The Macedonian Struggle 1903-1912.Paving the Way for the LiberationBasil K. Gounaris

1. From the 1897 Catastropheto the Hinden Uprising

The Greek defeat in 1897 inevitably marked a turningpoint in the evolution of the Macedonian Question. Theshattering military defeat, the overwhelming economicproblems, the imposition ofinternational economic con­trol, coupled with the devastating blow to the morale ofthe whole nation (and especially the army), provoked asevere domestic crisis and a revision of Greek foreignpolicy. The shock waves generated by this nationaldisaster were naturally felt in Macedonia. It was deemednecessary to put an end to the activities of the Ethniki

Etaireia (which was considered, and not unreasonably,to be partially responsible for the country's prematureentanglement in military operations) until spirits couldbe pacified at home and abroad. In response to powerfulpressure from the Theotokis government the Society wasdissolved in 1900, although its members remained inclose terms. I

The departure of the Greek armed bands, which hadonly made their first serious appearance in 1896, at thebehest ofthe Ethniki Etaireia, tilted the balance in favourofBulgarian, Serbian and Romanian propaganda, whichmoved swiftly to fill the gap left by the Greekwithdrawal. Thus the Greek communities in Macedoniawere once again exposed to an onerous situation, havingbeen deprived of not only the minimal protection of theGreek state, but also the slightest solicitude on the partof the Ottoman authorities. The greatest danger, ofcourse, came from Bulgaria, which proceeded to adopta policy of undisguised aggression. The favourable (forGreece) progress ofthe Cretan Question suggested to theleaders ofthe Bulgarian Principality that Macedonia wasa logical territorial adjunct. In fact, as we have alreadyseen, Bulgarian penetration had already made sig­nificant gains in northern Macedonia during this decade,

so that Bulgaria's hopes of eventually prevailing werenot unfounded.

Although irredentism in Greece had somewhat sub­sided, in Bulgaria in 1897 the various Macedonian com­mittees were more active than ever. The SupremeMacedonian Committee (Vrhoven Komitet) even issuedpatriotic bonds in support of Bulgarian efforts inMacedonia, payable when the revolution achieved itsaims. The issue was widely advertised, and purchase ofthe bonds was compulsory, even for the Greeks in thePrincipality. By the following year, under the dynamicleadership of Boris Sarafov and with the full support ofthe Bulgarian government, the influx of armed bandsinto Macedonia redoubled. Usually consisting of tenmen, these bands were largely formed of Bulgarians ofMacedonian descent, some soldiers, some civilians, whohad recently settled in the Principality and belonged forthe most part to the Internal Macedonian RevolutionaryOrganization, or IMRO. The aim ofthese guerrilla bandswas on the one hand to organize local revolutionarycommittees and armed cells, and on the other to preparethe economic and psychological groundwork for therevolution.2

In practice, however, things were not as easy as theinstigators ofthis plan wished to believe. The initial ideaof the founders ofiMRO, Gruev and Tatarchev, that is,the enlistment in their movement of anyone of anynationality who desired to take part in a quasi-socialistrevolt against-the Turks, gradually proved impracticable_The overwhelming majority of the Greeks had beensuspicious of the Bulgarian movements right from theoutset. Moreover, the mini-uprising of 1895 had alreadyshown that in the eyes of the Bulgarian komitad}is (i.e.members of the Komitet bands) there was very little

THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE LIBERATION 509

A 1904 photograph oftheftrstnationalist organization o/the

Macedonian Struggle, the "Frate~

nity o/the Friends o/the Poor ofGevgeli".

difference between Greek and Turkish aims.) Inevitably,then, IMRO's struggle served to foment the by nowtraditional conflict between Exarchists and Patriarchists,and the movement naturally sought support solely fromthe former party. The movement was further reinforcedby means ofacts of terrorism against the leading figuresof the Greek community in Macedonia, support forExarchist schools and churches, forced levies from theSlav-speaking Patriarchists, and the conversion ofsomeof the traditional klephts, who offered their considerableexperience to this unorthodox war.4

Eventually, and despite Greek resistance, thebalance-sheet at the end of the two-year period 1898­1900 was probably in favour ofthe Bulgarians. They hadtwo very capable leaders, Poptraikov and Pavel Chris­tov, who helped organize armed cells in the Kastoriaregion; and the murder of several tax collect.ors and taxfarmers established the movement's credeQtials as atyrannicide. Internal strife within the Greek com­munities, as well as the questionable practices of someof the ecclesiastical representatives of the Patriarchate,also helped push some of the oppressed residents of themiddle zone into the Exarchist camp.'

The formation of these cells continued into the earlyyears ofthe 20th century, while the simultaneous armingof Exarchist peasants was accelerated. Some of thesearms had been purchased in Athens with Bulgarianfunds, and had been dispatched into the Turkish-heldprovinces by way ofLarisa and Trikkala, via a carefullyorganized network whose chiefagents were Vlachs. Theauthorities on the Greek and Turkish borders werealerted, however, and this traffic was stopped before it

could become a serious problem. Furthermore, the Bul­garian units had by now grown to such an extent thatthey could openly challenge the Turkish army, whichindeed gradually began to take action, the most sig­nificant battle between the two forces taking place inFebruary 1902. In addition, the constant representationsof the European states to the Bulgarian governmentconstrained it to refuse IMRO its open support; theywere, however, unable to impose its dissolution.6

The Bulgarian organization would certainly havebeen able to accomplish even more ifit had not been tomby internal strife. First of all, there was serious frictionbetween local Slav-speaking chieftains and IMRO offi­cials. To a great extent this was a reflection ofthe refusalof the Slav-speaking Kota Christou from Rulia (Kota) tofight against the Greeks under the command of theBulgarian Markov, who was a newcomer to WesternMacedonia (1900), and his subsequent gradual estran­gement from the Bulgarian committee.

lust when open conflict between Kota and IMROseemed inevitable (August 1902), Major Iagov arrivedwith an armed unit at Zagoritsani (Vasileiada), inWestern Macedonia, as the principal agent of theSupreme Macedonian Committee and personal repre­sentative of the President, Ivan Tsonchev. His goal wasto instigate an uprising as soon as possible, with thepromise of open Bulgarian and Russian support. Thelocal chieftains, Tsakalarov, Kliasev, Mitros Vlachos,and others, were opposed to this idea, contending thatthe region was unprepared. The supply of arms, forexample, and despite all Tsakalarov's efforts, hadshrunk as a result of the Turkish army's intensive sear-

510

ches in 1901-02. Jagov did not abandon his plans, butthreatened to turn to Kota instead; he also accusedTsakalarov of embezzling IMRO funds. Tsakalarov'sreaction was spirited; he flung the accusations back atJagov, and even tried to collect some of the arms thathad been distributed to the peasants. The tide seemed tohave turned against Jagov, but he did not give up.

However, in spite of these leadership clashes, theactivity of the Bulgarian bands all over Macedonia, withevery imaginable sort of pressure and violence againstthe Greek population, continued relentlessly throughout1902, raising the spectre of imminent revolution andprovoking redoubled activity on the part of the Turkisharmy. The possibility of the complete disintegration ofthe revolutionary infrastructure was now a daily reality,and there were certainly Bulgarian chieftains who wereready to lay down their arms at a moment's notice; it isalso true that there was a general absencc of co-ordina­tion.

These were !he circumstances that Tsonchev andJagov were attempting to exploit, in prosecution of thewishes of the Supreme Macedonian Committee.Towards the end of 1902 the former appeared in theRazlog-Djumaja area at the head of a band of 300 men,and with the help oflocal units tried to incite an uprisingagainst the Turks. Jagov, for his part, was proclaimingthe revolution in Western Macedonia. These efforts weredoomed from the outset, of course, since they did nothave the approval of Sarafov and Gruev. This did notwony their perpetrators, howevert whose sole concernwas to create as many nests of revolution as possible inorder to provoke violent Turkish intervention, and topromote the concept of Macedonian autonomy on theinternational scene. In reality, very few villages in theDjuma-Bala-Melenikon and Edessa-Gevgeli areasjoined the movement, and none voluntarily. The criticalbattle was fought at the Kresna Pass. In spite of heavylosses, the Turkish army managed to capture the komi­

/ad}i positions and force their defenders to withdraw.The Turkish advance was accompanied by atrocities onthe part ofccrtain Albanian units and some Bashibazuks,who indulged their predilection for rapine and arson.These incidents, suitably inflated by the Bulgarian andforeign press, succeeded in attracting the attention ofEuropean public opinion; and from this point of view,which was what really interested the Bulgarian Prin­cipality, the uprising can be considered a success7

