we noted that pursoiialitY tendsby nature to comm ui iion. I’liis frequently flh1-

understood point should be eniphasized. For thperson requires membership in a society in virtueboth of its dignity and its needs. Animal groupSor colonies are called societieS ly in an inn

proper sense. The arc collective wholes coristituted of mere individuals. Society in the propersense, human society, is a society of perSoils. Acity worthy of the name is a city of humanpersons. The social unit is the person.

But why is it that the person, as person. seeksto live in society? It does SO, first, because of itsvery perfections, as person. and its inner urge tothe communications of knowledge and love whichrequire relationship with other persons. In its

lv

46 47

PERSON AND THE CON1lON GOOD Tui P1’BSON ANI) ‘ua wry

radical geue-ositv, the human person tends towcrflow into social coininun icatjons in responseto the law of superabundance inscribed in thedepths of being, life, intelligence and love. It(lOes SO secondly because of its needs or deficiencies, winch (lerive from its material individuality.In this respect, unless it is integrated in a bodyof •souial (‘011111 luuicatj( )flS, it cannot attain thefullness of its life and accomplishment Societyappears, therefore, to provide the human personwith just those conditions of existence and develol)menit which it needs. It is not by itself alonethat it reaches its l)lenitude but by receiving esseiitial goods from society.

Here the question is not only of his materialneeds, of l)read, (l0tliC5 and shelter, for whichniaii requires the help of his fehlowmen, but also,and above all, of the help which he ought to begiven to (10 the work of reason and virtue, whichresponds to the specific ‘eature of his being. Toreach a certain degree of elevation in knowledgeas well as a certain degree of perfection in morallife, man iteeds an C(luCation and the help ofother flR’Il. In this Sense, Aristotle’s statementthat man is by nature a political animal holdsith great e\actitude: man is a political animal

because he is a rational aiinnal I a cans’ r is 0

requires dc elopmei it t ha aighi character train i

educatton and the cooperat it a 11 at her i m’ii a’ Jbecause society is thus indi pensabic to tite a’complislinwnt of human dignity

There isacorrelatioii beiw ccii this i tttoa ofthe iwi’son as SoCial unit 111(1 the notion 1)1 thecommon good as the end of tin’ social vi hole.They imply one another, ru OiOIllOIs al is

(‘0111111011 because it is i (‘it vi ((1 III pcrSons tat ‘iione of whom is as a inirrol of tin hoIt’. \. in

the bees, there is a ptibhc good ihunch t1good functioning ol the hive lvii fllt a omia agood, that is. a good rcut’ived anti cowi In

cated’ The t’iid of so id \ tln’i ii on is ‘i ith rthe individual good tior the ttllo’’tio,t of the ii

H Iii an aiiitiial socicO ihi III ‘11 11110 1 11 1 11 >11 1 0has not the value of a urn ii o hole ‘ cc no i ‘oH ci If I ItIf the good Of till’ whole 1)101115 thi i lIt. tIll ‘1 15body profs in riamb, rs, t io s not o L h1t it ciback or iv !isfri0itcd to 1111111 11 is 10 1 11 1 1cr 111,1 th w C Hitself might subsist 50d 11. h,ttei , Is ed that Its IS IIIalive or maintained in iS ad elildItil 1 1 Iii. 1 IO pu Ito Hgood ot tue 5511(110 hut mit 115 Jut> Ill till 55111)11 111(1 e 1could it be the good of tin w Ii i I out iii 11 tO i >10parts wln’h Cli;IiISOa till 55111111 5(11>1 SIll II 1 rl 111111(5 iirihee oi this or that part Islu,! tIll .1011510 uil 5O ii 1to peril, as the hand to sis, tlic 1)1(1 1 1115 us ii itun 1the whole more thin its( it H C 101111 i 1 (>(l Stic 11 ‘I o>I

‘1 a CIfl1’Ofl nod ifl 1 >‘ nerd ml fl’ r 1 5 III ii Il

not the oriniiil oriul “orninon 01)Od Witt 1 h we or (004841:,)

THE PERSON ANI) TJTE CoxnIoN GOODTilE PERSON AND SOCWTY

(livid 0th goods of each of the persons who constitute it. Such a conception would dissolve society as st. h to the advantage of its parts, andWOU1(i amount to either a frankly anarchisticconception, or the old disguised anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in whichthe whole function of the city is to safeguard theliberty of each; thus giving to the strong fullfreedom to OC5S the weak.

The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. But if the good of thesocial body is not understood to be a commongood of liunian persons, just as the social bodyitself is a whole of human persons, this conception also would lead to other errors of a totalitarian tpe. The common good of the city isneithcr the mere collection of private goods. norcerned in this paper. It is common to the whole and to the partsonly in an improper sense, for it does not profit the pai Is forthciosclc a at tim same U [hO as for the wholc accordr[g to thecharacteristic e\igeneih’s of a whole constituted of persons It israther the propc r good of the whoe—uot foreign to the parts, tobe sure, but benefiting them oniy for its own sake and the sakeof the whole.

This kind of conunon good of an animal society is analeg:callva “boiiuin lioriestuui reached msi!crialitcr et executicc, sub direc—Oonc Del auctoris naturue , but in its proper order, where thewhole is composed of individuals who are not persons. The corn—IliOn good, formally social, of human societv, in crier to be trulycommon good and to attain, as common good, the character of‘bonum honestum, implies redistribution to the persons asp.i sans.

