THE MINORITIES QUESTION AND THE WILLINK INTERVENTION

SANI BALA SHEHU08065872052. 08080626852. 08073400690. 08045298685.

Sanibalashehukano@yahoo.com The roots of the minorities question and its current expression in relation to the problem of development is to be traced to the mode of evolution of Nigerian federalism. There is little doubt that Nigeria, Africa’s major federal state, has maintained an intensely living, strong and persistent tradition of federalism (Beckett, 1987:89,95). With over 250 distinct ethnic group, and ranked seventh with 13 percent homogeneity in terms of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity on an ascending scale in which north and south Korea are ranked 132th with 100per cent homogeneity (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1989; 422; kurian, 1987:1474), Nigeria seems ideally suited for federalism. There are suggestions that a national consensus exists about the relevance of the federal arrangement to Nigeria’s circumstances such that all post-independent constitutions have affirmed it and all but one regime, military and civilian, have accepted it (nwabueze, 1983; Jinadu, 1987). Nwabueze (1983:383-4), in fact, suggests that federalism is here to stay in Nigeria. The federal republic of Nigeria presently consists of a central of federal government, 30 states, 589 local governments, and a mayoralty in the federal capital territory, Abuja. This structure evolved from the amalgamation of southern and northern Nigeria in 1914. Between 1914 and 1945, the governmental structure was implemented through separate political and departmental administrations only tenuously coordinated at the centre (ukwu, 1988:27). In 1946, the Richards constitution imposed a unitary system which did not reckon with Nigeria’s cultural plurality. This was supplanted in 1951 by a quasi-federal constitution. A federal constitution of 1960 consolidated this by establishing Nigeria on the Westminster parliamentary model as a federal state. Both this and the republican constitution provided for the division of powers between central and regional governments (Nigeria, 1960; 1963). The federal system emerge in Nigeria at about a time of little official concern for local development save as might be inferred from the implementation of the colonial plan for the4 welfare and

development on Nigeria, to the extent that it was understood at all outside the circle of the political class, was relatively undeveloped (nwabueze, 1983:380). Contrary to the voluntaristic expectations of classical federal theory, Nigerian federalism, as federal experiments elsewhere in Africa (mckown, 1988a) , was not necessarily a result of local impetus inherent in calculation of advantages each unit would gain while retaining its local autonomy. It was also not explicitly introduced as a mechanism for local development and self rule. Federalism was introduced as a British administrative expedience designed to cope with Nigeria’s ethnic pluralism though the latter, it is often argued, made its introduction as a mechanism of political accommodation almost inevitable (awolowo, 1966). There is even suggestion that federalism was introduced as a British stratagem for maintaining indirect influence on Nigeria after independence (okonjo, 1974-chapters 9 and 10). What is certain however, is that Nigerian federalism was built up from a process of devolution or fissiparity, not accretion or aggregation as was typical of older federations-canada, Australia and the United States. The state essentially devolved part of its powers to regional governments (nwabueze, 1983:34; bach, 1989:221; ekeh, 1989:27). While federalism was thus useful both to the outgoing colonialists and the nationalist politicians as a tool for striking a balance between regional and national identities (mawhood, 1983), the balance struck was, and remains uneven, considering the interest of minority groups in the country. The adoption of federalism also failed to meet its political ends in Nigeria in its early years. The system adopted in 1954 was structurally flawed right from start (awolowo, 1966:21; olowu, 1990b:203). The flaws include (i) the correspondence3 of regional administrative units with the geography of the three major ethnic groups-hausa-fulani, Yoruba and Igbo which effectively regionalized the ruling class (ii) imbalance in the composition of the regions with the northern region dominating the rest both in geographical size (75 percent of Nigeria’s landmass) and population (60 percent); and (iii) the majority-minority ethnic structure within each region which underlined a permanent state of tension and instability. These, with the weakness of the federal centre which made the regions the repository of original sovereignty and ethnicity as the basis for political support, resulted in a tripartite conflict structure aggravated