In order to make the European position comprehen-

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sible, a brief outline of the balance of power connectedwith the Eastern Question at the end of the 19th centuryis necessary. In 1897 Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italyhad concluded a two-fold treaty defining their spheresofinfluence in the Balkans and upholding thes/alus quo.This of course did not mean that they had abandonedtheir designs in the area, and so while Austria-Hungaryintensified its pursuit of economic penetration in theeastern side of the peninsula, towards Thessaloniki,Russia seized the oppottunity to present itself as the justand natural protector of Serbia and Bulgaria. Mean­while, although British interest in preserving the Ot­toman Empire was waning, the Sublime Porte had founda new ally in Germany, which was beginning to playamore dynamic role on the international scene8

Such being the situation, then, the first sequels to theinternationalization of the Macedonian Question werenot long in appearing. The IMRO had already paved theway with a memorandum to the Great Powers in January1899 demanding a settlement of the Macedonian Ques­tion along the lines ofthat applied to the Cretan Question(1898). Four years after the refusal of the powers toaccept the memorandum, the Bulgarian government wasable to claim outright that Turkish brutality was sendingstreams of emigrants to the Principality, resuscitatingirredentism and endangering peace in the Balkans. Thecurbing of the Bulgarian revolutionary committees, soimperiously demanded by the Europeans, was impos­sible without some reform in the Balkan provinces. Latein November 1902 the Porte, in a combination ofdeference to international pressure and pursuit ofits owndilatory policy. Appointed Hilmi Husein Pasha Gover­nor-General ofthe European vi/aye/s, with a mandate torestore normalcy to Macedonia9

By the end of the year it was obvious that the newmeasures were no improvement on existing legislation,and that the situation demanded the direct interventionof the Great Powers. In a joint declaration from Viennain December 1902, the Russian Minister of ForeignAffairs, Count Lambsdorff, and his Austrian counter­part, Count Goluchowski, suggested the intlOduction ofa specific programme of reforms on the vi/aye/s ofThessaloniki,. Mo.lastir and Kosovo. These measures,known as the 'Vienna PrograMme', included the ap­pointment of an Inspector-General to the Macedonianvi/ayers for a period of three years, ",;th military as wellas administrative authority, the reorganization of thegendarmerie under foreign officers, the admission of

I

TIIEMACEDONIAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVlNGTIlE WAY FOR TIlE LlBERATlON 511

Christians to the gendannerie and the rural guard, andamnesty for political offences. Financial stipulationsincluded separate budgets for each vi/ayet, tithe collec­tion by village rather than by region, and honest manage­ment of revenues. By February 1903 this programmehad been approved by all the Great Powers; for the Porte,objection was neither possible nor desirable. Actual .application of the measures, however, was another mat­ter. Despite initial enthusiasm from the Porte and theco-operative attitude of the Inspector-General (Hilmi),the overwhelming technical difficulties, combined withgrowing anarchy, soon put an end to any attempt atrefonnw

Indeed, as 1902 approached its close, the Turkish:lnny's mopping-up operations slowed down, while thegreat majority of released political detainees movedstraight from the jails to the mountains. Pressures onPatriarchists increased, especially in the northern areas.Forced levies and violence were once again a dailyreality, while the ever-growing anned bands of Bul­garians made their presence felt constantly. In WesternMacedonia the number ofanned revolutionaries jumpedfrom 700to 1,200. In the spring of 1903, there were some2,700 anned komitad}is in Macedonia, organized intoabout 90 bands. Arms-gathering and other materialpreparations were once again proceeding rapidly andeverything seemed to indicate that Macedonia was onthe brink of yet another revolutionary explosion. Thebombings of railway stations and telegraph lines thatoccurred in late March and early April convinced theTurkish authorities that something serious was in thewindH

Their suspicions were confinned when Thessalonikiwas hit by a wave of bombings at the end <if April. Theperpetrators were members of a small gcollp of anar­chists which maintained casual links with IMRO, andtheir goal was to focus European attention on the futureof Macedonia. This was why their targets were shopsand services with direct or indirect European connec­tions, such as the Ottoman Bank, the steamshipGuadalquivir, the Turkish Post Office, and selected

coffee shops, clubs and hotels. Although at the time theBulgarian organization was blamed for the bombings, infact these were completely unrelated to the spate ofincidents in the countryside. In any case, the rapid inter­vention of the foreign consuls shielded the citizens ofThessaloniki from brutal reprisals.

In the Macedonian countryside the Bulgarian bands

A demonstration in Thessaloniki in 1903, in protest againstBulgarian actions.

continued their active and varied campaign, seeking tostir up revolutionary fervour against the Turks; this time,however, they insisted more on the social aspect of themovcment, telling the peasants that when the revolutionwas successful the chiflik lands would be redistributed.While Thessaloniki was rocking from the bomb ex­plosions, the Bulgarian leaders were gathered atSmilevo, near Prespes. The meeting was attended by thesecretary general of the Supreme Macedonian Commit­tee, Damien Gruev, and Boris Sarafov, who was verycritical of the Committee's strategy -immediate revolu­tion- in view of the actual state of preparations. He alsopointed out, though, that the independent and ill-con­sidered bomb attacks in Thessaloniki had alerted theTurkish anny, and that what preparations they had al­

ready made might well be discovered ifthe insurrectionwere not speedily organized and carefully carried out.This point of view was supported by other leaders, whorealised that they must act while the initiative still laywith them. The views ofthe Committee, then, which wasacting in close liaison with the Bulgarian Ministry for

512

War, were adopted, and preparations for the revolutionwere set in hand. Nevertheless, the decisive influence ofthe Vrhovists and the overt support of Bulgaria not­withstanding, the revolutionary machine was still in thehands of IMRO, which continued to mislead the localpopulation by brandishing the slogan "Macedonia to theMacedonians" .

In the meanwhile, the Turkish army had commenceda new round of mopping-up operations, of which themost important took place at Smardesi (Krystallopigi).A band ofBulgarians under Antonov were trapped in thevillage when a sizable Turkish force of both regular andirregular soldiers encircled it; they did in the end manageto escape, but the village was almost completelydestroyed: 85 dead, 50 wounded, 230 houses out of atotal 0000 burned, and almost all the animals lost. Thisincident was not unique; nor were its corollaries slow toappear. By now the consequences ofany abortive insur­rection were perfectly clear, and the peasants had everyreason to be wary ofIMRO.The latter, however, was notabout to let any such obstacles impede its course: it hadlong since developed quite effective methods for ensur­ing the support of the peasants -willing or otherwise.

Frequent skirmishes with the Turkish army did notslow down the steady growth of the Bulgarian guerrillabands, which were constantly being reinforced by ar­rivals from the Principality. IMRO's battle to amasssufficient men, food, money and equipment led to anorgy ofblackmail, forced levies and violence against thePatriarchist population which neither the local Greekleaders nor the Turkish authorities were able to stop.Early in July, when preparations were well under way,the date of the insurrection known as the !linden Upris­ing was fixed for July 20, the feast day ofProphet Elijah.

The events which followed, over the rest ofthat year,do not really merit the title of revolution. The principalaim of the Bulgarian guerrilla bands was to drive asmuch of the population as possible into the mountainsin order to create the impression of a broadly-basedmovement with adherents from various classes andnationalities. Military action was restricted to Westernand Northern Macedonia. The relentless searches forarms and the undiminished presence of the army in therest ofthe territory made diversionary action impossible,while absolutely no revolutionary activity took place inthe southern, Greek-speaking zone. The insurrection hadtwo operational goals: on the one hand to preventTurkish reinforcements from reaching the main theatre

BASIL GOUNARIS

of operations in time, and on the other to seize certainsecondary administrative centres, such as Krushevo(Krousovon), Kleisoura, and Neveska (Nymphaion),which did in fact fall to the insurgents and were endowedwith 'revolutionary committees'. No attacks were madeon urban centres like Monastir, Florina or Amyntaion.A number of bridges were destroyed and railroad tracksbombed. The bands also laid waste certain chifliks andmurdered a number ofTurkish landowners and govern­ment officials. Several of the Greek notables also fellvictim to the insurgents, while others were obliged toseek refuge in the cities.

Despite the damage to roads and railways, the Turksquickly assembled sufficient forces to put down therebellion. The troops they used were levied from theAlbanian territories, and their ranks included many ofthe second reserves who were renowned for their lack ofdiscipline, as well as a fair number of Bashibazuks.Krushevo was retaken in mid-August and consigned tothe flames. The Greek quarter suffered the most damage,and many Greeks lost their lives. Similar scenes wererepeated in most of the villages in the 'insurgent' ter­ritories. By the end of August the rebellion had col­lapsed, although scattered skirmishes occurredthroughout September and more rarely in October. Infact, towards the end of September the Vrhovists underTsonchev and Jagov attempted to spark a new revolt inthe area around Razlog, in Eastern Macedonia, usingBulgarian troops exclusively. IMRO, however, refusedto support them; and the Turks, after defeating theinsurgents in Western Macedonia were easily able todetach troops for the new front. Within a week theBulgarian units had retreated into Bulgaria.