the proper good of a whole which, like thespecies with respect to its individuals or the hivewith respect to its bees, relates the parts to itselfalone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the goodhuman life of the multitude, of a multitude 01

persons; it is their communion in good living, itis therefore common to both the whole and theparts into which it flows l)ack and which, in turn,must benefit from it. Unless it would vitiate itself,it implies and requires recognition of the fundamental rights of persons and those of the domesticsociety in which the persoims are more primitivelyengaged than in the political society. It includeswithin itself as principal value, the highest access,compatible with the good of the whole, of thepersons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to the communications ofgenerosity consequent upon such expansion. If,as we intend to emphasize later, the commongood of the city implies an intrinsic ordinationto something which transcends it, it is because itrequires, by its very essence and within its propersphere, communication or redistril )ution to thepersons who constitute society. It presllppos’S

the persons and flows back upon them, and, inthis sense, is achieved in them

5051

Tinz PERSON AND TIlE Co\l\foN GOOD Tiii PERsON A?D Sii:rv

Thus, that which constitutes the common goodof political society is not only: the collection ofpublic commodities arid services—the roads, ports,schools, etc., hich the organization of commonlife presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of thestate and its military power; the body of justlaws, good customs and wise institutions, whichprovide the nation with its structure; the heritageof its great historical remembrances, its symbolsand its glories, its living traditions and culturaltreasures. The common good includes all of thesean(l something much more besides—somethingmore profound, more concrete and more human.For it includes also, and above all, the wholesuns itself of these; a sum which is quite differentfrom a Simple collection of juxtaposed units.(Even in the mathematical order, as Aristotlepoints out, 6 is not the same as 3 + 3.) It includesthe sum or sociological integration of all the civicconscience, political virtues and sense of rightand liI)ertv, of all the activity, material prosperityand spiritual riches, of unconsciously operativehereditary isdom, of moral rectitude, justice,friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in theindividual lives of its meml)erS. For these thingsall are, in a certain measure, communicable and

so revert to each member, helping hiiii to perh this life and liberty of person I hey all constitutethe good human life of the multitude.

Let us note in passing ti iat the common goodis not only a system of advantages and utilitiesbut also a rectitude of life, an end, good in itselfor, as the Ancients expressed it, a 1)01mm Jienesturn. For, on the one hand, to assure tiic existence of the multitude is something morally goodin itself; on the other hand, the existence, lmsassured, must be the just and morally good existence of the community. Only on condition that itis according to justice and moral goodness is thecommon good what it is, namely, time good of apeople and a city, rather than (>1 a mob of gaHgsters and murderers. For this reason, perfidy, thescorn of treaties and time sworn oath, politicalassassination and unjust war, even though tliebe useful to a government and procure somefleeting advantages for the peoples who make useof them, tend by their nature as political acts—acts involving in some degree the common action—to the destruction of the common good.

The common good is soiiietiiiimg ethiicali good.[nuluded in it, as an essential element, is themaximum possible development, here and now,

52 53

TilE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD

of the persons making up the united multitudeto the end of forming a people, organized not byforce alone but by justice. Historical conditionsand the still inferior development of humanitymake difficult the full achievement of the end ofsocial life. But the end to which it tends is toprocure the common good of the multitude insuch a way that the concrete person gains thegreatest possible measure, compatible with thegood of the whole, of real independence from theservitudes of nature. The economic guaranteesof labor and capital, political rights, the moralvirtues and the culture of the mind, all contributeto the realization of this independence.A twofold observation is pertinent here. On theone hand, the common good of civil society implies that the whole man is engaged in it. Unlikea farmers’ cooperative or a scientific association,which require the commitment of only part ofthe interests of the members, civil society requiresthe citizens to commit their lives, properties andhonor. On the other hand, it should be noted thatthe idea of the “perfect society,” to which thei(lea of the common good of political Society islinked, has experienced many adventures in thecourse of history; it may even be doubted whether

THE PERSON ANI) Socii’ry

it has ever been truly rea1ized Wit! LIII the limitsof any particular social gi oup, Contemporaivstates are more remote from the ideal type of th“perfect society” than the city of Aristotles (Liyor the body politic in the time of Suarez. Thccommon good in our day is certainly not just thecommon good of the nation and has not yetsucceeded in becoming the eminon good of thecivilized world community’. It tends, however,unmistakably towards the latter. For this reasonit would seem appropriate to consider the crnimon good of a state or nation a merely an area,among many similar areas, in which the commongood of the whole civilized society achievesgreater density.

We have emphasized th sociability of tinperson and the properly human nature of thtcommon goed. We have seen that it is a goodaccording to the requirements of justice; that itmust flow back upon persons, and that it includes,as its principal value, the access of persons totheir liberty of exparisiofi.

We have not vet considered what might betermed the typical paradox of social life, Hereagain we shall find the distmctioii of the 111db—

vidual arid the person. For this paradox results54

55

THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GooDr PF RSON A1) So IL FY

from the fact, already noted, that each of us is inhis entirety an individual and iii his entirety aperson.

At this 1)Ouit, a few metaphysical and also theological observations would help to assure thecorrect development of the discussion. Let usrecall that the idea of person is an analogical ideawhich is realized fully and absolutely oniy in itssupreme analogue, God, the Pure Act. Let usrecall further that, for St. Thomas, the intelligiblevalue of “whole,” “totality,” is indissolubly boundto that of person. It is a fundamental thesis ofThomisin that the person as such is a whole. Theconcept of part is opposed to that of person.”

To say, then, that society is a whole composedIn III Sent ii. 3, 3, 2. St. Thomas, in this text, refers to the

human eomposlte iiuum per se ) and shows that, because it isonly a part of the human being, the separated soul cannot be aperson. To an one whose knowledge of Thomism is sufficientlydeep it is clear that the principle the ,atio of part is repugnantto that of peru)naliay’——is an entirely general principle and is ip—plied analogically depending on the case. Thus, John of St. Thomasshows, in spe.ikm f the hypostatie union, wInch takes place inj)erSOTia (Sum. 1Ii of., III, 2, 2.), that Cod can be united tohuriian nature only as iwrsori just as lie can be united to humanintelligeni i only as ijo us int lligibitis because in both cases lieis united to I • s term and as whole, not as part, ( Cur,isThec 1,, Dc Iricarnstiom, l)isput. IV, a. 1). The same principleroust evsd ntl co ne into plai also- though under completely different conditions and following another line of application—whenthe notion of person is considered with respect to wholes whichare no longer, like the human composite, substantial but have oniyan accidental smity, and are themselves composed of persons liketoe social whole,

of persons is to say th it Soc u ty is a hole C CM I

posed of wholes, Taken in its full sen ii sexpression leads us directly 10 tIn society of lbDivine Persons (for the idea of soc a ty is alsoanalogieal idea). In the l)ivine Trinity, there is i

whole, the divine Essence, which is the onnnougood of the three subsisting Relations, With rcspect to this whole, the Tin e ho coiriptsc thetrimiitarian Society are by 110 means l)arts, s ii

they are perfectly identical t it. ‘1 hey an tl11wholes who are the Whole &mong createdthings,” St. Thomas wi ites, on is Iart of It

and two of three (as one man is part of two n ciand two men of three). But it is not thus iii (socFor the Father is as much as the whole Trout

