The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War

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The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War

February 2005

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Understanding Emerging Threats:The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War• This study has several objectives:

– Develop a typology of tendencies in Muslim world

– Identify key cleavages and fault lines

– Identify the factors that produce extremism and violence

– Analyze the effects of 9/11, the GWOT and Iraq

– Develop recommendations for a U.S. strategy

• The goals of the strategy are:

– Help our friends and potential allies

– Neutralize our adversaries – Influence those in the middle

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Muslim Tendencies & Marker Issues

Seven Tendencies Seven marker issues

Radical Fundamentalists Ideology Scriptural Fundamentalists Political/legal views Traditionalists Views of government Modernists (liberal) Human rights Modernists (Islamist) Social agenda Liberal Secularists Propensity for violence Authoritarian Secularists Links to terrorism

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Typology of Muslim Tendencies

HighLowLowLow Situation-continent

HighPropensity for Violence

Terrorism an instrument of state policy

Usually noneUsually noneUsually noneGenerally indirect

DirectLinks to Terrorism

InconsistentProgressive in education and women’s rights

Generally progressive

Conservative but many value non-religious subjects in education

Reactionary Generally reactionary

Social Agenda

Primacy of party and state and collective interests

Primacy of individual political and human rights

Islam contains the basic concepts of human rights and individual freedoms

Islam guarantees human rights and liberties

SameReject Western concept of human rights and individual liberties

Human Rights

Political legitimacy derives from state ideology

Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections.

Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people through free elections.

Political legitimacy derives from the will of the people

Political legitimacy derives from God

Political legitimacy derives from God

Government

Rely on authoritarian structures

Support secular law and institutions

Politically moderate

Politically moderate

Politically conservative

Revolutionary and anti-status quo

Political-Legal

Leader cult and socialist and/or pan-Arab ideologies

Liberal democratic or social democratic values

Islam viewed as consistent with modern world

Fuse Islamic beliefs with local traditions

Literal interpretation of Islamic scriptures

Emphasis on obligation of jihad

Ideology

Authoritarian

Secularists

Liberal Secularists

ModernistsTraditionalistsScriptural Fundamentalists

Radical or neo- Fundamentalists

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Muslim Tendencies: Radical Fundamentalists

1 1 1 1

1 1

Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)

Jama’at al Ulema-e-Pakistan

Jama’at-i-Islami (Pakistan)

Islamic Movement of Nigeria

1 1

Al-Qaida (international)

Laskar-e-Toiba (Pakistan)

Asnar al-Islam (Iraq)

PIJ - Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Hamas (Palestinian territories)

Saudi Salafist Groups

IMU - Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan

Jemaah Islamiyah (SEA regional)

Hizbollah (Turkey)

1 1 1

Democracy+ -

Vio

len

ce

-

+

Hib ut-Tahrir (international)

MMI - Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia

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Add Scriptural Fundamentalists

1Darul Arqam (SEA regional)

Jamaa-i-Tabligh (international)

1 1

1

Muslim Brotherhood (regional)

SCIRI (Iraq)

Al-Dawa (Iraq)

1






Ennada (Tunisia)

1 1








Uzbekistan


Hizbollah (Turkey)


Hezbollah (Lebanon)1 1 1

Democracy+ -

Vio

len

ce

-

+

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Add Traditionalists and Modernists



Party of the Islamic Revival of

Tajikistan

Muhammadiyah (Indonesia)

AKP - Justice and Development

Party (Turkey)

Izala (Nigeria)

Al-Wasat (Egypt)

Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia)

1

PAS - Pan-Malay Islamic Party

Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesia)

1






Ennada (Tunisia)


SCIRI (Iraq)

Al-Dawa (Iraq)

1 1








Uzbekistan


Hizbollah (Turkey)



Democracy+ -V

iole

nce

-

+

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Add Secularists



Party of the Islamic Revival of

Tajikistan

Muhammadiyah (Indonesia)

AKP (Turkey)

Izala (Nigeria)

Al-Wasat (Egypt)

Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia) PDI-P (Indonesia)Kuwait Nat. Democratic Movement Democratic Left Party (Turkey)

1


SCIRI (Iraq)

Al-Dawa (Iraq)

Neo-Destour Party (Tunisia)

Central Asian ruling parties

PAS - Pan-Malay Islamic Party

Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesia)

1






Ennada (Tunisia)

Al-Fatah (Palestinian territories)

1 1








Uzbekistan


Hizbollah (Turkey)


Baath Party of Iraq and Syria


Democracy+ -V

iole

nce

-

+

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The Muslim World Is Far From Homogenous

B e r b e r – A f r i c a n

A r a b

T u r k i c P e r s i an

S o u t h A s i a n

M a l a y

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Briefing Outline

– The Islamic Landscape

– Fault lines in the Muslim World

– Sources of Islamic Radicalism

– Post-9/11 and Post-Iraq Trends

– Conclusions

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Sources of Islamic Radicalism

Processes

Catalytic Events

Conditions

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Sources of Islamic RadicalismConditions

Failed political and economic models Structural anti-Westernism Unresolved issues of state and religious authority

Processes The Islamic resurgence Riyaldiplomatik: external funding of religious

fundamentalism and extremism Convergence of Islamism and tribalism Growth of radical Islamic networks Emergence of the mass media The Palestinian-Israeli and Kashmir conflicts