In that summer of 1903, a total of 22 villages werecompletely destroyed and many more suffered seriousdamage, leaving 40,000 people homeless. The bulk ofthe damage was to the Greek and Vlach Patriarchistcommunities in the areas around Florina, Monastir andKastoria. For the Bulgarian side, the balance-sheet atfirst glance appeared negative. The revolutionarymachine wbich had been built up with such difficultyhad been severely damaged and never really managedto recover. t'/cvertheless, once again there had beensignificant gains on the diplomatic front. Although themovement had failed to persuade the Great Powers toagree on an immediate solution for the MacedonianQuestion, much less its preferred option of autonomy,nonetheless Turkish violence had been sufficiently

THE MACEDONlAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY-EOR THE LIBERATION 513

widely publicized in the press to give new urgency toplans for reform in Macedonia. 12

During this period (1897-1903) the Greek govern­ment, unable to intervene openly on behalfofthe Greeksin Macedonia, engaged in an unrewarding effort toimprove its diplomatic position on the internationalscene as well as within the Balkans in order to counteractBulgarian headway. One such attempt was a series ofnegotiations with Serbia in 1899 in an attempt to estab­lish spheres of influence in Macedonia. Unfortunatelythe intervention of Russia, which stepped in to settleSerbia's differences with Bulgaria, upset this plan, al­though a Greek-Serbian rapprochement seems unlikelyto have succeeded in any case. Generally speaking,Greek-Serbian co-habitation in northern Macedonia wasanything but comfortable in the period 1898-1903, butconflict was restricted to religious and educational mat­ters. Also unsuccessful was the attempt to approachRomania, despite a meeting between Kings George I ofthe Hellenes and Carol I of Romania. Although theRomanian government had accepted in 1898 that thelikelihood ofconverting the Koutsovlachs was not great,and although the conclusion of a trade pact in 1900 setthe stage for closer'co-operation, nonetheless the twogovernrnents could not agree on explicit terms for acommon position on Macedonia. Conversely, Greek­Turkish relations improved after 1900. Despite theirenormous differences, Athens and the Porte did shareone common interest: preservation of the status quo inMacedonia. For Greece, Turkish sovereignty in Mace­donia was the only guarantee against the Slav danger.This realisation soon led Greece to a rapprochement withGermany, which was also anxious to see the OttomanEmpire remain intact. For Turkey, on the 'other hand,friendly relations with Greece were indispensable toguard against a Balkan coalition. 13

Although the Greek state was unable actively topromote and defend its positions on Macedonia, it wasably seconded at this critical juncture by private initia­tives. After the dissolution of the Ethniki Etaireia, anumber of uneasy patriots, not only of Macedonianorigin, swelled the ranks of a variety of associations.Their role was to alert and enlighten public opinion inGreece, and to co-ordinate the defence of Greek Mace­donia. Some of these societies were: Theocharis Gero­giannis' 'Central Macedonian Society', StephanosDra-goumis' 'Macedonian Society', Neoklis Kazazis''Hellenism Society', and later, in 1903, the Archbishop

Pavlos Melas and his wife.

of Athens' 'Committee for Succour for theMacedonians'. Of similar outlook was the 'Committeefor the Support ofGreek Church and Education', whichfunctioned under the aegis of the Foreign Ministry. Itsmost active members were Dirnitrios Vikelas, GeorgiosStreit and Georgios Baltatzis, and it essentially replacedthe 'Society for the Dissemination of Greek Letters' ineducational activity in Macedonia. Especially in theperiod immediately after 1900 this committee's fman­cial support increased dramatically. Significant work ineducation was also performed by the 'Greek LiterarySociety' and the 'Macedonian Educational Fraternity ofConstantinople'. Moreover, the numerous societies andfraternities which had sprung up during the 1870s invirtually all urban and semi-urban centres in Macedoniacontinued their efforts for the improvement and thespread ofeducation. It is worth noting that at the begin­ning of the 20th century the Greek population ofMacedonia boasted more than 1,000 schools with ap­proximately 70,000 pupils. 14

Significant work was also undertaken in the periodafter 1900 by the Church, that is, by the·Patriarchate ofConstantinople, which abandoned its defensive strategyin favour of a policy of re-conquest. In order to achievethis it was essential to replace certain metropolitans who,whether from lack of enthusiasm or from excessivedevotion to the ideal of the 'Great Church' (which after

514 BASIL GOUNARIS

these troops rarely came into open conflict with IMRO(except during the Ilinden uprising when some unitsdirectly confronted the revolutionary forces) they never­theless served to guard the Patriarchist villages, and didsucceed in causing some people to turn away from theExarchists. 16

In November 1902 Karavangelis acquired a worthyadjutant in the person of Ion Dragoumis, the son ofStephanos, who at his own request was posted to Monas­tir as vice-consul, where his activities far exceeded hissphere of competence. In Monastir the young diplomatfounded an association called 'Amyna ' (Defence), whichquickly became active in most ofthe principal towns andvillages in Western Macedonia. Its purpose was to setup an information network and to intimidate the Bul­garians. Similar defensive organizations were estab­lished in Gevgeli, "Yenitsa, Naousa, Thessaloniki andelsewhere. At this time veterans of the Elhniki Elaireia

Germanos Karavangelis, were beginning to pour arms into Macedonia through thegood offices ofcertain officers in the Army CartographicService in Thessaly. Indeed, in response to Kara-

the catastrophe of 1897 was completely unrealistic),were unable to cope with the demands of the national Georgios Dikonymos-Makris.

struggle. They were replaced by active young prelateswho were in their prime during the period of armedstruggle, among them Metropolitans Germanos Kara­vangelis of Kastoria, Chrysostomos Kalaphatis ofDrama, and Ioakeim Phoropoulos of Melenikon.15

But the activities ofpaedagogues and churchmen, theguarded diplomatic efforts ofthe Greek government andthe less than remarkable abilities ofmany ofthose in thediplomatic service were unlikely to alter the balance ofpower in the Balkans, which was so unfavourable toGreece, unless they adopted some more energetic formsof action. The ambassador to Constantinople, NikolaosMavrokordatos, had indicated to the Foreign Ministry asearly as January 1900 that the use of force was a matterof unassailable urgency; but the initiative behind theapplication of such measures was taken by Germanos

"Karavangelis, in the very year he was elevated to themetropolitan throne of Kastoria. Karavangelis soon in­clined towards the formation of an armed corps, andmore specifically towards making use ofKota, who hadalready quarrelled with IMRO. He also turned to otherguerrilla leaders, such as Vangelis of Strebeno (Aspro­geia), Karalivanos and Georgis of Negovani (phIam­pouron), and his irresistible personality ensured that hisefforts were crowned with success. Although the first of

THE MACEDONlAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE LIBERATION 515

vangelis' constant pleas for more substantial aid, the firstarmed band was sent to Macedonia in May 1903 bycolleagues of Stephanos Dragoumis. It consisted ofeleven Cretans, including Euthymios Kaoudis and Geor­gios Dikonymos-Makris, and it saw action against IM­RO forces on the very first day of the Ilinden Uprising.Its eventual escape to Greece was only accomplished bythe personal intervention ofKaravangelis. 17

2. From the Miirzteg Agreementto the Young Turk Revolution

As we have seen, the bloodshed which followed thesuppression of the llinden Uprising once again toeusedinternational attention on the Macedonian Question. Bythe end of August 1903, it had become obvious that theVienna reform programme had failed. Great Britain hadearly proposed a series ofmodifications, but the substan­tial revision of the programme was the result of a jointRusso-Austro-Hungarian initiative. In September 1903the two emperors met at the Styrian city ofMiirzteg. Thenew schedule of reforms drawn up by their ForeignMinisters was submitted to the Porte at the end ofOctober, and one month later had been agreed in full,despite the initial reservations of the other Great Powersand Turkish attempts to reach an understanding with theBulgarian Principality. The Porte was left with no alter­native but to accept the proposals, reserving only theright to negotiate the manner of their implementation.