by the challenge it posed to minority ethnic groups to assert themselves (afigbo, 1989:12) . it also threatened the legitimacy of the centre and its ability to give leadership appropriate to the demands of nation-building. The reproduction of these structural defects at the level of exercise of state power informed perceptions that federal development resources were concentrated in the north. This promoted a structure of politics based on psychological fears of political and economic domination (elaigwu, 1979) and retarded political participation. Moreover, the structure posed difficulties for the ruling class in reconciling their private interest with maintenance of the conditions for local development. Ake (1988:48) forcefully suggests that: development, for sure, was never on the agenda. To the extent that it internalized the regional problem (dunford, 1988), early Nigerian federalism was, in awolowo’s words, an abominable disruptive heritage (awolowo, 1968:69). Under the colonial regime, the problems associated with this heritage informed the appointment of the Henry willink commission in 1957 to inquire, in particular, into the rears of the ethnic minorities.The willink intervention and thereafter. When alan lennox-boyd, the then secretary of state for the colonies appointed the willink commission in September 1957, its terms of reference included: to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of niogeria and to propose means of allayin those fears whether well or ill founded and to advise what safeguards should be included for this purpose3 in the constitution of Nigeria, (Nigeria, 1958) . this was part of the many efforts, some constitutional, some administrative, designed to reconcile the polylot elevemens which made up Nigeria. By this time, it had become obvious that Nigeria was a federation of an unusual composition, among other things because in each of the three regions it was possible to distinguish between a majority group of about tow thirds of the population and minority groups amounti8ng to about one third, (Nigeria, 1958:1) at his posed political difficulties which informed incessant claims by the minority groups for separate states at the various constitutional conferences in the 1950s. Given the structure of Nigerian federation at the time, the fears of the minorities were expressed mainly in relation to regional governme3nts which were practically dominatve by the major ethnic groups in each region. According to the willink report, the fears of the

mino9rities arose from two circumstances first the division of the whole territory into three powerful regions, in each of which one groups is numerically preponderant, and secondly the approach of independence and the removal of the restraints which have operative so far (Nigeria, 1958:2-3). In the western region, fears were expressed in the areas of Yoruba domination of, especially, the mid-west minorities; victimization in the process of maintenance of law and order by officially sponsored things, hooligans and strong arm p[arties, discrimination in the economic field and in the provision of services; gerrymandering and its effects on the distribution of parliamentary seats; conflict between ethnic and partisan loyalties in the intergovernmental context; and potential for the partiality of legislation. There were also trite fears by religious minorities among the Yoruba. Similar fears were expressed in the northern region. In the particular, the minorities were worried about the role of traditional rulers (emirs) who appointed district heads to rule over non-Muslims. There were also social fears and grievances concerning the use of contemptuous expression and discriminatory social practices; fears of political influence regarding the impartiality of the native authority police and the alkali (the legal aspect of Muslim law) religious intolerance; and fears that the political regime in the north was tending towards a foreign policy sympathetic with nations of the middle east based on their common allegiance to Islam. In the eastern region, there was the general fear amongst the minority ethnic groups that they might be ove run, commercially and po0litically, by the demographically dominant and socially mobile ibo. In particular, there were fears of autocratic government predicated on the perceived dictatorial conduct of the reigning (in the eastern region) ibo dominated national council of Nigerian citizens (NCNC); fear of public posts and services which included the deliberate object of the ibo majority… to fill every post with ibos; fears of local government and chiefs relating to insufficient devolution of powers which left ethnic minorities with limited powers to debate issues and little power to initiate action. There were also fears regarding public order and changes in the legal system similar to those expressed in the western and northern regions. In particular, the ethnic groups that made up the then rivers province of which ogni division was part, nursed long-standing grievances to the effect that the geography of their deltaic landscape and its associated difficulties

for development were not understood at and inland headquarters. They were, therefore, united by fear of neglect at the hands of a government who in any case put the needs of the interior first. (Nigeria, 1958;50). The willink commission acknowledged the existence of a body of genuine fears amongst minority groups althou7gh these might have been exaggerated in a few instances. However, the commission fell short of recommending any form of self-determination, including the creation of states, on the reasoning that to set up a separate state would accentuate and underline to obliterate, (Nigeria, 1958, 33, 87). Rather, the commissions recommended panacea included (i) a vague constitutional provision of some fulcrum or fixed pointer outside and above politics from which absolute impartiality can be exercised; (ii) the establishment of a council in each minority area charged with fostering the well-being, cultural advancement and economic and social development of the area (iii) the development of special areas should be placed on the concurrent legislative list such that funds and staff should be contributed by the federal and regional governments into a board, with a federal chairman to be established for this purpose. Such a board was to initiate schemes to supplement the normal development of the special area’ (Nigeria, 1958:88,103-104). The analysis of the willink commission and its recommendations suffered from a lack of depth inherent in its inability to go beyond the level of an epiphenomenal enquiry. For instance, it accepted laid down-procedures without establishing whether or not the letter and spirit of such procedures were adhered to. Similarly, the commission exhibited copious ignorance of the boundaries and hence distinct identities of various ethnic groups, hence the classification of a vast number of ethnic groups in the rivers province as Ibo. Such weakness contributed to its limited relevance to the resolution of the minorities and development question which called it into existence. Inevitably, the demand for the resolution of the question, especially through the creation of states, continued. The pressure for reform was dictated as much by the imperatives of development. These provided the grounds for political restructurings which carved out more units in the federation to ensure participation and development and to assuage fears of domination. The main instrument for this exercise was the creation of states. Thus, in 1963, the mid-western region was created by

