The Opening of Genesis.

Preliminaries II: On the Hexaemeron

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. On the Work of the Six Days: Genesis 1-2:3.

The Holy BibleDouay-Rheims Translation

Challoner Revision, 1749-1752

Douay-Rheims Translation the Challoner Revision - The Old Testament was first published by the English College at Douay A.D. 1609 & 1610. The New Testament was first published

by the English College at Rheims A.D. 1582. The whole translation was revised and diligently compared with the Latin Vulgate by Bishop Richard Challoner A.D. 1749-1752.

He is also credited with the annotations included in this revision.

THE BOOK OF GENESIS

This book is so called from its treating of the GENERATION, that is, of the creation and the beginning of the world. The Hebrews call it BERESITH, from the Word with which it begins. It contains not only the history of the Creation of the world; but also an account of its progress during the space of 2369 years, that is, until the death of JOSEPH.

Genesis Chapter 1

God createth Heaven and Earth, and all things therein, in six days.

1:1. In the beginning God created heaven, and earth.

1:2. And the earth was void and empty [or “invisible and shapeless”, LXX], and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God moved over the waters.

1:3. And God said: Be light made. And light was made.

1:4. And God saw the light that it was good; and he divided the light from the darkness.

1:5. And he called the light Day, and the darkness Night; and there was evening and morning one day.

1:6. And God said: Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters: and let it divide the waters from the waters.

A firmament. . .By this name is here understood the whole space between the earth, and the highest stars. The lower part of which divideth the waters that are upon the earth, from those that are above in the clouds.

1:7. And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament, and it was so.

1:8. And God called the firmament, Heaven; and the evening and morning were the second day.

1:9. God also said; Let the waters that are under the heaven, be gathered together into one place: and let the dry land appear. And it was so done.

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1:10. And God called the dry land, Earth; and the gathering together of the waters, he called Seas. And God saw that it was good.

1:11. And he said: let the earth bring forth green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind, which may have seed in itself upon the earth. And it was so done.

1:12. And the earth brought forth the green herb, and such as yieldeth seed according to its kind, and the tree that beareth fruit, having seed each one according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.

1:13. And the evening and the morning were the third day.

1:14. And God said: Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day and the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years:

1:15. To shine in the firmament of heaven, and to give light upon the earth, and it was so done.

1:16. And God made two great lights: a greater light to rule the day; and a lesser light to rule the night: and the stars.

Two great lights. . .God created on the first day, light, which being moved from east to west, by its rising and setting, made morning and evening. But on the fourth day he ordered and distributed this light, and made the sun, moon, and stars. The moon, though much less than the stars, is here called a great light, from its giving a far greater light to the earth than any of them.

1:17. And he set them in the firmament of heaven to shine upon the earth.

1:18. And to rule the day and the night, and to divide the light and the darkness. And God saw that it was good.

1:19. And the evening and morning were the fourth day.

1:20. God also said: let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth under the firmament of heaven.

1:21. And God created the great whales, and every living and moving creature, which the waters brought forth, according to their kinds, and every winged fowl according to its kind. And God saw that it was good.

1:22. And he blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea: and let the birds be multiplied upon the earth.

1:23. And the evening and morning were the fifth day.

1:24. And God said: Let the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind, cattle and creeping things, and beasts of the earth, according to their kinds. And it was so done.

1:25. And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds, and cattle, and every thing that creepeth on the earth after its kind. And God saw that it was good.

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1:26. And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth.

Let us make man to our image. . .This image of God in man, is not in the body, but in the soul; which is a spiritual substance, endued with understanding and free will. God speaketh here in the plural number, to insinuate the plurality of persons in the Deity.

1:27. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them.

1:28. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth.

Increase and multiply. . .This is not a precept, as some Protestant controvertists would have it, but a blessing, rendering them fruitful; for God had said the same words to the fishes, and birds, (ver. 22) who were incapable of receiving a precept.

1:29. And God said: Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat:

1:30. And to all beasts of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to all that move upon the earth, and wherein there is life, that they may have to feed upon. And it was so done.

1:31. And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And the evening and morning were the sixth day.

Genesis Chapter 2

God resteth on the seventh day and blesseth it. The earthly paradise, in which God placeth man. He commandeth him not to eat of the tree of knowledge. And formeth a woman of his rib.

2:1. So the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the furniture of them.

2:2. And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made: and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had done.

He rested, etc. . .That is, he ceased to make or create any new kinds of things. Though, as our Lord tells us, John 5.17, “He still worketh”, viz., by conserving and governing all things, and creating souls.

2:3. And he blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it: because in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made.

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2. Some elaborations of the Work of the Six Days.

Cf. The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol 7 (New York, 1910), s.v. “Hexaemeron”:

Hexaemeron

Hexaemeron signifies a term of six days, or, technically, the history of the six days’ work of creation, as contained in the first chapter of Genesis. The Hexaemeron in its technical sense – the Biblical Hexaemeron – is the subject of the present article. We shall consider: I. TEXT; II. SOURCE; III. MEANING .

I. TEXT OF THE HEXAEMERON

The Hexaemeron proper deals with the six days of the earth’s formation, or the so-called Second Creation. In its Biblical setting it is preceeded by the account of the First Creation, and is followed by the mention of the seventh day, or the Day of Rest. Completeness and clearness render it advisable to give the text of both of these additions.

A. First Creation [According to St. Thomas = the Work of Creation]

Verse 1: In the beginning God created heaven, and earth. 2: And the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God moved over the waters. [Actually, v. 2 belongs to the Second Creation, being its starting point.]

B. Second Creation

(a) Work of Division

First Day. – Verse 3: And God said: Be light made. And light was made. 4: And God saw the light that it was good; and he divided the light from the darkness. 5: And he called the light Day, and the darkness Night; and there was evening and morning one day.

Second Day. – Verse 6: And God said: Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters: and let it divide the waters from the waters. 7: And God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament, and it was so. 8: And God called the firmament, Heaven; and the evening and morning were the second day.

Third Day. – Verse 9: God also said: Let the waters that are under the heaven, be gathered together into one place: and let the dry land appear. And it was so done. 10: And God called the dry land, Earth; and the gathering together of the waters, he called Seas. And God saw that it was good.

(b) Work of Adornment

Verse 11: And he said: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind, which may have seed in itself upon the earth. And it was so done. 12: And the earth brought forth the green herb, and such as yieldeth seed according to its kind, and the tree that beareth fruit, having seed each one according to its kind. And God saw that it was good. 13: And the evening and the morning were the third day.

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Fourth Day. – Verse 14: And God said: Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven, to divide the day and the night [= a work of distinction], and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years. 15: To shine in the firmament of heaven, and to give light upon the earth. And it was so done. 16: And God made two great lights: a greater light to rule the day; and a lesser light to rule the night: and the stars. 17: And he set them in the firmament of heaven to shine upon the earth. 18: And to rule the day and the night, and to divide the light and the darkness. And God saw that it was good. 19: And the evening and morning were the fourth day.

Fifth Day. – Verse 20: God also said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth under the firmament of heaven. 21: And God created the great whales, and every living and moving creature, which the waters brought forth, according to their kinds, and every winged fowl according to its kind. And God saw that it was good. 22: And he blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the waters of the sea: and let the birds be multiplied upon the earth. 23: And the evening and morning were the fifth day.

Sixth Day. – Verse 24: And God said: Let the earth bring forth the living creature in its kind, cattle and creeping things, and beasts of the earth, according to their kinds. And it was so done. 25: And God made the beasts of the earth according to their kinds, and cattle, and every thing that creepeth on the earth after its kind. And God saw that it was good.

26: And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. 27: And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them. 28: And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth. 29: And God said: Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat: 30: And to all beasts of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to all that move upon the earth, and wherein there is life, that they may have to feed upon. And it was so done. 31: And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And the evening and morning were the sixth day.

C. Day of Rest

Chapter ii, verse 1: So the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the furniture of them. 2: And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made: and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had done. 3: And he blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it: because in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made.

The work of division separates between light and darkness, between the waters above and the waters below, between the seas and the dry land: the work of adornment covers the earth with vegetation, beautifies the firmament with heavenly bodies, fills the waters with fishes, the air with birds, and the continents with animal life. The third day and the sixth are distinguished by a double work, while each of the other four days has only one production assigned to it.

Including the account of what is called the First Creation, God intervenes nine distinct times: (1) He creates matter [he creates corporeal creation the totality of which is comprehended by two parts, heaven and earth]; (2) He produces light; (3) He develops the firmament (the

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atmosphere) [he produces the outermost sphere of the fixed stars]; (4) He raises the continents [he gathers the waters into one place allowing the dry land to appear]; (5) He produces vegetation; (6) He causes the heavenly bodies to be visible [he produces the sun, the moon, and the stars]; (7) He produces aquatic and bird life; (8) He calls into being the land animals; (9) finally, He creates man and makes him ruler of the earth.

Hence the suspicion arises that the division of God’s creative acts into six days is really a schematism employed to inculcate the importance and the sanctity of the seventh day. A trace of schematism may also be detected in the grouping of the Hexaemeron into the works of division and the works of adornment, in the division of things immovable (first three days) and things that move (second three days), and even in the separate accounts of each day. These latter begin with the respective Divine edict, add in the second place the description of its fulfillment, and end with the Divine approval of the work. On each of the first three days the Creator gives a name to His new production, and He imparts His special blessing at the end of each of the last two days.

II. SOURCE OF THE HEXAEMERON

The critics no longer ask whether the Biblical cosmogony taught by the Hexaemeron can be reconciled with the results of natural science, but whence the cosmogonic ideas expressed in the Old Testament have been derived. Prescinding from minor variations, the various views as to the source of the Hexaemeron may be reduced to four: (1) The Hebrews borrowed their ideas from others; (2) the Hebrew cosmogony is an independent development of a primitive Semitic myth; (3) the Biblical cosmogony is the resultant of two elements: Divine inspiration and Hebrew folk-lore; (4) the Hexaemeron is derived from Divine Revelation.

(1) Babylonian Source

Professor J. P. Arendzen has treated of the various cosmogonic ideas of the principal ancient and modern nations in the article COSMOGONY. For our present purpose it suffices to keep in mind a summary of the Babylonian traditions. The Babylonian account carries us back to a period prior to the existence of any god. The universe begins with a double, purely material, principle, Apsu and Tiamtu, male and female, probably personifying the mass of salt and sweet water, mixed into one. From these sprang first Lalimu and Lahamu, more probably the personifications of dawn and twilight than the monsters and demons with which popular mythology identified them. After a long interval Ansar and Kisar were produced, the personified ideas of the above and the below, or of heaven and earth in their most general acceptation. Another long interval intervened, and then Anu, Bel, and Ea (the sky, the earth, and the water) sprang forth. Then Ea and his consort Dauke gave birth to Belos or Marduk, the sun-god.

After this the differentiation of the watery All is seriously threatened. Tiamtu creates a set of monsters which endeavour to bring back the original chaos. Who were these monsters? Nightly darkness obscuring and enveloping all nature in the primeval shroud; black mists and vapours of fantastic shape, reuniting at times the waters of heaven and earth; continued rains threatening to deluge the earth and again to convert the celestial and terrestrial waters into the one vast original ocean; the crashing thunder and the fierce tornado, too, were among the offspring and the abetters of Tiamtu in her bitter warfare against the established order. Ansar, the lord of the comprehensive heavens, attempted in vain to overcome these foes; Ea, the deity of the earthly waters, availed still less. Finally, Marduk, the rising sun, is sent. A fearful storm ensues, a battle between Marduk and Tiamtu; but the god of the rising sun dispels the darkness, lifts the vapours in masses on high, subdues the tempest, reopens

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the space between heaven and earth. According to the personifying ideas of the Babylonian records, Marduk slays Tiamtu, establishes the superiority of Ansar, cleaves Tiamtu in twain, and with one half overshadows the heavens. Then he measures the watery abyss opposite the heavens and founds an edifice like Ishara, which he had built as heaven, and lets Amu, Bel, and Ea occupy their dwellings. Then he embellishes the heavens, prepares places for the great gods, makes the stars, sets the Zodiac, founds a place for Nibiru, fixes the poles, opens the gates provided with locks on either side, causes the moon to shine forth and establishes its laws. The remainder of the Babylonian tablet-series, as first known, is fragmentary, narrating only the creation of plants (possibly) and animals. Any reference to man it may have contained is broken off. But Berosus, priest of Bel, supplies this deficiency. Bel commanded one of the gods to remove his (Bel’s) head and mix the earth with the thence-flowing blood, and to form men and beasts capable of enduring the light. The more recently recovered additional fragments of the Babylonian Creation Epos agree with Berosus. “Let me gather my blood”, says Marduk, “and let me [take my] bone, let me set up man”.

We do not here consider the question of some remote connexion between the Babylonian creation story and the Hexaemeron – which is of course possible. But we ask: can the Babylonian story claim to be the source of the Biblical account? Their difference in form is striking, though not fully decisive. The Babylonian story knows nothing of a division into days, whereas a division into six days forms the whole framework of the Hebrew account. Again, the Babylonian presentation amplifies the plain narrative of creation with the account of the choice and of the deeds of a demiurgus: it is highly figurative and anthropomorphic to the highest degree. The Hexaemeron, on the contrary, is the sober recital, in simple yet stately prose, of the impressive teaching concerning the development of the ordered universe from chaos. This literary excellence of the Hebrew account might be due to the special capability of the inspired writer; if no other considerations prevented it, the Hebrew writer might be thought to have borrowed his material from the Babylonian cosmogony. But the discrepancy of ideas between the profane and the inspired writer prevents such an assumption. The cuneiform record goes back to a time when the gods did not exist: the Hebrew account places God before all creation. The Babylonian cosmogony knows nothing about the production of the original chaotic matter; the Hebrew writer derives even the primeval matter from the action of God. There is no idea of any creative action in the Babylonian tablets; the inspired account opens with God’s creative act. The Babylonian record starts with a double material principle; the Hebrew text knows only one God. The Babylonian stories taken together describe the primeval waters as spontaneously generative; the Hebrew account represents the material of the universe as lying waste and lifeless, and as not assuming order or becoming productive of life until the going forth of the Divine command. The Babylonian course of cosmic development is interrupted by the opposition of Tiamtu; the Hebrew Hexaemeron proceeds uninterruptedly from the less to the more perfect. According to the Babylonians the world arises out of a struggle between chaos and order, between good and evil; according to the Hebrew conception there is no opposition to the power of the Divine command. In the light of all these discrepancies between the Babylonian and the Hebrew cosmogonies, it is hardly possible to consider the former the source of the latter.

In reply, the critics grant that “the cosmogony of Gen., i, cannot have been simply taken over from the Babylonians”; they add, therefore, the following two modifications: (a) The Hebrew Hexaemeron does not correspond to the first part of the Babylonian account, but only to the formative work ascribed to Marduk. (b) “Circumstanced as the Israelites were, we must allow for the possibility of Phœnecian, Egyptian, and Persian, as well as Babylonian influences, and we must not refuse to take a passing glance at cosmogonies of less civilized peoples.”

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Both of these modifications deserve a passing examination.

(a) It is urged that in Marduk’s work the primeval light, the primeval flood, the production of heaven by the division of the primeval flood, the order of the creative acts, the Divine admonitions addressed to men after their creation, and the creation by a word are so many points of contact between the Hebrew and the Babylonian cosmogony. But several of these points present a discrepancy rather than a harmony. The critics themselves admit that the parallelism “in the present form of Gen., i, is imperfect”; they admit, too, that the Babylonian record does not mention creation by a word, but they merely suppose that this idea must have been prominent in the full Babylonian epic. It is true that Marduk, being the sun-god, was a god of light, but it is probable that the Babylonian primeval light is represented by Lahmu and Lahamu, the dawn and the twilight; again, Marduk is only a demiurge, a creature, and as such does not resemble the Hebrew God. Moreover, Marduk has no connexion with the primeval waters in the Babylonian account; he is at best the restorer of the order destroyed by Tiamtu. He does not produce heaven, but only reopens the space between heaven and earth. Finally, it would be hard to imagine a greater discrepancy than is found between the Babylonian story of man’s creation and the Hebrew account of the event. The source of the Hexaemeron, therefore, is not the Babylonian record of Marduk’s work.

(b) The appeal of the critics to Phœnician, Egyptian, and Persian influences is of a rather elusive character. It is hard to see which particular points of these various cosmogonies can be said to have influenced the Hebrew writer. The Phœnicians begin with air moved by a breath of wind, and dark chaos; another account places first time, then desire, then darkness. The union of desire and darkness begets air (representing pure thought) and breath (the prototype of life); from these springs the cosmic egg. Sun, moon, and stars spring from the cosmic egg, and under the influence of light and heat the cosmic development continues, till the present universe is completed. The Egyptian cosmogony does not appear to contain any elements more fit to serve as the source of the Hexaemeron than are the Phœnician successive evolutions. In the beginning we find the primeval waters called Nun, containing the male and female germs, and informed by the divine proto-soul. The latter felt a desire (personified as the got Thot) for creative activity, the image of the future universe having formed itself in the eyes of Thot. Thot causes a movement in the waters, and the latter differentiate themselves into four pairs of deities, male and female. These cosmogonic gods transform the invisible divine will of Thot into a visible universe. First an egg is formed, out of which arises the god of light, Ra; he is the immediate cause of life in this world. In the subsequent formation of the universe the great Ennead of gods concurs. Variations of this cosmogony are found in the more popular accounts of creation, but they are not such as might be regarded as the source of the Hebrew cosmogony. The Persian cosmogony is really the second phase of the Iranian concept of creation. The great characteristic of Iranian thought is its dualism, which gradually tends towards monism. The early Persian phase dates from the time of the Sassanids, but in its present form is not earlier than the seventh century of the Christian Era. At any rate it seems quite impossible that the well-ordered and clear account of the Hexaemeron should be the outcome of the complicated and obscure presentation of the Avesta and the Pahlavi literature. Generally speaking, the Biblical Hexaemeron cannot be surpassed in grandeur, dignity, and simplicity. To derive it from any of the profane cosmogonies implies a derivation of order from disorder, of beauty from hideousness, of the sublime from the bizarre.