The principal aims of the Miirzteg agreement werethe restoration oforder, the reparation ofdamages result­ing from the insurrection, and the application of thereforms agreed in the Vienna programme. Particularimportance was also assigned to reinforcing theEuropean presence in Macedonia, which was deemed offundamental importance for its eventual success.Provision was thus made for: 1) two poiitical advisorsand liaison officers, one Russian and one Austrian, withappropriate staff, to assist Hilmi Pasha; 2) reorganizationof the gendarmerie with officers and NCOs supplied bylhe Great Powers; 3) re-drawing the borders of theadministrative districts to rellect as far as possible eth­nographic distribution; 4) reorganization of the ad­ministration and justice systems with a view todecentralization and the employment of Christians; 5)the appointtnent of joint commissions of investigationfor political and other crimes; 6) financial aid to theravaged areas and repatriation of refugees from Bul­garia; 7) annual tax relief for the devastated villages; 8)

LambrosKoromi/as.

immediate implementation of the Vienna reformprogramme, and 9) the' disbanding of all irregularmilitary unitsl8

While the Great Powers were working for peace inMacedonia, the Greek government was beginning togive serious attention to the question of more dynamicand vigorous intervention in that region. The demonstra­tion organized by the Macedonian societies on 15August in protest against the brutality of the Turkisharmy had aroused public opinion and awakened thegovernment to a sense ofits tremendous responsibilities.The first decision was to proceed to a survey ofMacedonia in order to ascertain whether an armeddefence system could be installed. For this purpose acommittee of army officers was dispatched to WesternMacedonia in February 1904 (Anastasios Papoulas,Alexandros Kontoulis, Georgios Kolo-kotronis and Pav­los Melas), while the preparatory work for the otherregions was undertaken by the interpreter at the Embassyin Constantinople, Georgios Tsorbatzoglou. By the sum­mer of 1904 their work had been completed, but their

516

Dimitrios Kalapothakis, editor of "Embros"and president ofthe Macedonian Committee

reports and proposals did not concur in any detail.

Although action had to be delayed, the machineryhad nevertheless been set in motion. During the springof 1904 the Foreign Ministry had begun to reorganize itsconsular representation in Macedonia. Dimitrios Kaller­gis was named consul in Monastir, and LamprosKoromilas was sent to Thessaloniki as Consul General;while at the same time the Foreign Ministry dispatcheda group of officers to serve in the Greek consulates andvice-consulates in Macedonia. Further, in May 1904some former members of the Ethniki Etaireia foundedthe 'Macedonian Committee', with the editor of thenewspaper Empros, Dimitrios Kalapothakis, as its chair­man. Its purpose was "...the defence of Hellenism inMacedonia, Thrace, Epirus and Albania against anyattempt to diminish it, and the restoration to its bosomof however many villages and individuals have againsttheir will been severed from us and against their willremain severed". Its charter indicates that right from thebeginning the Committee undertook a wide range ofactivities, not only in reconnaissance and propaganda

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but also in the funding, initiating, recruiting and initialorganization of various bodies.

Barely four years after the dissolution of the EthnikiEtaireia the Greek govemment greeted with relief theresurgence of private initiative, which both satisfied theneed for immediate action and served as cover to thestate. It was obvious from the beginning, however, thatcomplications were bound to ensue if activities werecarried on by both the state and private persons at thesame time. The Committee was assigned the vi/ayet ofMonastir as its sphere of activity, while the ForeignMinistry assumed responsibility for the vi/ayet of Thes­saloniki. In practice, however, the interests and theambitions of the two bodies ranged far beyond theborders of their respective provinces,. and in the yearsthat followed the co-ordination of the struggle and theallotment of men and material were anything butsmooth19

While Greece was about this preparatory ground­work, the Bulgarian bands were not wasting their timeeither. The IMRO had, despite the disasters, managed tosave a large part of its arms and explosives, although itwas, ofcourse, much less active than it had been in 1903.Although Hilmi Pasha wanted to believe that this wasdue to the implementation of the reform programme, amore correct interpretation would probably be that IM­RO did not wish openly to undermine the reform andthus provoke the displeasure of the Great Powers. In­deed, the gendarmerie was still in the process of reor­ganization and so did not constitute a serious threat; itwas merely serving as a sort of locum tenens for theinterests of the Great Powers, while the work of sup­pressing the activity of the bands remained the respon­sibility of the army. Furthermore, the calm which hadprevailed since the Bulgaro-Turkish rapprochement inApril 1904 (and which had been condemned by theBulgarian committees) was if anything favourable toIMRO, for it provided for a general amnesty for thosearrested after the Ilinden uprising and the repatriation ofrefugees.

In any case, the IMRO units were by now chieflydevoted to seeking to convert the Siavophones to theExarchate; ~kIrmishes with the army were rare. It wasthis new atmosphere that inspired the ambush whichresulted in the assassination of Kapetan Vangelis ofStrebeno in May 1904. A few months later, a series ofmisunderstandings culminated in the betrayal ofKota tothe Turks; he was tried, sentenced and executed in the

THE MACEDONlAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE LIBERAnON 517

autumn of 1905. The void left by the loss of these twotraditional chieftains, who had been the leaders of thestruggle in Western Macedonia, a renewal ofactivity onthe part of certain Serbian guemlla bands in the north,and the new dangers arising out of Bulgaro-Romanian

collaboration, that is, the adherence to the Exarchate of

a significant number ofvillages in the median and north­

ern zones, all contributed to render the dispatch north of

Greek troops a matter ofurgency.z°

By the end of July 1904 Athens had been convincedthat the dispatch of armed men to Macedonia could no

longer be delayed. In mid August three units made ready(under Georgios Bolas, Pantelis Kokkinos, and Euthy­mios Kaoudis) and crossed the border, but only the lastwas able to take any effective action. Towards the endofthe month it was reinforced by the unit led by Pavlos

Melas (Zezas), but it achieved little. Melas was a polite

and obliging person, an idealistic and easily moved

patriot; but, although perfectly willing to adopt the formsof the invaluable klephtic traditions, he was essentiallyunable to accept the savage rules ofthis unorthodox formof warfare, and so it was not long before he became a

tragic hero. The letter he wrote to his wife ten days beforehis fatal encounter with the Turks is typical of him: "I

Pavlos Me/as' tomb in a contemporary photograph.KapetanKotas.

had hoped for much, but the people here are temfied ofthe murdering komi/od}is and for that reason do not helpus as much as they should... They are willing and full ofgood intentions, and they come to me and enthusiasti­cally propose all sorts of fine schemes. Poor me! I make

my plans, I set off -eold, wet, hungry- and when themoment amves either they do not come or they trick mein every possible way or they warn the Bulgarians tohide... I could have punished them, but I preferred to

. . II I . I" 21speak to them loglca y, stem y, movmg y .

Melas' death led to a redoubling ofactivity in Athens.

A few days later the unit led by Georgios Katechakis(Rouvas) crossed the border, followed in mid Novemberby that ofGeorgios Tsontos (Yardas). These two groups,together with Kaoudis' men, struck the first major blowsat IMRO, thus restoring Greek prestige in the eyes ofthe

people of Western Macedonia. Progress was also made

in the vi/oyer of Thessaloniki under the systematic

leadership ofLampros Koromilas and a group ofofficers

518

who had at intervals been assigned to the Consulate inThessaloniki (Georgios Kakoulidis, Michail Moraitis,Konstantinos Mazarakis, Athanasios Exadaktylos,Spyros Spyromilios, Dimitrios Kakkavos, and loannisAvrasoglou). Before the end of 1904 several unitsformed mainly of local men and Cretans, had alread;made their presence felt both in Central and in EastcmMacedonia.22

Winter put a temporaty halt to hostilities, butpreparations for the spring campaign began early in 1905

when Konstantinos Mazarakis journeyed to Athens onbehalf of Koromilas. He pressed for unification ofleadership under the Consul General in Thessaloniki,arguing the weaknesses of the Macedonian Committee,its spasmodic bouts of activity and problems of co-or­dination. But by now the Committee enjoyed too muchpolitical patronage and sufficiently high prestige to suf­fer any restrictions to its activities, and it thus continuedto control the course of the Struggle in the vi/ayer ofMonastir2J

Mazarakis was more successful in recruiting freshforces. Indeed, on the Greek side 1905 was marked byintensive military activity. By May there were aroundnine major units campaigning in the vi/ayer of Thes­saloniki, more than twelve in that ofMonastir, and a hostofsmaller bands, mostly recruited locally, which carriedout secondary missions. They had also managed tocollect an impressive supply of arms and ammunition.