We must be aware here ol the irreinediahit dcficiency of our language. Since our idea of soen t

originates in and, as lar as modes of conceptuahization are concerned, is bound to our expei ic ucthe only possible way for us to express tli (a tthat persons live in society is to say that they i

parts of, or compose, society. But can it be sat 1except quite impropeily that tia Divine P rsons“are parts of” or “compose the unereate ci Si

ciety? here, precisely, win re we are confronte

Sum. TIieol., I, 30, ad 4

56 37

TILE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD r1iIE PEnSON AND Sociii’y

with the society par excellence, a society of purepersons, our language is irremediably deficient.Let us keep in mind this essential point, which isthe proper difficulty of and the key to the precisions to follow, namely that, if the person of itselfrequires “to be part of” society, or “to be a member of society,” this in no wise means that it mustbe in society in the way in which a part is in awhole and treated in society as a part in a whole.On the contrary, the person, as person, requiresto be treated as a whole in society.

To get the right idea of human society, wemust consider it as located in the analogical scalebetween the uncreated exemplar, the super-analogue of the concept of society, namely, the divine society, except in an improper and metaphorical sense, namely, animal society. Infinitelyabove the city of men, there is a society of purePersons, who are at the summit of individuality,but without the shadow of individuation by matter (or even by a form, distinct from the act ofexistence). Each one is in the other through aninfinite communion,3’the common good of whichis strictly and absolutely the proper good of each,since it is that which each person is and their

“ Sum. TheoL, I, 42, 5.

very act of existing. Far below the society ol men,below even the level of all society propeily socalled, there is a “society” of material individualswhich are not persons, which are SO isolated cactiwithin itself that they do not tend toward ancommunion and have no common good, buteach is totally subservient to the proper good 0Ethe whole. human society is located betweenthese two; a society of CSOflS Vl1() are materialindividuals, hence isolated each within itsell butnonetheless requiring eoinrnmnon with one another as far as possible here below in anti’matmonof that perfect communion \\itll one another andGod in life eternal. Ilie terrestrial conunotiof such a society is, on the one hand, Superior tothe proper good of each member but flows backupon each. On the other hand, it sustains ineach that movement by which it strives towardits own eternal good and the transcendent \\iio1ethe same movement by winch each goes beyondtile order in which the common good of theterrestrial city is constitute(l.

Tile PCS011 1S such is a whole, an OP(’fl andgenerous whole. In truth, if human society u crc

32 In the formally social sense specifi< d above pp. Si) 40

58 59

TIlE PElsux AND THE CoEIoN GOOD THE PF1ISON An S1Ei

a society of pure persons, the good of society andthe good of each person would be one and thesame good. But man is very far from being apure person; the human person is the person of apoor material individual, of an aiiiinal born morehelpless thaim any other animal. ‘ihough the per—SOH aS such is an independent whole and thatwhich is noblest in all of nature, noiietheless thehuman person is at the lowest degree of per—son al ity—l iaked and miserable, indigent and fullof wants. W1hcn it enters into society with itskind, therefore, it happens that, by reason of itsdeflcieneies—eidences of its condition as an individual iii the SI)eCieS—the liuJilan person is present as part of a whole which is greater and l)etterthan its parts, and of which the common goouis worth more than the good of each part. Yet.because of personality as such and the perfcctioiewhich it implies as an independent and openwhole, the Ii urn an person requires membershipin society. Whence, as previously noted, it is essential to time good of the social whole to flowback in some fashion upon the I)erson of eachmember. It is the human person who enters intosociety; as an individual, it enters society as a

part whose proper good is loft nor to the good ofthe whole (of the whole constituted of pci sO[IS1.

But the good of the whole is hat it is, and SO

superior to the private good only ii it beHelits theindividual persoii, is red istribu ted to ti wiii ai

respects their dignit)On the other hand. because it is ordaiiied to the

absolute and is sun imoned to a destiny lx ondtime, or, in other words, because of the Iiilk St

requirements of persohlaliti is such, the hmuimianperson. as a spiritual totality referred to the Iraiiscendent whole, surpasses and is superior to Ill

temporal societies. From this 1)oliIt ol i ie\\, or if

you will, in respect to thims u Iiieli arc i ot

Caesar’s both society itself amni its coillmfloll goodare iidirecdv suhordinatt d to tiit’ perhtt accomplislirnent oh the person and its supra ternporal aspirations as to an erni of another (ii

an end winch trans(efldS Pa in A sinide huni nisoul is worth more than time whole unis mrse ofmaterial goods. ‘l’lmeie is nothui higher than thimmortal soul, save Cod. Vs ith iespeet to theeternal destiny of th soul, soc jety exists for caperson amid is subordinated to it.

Ve have just stated that time coninioii good is

60 61

Tiu PERSON AND THE CoMMoN GOOD uhf PERSON ANt) So( IIfI’V

what it is only if it is redistributed to persons.Let us now add a consideration which is derivedfrom the same principle but goes farther, namely,that the common good of the city or of civilization—an essentially human common good inwhich the whole of man is engaged—does notpreserve its true nature unless it respects thatwhich surpasses it, unless it is subordinated, notas a pure means, but as an infravalent end, to theorder of eternal goods and the supra-temporalvalues from which human life is suspended.