(2) Primitive Semitic Myth

Professor T. K. Cheyne (“Encyclopædia Biblica”, art. “Creation”, 940) writes: “Either the Hebrew and the Babylonian accounts are independent developments of a primitive Semitic

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myth, or the Hebrew is borrowed directly or indirectly from the Babylonian.” We have already excluded the second alternative. Professor Cheyne himself proves, against Dillmann, that the first alternative is inadmissible. A specifically Hebrew myth ought to be in keeping with the natural surroundings of the people. And, as the human mind naturally pictures to itself the first rise of the world as it still arises every day and every year, a distinctively Hebrew myth of the first rise, or the creation, of the universe should be a picture of the early morning and the springtime in Palestine or the Syro-Arabian desert. The watery chaos of the Hexaemeron, its division into the waters above and the waters below, and its separation between the waters and the dry land, do not agree with the sandy and desert country of the Hebrews. If it could be established that the Babylonian cosmogony is a mere nature myth, the foregoing data would agree with the phenomena of the Babylonian spring and the Babylonian morning. Owing to the heavy rains, the Babylonian plain looks like the sea during the long winter; then the god of the vernal sun, Marduk, brings forth the land anew, dividing the waters of Tiamtu, and sending them partly upwards as clouds, partly downwards to the rivers and canals. Again, the god of the rising sun, Marduk, every day conquers the cosmic sea, Tiamtu, dispelling the chaos of darkness, and dividing the nightly mists and fogs of the plain. A similar origin is quite impossible from a purely Hebrew point of view. While the foregoing considerations are hardly conclusive against those who admit a supernatural element in the formation of the Hebrew cosmogony, they are quite convincing against those who regard the Hebrew views on creation as a mere nature myth.

(3) Hebrew Folk-Lore

Those who regard Hebrew folk-lore as the source of the Hexaemeron point out that each nation has its tradition concerning its early history, or rather concerning men who lived and events which happened before the properly historical age of the nation. Among the Hebrews similar traditions must have existed, even including views as to the origin of the universe. Combining this fact with the Christian doctrine that the Biblical Hexaemeron is Divinely inspired, we may ask whether its text may not be a snatch of folk-lore, by Divine influence purged of error and of all that is not in keeping with the sacred character of the word of God, and committed to writing in order to teach men that the whole universe is the creature of God, and that the seventh day must be sanctified. In this case, the first chapter of Genesis would not be supernaturally revealed in the strictest sense of the word, but it would be an infallible record of an ancient belief, current among the Hebrews, as to the origin of the world. The sacred writer would have left us an inspired report of a Hebrew tradition just as other inspired writers have left us inspired accounts of certain historical documents. In itself, such a view of Gen., i, does not seem impossible; but, taking the Hexaemeron in the light of Christian tradition, its folk-lore theory of origin seems to be inadmissible. The Fathers, the early ecclesiastical writers, the Scholastics, and the more recent commentators would have been wrong in their endeavours to explain each sentence and even every word of Gen., i, in the same strict way in which they interpret the most sacred passages of Scripture. Their occasional recourse to figure and allegory only shows their conviction that the Hexaemeron contains not only inspired but also strictly revealed truth. A Catholic interpreter can hardly surrender such an uninterrupted Christian tradition in order to make room for a theory which sprang up only towards the end of the nineteenth century. Nor can it be urged that every sentence and every word of the Hebrew tradition concerning the origin of the universe, purified and infallibly preserved to us by inspiration, are equivalent to the strictly revealed passages of Scripture. Such an assumption concerning a profane ancient tradition implies the admission of a greater miracle than is demanded by a supernatural revelation in the strict sense of the word. Besides, the patrons of the folk-lore theory must explain the origin or source of the sublime Hebrew tradition, the existence of which they assume; thus they burden themselves with all the difficulties which are encountered by the critics in their endeavours to explain the natural origin of the creation myths.

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Finally the Biblical Commission in a decree issued 30 June, 1909, denies the existence of any solid foundation for the various exegetical systems devised and defended with a show of science to exclude the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis; in particular, it forbids the teaching of the view that the said three chapters of Genesis contain, not accounts of things which have really happened, but either fables derived from mythologies and the cosmogonies of ancient peoples, and by the sacred author expurgated of all error of polytheism and adapted to monotheistic doctrine, or allegories and symbols destitute of any foundation of objective reality and proposed under the form of history to inculcate historical and philosophical truths, or legends partly historical and partly fictitious freely composed for the instruction and edification of minds. The commission bases its prohibition on the character and historical form of the Book of Genesis, the special nexus of the first three chapters with one another and with those that follow, the almost unanimous opinion of the Fathers, and the traditional sense which, transmitted by the people of Israel, the Church has ever held.

(4) Revelation

As no man witnessed the creation and formation of the universe, all human speculations concerning this subject present only conjectures and hypotheses. In this field we obtain certain knowledge only by Divine revelation. Whether God granted this revelation by way of language, or by vision, or by another more intellectual process, we do not know; all of these methods are possible, and as such they may enter into the exegesis of Gen., i. Again, though very plausible reasons may be advanced for the thesis that God granted such a revelation to the first man, Adam, they are not absolutely convincing; the full instruction as to the origin of the world may have been given at a later period, perhaps only to the inspired writer of the Hexaemeron. If the revelation in question was granted at an earlier time, perhaps immediately after man’s creation, its substance may have been preserved by the aid of a special providence among the ancestors of the Hebrews. While the primitive doctrine degenerated among the races into their respective cosmogonies, modified by their various natural surroundings, one race may have kept alive the spark of Divine truth as it had been received from God in the cradle of humanity. Or, if such a purity of doctrine among the Hebrew ancestors appears to be incompatible with the vagaries of other Semitic cosmogonies, it may be assumed that God partially or wholly repeated His primitive revelation, during the time of the Patriarchs, for instance, or of Moses. At any rate, the attitude of Christian tradition towards the Hexaemeron implies its revealed character; hence, whatever theories may be held as to its transmission, its ultimate source is Divine revelation.

III. MEANING OF THE HEXAEMERON

The genuine meaning of the Hexaemeron is not self-evident. The history of its exegesis shows that even the greatest minds differ in their opinion as to its real meaning. All interpreters begin by feeling the need of an explanation of this passage of the Bible, and all end by differing from all other interpreters. There are hints as to the meaning of Gen., i, in other parts of Scripture. Prov., iii, 19 sq.; viii, 22 sq.; Wisd., ix, 9; Ecclus., xxiv, refer to the personal Divine Wisdom what the Hexaemeron attributes to the word of God; Prov., viii, 23 sqq., and Ecclus., xxiv, 14, exclude eternal creation. The words of the woman recorded in II Mach., vii, 28, inculcate a production out of nothing. Ps. ciii and Job, xxxviii sq., give a poetical amplification of the Hexaemeron. But these Biblical elucidations cannot claim to be a commentary on Gen., i. Nor has the Church given us any official explanation of the Mosaic account of God’s creative work. We must, therefore, rely on the principles of Catholic hermeneutics and the writings of Catholic interpreters for our understanding of the Hexaemeron. It will be found convenient, in our review of the pertinent exegetical work, to distinguish between literal and allegorical explanations.

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The legitimate character of this method of proceeding will become clear in the light of the aforesaid decree of 30 June, 1909, issued by the Biblical Commission. After safeguarding the literal, historical sense of the first three chapters of Genesis in as far as they bear on the facts touching the foundations of the Christian religion – e.g., the creation of all things by God at the beginning of time, the special creation of man, the formation of the first woman from the first man, the unity of the human race – the commission lays down several special principles as to the interpretation of the first part of Genesis: – (1) Where the Fathers and Doctors differ in their interpretation, without handing down anything as certain and defined, it is lawful, saving the judgment of the Church and preserving the analogy of faith, for everybody to follow and defend his own prudently adopted opinion. (2) When the expressions themselves manifestly appear to be used improperly, either metaphorically or anthropomorphically, and when either reason prohibits our holding the proper sense, or necessity compels us to set it aside, it is lawful to depart from the proper sense of the words and phrases in the above-mentioned chapters. (3) In the light of the example of the holy Fathers and of the Church herself, presupposing the literal and historical sense, the allegorical and prophetical interpretation of some parts of the said chapters may be wisely and usefully employed. (4) In interpreting the first chapter of Genesis we need not always look for the precision of scientific language, since the sacred writer did not intend to teach in a scientific manner the intimate constitution of visible things and the complete order of creation, but to give his people a proper notion according to the common mode of expression of the time. (5) In the denomination and distinction of the six days mentioned in the first chapter of Genesis the word yôm (day) can be taken either in its proper sense, as a natural day, or in an improper sense, for a period of time, and discussion on this point among exegetes is legitimate.

A. Literal Explanations

Literal explanations do not necessarily exclude the admission of any figurative language in the Hexaemeron. The various actions of God, for instance – His commands, His review of His work, His blessings – are expressed in anthropomorphic language. But a literal explanation insists on the literal interpretation of the six days, understanding them as periods corresponding to our spaces of twenty-four hours.

(a) Non-Concordist Interpretations

The author of IV Esdr., vi, 38 sqq., is excessive in the literalness of his interpretation; he also supplements the Biblical account of creation with profane Jewish traditions. Omitting the views of Theophilus of Antioch (“Ad Autol.”, II, in P. G., VI, 1069 sqq.), Hippolytus (fragm, in P. G., X, 583 sqq.), Tertullian (“Adv. Hermog.”, xix sqq., in P. L., II, 214 sqq.), and Clement of Alexandria (“Strom.”, V, xiv, in P. G., IX, 129 sqq.), who have dealt only cursorily with the Hexaemeron problem, we find patrons of the literal interpretation of Gen., i, in such writers as Ephraem (Opp., ed. Rome, 1737, I), Jacob of Edessa (ibid., p. 116), Diodorus of Tarsus (P. G., XXXIII, 1561 sqq.), Theodore of Mopsuestia (P. G., LXVI, 636 sqq.), St. Basil (P. G., XXIX, 17), Gregory of Nyssa (“Hexaemeron” in P. G., XLIV, 68), Philoponus (“De mundi creatione”; ed. Corderius, Vienna, 1730), Gregory the Great (“Mor.” in Job, xl, 10, in P. L. LXXVI, 644 sqq.), the Venerable Bede (“Hexaemeron” in P. L., XCI, 10 sqq.), Rabanus Maurus (“Comm. in Gen.” in P. L., CVII, 439), Walafried (“Gloss ord.” in P. L., XCIII, 67), Hugh of St. Victor (“Annot. in pentateuch”; “De sacram. fidei” in P. L., CLXXV, 29, and CLXXVI, 173), and other authors of minor importance.

During the Scholastic age, too, the literal interpretation of the Hexaemeron was the prevalent one, as may be seen in the great works of Peter Lombard (Sent., II), Bl. Albertus Mavgnus

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(Summ. theol., II, tract. XI), and St. Thomas (Summa, I, Q. lxv sqq.). Most of the subsequent commentators urged the literal sense of the Hexaemeron; this is true even of the early Protestant writers who were always insisting on the primitive text of Scripture. The scientific difficulties implied in the literal interpretation of Gen., i, were explained mainly by recourse to miracle, a method occasionally employed even down to our own day by some theological writers. We call these interpreters non- Concordist, not because they do not explain the difficulties in an absolutely possible way, but because they have no regard for the harmony between the inspired record and the laws of nature.

(b) The Hexaemeron Prior to the Geological Strata

In order to avoid any opposition between the Hexaemeron and the data of geology, it has been attempted to place the geological formations after the six days of creation. A. González de Sala (1650), I. Woodward (1659), I. Scheuchzer (1731), and others expressed the opinion that our present geological strata, fossils, etc. are due to the waters of the Deluge. G. Leibniz, A. L. Moro (1740), and others expressed their belief that the influence of fire and heat had been at least partial causes of the present conformation of the earth’s crust and surface. There was a great diversity of opinion as to the real length of time covered by the six days: G. Wiston (1696) maintained that before the rotation of the earth around its axis a day lasted a year; G. L. Buffon (1749) required a hundred thousand years for the Hexaemeron; while I. E. Silberschlag (1780) is content with six natural days. Among more recent writers the following are Diluvialists: C. F. Keil (“Biblischer Commentar”, Leipzig, 1866), P. Laurent (“Etudes géologiques”, Paris, 1863), A. Sorignet (“La Cosmogonie de la Bible”, etc., Paris, 1854), V. M. Gatti (“Institutiones apologetico-polemicæ”, 1867), I. E. Veith (“Die Anfänge der Menschenwelt”, Vienna, 1865), A. Bosizio (“Das Hexaemeron und die Geologie”, Mainz, 1865; “Die Geologie und die Sündfluth”, Mainz, 1877), A. Trisel (“Sündfluth oder Gletscher?” Munich, 1894, and “Das biblische Sechstagewerk”, Ratisbon, 1894), G. I. Burg (“Biblische Chronologie”, Trier, 1894). But this theory does not fully agree with the Biblical account of the Flood, nor does it satisfy the geologists.

(c) The Hexaemeron Posterior to the Geological Data

Another class of writers, whom we may call Restitutionists, are of the opinion that the Hexaemeron gives the history of the restoration of the earth after it had been so utterly destroyed that its chaos is properly described in Gen., i, 2. The geological data belong, therefore, to the period preceding this destruction of the world. Among the patrons of this theory we may mention: I. G. Rosenmüller (“Antiquissima telluris historia”, Ulm, 1776), W. F. Hetzel (“Die Bibel, Altes und Neues Test.”, Lemgo, 1780), Th. Chalmers (“Review of Cavier’s Theory of the Earth”, Edinburgh, 1814; “Evidence and Authority of the Divine Revelation”, Edinburgh, 1814), N. Wiseman (“Twelve Lectures”, London, 1849), W. Buckland (“Geology and Mineralogy”, London, 1838). The following interpreters identified the primeval destruction of the earth with the catastrophe brought on by the fall of the angels: L. Schmid (“Erklärung der hl. Schriften”, etc., Münster, 1834), A. Westermayer (“Das Alte Testament und seine Bedeutung”, Schaffhausen, 1861), and I. H. Kurtz (“Bibel und Astronomie”, Berlin, 1842). The speculations implied in this theory are hardly upheld by Sacred Scripture.

(d) The Hexaemeron within the Geological Formations

Father Pianciani has expressed the view that the six days of the Hexaemeron, though natural days, may not be continuous days; they may be picked out from among the long geological periods to which they respectively belong in such a way as to illustrate, as it were, the work

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going on in the several formative ages. A vast space of time may intervene between every two consecutive days, so as to make the six days cover the whole period of geological formation. But this explanation is hardly in keeping with the Biblical account of the six days. Besides, it can hardly be maintained that long ages intervened between the sixth and seventh day.

(e) The Hexaemeron is a Vision

Father von Hummelauer (“Commentarius in Genesim”, Paris, 1895) feels convinced, on the one hand, that the Hexaemeron speaks of six natural days, and that, on the other hand, it does not oppose the certain results of science. He believes that the vision theory will safeguard both these requirements. Instead of revealing the origin of the world in so many words, God showed Adam in a vision the general dependence of everything on His creative power; hence the Biblical Hexaemeron must be explained in the way in which other Scriptural visions are interpreted. The real length of time covered by the six visional days is not determined by Scripture; even the sequence of certain details may be different in nature from that in the vision, so that this theory does not interfere with the data of geology, while it safeguards the veracity of the inspired record. It is urged that the idea of Adam’s learning the history of the origin of the world in a vision was suggested by Chrysostom (P. G., LIII, 27), Severianus Gabalitus (“Or. V”, P. G. LVI, 431), and Junilius Africanus (“Instit. regularia”, lib. I, iii sq., in P. L. LXVIII, 17), for they taught that Moses learned the cosmogony by means of a prophetic light illuminating past, instead of future, events. Similar views concerning the origin of the Biblical cosmogony are advanced by Basil (P. G., XXIX, 5), Ambrose (P. L., XIV, 131 sqq.), Eustathius (P. L., LIII, 869), Gregory of Nyssa (P. G., XLIV, 65), Procopius (P. G., LXXXVII, 28), and other early writers. In more recent times the vision theory has been explained and partly defended by such writers as I. H. Kurtz (“Bibel und Astronomie”, Berlin, 1842), H. Miller (“The Testimony of the Rocks”, Edinburgh, 1857), F. W. Schultz (“Die Schöpfungsgeschichte nach Naturwissenschaft und Bibel”, Gotha, 1865), H. Reusch (“Bibel und Natur”, Freiburg, 1870), F. de Rougemont (“Le surnaturel démontré par les sciences naturelles”, Neuchâtel, 1870), B. Schäfer (“Bibel und Wissenschaft”, Münster, 1881), Moigno (“Les splendeurs de la foi”, Paris, 1877), E. Bougaud (“Le christianisme et les temps présents”, Paris, 1878), M.I. Scheeben (“Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik”, Freiburg, 1878), von Hummelauer (“Der biblische Schöpfungsbericht”, Freiburg, 1877; “Stimmen aus Maria Laach”, XXII, 1882, p. 97), V. Becker (“Studien op godsdienstig, wetenschappelik en letterkundig gebied”, Brussels and Bar-le-Duc, 1879), I. Corlay (“Spicil. dogm.-bibl.”, I, 880 sqq., Ghent, 1884; “La science catholique”, 15 July, 1889), W. Gray Elmslie (“The First Chapter of Genesis” in “Contemporary Review”, 1887), and some anonymous authors (“The Mosaic Record in Harmony with the Geological”, London, 1855; the “Katholik”, I, 1879, p. 250 sqq.). Still, there are other interpreters who take exception to the vision theory; they urge that in other parts of the Bible the presence of a vision is always indicated, that such a practical precept as the observance of the Sabbath cannot be based on a mere vision, etc.

(f) The Poetic Theory

We omit here the view that the Hexaemeron is merely an inspired record of a Semitic myth or a profane tradition (cf. F. Lenormant, “Origines”, I); this theory has been considered above. In a modified form it has been adopted by those writers who consider the Biblical cosmogony as a poem incorporated by Moses in the Book of Genesis. G. E. Paulus (“Neues Repertorium”, Jena, 1790) calls Gen., i, a Sabbath hymn; Rorison (“Replies to Essays and Reviews”, 1861), a creation psalm; Huxtable (The Sacred Record of Creation), a parable intended to teach the keeping of the Sabbath; Bishop Clifford (“Dublin review”, 1881, I, p. 311 sqq.; II, p. 498 sqq.; “The London Tablet”, 1881, April to July), a scheme to consecrate

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each day of the week to a particular creative act of God, so as to do away with the previous consecration of the weekdays to the several heathen gods. But both the setting of the Hexaemeron in the Book of Genesis and the constant tradition concerning its literary character agree in proclaiming its historicity; the poetic theory is at variance with this testimony.