The most significant military event of that year wasthe assault on March 25 (April 7, New Style) on theoverwhelmingly Exarchist village of Zagoritsani (Vasi­leiada), by a force of 300 men under Georgios Tsontos.The plan to encircle the village worked perfectly; andnot only did Tsontos' men crush all resistance (some 79villagers were killed), but they also repulsed a Turkishattack at the same time. One month later the units led byGeorgios Katechakis, Petros Manou (Vergas), and Pav­los Gyparis successfully repulsed a massive Turkishattack near Blatsi (Oxyes). Less fortunate were the menof Nikostratos Kalo-menopouJos (Nidas) and ChristosTsolakopoulos (Rebelos), who at about the same periodwere entrapped by Turkish forces at Belkameni(Drosopigi) and suffered heavy losses. But in general theweight of the campaign in Western Macedonia wasshouldered by Konstantinos Mazarakis (Akritas); Spy­ros Spyromilios (Bouas), and Manolis Katsigaris andtheir men; and despite betrayals from pro-RomanianVlachs and many reverses, they were extremely success-

BASIL GOUNARIS

Georgios Ka/echakis(Kapetan Rouva.\).

ful in increasing support for the Greeks in the areasaround Prilep, Monastir, Kastoria and Edessa. IMROactivity had in the meantime slackened, both because ofthe organization's differences with the Supreme Mace­donian Committee and because the Bulgarian govern­ment was trying to suppress any activity which mightendanger its good relations with the Porte.

In Central Macedonia there was less actual fighting,but tremendous efforts were made (and seconded by thelocal guerrilla leaders) to organize the defence of thevillages and to create bases in the marshes around Gian­nitsa. In Eastem Macedonia the struggle was less suc­cessful. After Turkish forces had exterminated loannisDaphotis' band, Greek resistance was left entirely in thehands of local units, and unfortunately their opponentwas the extremely capable Sadanski. In northern Mace­donia the Serbian bands were continuing to preach theircause and to fight their battles, whether with Bulgarianor Turco-Albanian bands or with the Turkish army24

The Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian guerrilla bandsusually avoided frontal attacks, which were counter­productive for two reasons: they wasted men, and theygenerally provoked the intervention ofthe Turkish army,usually with unpleasant consequences. All the partieswere principally interested in converting to their cause

THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE LIBERATION 519

any person or village that may have displayed a certainfickleness of national attachment. Their methods ofcourse, were anything but peaceful. The tragic deat~ ofPavlos Melas and the frequent betrayals and denuncia­tions had put an end to the era of peaceful propaganda.The only guaranteed method of shaking or alteringpeople's beliefs was systematic terrorism: arson, assas­sination of priests and civil leaders, blackmail andbrutality of every kind were now commonplace. Otherstrategically imponant targets were the adversary'scommunication networks and support systems; this wasa major source of conflict between the Greek bands andpro-Romanian Koutsovlachs throughout 1905. Indica­tive ofthe savagery ofthe struggle, especially in WesternMacedonia, was the flood of emigration which beganafter the Ilinden uprising, although economic conditionsshould not be discounted. In 1905 alone some 5,500 menemigrated to America from the Monastir area, mainlyfrom the Slav-speaking villages which were the objectof heavy pressure from both sides.

The situation, meanwhile, had not escaped the atten­tion of the Great Powers, which flooded Sofia, Athensand Belgrade with complaints of the guerrilla activitywhich was impeding implementation of the reformprogramme. The British government was particularlyactive throughout 1905: in its attempts to prevent Austriaand Russia from being sole masters of developments inMacedonia it pressed for sterner measures and increasedEuropean presence in the European provinces of theOttoman Empire. The combination of the opposition ofthe other powers and the opportunism of the Porte suf­ficed to modify and delay British plans, but nonetheless,between May and November 1905 a certain number ofadditions and modifications to the refoll],1 programmehelped considerably to curtail Ottomarr sovereignty inMacedonia.25

Generally speaking the military situation throughout1906 was much what it had been the previous year. InWestern Macedonia Antonios Vlachakis (Litsas) andKonstantinos Poulos (Platanos) with their men, alongwith a local band under Loukas Kokkinos, kept the frontopen through the winter months. The most significantbattle of the year took place on New Year's Day, whenVlachakis and his men successfully attacked MitrosVlachos and his band at Ezerets (Petropoulaki). In Mayreinforcements began to arrive for the summer cam­paign: Zacharias Papadas (Phouphas), Georgios Diko­nymos-Makris, Georgios Volanis, Pavlos Gyparis,

Georgios Kanellopoulos, Vasileios Pappas (Vrontas),Grigorios Phalireas (Ziagas) etc., with fairly large num­bers of men. Once again the Greek forces found them­selves fighting mainly against Turkish troops. Early inMay Vlachakis attacked the Exarchist village of Osnit­sani (Kastanophyton), but he was counter-attacked by aTurkish battalion and forced to retreat, with severe los­ses. Towards the cnd of the month the bands led byVolanis, Gyparis and Kanellopoulos suffered heavy los­ses in an extremely bloody battle with il large Turkishforce at Strebeno (Asprogeia); the same fate awaitedTsontos' band at Zelovo (Antartikon) in June, and thoseunder Ioannis Karavitis and Evangelos Nikoloudis atGomitsovo (Kelli) in July.

It is true that the massive presence ofTurkish troopsin Western Macedonia severely restricted the activitiesof the Greek guernlla fighters, and to a certain extentinhibited the local population from supporting them.Nevertheless, such reverses arc in no way indicative ofwhat they actually accomplished in the viiayetofMonas­tir. The initiative now lay with the Greeks, who kept uptheir heavy pressure on the Bulgarian bands and attackedthe principal komitadjis relentlessly. Severe damage wasinflicted on the Romanian propaganda and espionagenetworks and on several bands of brigands. The attackson Exarchist villages were continued, two of the mostsigni ficant being those carried out by Konstantinos

Grigorios Phalireas and his band.

520

Goutas on Smilevo and Phalireas on Holista (Melis­sotopon). In other words, despite certain reverses theGreek position in Western Macedonia was strengthened,both in the countryside and in the town of Monastir.

It is however undeniable that the situation in WesternMacedonia could have been even better for the Greeksifthey had had a unified command. In principle, respon­sibility for this area belonged to the Macedonian Com­mittee under Dimitrios Kala-pothakis, but in practicethere was constant govemment interference, via theconsulate in Monastir, both in funding and in campaigndecisions. The problems caused by this dual leadershipwere extremely serious. A fierce battle for s~premacy

raged between the consularofficials and the senior mem­bers ofthe Committee. The civil leaders ofthe Commit­tee were opposed to responsibility for the Struggle beingexclusively in the hands of the military; while as far asthe officers were concerned, it was obvious that, giventhe tremendous problem ofcommunications, operationsover a constantly changing front could not possibly beconducted from Athens. Since neither side would yield,the result was that contradictory orders were issued, andthat several undesirable local chieftains whose brigandactivity could only embarrass the Committee, weredrawn into the struggle, which then served to widen theabyss between the two sides.

The activity of the armed bands in Central and East­ern Macedonia under the aegis of the Consulate inThessaloniki was more effective. Between May andNovember of 1906 about 30 raids were carried out onExarchist villages, which enhanced Greek prestige im­mensely. Generally speaking, the conduct ofthe strugglewas irreproachable, the flow of arms, men and moneyunimpeded, the selection of officers appropriate, dis­cipline adequate and outrages infrequent. The sys­tematic labours of Lampros Koromilas, who since themiddle ofthe year had only occasionally appeared in hisconsulate in Thessaloniki, were bearing fruit. One ofthemost notable bands was that under KonstantinosGarephis, which in June 1906 completely annihilated theband led by voivode Danev, and early in August thoseof Karatasos and voyvod Luka. In this last battleGarephis was wounded, and he succumbed to his injuriessoon afterwards. Meanwhile, the bands led by NikolaosRokas (Kolios) and Michail Anagnostakos (Matapas)were active against the brigands on Mt Olympus andRomanian propaganda in the area surrounding Edessa,Goumenissa and Mt Paiko, and progress was being made

BASIL GOUNARIS

in Eastern Macedonia under the guidance of the consu­late in Serres. Three units patrolled the area, and civilguards were formed in various villages. Invaluable or­ganizational assistance was provided by the Metro­politan of Drama, Chrysostomos. It should beremembered that in this region the Bulgarian party hadto cope not only with Greek attacks but with the 'civilwar' raging between the bands supported by theSupreme Committee and those ofIMRO, while the onlyproblem the Greeks faced in Central and EasternMacedonia was that caused by the undisciplined be­haviour of the men under Giaglis, a brigand chief en­listed by a Macedonian association in Athens called'Alexander the Great'.

One of the most heroic pages in the story of thestruggle for Macedonia was written in the marshesaround Giannitsa. This area was traditionally the head­quarters for the Bulgarian bands which roamed the ter­ritories of Edessa and Almopeia as well as the marshvillages. At the beginning of 1906 the Greek leaders inthe marshes were Stavros Rigas (Kavodoros) andMichail Anagnostakos, who were reinforced in April byPanagiotis Papatzaneteas and Ioannis Sakellaropoulos(Zirias). Throughout the summer the Greeks tried un­.availingly to dislodge the Bulgarians. When it was real­ized just how ideally the marsh was situated forcontrolling communications and the flow of arms, andin general for commanding all of Central Macedonia,fresh forces were sent out in September 1906 in order toredouble activity in this area. The bands led by TelosAgapinos (Agras), Konstantinos Sarros (Kalas) andIoannis Demestichas (Nikiphoros) did indeed reinforcethe Greek positions, but despite repeated attempts theyfell short of dealing a decisive blow on the Bulgarianforces. It should be noted that besides the unwillingnessof the Bulgarians to fight when they were outnumbered,operations in the marshes were further hindered by thefrequent changes in leadership occasioned by malaria.