plebiscite partly to assuage fears of political domination of minority groups and bring development closer to the people, and partly for partisan political reasons (mckown, 1988b) . Twelve states were created out of the existing regions in 1967. This revealed the fundamental character of Nigerian federalism as multi-ethnic, and multi-ethnicity as the very essence of Nigerian politics (afigbo, 1989). The revelation provided the precondition for the creation of more states in 12976 to bring the number to nineteen. State creation was expected to balance the federation as well as shift both allegiance and competition for development resources from broad ethnic groups to neutral state entities (miles 1988). There are reservations that it achieved the desired balance (nwabueze, 1983:306); but certainly the logic of organizational structure and procedures of the military (oyewole, 1978) and encouragement by top bureaucrats (olowu, 1990b) facilitated the rapid development of centralizing federalism in Nigeria between 1966 and 1979. so too did the increase in revenue yields from the sale of petroleum on the world market in the 1970s, the logic of which enjoined the state to act in the interest of capital as represented by oil companies. And so between 1966 and 1979, the balance of power and resources became increasingly tilted in favour of the federal centre. Nwabueze (1983:1) argues that such a communist arrangement in which lower levels of government accept direction from the center on the conduct of their affairs is not federalism. Olowu (1990a) uses the term federal-unitarism to describe federal practice between 1975 and 1979. This notwithstanding, the concentration of oil wealth at the centre made control of state power at this level very attractive. It was also during this period that probably the most enduring legacies of Nigerian federalism were instituted. Alongised the creation of states and adjustment of political and geographical boundaries was the establishment in 1976 of a formal third tier of government at the local level together with a nation-wide reform of the local government system. The aim was to forge a viable and stable political system capable of responding to the development needs of the country. While Nigeria might have borrowed the idea of a three-tier governmental structure from Brazilian federalism (olowu, 1982) , it was expected to respond to the peculiar needs and problems of Nigerian society. Hence much was expected from the new federal arrangement on the return to civilian rule in October 1976. The consensus on Nigerian federalism was teste. So far, it has not been vindicated. Nigerian

federalism is yet to fully come to grips with the minorities and development question. In the present age, the problem is exemplified by minority groups of the oil mineral producing areas, of which Ogoni is just one.

GROUP DISAFFECTION AND QUEST FOR A RE-STRUCTURING OF THE FEDERATION

Among the many groups that were created to promote either regional or ethnic interest or a wider, more secularly-based reformation of the federal set up were the middle belt forum, the eastern mandate union (EMU), the western consultative group, the northern elders forum, the egbe afenifere, the movement for national reformation (MNR), the ndigbo, and of course, MOSOP and EMIRON. The issues which dominated the discourse of most of the groups included ways of ensuring that federal political power is equally accessible to all Nigerian nationalities which should also be allowed to have their own political and economic space in a radically restructured federation in which the power of the federal state is reduced. Vociferous demands were also made for a greater balance between the north and the south of Nigeria in the leadership of the country, in the distribution of political and parasitical offices, and the economic benefits accruing to the country. Furthermore, arguments for and against a greater balance between the Christians and Moslems both in the headship of the federal government and in key military command appointments. Some groups even went so far as to canvass the re-regionalization of the Nigerian police force as well as the regionalization of the armed forces as part of a strategy both for giving substance to regional autonomy as well as preventing the all too frequent intervention of the military in politics. Strong views were expressed in support of and against the use of the principle of derivation as the sole or main criterion for the allocation of revenue. There is much in the plethora of views that were canvassed that was both useless and useful democratic and anti-non democratic but whatever view we may hold of them, they reflected the changing mood in the country for a far-reaching programme of reform. The financial profligacy and political recklessness of the Babangida military regime only served to reinforce the necessity for reform and, in time, a host of professional associations and interest groups whose members still had an objective interest in defending a pan-Nigeria national-territorial agenda began publicly to push the case for the convening of a sovereign national conference to discuss the entire

basis on which the Nigerian federation is built and to reform it in such a way that it would promote democratic accountability, greater participation in national and sub-national affairs by a majority of the people, the creative channeling of the energies of the people for national reconstruction and development, and the enhancement of the basis for national unity. Among the interest groups and professional which were at the forefront of the campaign for a sovereign national conference were those represented by the Nigeria labour congress (NLC) and a majority of its 42 affiliate unions, the national association of Nigerian students (NANS), the academic staff union of universities (ASUU), the association of democratic lawyers (NADL), the civil liberties organisation (CLO), women in Nigeria (WIN), the constitutional rights projects (CRP), the concerned professionals (CP), Nigerians medical association (NMA), and the committee for the defence of human rights (CDHR), among others. Several of these groups were affiliate members of the campaign for democracy (CD) that was at the forefront of the struggle against the continuation of general Babangida and the military in power following the annulment of the 1993 presidential election (Olukosi, 1993b, 1994). The campaign by professional associations and interest groups (like labour, students, and academics) with a national-territorial agenda was taken up by some of the organizations that had been set up to canvass the reformation of the federal system on the basis of autonomous nationalities in a political arrangement that involves a reduction in powers, competences and responsibilities of the federal centre. Particularly prominent tin this regard were the MNR (1993) and EMIRON/MOSOP. The various groups and interest were united, partly at least, by an extreme distrust of the military government of general Babangida in whose programme of transition to civilian rule they had little or no faith. This loss of faith in the Babangida regime related as much to this distrust of its intention to hand over federal power to an elected federal executive as to their loss of faith in the capacity of the regime particularly, and the Nigerian military in general, to champion a systematic reform of the federation to permit a greater input in decision-making by the people. The tempo of the campaign for a sovereign national conference grew with the increasing arbitrariness with which the Babangida regime conducted the transition programme. The programme itself was cumulative discredited with every round of postponement of the date for the