B. Allegorical Explanations

Philo maintained the eternity of matter, identified the light of the first day with the angels, and gave a similar allegorical explanation of the other cosmogonic days. Origen, too (“Hom. in Hex.” in P. G., XII, 145 sqq.; “De princ.”, lib. IV, n. 16, and “C. Cels.”, lib. VI, 60, in P. G., XI, 376 sq., 1380), follows an allegorical explanation – the light of the first day denotes the angels, the abyss is hell, the upper and lower waters are the good and bad angels, the sun and the moon are Christ and His Church, etc. The world was created simultaneously, the various days denote only the diversity of created objects. Athanasius (“Or. II, c. Arian.”, n. 60, in P. G., XXVI, 276) also appears to maintain a simultaneous creation of the world; Procopius (“Comment.” in P. G., LXXXVII, 28 sqq.) regards the days of the Hexaemeron as purely ideal, indicating the order of created things. St. Augustine attempted three different times to explain the Hexaemeron in a literal sense, but each time he ended with an allegorical exegesis. In 389 (“De Gen. c. Manich.” in P. L., XXXIV, 173) he arrived at the conclusion that the cosmogonic evening and morning denote the completion and the inception of each successive work. In 393 (“De Gen. ad lit. lib. imperf.” in P. L., XXXIV, 221) the great African Doctor starts again with a literal explanation of Gen., i, but is soon perplexed by the questions: Did God consume the whole day in creating the various works? – How could there be days before there were heavenly luminaries? – How could there be light before the existence of the sun and the stars? – This leads him to adopt simultaneous creation, to identify the light of the first day with the angels, and to explain the evening and morning by the limitation and the beauty of the various created objects. In 401 Augustine began the third time to explain the Hexaemeron (“De Gen. ad lit. libr. XII” in P. L., XXXIV, 245; cf. “Retract.”, II, 24; Confess.”, lib. XII sq., in P. L., XXXII, 825), but published his results only fifteen years later. He admits again a simultaneous formation of the world, so that the six days indicate an order of dignity – angels, the firmament, the earth, etc. Morning and evening he refers now to the knowledge of the angels, assuming that they denote respectively the angelic vision of things in the Word of God, and the vision of the objects themselves. The opinion of Augustine was followed by pseudo-Eucherius (“Comm. in Gen.” in P. L., L, 893), Isidore (“Quæst. ex V. et N. T.” in P. L., XXXV, 2213), Alcuin (“Interr. et respons. in Gen.” in P. L., C, 515), Scotus Eriugena (“De divis. natur.” in P. L., CXXII, 439), Rupertus (“De Trinit. et oper. ejus” in P. L., CLXVII, 199), and Abelard (“Expos. in Hex.” in P. L., CLXXVIII, 731). In the sixteenth century, too, Cajetan and Melchior Cano adhered to the view of a simultaneous creation (cf. “Loc. theol.”, Salamanca, 1563). In the following centuries this allegorical interpretation developed into two main branches. –

(a) The Concordists

I. Kant (1755) and P. S. Laplace (1796) suggested that the stars were formed under the influence of the force of gravity by the rotation of the primitive body of matter around its own axis. G. Cuvier (“Discours sur les révolutions du globe”, Paris, 1812) divided the ages of geological formation into six periods and separated one from the other by great catastrophes. He was followed in this by M. de Serres (De la cosmogonie de Moïse), J. F. Krüger (“Geschichte der Urwelt”, Quedlinburg and Leipzig, 1822), D. A. de Frayssinous (“Défense du christianisme”, Paris, 1825), A. Nicolas (“Etudes philosophiques sur le Christianisme”, Paris, 1842), and I. B. Pianciani (“In historiam creationis mosaicam

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commentatio”, Naples, 1851). C. Lyell (1836-38) denied the occurrence of the six great catastrophes, substituting an imperceptibly slow process of geological formation in their place. Still, there remains the general division into the palæozoic, the mesozoic, and the cenozoic strata; the first are characterized by their remains of carboniferous plants; the second by traces of amphibious and fish life; the third show remnants of mammals. These periods correspond, therefore, roughly speaking, to the third, fifth, and sixth days of the Hexaemeron. Similarly, there appear to be astronomical periods which correspond to the first, second, and fourth days of Gen., i. It is not surprising, therefore, that the so-called Concordists have found these six long periods in the six days of the Hexaemeron, and have endeavoured to establish an identity between the product of each period and the work described in each day of Gen., i. Moreover, these scholars point out that the Hebrew word translated “day” does not necessarily mean a natural day; that, in the absence of the sun, the first three days of the Hexaemeron cannot be natural days, and that therefore the second three days are not necessarily natural days; again, that the seventh day is certainly not a natural day, so that the first six days must be indefinite periods of time rather than natural days. Among the writers who favour this theory we may name: C. G. Hensler (“Bemerkungen über Stellen aus den Psalmen und der Genesis”, Kiel, 1791), S. Turner (“Sacred History of the World”, 3 rd ed., London, 1833), H. Miller (“The Testimony of the Rocks”, Edinburgh, 1857), I. Ebrard (“Der Glaube an die heilige Schrift und die Ergebnisse der Naturforschung”, Königsberg, 1851), Mgr Meignan (“Le monde et l’homme primitif”, Paris, 1869), G. Molloy (“Geology and Revelation”, London, 1870), M. Pozzy (“La terre et le récit biblique de la création”, Paris, 1874). On the other hand, it has been pointed out that more than 20,000 species of animal life are found in the old palæozoic strata, while the fruit-bearing plants are found only in the mesozoic strata; moreover, that the plants found in the palæozoic strata resemble the plants found in the more recent strata, so that they must have needed the light of the sun, though the sun appeared only in the period succeeding that of the palæozoic strata; finally, that, according to the obvious sense of the text, the work of each day of the Hexaemeron was complete before the next day commenced. Arguments like these are urged by such writers as H. Reusch (“Bibel und Natur”, 3rd ed., Freiburg, 1870, pp. 235 sqq.; 4th ed., 1876, pp. 344 sqq.) and C. Gütler (“Naturforschung und Bibel”, Freiburg, 1877, pp. 91 sqq.).

(b) The Idealists

We have seen that St. Augustine and a number of patristic writers maintained the simultaneity of creation, and regarded the division into six days only as a classification of the various things created. The Idealists take their start from the second part of St. Augustine’s position, while for the great African Doctor’s simultaneous creation they substitute the gradual development of the earth as demanded by the scientist. Among the first to propose this theory was F. Michelis (“Natur und Offenbarung”, Münster, 1855). He believes that Moses narrates the creation story as an historian might write the life of Charlemagne by considering him successively as king, as lawgiver, as Christian, as father of a family. Reusch, who had been a Concordist in the first editions of his great work, became an Idealist in the third edition (“Bibel und Natur”, Freiburg, 1870). Father Braun (“Ueber Kosmogonie vom Standpunkt christlicher Wissenschaft”, Münster, 1889) endeavours to combine Concordism with Idealism. I. B. Baltzer (“Die biblische Schöpfungsgeschichte”, Leipzig, 1867), Reusch (“Theol. Literatur-Blatt”, Bonn, 1867, p. 232), C. Gützler (“Naturforschung und Bibel”, Freiburg, 1877, pp. 101 sqq.), and Schäfer (“Bibel und Wissenschaft”, Münster, 1881, pp. 237 sq.) have written against Idealism either as a whole or in its various special forms. The cosmogonic days and their succession, as exhibited in the Hexaemeron, appear to lose all meaning in the Idealists’ theory.

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Considering the foregoing theories without bias, and in the light of both science and Revelation, a moderate form of Concordism or the theory of vision will be found to serve the Catholic interpreter most effectually both from a scientific and a critical point of view.

GUNKEL AND ZIMMERN, Schöpfung und Chaos (Göttingen, 1895); DELITSCH, Das babylonische Weltschöpfungsepos (Leipzig, 1896); JENSEN, Mythen und Epen (Berlin, 1900); LOISY, Les mythes babyloniens (Paris, 1905); DAMASCUS, Quæstiones de primis principiis, ed. KOPF (1826); ABYDENUS in EUSEBIUS, Præpar. evang., IX, xli; BEROSUS in EUSEBIUS, Chronicon, Armenian version, according to ALEXANDER POLYHISTOR; DAVIS, Genesis and Semitic Tradition (London, 1894); LAGRANGE, Etudes sur les religions sémitiques (2nd ed., Paris, 1905); VIGOUROUX, Manuel biblique (9th ed.), I, 499 sqq; IDEM, Les Livres saints et la critique rationaliste (4th ed.), III, 235 sqq; IDEM, La cosmogonie mosaïque d’après les Pères in Les Mélanges bibliques (2nd ed.), 11 sqq.; MOTAIS, Moïse, la science et l’exégèse (Paris, 1882). – Add all the authors and works cited in the body of the article. A.J. MAAS

Cf. Robert J. Schneider, “What the Bible Teaches About Creation”: In sum (with my additions [in square braces]—B.A.M.):

Many scholars have noted a pattern to the “six days”: in the first three [days,] “bohu,” i.e., “formlessness,” is given form:

(1) light emerges from darkness, [God creates light and separates it from the darkness](2) [God creates the firmament and by its means] the waters are separated to form the lower and upper seas—the latter supported by the “firmament,” and (3) [God separates the dry land from the seas, so that] land emerges from the lower sea and is adorned with plant life.

In the latter three days “tohu,” i.e., the state of being “empty,” is filled:

(4) the sun, moon, and stars fill the firmament [or rather, are set within it as adornment], (5) fish and other sea creatures fill the lower sea and birds the sky, and (6) wild and domestic beasts, other land creatures, and human beings fill the earth (Hyers 67—71).

The seventh day of rest hallows and validates the commandment of a Sabbath rest (Exod. 20:11) by weaving it into the very structure of creation.

I say:

1. first there is the work of creation: the bringing into being of the all2. then there is the work of distinction, which consists in giving form to what is

formless: this rationale applying to heaven as well as to earth (i.e. it is wrong to speak of the work of the six days as if it applied only to the earth: the creation of the firmament is a determination of ‘heaven’)

3. then comes the work of adornment, which consists in filling up what is empty: which applies to both heaven (with the sun, the moon, and the stars) as well as to the earth

These are like steps which an artisan would take in making a kosmos, or ornament.

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In sum:

(1) opus distinctionis (the work of distinction): days one, two, and three (first part)(2) opus ornatus (the work of adornment): days, three (last part), four, five, and six

Cf. Richard M. Davidson, “In the Beginning: How to Interpret Genesis 1”.1

The natural flow of Genesis 1-2

The flow of thought in Genesis 1-2 is as follows:

a. God is before all creation (verse 1). b. There is an absolute beginning of time with regard to this world and its surrounding

heavenly spheres (verse 1). c. God creates the heavens and earth (verse 1), but they are at first different than now, they

are “unformed” and “unfilled” (tohu and bohu; verse 2). d. On the first day of the seven-day Creation week, God begins to form and fill the tohu and

bohu (verses 3 and following). e. The “forming and filling” creative activity of God is accomplished in six successive literal

24-hour days. f. At the end of creation week, the heavens and earth are finally finished (Genesis 2:1). What

God began in verse 1 is now completed. g. God rests on the seventh day, blessing and sanctifying it as a memorial of creation (2:1-4).

Cf. Fr. John F.X. McCarthy, “Not the Real Genesis 1”. Review of Stanley L. Jaki, Genesis 1 Through the Ages (Living Tradition No. 51, March, 1994):

Thus, for instance, Richard Clifford in the New Jerome Biblical Commentary (p. 10) and Bruce Vawter in A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture (p. 173) align the se-paration of light from darkness on day one with the fixing of the lights in the firmament on day four, the separation of the waters above and below the firmament on day two with the creation of the birds of the air and the fishes of the sea on day five, and the separation of the dry land from the oceans on day three with the creation of the land animals (and man) on day six. (Clifford and Vawter also align the creation of plants on the third day with the creation of man who feeds on plant life on the sixth day, but this is arbitrary.)

Cf. John F. McCarthy, ibid.:

The author identifies three themes in the discourse of Genesis 1: a) “a thematic emphasis (in two stages) on the totality of all things as wholly dependent on the Maker of all and on the consequent radical goodness of all things”; b) the presentation of God the worker as a pattern for all human labor; c) man’s introduction as the purpose and steward of creation.” The theme of man’s introduction as the purpose and steward of creation “is the easiest to isolate, coming as it does towards the end.” The other two themes are “intertwined through the entire discourse or narrative.” Genesis 1 gave a “renewed emphasis” to an Old Testament injunction relating to the sacredness of the Sabbath, “a feature that goes far beyond a grouping of days into seven-day units, a facet already on hand in other ancient cultures” (290).

<...>

1 (http://dialogue.adventist.org/articles/06_3_davidson_e.htm [accessed 12/1/06])

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The parallelism of the days of creation has been much better illustrated by other writers. The usual parallel is between the opus distinctionis of days one, two, and three, and the opus ornatus of days four, five, and six.

Thus, for instance, Richard Clifford in the New Jerome Biblical Commentary (p. 10) and Bruce Vawter in A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture (p. 173) align the separation of light from darkness on day one with the fixing of the lights in the firmament on day four, the separation of the waters above and below the firmament on day two with the creation of the birds of the air and the fishes of the sea on day five, and the separation of the dry land from the oceans on day three with the creation of the land animals (and man) on day six. (Clifford and Vawter also align the creation of plants on the third day with the creation of man who feeds on plant life on the sixth day, but this is arbitrary.) The author over and over again berates the opus distinctionis / opus ornatus schema, but he does not mention this standard alignment at all, nor does he, consequently, offer any arguments against it, even though it is by all means the most obvious one.

<...>

To split or to create. ...There are other problems also with the reasoning of the author. Logically, on the basis of his etymological claim regarding b r ‘, he should suggest as the translation of verse 1: “In the beginning God split heaven and earth,” or “In the beginning God slashed heaven and earth,” but instead he begins to look at the context, the fact that it is the omnipotent God Who is acting, and he translates it as “made with the greatest ease.” This, however, is no contribution to the meaning of the verse. What else is to create out of nothing than to create with the greatest of ease and even with a flourish? Has anyone ever supposed that to create out of nothing involves some kind of a struggle? Moreover, the great exegetes of the past never took the meaning “to create out of nothing” from the mere use of the verb b r ‘, but rather from a fuller understanding of its context in the verse. It is the phrase “in the beginning,” signifying at the beginning of time, before which nothing in the universe existed, that causes b r ‘ to mean “created out of nothing.” The Vulgate uses the word creavit (created) in the Latin translation of three verses of Genesis 1: in verse 1 for the creation of the world; in verse 21 for the creation of life in biological beings; and in verse 27 for the creation of man.

To understand the context of these three uses of the word creavit, it is necessary to recognize two kinds of creation out of nothing. The first kind is creatio ex nihilo sui et subiecti (creation out of the nothingness of itself and of a subject). This is the first act of creation recorded in verse 1 – the only place where the Fathers and other traditional exegetes have understood creation out of nothing in the strict sense. The second kind of creation is creatio ex nihilo sui (creation out of the nothingness of itself) from a subject already existing. This applies to the creation of plants and animals from pre-existing matter and the creation of man “from the slime of the earth” in the narrative of Genesis 1. The assumption is that Moses used the special term b r ‘ for these three instances of creation out of nothing to emphasize also the fact that the living species of plants and animals and the rational species of man could not have come into existence from lower forms without the first production of these forms from the nothingness of themselves. In each case, the translation of b r ‘ as created stems from its fuller meaning in the respective sentence.

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3. The structure of Genesis: general considerations.

Cf. Theopedia, “Interpretations of the creation account:”2

Genesis 1 in outline

Before tackling the areas of discussion among Christians, it is good for us to consider all on which we are agreed. The account of creation in Genesis 1 teaches several such truths, a selection of which is presented here below.

Firstly, that God pre-exists everything in the universe. We see that “in the beginning, God created the heavens and earth”; in context, this refers to everything to follow. But everything to follow is, precisely, every physical thing.

Secondly, that it is God who created everything. The opening words, indeed, tell us that “in the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth”. The phrase “the heavens and the earth” is a Hebrew short-hand for “everything”, since anything can be categorised as belonging to the heavens, or to the earth.

Thirdly, that God created everything. The term for “to create” is a Hebrew word which, in this context, means “to fashion something new, from nothing”.

Fourthly, that God’s creation was exactly as he wanted it to be. God declared each day’s work to be “very good”, meaning that nothing was lacking. Everything he had made fulfilled its purpose completely.

Cf. Analysis of the Creation account of Genesis 1:

Day

What God said What was madeWhat was

named

What was added or changed

1 Let there be light. Heaven and earth; earth was covered by the primeval waters, and in darkness. The earth was “without form, and void”.The first morning dawned with the appearance of the light, when the universe was formed, and as the light penetrated the primeval darkness.All was declared good.

Day, Night

Naming of “Day” and “Night”.

2 Let there be a ‘solid layer’ in the midst of the waters.

The earth’s waters were divided; the ‘raqia’ was formed “in the midst of the waters”. This was the formation of the rocky crust of the earth, which overlies the interior waters of the ‘great deep’. [actually, the firmament is the sky, not earth (B.A.M.)]

Heaven The statement about God naming the ‘raqia’, redefining it as Heaven. The declaration that all was good is missing in the Hebrew and KJV, but it occurs in the LXX.

2 (http://www.theopedia.com/Interpretations_of_the_creation_account [12/13/06])

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3 Let the waters be gathered into one place, and let dry land appear. Let the earth bring forth grass, herbs, and fruit trees.

The newly formed rocky crust of the earth was raised from the waters of the sea, and water drained off the land. Continents and oceans formed, and vegetation developed.All was declared good.

Earth, Sea

Naming of Earth and Sea.

4 Let there be lights to divide day and night, and to determine the seasons and years.

Two lights were made, the sun and the moon.All was declared good.

Statements that the luminaries were “set in the firmament”, and about their “ruling” of Day and Night, and the possible addition of the words “and the stars.”

5 Let the waters bring forth moving creatures, and fowl that fly in the air.

Great whales and all other sorts of sea creatures; also birds. They were blessed; sea creatures were to be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters, and fowl were to multiply in the earth.All was declared good.

The reference to the fowl flying in the “open firmament of Heaven”.

6 Let the earth bring forth living creatures; Let us make man in our image, and let them have dominion over the created things.

Beasts and cattle, and all creeping things. Man was created, male and female. They were given all fruit and green herbs for food. God blessed man and gave them dominion, and told them to multiply, and subdue the earth.All was declared good.

7 On the 7th day God rested from all his work. Because of this, he sanctified the Sabbath day, and blessed it.

© Copyright 1996 by Douglas E. CoxAll Rights Reserved.

§

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Cf. Making Sense of Genesis 1:3

Rikki E. WattsRegent CollegeUsed by Permission, 2002.

Interpreting Genesis 1 continues to be a controversial issue—and for all sorts of people. This is hardly surprising for at least two reasons. On one level, how one reads Genesis 1 has in some circles become a litmus test of Christian orthodoxy, whether conservative or liberal. Hold the “wrong” view and one is either a dupe of secular critical theory or a troglodyte literalist. This hardly bodes well for the unity of that new humanity that God is forming in Christ. On another level, the importance of stories of origins cannot be overestimated. They define us. They tell us who we are and what it means to be human. In terms of our topic, whatever the technical merits or otherwise of Darwin’s theory of biological evolution, its widespread acceptance has gone a long way toward discrediting a “literal” reading of Gene-sis 1 and with it the standing of Christianity and its vision of humanity. Consequently, and rather more provocatively, it is hard to imagine the modern North-American trade in aborted baby body parts or the horrors of Holocaust and Gulag were it not for the stark materialism of, and the eugenic theory inherent in, the more imperialist and triumphalist forms of twentieth-century Darwinism. However, it must be recognized that it will be difficult if not impossible to reverse these trends if resistance is not undergirded by a more convincing and coherent alternative view of human origins than Darwinism can offer. And this in terms of both the objective—what happened—and the subjective—what it means. For Christians such an alternative must include Genesis 1 and that necessarily involves the question of how it is to be read. If in the end we find that Genesis 1 ought to be read “literally”, then so be it. On the other hand, the more work I do on the world out of which this account emerged, the more I am led to question whether the “literalist” reading is in fact truly faithful to the text.