Within the city ofThessaloniki the Greek counter-at­tack was identified with the organizational efforts ofsecond lieutenant Athanasios Souliotis (Nikolaidis).Souliotis was posted to Thessaloniki in March 1906,where, unde; the cover ofa commercial agency, he verysoon set up an extremely efficient network called theOrganization ofThessaloniki. Its purpose was to collectinformation on Exarchist activity in the city, but his ownactivities did not end there. Between 1906 and 1908 hemanaged to reinforce the Greek presence in the city,

THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE LIBERATION 521

Kapetans Kalas, Agra!iand Nikiphoros in the

marshes ofGiannitsa.

strengthen the solidarity of the Greek community, or­ganize a small scale economic war and terrorize theExarchists to the greatest possible degree26

An overall evaluation of military operations showsthat in 1906 the situation in Macedonia had begun tofavour the Greeks. The great number of active bands(more than 80 bands and 1500 men arc mentioned duringthe summer of 1906) restored a significant number ofschismatic villages to the Patriarchate. Also important isthe fact that Greek losses to the Turks were far less thanthose of the Bulgarians, who were the Turkish army'schief target. This period also saw renewed efforts in thefield of education, with the creation of nursery andprimary schools in the villages which had recently beenrecovered. The work of the Foreign Ministry and theCommittee for the Support of Greek Education and theGreek Church was supported by the Society for theDissemination of Greek Letters and the Melas NurseryTrust.27 -

As was only to be expected, the growth ofthe Greekbands and their frequent clashes with the Turkish armedforces caused the Great Powers to redouble their proteststo the Greek government. Incessant strife in Macedoniawas hindering the implementation of the reformprogramme, in spite of all the efforts being made. Theflow of emigration continued, and the large landownerswere unable to pay their taxes,just when the local budgethad to meet the extra expense incurred by the reorganiza­tion ofthe gendarmerie. The Porte requested that importduties be increased from 8% to II% in order to offsetthe additional costs; this was nothing less than an attemptto blackmail the Great Powers into sharing the cost of

the reforms. It was quite predictable, then, that pressurewould next be put on the Greek government. The lattertried to draw the attention of the powers to Bulgarianatrocities in Macedonia, but was in the ·end obliged toagrec to impose restraints and to check the formation ofarmed bands and the sale ofarms. These measures werenever implemented, of course, because it was obviousthat the Porte did not want an open confrontation withGreece which essentially would be ofbenefit only to theBulgarian Principality. On the contrary, the fact thatGreek and Serbian forces were occupied with the Bul­garian rebels, at a time when their activities were becom­ing steadily more alarming, was all to the Turks'advantage. Meanwhile, relations between Bulgaria andthe Great Powers had improved. Despite unremittingprotestations from the Porte, the Europeans were never­theless convinced that the Bulgarian government wasdoing all it could to control and direct the bands. PrinceFerdinand of Bulgaria, in an attempt to exploit thefriendly climate, went so far as to propose including inthe discussions on the Cretan Question a similar settle­ment for Maeedonia.28

After the inevitable halt over the wirter months, inthe spring of 1907 guerrilla activity reswned on allfronts, once again drawing out the Turkish forces. In theMorihovo region the bands led by Vasileios Pappas(Vrontas), Georgios Kondylis (Zagas), PhilolaosPichion (philotas), Dimitrios Papavierou (Gouras) andManolis Katsigaris continued to organize the defence ofthe villages and harry the Bulgarian bands. In the Kas­toria-Kastanoehoria region Phalireas and ZachariasPapadas (Phouphas) were very active; the latter unfor-

522 BASIL GOUNARIS

Officers AI. Mazarakis, Kyr.Tavou/uris, KourveUs,Kourkoulis alid Exadaktylos inthe garden olthe Greek Consu~

late in Thessa{oniki.

tunately was killed in April of that year in an unsuccess­ful raid on Palaiochori (phoupha). Tsontas was fightingin the sector comprising Florina, Monastir, Prespes andKorestia; his attacks on the villages of Kalenik (Kal­liniki) in April and Ostima (Trigonon) in June weresuccessful, while in July, at Grentsi (Phtelia), GeorgiosTompras (Roupakias) destroyed the band led by voyvodKarsakov.

Action in Central Macedonia was co-ordinated fromThessaloniki by Athanasios Exadaktylos, DimitriosKakkavos and Kyriakos Tavoularis (Katsanos), and laterAndreas Kourouklis (Kolyvas) and AlexandrosOthonaios (palmidis). The struggle in the marshes ofGiannitsa continued relentlessly all winter, despite theexceptionally severe weather. In the spring Demestichasand his band undertook impressive campaigns in thesurrounding area, including important raids on Bozets(Athyra) and Kouphalia in March. Fighting in this regioncame to an end the following month, however, whenTurkish operations drove both the Greeks and the Bul­garians out of the marshes. Meanwhile, Dimitris Kos­mopoulos (Kourbesis) managed to keep the Bulgariansin check in Chalcidice.

The progress of the Greek national forces was lessspectacular in Eastern Macedonia. The imprisonment ofcavalry lieutenant Dimitrios Vardis, the removal of themetropolitan ofDrama, Chrysostomos and the vice-con­sul of Kavala, the restrictions placed on the free move-

ment of the metropolitan of Serres, Grigorios, and theconsul, Antonios Sachtouris, were so many checks;some local units did nonetheless continue their raids ona small scale, and a remarkable number ofvillages wererecovered for the Patriarchate.

Of course, as happened every year, there wereclashes with Turkish troops which were usuallycatastrophic for the Greeks. In June the bands led byPhalireas, Tompras and Papavierou encountered a largeTurkish force outside Lehovo, but they managed toavoid encirclement and to inflict serious losses. Phali­reas was less fortunate one month later when his band,along with that led by Nikolaos Tsotakos (Gerrnas), wastrapped in the Kalogeriko gorge near Losnitsa (Gerrna)and decimated: only eight men (including Phalireas)managed to escape. That same month the band led byAndreas Makoulis (a chieftain from Stenimachos) wasannihilated at Dovista, and in August another chieftain,Pantelis Papaioannou, or Graikos, was killed in a skir­mish with a strong Turkish detachment near Stromnitsa.

Nor were things were easier for the Bulgarians thatyear. Not only were they being incessantly and severelypounded by Greek and Serbian units, but there was norespite in the friction between IMRO and the SupremeMaeedonian Committee, friction which often flared intoopen conflict and to which Sarafov himselffell a victim.After the death of Gruev, however, the influence of theSupreme Committee within IMRO increased sharply.

I

THE MACEDON IAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE LlBERATlON 523

Large numbers oflocal chieftains, dismayed at IMRO'scollapse, began to attach themselves to the Greek party,while continued emigration to the New World curtailedrecruitment from among the peasants. In the course ofsuch negotiations Agras fell into an ambush, and washanged near Edessa. Then too, especially in WesternMacedonia, a considerable number of the leadingkomiradjis were eliminated, whether by Greek or byTurkish forces, leaving a gap which was very hard to fill.

These developments in Macedonia were anythingbut encouraging for Bulgaria's foreign policy, whichslowly began to become more conciliatory. The Greekgovernment, on the other hand, continued all through1907 to be swamped by protests from Turkey and theGreat Powers, especially Great Britain. Despite all thenimble manoeuvring by Foreign Minister AlexandrosSkouzes, it was evident that Greece had neither thedesire nor the power to check the activities ofthe variousbodies in Macedonia. In the summer of 1907 theTheotokis government tried to deflect the menace ofdiplomatic isolation which was hanging over his countryby proposing an alliance with Great Britain and France,

but his efforts came to nothing. When in September 1907Russia and Austria-Hungary joined Britain and Turkey

in their league against Greece, it was no longer possibleto ignore the pressure, and the Theotokis governmentproclaimed abatement of Greek efforts in Macedonia amatter of necessity. The Foreign Ministry, on the otherhand, began to pay more serious attention to identi fyingand solving chronic problems in education, such assubject matter, curriculum, teachers' qualifications, in­spection, etc.29

Curtailing military activity, however, was only oneaspect of the problem. The divergence between theCommittee and the consulate in Thessaloniki haddeveloped into an open breach. The firiar removal ofKoromilas, in response to Turkish pressures, and hisposting to the United States, did facilitate matters, as hehad been the Committee's principal vindicator. It ap­pears that the Theotokis government even consideredconceding direct responsibility in both vi/ayers to theCommittee, which would certainly have improved itsposition vis-a-vis the Great Powers. The officers at­tached to the consulate in Thessaloniki, however, had adifferent point of view. Besides their objections to cer­tain plans of action and their solid scorn for politiciansand journalists who gave orders from afar, these officersfelt embittered by the partiality displayed by the Com-

Theodoros Askitl's, interpreter at the Greek Consulatein Thessaloniki. He was assassinated in 1908.

mittee, which had often led to able officers being passedover. The officers attached to the centre in Thessalonikidid not want to oppose the government's wishes com­pletely, and so an alternative solution was proposed: thatColonel Panagiotis Daglis be named head of this newsection.