handing over of executive power to an elected president. Such was the extent to which the tempo for genuine reformation of Nigerian politics, economy, and society had built up that not even the election of a civilian president could have blunted the demand for a national conference on one sort or the other.

It was a mark of the groundswell of pressures that had build up in favour of the restructuring of the federal arrangement in the country that a group of retired senior civil servants (the so-called super).

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND NATIONAL BUILDING: THE LINK

The construction of stable nation out of desperate and often antagonistic ethnicities or nationalities cohabiting in an artificial modern state like Nigeria is contingent upon effective resolution of what is generally known as the “national question” i.e. finding acceptable solution to the problems of peaceful, harmonious cohabitation and relationship among the various nationalities that artificial boundaries have brought together. Even older and more develop state have had to confront this inevitable problem. The national question has always been a major factor in all multi-national societies, and harmonious coexistence depends on its successful resolution. Where issues of national question have been left unresolved, such nations have had to be held together largely by coercion, intimidation and violence.This was the case with the defunct Soviet Union, a multi-national conglomerate held together by communist authoritarianism which for decade swept the “nationalities problems underneath the rug. It confronted the problem headlong in 1991 and had to split up into its constituent units later year. Cohabitation of strange bedfellows

remains a problem that states of heterogeneous nationalities which eventually dealt with. Dealing with the national question or the nationalities problem is an integral part of any nation’s march to political development and maturity. new nations, especially those that emerged recently from colonialism have a numerous task of evolving new and concrete national identities by carefully welding together their disparate ethnic or nationality groups and conscious cultivation of a bond of common national identity. this process of resolving what Lucian term as “national identity crisis fundamentally involves the acceptance by all those who co-exist in the same demarcated geographic space and under the political authority of a modern nation-state that they share some “distinctive and common bond of ultimate association. this is far from being an easy process for emergent post-colonial states. as they further observes in many of new countries the identity crisis immediately became of the artificial acquire of their physical boundaries”. The orders inherited by the new successor states were arbitrary legacies of Europeans colonization which did not take into proper consideration pre-colonial ethno-cultural configurations and patterns. As a result of their artificiality and because of the unwillingness of the colonialist to forge nations out of these diverse ethnic mosaics, there is rally little emotional attachment to the emerging nation-states. instead, primordial attachment remain quite strong, regrettable to the development of “cohesive national identity”. In large rears its head more poignantly whenever the evolving political systems fail to endanger the feeling that the nation-state belongs equally to all that comprise it. This crisis, it must be emphasized, it is not just a peculiarity of the new states along. Older and seemingly more stable polities also experience i.e., for example, Canada with recurrent agitations for Quebec separatism, Scottish nationalism in great Britain Basque separatism in Spain the collapse and disintegration of former soviet union. in Africa, the appeal to ethnic separatism was effectively stifled by the coercion and violence of colonial rule. the pent-up ethnic feeling were later to explode after

independence to haunt the new states which lacked the where withal for the amelioration historical divisions and hostilities.Regrettably, the post-colonial state in Africa has failed woefully in the realm of nation-building. The festering sore ethnic nationalism which colonialism merely suppressed has now become the dangerous inheritance of the new Africa state. the new rulers of the state, rather tan symbolized their nations unfortunately cast themselves in the role ethnic champions who willingly fan the members of ethnic chauvinism and mutual hatred.Latent ethnic hatred have therefore found expressions through political actions that exacerbated the domination of minority by majority nationalities, policies that marginalized minorities, escalated hostilities and intensified primordial feelings for the ethnic group over and above loyalty to the nation-state.The resultant heightened tension and hostilities have created a vicious cycle of violence and national insecurity as eruptions of rabid ethno-nationalism are violently and forcibly suppressed by ruling authorities,Socially where major nationality groups controlling power employ the coercive resources of the state to oppress recalcitrant minority groups. In periods of national crisis engendered by this process, the tendency to take solace in primordial groups become stronger, thus cancelling all pretensions of national solidarity and coercion. The above has been the lot of most African state largely of colonial heritage and their own palpable ineptitude to evolved mechanisms for the resolution of the crucial national question.