In my experience most Christians and readers of the Bible come to Genesis 1 with many of their beliefs already in hand. This is not to be dismissed as a typical example of blind private faith versus well-attested public fact, as Bertrand Russell so gloriously misconstrued things. It is an inescapable part of being human. Michael Polanyi reminded us that taking a great many things on trust is the essential first step to knowledge, even and perhaps especially in that highest and holiest of all modern callings, science. All of us, Christians and scientists together, simply have to take a great deal on trust, to assume much, if we are ever to get started on the path to knowing. The saying is sure, without assuming something no one shall know anything. But having said that, it is important regularly to reassess those assumptions in the light of our growing knowledge and in doing so to recognize that truth in this kind of historical and literary endeavour is much more a matter of coherence than of certainty. Bernard Lonergan rightly understood that the first step in knowing was to pay attention to all of the data, then to apply our intelligence in seeking to understand, and finally to use our reason to judge between hypotheses. This is the advice, which, to the best of my ability, I intend to take here.

Reading Ancient Documents

Our problems begin in that most of us read Genesis 1 in our mother tongue, and that tongue is not Hebrew. This is both helpful and potentially misleading. The help is obvious, the potential harm less so. The fact remains that this story was originally written in another language, a very long time ago, and in a culture whose world, while not totally other than ours, was both different and very differently understood. In one sense they no doubt looked

3 (http://www.asa3.org/ASA/topics/Bible-Science/6-02Watts.html [12/13/06])

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out on the same physically constituted landscape, but as Lonergan also reminded us: seeing is not the same as knowing. The assumptions that they once brought and we now bring to the text—Gadamer’s horizons—are very likely to be rather different. That this is so can hardly be contested as the divergent interpretations of Genesis 1 even in our own day bear witness. The same ink spots generate some very different understandings. The upshot is that if we are not attentive, the fact that Genesis 1 is in our own language can lull us into assuming that familiar words and phrases are intended to invoke the understandings and assumptions of our twenty-first-century world. This is, of course, just as much a mistake as reading Shakespeare as though he was writing in twenty-first-century Vancouver or Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, the less we “modernize” Shakespeare the more foreign he appears and the less likely the error of anachronism. It is useful, then, to remember that Genesis 1 was originally written in Hebrew, and even better to read it in the same.

The question arises: but even so, whose understanding is correct? Do not our individual perspectives mire us in a hopeless relativism? Not at all. These ink spots are not merely signs. They are particular signs in a particular order. They are the readers’ “marching orders,” designed by the writer to communicate what he intended to the competent reader. The terms of those marching orders are indicated by the genre, the contract made between writer and reader as to how the signs are to be read. This is really nothing new since we all get along very well every day on this basis, almost unconsciously using genre to distinguish between the truth claims of Peanuts (no, there is not in fact a canine whose philosophizing rivals Plato) and The Vancouver Sun (but how we wish that some of our politicians were more like Snoopy!).

The trick is to do as much work as we can in determining the genre and in seeking to understand the worldview out of which Genesis 1 emerged. This will involve not only looking at Genesis 1 in detail but also paying attention to similar stories elsewhere in order to get a feel for the kinds of issues with which the ancients were concerned and the language they used in dealing with them. The last sentence might generate some anxiety. There is no need. When a good preacher or exegete does word studies he or she is not confined only to the biblical texts as though they were written in an hermetically sealed environment. They also consider how the language functioned in the broader cultural context of the day. The same surely applies here. But bear in mind the distinction: we are not talking about borrow-ing or dependence but rather about the use of common motifs and ideas to deal with com-mon concerns. The central truth claims of Genesis 1 can be very different from the origins stories of the surrounding cultures even if it uses, as we would expect it to, the language and imagery of the day.

Genre as Reading Contract: Form and Content

Literary genre is communicated to the reader through form and content. <…>

William Blake’s famous couplet, “Tiger, tiger, burning bright, in the forests of the night,” is another case in point. It is true? Not if one reads it “literally” as a description of the propensity of feral cats to ignite spontaneously during their nocturnal wanderings. And protesting with increasingly agitated vigor “Blake says it, I believe it, and that settles it” does not help much. What Blake actually says is a matter of genre, that is, of form and content. We recognize the form: poetry. That means we need to be alert to metaphor, image, and poetic license, whether simplification or hyperbole. It would be folly, if not downright and culpable stupidity, to demand technical precision from poetry. We also consider the content. Tigers do not in our experience habitually explode whilst wandering in dark forests. These two considerations—form and content—help us understand what it is that Blake is trying to say. So is his description true? In one very real sense, yes. Ask yourself, what gives a better

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understanding of the essence of tigerness: Blake’s simple and stylized couplet or a fifty-five-volume DNA map of tiger genes?

Two important considerations emerge. First, in our scientific world it is easy to forget that there are ways of telling the truth other than algebraic formulae or Western-style history. Furthermore, some of the most important and meaningful things in our lives are best shared using metaphor and poetic image. Listen to the top 40 and see how often lyrics such as E=mc2 dominate the charts. The same applies to the biblical text, large slabs of which are not in plodding prose. Most of the prophets preferred poetry. This does not mean that what they say is not true. But in order to make their message more memorable and compelling, they use a genre best suited to that task. Now, I am not attempting to stack the deck for a partic-ular reading of Genesis 1. I am only trying to establish the fact that some of us have a sub-conscious suspicion of anything other than one particular kind of truth-telling genre to which certain parts of our culture or our upbringing have accustomed us.

In my experience this immediately gives rise to a second question: but if we read Genesis 1 like this, where will it all end? What is to prevent everything solid from wilting into some kind of metaphorical jelly? The answer is again genre. Take, for instance, Jesus’ walking on the water. Bultmann, like Schweitzer before him, regarded these stories as myths, largely on the grounds that people do not do this kind of thing. And they are, in part, right. We have never seen such things and we ought to be amazed and sceptical. But remember, content is only half the story. There is also form. Although there is some debate, it seems clear to me that the form of the gospels will not allow myth, fairy tale, novel, or legend as viable genre options. At this point, form overrides the content consideration. Whatever else the gospel writers were trying to do, to the best of our present knowledge the form of their stories indicates that they are convinced that these things really happened.

So with all this in view, what can we say about the genre and consequently the truth claims of Genesis 1?

Genesis 1: Form and Content

Turning first to the form, even a cursory reading of Genesis 1 reveals a great deal of repetition: “and God said” (vv. 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, 24, 26, 28, 29), “let there be” (or some form thereof; vv. 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, 24, 26), “and it was so” (vv. 3, 7, 9, 11, 15, 24, 30), “and God made” (or similar action; vv. 4, 7, 12, 16, 21, 25, 27), “and God saw that ‘x’ was good” (vv. 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31), some form of naming or blessing (vv. 5, 8, 10, 22, 28), “there was evening and there was morning” (vv. 5, 8, 13, 19, 23, 31), and then a designation of the day as first, second, etc. (vv. 5, 8, 13, 19, 23, 31; 2.2), with most of these occurring seven times. Usually we associate this kind of repetition with poetry. But we have examples of ancient Hebrew poetry (e.g., Exod 15; Num 23-24; Deut 33; Judg 5), and Genesis 1 is clearly not the same thing. But equally, if not more so, neither is this repetition characteristic of straight narrative, as a quick glance at even Genesis 2 or 1 Samuel will reveal. That modern translators and the vast majority of commentators recognize the poetic character of Genesis 1 is indicated by the printed format used in nearly all modern versions of the Bible.

There are other indications that this text is highly stylized. In ancient writing it is not uncommon to find the opening sentences offering clues to the structure of what follows—something like their version of a table of contents. Genesis 1:2 tells us that the earth was without structure (formless) and empty. With this in mind, it has long been recognized that days 1-3 and 4-6 are correlated, with days 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6 concerning the same elements of creation:

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Day Structuring Filling Day

3 water / land land animals / humans 6

2 waters above (sky) / waters below

birds / fish 5

1 day / night sun / moon and stars 4

Entirely in keeping with Genesis 1:2, we have two sets of three days: the first con-cerning giving form to or structuring what was formless and the second concerning filling the newly created but empty forms. Furthermore, in both sets there is a progression from heaven to earth, with the preparation of the land and the formation of humanity respect-tively as the climactic moment. This progression is further highlighted by the nature of Yahweh’s creative acts. Days 1 and 4 have a single act, days 2 and 5 one creative act of two parts, and finally days 3 and 6 consist of two creative acts. It seems to me that unless we have a previous agenda this kind of detailed and highly stylized literary patterning strongly cautions against taking this account too concretely. This is not to say it is not true, only that its truth claims may not be of the kind we associate with “literal” reading.

So much for formal indications. What about the content? The first thing we note is the twenty-four hour period—or, to be more precise, a working period of twelve hours from morning to evening (the day ending with evening and the following announce-ment of morning indicating the beginning of a new day). While it is true that “day” (yom) can elsewhere mean a longer period (e.g., Ps 90:4), it seems to me that the use of evening/morning terminology and Yahweh’s rest on the seventh day (in the light of the Sabbath commandment, Exod 20:11; more on this below) makes it all but undeniable that twenty-four hour periods are in view. We also note that there is no mention of any ending of the seventh day. This is probably because the narrative has arrived at Yahweh’s rest in his completed creation, and there is no need to go further.

More to the point perhaps is the question: why did the various creative acts of the six days take the same amount of time? One would have thought that creating the sun, moon, and stars with all their mind-numbing extent throughout our vast universe would require consid-erably more time than creating birds and fish. And why would separating the waters above and below take as long as creating all of the land-dwelling creatures? Even the notion of a firmament in which the heavenly bodies are placed is hardly in keeping with what we now understand. And why exactly twelve hours and not two or forty-seven and a quarter? Why should it take God any time to do anything? Why should he work only in daylight hours? Surely he does not need to rest at night, and the idea that it was too dark for him to see is ludicrous. And what about the flightless land birds and the amphibians which seem not to fit any of the categories? Then we notice that Genesis 2:4-7 suggests that the creation of plants was delayed until apparently the creation of humanity to work the fields. But in Genesis 1 plants are created several days beforehand. It is hard to understand how three days without tillage could be such a problem.

None of this is intended to be taking cheap shots. It is, however, intended to suggest something about the genre, and thus about the kind of truth communicated in Genesis 1. When we ask questions and get answers like these, our customary response is to recognize that whatever the truth claims of the account might be, it is not what we normally call “literal” history. Strangely, some readers of Genesis at this point suddenly decide to ignore the genre contract between writer and reader which they customarily and everywhere else observe. One cannot help but wonder if there is some other agenda at work.Based at this point solely on the text itself and applying the same standards we use

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everywhere else for assessing genre, that is, to consider form and content, it appears that Genesis 1 is not intended to be read “literally,” at least in the popular usage where it usually means “concretely” or strictly and without the possibility of metaphor, hyperbole, or symbol. This does not mean Genesis 1 is not true. It does, however, mean that its truth claims are of a different nature.

Genesis 1 in Its Ancient Near Eastern Environment

How then are we to approach our reading of Genesis 1? As in the reading of any document, it helps to have some familiarity with comparable materials, in this case other ancient creation stories. What we are after, in dealing with the ancients’ view of origins, is some idea of the kinds of questions they asked and how they answered them. Again, this is not to assume that Genesis 1 is identical to, or of the same genre as, these other stories or has borrowed from them. We are simply interested in trying to understand what issues a second-millennium B.C. culture might have been interested in. I am, however, assuming that they were not trying to do modern science nor attempting to show that Darwin was wrong—hardly likely since neither was around at the time. It is impossible here to carry out a thorough comparison of ancient creation stories, but a cursory overview will be helpful in giving us a feel for the kinds of concerns that the first audience of Genesis 1 might have brought to the text.

(1) Sumerian — We have very little from the Sumerians of the third millennium B.C. They have no epic origins poem, and instead all we have are some brief indications in introductions legitimating their social order. One story describes a very early division between heaven and earth where Enlil, god of the air, separates An and Ki (heaven and earth). Another begins with Nammu, a watery goddess, who then becomes mother of heaven and earth and all the gods. As increasing order emerges from an amorphous whole, humans, who had previously been animals, become a special kind of creature.

(2) “Babylonian” — Although often regarded as “Babylonian,” the Atrahasis and Enuma Elish myths are probably of more complex origins. Not only had Babylonian culture inherited materials from the Sumerians, but it was also influenced by a mid-third-millennium incursion of Semites and a late-third-millennium takeover by the Amorites. Although most of our sources derive from the Assyrian or Neo-Babylonian period, the traditions themselves are probably more ancient. The Atrahasis myth, whose earlier form is found in the Sumerian account of Enki and Ninmakh, was probably the standard Babylonian version of the creation of humanity. At first the gods and humans were not differentiated. The weaker gods, the Igigi, performed irrigation and drainage, but growing tired, they threatened rebellion. Humans were then created, by mixing clay with the blood of a god, to take over these tasks.

Our earliest records of the Enuma Elish have been dated from the 1300s, although they too are probably derived from earlier sources. More recently this account has been regarded as a late and sectarian story concerned with the localized elevation of Babylon and her god Marduk as both rose to prominence around 1500 B.C. In any case, Tiamat, the seawater, and her husband, Apsu, the fresh groundwaters, are the first to rise from primeval chaos, and their intermingling engenders other generations of gods. Apsu, seeking rest in his maturity, becomes agitated at the increasing activity and noise of the younger deities and plots their extermination. He is thwarted, however, by Ea, the god of the heavens, who casts a sleeping spell upon him, murders him, and builds his palace upon Apsu’s water-corpse. Ea and his wife, Damkina, have their first son, the precocious Marduk, who is twice as strong, wise, and glorious as any other god.In time, the younger deities seek to avenge Apsu’s murder, and Kingu, new consort of

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Tiamat, is chosen as their leader. The other gods, terrified, choose Marduk, son of the usurper Ea. As battle is joined, Kingu is cowed by Marduk’s magnificent appearance, but Tiamat with an accompanying host of serpent monsters is undeterred. However, with the help of the mighty north wind that distends Tiamat’s watery body, Marduk shoots an arrow down her gullet. He celebrates his victory by dividing her watery carcass in two, creating heaven and earth, then the stars, plants, and other living things. After the battle, Kingu and his host are reduced to servitude but soon complain that this role is not fit for deities. Kingu is slain and his blood mixed with earth to create humans who are now to perform forced labour for the gods. They are particularly to provide for Marduk in his Temple at Babylon, which is then established. There is no mention of humans being made in the image of the deities, although the reference to the Lamga gods may imply some sense of humans reflecting divine statuary.

It should be noted, however, that this story is not primarily an explanation of creation, but is rather an aetiology to elevate Marduk, the chief god of the Babylonian pantheon, showing how he attained his supremacy in cosmological terms and to explain why Babylon (with its Temple) is the chief city. Some fifty names celebrate Marduk as the sustainer of life on earth and in heaven. His glorification undergirds and legitimates both divine and human institutions of governance, namely, the Temple and the kingship, which are the sine qua non of great Babylon’s existence.

(3) Egyptian – Surprisingly, although Israel had just spent 400 years in Egypt, relatively little attention has been given to Egyptian creation accounts which one might otherwise expect to provide the dominant background against which Genesis 1 was heard or read. And considering that Genesis is traditionally described as one of the books of Moses, from a literary standpoint it seems right to read it in the light of Israel’s exodus. At the outset, it should be noted that there is no unitary or common Egyptian creation story but rather a range of variations depending on which deity is in view. Egyptians apparently accepted a variety of myths and rejected none with the result that the often meagre data derives from a range of diverse texts. Nevertheless, some characteristic themes emerge.

Unlike the Mesopotamians who believed in a number of creator gods, the Egyptians held only one deity responsible for their universe—referred to as “heaven and earth”—whether in the New Kingdom or in Memphite theology. The act of creation is described in various ways. In the Pyramid texts (c. 2350-2176 B.C.) there is a sudden emergence of a primordial mound(s) or hillock(s) (which the Pyramids symbolized) out of the watery void of Nun, upon which Atum materialized in an act of self-creation. These became the sites—the Holy Places of creation—upon which Temples were built. Atum then creates the lesser gods, all of whom are personifications of various elements of the natural world. In the Memphite texts (Old Kingdom, c. 2500-2200 B.C.) which polemicize against Atum theology, Ptah not only creates all, he is also the primeval waters that begat Atum.

In the little known stela of Ptah and Sekhmet we find the idea of creation through lordly speech where Ptah’s tongue commands what his mind thinks—”One says in his mind (heart) ‘Look, may they come into being’”—no preexistent material is used (cf. Ps 33:6). This idea of creation by fiat is also found in a Coffin Text, where life is created “according to the word of Nun in Nu…” and Atum creates animal life through his command. Similarly, Genesis 1 is thoroughly, even characteristically, permeated by the idea of Yahweh speaking creation into being.

Creation emerges from the deep, the darkness, the formlessness and emptiness, and the wind. The Coffin texts mention the Hermopolitan Ogdoad (also known as the Octead, see below) who are eight primordial beings—four pairs of cosmic forces and their consorts with

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the four males being toads and the four females snakes—who inhabited the primeval slime from which creation emerges. There is some debate over their identification. On one view, Nun is a formless deep, Keku is darkness, Amun is a breath, and Hehu (the least clear) is some kind of illimitable chaos. On another reading, these eight consist of Nun and Naunet, representing primordial matter and space, Kuk and Kauket, the idea of the illimitable and the boundless, Huh and Hauhet, for darkness and obscurity, and Amon and Amaunet, representing the hidden and concealed. In Memphite theology these arise from Ptah, and out of them emerges the sun. Interestingly, the biblical record begins with Elohim and then speaks of a formlessness and emptiness, a deep, a darkness, and a hovering wind (Gen 1:1-2).

In terms of the order of creation, the god Re first creates light out of darkness, and only after this the sun-god. This resembles Genesis 1 where Elohim creates light before the creation of the sun. Separation is also a key idea with Ptah separating earth and sky and Atum separating Geb (earth-god) from Nut (sky-goddess). In the Hermopolitan story the primordial hill becomes the firmament which divides the upper and lower waters. Given that the biblical idea of the “firmament” has connotations of beaten metal, it is interesting that another Egyptian tradition describes the resurrected king as taking possession of the sky and then splitting or separating its metal.