This intrinsic subordination refers above all tothe supernatural beatitude to which the humanperson is directly ordained. It is also and alreadyrelated—a fact which a philosopher cannot ignore—to everything which of itself transcends politicalsociety, because all such things belong to theorder of the absolute.33 We have in mind the

In this sense---hccause there do exist supra-temporal goodsof the natural order (as, for example, the contemplative hit’ asconceived by Aristotle )—it is perfectly true to say with MortimerAdler and the Rev. Walter Farrell that the natural happiness ofthe Imnian being transcends in certain essential elements thepolitical common good (cf. Walter Farrell, OP., “Person and theCommon Coot! in a Democracy,” Proceedings of the AmericanCatholic Philosophical Association, Volume XX, December 27 and25, ii 15). These supra-temporal natural goods, by reason ofwhich, even in the natural order, the human person transcendsthe State, are refracted imperfectly and diminishingly, in accorduice with a certain social-temporal participation, in tlse political

natural law, the ride of just ice and the requ 1r —

ments of fraternal love; the life of the spirit itH(lall that which, itt us, is a natural begiiiiiiiig ofcontemplation; th(’ immaterial di gi ut y of U ic

truth, in all domains and all degrees howeverhumble they may be, of theoretical knowlt’dgand the immaterial dignity of beauty, both ofwhich are nobler thait the things of cominoli lift’and which, if curbed by it, never fail to avengethemselves. In the measure that lminaii societyattempts to free itself from this subordinat,ioiand proclaim itself the supreme good, in the ye’ ‘

same measure it perverts its iiiì all ire and t I tatof the COflHROR good—ui th(’ same measure it destroys the common good. TI te (‘OTI1IHO1I goodpolitical Society is an “luotwsl good. But it is apractical good, and not the absolute good which,as we noted in the beginimig, is the supreme

common good itself. (It is touch the sane with the sujwrnattir,ilvirtues of the saints iii so far as the add to this’ itioral pati nimoyand glory ot their ten ipo il tat I or land 1 B it at ii tc its, k is, t I oware related to the order of cis ilt:at ant, tad ‘\ en na,n to theorder of s hat, lartlier on, Wi’ call the <otmttminity of minds. ‘i’hievare integrated in the cot in ion gnus! of cit ilt in tan ( at at tins is“temporal” in contrast to liii’ spO limit ‘ iii sul)ernatui d order ofthe lii ngdoin of God, b it its 1 igh ‘si tat o a] ‘. a I icc are ‘‘sit iretemporal or of the ahsol tilt’ 05 den a ml t lit iii ist’ din ‘ct ic mit olthe common good of the t’uninhinlitV of tmunils. it hotli (litloon good of civilization it ml t It a of the cot ni mm it v ol at titusare themselves subardinah d to th,’ c,i m’rnatural cotiltitu’li good

62 63

TILE PERSON AND 1HE COMMON GOOD Tiu PEIu,oN ANT) S(xai’rv

object of the theoretical intellect. The commongood of civil life is an ultimate end, but an ultimate end in a relati e sense and in a certainorder. It is lost if it is closed within itseff, for, ofits very nature, it is intended to favor the higherends of the human person. ‘ihe human person’svocation to goods which transcend it is embodiedin the essence of the common good. To ignorethese truths is to sin at the same time and by thesame token against both the human iwrson andthe common good.

When, against social pressures, the human person upholds right, justice, fraternal charity, whenit raises itself a hove social life to cuter into thesolitary lift’ of the spirit, when it deserts the ban(Pit’tS of common life, to feed upon the transcen—deiitals, when, seeming to forget the city, itfastens to the adamnaiitiiie objectivity of beautyand truth, w hen it pays obeisance to Cod ratherthan to mcii, in these very acts it still serves thccomniomi good of the city and iii an eminentfashi )n.

And when f lie persoa saerilices to the comiacugood of the city that w lich is dearest to it, sufferstorture and gives its life for the city, iii these veryacts because it v ills what is good and acts in

accordance with justice, it still loves its own soulin accordance with the oidei of charity, “iouthan the city and the common good of the city.

We see, then, that the true concept ion of political life is neither exclusively persomiahist nor cxelusively communal. As we wrote many yeaisago, it is both personahst and comnhlilial in sucha way that these two terms call for and imply oneanother. Hence, there is nothing more ihlimsoithan to pose the Problem of the person aii(l thecommon good in terms of opposition. lii reality,it is posed in terms of recipi ocal subordinationand nrntual imphicatiomi.

Thus it is in the nature of things that man, aspart of society, should he ordained to the coinmon good and the common work for which thcmembers of the city are assembled. it is iii thenature of things that he should, as the uieed arises,renounce activities hich are nobler in thienmselves than those of the body poutic fur the sak ation of the communit . it is also ill the nature ofthings that social life should iiiipose numerousrestraints and sacrifices upoii his fife as a person.considered as a part of the whole. Bit iii the

The Rights of Man and N’ ztia1 L in , \ w york, 1) Ii39-43.

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THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD TIlE PERSON AN1) Sociii’y

measure that these sacrifices and restraints arerequired and accepted in the name of justice andamity, they raise higher the spiritual level of theperson. ‘Man finds himself by subordinating himself to the group, and the group attains its goalonly by serving man and by realizing that manhas secrets which escape the group and a vocation which the group does not encompass.”

And when, as we just noted, man freely acceptsdeath, not as an enslaved fanatic or blind victim,but as a man and a citizen, for the sake of hispeople and his country, in that very act of extraordinary virtue, he affirms at the same timethe supreme independence of the person in relation to the things of this world. In losing itself,in a temporal sense, for the sake of the city, theperson sacrifices itself, in the most real and complete fashion. Yet the person is not defeated. Thecity still serves it because the soul of man is immortal and because the sacrifice gives grace onemore chance.

We might observe in passing, that the slicerfact of existiig is neither the supreme good norany one of the absolute goods to which the personas such is ordained. It is, however, the first pre

Ibid., p. 32,

requisite condition of the jwrSons ordination Itthese goods.36 A humaim life is less precious thanthe moral good and the duty of assuring the salvation of the comrnuiiity, is less precious than thehuman and moral patriinoiiy of which the eoinmunity is the repository, and is leSS precious alSothan the human and moral work which the cornmunity carries on from one century to the next.It is, nonetheless, as the hfe of a person, superiorto every value of mere social utility. For it is ihlife of a substance endowed with a spiritual souland possessing a right to its own existence. Notthe least paradox of our conthitiou is the factthat this good, which is metaphysically so precious, is by nature exposed, and e en Squanderedin all manner of adventures—fre wi itlv for veryslight reasons. In the name of goods and interests,which are only remotely connected with thecommon good, society itselF does not hesitate toabuse it for any ends, even to waste it. The 1iistory of mankind is proof enough that human life,as the life of an individual in the group, is ni—

For this reason, Christ euuid say of J tidis: “It icere lollerfor him, if that iizan had not been born, ( Malt,, 2(i, 21,) OfCOUrSe the act of e’istiiig never coast’s to la Jar se gooti anddesirable; hut per uccidens it ceases to he so wi so it LIs tornpletely and lacks everything to which it is oi darned. Cf SumTheoL, 1, 5, 2, ad 3.