Aside from occasional expression and outbursts of national feelings and patriotism for the nation-state during periods of international crisis that might threat the corporate existence of the state, the feeling of ethnocentrisms has already been elevated to higher pedestal while attachment to primordial groups remains the order of the day. This has resulted in the failure

nation-building efforts, since “the process of nation-state” according to bill and Hardgrave, “depends impart on breaking these primordial patterns of attitude and behaviour, and creating a new sense of political identity”. This involves a careful process of creating national institution “for the counter-socialization of individuals whose orientations have already been formed to some extend along traditional lines”. As an ultimate necessity, nation-building cannot be brought about by mere wishful-thinking or simply by the mere fact of coexistence. Socialization in to an entirely new political culture i.e. the development of emotional attachment to the nation-state rather than to the ethnic group, according to bill and Hardgrave, “cannot always be attained by fiat or even by the most enlightened programme of political education”. New nations must consciously develop rather than legislate by fiat mechanisms for the gradual erosion of particularistic or parochial attitudes, feelings and behaviour to pave way for real nations. Valuable lessons can be learnt in this regard from the experience of the now defunct USSR where all pretensions to solving the nationalities problem through forcible Russification failed abysmal. Even when multi-national states held together by force, there comes a time when the need to face up to the challenges of resolving the

thorny question becomes an inescapable national imperative..CONCLUDING REMARKS.The feelings and assertion of ethnic nationalism have been the bane of nation-building in Nigeria. ethnocentricism, even ethnic chauvinism has fualled by the historical circumstances of Nigeria`s emergence under colonial rule.the conscious manipulation of post-colonial politics for the perpectuation of inherited prejudices,structural imbalance in the federal structure,divisive and destructive military rule e.t.c which make Nigeria still largely a “geographical expression” after three decades.notmuch progress would be made until full democracy is achieved with structures and mechanisms that would bridle the propency for ethnic nationalism and channel loyalties away from the primordial nationality to the Nigerian nation-state. a return to JUNE12 as the basis for democratic rule is inevitable, and no amount of deceptive overtures and subterfuge by the interim national government would wish away the peoples` verdict. The interim national government is itself an illegitimate contraption. And any election organised by it can only be of dubious credibility. if the nation would not allowed to dissolve in chaos the will of Nigerian people as freely expressed by them on June 12,1993 must be respected.#A word must also be said on the agitations for a national conference. the current spate of agitations for national conference is a by-product of Babangida’s unjustifiable annulment of the people’s mandate. by this arbitrary action, the dictator succeeded in sowing the seeds of discord among Nigerians, creating the impression that annulment of the presidential election was to prevent a southerner from becoming the president thereby perpetuating northern domination, the truth or falsity of the suspicion notwithstanding, it is a start reality that the basis for Nigerian unity has been called in to question. The other side of the controversy, of course, is that a national conference is an open invitation to chaos. the view is that such a

conference is bound to exacerbate mutual suspicions,unlikely to resolve any of the contentiousof the polity in chaos. Analyst of this persuation are of the view that national conference is death knell for Nigeria as outcome may be a replay of the Yugoslav debacle here. Persuasive as this argument may seem on the surface, it merely seeks to push the matter under the rug for the sake of geopolitical expediency.pretending that all is well would not guarantee the survival of the polity.Only a realist appraisal of the collective destiny of the nation through frank discussion at a national conference hold out hope for thorough nation building.Sani bala Shehu can be reach via his emails and web blog.sanibalalshehukano@yahoo.comsanibalashehu2004@yahoo.co.uksanibalshehukano@gmail.comsanibalashehukano@fanbox.comWeb Blog:www.sanibalashehu.wordpress.comwww.sanibalashehu.ning.comwww.naijapals.com/kusurwawww.sanibalashehu.blogspot.comwww.sagagikano.blogspot.comwww.fanbox.com/sanibalashehukano

THE MINORITIES QUESTION AND THE WILLINK INTERVENTION

March 28, 2009

THE MINORITIES QUESTION AND THE WILLINK INTERVENTIONThe roots of the minorities question and its current expression in relation to the problem of development is to be traced to the mode of evolution of Nigerian federalism. There is little doubt that Nigeria, Africa’s major federal state, has maintained an intensely living, strong and persistent tradition of federalism