In the Hymn to Khnum, we are told that the god “made plants in the field, he dotted shores with flowers; he made fruit trees bear their fruit,” and this apparently precedes the creation of human beings. A similar sequence is found in the Great Hymn to Amon, who puts the stars in his path, and creates fish to live in the rivers and birds to live in the sky, while Atum forms the Nile and calls it “the lord of fish and rich in birds.” One notes here the similar sequence of Genesis 1, beginning with the sun, moon, stars, and then fish and birds, with the latter together in the one set and even in the same order (Gen 1:20-21). The fashioning of the animals and humanity is also linked in the Egyptian accounts, as it is in day six in Genesis 1:24-26.

Unlike the Babylonian traditions, the Egyptians grant a special role to humans. According to the Great Hymn to Atum, the god “created mankind and distinguished their nature and made their life.” We also find the making of man from clay with either Khnum being seen as a potter molding humanity on his wheel (Great Hymn to Khnum) or Ptah molding humanity with his hands. In the Instruction of Amenemope, “Man is clay and straw, and God is his potter” and in a few texts there is even the idea that humanity is made in the image of the god, as per the Instruction of King Merikare: “They are his [Re] own images proceeding from his flesh.” The Egyptian word used here (snnw) is often written with a determinative in the shape of a statue. This is similar to Genesis 1’s notion of humanity being made from the dust of the earth in Elohim’s image (tselem), a word which initially meant a piece cut from an object and which would be entirely appropriate for a piece of clay cut for a sculpture.

As far as I can ascertain there is no notion in Mesopotamian stories of humanity being imparted breath by the gods. But in the Instruction of King Merikare—“[A]nd he (Re) made the air to give life to their (men) nostrils”—the impartation of life occurs through the breath of the creator-deity. On the other hand, the reason for the creation of humanity is unclear, though it seems a possibility that it was to carry out the creator-god’s purposes.

Finally, the idea of the deity as craftsman is implied by the use of words that describe the metal worker who hammers and casts, or the master potter who molds, which would fit with the concept of a hammered firmament and with humans being fashioned from the earth.

Comparisons between Genesis 1 and Ancient Near Eastern Creation Myths

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Some significant contours should be evident. For the ancients the very order and coherence of the natural world implied some kind of personal agency. There is not a hint of the idea that the ordered world emerged from chaos by purely natural means. My point here is that no one wrote these texts to argue for the existence of the gods. That much was simply assumed. On this basis, Genesis 1 is unlikely to offer much succour for those who want to argue against Darwin. It was never designed to do so. More probably it was designed to answer the question: which god/s ordered and filled the heavens and the earth?

Whereas for moderns the process of creation is thoroughly materialistic with the earth emerging merely as part of a larger solar system and life, if discussed at all, being considered in only the most primitive form, for the ancients the primary concern is with the earth as the setting for the appearance of a fully formed human community and culture. In terms of the starting points, the motifs of water/watery deep, wind/storm, and formlessness are common, and, in the Egyptian Coffin Texts, one also finds the primeval darkness. Thus most stories, including in part Genesis 1, begin with either an amorphous mass or primeval chaos, out of which through increasing differentiation heaven and earth are separated and ultimately a particularly social order emerges. Genesis 1 is unusual in that although it begins with the same basic elements it is more universal and seems less interested in legitimating a specifically Israelite social order, though in the larger context of the Torah one might perhaps be expected to understand as much. Certainly Yahweh’s lordship is assumed as the fundamental datum of all existence. In contrast to modern origins stories which utterly reject any psychologizing of what is seen as a purely “objective” materialist account, ancient stories—with the notable exception of Genesis—simply assumed a continuity between personified “nature” and the appearance of humanity. If one might be permitted the aside: it seems that the Genesis account manages to hold together the tension between nature and personhood in ways that neither the ancients nor modern materialism can.

The idea of warfare, though absent from Egyptian or Sumerian accounts, is prominent in the “Babylonian” stories, and particularly in the defeat of the chaos-storm-monster (cf. the allusions in Job 26:12; Ps 89:10; Isa. 51:9). Here cosmogony was essentially a conflict of wills from which one party emerged victorious (so Ea/Apsu; Marduk/Tiamat; cf. Baal and Yam/Mot). Babylonian stories also involved the use of magic on the part of the deities. In the Egyptian stories, however, there is only one creator god who creates and this by fiat through divine speech. But even so, their stories are still theogonic, that is, concerned with the emergence of the gods as personifications of aspects of nature. Apart from the single creator and creation by speech alone, none of these features is found in Genesis 1.

In the Babylonian materials humans are created to undertake menial labour for Babylon’s gods who are now free to take their ease. The Egyptian sources by way of contrast are unclear as to humanity’s purpose. The notion of humans bearing the deity’s image is found only in Egypt and Genesis 1. In the latter, all humanity, not just a single individual, act as Elohim’s vice regents superintending his creation. Apart from Genesis 1 there appears to be no concern with duration or a literary framework wherein time is broken into a series of consecutive days. Only in the Baal palace-building story—and again there is debate over whether this is a creation narrative (fn. 11)—is there mention of a seven-day program to build Baal’s palace-temple (cf. seven years for Solomon’s temple; 1 Kgs 6:37-38).

Before considering this temple connection further, it is worth recalling Israel’s exodus experience. They had just seen Yahweh, the god of the Fathers, uncreate Egypt by overturning the rule of Pharaoh, son of Amon-re, with the ten plagues that effectively dissolved the boundaries that gave the land of Egypt its order and form. And then at the Reed Sea (Exod 14:19-31) they had witnessed Yahweh cause light to shine in the

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darkness and a divine wind to drive back the deep of the Yam Suph (a sea that the Egyptians also regarded as the being at the edge of the world and the abode of Apophis the chaos serpent) and so to reveal dry land.

Not only so, but Pharaoh’s crown carried a Urea, an enraged female cobra, which functioned both as a symbol and the actual repository of Egypt’s power. Pharaoh’s “father,” the sun-god Re, after traveling through the heavens, would descend into the watery underworld of the dead, the sea of reeds. Escorted by two fire-breathing cobras he would do battle with Apophis the chaos serpent and emerge victorious each morning to bring life to Egypt. Like father like son, Pharaoh was to bring order and justice to Egypt by restraining the chaos of lawlessness. One can understand why Pharaoh, as Amon-Re’s son, thought he too could send his armies into the watery deep of the Yam Suph and emerge victorious. But as with Moses’ first sign—the transformation of his judicial staff and symbol of his authority into a serpent that swallows those of Pharaoh’s magicians—so too with the last, when Pharaoh’s Urea-led armies are engulfed by the unrestrained sea, and that at Yahweh’s command. It is hardly surprising, then, that the sight of the Egyptians’ dead bodies on the shore of the Yam Suph (cf. the Sea of Reeds and Pool of the Dead) had a considerable impact on Israel (Exod 15).

It is, therefore, probably not by accident that one can hear echoes of light in the darkness, the wind over the deep, and the appearance of dry land in Genesis 1: they had seen Yahweh do this when he delivered them at the Yam Suph.

This considerable similarity with the Egyptian accounts raises a very interesting question. It is sometimes suggested that the other ancient creation stories are distorted echoes of the original creation story, namely Genesis 1. This is always a possibility. But then one is left with a strange fact. How does one explain that it happens to be Egyptian stories, the place where Israel has just spent 400 years and which stories antedate considerably Israel’s stay in Egypt, whose scattered details on the whole bear a greater resemblance to Genesis 1 than those, for example, of Mesopotamia? Might not a better explanation be the exact opposite? Namely, that it was the details of the varied Egyptian accounts that have influenced the language of Israel’s creation story precisely to make it all the more effective against the gods of Egypt? Might it not be that Genesis 1 was written with a particular concern to declare that it was Israel’s god, Yahweh, and not Ptah, Atum, or any other of Egypt’s failed deities, who was alone responsible for the good and perfect order of creation?

It might also be that the clear literary art and architectonic patterning of Genesis 1 is a deliberate artistic device intended to underline the good order and patterning of Yahweh’s creational activity. If so, what do we do with the order of the parallel three days? It seems to me that they are designed to reflect the same emergence of increasing order—form and fullness—we have seen elsewhere in the ancient world and particularly Egypt, but now at Yahweh’s command. But why “three” days? I suggest it comes from the ancients’ perception of the basic structures of their reality. The fundamental given of human existence is the experience of night and day, no matter whether one is above or below, or on sea or land. The next level of complexity is above and below, and then finally, on the below, the division between land and sea. These three days together delineate the fundamental structure of the ancient world as the ancients experienced it. But the structure was not created to remain void or empty, and so on the second set of three days Yahweh fills each of the realms with, as it were, their rulers (cf. Gen 1:16) up through finally the appearance of the image-bearer (Gen 1:26-27; see below).

To return to the temple motif noted earlier, a key feature in a number of the stories is that the gods, having defeated the chaos monster, construct their palace-temples. (In Hebrew “palace” and “temple” are represented by the same word, which in certain circumstances is

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synonymous with “house”—e.g., house of Yahweh—the idea going back to the Sumerians, where the word for temple is “big house”). As Arvid Kapelrud has argued, when one has defeated one’s foes, be one human or divine, and has established one’s realm, one builds a palace or temple.

Creation as God’s Palace-Temple

I want to pick up for a moment on the palace-temple image. If we ask how ancient peoples might have conceptualized their world, the answer seems to be as a palace-temple, such that creation becomes an act of palace-temple building. Egyptian sources contain hints of this, with several traditions mentioning some poles that lift the heaven over the earth and which are oriented toward the cardinal points. This might also explain the Egyptian practice of building Temples at various sites associated with the Holy Place/s of creation. At the same time, the Egyptian cultic complex of the exodus period was a model of cosmic origins, with its lake of reeds and stately temple.

In the “Babylonian” Enuma Elish, the outcome of Ea’s victory over the watery god Apsu is not creation but the building of a palace-temple on the body of his foe. Likewise, after Marduk’s defeat of Tiamat he divides her corpse and stretches out one half like a roof to form the heavens, apparently forming the earth from the remainder, though the text is unclear at this point. Similarly in the Canaanite story of Baal’s victory over Yam, after Baal gains dominion, a house (temple) is constructed for him (as already noted opinions are divided over whether this is an account of creation but my interest here is the form of conceptualization). However, if Baal’s temple is a microcosm as it seems to be, then this act of temple-building could perhaps correspond to creation such that creation, kingship, and temple-building all belong together. Interestingly Baal’s temple is created in seven days and Yahweh’s Jerusalem Temple, itself a microcosm, in seven years (1 Kgs 6:37-38).

The “creation as temple-palace” metaphor is hardly surprising if one reflects for a moment on the realities of the ancient world. If the biggest threat to a settled agricultural existence was chaos, usually through war, lawlessness, or flood, then who was it that established order and security? Naturally, it was the great king who defeated the enemy, who promulgated and upheld the law (his word), and who supervised and orchestrated the building of dykes, etc., to restrain the devastating floods. Having established his realm he would then build his palace. If kings do this on a micro scale, then surely the gods do it at a cosmic one. In fact, it is in recognition of this connection that victorious kings, having entered into their rest, built temples for their deities.

But is there any evidence of this notion in the Bible? The data is overwhelming. In Psalm 104:2-3 we are told that Yahweh “wraps himself in light as with a garment; he stretches out the heavens like a tent and lays the beams of his upper chambers on their waters.” Isaiah 24:18 declares that “ the windows of heaven are opened, and the foundations of the land tremble.” One notes especially Job 38:4ff:

Where were you when I laid the earth’s foundation? ….Who marked off its dimensions?Surely you know!Who stretched a measuring line across it?On what were its footings set,or who laid its cornerstone ….Who shut up the sea behind doors ….When I fixed limits for it and set its doors and bars in place ….Have you entered the storehouses of the snow

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Or seen the storehouses of the hail?

In fact, the Hebrew Bible is awash with architectural imagery when describing creation. It speaks of the foundations of the earth (Ps 18:15; 82:5; 102:25; 104:5; Prov 8:29; Isa 51:13,16; 2 Sam 22:8,16; Zech 12:1; cf. 2 Sam 22:8), the pillars of the earth and of the heavens (1 Sam 2:8; Job 9:6; Ps 75:3; Job 26:11), the heavens’ windows (Gen 7:11; 8:2; Isa 24:18; Mal 3:10; 2 Kgs 7:2; Ps 104:2), the stretching out of the heavens like a canopy/tent (Isa 40:12,22; 42:5; 44:24; 45:12; 48:13; 51:13; Jer 10:12; 31:37; 32:17; 51:15; Amos 9:6; Zech 12:1; Job 9:8; Ps 102:25), and storehouses (Deut 28:12; Jer 10:13; 50:25; 51:16; cf. Ps 33:7; 135:7; Job 38:22).

But what kind of building is this? As Isaiah 66:1 makes clear, “Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool. Where is the house you will build for me? Where will my resting place be?” Where does one find a throne and a footstool if not in a palace, and what is the palace of Yahweh if not a temple? And note too the image of resting in his house (= Temple) in the light of Yahweh’s resting in his completed abode on the seventh day of Genesis 1. In this sense, the whole of creation is seen as Yahweh’s palace-temple, and hence the reason for his Jerusalem temple itself being a microcosm, a mini universe: it serves to remind Israel that the whole world is Yahweh’s. Granted, Genesis 1 does not explicitly describe Yahweh as actually rolling up his sleeves and “building”—why should it when a truly Lordly Yahweh would merely have to give the word? But given the rather widespread Ancient Near Eastern notion linking creation, defeat-of-chaos, and temple-building, and the thorough-going architectural imagery which characterizes the biblical conceptualizing of creation, it would be very odd if Genesis 1 were not to be understood along the lines of cosmic palace-temple building. As the Great King, Elohim naturally creates realms for the lesser rulers (cf. Gen 1:16) as he forms his palace-temple out of the deep and gives order to and fills it. And as the Great King, having ordered his realm, he now rules over all in “Sabbath” rest (see Exod 20), sitting in the great pavilion of his cosmos-palace-temple (cf. Ps 93).

This might also explain some elements of John’s Revelation where he describes the New Jerusalem as coming down out of the heavens to earth (Rev 21). One striking feature is the absence of any Temple (Rev 21:22). The odd cube shape of the city might explain this. The only other biblical objects in a similar setting that are cube-shaped are the Holy of Holies in the Tabernacle (10 cubits, probably) and Solomon’s temple (20 cubits; 1 Kgs 6:20; 2 Chr 3:8; cf. the Holy Place in Ezekiel’s temple, 500 cubits square, Ezek 42:16-20; 45:2). If so, then this suggests that the reason there is no temple in the New Jerusalem is because the city itself has become, not just the Temple, but the very Holy of Holies (cf. also Ezek 45:2-3). But what about the surprising size of the city: 12,000 stadia (approximately 1,500 miles) along each axis? The significance of these dimensions might lie in the observation that the size of the city corresponds to that of the then-known Greek world, while the height emphasizes the co-mingling of heaven and earth. In other words, the climax of the new creation is not the abandonment of the earth, but instead the coming of Yahweh himself to the earth to dwell among us. Here, then, is the climax of Genesis 1’s six-fold affirmation of the goodness of creation with its progression in both sets of days from heaven to earth. The final goal is not the destruction of creation, but rather the unification of heaven and earth such that the renewed earth itself now becomes Yahweh’s very throne room.

Further support for this palace-temple conceptualization is found in the final act of creation: the forming of humanity, male and female, in the image of Elohim. Long the subject of debate, the image of God language makes a great deal of sense within the palace-temple context. After all, what is the last thing placed inside the deity’s house, if not his image? So here in Genesis 1 on the last creative day, Yahweh fashions his own image and places it in his palace-temple. At the same time, as Shelley’s poem Ozymandias so evocatively

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describes, ancient kings frequently placed images of themselves throughout their realms as signs of their power and sovereign authority. It is highly likely that in the biblical account humanity serves the same function. Thus, both Israel (Exod 4:22) and her king (Ps 2:8) are called to be God’s son in the sense of being faithful bearers of his image, that is, to reflect his character and act as his vice-regents as they live in his palace-temple.

From this perspective, Genesis 1 is a “poetic” account in which Yahweh, Israel’s god, is proclaimed the builder of creation, his palace-temple. It is he who by the fiat of his kingly command provided the fundamental structures of ancient human experience and who filled these sub-realms with their rulers, over all of which he has placed humanity, his image-bearer, as his vice regent.

Conclusions

What might we conclude about the truth claims and significance of Genesis 1? Given its genre—a highly stylized form and unrealistic content—I would suggest that it is not to be taken “literally” in the popular modern Western sense as a blow-by-blow, chronologically accurate, account of creation. No one in the ancient world, apart from the isolated account of the time taken to build Baal’s palace, seems particularly concerned with these kinds of questions. Our chronos-fixated age measures things in nanoseconds and smaller—but not theirs. Rather, the pattern of days probably derives from the ancients’ understanding of the structure of their world—day/night, above/below, and land/sea—this being conceptualized in terms of the deity’s construction of his palace-temple as he gives it form and fills it. The fundamental issue is that it is Yahweh, Israel’s God, a God who cares for slaves, non-entities, and even non-Israelites (cf. the mixed multitude who are also delivered from Pharaoh’s genocidal proclivities; Exod 12:38), who brought order to the world, not the failed deities of oppressive Egypt nor, to a lesser degree, those of Canaan or Mesopotamia. And in doing so, it uses the language and imagery to which that world, and particularly Egypt, was accustomed. This is hardly suprising.

On this reading the twenty-four hour periods, or more accurately dawn-to-dusk days, probably reflect the notion of the customary daily periods of work. Yahweh is the builder, and each day he speaks and thus by divine fiat builds or fills a discrete part of his realm. Consequently, the injunction to keep Sabbath is less intent on imitating six literal twenty-four-hour days of creation than it is a summons for Israel to live out her creation story—structured as it is in the nature of the case by six days with a seventh to rest—and so to declare herself to be Yahweh’s “son,” imitating him in continuing his creation work of bringing order with the ultimate goal of Sabbath rest.

So in what sense is this true? If this kind of metaphor, symbol, or antiquated way of seeing the world is all that is intended, how does it translate into our modern world? In what sense can this be meaningful for us? The answer is surprisingly modern. We recall that for the ancients the fundamental concern of their stories was the emergence of humanity, society, and culture. It was the same for Israel. Yahweh has designed this palace-temple, this pavilion, to be the habitation of his image-bearer, namely, humanity. This, it seems to me, is nothing other than the ancient version of the recently formulated Anthropic Principle, which in its various forms reflects the fact that the fundamental structures of this world, the observed values of its cosmological and physical quantities, appear to have been fine-tuned with human existence in view. To observers both then and now there are strong hints that this creation was designed for us. And Genesis 1’s answer, it seems to me, is not so much concerned with the “how” in the technical or mechanical sense as it is with the “who,” namely, Yahweh. It is Israel’s God who has created this world, and humanity will never truly know what it means to be human until we learn to reflect his image. There is truth here, but

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it is more like the pungent and memorable truth of Blake’s “Tiger, Tiger” than the serried ranks of mathematically precise gene maps.