Catalytic Events The Six-Day War (in Arab world) The Iranian Revolution The Afghan War The (First) Gulf War September 11 and the Global War on Terrorism The Iraq War and its aftermath

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Briefing Outline

– The Islamic Landscape

– Fault lines in the Muslim World

– Sources of Islamic Radicalism

– Post-9/11 and post-Iraq Trends

– Conclusions

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The War in Iraq a “Catalytic Event”in the Middle East

On the order of the 1967 Six-Day War or higher

• Western-led coalition assumed responsibility for restructuring political system of Muslim country

• Effects of the war can be analyzed at three levels:

– Effects on Iraq

– Effects on Middle East

– Effects on broader Muslim World

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A Strategy for the Muslim WorldNeeds to Include:

A geopolitical vision of the Muslim world:

What kind of a Muslim world do we want to see emerge from the current turmoil?

And what are the engagement, military posture, and access implications of this vision?

Practical steps to:

(1) support friends and potential allies

(2) neutralize enemies

(3) appeal to mainstream Muslims: “The War of Ideas”

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The Centerpiece of the Practical Side of the Strategy is to Empower Moderates

• Two components of this approach:

– Help to create moderate Muslim networks

– Support “Civil Islam”organizations

• Currently radicals have the advantage

– They are a minority, but have developed extensive international networks

– Liberal and moderate Muslims have no similar networks

• Creation of an international moderate Muslim network would provide a platform to amplify their message and protection

• However, the initial impulse may require an external catalyst

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And Disrupt Radicals

• The U.S. and its allies also need to disrupt radical networks and deny resources to extremists

• The key analytical/intelligence problem is: how can hostile networks be identified?

• Within Western countries, policymakers need to be attentive to radical infiltration of prisons and the military

• Resource denial involves difficult practical problems, but could be partially addressed through network disruption

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Influence the Muslim Mainstream

• Obvious attempts by non-Muslims to influence Muslims would likely backfire.

• U.S. needs to rely on Muslim scholars to delegitimize radical ideology

• Over the long term, important to promote madrassa and mosque reform

• What the U.S. and its allies can do:

– Assist moderate madrassas to provide broad modern education & marketable skills

– Assist governments in developing/strengthening capabilities to monitor mosques and madrassas

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Seek to Engage Islamists in “Normal Politics”

• Goal is to influence radicals into moderation

• Always a danger that an Islamist party, once in power, may move against democratic freedoms

• However, inclusion of such groups within democratic institutions may over time lessen threat

• An unequivocal commitment to non-violence and democratic processes should be prerequisite

– Turkey’s AKP an ambiguous model

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Engage Muslim Diasporas

• Engagement of Muslim diasporas could help U.S. advance its interests in Muslim world

• One possibility is working with Muslim NGOs in responding to humanitarian crises

• However, efforts to engage diasporas need to be undertaken cautiously

• Need to be able to distinguish between “benign” and “malign” diasporan manifestations

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Expand Economic Opportunities

• Will not by itself prevent extremists from striking at perceived enemies of Islam

• However, might help to indirectly undercut the appeal of radicals

• Priority on improving the economic/job prospects of the young

• How international assistance is channeled is critical

• Funding should not be politically neutral

– Should emphasize programs run by secular or moderate Muslim organizations

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Build Appropriate Military Capabilities and Posture

• Comprehensive review of U.S. military capabilities and posture in Muslim world needed

• New challenges require the U.S. to develop different kinds of military capabilities

– counter-insurgency & stabilization capabilities

– cultural intelligence

• In Iraq, the U.S. faces a dilemma:

– cannot leave without defeating insurgency or leaving power vacuum behind

– but need to reduce visibility as “occupying power”

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Geopolitical Implications of Pro-Democracy Strategy

A pro-democracy strategy implies:1. Re-examination of the current U.S. military relationship

with authoritarian but “friendly” Muslim states

2. Hard-headed look at benefits/costs of such relationships

What are the alternatives to authoritarian regimes?

What is the risk/benefit balance?

3. Distancing from authoritarian but friendly regimes could have access implications as well

4. Compensate through closer engagement with countries undergoing democratic change

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Engagement and Access Implications

• In Arab world, shift focus of U.S. security relationships from authoritarian states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) to democratizing states (Bahrain, Qatar)

• Main operating bases in Iraq not desirable at this time, but should not foreclose option

• Throughout the Muslim world:

– seek to reduce “ungoverned areas” that can become havens for terrorists

• Shift from bilateral to regional approaches to what are essentially transnational problems

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Bottom Line• Islamic radicalism is driven by complex and interactive

factors

• Some are common to Muslim world; others vary widely from region to region; regionally-based analysis is critical

• Key challenge for the U.S. is to identify and find common ground with liberal Muslims and find ways to help them counter the extremists

• Islamic networks play key role in spread of extremism; there is critical need to build moderate Muslim networks

• Education a key battlefield: problem is how to move reform of both secular and Islamic schools

• A democratization strategy will require comprehensive re-examination of U.S. defense relationships in Muslim world and will have engagement and access implications

The Muslim World After 9/11 & the Iraq War

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