(Beckett, 1987:89,95). With over 250 distinct ethnic group, and ranked seventh with 13 percent homogeneity in terms of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity on an ascending scale in which north and south Korea are ranked 132th with 100per cent homogeneity (Derbyshire and Derbyshire, 1989; 422; kurian, 1987:1474), Nigeria seems ideally suited for federalism. There are suggestions that a national consensus exists about the relevance of the federal arrangement to Nigeria’s circumstances such that all post-independent constitutions have affirmed it and all but one regime, military and civilian, have accepted it (nwabueze, 1983; Jinadu, 1987). Nwabueze (1983:383-4), in fact, suggests that federalism is here to stay in Nigeria.The federal republic of Nigeria presently consists of a central of federal government, 30 states, 589 local governments, and a mayoralty in the federal capital territory, Abuja. This structure evolved from the amalgamation of southern and northern Nigeria in 1914. Between 1914 and 1945, the governmental structure was implemented through separate political and departmental administrations only tenuously coordinated at the centre (ukwu, 1988:27). In 1946, the Richards constitution imposed a unitary system which did not reckon with Nigeria’s cultural plurality. This was supplanted in 1951 by a quasi-federal constitution. A federal constitution of 1960 consolidated this by establishing Nigeria on the Westminster parliamentary model as a federal state. Both this and the republican constitution provided for the division of powers between central and regional governments (Nigeria, 1960; 1963). The federal

system emerge in Nigeria at about a time of little official concern for local development save as might be inferred from the implementation of the colonial plan for the4 welfare and development on Nigeria, to the extent that it was understood at all outside the circle of the political class, was relatively undeveloped (nwabueze, 1983:380).Contrary to the voluntaristic expectations of classical federal theory, Nigerian federalism, as federal experiments elsewhere in Africa (mckown, 1988a) , was not necessarily a result of local impetus inherent in calculation of advantages each unit would gain while retaining its local autonomy. It was also not explicitly introduced as a mechanism for local development and self rule. Federalism was introduced as a British administrative expedience designed to cope with Nigeria’s ethnic pluralism though the latter, it is often argued, made its introduction as a mechanism of political accommodation almost inevitable (awolowo, 1966). There is even suggestion that federalism was introduced as a British stratagem for maintaining indirect influence on Nigeria after independence (okonjo, 1974-chapters 9 and 10). What is certain however, is that Nigerian federalism was built up from a process of devolution or fissiparity, not accretion or aggregation as was typical of older federations-canada, Australia and the United States. The state essentially devolved part of its powers to regional governments (nwabueze, 1983:34; bach, 1989:221; ekeh, 1989:27). While federalism was thus useful both to the outgoing colonialists and the nationalist politicians as a tool for striking a balance

between regional and national identities (mawhood, 1983), the balance struck was, and remains uneven, considering the interest of minority groups in the country.The adoption of federalism also failed to meet its political ends in Nigeria in its early years. The system adopted in 1954 was structurally flawed right from start (awolowo, 1966:21; olowu, 1990b:203). The flaws include (i) the correspondence3 of regional administrative units with the geography of the three major ethnic groups-hausa-fulani, Yoruba and Igbo which effectively regionalized the ruling class (ii) imbalance in the composition of the regions with the northern region dominating the rest both in geographical size (75 percent of Nigeria’s landmass) and population (60 percent); and (iii) the majority-minority ethnic structure within each region which underlined a permanent state of tension and instability. These, with the weakness of the federal centre which made the regions the repository of original sovereignty and ethnicity as the basis for political support, resulted in a tripartite conflict structure aggravated by the challenge it posed to minority ethnic groups to assert themselves (afigbo, 1989:12) . it also threatened the legitimacy of the centre and its ability to give leadership appropriate to the demands of nation-building.The reproduction of these structural defects at the level of exercise of state power informed perceptions that federal development resources were concentrated in the north. This promoted a structure of politics based on psychological fears of political and economic domination (elaigwu, 1979) and

retarded political participation. Moreover, the structure posed difficulties for the ruling class in reconciling their private interest with maintenance of the conditions for local development. Ake (1988:48) forcefully suggests that: development, for sure, was never on the agenda. To the extent that it internalized the regional problem (dunford, 1988), early Nigerian federalism was, in awolowo’s words, an abominable disruptive heritage (awolowo, 1968:69). Under the colonial regime, the problems associated with this heritage informed the appointment of the Henry willink commission in 1957 to inquire, in particular, into the rears of the ethnic minorities.The willink intervention and thereafter. When alan lennox-boyd, the then secretary of state for the colonies appointed the willink commission in September 1957, its terms of reference included: to ascertain the facts about the fears of minorities in any part of niogeria and to propose means of allayin those fears whether well or ill founded and to advise what safeguards should be included for this purpose3 in the constitution of Nigeria, (Nigeria, 1958) . this was part of the many efforts, some constitutional, some administrative, designed to reconcile the polylot elevemens which made up Nigeria. By this time, it had become obvious that Nigeria was a federation of an unusual composition, among other things because in each of the three regions it was possible to distinguish between a majority group of about tow thirds of the population and minority groups amounti8ng to about one third, (Nigeria, 1958:1) at his posed political difficulties which