Two final observations. If this creation is Yahweh’s palace-temple, then we had best take good care of it. Far too many of us treat our homes far better than we treat this creation. We would never tolerate toxic waste or unbridled pollution in our living rooms, and yet we seem happy to do so when it comes to God’s palace-temple. While some have mistakenly read the apocalyptic language of purging fire as a carte blanche to do whatever they will to this present earth, we might do well to remember the warning in Revelation 11:18: God will destroy those who destroy his earth. Given that it is his palace-temple, and that far from people going to heaven, heaven is coming here (at least if Revelation 21 is to be believed), God’s anger against violators of the earth is perfectly understandable. It is his palace-temple they are defiling, whereas he is committed to renewing it.

Second, if humans are made in God’s image, then the repercussions are serious indeed. In the ancient world, to deface the image of the king or deity was tantamount to high treason. If one did not want to live in his realm or under his kingship, that could be arranged, either by exile or death. If we take the Genesis 1 account seriously, namely, that every human being is made in God’s image, then we need to know that any act of abuse against another human being is an act of high treason against the God whose image we bear and to whose kingship and sovereignty we therefore inherently bear witness. With this in mind, it is not hard to comprehend why Jews and Christians have historically put such a high value on human life, whether women, slaves, gladiators, newly born, or even unborn children.

It seems to me that this kind of reading of Genesis not only makes good sense of the text within its cultural horizons, but puts the emphasis back where it belongs. Perhaps it is time to stop warring, for example, over the length of the days and instead to recall what Genesis 1 is more likely about. This world is God’s temple-palace and he has not abandoned it. If we are truly to bear his image, then neither should we. Not only so, but every human being is made in God’s image. From this perspective, it makes a great deal of sense for Jesus as God’s son among us not only to cleanse Israel’s microcosmic temple, but also to restore our image—opening blind eyes, deaf ears, raising the dead, etc. Little wonder Paul speaks of a new creation. With these truths firmly in mind and heart, it would be difficult for Christians not to change the world.

Sources:

Allen, James P., Genesis in Egypt: The Philosophy of Ancient Egyptian Creation Accounts (New Haven: Yale Egyptological Seminar, 1988).Barker, Margaret, The Gate of Heaven: The History and Symbolism of the Temple in Jerusalem (London: SPCK, 1991).Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).Batto, Bernard F., “Red Sea or Reed Sea?” Biblical Archeology Review 10 (1984): 57-63.Beale, G.K., The Book of Revelation, New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999).Blocher, Henri, In the Beginning, trans. David G. Preston (Leicester: InterVarsity, 1984).Clifford, R.J., “Cosmogonies in the Ugaritic Texts and in the Bible,” Orientalia 53 (1984): 183-201.Currid, John D., Ancient Egypt and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997).Ellul, Jacques, “Le rôle médiateur de l’idéologie,” in Demythisation et idéologie, ed. Enrico Castelli (Paris: Aubier, 1973): 335-54.Fisher, Loren R., “Creation at Ugarit and in the Old Testament,” Vetus Testamentum 15

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(1965): 313-24.Fletcher-Louis, Crispin, “The Temple Cosmology of P and Theological Anthropology in the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sira,” in Of Scribes and Sages: Studies in Early Jewish Interpretation and Transmission of Scripture, Studies in Scripture in Early Judaism and Christianity 8, ed. C.A. Evans (Sheffield: Academic, 2001).Gibson, J.C.L., “The Theology of the Ugaritic Baal Cycle,” Orientalia 53 (1984): 203-19.Grudem, Wayne, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan; Leicester: InterVarsity, 1994).Heidel, Alexander, The Babylonian Genesis: The Story of Creation, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).Hoffmeier, James K., ‘Sacred’ in the Vocabulary of Ancient Egypt, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 59 (Freiburg: Universitäts Verlag, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1985): 171-77.Hoffmeier, James K., “Some Thoughts on Genesis 1 & 2 and Egyptian Cosmology,” Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Studies 15 (1983): 39-49.Kapelrud, Arvid, “Temple Building, a Task for Gods and Kings,” Orientalia 32 (1966): 56-62.Kline, Meredith, Kingdom Prologue (South Hamilton, MA: privately published by Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 1993).Kutsko, John F., Between Heaven and Earth: Divine Presence and Absence in the Book of Ezekiel, Biblical and Judaic Studies 7 (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2000).Labat, R., “Les origines et la formation de la terre dans le poeme babylonien de la creation,” Studia Biblicus et Orientalis 3 (1959): 205-15.Lambert, W.G., “The Babylonian Background of Genesis,” Journal of Theological Studies 16 (1965): 287-300.Levenson, John D., The Theology of the Program of Restoration of Ezekiel 40-48, Harvard Semitic Monographs 10 (Missoula: Scholars, 1976).Meyer, Ben F., “The Temple at the Navel of the Earth,” in Christus Faber: The Master-Builder and the House of God. (Allison Park: Pickwick, 1992): 217-79.Meyer, Ben F., Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship: A Primer in Critical Realist Hermeneutics (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1994).Niditch, Susan, “Ezekiel 40-48 in a Visionary Context,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 48 (1986): 208-48.Reymond, E.A.E., The Mythological Origin of the Egyptian Temple (Manchester: University Press, 1969).Ricoeur, Paul, “The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality,” Man and World 12 (1979): 123-41.Ringgren, Helmer, Religions in the Ancient Near East, trans. John Sturdy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973).Towers, J.R., “The Red Sea,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 18 (1959) 150-53.van Seters, J., In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and Origins of Biblical History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).Wifall, Walter, “The Sea of Reeds as Sheol,” Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 92 (1980): 325-32.

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On the correspondences among days, cf. Fr. John F. McCarthy, “Not the Real Genesis 1”. Review of Stanley L. Jaki, Genesis 1 Through the Ages (Living Tradition No. 51, March, 1994):

Thus, for instance, Richard Clifford in the New Jerome Biblical Commentary (p. 10) and Bruce Vawter in A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture (p. 173) align the separation of light from darkness on day one with the fixing of the lights in the firmament on day four, the separation of the waters above and below the firmament on day two with the creation of the birds of the air and the fishes of the sea on day five, and the separation of the dry land from the oceans on day three with the creation of the land animals (and man) on day six. (Clifford and Vawter also align the creation of plants on the third day with the creation of man who feeds on plant life on the sixth day, but this is arbitrary.)4 (emphasis added)

Cf. also the overview provided by Robert J. Schneider, “What the Bible Teaches About Creation”:5

It might seem redundant to those of you who are Christians if I should summarize the content of Genesis 1, but there is a pattern in this creation narrative that is often not recognized, and it is worthwhile to point it out. The account begins with that part of the creation that is other than the heavens, here spoken of as “the earth” but including “the Deep,” in a state of “utter chaos” (Wenham I, 15—16), translated in the KJV as “without form and void” (Heb. “tohuwabohu”). Many scholars have noted a pattern to the “six days”: in the first three [days,] “bohu,” i.e., “formlessness,” is given form: (1) light emerges from darkness, (2) the waters are separated to form the lower and upper seas—the latter supported by the “firmament,” and (3) land emerges from the lower sea and is adorned with plant life. In the latter three days “tohu,” i.e., the state of being “empty,” is filled: (4) the sun, moon, and stars fill the firmament, (5) fish and other sea creatures fill the lower sea and birds the sky, and (6) wild and domestic beasts, other land creatures, and human beings fill the earth (Hyers 67—71). The seventh day of rest hallows and validates the commandment of a Sabbath rest (Exod. 20:11) by weaving it into the very structure of creation. Because of this pattern, many evangelical biblical scholars have been drawn to some version of a “framework hypothesis”: the six days are to be seen not as a chronological account of the steps of creation but as a framework in which the various categories of “creature”—the word refers to both inanimate and living things—are laid out in a logical order that in itself declares that creation in the beginning involves the bringing of order out of chaos. The “utter chaos,” the “formless and empty” undifferen-tiated mass of the beginning of creation, is a “problem” God moves immediately to solve, and the solution is to differentiate matter through separation and to fill it with both inanimate and animate creatures. Seen in the light of this hypothesis, Genesis 1 provides a theological declaration of God’s creativity rather than a scientific description of events (Hyer, ibid; Wenham I, 39-40). If we read and interpret Genesis 1 theologically rather than scientifically, then what sort of revelation can we expect to find in it?

Genesis 1 teaches what is the common faith of all Christians (and also Jews and Muslims): that there is one God, not the many, combative divinities Israel’s Semitic neighbors believed in and made actors in their creation myths. The creation is called forth by this one God in a placid and orderly manner and given structure; it is not the expression of contending divine forces that Israel’s neighbors believed accounted for the

4 Actually, one should align the establishment of the creatures of earth, animals and man, with the domain of earth.5 (http://community.berea.edu/scienceandfaith/essay01.asp [12/12/06])

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changes and upheavals they experienced within nature. The “utter chaos” of undifferen-tiated matter God marshals and makes fertile by simple but powerful and royal declarations of “Let there be!” God does not have to battle other forces in order to bring cosmos (order) to creation. Even the sea monsters are not divinities (as in the creation myths of Israel’s neighbors) but products of God’s creative word (Gen. 1:21).

Further, this creation is entirely natural; no portion of it is to be understood as divine. While it is sacred because it is the product of the Holy One, it is not composed of divine beings. Genesis 1 also implies that the entire creation is contingent, wholly dependent upon its Creator for its very being and continuing existence and for all of the forms, capacities, capabilities, and potentialities it possesses—all of its elements, living and non-living—and that it is given all these solely by the will of its Author. Finally, this majestic narrative proclaims that in the eyes of its Maker, each element of the creation is essentially good, and that looking upon the whole of creation God declares that it is very good. (emphasis added)

Cf. Dallas E. Cain, “Creation and Capron’s Explanatory Interpretation, c. 1902: A Litera-ture Search”:6

The natural tendency with Genesis One is to follow one’s first impression and assume that each creation fiat was miraculously fulfilled immediately. There are four parts to the record of each step in creation (the fiat, the fulfillment, the post-fulfillment activity and the day) and our first impressions see the day as encompassing everything. Capron discovers that the structure of the record permits the fulfillment to come after the day, and to take a long time for completion. Thus, with indefinite time spans, a fulfillment may extend to the point of overlapping successive fulfillments. Capron is breaking new ground in showing that the ful-fillment sections of Genesis One are explanatory or parenthetical, which allows the separ-ation of the fulfillment from the day. This separation, while retaining the literalness of the days, allows indefinite time for everything, allows processes to have a prominent place, allows overlapping of the fulfillments, and still the fiat itself is the input work that brings about each step. So Exodus 20:11 is also literal with “in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them.” (emphasis added)

“There are four parts to the record of each step in creation

1. (the fiat, 2. the fulfillment,3. the post-fulfillment activity 4. and the day)”

N.B. The structure of a given day also includes the declaration of the goodness of what was created, and the naming of what was done.

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6 (http://www.ibri.org/RRs/RR027/27creation.html [12/15/06])

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4. According to a Father of the Church:

Cf. Gregory of Nyssa. On the Making of Man:

Note

This work was intended to supplement and complete the Hexaëmeron of S. Basil, and presupposes an acquaintance with that treatise. The narrative of the creation of the world is not discussed in detail: it is referred to, but chiefly in order to insist on the idea that the world was prepared to be the sphere of man’s sovereignty. On the other hand, Gregory shows that man was made “with circumspection,” fitted by nature for rule over the other creatures, made in the likeness of God in respect of various moral attributes, and in the possession of reason, while differing from the Divine nature in that the human mind receives its information by means of the senses and is dependent on them for its perception of external things. The body is fitted to be the instrument of the mind, adapted to the use of a reasonable being: and it is by the possession of the “rational soul,” as well as of the “natural” or “vegetative” and the “sensible” soul, that man differs from the lower animals. At the same time, his mind works by means of the senses: it is incomprehensible in its nature (resembling in this the Divine nature of which it is the image), and its relation to the body is discussed at some length (chs. 12-15). The connection between mind and body is ineffable: it is not to be accounted for by supposing that the mind resides in any particular part of the body: the mind acts upon and is acted upon by the whole body, depending on the corporeal and material nature for one element of perception, so that perception requires both body and mind. But it is to the rational element that the name of “soul“ properly belongs: the nutritive and sensible faculties only borrow the name from that which is higher than themselves. Man was first made “in the image of God:” and this conception excludes the idea of distinction of sex. In the first creation of man all humanity is included, according to the Divine foreknowledge: “our whole nature extending from the first to the last” is “one image of Him Who is.” But for the Fall, the increase of the human race would have taken place as the increase of the angelic race takes place, in some way unknown to us. The declension of man from his first estate made succession by generation necessary: and it was because this declension and its consequences were present to the Divine mind that God “created them male and female.” In this respect, and in respect of the need of nourishment by food, man is not “in the image of God,” but shows his kindred with the lower creation. But these necessities are not permanent: they will end with the restoration of man to his former excellence (chs. 16-18). Here Gregory is led to speak (chs. 19-20) of the food of man in Paradise, and of the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil.” And thus, having made mention of the Fall of man, he goes on to speak of his Restoration. This, in his view, follows from the finite nature of evil: it is deferred until the sum of humanity is complete. As to the mode in which the present state of things will end, we know nothing: but that it will end is inferred from the non-eternity of matter (chs. 21-24). The doctrine of the Resurrection is supported by our knowledge of the accuracy with which other events have been predicted in Scripture, by the experience given to us of like events in particular cases, in those whom our Lord raised to life, and especially in His own resurrection. The argument that such a restoration is impossible is met by an appeal to the unlimited character of the Divine power, and by inferences from parallels observed in nature (chs. 25-27). Gregory then proceeds to deal with the question of the pre-existence of the soul, rejecting that opinion, and maintaining that the body and the soul come into existence together, potentially in the Divine will, actually at the moment when each individual man comes into being by generation (chs. 28-29). In the course of his argument on this last point, he turns aside to discuss at some length, in the last chapter, the structure of the human body: but he returns once more, in conclusion, to his main position, that man “is generated as a living and animated being,” and that the power of the soul is gradually manifested in, and by means of, the material substratum of the body; so

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that man is brought to perfection by the aid of the lower attributes of the soul. But the true perfection of the soul is not in these, which will ultimately be “put away,” but in the higher attributes which constitute for man “the image of God.”

Introduction

Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, to his brother Peter, the servant of God.

If we had to honour with rewards of money those who excel in virtue, the whole world of money, as Solomon says, would seem but small to be made equal to your virtue in the balance. Since, however, the debt of gratitude due to your Reverence is greater than can be valued in money, and the holy Eastertide demands the accustomed gift of love, we offer to your greatness of mind, O man of God, a gift too small indeed to be worthy of presentation to you, yet not falling short of the extent of our power. The gift is a discourse, like a mean garment, woven not without toil from our poor wit, and the subject of the discourse, while it will perhaps be generally thought audacious, yet seemed not unfitting. For he alone has worthily considered the creation of God who truly was created after God, and whose soul was fashioned in the image of Him Who created him,—Basil, our common father and teacher,—who by his own speculation made the sublime ordering of the universe generally intelligible, making the world as established by God in the true Wisdom known to those who by means of his understanding are led to such contemplation: but we, who fall short even of worthily admiring him, yet intend to add to the great writer’s speculations that which is lacking in them, not so as to interpolate his work by insertion (for it is not to be thought of that that lofty mouth should suffer the insult of being given as authority for our discourses), but so that the glory of the teacher may not seem to be failing among his disciples.

For if, the consideration of man being lacking in his Hexaëmeron, none of those who had been his disciples contributed any earnest effort to supply the defect, the scoffer would perhaps have had a handle against his great fame, on the ground that he had not cared to produce in his hearers any habit of intelligence. But now that we venture according to our powers upon the exposition of what was lacking, if anything should be found in our work such as to be not unworthy of his teaching, it will surely be referred to our teacher: while if our discourse does not reach the height of his sublime speculation, he will be free from this charge and escape the blame of seeming not to wish that his disciples should have any skill at all, though we perhaps may be answerable to our censurers as being unable to contain in the littleness of our heart the wisdom of our instructor.

The scope of our proposed enquiry is not small: it is second to none of the wonders of the world,—perhaps even greater than any of those known to us, because no other existing thing, save the human creation, has been made like to God: thus we shall readily find that allowance will be made for what we say by kindly readers, even if our discourse is far behind the merits of the subject. For it is our business, I suppose, to leave nothing unexamined of all that concerns man,—of what we believe to have taken place previously, of what we now see, and of the results which are expected afterwards to appear (for surely our effort would be convicted of failing of its promise, if, when man is proposed for contemplation, any of the questions which bear upon the subject were to be omitted); and, moreover, we must fit together, according to the explanation of Scripture and to that derived from reasoning, those statements concerning him which seem, by a kind of necessary sequence, to be opposed, so that our whole subject may be consistent in train of thought and in order, as the statements that seem to be contrary are brought (if the Divine power so discovers a hope for what is beyond hope, and a way for what is inextricable) to one and the same end: and for clearness’ sake I think it well to set forth to you the discourse by chapters, that you may be able briefly to know the force of the several arguments of the whole work.

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I. Wherein is a partial inquiry into the nature of the world, and a more minute exposition of the things which preceded the genesis of man

1. “This is the book of the generation of heaven and earth,” says the Scripture, when all that is seen was finished, and each of the things that are betook itself to its own separate place, when the body of heaven compassed all things round, and those bodies which are heavy and of downward tendency, the earth and the water, holding each other in, took the middle place of the universe; while, as a sort of bond and stability for the things that were made, the Divine power and skill was implanted in the growth of things, guiding all things with the reins of a double operation (for it was by rest and motion that it devised the genesis of the things that were not, and the continuance of the things that are), driving around, about the heavy and changeless element contributed by the creation that does not move, as about some fixed path, the exceedingly rapid motion of the sphere, like a wheel, and preserving the indissolubility of both by their mutual action, as the circling substance by its rapid motion compresses the compact body of the earth round about, while that which is firm and unyielding, by reason of its unchanging fixedness, continually augments the whirling motion of those things which revolve round it, and intensity is produced in equal measure in each of the natures which thus differ in their operation, in the stationary nature, I mean, and in the mobile revolution; for neither is the earth shifted from its own base, nor does the heaven ever relax in its vehemence, or slacken its motion.