Indeed, in mid February 1908, Daglis was summonedto assume the direction of the eastern division, with fullpowers and with the mandate to reconcile the Committeeand the officers. In the meanwhile, during the course ofthe winter, the dwindling away of the Greek guerrillasand the increased activity of the Bulgarians had createdserious problems. Bulgarian enterprise reached itsclimax with the murder on February 22 of TheodorosAskitis, the interpreter attached to the consulate in Thes­saloniki. With the arrival ofGreek reinforcements in theearly weeks of the spring and their resumption of the

524

olTensive, the losses were no longer so one-sided; and inany case, with the exception of the Serres region, thefighting was not as frequent as it had been in previousyears. Despite all the problems he had to face and hisrepeated requests to resign his post, Daglis was able tomaintain Greek support in Macedonia unabated at a verycritical juncture. Because of the pressure exerted by theCommittee, however, and despite the support of theofficers attached to his sector, he was unable to establisha paramilitary service answerable only to the govern­ment and the Army High Command; for this reason herefused all"responsibility forthe actions of the Commit­tee and ceased to attend its meetings.3o

3. From the Young Turks to the First BalkanWar

The success ofthe Young Turk Revolution created awhole new situation in Macedonia. After the rebellionof the 3rd and the 2nd Army Corps and the completeascendancy of the paramilitary Committee ofVnion andProgress, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was forced on II July1908 to promise a constitution and grant an amnesty. Theresult was that the vast majority of the amnestied rebelsmoved into the cities, and the Bulgarian and Greek bandsdisintegrated. By the end of the month 26 Greek bandswith a total of217 men, 55 Bulgarian bands (707 men),and 340 Albanian brigand fugitives had definitively laiddown their arms] I

This new state ofalTairs coupled with the imminenceof elections for the Ottoman parliament quickly trans­formed the former guerrilla chiefs into party leaders.Vlahov, Sadanski and Panicha's short-lived FederalPeople's Party held its constituent assembly on AugustIS 1908 in Thessaloniki. Although Sadanski wantedMacedonia to rebel and declare its independence imme­diately, the party eventually adopted a more conciliatorystance, though one still befitting the radical socialismwhich distinguished it. Its demands included: ad­ministrative decentralization and autonomy, no dis­crimination against religious minorities, nationalizationofmines and railways, compulsory education, universalfranchise, and the redistribution of large estates. Itproved more difficult for the remaining members ofIMRO to agree on a common platform. After extensivediscussions on the local level, a congress met in Septem­ber in Thessaloniki which proposed the following:revision of the constitution based on the primacy ofnational rights, freedom ofconscience, press and educa-

BASIL GOUNARIS

tion, provincial parliaments, preservation of religiousprivileges, changes to the electoral law, reform of thejustice system, etc. The Greek party presented a unitedfront. In its memorandum the Greek community in Thes­saloniki urged a variety ofeconomic, administrative andlegal reforms, and stressed the necessity both for theGreek community to remain a distinct society and for thePatriarchate to retain its prerogatives untouched. It wasevident that neither the Greeks nor the Bulgarians weredisposed to forget the religious aspect of their struggleand allow themselves to be swallowed up in the racialequality proclaimed by the Young Turksn

For the Greek govemment, the establishment of astrong constitutional regime in Turkey signalled the endof the immediate threat of a premature collapse whichmight have found the Greek army unprepared to takeadvantage of the opportunity thus presented. On theother hand, however, it was by no means certain that thegains in Macedonia would be pre-served once the Greekbands were no longer there. On the contrary, it wasextremely doubtful that the Greek population could sur­vive guarded only by peaceful means. Moreover, it soonappeared that IMRO was determined to exploit the situa­tion to its own advantage. In August it began to re-armthe Exarchist peasants and to step up propaganda;meanwhile, many of the komitadjis who had been heldin Turkish prisons were released. By October the localbands had resumed their activities.

By now the creation of an organization in theEuropean provinces of the Ottoman Empire, at least inthose where Greece had vital interests, was a matter ofconsiderable urgency. Agents such as Ion Dragournis,Athanasios Souliotis and Panagiotis Daglis were sound­ing the alarm, and eventually they convinced the ForeignMinister Georgios Baltatzis of the necessity of this step.And so was founded the Panhellenic Organization, aparamilitary service under the direction ofDaglis whichset up special offices to furnish arms and economicsupport to the Greek population and to undertakenationalist propaganda. Some 75 officers and NCOs, allreliable veterans of the Struggle, joined its ranks andolTered their services either as consular employees andagents or military leaders.

The work of the organization, however, did notproceed unimpeded. In the Epirus sector the parallelactivity of the Epirotic Society' caused seriousmisunderstandings. [n Constantinople the Constan­tinople Society, founded by Dragoumis and Souliotis,

THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING THE WAY FOR THE UBERATION 525

did what it could to preserve its autonomy. Finally, inMacedonia, Kalapothakis' Committee continued un­remittingly to undermine Daglis and his work in anattempt to avenge its supersession. Additional problemswere created by the dissatisfaction ofmany members atthe unfair and limited rewards offered to the veterans.The major obstacle, however, was the steady pressurefrom the Young Turks for the removal of all Greekofficers, pressure which, after the publication ofcertaincompromising letters about Greek activity in Mace­donia, became an unveiled threat of war. Early in thesummer the Theotokis government, anxious to avoid aninopportune clash with the new regime, pushed forwarda scheme to strip all the special offices of the Organiza­tion in the Monastir area. A few weeks later the govern­ment of Dimitrios Rallis, in an attempt to defuse a newcrisis of the Cretan Question, ordered and effected theremoval of all officers and NCOs from Macedonia. Thereturn of all these disgruntled soldiers, who had seentheir activities curtailed and all they had fought for yearsthrown away, accelerated the process which culminatedin the coup at Goudi and the fall of the Rallis govern­ment. The Panhellenic Organization was itselfformallydissolved in November 1909.33

In the meanwhile, the situation in Macedonia hadchanged afterthe disappointment ofthe elections and thesultan's coup in March 1909. While the Greek officerswere being withdrawn, the Young Turks were hardeningtheir stand. In July 1909 a parliamentary resolution putan end to the activity ofthe civilian nationalist societies.As the interventions of the Great Powers lessened, thehigh-handedness of the Young Turks increased. Theintensification of Turkish nationalism provoked IMROto fresh activity, in order to excite European interest. Inthe autumn of 1910, in their attempt to bring IMRO toheel, the Turks even made use of Sadanski and his men,who at that time were preaching autonomy forMacedonia within the Ottoman Empire. The battles be­tween IMRO and the army continued all through 1911and 1912. It seems too that Austria-Hungary took a handin the game at this point, with support for the Bulgarianbands. The situation worsened sharply after the Albanianrebellion in 1912 and Albanian collaboration with theBulgarian bands in the Monastir area. In view of thisgeneralization of the fighting, armed bands began toassemble in Greece in August 1912, and, under thecommand of Anagnostakis, Papatzaneteas, AlexandrosZannas and others, they crossed into Macedonia late in

September. These new arrivals not only facilitated theoperations ofthe regular army but also conducted opera­tions of their own in several areas around Chalcidice,Nigrita and Pravi {Eleutheroupolis).34 .

In conclusion one could say that the military ac­tivities of both the Greeks and the Bulgarians inMacedonia were organized to the same pattern, adaptedto the current political necessity and the demands of apeculiar and unorthodox war. Fear of an unexpectedmartial confrontation with the Ottoman Empire in anexceptionally uncertain diplomatic context induced bothcountries to pursue a fairly discreet policy, if one over­looks the situation in Macedonia. This policy, ofcourse,favoured the formation of patriotic committees, whichtook over the irredentist campaigns of both countries.Although the activity of these committees certainlyserved the long term interests ofboth the Bulgarians andthe Greeks, co-operation between governmerlt and in­dividual nevertheless proved exceptionally difficult andoften imperilled the outcome of the national enterprise.The soaring p'restige of irredentism in the young Balkanstates and its corresponding political support lent thecommittees such power and prestige that the legitimategovemments hesitated to curb them, even though theyheld their purse strings.