66

THE Piuis( N ANI3 ‘rim Coii ‘uo’j Cool) TILE IF1ISON AM) So IFTY

deed cheap. Only yesterday, across the Rhine,we saw to what atrocities a purely biologicalconception of society can lead. The destructionof human lives, which were believed to have become a burden on the community, was not onlyperimt ted, but even extolled.

In reality, tile privilege connected with thedigmtv of the person is inalienable, and humanlife invokes a sacred right. Whether to rid society0 a usoless member or for raison d’etat, it is acrime to kill an innocent man. It is a crime todoom a prisoner to death in order to test somedrugs which may save thousaiids of the sick. TheSocial body does have the right, in a just war, tooblige its citizens to expose their lives iii combat.It does not have the right to demand more thanthis risk, or to decree the death of a man for thesalvation of the city. when it is a question ofspecial missions in which men go to certain oralmost certain death, volunteers are called for.This fact is itself an additional testimony to theright of the human person to life. Even in theseextreme eases, something still bears witness tothe transcendent value of human life in so far asit is the life of a person, The person can be obligated in conscience and, if necessary even con-

strained, to expose its life, but ía \ or can it I >t

branded like an animal 101 tiit slain,hiterhoiist . Itis still as master of itself ai (l l)\ an act of ‘ irtuethat it faces death. \part Ii urn these ultimatedemands of its (l1gn1t , it n mains true that tlitperson is dutv—bouiid. iii justice, to risk its OW ii

existence for the salvatinia of tile W hole vlieii thewhoie is imperilled, it is so bound precisely lxcause, as an idividual, the WrsOH 15 iii its (‘fl

tirety a part of the connnuiiit Irwin which, iii a

certain fashion, it has received all that it is, Butit is thus obliged only bet anse the terresti iiicommon good itself iiiuludcs supra-hitiinan valuesand is indirectly related to the al )SOlU teix lt i—mate end of man. 11 the COflhlilOti gout! t

human society wcr uniqi ielv and (‘YCI1IS1VCI\’ 1

sum of temporal advantages and aubieveiiicuts,like the common good—not really common huttotalitarian—of an apiary or anthill, it w nih!surely ie nonSensical to saorifice tile life 1human person for it ‘Iluis \\ar, which pushes tothe extreme limit the suboadination of the mdividual person to the temporal ‘ nn tunitv. at thesame time attests the stipra-tenlporal jinpilca—tions and supra—social finahitu s that this subordination presupposses. It can bt seen, on the otla

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Tins PERSON AND TIlE COMMON Goon i’in PERSON ANI) So ii ry

hand, that, by reason of their very nature, thetotalitarian states—the very states that devourhuman lives in the name of the nation—Jose, assuch, the right to ask of a man that he sacrffice hislife for them.”

In short, though the person as such is a totality,the material individual, or the person as a material individual, is a part. Whereas the person, asperson or totality, requires that the common goodof the temporal society flow back over it, andeven transcends the temporal society by its ordination to the transcendent whole, yet the personstill remains, as an individual or part, inferior andsubordinated to the whole and must, as an organof the whole, serve the common work.

Two texts of St. Thomas, which supplementand balance one another, can guide us to adeeper penetration of these ideas. “Each individual person,” St. Thomas writes, “is related to theentire community as the part to the whole.” a

‘ Do Bcrgson a Thonws D’Aquin, pp. 148-149.‘ Sum. TheoL, 1141, 64, 2, Elsewhere too: “For, since one

man is a part of the community, each man, in all that he is andhas, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all that it is,belongs to the whole.’ 1-11, 96, 4. “The person is compared tothe community as a part to the whole.” Il-lI, 61, 1. “The wholeof man is directed as to his end to the whole of the commimityof which he is a part.” Il-Il, 65, 1.

From this point of view and in this respect, thatis because it is by reason of certain of its propieonditions a part of society, ih. person is iii itsentirety engaged in and ordained to the commongood of society.

lktt let us add at once that although man inhis entirety is engaged as a part of political socicty (since he may have to give his life for it),

ho is not a part of political society by T(’flSOfl of

his Cntlre self and all that is in hun. On the contrary, by reason of certain things in him, man inhis entirety is elevated above political soci. ty

St. Thomas’ second text that completes and balances the first is pertinent here, “Mart is not ordained to the body politic according to all that lit

is and has,”There is an enormous diflerence between this

statement: “Man, by reason of certain thingswhich are in him, is in his entiiety engaged as apart of political society” and this other statement“Man is part of political society by reason of

hknself as a whole and by reason of all that is inhim.” The first one is true, and the second one isfalse. here lie both the difficulty and the SOlUtlO1l

*4 is not ordained to the body politic according to allthat he ía and has.” Sum. 7ho1,, 1-lI 21 4, ad S. “But all thitman Ia, and can, and has, must l>e ri ferred to God “ Ibid.