2. These, moreover, were first framed before other things, according to the Divine wisdom, to be as it were a beginning of the whole machine, the great Moses indicating, I suppose, where he says that the heaven and the earth were made by God “in the beginning Genesis   1:1 ” that all things that are seen in the creation are the offspring of rest and motion, brought into being by the Divine will. Now the heaven and the earth being diametrically opposed to each other in their operations, the creation which lies between the opposites, and has in part a share in what is adjacent to it, itself acts as a mean between the extremes, so that there is manifestly a mutual contact of the opposites through the mean; for air in a manner imitates the perpetual motion and subtlety of the fiery substance, both in the lightness of its nature, and in its suitableness for motion; yet it is not such as to be alienated from the solid substance, for it is no more in a state of continual flux and dispersion than in a permanent state of immobility, but becomes, in its affinity to each, a kind of borderland of the opposition between operations, at once uniting in itself and dividing things which are naturally distinct.

3. In the same way, liquid substance also is attached by double qualities to each of the opposites; for in so far as it is heavy and of downward tendency it is closely akin to the earthy; but in so far as it partakes of a certain fluid and mobile energy it is not altogether alien from the nature which is in motion; and by means of this also there is effected a kind of mixture and concurrence of the opposites, weight being transferred to motion, and motion finding no hindrance in weight, so that things most extremely opposite in nature combine with one another, and are mutually joined by those which act as means between them.

4. But to speak strictly, one should rather say that the very nature of the contraries themselves is not entirely without mixture of properties, each with the other, so that, as I think, all that we see in the world mutually agree, and the creation, though discovered in properties of contrary natures, is yet at union with itself. For as motion is not conceived merely as local shifting, but is also contemplated in change and alteration, and on the other hand the immovable nature does not admit motion by way of alteration, the wisdom of God has transposed these properties, and wrought unchangeableness in that which is ever moving, and change in that which is immovable; doing this, it may be, by a providential

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dispensation, so that that property of nature which constitutes its immutability and immobility might not, when viewed in any created object, cause the creature to be accounted as God; for that which may happen to move or change would cease to admit of the conception of Godhead. Hence the earth is stable without being immutable, while the heaven, on the contrary, as it has no mutability, so has not stability either, that the Divine power, by interweaving change in the stable nature and motion with that which is not subject to change, might, by the interchange of attributes, at once join them both closely to each other, and make them alien from the conception of Deity; for as has been said, neither of these (neither that which is unstable, nor that which is mutable) can be considered to belong to the more Divine nature.

5. Now all things were already arrived at their own end: “the heaven and the earth Genesis   2:1 ,” as Moses says, “were finished,” and all things that lie between them, and the particular things were adorned with their appropriate beauty; the heaven with the rays of the stars, the sea and air with the living creatures that swim and fly, and the earth with all varieties of plants and animals, to all which, empowered by the Divine will, it gave birth together; the earth was full, too, of her produce, bringing forth fruits at the same time with flowers; the meadows were full of all that grows therein, and all the mountain ridges, and summits, and every hillside, and slope, and hollow, were crowned with young grass, and with the varied produce of the trees, just risen from the ground, yet shot up at once into their perfect beauty; and all the beasts that had come into life at God’s command were rejoicing, we may suppose, and skipping about, running to and fro in the thickets in herds according to their kind, while every sheltered and shady spot was ringing with the chants of the songbirds. And at sea, we may suppose, the sight to be seen was of the like kind, as it had just settled to quiet and calm in the gathering together of its depths, where havens and harbours spontaneously hollowed out on the coasts made the sea reconciled with the land; and the gentle motion of the waves vied in beauty with the meadows, rippling delicately with light and harmless breezes that skimmed the surface; and all the wealth of creation by land and sea was ready, and none was there to share it.

II. Why man appeared last, after the creation

1. For not as yet had that great and precious thing, man, come into the world of being; it was not to be looked for that the ruler should appear before the subjects of his rule; but when his dominion was prepared, the next step was that the king should be manifested. When, then, the Maker of all had prepared beforehand, as it were, a royal lodging for the future king (and this was the land, and islands, and sea, and the heaven arching like a roof over them), and when all kinds of wealth had been stored in this palace (and by wealth I mean the whole creation, all that is in plants and trees, and all that has sense, and breath, and life; and—if we are to account materials also as wealth—all that for their beauty are reckoned precious in the eyes of men, as gold and silver, and the substances of your jewels which men delight in—having concealed, I say, abundance of all these also in the bosom of the earth as in a royal treasure-house), he thus manifests man in the world, to be the beholder of some of the wonders therein, and the lord of others; that by his enjoyment he might have knowledge of the Giver, and by the beauty and majesty of the things he saw might trace out that power of the Maker which is beyond speech and language.

2. For this reason man was brought into the world last after the creation, not being rejected to the last as worthless, but as one whom it behoved to be king over his subjects at his very birth. And as a good host does not bring his guest to his house before the preparation of his feast, but, when he has made all due preparation, and decked with their proper adornments his house, his couches, his table, brings his guest home when things suitable for his refreshment are in readiness,—in the same manner the rich and munificent Entertainer of our

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nature, when He had decked the habitation with beauties of every kind, and prepared this great and varied banquet, then introduced man, assigning to him as his task not the acquiring of what was not there, but the enjoyment of the things which were there; and for this reason He gives him as foundations the instincts of a twofold organization, blending the Divine with the earthy, that by means of both he may be naturally and properly disposed to each enjoyment, enjoying God by means of his more divine nature, and the good things of earth by the sense that is akin to them.

Cf. also the following:

Basil of Caesarea (from André Thevet)Click on thumbnail for information on how to

purchase a larger version of this image(see copyright information)

Synopsis

Basil was born in Caesarea, the capital of Cappadocia,[1] one of nine children.[2] His grandmother, Macrina, was converted through the ministry of Gregory the Wonderworker (a disciple of Origen), and two of his brothers (Gregory of Nyssa and Peter of Sebaste) also became bishops, and his sister (Macrina) a nun.[3] He received a Greek education at Caesarea, Constantinople and Athens,[4] studying the classics, astronomy, geometry, mathematics and medicine. Medicine seems to have held a special fascination for him, which has led some writers to claim that he actually practised it.[5] Basil never learned Latin - a fact deduced from the lack of Latin sources quoted in his writings.[6] Basil initially intended to take up a career as a lawyer when he returned from five years at the university in Athens in 355. Instead he turned to a life of asceticism, and together with his friend, Gregory of Nazianxus, founded a small monastic community.[7] In 360 he was ordained as a reader, in 362 as a presbyter, and in 370 as bishop of Caesarea.[8]

Many of Basil’s writings have survived. Of particular interest is his work Hexameron or On the Six Days of the Creation, which was originally delivered as a series of nine sermons during Lent. Basil’s deep love for nature of evident throughout this work. He drew extensively from the works of the classical writers.[9] The most significant influence on his thinking was probably that of Aristotle. Basil maintained that he interpreted the Bible literally, rather than allegorically as Origen had done. Concerning that he wrote:

I know the laws of allegory, though less by myself than from the works of others. There are those, truly, who do not admit the common sense of the Scriptures, for whom water is not water, but some other nature, who see in a plant, in a fish, what their fancy wishes, who change the nature of reptiles and of wild beasts to suit their allegories, like the interpreters of dreams who explain visions in sleep to make them serve their own end.[10]

A good example of Basil’s literalism is he refutation of Origen’s identification of the waters mentioned in Genesis 1 with spiritual and incorporeal powers. He declares: “Let us reject these theories as dreams and old wives tales. Let us understand that by water, water is meant; for the dividing of the waters by the firmament let us accept the reason that has been given to us.”[11] He was also careful to distinguish between literal statements and poetic imagery, such as “the heavens declare the glory of God” (Psalm 19:1), which did not imply to Basil that the heavens could speak.[12] His interpretation of Genesis is illustrated by examples from contemporary ‘science’,[13] which while often being remarkably accurate from our modern perspective also contained elements of folklore. Basil mocks and rejects the theories of the Greek Atomists, arguing that the Greek philosophers were wrong because they did not

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know the Creator:[14] “...these men, I say, have discovered all except one thing: the fact that God is the Creator of the universe, and the just judge who rewards all the actions of life according to their merit.”[15] The influence of Platonism is evident when Basil equates Yahweh with the Demiurge.[16] Matter is created, because if it were uncreated it would mean that the universe is the result of the action of two beings, the one who made the matter and the one who shaped it.[17] God is both the Creator and the Demiurge (shaper) of the universe.[18] Before the creation of this world there existed another world, the invisible and intellectual world equivalent to Plato’s world of forms. Afterwards this world was made as a “school and training place where the souls of men should be taught and a home for beings destined to be born and to die.”[19]

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References

[1] Not to be confused with Caesarea the seaport in Palestine.[2] Frederick W. Norris, “Basil of Caesarea,” Everett Ferguson, editor, Encylopedia of Early Christianity. (New York: Garland, 1990), 139.[3] F.L. Cross & E.A. Livingstone, editors. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 139.[4] Cross & Livingstone, 139.[5] Robert Travers Smith, St. Basil the Great. (London: SPCK, 1879), 17.[6] Smith, Basil, 12, 199.[7] W.H.C. Frend, The Rise of Christianity. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 630-631.[8] Norris, “Basil,” 140.[9] Including Aristotle, Plotinus, Pericles, Plutarch, Pliny the Elder, Aelian, Theophrastus, Hippias, Plato, Protagorus, Thrasmachus, Hesiod, Homer, Solon, Socrates and Diogenes Laertus.[10] Basil, Hexameron, 9.2 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 102); cf. Basil, Hexameron, 3.9 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 70-71).[11] Basil, Hexameron, 3.9 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 71).[12] Basil, Hexameron, 3.9 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 71).[13] Sheldon-Williams, 432: “...he drew chiefly on the current cosmology, meteorology, botany, astronomy and natural history.”[14] Basil, Hexameron, 1.2 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 53).[15] Basil, Hexameron, 1.4 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 54).[16] Armstrong, 432.[17] Basil, Hexameron, 2.2 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 59).[18] Basil, Hexameron, 1.5; 2.2 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 54, 59).[19] Basil, Hexameron, 1.5 (NPNF, 2nd series, Vol. 8, 54).

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5. Overview of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Hexaemeron.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 65, prologue:

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (Questions 65-74)

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

   From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely,

the work of creation, as given in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”;

the work of distinction as given in the words, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament”;

and the work of adornment, expressed thus, “Let there be lights in the firmament.”

6. In sum:

the consideration of corporeal creatures in the production of which three works are found:

a) the work of creationb) the work of distinction

(1) “He divided the light from the darkness, and (2) the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the

firmament”c) the work of adornment

7. The work of distinction in sum:

(a) tohuwabohu: the earth was without form (= lacking substantial and accidental form, the latter being figure) and void or empty (= unadorned, i.e. ‘a barren landscape’):

(b) darkness was on the face of the deep: everything was unapparent

(1) the formless is given form (the work of separation, as the potter first divides his clay, etc.): the imparting of accidental form and

(2) the empty or void is given adornment: the imparting of accidental form: adorn-ing (the category of habitus)

(3) the unapparent is given appearance

Hence on the first day of creation all is unapparent or invisible. The earth was in a chaotic state, bordering on nothingness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa q. 74, art. 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?

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Objection 1: It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed like the other parts. Now, the same thing should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire.

Objection 2: Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water. Since then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, and some need to be cleansed by water---which distinction is moreover observed by the Old Law---it would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse all things.

Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world’s beginning was effected by God’s power alone, for the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 49:3): “A fire shall burn before Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him”; and afterwards in reference to the judgment (Ps. 49:4): “He shall call heaven from above, and the earth to judge His people.” Therefore it would seem that the final cleansing of the world will be by means of fire.

Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): “The heavens being on fire will be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat.” Therefore this cleansing will be effected by fire.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1]) this cleansing of the world will remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity resulting from mixture, and will be a disposition to the perfection of glory; and consequently in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the elements, its natural properties are more like the properties of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to light. Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; nor are we so familiar with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so that it is not so liable to depreciation. Moreover, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in separating by a process of rarefaction.

Reply to Objection 1: Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter (since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter: and in this respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in its pure state. But in so far as it has an admixture of some foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it will be cleanser and cleansed under different aspects. and this is not unreasonable.

Reply to Objection 2: The first cleansing of the world by the deluge regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent then was the sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting for it to be effected by fire than by water. For the power of water tends to unite rather than to separate; wherefore the natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world were already growing old, because then, according to Mat. 24:12, “the charity of many shall grow cold,” and consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being

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destroyed themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire.

Reply to Objection 3: By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa q. 74, art. 2,obj. 2, ad 1 (tr. English Domi-nican Fathers):

Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world’s beginning was effected by God’s power alone, for the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire.

Reply to Objection 3: By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.

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8. Treatise on the Work of the Six Days (St. Thomas Aquinas):

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (Questions 65-74)

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

   From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; the work of distinction as given in the words, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament”; and the work of adornment, expressed thus, “Let there be lights in the firmament.”

   First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:    (1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?     (2) Whether they were created on account of God’s goodness?     (3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?     (4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 65  [<< | >>]Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

  Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): “I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever.” But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): “The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.” Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

  Objection 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good.” But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun’s heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

  Objection 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): “While we look not at the things which are seen.” Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

  On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): “Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them.”

  I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), “The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers.” But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence

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whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, “Whose god is their belly” (Phil. 3:19).

  Reply to Objection 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle’s words, “The things which are seen are temporal,” though true even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): “It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory.”

  Reply to Objection 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.

  Reply to Objection 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for “the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rm. 1:20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): “Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise.” And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 65  [<< | >>]Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness?

  Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God’s goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God “created all things that they might be.” Therefore all things were created for their own being’s sake, and not on account of God’s goodness.

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  Objection 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God’s goodness.

  Objection 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of God’s goodness.

  On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord hath made all things for Himself.”

  I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God’s original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, “God saw that it was good” (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen’s opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun’s body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.

   Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing;

secondly, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart;

and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole.

Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God.

So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe.

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Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.

  Reply to Objection 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness.

  Reply to Objection 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God’s goodness.

  Reply to Objection 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.

Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 65  [<< | >>]Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?

  Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 “Thou hast made all things in wisdom.” But “it belongs to wisdom to ordain,” as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.

  Objection 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).

  Objection 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.

  On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.

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  I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

   In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

  Reply to Objection 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures.

  Reply to Objection 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above (Question [15], Article [2]); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.

  Reply to Objection 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 65  [<< | >>]Article: 4  [<< | >>]

Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): “From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter.” But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.

  Objection 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances.

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  Objection 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.

  On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): “We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus.” But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God.

  I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, “participation” (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or “per se” life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist “per se” in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called “intelligences” by them, but “angels” by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.   But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the “composite.” Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the “composite”; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing’s mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, “God said, Let this thing be,” or “that,” to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is “all form and fitness and concord of parts.”

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  Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): “By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made.” But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.

  Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.

  Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.

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ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

   We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?    (2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?     (3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter?    (4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 66  [<< | >>]Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?

  Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): “The earth was void and empty,” or “invisible and shapeless,” according to another version [*Septuagint];7 by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form.

  Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working.

  Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form.

  On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God are perfect.” Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. If, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation.

  I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction.

7 Dicitur enim Gen. 1, terra erat inanis et vacua, sive invisibilis et incomposita, secundum aliam litteram; per quod designatur informitas materiae, ut Augustinus dicit.

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As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms.

Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but ‘this’ actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole.

But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be shown later (Question [69], Article [1]; Question [74], Article [2]).

As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to be without form.

For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that “darkness was upon the fact of the deep.”

[Missing: the second way in which the heavens lacked beauty, which was taken away by second work of distinction, the production of the firmament. (B.A.M.)]

And the earth lacked beauty in two ways:

first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that “the earth was void,” or “invisible,” inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view;

secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called “empty,” or, according to another reading [*Septuagint], “shapeless”—that is, unadorned.

Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, “darkness was upon the face of the deep,” since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, “the earth was void and empty.”

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  Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words “earth” and “water,” in this passage primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be “void and empty,” or “invisible and shapeless,” that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called “invisible” or “void,” and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is “place” [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said (Article [1]) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.

  Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces an effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.

  Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject.

   In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God’s part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.

   In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture.

But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later (Article [3]; Question [68], Article [1]). This is signified by the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words, “Spirit of God,” since spirit is another name for air, and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because by the words “Spirit of God” Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to “move over the waters,” not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman’s will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form.

The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above the

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waters, in the words: “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.” The remaining distinctions will appear from what follows (Question [71]). (emphasis added)

I say:

This article asks the wrong question and so does not arrive at a satisfactory answer, which is evident from the fact that the instances of formlessness considered belong to all three of the species of works, namely, of creation, of distinction, and of adorn-ment, but the inquiry is not organized according to this order. But that being the case, the right question to ask would have been, ‘Inasmuch as there are three kinds of work, what sort of formlessness (if any) belonged to them?’ The right answer, then, would be:

the work of creation, being the bringing into being out of nothing composites of matter and form, matter had to be created at the same time as the form, since first matter could not have existed without form

the work of distinction, involving the imparting of form to what was only rela-tively formless, as to an existing subject understood to exist with a certain indis-position and lack of ordination, as elsewhere explained, had to be disposed and ordered in the appropriate ways

the work of adornment, involving the being void or empty of the heaven and the earth, had to be taken away by the earth and heaven being ‘filled’

§

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 66  [<< | >>]Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless,” and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same.

  Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): “Things that are one in genus are one in matter.” But all corporeal things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same.

  Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.

  Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.

  On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.

  I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: “By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together.” But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms–-that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains

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subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form.

   Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and “vice versa.” Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

   Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven–-beings in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form–that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form–it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle [*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality.

  Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures.

  Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity.

  Reply to Objection 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated above.

  Reply to Objection 4: As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form.

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Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that “the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order.” If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

Objection 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): “In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world”; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.

Objection 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth,’ heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.

I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: “Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest.” But they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a twofold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in

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the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.

Reply to Objection 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.

Reply to Objection 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra, Question [112], Article [3]], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.

Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: “The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): “It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region.” But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.

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Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?

  Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things that Thou didst create before time

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was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. “Therefore time was not created with formless matter.

  Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when “God divided the light from the darkness.” Therefore in the beginning time was not.

  Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament’s movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not.

  Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.

  Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.

  On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): “Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.”

  I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four–-the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created—the angelic nature and corporeal matter—making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.

  Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.

  Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.

  Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament’s movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament’s movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than “the measure of priority and succession in movement.”

  Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.

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  Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the “now.”

§

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 67  [<< | >>]

ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

   We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly the work of the third day.

   Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

    (1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?    (2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?     (3) Whether light is a quality?     (4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?

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Whether the word “light” is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

  Objection 1: It would seem that “light” is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that “in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically.”

  Objection 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters.

  Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): “All that is made manifest is light.” But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.

  On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that “Splendor” is among those things which are said of God metaphorically.

  I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways—that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word “sight,” originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, “Seeing how it tastes,” or “smells,” or “burns”. “Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God” (Mt. 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

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   The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.

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Whether light is a body?

  Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that “light takes the first place among bodies.” Therefore light is a body.

  Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that “light is a species of fire.” But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.

  Objection 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies. Therefore light is a body.

  On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a body.

  I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.

   The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body.

   The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.