informed incessant claims by the minority groups for separate states at the various constitutional conferences in the 1950s.Given the structure of Nigerian federation at the time, the fears of the minorities were expressed mainly in relation to regional governme3nts which were practically dominatve by the major ethnic groups in each region. According to the willink report, the fears of the mino9rities arose from two circumstances first the division of the whole territory into three powerful regions, in each of which one groups is numerically preponderant, and secondly the approach of independence and the removal of the restraints which have operative so far (Nigeria, 1958:2-3). In the western region, fears were expressed in the areas of Yoruba domination of, especially, the mid-west minorities; victimization in the process of maintenance of law and order by officially sponsored things, hooligans and strong arm p[arties, discrimination in the economic field and in the provision of services; gerrymandering and its effects on the distribution of parliamentary seats; conflict between ethnic and partisan loyalties in the intergovernmental context; and potential for the partiality of legislation. There were also trite fears by religious minorities among the Yoruba.Similar fears were expressed in the northern region. In the particular, the minorities were worried about the role of traditional rulers (emirs) who appointed district heads to rule over non-Muslims. There were also social fears and grievances concerning the use of contemptuous expression and discriminatory social practices; fears of political influence regarding

the impartiality of the native authority police and the alkali (the legal aspect of Muslim law) religious intolerance; and fears that the political regime in the north was tending towards a foreign policy sympathetic with nations of the middle east based on their common allegiance to Islam.In the eastern region, there was the general fear amongst the minority ethnic groups that they might be ove run, commercially and po0litically, by the demographically dominant and socially mobile ibo. In particular, there were fears of autocratic government predicated on the perceived dictatorial conduct of the reigning (in the eastern region) ibo dominated national council of Nigerian citizens (NCNC); fear of public posts and services which included the deliberate object of the ibo majority… to fill every post with ibos; fears of local government and chiefs relating to insufficient devolution of powers which left ethnic minorities with limited powers to debate issues and little power to initiate action. There were also fears regarding public order and changes in the legal system similar to those expressed in the western and northern regions. In particular, the ethnic groups that made up the then rivers province of which ogni division was part, nursed long-standing grievances to the effect that the geography of their deltaic landscape and its associated difficulties for development were not understood at and inland headquarters. They were, therefore, united by fear of neglect at the hands of a government who in any case put the needs of the interior first. (Nigeria, 1958;50).

The willink commission acknowledged the existence of a body of genuine fears amongst minority groups althou7gh these might have been exaggerated in a few instances. However, the commission fell short of recommending any form of self-determination, including the creation of states, on the reasoning that to set up a separate state would accentuate and underline to obliterate, (Nigeria, 1958, 33, 87). Rather, the commissions recommended panacea included (i) a vague constitutional provision of some fulcrum or fixed pointer outside and above politics from which absolute impartiality can be exercised; (ii) the establishment of a council in each minority area charged with fostering the well-being, cultural advancement and economic and social development of the area (iii) the development of special areas should be placed on the concurrent legislative list such that funds and staff should be contributed by the federal and regional governments into a board, with a federal chairman to be established for this purpose. Such a board was to initiate schemes to supplement the normal development of the special area’ (Nigeria, 1958:88,103-104).The analysis of the willink commission and its recommendations suffered from a lack of depth inherent in its inability to go beyond the level of an epiphenomenal enquiry. For instance, it accepted laid down-procedures without establishing whether or not the letter and spirit of such procedures were adhered to. Similarly, the commission exhibited copious ignorance of the boundaries and hence distinct identities of various ethnic groups, hence the classification of a vast number of ethnic groups in

the rivers province as Ibo. Such weakness contributed to its limited relevance to the resolution of the minorities and development question which called it into existence. Inevitably, the demand for the resolution of the question, especially through the creation of states, continued.The pressure for reform was dictated as much by the imperatives of development. These provided the grounds for political restructurings which carved out more units in the federation to ensure participation and development and to assuage fears of domination. The main instrument for this exercise was the creation of states. Thus, in 1963, the mid-western region was created by plebiscite partly to assuage fears of political domination of minority groups and bring development closer to the people, and partly for partisan political reasons (mckown, 1988b) .Twelve states were created out of the existing regions in 1967. This revealed the fundamental character of Nigerian federalism as multi-ethnic, and multi-ethnicity as the very essence of Nigerian politics (afigbo, 1989). The revelation provided the precondition for the creation of more states in 12976 to bring the number to nineteen. State creation was expected to balance the federation as well as shift both allegiance and competition for development resources from broad ethnic groups to neutral state entities (miles 1988). There are reservations that it achieved the desired balance (nwabueze, 1983:306); but certainly the logic of organizational structure and procedures of the military (oyewole, 1978) and encouragement by top bureaucrats (olowu, 1990b)