*

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THE PERSON ANt) THE COMMON GOOD ‘T’IIF PinsoN \n Sx IEI’Y

of the Problem. Anarchical individualism deniesthat man, by reason of certain things which arein him, is engaged in his entirety as a part ofpolitical society. Totalitarianism asserts that manis a part of political society by reason of himselfas a whole and by reason of all that is in him (“allin the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside of the state”). Tlìe truth is that man is engaged in his entirety—but not by reason of hiswhole self—as a part of political society, a partordained to the good of the society. In the sameway, a good philosopher is engaged in his entiretyin philosophy, but not by reason of all the functions and all the finalities of his being. He is engaged in his entirety in philosophy by reason ofthe special function and special finality of the intellect in him. A good runner engages the whole ofhimself in the race but not by reason of all thefunctions or all the finalities of his being. Heengages the whole of himself in the race, but by’reason of the neuromuscular machinery in him,not by reason of his knowledge of the Bible, forexample, or of astronomy. The human person isengaged in its entirety as a part of political society, but not by reason of everything that is init and everything that belongs to it. By reason of

other things which are in the I)erso1, it is alsits entirety above political socu ty. For in tlperson there are miie thiiigS—afl(I the are themost important and sacred ones—wInch ti an

scend political society and draw’ man in his entirety above political societv- (lie very saiiw

whole man who, by reason of another ( itegors

of things, is a part, of political society, h r’asoii

of certain relations to the coimnoti life ‘ hieliconcern our whole being, we are a part ol tInstate; hut by reason ol other relations (likewiseof interest to our whole being) to things moreimportant than the common life there are goodand values in us which are neither l)V nor for thestate, which are outside of the state.

Man is a part of and inlerior to the politicalcommunity by reason of the tiiiiigs iii and of hiniwhich, due as they are to the deficiencies ofmateria] individualit, depend in their ci

sence upon political society and which iii turnmay be used as means to promote (lie temporalgood of the society. In this sense, a niathematician has learned maUwniatics by reason f)f theeducational institutions that social life alom.makes possible. ru progressis e formation. hicliis received from others and is a proof of the liini-.

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TIlE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 1HE PERSON A\I) S.xiv ry

tations of the individual, depends upon the community. Consequently, the community can ingiven circumstances, require the mathematicianto serve the social group by teaching mathematics.

On the other hand, by reason of the things inand of man, which are derived from the ordination of personality as such to the absolute andwhich thus depend in their essence on somethinghigher than the political community and so concern properly the supra-temporal accomplish-merit of the person as person, man excells thepolitical community. Thus mathematical truthsdo not depend upon the social community, butconcern the order of the absolute goods of theperson as such. The community will never havethe right to require the mathematician to hold astrue some one mathematical system rather thanany other, or to teach such mathematics as isdeemed to be more in conformity with the lawof the social group (because they are, for instance, “Aryan” mathematics or “Marxist-Leninist” mathematics. •) 40

Man is constituted a person, made for God andlife eternal, before he is constituted a part of the

4° Cf. The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 17.

city; and he is constituted a pint of the faintlySociety before he is constituted i part of the political society. This is the origli i of those I)Ti1flo1,—dial rights which political society imist respectand which it may not injure when it requires theservices of its nk’inbers.

Ve have stated that, on the one hand, it isthe person itself winch enters into society andon the other, that it. is ultiinat ly by reason ofits material mdividiiahty that it is iii society as apart whose good is niferior to the good of thewhole. If that is tile case, it is understandable thatsociety cammt live without the perpetual gifts

which come from persons, each one of \vllom isirreplaceable and incommunicali Ic; amid that, nevertheless, the very thing of p(’rsons winch in social usage is retained is transmuted iiit() SOfl1C

thing comnumicable and rcpla eahl’, always mdividualized but depersonal i/C( I

We might add also that .soeict, its life, and itspeace, cannot subsist without that aiiiitv, iianiclv.civil amity, which is the ailimnatimig form of society

‘ and essentially personal. however, [lierelations which make tip the structure of society

‘ Cf. Cerald B. i’lwlan, “Jnstwi’ and F’i n ndsliip,” in 1 IwMaritain Volume of the Thcnnist ( Niw \ iiik, Siweci and WardJan. 1943), pp. 153-170.

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THE PERSON ANI) THE COMMON GOODe Pi’nso AlsO Socii r

concern, as such, only justice, which is essentiallyimpersonal because it is measured on things, anddoes not make acceptance of persons.

From the above considerations we can drawtwo conclusions. The first concerns the mutualrelations of the person and society. To characterize these relations we might make use of thefollowing formulae: just as the person requiressociety both on account of its abundance or as aperson, and on account of its poverty or as anindividual, so the common good, by its veryessenee, directs itself to the persons as persons anddirects the persons as mdividiials to itself. It directs itself to persons in a two-fold way: first, inSO far as the persons are engaged in the socialorder, the common good by its essence mustflow l)ack over or redistribute itself to them; seeon(12 in so far as the persons transcend the socialorder and are directly ordained to the transcend—nt W1hole, the common good by its essence mustfavor their progress toward the absolute goodswhich transcend political society. From the firstpoint of view, we have law of redistributioiof th ufloIUOOdtQ.thej2ar. çjsociety because these parts are persons. From the second

point of view, we have the law of_traiisccmieinby which the transcendence of tile person OV(

society is manifested.The second coiielusion concerns the state Of

tension and conflict which is inherent in humansociety. Social life is naturall ordained—in theway in which we have tried to describe—to (liegood and the freedom of tht persoi And ythere is in this very same social life a naturaltendency to enslave and diiniiiisli the personthe measure that society considers the person asa part and as a mere material individual. “\Vhenever I have been among mcii,’ Sciieca \VrOtc. ‘ Ihave come back less a man.’

The person as pemson insists on serving thcommunity and time common good freel\ It Ui

sists on this while tending to\vard its unim fullness.while transcending itself and the community ii

its movement toward the ii niscendemit \ holeThe person as an individual is necessarily bound,by constraint if need be, to serve t he con H nut ii tvand the common good so ice it IS (\CCllCd by thenas the part b the wh,h

This naradox, tins tensioti. and this cotidiet aresomething natural iaid iiiv it iNc. ‘linn solutionis not static but dynanuc. F or, in this wa a