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   Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.

  Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act–-in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

  Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is “flame,” or in earthly matter is “burning coal.” Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.

  Reply to Objection 3: All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.

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Whether light is a quality?

  Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.

  Objection 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensible quality.

  Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form.

  On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a species of quality.

  I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have said that light is the sun’s substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form

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of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

   We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies.

  Reply to Objection 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause.

  Reply to Objection 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.

  Reply to Objection 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.

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Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (Article [3]), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

  Objection 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day.

  Objection 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

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  Objection 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (Question [63], Article [5]). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day.

  On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.

  I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when we read, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word “heaven,” and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word “earth.” And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.

   Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i in Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.

   Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars, which was forbidden them (Dt. 4).

   But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read that “the earth was void and empty,” and another where it is said that “darkness was upon the face of the deep.”

Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light.

In the first place because light is a quality of the first body [i.e. of heaven, the transparent body, which, being the noblest thing, comes first], as was stated (Article [3]), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form.

[i.e. because the heaven is the first body, its formlessness, which was darkness, is fittingly removed first by the production of light]

The second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim. ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is [the] more common quality.

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   Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.

  Reply to Objection 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds the first place.

  Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to exist.

   Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is superfluous, whereas none of God’s works have been made in vain. On this account it is held by some that the sun’s body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on another form.

   I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the sun’s light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards added the special and determinative power required to produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness. First, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of dark-ness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is signified by the words, “He called the light day, and the darkness night.”

  Reply to Objection 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the common movement of the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, in the words, “let them be for seasons, and for days, and years” is due to proper movements.

  Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must understand the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in

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which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed from their creation as said above (Question [62], Article [3]). Thus the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form. But if all created things received their form at the same time, the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would exist.

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 68  [<< | >>]

ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (FOUR ARTICLES)

   We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:    (1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?     (2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?     (3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?     (4) Whether there is more than one heaven?   Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 68  [<< | >>]

Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day. For it is said (Gn. 1:8): “God called the firmament heaven.” But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Objection 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Objection 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “God said: let there be a firmament,” and further on (verse 8); “And the evening and morning were the second day.”

I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing. We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were

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a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32). According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist. But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the elemental. Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time. Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form. If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day. Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. “For a body is called firm,” that is dense and solid, “thereby differing from a mathematical body” as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: “I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and then proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as one might say: “This house was constructed by that builder,” and then add: “First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and thirdly, put on the roof.” In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day. We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and

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the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that “God called the firmament heaven”; just as in a preceding verse it said that “God called the light day” (since the word “day” is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses. The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has been already said.

Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 68  [<< | >>]

Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether there are waters above the firmament?

  Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

  Objection 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water above it.

  Objection 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water would be useless there. But none of God’s works are useless. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

  On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:7): “(God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament.”

   I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, “These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there.” As to the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are “spiritual substances.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): “Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord,” and (Dn. 3:60): “Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord.” To this Basil answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures, but that “the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator.” Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to these.

   We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the starry

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heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.

   If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere absurdity.8 The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only.

  Reply to Objection 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says “It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle.” We leave this view, then, and answer that according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven. Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified.

  Reply to Objection 2: The solution is clear from what has been said, according to the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

  Reply to Objection 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament.

8 In truth, what is “a mere absurdity” is the supposition that the waters need to be “lifted up” above the firmament in the first place; the plain meaning of the text being that they were already there: the firmament, so we are told, being “made in the midst of the waters,” from which it follows that the waters divided by the firmament are already in place at the start of the Second Day. How they got there presents a problem to be sure; but whatever the explanation one gives, no such difficulty as touched upon by St. Augustine exists.

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 68  [<< | >>]Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): “All water is the same species.” Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place.

  Objection 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firmament that distinguishes them.

  Objection 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.

  On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters.”

  I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the word “deep” might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within–-that is to say, from all bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of them all.

   As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum.

   Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: “Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.

   Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the

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name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.

  Reply to Objection 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.

  Reply to Objection 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their destruction, but only as the boundary of each.

  Reply to Objection 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 68  [<< | >>]

Article: 4  [<< | >>]

Whether there is only one heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven.

Objection 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:4): “Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens.”

I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words ‘heavens of heavens’ are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9]. But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one.

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In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense.

Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature.

In this body there are three heavens;

the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous;

the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent;

and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres.

One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential.

Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon’s orb, calling it the aerial.

According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was “rapt to the third heaven.”

But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, “I will ascend into heaven”; whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words, “Your reward is very great in heaven” (Mt. 5:12).

Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul’s rapture “to the third heaven.”

Reply to Objection 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens.

Reply to Objection 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one.

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Reply to Objection 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.

N.B. On the Olympian heaven, the air, the aether, and Olympus, cf. [Pseudo-]Plutarch, The Life and Poetry of Homer, nn. 92-99 (tr. Thomas Y. Cromwell).

[95] Although the air is around the earth, he says the ether is higher in the following lines (I. xiv. 287):– And going up on a lofty pine, which then grew on the summit of Ida and through the air reached into the ether. But higher than the ether is heaven (I. xvii. 424):– And thus they fought: the iron clangor pierc’d The airless ether and brazen vault of Heaven. And, besides, in the following (I. i. 497):– The vapor ascended to the great heaven and to Olympus. The top part of the air is finer and more distant from the earth and its exhalations. Therefore it is said Olympus is called “wholly shining.”

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 69  [<< | >>]

ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)

   We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:    (1) About the gathering together of the waters;     (2) About the production of plants.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 69  [<< | >>]Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?

  Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been “made” in the words, “God said: Be light made,” and “Let there be a firmament made.” But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together.

  Objection 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as “invisible” [*Question [66], Article [1], Objection [1]]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together.

  Objection 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were not gathered together into one place.

  Objection 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary.

  Objection 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity.

  On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.

  I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently to this question according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words “earth” and “water.” Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is

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recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, “Let there be made a firmament,” by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore the words, “Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear,” mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.

[Note: The work of the third day involved the imparting of shape to both the waters and the earth, not the imparting to them of their elemental forms or natures. Likewise, the works of the preceding days involved the imparting of forms to heaven: in reverse order, the work of the second day imparted a form to the starry heaven, while the work of the first day imparted a form to the aerial heaven.]

   According, however, to other holy writers [*Question [66], Article [1]] an order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named as already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness.

Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long as “darkness” filled it, because it was the source of light.

[the transparent body of heaven was without form until light was created, light being the act of the transparent, and therefore a form]

The formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the “deep,” because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass of waters without order.

[the deep, or ‘the mass of waters without order’, was without form until its was divided by the production of the firmament, leading to the separation of the waters above from the waters below.]

Thirdly, the formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to be “void” or “invisible,” because it was covered by the waters.

[the earth was without form until its veil of waters was withdrawn from it and it became visible]

Thus, then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day. And since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this formation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and day.

On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that water be understood as including certain other things, as explained above (Question [68], Article [3])).

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On the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, clearly expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words, “Let the dry land appear.”

  Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For “water,” to use Augustine’s words, “glides and flows away, the earth abides” (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as made.

  Reply to Objection 2: This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine’s opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable.

  Reply to Objection 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, “one place” is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, “Let the waters be gathered together in one place,” that is, apart from the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow, “The gathering together of the waters He called Seas.”

  Reply to Objection 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement and by these natural movements they are said to “fulfill His word.” Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth’s surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is said, “I set My bounds around the sea,” and Jer. 5:22, where it is written: “Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea?”

  Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here in respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it is written: “He called the dry land, Earth.” It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the expression, “He called,” denotes throughout an

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equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that “He called the light Day”: for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that “there was evening and morning, one day.” In like manner it is said that “the firmament,” that is, the air, “He called heaven”: for that which was first created was also called “heaven.” And here, again, it is said that “the dry land,” that is, the part from which the waters had withdrawn, “He called, Earth,” as distinct from the sea; although the name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or not. So by the expression “He called” we are to understand throughout that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave.

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Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?

  Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of distinction.

  Objection 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words of Gn. 3:17, “Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee,” show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with the work of formation.

  Objection 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day.

  On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): “The earth brought forth the green herb,” after which there follows, “The evening and the morning were the third day.”

  I answer that, On the third day, as said (Article [1]), the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold.

On the one hand, the earth was “invisible” or “void,” being covered by the waters;

on the other hand, it was “shapeless” or “empty,” that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment.

Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when “the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared”; secondly, when “the earth brought forth the green herb.”

But concerning the production of plants, Augustine’s opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in

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their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew.” Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth’s surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, “He worketh until now.” Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only.

However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, “before it sprung up in the earth,” and “before it grew,” that is, before like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed.

Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): “Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed,” as indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, from which the seed of others should arise.9

Nor does the question where the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument.

  Reply to Objection 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth’s formation.

  Reply to Objection 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is said: “Shall it bring forth TO THEE.”

  Reply to Objection 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (Question [67], Article [4]; Question [68], Article [3]). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them.

9 Unde signanter Scriptura dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem et facientem semen, quia scilicet sunt productae perfectae species plantarum, ex quibus semina aliarum orirentur. “And so Scripture pointedly says, ‘Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed,’ meaning that the perfect species of plants were produced, from which the seed of others [i.e. of other plants, which they reproduce] should arise.” That is, the species of plants were produced in perfection since they are able to reproduce right from the start, just as were Adam and Eve.

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OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)

   We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.

   In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.

   Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:     (1) As to the production of the lights;     (2) As to the end of their production;     (3) Whether they are living beings?

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Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.

  Objection 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.

  Objection 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: “He set them in the firmament.” But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day.

  Objection 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day.

  Objection 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly described as the “two great lights.”

  On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

  I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says (Gn. 2:1): “So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them,” thereby indicating that the work was threefold.

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In the first work, that of “creation,” the heaven and the earth were produced, but as yet without form.

In the second, or work of “distinction,” the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose.

To these two works is added the work of adornment, which is distinct from perfect[ion]. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like.

Now just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth.

But it has been stated above (Question [69], Article [1]), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth [Literally, “Now as was stated above, mention is made of three things in creation, namely, of heaven and water and earth”];

and these three received their form from the three days’ work of distinction,

so that heaven was formed on the first day;

on the second day the waters were separated;

and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land.

So also is it in the work of adornment;

on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements;

on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;

while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it.

It must also here be noted that Augustine’s opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: “Let the firmament produce lights,” though it says: “Let the earth bring forth the green herb.”

  Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine’s opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the

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beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning.

  Reply to Objection 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun’s light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.

  Reply to Objection 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said (Question [67], Article [4]; Question [68], Article [3]). The objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher firmament.

  Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by his labor.

  Reply to Objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater.

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Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not

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reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear.” Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs.

  Objection 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs.

  Objection 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were not made “for seasons, and days, and years,” that is, in order to distinguish them.

  Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, “since the end is better than the means” (Topic. iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made “to enlighten it.”

  Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said “to rule the night.” But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made “to rule the night.”

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As we have said above (Question [65], Article [2]), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19): “Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations.”

Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis as threefold.

First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: “Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth.”

Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he says: “Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years.”

Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And in this respect he says: “Let them be for signs.”

  Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will.

  Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says “signs,” rather than “causes,” to guard against idolatry.

  Reply to Objection 3: The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven and

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may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.

  Reply to Objection 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe.

  Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself.

For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.

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Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.

  Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life.” The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings.

  Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a living soul.

  Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.

  Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move

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themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings.

  On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), “Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have neither life nor sense.”

  I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), “was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.” On the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church.

It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. 1:6), “The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about.” But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).

   In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions.

There are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it.

It is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain

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the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).

   From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.

  Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance.

  Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.

  Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.

  Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.

  Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).

§

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ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)

   We must next consider the work of the fifth day.

  Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth,” do not fittingly describe this work.

  Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are produced from water.

  Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced from the air, and not from the waters.

  Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life.”

  Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.

  On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

  I answer that, As said above, (Question [70], Article [1]), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.

Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes.

As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second.

It must, however, be observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially.

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  Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way.

It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the elements.

But at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars.

  Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described.

  Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly “beneath the firmament,” even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water.

  Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs, the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life,” are followed by these: “God created great whales,” etc.

  Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect.

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 72  [<< | >>]

ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)

   We must now consider the work of the sixth day.

  Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, “Let the earth bring forth the living creature,” should rather have been, “Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures.”

  Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.

  Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said “according to its genus” and “in its species.”

  Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well.

  Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time.

  Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned.

  On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

  I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual.

  Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on (Question [78], Article [2]). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some

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imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes “living creatures,” but “creeping creatures having life”; whereas it does call land animals “living creatures” on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.

  Reply to Objection 2: By “cattle,” domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man: but by “beasts,” wild animals such as bears and lions are designated. By “creeping things” those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word “quadrupeds” is added. Or perhaps the word “quadruped” is used first as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.

  Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.”

  Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.

  Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise than potentially.

  Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): “If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe.” And, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him.

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 73  [<< | >>]

ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)

   We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:    (1) About the completion of the works;     (2) About the resting of God;     (3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 73  [<< | >>]Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?

  Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world (Mt. 13:39,40). Moreover, the time of Christ’s Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it is called “the time of fulness [*Vulg.: ‘the fulness of time’]” (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, “It is consummated” (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day.

  Objection 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day.

  Objection 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): “The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth.” Miracles also are new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): “Renew thy signs, and work new miracles.” Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: “And He that sat on the throne said: Behold I make all things new.” Therefore the completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.

  On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made.”

  I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The ‘first’ perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete. But the ‘second’ perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of

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the second, because the form is the principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.

  Reply to Objection 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ” (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ’s Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory.

  Reply to Objection 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the “second” perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version, however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on that day to have consummated His work.

  Reply to Objection 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous existence materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read (Phil. 2:7), The Son of God “was made in the likeness of men.” And again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), “Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us.”

Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 73  [<< | >>]Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?

  Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), “My Father worketh until now, and I work.” God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His work.

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  Objection 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work.

  Objection 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words “God created” or “made” this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest.

  On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “God rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done.”

  I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire. Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day. First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said above (Article [1], ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He is not said to have rested “in” His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested “from” them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God’s resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).

  Reply to Objection 1: God indeed “worketh until now” by preserving and providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones.

  Reply to Objection 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an external object.

  Reply to Objection 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 73  [<< | >>]Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?

  Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the seventh day. For

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it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day.

  Objection 2: Further, the Latin “benedictio” [blessing] is derived from “bonitas” [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days, therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than the day on which He ceased producing them.

  Objection 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as upon each work it was said, “God saw that it was good.” Therefore it was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed.

  On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), “God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work.”

  I answer that, As said above (Article [2]), God’s rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since, as we explained (Question [72], ad 4), the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: “Increase and multiply.” Now, this increase is effected through God’s Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.

  Reply to Objection 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.

  Reply to Objection 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition.

  Reply to Objection 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation.

§

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Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 74  [<< | >>]

ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)

   We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three points of inquiry:    (1) As to the sufficiency of these days;     (2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?     (3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.

  Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 74  [<< | >>]Article: 1  [<< | >>]

Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?

  Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.

  Objection 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air.

  Objection 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beasts of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds and another to that of man.

  Objection 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days.

  Objection 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumerated with the others.

I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above (Question [70], Article [1]), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it.

Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part.

Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the

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fourth, the middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.

  Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place “in a day,” but creation “in the beginning” which denotes something indivisible.

  Reply to Objection 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 13).

  Reply to Objection 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days of their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world, or different parts.

  Reply to Objection 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Question [70], Article [1] ad 2).

  Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh–-namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work.

Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 74  [<< | >>]Article: 2  [<< | >>]

Whether all these days are one day?

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  Objection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is written (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . . made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up in the earth.” Therefore the day in which God made “the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field,” is one and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day, and for a like reason all the rest.

  Objection 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): “He that liveth for ever, created all things together.” But this would not be the case if the days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many but one only.

  Objection 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.  Objection 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are the words (God) “said . . . . and it was . . . done.” If, then, He had kept back His next work to another day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with the day of the work that follows.

  On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1), “The evening and the morning were the second day . . . the third day,” and so on. But where there is a second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore, only one day.

  I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different. For Augustine understands by the word “day,” the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called “day,” since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things produced.

   If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Question [67], Article [1]; Question [69], Article [1]), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms, and the

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works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown (Question [67], Articles [1],4; Question [69], Article [1]). Secondly, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference; which are not consistent with Augustine’s explanation. In order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.

  Reply to Objection 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but “before it sprung up in the earth,” that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

  Reply to Objection 2: God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. Hence the word “creation” is significant.

  Reply to Objection 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.

  Reply to Objection 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God’s part, as requiring time in which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection.

  Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.

Index  [<< | >>]First Part  [<< | >>]Question: 74  [<< | >>]Article: 3  [<< | >>]

Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?

  Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth. For “all things were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3). Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention should have been made of the Word of God.

  Objection 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently described.

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  Objection 3: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” It ought, then, to have been said of each work, “God saw that it was good.” The omission, therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is not fitting.

  Objection 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, “The Spirit of God moved over the waters,” are unbecoming.

  Objection 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again. Therefore to the words, “God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and it was so,” it is superfluous to add, “God made the firmament.” And the like is to be said of other works.

  Objection 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, “The evening and morning were the second day” or, “the third day,” are not suitable.

  Objection 7: Further, “first,” not “one,” corresponds to “second” and “third.” It should therefore have been said that, “The evening and the morning were the first day,” rather than “one day.”

  Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, “In the beginning God created,” since by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, “God said,” signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.

  Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the word, “earth,” Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, “Praise the Lord from the earth,” is added, “fire, hail, snow, and ice.”

  Reply to Objection 3: In the account of the creation there is found something to correspond to the words, “God saw that it was good,” used in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, “there are two things,” says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God’s love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence.

That they might then exist, and exist permanently, “the Spirit of God,” it is said, “moved over the waters”–-that is to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work.

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And the words, “God saw that it was good,” signify that the things that He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than before He made it.

Thus in either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good.

And if the words, “God saw that it was good,” are not said of the work of the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the second days’ work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world.

The above three reasons are given by Rabbi Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.

  Reply to Objection 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the “Spirit of the Lord,” the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these things are throughout attributed to God.

But according to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to “move over the water”–-that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7).

It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water, “fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods over her chickens.” For water has especially a life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is liquid.

Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism, according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”

  Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the command “Let . . . be made”; secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, “It was . . . done”; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, “He made.” And because the formation of the angels is recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, “He made.” It may also be said, following other writers, that the words, “He said,” and “Let . . . be made,” denote God’s command, and the words, “It was done,” the fulfilment of that

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command. But as it was necessary, for the sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the words, “It was done,” some act of God is expressed by some such words as, “He made,” or, “He divided,” or, “He called.”

  Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the “evening” and the “morning” are understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Question [58], Article [6],7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part, the day. And instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, “The days of my pilgrimage,” where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins with morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction of creatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But Chrysostom’s explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning (Hom. v in Gen.).

  Reply to Objection 7: The words “one day” are used when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning “one,” the measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven days, the first day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).

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(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved.

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