Irredentism without the support of the military wasof course impossible. Both the Bulgarian Principalityand the Kingdom ofGreece hada surfeit ofofficers eagerto abandon the inactivity of the barracks and seek glory,honours and dignities, to write pages of heroism andself-sacrifice, and at the same time to seck to advancetheir own future. Their bands were composed not onlyofMacedonian refugees and seasonal labourers, but alsoof volunteers from many places, often fellow villagersfrom their own villages. Greece also had an exception­ally effective militia in its border guards, who werealways ready for a raid on their neighbour.

Even more important than the contribution of theofficers was that made by the local chieftains, brigandsand nomads. Survival in an unfamiliar mountain area, inexceptionally severe weather conditions, and at the sametime to prosecute the struggle on many fronts was im­possible for any corps, Bulgarian or Greek. First theBulgarians and then the Greeks realized that the affilIa­tion of local brigand bands would confer an enormousadvantage. Thus, a considerable number of brigandbands were enlisted in this national conflict, reinforcingthe units with men in fine fighting condition, passing on

•

526

Celebrations in the streets ofThessa/onikion the occasion ofthe Young Turks' proclamation

ofthe Constitution in 1909.

their invaluable experience of guerrilla warfare, andkeeping the front open throughout the winter. Ofcourse,the engagement of these traditional rejecters of/aw andorder could often get out of hand. Many of them wereunable to abandon their old habits: they robbed, theymade deals with the enemy, and their activities oftenjeopardized the efforts of the Greek and Bulgariannationalists in the eyes of the local population. This alsoexplains the frequent clashes between the brigands andthe guerrillas. Tn any event, the importance of thebrigands became particularly obvious when they begangradually to abandon IMRO in its decay and adhere tothe Greek party.

BASIL GOUNARIS

Equally important was the employment of thenomads. Their assistance was essential for bivouacking,succouring the wounded, marching, provisioning, andhelping whatever units had the courage to brave thesevere Western Macedonian winter to see it through.They were also invaluable in collecting and passing oninformation in a struggle where early information andprecise knowledge ofthe ground could be decisive. Thiswas why raids on nomad camps were not infrequenttheir perpetrators were assured of supplies at no costwhile at the same time paralysing their opponents' sup­port system.

As far as operations were concerned, Greek andBulgarian methods were identical. They relied oneliminating their opponents' infonners, organizing civilguards to defend their villages, severe reprisals againstvillages, terrorism against individuals, especially localnotables, teachers and priests, betrayal of enemy bandsto the Turkish authorities and blockading certain sensi­tive areas. Open battles between Greek and Bulgarianbands were rare all during the struggle, much rarer thanthose with Turkish forces.J5

Despite all the similarities between the conduct oftheGreek and Bulgarian bands, there was one essentialdifference which effectively decided the struggle forsupremacy in Macedonia. The Greek side had the over­whelming majority of the local population behind them,and an extremely vigorous system of education. Thisessentially was what enabled the Greeks, within a shortspace of time, to organize their defences, consolidatetheir support, neutralize Bulgarian operations over alengthy period, and counter-attack decisively and vic­toriously.

THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE 1903-1912. PAVING TIlE WAY FOR THE LIBERATION527

BASIL K. GOUNARIS

THE MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE1903-1912 PAVING THE WAY

FOR LIBERATION

NOTES

I. K. L Mazarakis-Ainian, 'The Macedonian Struggle, Remi­niscences', in The Macedonian Struggle, Memoirs (in Greek), Thes­saloniki 1984, pp. 175-176; Pavlos L. Tsamis, The MacedonianStruggle (in Greek), Thessaloniki 1975, p. 69.2. Douglas Dakin, The Greek Stmggfe in Macedonia, 1897-1913,Thessaloniki 1966. pp. 48-49. 55.3. Konstantinos A. Vakalopoulos, Macedonia on the E\'e 0/ theMacedonian Struggle, /894-J904(in Greek), Thessaloniki 1986, pp.56-58.4. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 135-146; Dakin op. cil., pp. 61-62.5. Vakalopoulos, op. cit., p. 151; Dakin, op. cit.• pp. 62-63.6. Nikolaos Vlachos, The Macedonian Struggle as a Phase oj theEastern Question, 1878-1908 (in Greek), Athens 1935, p. 161.7. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 65-81.8. Vlachos, op. cit., pp. 77-86.9. IbM., pp. 146-152.240.10./bid., pp. 253-261; Dakin, op. cit., pp. 86-91.II. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 92-94; Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 197-208.12. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 92-106; Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 208-214;E. Koras, 'Liberation Struggles', in Macedonia: 4000 Years o/GreekHistolY and Civilization (in Greek), Athens 1982, pp. 471-472.13. Dakin, op. cit.. pp. 83-85: Vakalopoulos, op. cit., pp. 239-256;

Vlachos.op. Cil., pp. 186-190. 198-201.14. Atmy General SlafllArmy History Directorate (AGSlAHD), TIreMacedonian Stnlggle and Events in Tlrrace (in Greek), Athens 1979,p~. !25-126; Kofos,. 'Struggles', p. 471; K.Th. Dimaras. 'SpirilualLife, frornMacedoma: 4000 Yearso/lfistoryandC;vUizafion, p. 493;Eleni Belia, 'The Educalional Policy of the Greek Stale in Macedoniaand the Macedonian Slruggle', in Proceedings a/the Symposium onthe Macedonian Stnlggle (in Greek), pp. 32-33; Dakin, op. cit., p. 19.15. Vlachos, op. cit., p. 229; Haralampos K. Papastathis, 'The Churchand the Macedonian Struggle', in Proceedings ofthe Symposium onthe The Macedonian Stnlggle, pp. 69-70.16. K. Svolopoulos, 'The Decision to Organize the Armed Struggle',in Proceedings o/the Symposium on the Macedonian Stnlggle, Thes­saloniki 1987, p. 53; Dakin, op. cit., pp. 119-133.17. Dakin. op. cit., pp. 142-145; Kofos, 'Struggles', pp. 470-471;Tsamis, op. cit., pp. 152-159; AGS/AlID, op. cit., pp. 116-117.,18. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 112-115; Vlachos, op. cil., pp. 294-297.19. AGS/AHD, op. cil., pp. 130-138.346-348.20. AGS/AHD. op. cit.• pp. 138-146; Dakin, op. cit., pp. 162-183;Vlachos, op. cit., pp. 326-343.21. Anonymous, Pavlos Melas. Biography (in Greek), Athens 1931,p.440.

22. Konstantinos A. Vakalopoulos, The Macedonian Stntggle (/904­1908). The Armed Phase (in Greek), Thessaloniki 1987, pp. 69-97.23. Mazarakis, op. cit., pp. 208-210.24. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 221-242.25. Vlachos, op. cit., pp. 339-411.26. Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, 'The Macedonian Struggle. TheOrganization of Thessaloniki.l908-1908'. from Memoirs, Thcs­saloniki 1959, pp. 31-49.27. AGSlAHD, op. cit., pp. 207-234; Dakin. op. cit., pp. 250-279;Belia, 'Educational policy', p. 36.28. Vlachos, ofJ. cit., pp. 455-470; Dakin, op. cit., pp. 288·294.301-305.29. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 306-339; AGS/AHD. op. cil.• pp. 243-280;Belia, 'Educational policy', p. 35.30. Vasileios Gounaris, 'From Macedonia to Gaudi. Activities oflheOfficers-Fighters of the Macedonian Struggle(I908-1909)' (inGreek), Bulletin o/the Historical and Ethnological Societyo/Greece.29 (1986),181-189.31. AGSlAHD, op. cit.• p. 30032. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 385-392; Kostis Moskov, rhessaloniki. Profileoflhe Trading Cily (in Greek), Athens 1978, pp. 145-146; Centre forMarxist Research, The Socialist Organization Federation in Tlres­saloniki /909-/918 (in Greek), Athens 1989, p. 40 and footnote 3.33. Gounaris, 'From Macedonia to Goudi', 189-225; Konstantinos A.Vakalopoulos, Young litrks ami Macedonia 1908-1911 (in Greek),Thessaloniki 1988, pp. 218-247.34. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 392-396; Ioannis Koliopoulos, 'The Situationin Macedonia from 1909-1912', from History oJthe Greek Nation (inGreek), vol. 14, Athens 1977, pp. 279-280; Vakalopoulos, YoungTurks. pp. 261-350, 371-379. 382-395.35. John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause. Brigandage andIrredentism in Modern Greece 182J-19J2, Oxford 1987, pp. 215-236.

END OF VOLUME II