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TIlE PERSON AND THE ColloN GOOD TilE PEnsoN ANI) Socii’ry

double movement is generated—a movement farmore profound than the dialectical movement towhich the Marxists appeal. The first of thesemovements is a dearly bought and ceaselesslyhampered movement of the societies themselvesas they develop in time. It is like a thrust—dueabove all to the energies of the spirit and of freedom—across an ebb-tide in which the corruption,which belabors us, ceaselessly appears. For insofar as it a(lvances, this movement tends to realizegradually, in social life itself, man’s aspiration tobe treated as a person in the whole, or, if you will,as a whole n(l not as a part. To us this is a veryabstract but exact expression of the ideal towhich, from their inception, modern democracieshave been aspiring, but which their philosophy oflife has vitiated. This ideal, the complete realization of which cannot be expected here below, ian upper limit drawing to itself the ascendingpart of history. It calls for an heroic philosophyof life fastened to absolute and spiritual values.It can be gradually realized only by the development of law, of a kind of sacred sense of justiceand honor, and by the development of civicamity. For justice and right, by imposing theirlaw upon man as upon a moral agent and by

Ltppealing to reason and free will, concern, aswch, personality; they transfoi Ri ii tto a relatit >11

between two wholes—the whole of the mdividualperson and the social whole—that which otherwise would be no more thait the pure subordiiia—tion of the part to the whtile. And love, by assuming voluntarily that which would otherwise beservitude, transfigures it into liberty and a fredgift.4

The second moveinetat is, so to speak. a verticalmovement of the life of the persot as tllenlscl\ es iii

the midst of social life. It arises out of the (hitler—ence in altitude between the le( I where the person has the center of its life as a person and thelevel where it is constituted as a part of a socialcommunity. Because of this dificrence in level,the person demands society and always tends togo beyond it, “until, at last, it enters into a societyof pure persons, that is, into the society of 1)ivinePersons, which ovcrwhelaiis it with the gift of

42 Let us note here that just as tlw \trmsic common g ;odof an army (victory) is superior to its “iiiimaieut common good,so the extrinsic colon 11)11 gi od of the Lii 1 lift of u Ito in tcourse of terrestrial history (victory ost. r servitnih and (lie utagonisms that divide humanity) is supi ior to its iiiiiiL went

common good” and completes its es olution Out of tlus bet ann sthe historical dynamism ss liii h, through Li oils and disasters inthe direction of an end, which pci hips will uc’s ci be attaint d iii

the conditions of life here below, carries along with it the sociallonns of peoples and civilizations.

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Tin PERSON AND THE ConioN Goon

I

TILE PERSON ANI) Socii FY

infinitely more than that to which it could of itsown nature properly aspire. From the familygroup (which is more fundamental than theState because it touches upon the generic difference of the human being) man passes into civilsociety’ (which touches upon the specific difference) where he feels the need of clubs and fellowships that will interest his intellectual andmoral life. These he enters of his own free choice;they assist the soul in its efforts to ascend to ahigher ieve1. In the end these also fail to satisfy—the soul is cramped arid forced to go beyondthem. Above tIie level of civil society, man crossesthe threshold of supernatural reality and entersinto a society that is the mystical body of anincarnate God—a Society, the proper office ofwhich is to lead him to his spiritual perfectionand his lull liberty’ of autonomy, to his eternalwelfare. The Ghurch is at once Desert and Gity.43l7ithin her precincts, she nourishes human personality on a divine food and leads it away fromthe crowds at the circumference, where the soulfinds contentment in life among men, towardsthe deeper solitude at the center, where it finds itshighest conteiitineiit in life among the divine Per—

‘ Cf. 11. Clerissac, Le Mytèrc de l’Eglise, Chap. VI.

suns. At last, in the vision in which the intellectapprehends the Divine Lssence, the person ismore than ever lost iii the life of the Church, muthe common good of the Church is now unveiledand the human being, exalted by stipernatuilpower to share as a pure personality in the Uncreated Society of the Divine Persons, enters intothe Kingdom of God and the Light of Glory.Strive not, ye men, to socialize the life of thespirit. It tends of its own nature to live iii society

Rod finds its fulfillment only there.”It will be noted that these considerations en—

Rhic us to understand in its true SCIIS the state—nt of Aristotle, so often repeated by St. Thomasand already alluded to at the begmnmg of thisessay; the good of the city is more noble, moredicine than that of the individual. I Iere, as on somany other pomts, Aristotle has expressed a remarkably pure principle whose signilicance coukibe penefrated only by eves inure ihiummatedthan those of the pagan wisdom. This principlemust be understood in a very precisely formalway; in the very same line of values in which theperson is a part in relation to the social whole.

“ Cf. Jacques Maritairi, Freedom in the Modern World, I 936,pp. 51-52.

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THE PERSON AND THE CoMMoN Goon

rrlj, PERsoN AND Socnry

Then it is clear, as explained above, that the goodof the community (the authentic and true common good) is superior to the good of the individual person in the order of terrestrial talucsaccording to which the person is a part of theCOmfflumty. But these values are not equal tothe dignity and destiny of the person. By reasonof the law of transcendence or transgressionwhich we have described, the person is raised toa higher level than the level at which it is but apart; at this level, the good of the person is themore elevated. however, at this higher level, itis still a part, but of a higher community, so thatthe dictum authenticum of Aristotle is verifiedanew, under altogether different conditions, an4on an altogether different plane.

Thus in the natural order there is a communityof minds in as much as minds communicate in thelove of truth and beauty, in the life and work oiknowledge, art and poetry, and in the highestvalues of culture. However, this community doesnot succeed in constituting itself as a society inthe proper sense of the word, the kingdom ofimnds, as Leibnitz put it. We could speak of itscommon good only in an analogical sense. in fact,

the common good of the intellects can be underitood in two ways: in the first way, it is truthand beauty themselves, through the enjoyment ofhitii minds receive a certain natural irradiationor participation of the Uncreated Truth andIleauty or of the separated common good. Thisconniou good of the intellects is obviously superior to the personal act by which each intellectvonquers a fragment of it; but it is not a socialgood, a common good in the strict sense. Thiscommon good of the intellects is the immensity ofthe supra-teinporal object, to sonw aspect ofbich, each adheres in solitude.