facilitated the rapid development of centralizing federalism in Nigeria between 1966 and 1979. so too did the increase in revenue yields from the sale of petroleum on the world market in the 1970s, the logic of which enjoined the state to act in the interest of capital as represented by oil companies. And so between 1966 and 1979, the balance of power and resources became increasingly tilted in favour of the federal centre. Nwabueze (1983:1) argues that such a communist arrangement in which lower levels of government accept direction from the center on the conduct of their affairs is not federalism. Olowu (1990a) uses the term federal-unitarism to describe federal practice between 1975 and 1979. This notwithstanding, the concentration of oil wealth at the centre made control of state power at this level very attractive.It was also during this period that probably the most enduring legacies of Nigerian federalism were instituted. Alongised the creation of states and adjustment of political and geographical boundaries was the establishment in 1976 of a formal third tier of government at the local level together with a nation-wide reform of the local government system. The aim was to forge a viable and stable political system capable of responding to the development needs of the country. While Nigeria might have borrowed the idea of a three-tier governmental structure from Brazilian federalism (olowu, 1982) , it was expected to respond to the peculiar needs and problems of Nigerian society. Hence much was expected from the new federal arrangement on the return to civilian rule in October 1976. The

consensus on Nigerian federalism was teste. So far, it has not been vindicated. Nigerian federalism is yet to fully come to grips with the minorities and development question.In the present age, the problem is exemplified by minority groups of the oil mineral producing areas, of which Ogoni is just one.GROUP DISAFFECTION AND QUEST FOR A RE-STRUCTURING OF THE FEDERATIONAmong the many groups that were created to promote either regional or ethnic interest or a wider, more secularly-based reformation of the federal set up were the middle belt forum, the eastern mandate union (EMU), the western consultative group, the northern elders forum, the egbe afenifere, the movement for national reformation (MNR), the ndigbo, and of course, MOSOP and EMIRON. The issues which dominated the discourse of most of the groups included ways of ensuring that federal political power is equally accessible to all Nigerian nationalities which should also be allowed to have their own political and economic space in a radically restructured federation in which the power of the federal state is reduced. Vociferous demands were also made for a greater balance between the north and the south of Nigeria in the leadership of the country, in the distribution of political and parasitical offices, and the economic benefits accruing to the country. Furthermore, arguments for and against a greater balance between the Christians and Moslems both in the headship of the federal government and in key military command appointments. Some groups even went so far as to canvass the re-

regionalization of the Nigerian police force as well as the regionalization of the armed forces as part of a strategy both for giving substance to regional autonomy as well as preventing the all too frequent intervention of the military in politics. Strong views were expressed in support of and against the use of the principle of derivation as the sole or main criterion for the allocation of revenue.There is much in the plethora of views that were canvassed that was both useless and useful democratic and anti-non democratic but whatever view we may hold of them, they reflected the changing mood in the country for a far-reaching programme of reform. The financial profligacy and political recklessness of the Babangida military regime only served to reinforce the necessity for reform and, in time, a host of professional associations and interest groups whose members still had an objective interest in defending a pan-Nigeria national-territorial agenda began publicly to push the case for the convening of a sovereign national conference to discuss the entire basis on which the Nigerian federation is built and to reform it in such a way that it would promote democratic accountability, greater participation in national and sub-national affairs by a majority of the people, the creative channeling of the energies of the people for national reconstruction and development, and the enhancement of the basis for national unity. Among the interest groups and professional which were at the forefront of the campaign for a sovereign national conference were those represented by the Nigeria labour congress (NLC) and a majority of its

42 affiliate unions, the national association of Nigerian students (NANS), the academic staff union of universities (ASUU), the association of democratic lawyers (NADL), the civil liberties organisation (CLO), women in Nigeria (WIN), the constitutional rights projects (CRP), the concerned professionals (CP), Nigerians medical association (NMA), and the committee for the defence of human rights (CDHR), among others. Several of these groups were affiliate members of the campaign for democracy (CD) that was at the forefront of the struggle against the continuation of general Babangida and the military in power following the annulment of the 1993 presidential election (Olukosi, 1993b, 1994).The campaign by professional associations and interest groups (like labour, students, and academics) with a national-territorial agenda was taken up by some of the organizations that had been set up to canvass the reformation of the federal system on the basis of autonomous nationalities in a political arrangement that involves a reduction in powers, competences and responsibilities of the federal centre. Particularly prominent tin this regard were the MNR (1993) and EMIRON/MOSOP. The various groups and interest were united, partly at least, by an extreme distrust of the military government of general Babangida in whose programme of transition to civilian rule they had little or no faith. This loss of faith in the Babangida regime related as much to this distrust of its intention to hand over federal power to an elected federal executive as to their loss of faith in the capacity of the regime particularly, and the Nigerian

military in general, to champion a systematic reform of the federation to permit a greater input in decision-making by the people. The tempo of the campaign for a sovereign national conference grew with the increasing arbitrariness with which the Babangida regime conducted the transition programme. The programme itself was cumulative discredited with every round of postponement of the date for the handing over of executive power to an elected president. Such was the extent to which the tempo for genuine reformation of Nigerian politics, economy, and society had built up that not even the election of a civilian president could have blunted the demand for a national conference on one sort or the other.It was a mark of the groundswell of pressures that had build up in favour of the restructuring of the federal arrangement in the country that a group of retired senior civil servants (the so-called super).

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