In the second way, the colmnon good of theIntellects is the intelhgil)le treasme of culture iiis hich minds communicate with one another. Thistreasure of culture, in relation to which minds ac—eamplish a common work, more ot less perfectlyflows back over each of them. lii this sense, it isundoubtedly a schema of social or common goodin the strict sense—without an organized socialbody—and in a certain way, extencn’c ci difjnsice,it is something better than tile proper good of

j each. From the point of view of e’dcnsion, or fromthe point of view of the multiplicity by which the

I

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THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD TuE PERSON AND SocII:TY

diverse aspects of the search for truth are manifested, it is better to have Plato, Aristotle, Kantand St. Thomas, than to have St. Thomas alone,even though, personally, we would be willing todispense with all the others for St. Thomas. It isbetter to have Ruysbroeck and the pseudo-Dionysius, Gertrude and Catherine of Sienna, St.Theresa and St. John of the Cross than to have St.John of the Cross alone. But, absolutely speaking,the communion in which each mind enters, in apersonal and solitary fashion, with truth throughtheoretical knowledge, and with God throughcontemplation, is better than the treasures ofcommunicable culture which minds receive fromone another. Thus the law of transcendence stillholds with regard to the community of minds, asit does with regard to every human community.The person will still emerge above the community of minds and demand more, at least so longas the community in which it is engaged is notthe supernatural society whose life is the communicated life of God—the Church herself, whosegood is the same as the person’s. There, in thecommunity of the saints, the person no longertends to emerge above the community and pass

into a better society, for it is in the Church herself that its participation in the divine life is accomplished. Here, it is more than ever true thatin different respects the person is for the community and the community is for the person. Forthere is for the Church a common work, which iscontinued redemption, to which each is ordainedas the part to the work of the whole. But this common work is itself ordained to the personal goodof each, to the union of each with God himself,and to the application of the redeeming blood toeach as a single person.

On the one hand, the proper good of the person as a person is achieved in the union of graceand charity with Cod, with the Uiicreated Good,which is the Common Good of the Church—atranscendent common good which no longer is apractical good to be realized, but the subsistinggood to which to adhere—above all human goodand all communications of created goods foundin the Church. In this sense, Francis de ‘itoriawrote: “In the corporeal organism, the naturalpart exists directly for the ho1e. But in theChurch, each man exists oiily for Cod and himself, at least directly and prineip’lly, because

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Tiii PERSON AD THE Co1IoN Goor

r

Tiu PERSON AND SOCIETY

neither grace nor faith, nor hope, nor any othersupernatural formality resides immediately in theentire community as in its subject.”

On the other band, the proper good of theperson, as an individual, that is, as a part of thecreated whole of which the head is the IncarnateWord, is inferior not only to the divine commonGood of this whole, but also to the collection ofhuman goods and of the communications of created goods which derive in this whole from itsunion of grace with the uncreated Good.

Thus, if we consider this grand City as livingin its entirety upon a common good which is thevery life of God, communicated to the multitudeof the just and seeking out the errant, then eachstone is for the city. But if we consider each stoneas living itself, in its personal participation in thiscommon good, UpOn the very life of God that iscommunicated, or as sought after personally byGod, who wills to communicate Flis own life to It

‘Besides, in the body, a natural part exists absolutely for thesake of the whole; in the Church, individual awn exist for tksake of God and for themselves alone. Their private good iordained to the good of the whole at least formally or principally.As neither grace, nor faith, nor hope, nor any other supernaturallornis reside umnediately in the whole community, neither doesthe spiritual power, which is equally or cx en more supernataral,’Dc p)tsta(i’ Ecclciiae, II, 5. Cf. Genito, Relceciones dci MaestroFoe,’ Fra,u’Lsco de Vitoria, Madrid, 1934, t. II, p. 117.

then it is toward each one that all the goods ofthe city converge to flow back in the measure ofhis capacity to receive of their plenitude. In thissense, the city is for each stone, It is for each ofCod’s samts, St. Thomas writes, that it is spokenin Matthew: “lie shall place him over all hisgoods” And of each, St. John of the Crosswrites: MimIc are the heavens and mine theearth, mine arc all men, the just and the wicked;the angels are mine and the Mother of God, allthings are mine; God himself is mine and for me.

What then dost thou demand and after what (lostthou seek, oh my soul? For thine is all ot this, andall of this is for thee.”

l?inally, in the beatific vision, through the intuition of the divine essence, each 1)leSSed soulbecomes Cod, in an intentional way, as Cajetansays, and thus enters into the uncreated societyof the Divine Persons. The propci’ eternal goodof each, in the degree that its vision grasps it, isthe common Good itself of the l)ivine Persons.Each beholds but does not comprehend it, forIt still exceeds infinitely the capacity of each. Andeach one loves it more than itself. Further, be

Sabt Thomas, Expos. in Ep. ad Rem, c S h ci 6.‘ Saint John of the Cross, siie.s y Senlcm ins (nis. d’Andujar).

de, l, p.

I

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TRE PERSON AND THE COMMON Goon

cause there is a multitude of blessed souls whichpartake of the same uncreated Good, this Goadactually becomes the common Good of both theDivine Persons and the Church of Heaven. Being God Himself, it is of course more divine thanthe act, entitatively considered, by which eachcreated member of the heavenly community, according to the degree of its vision, takes possession of its personal good, (which, be it noted, ismore really the good of the created person sinceit excels it infinitely). But in what sense might thepersonal good, of which each soul thus takespossession, be inferior to this common good?They are identical; the personal good is also GodHimself. In relation to the divine service and thedivine praise, each soul is a part of the community of the blessed. In relation to the object ofthe vision, there is no longer a question of beinga part but of being identified with the Whole inthis society of the blessed, the common object ofwhich is better only because it is, for the multitude of the members, the same object in whicheach one shares, though in different degrees, as awhole identified with the Whole. Here, in the intentional identification of each soul with thedivine essence, the law of the primacy of the

THE PERSON AND SOCIETY

common good over the personal good comes toan end in a certain sense.4s And it comes to anend here precisely because the personal good isat that moment the common good. “The personalgood of each of the blessed is as divine as thecparated common Good of the entire universe:it is identically this very same Good, spirituallypossessed.”

In inothcr sense, this law always holds, in the sense that the5nite communicability of the incomprehensible Essence foreveruanscends the conurninicatiOn which, through its ViSion, the cwatwe eceive$ of it.

Charles journet, “La cause mat&wIle dc I’Eglise gloricuse,ct Vtcra, January-March, 1945, p. 86.

88 89